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Society for Asian & Comparative Philosophy

Australasian Society for Asian & Comparative Philosophy

2013 Joint Meeting in Singapore

Panel Paper abstracts (sorted by author last name) Akina, William Kelii Panel IB, 8 July 1015h-1215h

The Role of Mind in Alvin Plantingas Reformed Epistemology and Wang Yangmings Xinxue (School of Mind)

This paper identifies several philosophic moves executed by contemporary Reformed Epistemologist Alvin

Plantinga which parallel Wang Yangmings attempt to navigate the conflict between empirical and rational

knowledge in the development of virtue. Like Wang, Plantinga posits an extra-empirical theory of knowledge.

Both Wang and Plantinga see mind as essential to the cultivation of practical virtue. Wang Yangming is known

for rejecting the primacy of empiricism in the epistemology of Zhu Xi. Wangs departure from Zhu

foreshadows the response made by Plantinga to modernist empiricism. Wang concluded that self-cultivation

does not begin, as Zhu held, with gewu (the investigation of things), but with the extension of innate knowledge.

He asserted that those who desire to be practical sages in the world must first turn inward, not for a rectification

of the mind, but for rectification by the mind. Wang built upon Mencius idea that cultivation of virtue is

essential to attaining sagehood because the virtues are innate only in a duan (i.e., beginning or potential)

sense. Similarly, Plantinga does not regard empirical knowledge to be the source of moral knowledge or virtue,

but regards moral knowledge and practice to be informed by the cultivation of properly basic knowledge

found within the individual. Like Wang, Plantinga sees this episteme present in an incipient (i.e., duan-like)

form, requiring cultivation to become effectual in practice. Wang wrote, When the mind is free from the

obscuration of selfish desires, it is the embodiment of li, the Principle of Nature, which requires not an iota

added from the outside. (Instructions for Practical Living, 3). Similarly, Plantinga holds that it is proper

noetic (i.e., mental) functioning which enables the cultivation of knowledge and virtue beyond their basic

(i.e., duan-like) form.

Ashton, Geoff Panel VIB, 9 Jul 1600h-1800h

From Terror to Love of Fate in the Bhagavad Gt: Reading Kas Theophany and the Path of Devotion (Bhakti Yoga) through Nietzschean Amor Fati

If one of Kas basic concerns is to get Arjuna to act according to his katriya dharma, then what could be his rationale in revealing his divine form in Chapter 11particularly given that the events it discloses re-enact the

terror that stifled Arjunas will to act in the first place? Furthermore, what, if anything, does the path of devotion

(bhakti yoga) have to do with Arjunas recovery from this second crisis of will in the Gt? This paper argues

that Ka reveals the impending destruction of the world (through the theophany) in order to help Arjuna to

love a potentially repellent fate with Nietzschean-like, yes saying pathos. The paper begins by drawing

attention to the post-theophany chapters, which clarify the architecture of circumstance (prakti) la the theistic

metaphysics of the early Skhya doctrine. It then situates bhakti yoga in this philosophical context, arguing

that devotion to Ka helps Arjuna to re-embody not just his limited physical body, but his entire situation qua

empathic identification with the cosmic body of Ka. Finally, the paper links bhakti yoga, Skhya

metaphysics, and the theophany by way of Nietzsches formulation of amor fati. In brief, bhakti yoga is a kind

of amor fati that enables Arjuna to love the body of life as his own in full awareness that his love will not

modify his fate.

Berger, Doug Panel VIIB, 10 Jul 1015h-1215h

The Sense Organs and Awareness: Classical Indian and Chinese Perspectives

Even before the migration of Buddhism from South to East Asia, classical Indian schools of thought like

Samkhya and Nyaya and pre-Qin and Han Chinese traditions of Confucian, Mohist and Daoist thought shared,

remarkably, some general views about the bodily sense organs (Skt. indriya; Ch. tian guan). Both large

frameworks of reflection held that the human body possessed six organs of sense, five external and one internal,

that these organs were susceptible to their respective spheres of attention because of their elemental

correspondence with their specific objects, and that these organs affectively and cognitively responded to their

environments. Both traditions held furthermore that these sense organs in various circumstances could act

alternatively in internal conflict or harmony in the experience of any individual person. However, their most

conspicuous disagreements between these cultural traditions arose regarding the problems of (1) whether the

physical sense organs themselves were aware of their sensibilia or not, with Indian schools arguing in the

negative and Chinese schools in the affirmative; and (2) what specific capacities the major coordinator of the

sense organs' activities (atman in the Indian traditions and xin in the Chinese) needed to carry out its controlling

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functions over them. This paper will survey the views and general arguments of classical Indian and Chinese

schools in the hope of encouraging dialogue between scholars of these traditions on the character of bodily and

cognitive awareness.

Bilimoria Purushottama Panel ID, 8 Jul 1015h-1215h

Disenchantments of secularism: Taylors polysemy of Secularity and India

In his compellingly massive tome, The Secular Age (2007) Charles Taylor sets out three senses of secularism. I

am interested in his third sense, that Taylor christens as secularity: Secularity is a matter of the whole

understanding in which our moral, spiritual or religious experience and search takes place. Taylor is

comfortable in concluding that a society would be deemed secular qua secularity or not, in virtue of the

conditions of experience and search for the spiritual. And while in passing he mentions that the case of India is

correlated better (perhaps historically at least) with the latter sense, in the case of the West, the shift to public

secularity has been part of what helped to bring on a secular age in the third sense. (The distinctiveness of the

shift is not always clear in Taylors massive tome.) I wish to contest Taylors still profoundly and evidently

redemptive-eschatalogical Christian construction of the reformed secularity that he wishes to advocate, or

prescribe, and more importantly, the narrow representation of the supposed case of India, that he mentions en

passant. So I will problematize the senses in which India could be said to be secular or not secular, or the kind

of secularity that afflicts the Indian condition. The imposed discourse(s) of secularism in any and all of Taylors

valences only helped to, as it were, muddy the waters and has left behind in the postcolonial-scape a troubling

legacy from which the Indian society has barely recovered and with which the modern nation-state continues to

grapple. If not that, then it becomes entangled in ambivalent and hybrid imbroglios, such that we now have

adherents of God Rama protesting that India has embraced an ideology of pseudo-secularism to the detriment

of its national and cultural harmony and, indeed, erstwhile heterogeneity. The battleline is drawn not just

between secularism and spiritual transcendence, but it cuts in multiple vectors across religions (of which there

are more and claims more adherents than in all of the US, Europe and the rest of the Western world put

together). The situation and challenges from and for secularism facing the Indian (to be sure, post-Gandhian)

experiment are so fraught with dilemmas and discursive instabilities that it is worth examining this scenario if

only so that the West may heed to its own by-gone Orientalist errors and be cautious before hurriedly coveting

or expropriating religion within the nuances of secularity.

Bockover, Mary I. Panel IA, 8 Jul 1015h-1215h

Emotion, Ethics and Equality: Humanity as Moral Feeling In this presentation I will argue that the feeling relevant to understanding emotion is an irreducible unity of

affect and cognition. These "emotionally relevant feelings (ERFs) are cognitive but cannot be equated with

belief: ERFs entail belief but are not entailed by belief and so must be distinguished on conceptual grounds.

ERFs do not entail the experience of specific bodily sensations and so are not a combination of cognition and

affect either. Briefly, emotion has been misconceived in the West because reason and affect have historically

been treated as independent and often mutually exclusive faculties. My thesis that emotion has both cognitive

and affective aspects that cannot be separated except for the purpose of analysis accords more closely with the

ancient Chinese notion of xin or "heart-mind". I will tie my concept of emotion to a new way of thinking about (gender) ethics in light of the fact that

Confucianism puts such heavy emphasis on social roles without an explicit mechanism to critique them when

ren or human flourishing is at stake. I will show such critique is moral only when one feels truly that a wrong has been done that dehumanizes a person or group. Ren is an intensional affect that links us to the

humanity of others, but here must also be concerned with yi or the lack of parity or fairness that can accompany imbalances of power. The claim that a role ethic alone can account for the good life is just too

simple without explicitly showing how, on Confucian grounds, concerns for equality are linked to human

flourishing in general. Otherwise, the role ethic risks defaulting to a status quo that has unjustly benefited some

(e.g., males) at the expense of others (e.g., females).

Burik, Steven Panel IIA, 8 Jul 1345h-1545h

Polemos and Dao, Conflict and Harmony, Heidegger and Zhuangzi

Using Heideggers reinterpretation of Heraclitus polemos and Zhuangzis ideas of dao, struggle and sorting of

differences, I will argue for a reinterpretation of notions of conflict and harmony in the two thinkers.

Heideggers Auseinandersetzung (con-frontation) and Zhuangzis famous sorting which evens things out, the

seminal second chapter of the book Zhuangzi, suggest that harmony lies not in overcoming differences, but

exactly in making difference and diversity central. I start with an exposition of how Heidegger understands

logos and polemos in radically different ways from their normal or traditional meanings, and how he attaches

great importance to both terms. I then proceed to analyse Zhuangzis understanding of the world in terms of the

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yin-yang dichotomous forces, and argue how a comparison of both thinkers can show us a new understanding of

ideas of difference, conflict and harmony. It will be shown how harmony in Daoism is not to be understood as a

dialectical resolution to conflict, but more as a situating within the different forces, and a certain form of

responding to conflict and diversity. Heideggers differential thought will be employed to show a similar

approach to difference, where in contradistinction to a Hegelian resolution or sublimation of the difference,

Heidegger shows how difference is not to be overcome, but to be acknowledged as fundamental to being. Such

responses carry a form of great responsibility, since they might be perceived as random and spontaneous. Yet I

will argue that they are anything but random, and that both Heidegger and Zhuangzi seek to engage diversity,

struggle and conflict in a most objective and disinterested manner. Such an engagement will then be shown to

have ethical implications beyond the philosophical worlds of Heidegger and Zhuangzi.

Chan, Benedict Panel IVD, 9 Jul 1015h-1215h

Do Economics Rights Really Conflict with Liberal Rights? An East and West Cultural Debate

There are different cultural debates between the East and the West; one of them focuses on the conflict between

economic rights and liberal democratic rights. Some regions in East Asia have strong economic growth in the

past decades, but these regions do not have enough political freedom and democracy. Some argue that this

shows that in East Asia, economic rights have a higher priority than liberal democratic rights, and liberal

democratic rights should be sacrificed for economic rights when necessary. In this essay, I am going to evaluate

such a debate in depth. I first discuss some information as the background of this debate, and then I focus on the

philosophical part of this debate and summarize the points into a philosophical argument, which concludes that

economic rights are more important than liberal democratic rights. I then develop my own argument against

such a conclusion. My argument is divided into two parts. First, I analyze the meaning of economic rights and

argue that economic subsistence rights are the core of economic rights. Second, by discussing the views from

different scholars, such as Michael Walzer, Joseph Raz, Amartya Sen, and Henry Shue, I argue that economic

subsistence rights and liberal democratic rights are inseparable and we should promote both of them together in

East Asian cultures. In other words, in East Asia, economic rights are not more important than liberal

democratic rights, and one should not sacrifice liberal democratic rights for economic rights in the East.

Chan Wing Ching Elton Panel VIIIB, 10 Jul 1345h-1545h

Discipline for harmony: the power of Confucian ritual propriety

The Record of Ritual says harmony and serenity, such are the use of ritual propriety.1 Faced with a world of

conflicts and chaos, Confucianism never lost confidence in reestablishing the general harmony of society.

Recurrent in Confucian texts are quixotic solutions such as having a sage-king to restore harmony by touching

the heart of the people, but beneath the rhetoric, Confucians have in fact invested their hope for harmony in

building a social order based on ritual propriety. Yet what features does ritual propriety possess that would

justify such confidence in its power? Contemporary studies have offered multifarious interpretations. Ritual

propriety has been seen as a kind of habituation, a social system, a form of moral guidance, a grammar for social

interactions, or an individuals awareness for navigating role-based human relationships. Notwithstanding their

merits, however, these accounts seem to have neglected one important feature of ritual propriety: it is not only a

moral framework, but also a political one. It seeks not simply to make possible for every individual the pursuit

of a good life, but more specifically to actively shape how such good life is to be led.

Chandler, Marthe Panel VID, 9 Jul 1600h-1800h

Whistling to summon spirits: Daoist attempts to whistle what cannot be said

The logician Frank Ramseys legendary response to Wittgensteins Tractatus was What you cannot say, you

cannot say. And you cant whistle it either. Ramseys remark has been taken to emphasize that there are

certain things philosophy cannot, and should not attempt to do.

Daoists are also concerned with what cannot be said. Zhuangzis chapter The sorting which evens things out

suggests a relationship between natural sounds and the sounds of flutes and whistles, contrasting these sounds

with human speech. Like music produced on instruments, the sound of wind, and the chirping of birds,

whistling does not carry the semantic meanings speaking does.

The third century CE text Poetic Essay on Whistling describes Daoist breathing exercises teaching students

how to whistle. The physical discipline involved allowed adepts to transcend the limits of their bodies, to

wander in the clouds and to summon natural spirits. For Daoists whistling may have been a way to enter a

mystical state, to transcend space and time (physical limitations) and contact a spiritual reality. Confucians, and

philosophers like Frank Ramsey, are dubious about the value of this sort of behavior, attempt.

Moreover even people trained in Daoist whistling may find it producing unexpected results. The poet-

philosopher Su Shi lived a good Confucian life, devoting himself to government service and literary

accomplishment. His efforts resulted in arrest, prison, poverty and exile. In Sus Second Red Cliff Ode he

described climbing a steep cliff, and whistling to summon a sympathetic and comforting response from the

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natural world. The Daoist immortal who appeared was hostile and mocked the poets efforts. Su had bumped up

against a limitation of philosophy: it cannot provide comfort and escape from the misery and disappointment of

the ordinary, human world.

Chang, Wonsuk Panel ID, 8 Jul 1015h-1215h

Social Vision and Experience in Choe Han-ki and Pragmatism: Achieving a Flourishing Community without

Disintegration

In this article, I would like to articulate some consistencies between the social visions of Confucianism and

pragmatism, both of which embrace a notion of experience as immanent, evolutionary process. To begin with, I

outline the social philosophy of Choe Han-ki, a 19th

century Confucian thinker in Korea, by clarifying some of

the vocabulary related to his social philosophy, such as self-regulative process , interactivity ,

achieved integration of society and governance of associated humanity . Through this clarification, I will argue that one can adequately interpret his social philosophy by concentrating on the ideas of relatedness

and process rather than of agencies like a discrete individual or organic society, in which the notion

of configurative energy plays a crucial role. Here the self can become mature by commitment to a

variety of changing configurations of relation . And through this one can contribute to the harmonious whole. To strengthen my argument, I turn to the rich connections between Choes thought and the tradition of

pragmatism as found in the works of John Dewey, George Herbert Mead and Jane Addams. These defy

transcendentalism and develop ideas of robust communities based on shared experience and associations.

During this comparison, I also examine the role of harmony and conflict in the formation of flourishing societies

in consideration of agonists and Marxist criticism. I will look at Choes understanding of scholarly debates,

remonstration, and social conflict in comparison with Dewey and Addams understanding of role of conflict in a

democratic society.

Chien Yi-Chun Panel IVD, 9 Jul 1015h-1215h

What Do We Owe to Migrant Domestic Workers?Rethinking Immigration Ethics in East Asia

In recent decades, migration patterns have increasingly become feminized. According to the UN 2006 report,

the number of female migrants across the world increased from 35 million to 95 million between 1965 and

2005. From these numbers, approximately 1.4 million women have migrated from Southeast Asia to the

industrialized countries of East Asia as domestic workers. However, this feminized shift of migration patterns in

East Asia have raised new questions that have not been adequately addressed. I will examine these issues

through a comparison across East Asian contexts, engaging both empirical and theoretical approaches. This

paper will focus on the policies of two major labour-importing countries in East Asia South Korea and

Taiwanwhich share similar cultural backgrounds, labour market structures and demographic pressures.

Nevertheless, variations exist between their labour and immigration policies. I will explore whether the differing

emphasis put on maintaining an ethnically and culturally communitarian notion of liberal democracy has

affected the policy-making in these countries. Additionally, I will investigate their differing historical, economic

and political paths to understand the underlying causes of these variations. From a theoretical perspective, my

research will explore how Asian schools of political theory, which emphasize communalism and social

emotions, interact with Western liberal notions of human rights and justice in shaping public debates about

migrant labour policies. I will also explore how the existence of migrant domestic workers reshapes the structure

of family and concept of care in these countries. Lastly, I will examine whether an Asian model of just treatment

for migrant domestic labourers is feasible or desirable as an alternative to Western models.

Chow Ken Q, Joel Panel VB, 9 Jul 1345h-1545h

The Irony of It All The Junzi as Ironic Philosopher

Richard Rorty and Confucius can be read as positing two opposed views of citizenship. On the one hand,

Rortys model of the ironic philosopher sees the citizen as someone who does not have a final vocabulary, a

citizen who is able to continually revise his/her own deepest ends and yet also have the convictions to defend

those views in a public democratic setting. Rortys understanding of citizenship is thus supposed to be based on

an anti-foundationalist understanding of politics. Comparing Rortys ironic philosopher to Confucius junzi in

the light of citizenship reveals an important limitation of Rortys work: the neglect of individuals as relational

and thus co-dependent in their moral and political development. I will argue that it is possible to give an ironic

reading of Confucius junzi, but that such an approach also highlights particular tensions between Confucian

thought and liberal democracy, particularly in the understanding of the Confucian emphasis on rituals (li) and

Rortys ironic stance towards citizenship. These comparisons also point to problems within Rortys over-

emphasis of a kind of irony that ends up inflating the significance of literature. It also challenges Rortys firm

distinction between the private and the public, where one cannot conduct ironic discourse in public that is,

impose ones private search for autonomy on strangers in the public sphere. These tensions however, can be

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accommodated in a broadened understanding of moral motivation and continual creative engagement within

these two traditions, along the vein of the ironic reading of the junzi argued for in this paper.

Chow Lee Tat Panel VC, 9 Jul 1345h-1545h

Musicality in Ritual: Lessons from Music in the Zhongyong.

The opening line of the Zhongyong smacks of theism on first impact, redolent with suggestions of a

transcendent super-force (tian ) who dictates (ming ) a predetermined order or essence (xing ), from

which an inevitable progression ensues (dao ) whereby ...we cannot quit even for an instant. Under such an

order, exemplary persons (junzi ) charge themselves with attempting to understand this divine knowledge,

and alongside their faithful flock, seek to perpetuate their revelations through education (jiao ). Does this

apparently theistic first impression then decisively fix the tone for everything else that follows in the Zhongyong,

leaving it as yet another iteration of the theistic narrative? I think not, for the subsequent passages in the

Zhongyong employs the curious analogy of music to illustrate these apparently 'theistic' concepts. Music, which

is ordinarily conceived of as a spontaneous, creative and fluid art, is used analogously in making sense of the

concepts sketched in the Zhongyong's opening passage, concepts which we have speculated as theistic, that is,

as a predetermined, dictated and static order of things; the contrast here is glaring. Our main concern in this

paper would be an attempt in making sense of that contrast between the analogies of music and the apparently

'theistic' concepts of tian (heaven), ming (decree, command), xing (natural tendencies) and

dao (the proper way), all of which have bearings on the conceptions of jiao (education) and junzi

(the exemplary person); at base, we would argue that these concepts are not theistic in light of the

explanatory role given to music and attempt to articulate the lessons one might draw from the Zhongyong's

rendition of music.

Chuang, Christina Panel IC, 8 Jul 1015h-1215h

Understanding a desireless action as a benevolent action

In the Bhagavad-Gita, Krishna advises Arjuna to act without desire. According to the final two verses of the

second chapter, the person who, having abandoned all desires, acts without desire, without a sense of mineness,

without a sense of self, that person attains peace. Scholars have questioned the doctrine of desireless action and

debated whether Krishnas advice is to be taken literally. In this paper I argue that even if we interpret the text

with the Humean principle that only desire motivates action, Krishnas advice is still coherent on the basis that

we understand a desireless action as an action "motivated" by benevolent desire. Here I am using the notion of

benevolence as constructed by Francis Hutcheson (rather than Hume). I offer two reasons for my claim. First,

Hutchesons benevolence has an empty character because benevolence is receptive to something and to respond

with a moral evaluation. Benevolent desire is a permissible desire since to act benevolently is to act

disinterestedly and thereby accepting purusha as ones true nature. Second, for Hutcheson, love is a motive

insofar as it necessarily includes a desire for the happiness of the agent that we approve. For Hume, on the other

hand, love cannot be a motive because it is simply reactive and does not include a desire. Since the ultimate

teaching of the Gita is not a technique, but the teaching that love is at the core of our being, it is referring to a

kind of moral love that necessarily includes benevolence.

Coyle, Daniel Panel IVB, 9 Jul 1015h-1215h

Conflict and Harmony in Chinese Strategic Philosophy: From Embodied Emotions to Global Efficacy

A central theme in early Chinese philosophy is buzheng (not contending). This strategy for harmonious

living--recommended by Daoists, Strategists, and Confucians--defers to the uniqueness of each situation as the

model of efficacy. Ames and Hall understand the buzheng formula as it occurs in Daodejing as something of an

injunction to cultivate a disposition that is advantageous to all, to organize the world using accommodation

rather than coercion. The best human beings perform synchronizing roles, which are both active,

participatory, and effective (see especially the Comment to Laozi 66). The Guiguzi (or Book of Master

Guigu) develops the formula in an explicit and controversial way. The text prescribes that one non-coercively

establishes a cultivated situation to regulate affairs. It claims that if one can fathom embodied emotions (qing

- actually, both human emotional-psychological affects and states, as well as world-psychological affects

and realities.) then one can achieve global efficacy. This paper will evaluate the Guiguzi's claim in light of

the Strategists critique of Confucianism in the Laozi and Sunzi texts, specifically, their arguments that

Confucian moral philosophy alone is inadequate to the task of resolving unavoidable conflicts.

Creller, Aaron Panel IB, 8 Jul 1015h-1215h

Harmonizing Knowledge: Using Resources from Classical Chinese Philosophy to Reintegrate Techne and

Episteme

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Virtue is so noble an end for Aristotle and Plato that the workings of a city should aim toward it in every way

the education of the children, the religious beliefs of the citizens, the punishment of the vicious, the status of

craftspeople and laborers, and so on. Despite their differences, the projects of Platos Republic and Laws and

Aristotles Politics are structured with some of the same assumptions about knowledge, assumptions that lead

them to similar political stances on labor. This paper begins by picking out some key features of the metaphysics

of Greek epistemology that lead to the devaluation of techne and craftwork and the ascent of episteme in the

politico-ethical life. Following the Platonic and Aristotelian accounts of labor, I complicate their concept of

craftwork as merely vulgar by referencing two philosophically exemplary craftsmen from classical Chinas

Zhuangzi. I close the paper by concluding that comparative epistemology needs to comprehensively harmonize

skillful approaches to knowledge with intellectual approaches to knowledge, especially given the relevance of

epistemology to daily life.

da Silva, Diogo Csar Porto Panel VC, 9 Jul 1345h-1545h

Living Seduction: Iki within Japanese Aesthetics and Thought

Focusing on Kuki Shz's The Structure of Iki chapters 1 and 2, our aim is to analyze his Hermeneutical

approach to the phenomenon of consciousness sprung in the Japanese sensibility called Iki and its intentional

structure. Iki as a meaning within a particular culture have three distinguishing marks: Seduction (), Pride (

) and Resignation (). Through this we expect to find a path to contextualize and elucidate, in a comparative perspective, the relation between Kuki and Heidegger's Hermeneutics. Although, this proximity

could raise critiques concerning the legitimacy of using an Occidental methodology to grasp a particular

phenomenon of Japanese culture and history, our claim is that the opposite is true; by employing Hermeneutics,

in a Heideggerian sense, Kuki was able to put light on constitutive aspects of Iki's meaning that keep Iki firmly

tied to Japanese aesthetics and thought. Those aspects, we believe, are to be found in Iki distinguishing marks,

namely, Pride () and Resignation (). Our presentation attempts to show how those marks appear in other Japanese historical developments, as for example the detachment from worldly affairs characterized by

Resignation that appears in the poetics of Genji Monogatari and as Pride has a fundamental role on the Theory

of Shame that explains Japanese character.

de Silva, Padmasiri Panel IA, 8 Jul 1015h-1215h

Embodied Cognition and Emotions:

A Buddhist Perspective on Body-Mind Emotional Reactivity.

Cognition is embodied when it is deeply dependent on the features of the physical body, and when a persons

body beyond the brain play a significant role from a causal or physically constitutive role in cognitive

processing. Traditional cognitive science has looked at cognition in a narrow sense in abstraction from the

bodily mechanisms of sensory processing and motor control. Since Varella, Thompson and Rosch published the

work, The Embodied Mind, there emerged a new dialogue between cognitive science and Buddhist

contemplative/meditative psychology. In a different kind of lineage in the Western philosophy of mind, Jesse

Prinz has also revived the Jamesinian thesis that emotions are perceptions of changes in the body and they

allow us to literally perceive danger (fear) and loss (grief).

This paper has a specific focus on emotional reactivity in negative emotions (both of the body and mind) and I

re-visit Strawsons classic paper on Freedom and Resentment along with a critical appraisal of Owen

Flanagans response to Strawson and Buddhist thoughts on Destructive Emotions. I accept the importance of

Strawsons classic study but maintain that Strawson has conflated two significant dimensions of moral emotions

and that Owen Flanagans analytical response to Strawson on reactive attitudes is useful but we need a deeper

analysis of reactive attitudes in the light of the innovative integration of Buddhist contemplative practices to

new research in neurology the impact of a meditative life on the emotional brain. The paper will develop the

concept of non-reactivity with a special focus on internal affective and autonomic balance, as well as

interactive flexibility, and the role of the prefrontal cortex in this context. Case studies of the emotion of

Anger, drawn from my professional experience would be added.

Forte, Victor Panel VIB, 9 Jul 1600h-1800h

True or False Entrusting? A Response to Masao Abes Study of Falsity and Faith From the Standpoint of

Shinrans Shinjin

In Masao Abes essay, Evil, Sin, Falsity, and the Dynamics of Faith (2000) he examines how the awareness of

evil and sin turns human beings towards faith in order to transcend the limits of ego and self-centered will. But

for Abe, this overcoming of sin through faith in God is unsatisfactory, since such a faith results in a

fundamentally divided self, split between the sinful self, cut off from the ideal subjectivity of God, and the saved

self, which is unified with God. In this sense, faith inevitably fails in its initial project to transcend the self. The

person of faith must therefore live with an on-going conscious awareness of falsity. The inevitability of falsity in

faith leads to a deep sense of nihilism, when one is faced with the nothingness that results from the failure of

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faith to transcend the limits of the ego. Abe concludes that a true religion would have to be based in a faith

that can overcome this sense of nihilism, which has been brought about by a profound awareness of falsity.

In his essay Abe limits his discussion of falsity and faith to the faith directed towards a transcendent God, and

does not take up the question of the place of shinjin (true entrusting) in Shinrans Buddhism, or compare how

the faith-centered practices of Shin Buddhism might respond to the nihilism he claims to have discovered in his

study of the dynamics of faith. The purpose of my paper is to critically assess Shinrans understanding of true

entrusting from the standpoint of Abes notions of falsity and faith, and to determine to what extent the faith

prescribed by Shinran is able to overcome the nihilism of Abes true religion.

Gagnon, Jean-Paul Panel IID, 8 Jul 1345h -1545h Hainans Li Peoples: Roles of Women and Democracy

The Island of Hainan, just off the southern coast of mainland of China, is the territorial home of an 'ethnic

minority' that most contemporaries identify as the Li Peoples. This indigenous group, thought to have resided on

the island for circa 3000 years, is an important locus for the study of Asian democracy. Ethnographers argue that

the Li were (and to some extents still are) a matrilineal society where women enjoyed political power: as

representatives, administrative leaders, producers of economy, and shamans. The Li were initially hunter-

gatherers but later slash and burn agriculturalists. Families, or clans, governed resources collectively. Their

governance system was based on assemblies, dialogue, and peaceful conflict-resolution. It is a choice model to

look at and to revive for contemporary politics. The dominance of women in historic Li politics and society is a

refreshing change to what is often a male-centric and undemocratic historiography of Asia.

Gao, Yin Panel VIIB, 10 Jul 1015h-1215h

Conflict and Harmony in the Body: the Military Metaphors in Classic Chinese Medical Texts

Military metaphors are used very often in todays medical and public health discourse. We talk about pathogens

invading the body, deploying antibiotics or antiviral drugs to defend the body and fight diseases, or a war

against cancer. The military metaphors are also widely used in classic Chinese medical texts. A physician of

18th

century China argued that, using drugs is like deploying soldiers. Military texts are cited directly and

military strategies are used to defend treatment strategies in many classic Chinese medical texts. This paper

explores the similarities and differences in the usage of military metaphors between modern biomedical

literature and that of classic Chinese medical texts. I argue that the metaphors used in classic Chinese medical

text are less confrontational than that of biomedicine. The focus, in line with the thoughts of classic Chinese

military strategist schools such as Sunzi, is on resolving conflicts and restoring harmony in the body with

minimum effort and maximum benefit rather than eliminating the invading force as in Western medical and

public health discourse. I argue that such differences are derived from the fundamentally different perceptions

and conceptions of illness and health between biomedicine and traditional Chinese medicine.

Garrison, James Panel VB, 9 Jul 1345h-1545h

The Aesthetic Life of Power

The post-structuralist notion of [I] "subjectivation" advanced by Michel Foucault and Judith Butler describes the

formative imprisonment of normative subjects as being relational, discursive, bodily, and based in ritual and

being based around a drive for [II] autonomy. Classical Confucianism's notion of person-making is likewise

relational, discursive, bodily, and based in [III] ritual propriety (l ). Although lacking a substantive critique of

power relations, Confucianism accounts for the social self with a parallel vocabulary more keen on aesthetic

self-development.

Working today, L Zhu extends the classical Confucian view with his Marxian notion of [IV]

"subjectality," the sedimentation of ritual in society's collective unconsciousness, as does Richard Shusterman

with his approach to [V] "somaesthetics" and giving conscious, ritual attention to bodily life. Putting this all

together results in an intercultural account that gives novel resources the post-structuralist project. This approach

does not completely solve the problems of [I] subjectivation, but by providing a new sense of [II] autonomy

through conscious attention to how [III] ritual l, in the process of [IV] subjectality, sediments in collective

unconsciousness, [V] somaesthetic practices can ameliorate the dilemma bit by bit.

Higgins, Kathleen Panel IVA, 9 Jul 1015h-1215h Embodied Emotion and the Aesthetics of Loss and Mourning

To many theorists of emotion, who see emotion as provoking action tendencies, typically functional ones, grief

has seemed anomalous because it appears to prompt inaction or dysfunctional behavior. Robert C. Solomon

argues that grief is thoroughly functional, serving to continue love and exhibiting action tendencies in the

commemorations they motivate. Accepting these points, I argue manifestations of this impulse to commemorate

reveal an aesthetic side to grief. Grief characteristically raises aesthetic concerns and prompts aesthetic

expression. Grief is embodied in aesthetic forms that include both works that endure (commemorative artworks,

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graves, shrines, monuments, artworks that take grief and loss as subject matter, etc.) and performances, in which

the emotion is literally expressed through the survivors bodily actions. Among the latter, most notably, are

rituals associated with mourning, a phenomenon that is ubiquitous. Xunzi, in defense of ritual as a means of

expressing emotion, helps explain the aptness of aesthetic embodiments of grief: rituals of mourning provide

channels for expressing a highly upsetting emotion in a manner that is not socially disruptive. The Great

Preface also indicates that rituals embody the emotion. Aesthetic expressions of grief, I will contend, are in part

motivated by the desire to reanimate the dead person, a desire that can only be satisfied symbolically. Our being

restricted to symbolic gestures is one of the reasons that survivors feel that nothing they can do would be

adequate to honor the deceased loved one. The insufficiency of any particular symbolic form also provides an

impetus to further creative gestures of commemoration. Thus we overlook the close association between

aesthetics and loss because none of our aesthetic gestures are adequate embodiments, but this inadequacy is in

part responsible for further expressions of loss and grief that take aesthetic form.

Huang, Anita (Yahui) Panel ID, 8 Jul 1015h-1215h

Achieving Social Harmony with Pragma-linguistic Strategies

This paper examines ways of achieving social harmony in Chinese discourse from the point of view of

philosophy of language. It analyzes various speech acts realized by the use of buhaoyisi to feel

embarrassed/thanks/sorry, an expression that is commonly taken to save face among conversational participants

and promote social harmony. It shows that the meaning of buhaoyis ties to a wide range of speech acts and that

it is difficult to define its meaning based on its illocutionary force. Searle claims that in order to define the

linguistic meaning of a word it is not adequate to follow the classical linguistic analysis that says: the word W

is to perform speech act A (1969, p. 137). I show that an adequate account of buhaoyisi indeed cannot rest on

such a formula, nor can it rest on an account that simply emphasizes the primary use of such an expression.

Rather, one must take into consideration its multivalent nature in naturally occurring data, because buhaoyisi

can be used in a variety of syntactic environments without having the same meaning. By defining the meaning

of buhaoyisi and calculating its illocutionary force, the present study perfects previous analyses and makes

better predictions about how speakers achieve social harmony with pragmatic linguistic strategies using similar

expressions.

Johnson, David Panel IB, 8 Jul 1015h-1215h

Self-Determination of the Whole: Nishida and the Achievement of Perception

Nishida Kitar elucidates an ontology in which the individual is seen as an aspect of the world rather than as an

entity standing over against it. The relation between self and world, then, is one of ontological continuity, but

the form that this continuity takes is dynamic: one can cultivate or neglect this connection and achieve or fail to

achieve it in its most replete and harmonious forms. In this talk I show that these ideas can be productively

related to a central theme in phenomenology, found especially in the work of Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty.

Like Nishida, these thinkers propose an ontology of the intertwining of self and world. This provides the ground

for one of the most important and distinctive claims in this tradition, namely, that self and world mutually

determine one another. I attend in particular to the way in which the side of the self contributes to determining

the world and its objects. One sees this in the way in which our practices, language, and history, in the case of

Heidegger, or the structure, capacities, and skills sedimented in our body, in that of Merleau-Ponty, help to

constitute the perceived world.

Nishidas work on the structure and possibilities of the self in its relation to the world will allow us to show in

addition that who we are and become also determines in addition how things appear in our perceptual

experience. Who we are and become is, as Nishida shows, something that is open to a certain kind of shaping.

The significance of this claim will be seen in our capacity to cultivate our powers of perception; by bringing the

self and world closer together and so into a kind of harmony, our perceptions are able to be faithful to what is

there to be perceived.

Kim, David H. Panel IIB, 8 Jul 1345h-1545h

Confucian Shame: Harmony, Hierarchy, and Hegemony

This paper takes up the conference theme of conflict and harmony through an examination of the ethical and

political practice of shame generally and Confucian shame particularly: the ethical formation/revision of shame,

shames ramification in and through rites and relations, and the political complexities of resistance against

certain types of shame. The paper begins with a philosophically-comparative account of shame as a

heteronomous, subject-forming, and ethics-enabling emotion and then explores the ethical and political problem

of hegemonic heteronomy. I describe both parts of the paper below. In the account of shame, I depart from

much of the literature on shame and focus on the basic filiality of the emotion. Specifically, I tell a Y-shaped

story: Shame as filial conciliation, propitiation, or appeasement, which then gets recruited to the aim of (1)

ethical integrity through partially autonomist modification of the emotion (which is the focus of John Rawls,

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John Kekes, Bryan Van Norden, Kwong-Loi Shun, and others), and of (2) hegemonic appeasement through

insistently heteronomist entrapment by a normative regime (which is the focus of Sandra Bartky, John Deigh,

and many feminist thinkers). In the second part of the paper, I discuss how the foregoing account of shame

indicates not simply that shame plays a vital role in ritual/li (and of course righteousness/yi) but that it has a

ritual/li-like configuration in virtue of its propitiation structure. It has a heteronomy richer than the sort

described by Bernard Williams. However, this exposes Confucian shame to two aspects of what we might call,

hegemonic heteronomy. One of the ethical and political dangers of shame is that it can produce hegemony in the

guise of harmony, as when ones shame-configured subject-formation naturalizes womens second-class

status or regimes of racial hierarchy. Another ethical and political danger of shame so conceived is that it can

support hegemony in spite of intra-psychic disharmony. If time permits, I explore whether Confucian accounts

of ethical parenting and filial remonstrance are sufficient for addressing the problem of hegemonic heteronomy.

Kim, Doil Panel VIB, 9 Jul 1600h-1800h

Qian () and modesty Qian Xun () in modern Chinese and its equivalent in Korean are usually translated as modesty or humility

in English, with the people highly praising a person with the virtue. In this paper, I will examine its original

form in early Chinese thought, qian (). I will juxtapose it with modesty in the contemporary Western context,

with the comparison aimed ultimately at the articulation of the characteristic of qian. The recent discussion of

modesty in the Western context is concerned primarily with how the everyday experience in which a modest

person seems to devaluate her accomplishment or herself can be explained. This kind of inaccuracy in

assessment has perplexed many Anglo-American philosophers, for it runs counter to the traditional

understanding of the virtuous who has accurate knowledge. Different accounts have been suggested to explain

how modesty can still be a virtue, even though it appears to involve a kind of ignorance. Similarly, qian in early

Chinese thought, especially, in the Xunzi (), the Laozi (), and the Zhouyi (), involves devaluation

of ones own accomplishment or oneself. For this reason, I will utilize the sophisticated discussion of modesty

as an analytic tool to understand qian. However, this approach is not taken simplistically to analyze qian

through modesty; rather, it is intended to draw attention to the characteristic of qian that cannot be captured by

the Western discussion. This exercise of comparative philosophy will have a philosophical pay-off, in that my

account of qian will show how the seemingly similar ethical experience is justified in a distinctive way in early

Chinese thought. To anticipate, qian, unlike modesty, will be understood as a unique way to respect for other

people in social interactions.

Kim, Myeong-Seok Panel IIIA, 8 Jul 1600h-1730h

Emotion and Judgment: Two Roots of Moral Motivation in Mengzi

As David Nivison has aptly pointed out, Mengzi was not merely concerned about making people behave in a

certain way, but making them grow into the kind of people who will always do certain actions with the right

feelings and dispositions. Then, when people say that they are short of moral strength required for doing moral

actions, Mengzi might interpret them to be saying that they do not feel, say, enough compassion for the starving

people on the street to share food with them, do not find it especially humiliating when they are offered ten-

thousand bushels of grain in a manner compromising their moral dignity, and so forth. This sounds a very

plausible view of Mengzis conception of moral motivation, but actually this view gets problematic when it is

combined with Nivisons specific thesis that moral emotions constitute the only source of moral motivation.

According to Nivison, Mengzi postulates only one source of moral motivation (heart as the locus of moral

emotions or feelings), whereas Mengzis rival thinkers additionally postulate maxims or doctrines. However,

I argue that Mengzi also postulates two sources of moral motivation, and this interpretation of mine enables us

to solve Nivisons immediate action problem. That is, according to Nivisons view of one-source morality,

one cannot perform moral actions until one has fully cultivated ones ethical sprouts, but this seems to

introduce a serious moral dilemma for Mengzi because Mengzi acknowledges that there are some moral

obligations that should be fulfilled immediately. In this paper, I try to solve this problem by arguing that what

really motivates oneself in Mengzi is not an emotion but an ethical reason that may or may not be embodied in

an emotion, and this in turn reveals Mengzis idea that full moral action is possible even before one fully

cultivates ones ethical emotions.

Konovait, Liuda Panel VIIIB, 10 Jul 1345h-1545h

Harmonious Inconsistency

Role conflict is a significant research topic for the role theorists. Ralph Linton maintains that individuals (and

societies) are capable of ambivalent attitudes, and this capacity for inconsistency makes it possible for human

beings to achieve integrated personalities and at the same time survive in an unstable and constantly changing

environment (Study of Man, 1936). On the other hand, contradictory demands, which rise due to the

inconsistency within and among the roles, may cause intra- and inter-role conflicts. This paper examines views

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on inconsistency and role conflicts as presented in Confucian role ethics - an ethical framework proposed by

Henry Rosemont, Jr. and Roger T. Ames. According to this approach, persons are defined by their relationships

with their fellow human beings within a set of roles that they live (not play) at all times. Since people are

conceived of as essentially constituted by these roles, a question arises whether contradictions and conflicts are

an indispensable part of human nature or whether apparent inconsistency could be interpreted in an alternative

way.

Kumar, Shashiprabha Panel IVC, 9 Jul 1015h-1215h

Vedic View of Cosmic Harmony

The present paper intends to explore and expound the Vedic idea of inherent synergy between the gross

(embodied) and the subtle (disembodied) levels of existence. Veda is the most ancient available literary

document of mankind and it proclaims that life is a divine opportunity. It exhorts all human beings as the sons of

immortality and enunciates that the human body is a micro model of the macrocosm: yath pinde tath

brahmnde. Moreover, seeds of conflict or amity are actually rooted in the mind and if the mind is attuned in

such a manner that there is no intra-personal disturbance, then inter-personal disputes will automatically be

dissolved. Consequently, a complementarity between opposites such as evil and good, ignoble and noble,

darkness and light, untruth and truth, mortality and immortality will also be accomplished. Accordingly, if we

aspire to achieve global peace, then first we have to be at peace within ourselves. Vedic view propounds a

complete communion between man and Nature; the external as well as the internal space have to work in unison

because all forms of existence are intertwined in an integral bond. Even the eternal conflict between male and

female is not actual in Vedic view, since both of these are stated to be twin aspects of the same reality. Mankind

today is passing through a critical phase when all aspects of the universe seem to be in conflicting mode and the

quest for harmony is far greater than ever. It is in this background that the profound Vedic vision can offer fresh

insights for future possibilities.

Karyn Lai Panel IIB, 8 Jul 1345h-1545h

Reliability in Confucius Analects

This paper discusses the notion of reliability in the Analects. It focuses centrally, though not exclusively, on the

term xin (), commonly translated as sincerity or trustworthiness. According to a common translation of the term, to describe a person as xin is to say that she keeps her word or puts words to action (this draws on its

Chinese character). Yet, by focusing only on matching deed with word, this translation fails to capture an aspect

of xin, which is that a person is reliable. This latter aspect of xin implies a level of consistency in a persons

actions across a range of situations. The focus of this paper is especially on the nature of such reliability,

understanding it in light of its place in the life of the Confucian exemplary person (junzi ). It explores some epistemological and pedagogical aspects of reliability, including the cultivation of the person in order to

successfully manifest her commitments in different scenarios. To put this in a different way, these investigations

focus on the concrete moments when a persons commitments are realised in her actions. The paper suggests

that the term xin has a greater role in the Analectsand, indeed, in the life of the exemplary personthan is

commonly held.

Lee, Chan Panel VID, 9 Jul 1600h-1800h

Language and Ethical Conflicts Between Knowledge and Action

The conflict between what I morally know and what I ought to do is a perennial problem in philosophy. Moral

weakness of will is one of the most compelling explanations in understanding the problem. To reinforce the will,

most thinkers commonly emphasize the cultivation of moral virtues. Interestingly, Zhu Xi offers genuine

knowledge to solve this problem. He explains the conflict between knowledge and action as arising from moral

ignorance. If so, his solution should be justified by elucidating that attainment of genuine knowledge can lead to

strengthen moral motivation to do right things. In order to explain that genuine knowledge has a performative

faculty, Zhu emphasizes its two key aspects: embodiment of emotions and identification of experiences. To

Zhu, these two imply a process of objectifying what I know. In order to do so, these justify themselves via a tool

of language, which can make the world orderly. In this vein, Zhu claims that language should accord with the

reality of the world. By working on his ideas of the relationship between language and the world, this paper will

show that Zhus way of unifying language with the world is one of the effective ways to enhance moral

judgment. Moreover, his way will prove that moral values or virtues are not merely delimited to a subjective

matter of taste, but predicated upon a precise understanding of the world.

Lee, Kyoo Panel IA, 8 Jul 1015h-1215h

Weiwuyoushen (as I have a body), Our Bellies Need Harmonious Addressing:

A Lesson from Daodejing on the Interconnectedness of Physical Needs and the Social Body

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Weiwuyoushen (, As I have a body, 13 of Daodejing): This truism that points, un-trivially, to the stomach (12) to be fed rather than the eye to be feasted, illustrates the metabolic materialism of Daoist

political philosophy and social ethics, of this belly philosophy that affirms life-forces of all living beings.

Laozi, the alleged author, too, sees that blah-blah-blah is tasteless (35), i.e., that a talk is empty. This

straightforward attention to the inner workings and outer manifestations of the psychosomatic body epitomizes

the embodied spirit of Daoist strands of thinking, an anti-idealist streak. To be natural is to have a body; to live

is to be embodiedenergized. This paper interpretatively reconstructs a tapestry of such passages on the vibrant

ontology and material phenomenology of the body in Daodejing, while weaving into it some of the concepts

from the phenomenological tradition of the West, ranging from the work of St. Augustine to Jacques Derrida,

including that of Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Emmanuel Levinas, all of whom understood something about, say,

a soup for the hungry soul, something we all need and need to feed one another. If ruling a big country by

Dao is like cooking a small fish (60) with Wuwei virtuosity, reading Dao properly would entail saving ten

thousand (wanwu) tiny eggs in and from that small fish. By engaging Daodejing this way in colorful and

extensive detail, we will not only rediscover in it some kernels of nomadic, fugitive wisdom on ways of life or

life as a series of way-making, but more specifically, as I will show, renew our organic, holistic appreciation of

this timeless text as strong embodiments of phenomenological imaginationethico-political, feminist,

pragmatic and aesthetic.

Lee, Sang Im Panel IVC, 9 Jul 1015h-1215h

On the Uncertainty in I-Ching

It is said that I-Ching must have been originated from "the consciousness of suffering" in daily life. And such

worries are usually caused from the conflicts occurring in real life, that is, conflicts from the relations between

the nature and human beings, the individual and society, and self and others. To resolve these conflicts, a

prognosis is needed which makes it possible to know about the present, reflect on the past, and predict the future.

However, in the process of the prognosis, one of the major obstacles among them seems to be the uncertainty.

What will be the ability to predict the result from the uncertainty optimally? That is, what will be the most

objective standard to predict the future? As Aristotle claims that it is 'the practical wisdom,' in I-Ching it is

regarded as the ability to grasp the divinatory signs. It can be said that the divinatory signs can be the medium to

overcome the uncertainty. Then again, to cope with the uncertainty, it is necessary to catch the divinatory signs,

and the ability to understand those signs can be accomplished through the cultivation of virtues.

Li, Jifen Panel IC, 8 Jul 1015h-1215h

Xin in the Xunzi: the Origin of Goodness In this essay I argue that Xin is the origin of goodness in the Xunzi. First, I will examine various accounts of

desires or sentiments, xing and xin, and then I will clarify why I argue that xin is the best choice to explain

the origin of goodness in the Xunzi. Second, I will discuss xing. I argue that there are mainly two senses of xing

in the Xunzi. One is involved with sensuous reactions(benxing ), which are connected with five organs. And

the other is involved with emotional reactions(qingxing ), such as likes, dislikes, pleasure, anger, grief, joy,

which are connected with xin. Based on this, I suggest that Xunzis claim that xing is evil, should be best

expressed as qingxing is evil. Third, I conduct textual analysis to show that, for Xunzi, the origin of goodness

lies with xin, which has the function of zhi . Xin for Xunzi basically has two statues, which are connected with

the two senses of xing. Both qingxing and desires are from xin, and it is xin that motivates the transformation of

xing.

Li Lan-fen Panel VD, 9 Jul 1345h-1545h

Criticism and Reconstruction on Justice Criteria System

Measuring the significance of a justice criteria system is an extraordinarily complex issue. No such system can

avoid the criticism and reconstruction of its significance, as changed and unbalanced development in social

structure always exceed the significance system corresponding to the social structure. Considering the transition

of Chinese contemporary justice criteria system, which change from authority justice to efficiency justice to

harmonious justice, this paper aims to construct a justice criteria system with multidimensional values including

the personal dignity, social vitality, and happiness, to embody harmony justice and provide a legitimacy basis for

contemporary transformation and development in China.

Liu Liangjian Panel IVB, 9 Jul 1015h-1215h

Kang Youweis Doctrine of datong (Great Harmony) and the Overcoming of World Political Conflicts: New

Philosophical Dreams

Kang Youwei develops a theory of world political order in his Book of Great Harmony in an age of conflicts

among nation-states. He advocates a world state with great harmony to go beyond the separation and conflicts

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among nation-states. Zhao Tingyang echoes Kang Youwei to some degree in his project of tianxia system. A

dialogue among Kang Youwei, Zhao Tingyang, Kant, Habermas and Thomas Pogge leads us to have a new

understanding of the significance of a world state, which is a discarded choice in Kant. Similar to Kang

Youwei, Kants doctrine of perpetual peace starts from the sufferings because of the international lawless

condition. Kant supposes two different solutions: the positive idea of a world republic and its negative surrogate

of a federation of nation-states. A world republic is discarded by Kant because it is impractical although it is

right in theory. Kant seems to be too optimistic about his federation of free states. Without hard binding force, a

nation-state, even if a free nation-state, is innately and essentially ready for war. We could reasonably believe

that a world republic will not inevitably bring about the most horrible despotism and it is worthy of our

pursuit. The contemporary world is in a transitional period from nation-states to a world state. We wonder

whether the term glocality, which suggests glocal perspective, institution and principle in a glocal age, could

be a constructive concept in imagining a possible desirable world order in such a transitional period.

Loy, Hui-chieh Panel VA, 9 Jul 1345h-1545h

On the Mohists Divine Command Doctrine of Morality

The Mohists of ancient China are well known for their doctrine that Heavens intent (tian zhi) is the standard for

moralityjust as the setsquare is, to the carpenter, the standard for the right angle. This notion has strongly

suggested to some that the Mohists might have subscribed to what would be called a Divine Command Theory

of Morality, i.e., the doctrine that what is morally right is determined by the will of a deity. Other scholars of the

text, focusing on the many clear instances in which the Mohists argued for their proposed course of conduct or

policy on the basis that it brings about the impartial benefit of the world, see them first and foremost as

consequentialists. More than thirty years after the seminar paper by Ahern Dennis igniting the modern

discussion (Is Mo Tzu a Utilitarian? published in 1976), the precise nature of the Mohist appeal to Heavens

intent, and the exact relationship between that and their appeal to beneficial consequences to ground their

proposed dao continues to invite controversy. My aim in this paper is to provide an overview and evaluation of

the recent debate, and propose an interpretation of the role that Heavens intent (and related phenomena) plays

within the Mohist ethical and political program.

Majithia, Roopen Panel IIC, 8 Jul 1345h-1545h

Emotions and Action in the Nicomachean Ethics and the Bhagavad Gt

The paper proposes to develop and then explore the implications of the view in the Ethics that the wise person's

virtuous action requires the various desires (emotional, appetitive and rational) speak with one voice, whereas

the Gt suggests that the detached dharmic action of the sage is free of desire. Issues discussed may include:

the nature and extent of moral intentionality (i.e. whether it has only rational dimensions), the implications for

agency and the role of the body in moral action, and the place of love and compassion in right action.

Man, Eva Kit Wah Panel IVA, 9 Jul 1015h-1215h Beyond Ontology? A Review of Robert Solomons Ideation of Emotion and Mencius Notion of Embodied

Emotion

Robert Solomon regards emotion as a form of cognition and a matter of ideation. He opens the question of

whether different cultures with different ideas might have different conception and emotions. He sees the values

of cross-cultural research on emotion as it clearly lies on the side of ideas and different ways of conceiving

and evaluating the world. He has polemicized that claims of ontology of ideation may lead to a philosophical

black hole, and that he prefers phenomenology for its better attention to details and its insights and

understanding. While cross-cultural studies are revealing to his interests in the role of ideas in emotion, it will be

revealing also to those who investigate the moral ontology of the Confucian philosophy and its regulatory ideals

and practices regarding embodied emotion. This paper will use Mencius theory of the body as a cross-cultural

study example to review the relation and tension between the ontological and phenomenological elements which

are put forward in Solomons discussion. The paper demonstrates how Mencius theory of the body, its

suggestion on moral and physical regulation of embodied emotion and cultural examples in the Book of Rites

provide insights to the answers of Solomons invitational questions: Do ideas share some of the properties of

feelings and those being concerned with the body? How are both ideas and feelings tied to behavior, and the

social world and relationships? and Are emotions essential to ethics? and finally, Are emotions belong to a

culture?

Mason, Joshua Panel IIID, 8 Jul 1600h-1730h

Between Chaos and Vagueness: The extremes that threaten a harmonious society

A general definition of harmony is an orderly unity of distinct parts. Given this understanding, there are two

extremes that can inhibit or damage harmony: differences in the parts can be so extreme that they cannot be

unified, or the imposition of thoroughgoing unity can overwhelm the distinctiveness of the different pieces. A.N.

13

Whitehead gives us a useful vocabulary for understanding these two ways of preventing a rich harmony from

forming. He says that when the bonds that unite differences are not strong enough or when the differences are

too great to be unified then the result is chaos. When unity swamps distinctions or demands a sacrifice of

differences then the result is vagueness. In its pursuit of a harmonious society, China has been deeply concerned

about chaos in the state. Because disintegration into separate parts, divisions, and conflicts are seen as disasters,

the government has emphasized national unity, social conformity, and political stability. With the pressure to

avoid chaos, a compensatory overemphasis on stability and conformity leads to an imbalance between

difference and unity which undercuts the potential for harmony. For example, in practicing censorship,

suppressing petitioners, and pushing cultural hegemony into the edges of the Chinese nation, China pursues a

harmony that is too heavily weighted towards unity and stability. The risk of such policies is a vagueness that

inhibits genuine social harmony. In the end I suggest that only policies which pursue justice for every

constituent part can maintain the delicate tension of chaos and vagueness, difference and unity, which

characterizes lively, vibrant harmonies.

Mattice, Sarah Panel IIIB, 8 Jul 1600h-1730h

Interrogating Comparative Philosophy: The Prevalence of the Combat Metaphor

In the article No (More) Philosophy Without Cross-Cultural Philosophy Karsten Struhl argues very

successfully that cross-cultural or comparative philosophy is a necessary component of philosophy, broadly

construed. If a key part of philosophical activity is the identification, articulation, and examination of

assumptions, then Struhl concludes we need the ability to engage distinct traditions in order to raise internal

philosophical assumptions to the level of inquiry. However, we can find in Struhls article evidence of one of

the assumptions that dialogue between philosophical traditions has the power to make visiblethe prevalence

of combat metaphors in and for philosophical inquiry. Struhl encourages comparative philosophers to go on the

offense, and repeatedly suggests that a key component of philosophical activity is interrogation. While these

are commonplace English terms to use in this context, they also point to a way of conceiving of philosophy that

has its roots in the combative society of ancient Greece, and that is not a mainstream part of philosophical

discourse in other traditions such as classical China. If we are to engage in the contemporary project of

responsible comparative philosophy, as Struhl suggests, then we need a special sensitivity to the power of the

conceptual metaphors we employ. In this presentation I explore the significance of conceptual metaphors for

philosophy in both ancient Greece and classical China, and articulate some ways that the differences between

those two traditions on the issue of metaphor might suggest changes to contemporary philosophical

methodology.

McGinty, Daniel Panel VIIIA, 10 Jul 1345h-1505h

A phenomenological approach to the cultivation of personal and public identity in early Confucianism

Confucian philosophy emphasizes the social qualities of the self, insofar as a persons identity is primarily

constituted by their relationships to others. Additionally, ones selfhood is formed over time and through gradual

self-cultivation via harmonious participation in social roles a conception with few similarities to most

traditional notions of the self in Western philosophy. However, the phenomenology of Husserl offers an in-

depth understanding of the transcendental ego that is inherently public a self that cannot be separated from the

social sphere and strongly relies upon social interactions for its ongoing development. Utilizing a comparative

phenomenological approach to personal identity in Confucianism can potentially provide new insight into its

cultivation through efficacious engagement in social relationships. Additionally, such an approach can analyse

the development of ones public identity as constituted by the ongoing acquisition of new manifolds of

presentation of the self manifolds that possess an intrinsically social character. This results in an understanding

of the junzi as a master of the actualization of an ever-expanding manifold of social roles as a person whose

core identity is continually enriched by the practice of xiao (among their family) and ren (within a community

or state). As a consequence, the junzi develops a multi-dimensional character with many facets that publicly and

appropriately manifest according to each situation. The junzi can thus be considered a larger-than-life

character due to the richness and complexity of their personal identity. This richness of character could perhaps

be considered a factor in the attractiveness of the junzi and the propensity of others to emulate them.

MI Chienkuo Panel VD, 9 Jul 1345h - 1545h

The Virtue Turn in Chinese Philosophy

The concept of virtue is a traditional and significant idea, it is also a modern and innovative conception. Both in

the traditional western culture (Aristotle, for example) and eastern culture (Confucius, for example), the concept

of "virtue" has been playing an important role not only being a constitutional element for human beings to

achieve the practical wisdom, but also an essential guideline for the agents to realize their well-beings

(eudaimonia for Aristotle and sagehood for Confucius). We have also currently witnessed that the idea of

"virtue" finds its new life and works its way back to the contemporary development of ethical and

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epistemological theories. Both moral virtues and intellectual virtues return to the central stage of the fields and

inspire philosophers in ethics and epistemology in discovering new strategies of solving the old problems. The

virtue-theoretic account of epistemic normativity and the virtue-based approach toward a normative ethics are

both the driving force for effecting and promoting this new value-driven approach. What is more important is to

expect "the virtue turn" also occurring in the Chinese Philosophy. Michael Slote, Stephen Angle, Bryan Van

Norden, and Jiyuan Yu have done some pioneer works in connecting virtue ethics with the Chinese Philosophy.

Ernest Sosa and I (Chienkuo Mi) have also been working on the subject connecting virtue epistemology and the

Chinese Philosophy. This project will emphasize the influence of "the virtue turn", and integrate issues and

problems involved in Ethics, Epistemology, and the Chinese Philosophy. This project will result in a more

globalized, cross-fields, and cross-cultural developments in East and West.

Moad, Edward Panel IIB, 8 Jul 1345h-1545h

Epistemic Hierarchy, Segregation, and Transformative Interaction in Classical Islamic Thought

This paper will explore some philosophical mechanisms of conflict management in the classical Islamic

tradition. The mechanism in question emerged on the basis of a common hierarchical view of epistemic

faculties corresponding to an ontological hierarchy on the one hand, and a social hierarchy on the other. One

method of managing ideological conflict was to diagnose the problem as an inappropriate discursive relation

between non-correspondent levels of these hierarchies, and to prescribe a strict segregation between these levels,

keeping everything and everyone in its place. Ibn Rushd is a proponent of this strict class system, and violation

of this policy is one of the main charges he brings against Al-Ghazali in his Decisive Treatise. But we find that

Ghazali takes a path of carefully managed transformative interaction, with the aim of lifting people to what he

sees as higher levels on the epistemic hierarchy. This strategy helps explain the apparent contradictions of

which Ibn Rushd accused him. But Ibn Rushds own mentor, Ibn Tufayl is no less guilty, as we will see, on the

same charge. Lastly, we will look at a move by Muhyedin Ibn al-Arabi to induce transformative interaction by

means of a complete inversion of the epistemic hierarchy.

Nakamura Tomoe Panel IIIC, 8 Jul 1600h-1730h

Nishi Amanes reconciliation of epistemological differences between Western Europe and Japan

This paper deals with an eclectic philosophy pursued by a Japanese philosopher, Nishi Amane. Nishi was a

philosopher of what came to be called the Tokyo school and an educator in the late 19th

century, who created a

number of translations of European philosophical terminologies currently in use both in Japan and China. His

philosophy can be seen as the reconciliation of European philosophy and traditional Japanese thought. He drew

on a diverse number of philosophical ideas. These included enlightenment, utilitarianism, positivism, and

empiricism from European philosophy as well as Japanese traditional thought, in particular, Confucianism.

The special focus of the presentation lies in addressing how Nishi attempted to reconcile the epistemological

differences between Western Europe and Japan. The mainstream of Western European epistemology is more or

less based on the dichotomy between noesis (intellectual perception) and aisthesis (sensory perception) and

philosophical predilection for the former. This dichotomy reflects the attention of European philosophy to the

distinction between human beings and the rest of natural world. Japanese traditional understanding of thought

did not have such a radical dichotomy and this was reflected in its conception of human beings. A main task of

this paper is to clarify how Nishi confronted the differences of epistemological concepts between the forms of

philosophy on which he drew and how he attempted to reconcile them. This is first done by articulating Nishis

creation of translations with its philosophical roots. Furthermore, it will also be argued that his reconciliation

was not only pursed theoretically but also practically. By this means I will attempt to explore a way to create an

intercultural perspective and utilise it in a practical sphere.

Nirban, Geetesh Panel VB, 9 Jul 1345h-1545h

A Case of Gender Conflict: Radical Amb in Mahbhrata

The paper proposes to discuss the issue of gender based conflicts and the strong character of Amb (as depicted

in Mahbhrata) who becomes a forcible casualty due to the irrationality and insensitivity inherent in the

societal norms, concretised by the masculine fraternity. The matter is a cause of concern in the 21st century (in

light of Nirbhaya, the brave-heart who became a victim of brutal inhumanity in New Delhi in Dec 2012). Unlike

her two sisters Amb and Amblik who relent to the norms of the society and appear as conformists, Amb

adopts a radical approach and denounces the sanctioned ways of patriarchy which eulogize womans identity in

form of mother, daughter and wife while according intolerant treatment to her existence. Forcefully abducted for

marriage and further assailed by an extraordinary mental anguish with no support, she is not discouraged or

demotivated. The paper will highlight Ambs emergence as an epitome of strength for women of all ages

through her ways of deriving self-empowerment and resolving the gender conflict by her determined response,

taking karma as her dharma and intelligently calculating the end of her tormenter (Bhma) not as a pleasurable activity (preyas) but as a morally desirable end (reyas). Amb carries in her character the vision and mission of

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an ethically enlightened woman of the epic who sets an example for the modern day women to rise above the

state of self-pity and hold on to action-oriented philosophy fearlessly so that cases of gender conflict can have

viable solutions giving rightful space to reason over emotion.

Oberg, Andrew Panel VIC, 9 Jul 1600h-1800h

This has nothing to do with George

Security cameras have now become a ubiquitous part of everyday life in most major cities in developed

countries, yet each new camera installed seems to come with its own cries of foul play by defenders of privacy

rights. Our long history with these cameras and CCTV networks generally does not seem to have alleviated our

concerns with being watched, and as we feel ourselves losing privacy in other areas especially the internet

the worry generated by security cameras has remained. In this case, however, our feelings of disquiet are

unnecessary, inspired as they are by an erroneous view of the self. The present paper argues that the atomistic

view of an autonomous self that has become commonplace is not only detrimental but unfactual. Our approach

to public services like television or healthcare is considered in the context of governmental obligation and

coercion, highlighting the inaccuracies of our view of the self and its borders as currently defined. In contrast to

this a more holistic view is offered, one that includes in the self all of those with whom our lives are entangled,

taking examples from charitable giving and other social behavior. Seen from this vantage point, more objective

analyses of the costs and benefits of a system like a CCTV security network or other programs meant for the

public good are possible, showing that in the end the issue is not about privacy but rather the relationship

between one and ones fellows.

Ozbey, Sonya Panel IIA, 8 Jul 1345h-1545h

Human Adaptability and Formation, and Dissolution of Human Alliances in Spinoza, and the Zhungz

In relation to the critical stance taken against Enlightenment humanism and theories of human exceptionalism,

many contemporary scholars within the Continental European tradition have turned to philosophies of certain

heterodox historical figures with monistic and immanentist ontologies (which are characterized by the absence

of transcendent principles generating and ordering the world). Turning to these previously under-studied texts,

among which, Spinoza has perhaps received the most scholarly attention in the last 50 years, seems to be

motivated by a desire to develop an ontological vocabulary where differences are articulated on a flexible and

continuous trajectory without final closures which is exactly what immanentist philosophies seem to promise,

as the absence of a transcendent horizon is expected to translate into the absence of ontologically prior measures

of difference which set up clearly delineated boundaries between beings (e.g. the way humans are thought to be

created in the image of God, which separates them from the rest of the creation in the Judeo-Christian tradition).

However, despite the ontologically flexible framework that they provide, the texts themselves sometimes present

us with remarks hinting a human-nonhuman distinction formulated in terms of sharp, and sometimes

unbridgeable, discontinuities. In this paper, I will attempt to make a comparative examination of two different

immanentist systems, Spinozas and Zhungzs, with the hope to not only further understand the way this

distinction features in their philosophies, but also examine the very grammar of the different types of reasoning

which picks out humans as exceptionalwhich helps bring out certain historically and personally contingent

factors that give rise to presence and absence of certain threads of thinking, and thus complicates certain

sweeping generalizations we make about immanentist philosophies.

Park, So-Jeong Panel VC, 9 Jul 1345h-1545h

Ritual and Music Revisited: Debates and Compromise in Confucian Discourse on Music

Until Ritual and Music ( lyu) became the concept which represents Confucian thought, there had been

the process of extensive debate and persistent compromise over a long period of time. We need to pay attention

to diverse opinions residing in Confucian ritual and music discourse and have a close look at conflicts and

differences among Confucian thinkers. If we do not do so, we will miss many disputed points that the Confucian

thinkers developed, such as the tension between institutional art and autonomous development of art,

discrepancy between musical practice and theory surfaced with the emergence of new music, and so on. The

bigger problem is that our ignorance of diverse views may lead us to misidentify Confucian discourse as an

authoritarianism which subordinates music to ritual or as an anachronism and restrain music from its natural

transformation for the adherence to traditional value. This paper argues that much wider range of views on

music than that of typically understood flourished and contended in Confucian ritual and music discourse.

Confucius was not one who attempted to demote music under ritual but rather the one who first found the own

value of music from the previous ceremonial form of musical performance and its inseparable relationship to

ritual as mutual reinforcement and complement. The paper also explores different opinions concerning ritual and

music from Zigong and Zixia through Mencius and Xunzi to various inclinations appearing in the Book of

Music. If my arguments are successful we will be able to answer the following question with less monolithic but

more comprehensive concern: Is the value of music merely instrumental in Confucian discourse?

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Park, Yeoun Gyu Panel VIIIB, 10 Jul 1345h-1545h

The Relational Self as Distancing and Defamiliarizing to the Others

In the classic tradition of Confucianism the relational self as being against the individual self is to conceive an

individual relationally and situationally, namely, to do him as the totality of roles and as the co-author of his

action. The concept of the relational self has surely received the philosophical merits to solve the difficult

problem of what the subject is, and to extend the domain of the ethical activities of the individual without much

conflict. Some recent articles of Xinyan Jiang and David Wong about the relational self well illustrated these

points through their practical and contextual argumentation. Although I generally agree with them, I here

propose a new way to understand the relational self, using two concepts, 'distancing' and 'defamiliarizing' that I

extracted from the Confucian and neo-Confucian tradition of jing (; mindfulness or reverence). I regard the 'distancing' and 'defa