IN-DEPTH ANALYSISEPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service

Author: Nora MilotayMembers' Research Service

November 2017 — PE 614.579EN

Socialgovernance inthe EuropeanUnionGoverning complex systems

This publication aims to provide an overview of the social aspects of EU governance. While economicgovernance has a regulated, 'hard' framework, there is no such framework for social governance. Socialgovernance functions mainly within the 'soft', unregulated realms but it is also marked by some 'hard'governance mechanisms. This publication presents an overview of existing EU social governancemechanisms and tools, including their current state of play, the debates that surround them andpossible avenues for their further development.

PE 614.579ISBN 978-92-846-2232-0doi:10.2861/85290QA-06-17-270-EN-N

Original manuscript, in English, completed in November 2017.

Disclaimer and CopyrightThis document is prepared for, and addressed to, the Members and staff of the EuropeanParliament as background material to assist them in their parliamentary work. The content of thedocument is the sole responsibility of its author(s) and any opinions expressed herein should notbe taken to represent an official position of the Parliament.Reproduction and translation for non-commercial purposes are authorised, provided the sourceis acknowledged and the European Parliament is given prior notice and sent a copy.© European Union, 2017.Photo credits: © taa22 / Fotolia.eprs@ep.europa.euhttp://www.eprs.ep.parl.union.eu (intranet)http://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank (internet)http://epthinktank.eu (blog)

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Governance is often defined in contrast to government: government is about hierarchyand bureaucracy, and governance about decentralised markets and networks. Socialgovernance is defined as a process of governing societies in a situation where no singleactor can claim absolute dominance. In the European Union it is referred to mainly inrelation to social policies and objectives, and increasingly with the idea of puttingeconomic and social objectives on an equal footing. There is no Europeancomprehensive, regulated, governance framework to compare with what exists foreconomic governance. Several 'soft' social governance tools are available, however,while economic governance influences and impacts the social realm.

The two main challenges that are currently said to be facing social governancemechanisms at European level are those of finding social adjustment mechanisms inthose policy areas where the EU already has the legitimacy to act, while at the same timepreparing sustainable and legitimate future directions for social policy. Addressing theincreasingly complex fields of globalised economies and societies and their interactionsrequires new governance frameworks that combine an analysis of economic and socialsystems on an equal footing.

The existing tools of social governance in the EU are all under pressure to contribute tothese developments. These are: the social open method of coordination (OMC), theimpact assessment of policies and programmes, the renewed social dialogue, theEuropean Semester with more focus on social and employment issues, and the Europeanfunds designed to support Member States in achieving upward economic and socialconvergence.

The OMC, which can help Member States to achieve commonly agreed objectives as aresult of a mutual learning process, is assessed as a powerful tool by some, but not byothers. Impact assessment of future legislative – or sometimes non-legislative –measures, with an increasing focus on social impact and on future reforms is considereda powerful tool for developing a more comprehensive governance framework within theEU. The renewed social dialogue directs attention to the importance of social partnerparticipation in policy processes at European level but also in national contexts,particularly for finding tailor-made solutions for challenges and implementing them. TheEuropean Semester, which has gone through several changes since its advent, isbecoming less hierarchical and more interactive, with country specific recommendationsthat are less uniform and less prescriptive and that include more analysis of social andemployment issues. Finally, the European structural and investment funds, that wereoriginally created so as to bring about more economic, social and territorial cohesionacross the EU, have been linked increasingly to economic governance, andmacroeconomic conditionality. This 'policy overload' has raised questions as to whetherthe funds still serve their original function, and, if not, how this could be corrected. Inaddition, there is also the issue of how these funds can co-exist with the relatively newEuropean Fund for Strategic Investment, so that they all support investment in humancapital in the most efficient way.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Introduction................................................................................................................... 3

1.1 What is social governance? ................................................................................ 3

2. Social governance tools in the EU ................................................................................. 4

2.1. Soft governance tools............................................................................................. 62.1.1. Open method of coordination ..................................................................................... 6

2.1.2. Impact assessment....................................................................................................... 8

2.1.3. Renewed social dialogue.............................................................................................. 9

2.2. European Semester .............................................................................................. 11

2.3. Funds and programmes........................................................................................ 14

3. Outlook ........................................................................................................................ 17

4. Main references........................................................................................................... 19

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1. IntroductionDeepening economic and monetary union (EMU) and strengthening its social dimensionare among the priorities of the current Commission. The Five Presidents' Report (22 June2015) called for reformed labour markets, for access to adequate education for all andfor effective social protection systems that also take care of the most vulnerable. Itdeclared as Europe's ambition to earn a 'Social Triple A', as a tool to contribute to fairand balanced growth, decent jobs and labour protection. It also acknowledged that thereis no 'one-size-fits-all' template to follow but that there are often similar challengesacross the Member States in terms of employment situations, working conditions, socialprotection, the situation of older people and education. These considerations, linked tostructural reforms encouraging growth and competitiveness while promoting qualitysocial standards across the Member States for all, have come into sharper focus in EU-level policy discussions in the aftermath of the financial crisis and also feature highly indiscussions on the future of the EU.

Given the limited competence of the EU in social policy1 and thus the complexity of actorsand mechanism involved, this analysis should support discussions on EU governance,with particular focus on social issues.

1.1. What is social governance?There is no universal definition for the concept of governance. Scholars often definegovernance in contrast to government: government is about hierarchy and bureaucracyand governance is about decentralised markets and networks. European governanceresearch distinguishes many but, in particular, four main types of governance: multilevel(referring to EU, national and subnational level), network (both horizontal and vertical),regulatory (centralised administration by regulation) and experimentalist (involving goal-setting and revision based on learning from the comparison of alternative approaches toadvancing in different contexts).

For this analysis social governance is defined as the process of governing societies in asituation where no single actor can claim absolute dominance. As an abstract theoreticalconcept, it refers to all processes of social organisation and social coordination.2 Itincludes the various interaction and decision-making processes among the actorsinvolved in solving a collective problem.3 These processes include the ways (i.e.mechanisms, processes and relations) by which stable practices and organisations ariseand persist. Many recent publications emphasise the challenge inherent in the fact thatpolitical and personal beliefs, combined with the complexity of the system and thevolume of policy-relevant information, are the main forces that often push policy makingaway from a rational and structured ideal. Others stress that good governance is notabout making the correct decisions as such but more about the quality of thecoordination and decision-making processes related to the problem. They point to themost important qualities of good governance, such as being transparent, participatory,inclusive, effective, legitimate, accountable, etc.

1 This will be explained further in Chapter 2.2 M. Bevir, Governance: A very short introduction, Oxford University Press, 2013.3 M. Hufty, 'Investigating policy processes: The governance analytical framework (GAF)', Research for

Sustainable Development: Foundations, Experiences, and Perspectives, U. Wiesmann and H. Hurni(eds.) with an international group of co-editors, Vol. 6., Geographica Bernensia, 2011, pp. 403–424.

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In these studies the subject of social governance is strongly linked to discussions on thewelfare state. They explain that currently European welfare states face problems thatcross individual welfare policy sectors. Some of these are related to ageing societies,youth inclusion, youth unemployment, sustainable lifestyles, refugees, etc. Addressingthese issues requires revision of the governance of the welfare state beyond anyindividual sector of welfare policy. Welfare states also face serious governance problemsthat are independent of the policy sector involved. While previously governancemechanisms were considered to have a secondary role, 'as a means to implement policy',currently there seems to be a necessity to rethink them. How welfare states operate istherefore a priority issue. In this context there is also a moving away from the traditionalcategories of welfare state models, such as the social-democratic (Scandinavian) model,the corporatist (Continental) model and the liberal (Anglo-Saxon) model, which cannowadays be complemented by a Mediterranean model (paths followed by Spain, Italyand Greece) and an East European model (post-socialist countries) as often there are bigdifferences between countries within one regime and at the same time a convergenceof policy areas across regimes.4 These are for example, social investment, pre-distributive policies, and personalisation of policies.

In this context the challenges for social policy within the EU are twofold: strengtheningsocial adjustment functions in those policy mechanisms and policy areas where the EUalready has legitimacy of action, while simultaneously preparing definitions ofsustainable and legitimate long-term directions for social policy in the EU.5 Severalinitiatives already exist in Europe and globally with the intention of creating moreintegrated governance frameworks that can address complex challenges of both aneconomic and a social nature. The 'new approaches to economic challenges' (NAEC)initiative of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), forexample, by upgrading the organisation's analytical frameworks and strengthening itspolicy advice, intends to analyse the interactions between economic and social systemson an equal footing. As part of the project the OECD has developed the concept ofinclusive growth with a 'multidimensional living standards' measurement tracking towhat extent growth contributes to the well-being of the individual, as well as agovernance framework.

2. Social governance tools in the EUThere is no social governance framework as such in the EU but there are severalmechanisms through which social governance is practiced. Two types of governancemechanisms exist: hard and soft. Hard governance functions through regulations andsoft through the soft 'acquis', harmonised mainly through the open method ofcoordination (OMC) with benchmarks, targets, and non-binding regulations. Thechallenge with social governance is that it happens mainly within the soft governancerealms but it is also affected by some of the hard governance mechanisms.

In terms of its legal base, social policy within the EU has been developing since the Treatyof Rome, which made provisions for the establishment of the European Social Fund (ESF)

4 Most recently in P. Taylor-Gooby, B. Leruth and H. Chung (eds.), After austerity: welfare statetransformation in Europe after the great recession, OUP, 2017.

5 E. Helltström and M. Kasanen, 'Governing the welfare state and beyond – Solutions for a complex worldand uncertain future', in Redesigning the European welfare state- ways forward, Vision Europe, 2015.

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and the coordination of national social security systems to enable free movement. In thebeginning, a set of legislative initiatives for selected employment rights were introduced.In 1986, the Single European Act established a Community policy of economic and socialcohesion to counterbalance the effects of the completion of the internal market on theless developed Member States and to reduce discrepancies in development between theregions. These were then followed by a non-binding Community Charter of FundamentalSocial Rights of Workers in 1989. In 2009, social and labour rights became legally bindingthrough the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFREU). Majormilestones in the development of European social policy have included: the socialprotocol of the Maastricht Treaty, expanding areas of EU action in 1992; the AmsterdamTreaty in 1997, incorporating the Agreement on Social Policy into the text of the Treatyon European Union ((TEU), as well as supporting high levels of employment through theEuropean Employment Strategy; and the 2001 Treaty of Nice, which set up the SocialProtection Committee (SPC) to monitor the development of social conditions in theMember States and to cooperate on policies. Since the late 1990s, Member States havebeen using the OMC for non-binding coordination of their national policies. Finally,Article 3(3) of the TEU included the concept of achieving a highly competitive socialmarket economy. The horizontal social clause (Article 9 of the Treaty on the Functioningof the European Union (TFEU)) placed balanced economic growth and sustainabledevelopment on an equal footing with full employment, a high level of social protection,equality, promotion of social justice, and respect for diversity. It basically called for bettersocial mainstreaming of all policies:

In defining and implementing its policies and activities, the Union shall take into accountrequirements linked to the promotion of a high level of employment, the guarantee ofadequate social protection, the fight against social exclusion, and a high level of education,training and protection of human health. (Article 9 TFEU)

The main fields relevant for social policy covered by EU directives are: the informationand consultation of employees; restructuring; health and safety (including working time);equal opportunities; the integration of vulnerable groups into the labour market; postedworkers; the social security regulation; European Works Councils for large Europeancompanies; the directives on part-time and fixed-time contracts; and the directives ontemporary agency work and on protection of workers in the event of insolvency ofemployers. It is important to mention that, following a rather active period from about1991 up to 2004, there has been a period of stagnation (up until the 2008 crisis andbeyond), during which no major social directives have been ratified.6

The latest framework for social governance in the EU was set out in the Five Presidents'Report on completing EMU, which envisaged three stages: 'deepening by doing' (1 July2015 to 30 June 2017), 'completing EMU', and the final stage, when the deep andgenuine EMU would be fully operational, at the latest by 2025.

With the implementation of the priorities of this report, the Europe 2020 strategy hasbeen losing ground and the main emphasis has shifted to the political guidelines of theJuncker Commission. In this context the main focus in the social field has been onachieving the 'Social Triple A' across the EU. For the first phase, the Commission alreadyenvisaged a move towards 'an economic union of convergence, growth and jobs' thatwas to rest on four pillars with focus on the euro area: the creation of a euro area system

6 With the exception of the directives on seafarers and on workers in cross-border railways of 2005. Thedirective on work-related musculoskeletal disorders was stalled.

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of competitiveness authorities; strengthened implementation of the macroeconomicimbalance procedure (MIP); a greater focus on employment and social performance; andstronger coordination of economic policies within a revamped European Semester. Allwere to be implemented through the Community method. When it comes tostrengthening the social and employment aspects of EMU, which was described as anecessity, the Commission drew attention mainly to labour markets and welfaresystems. It particularly emphasised that 'there is no 'one-size-fits-all' template to follow'and that although systems in the Member States were diverse there should be anemphasis on getting more people of all ages into work; promoting flexicurity at work;securing the same protection for both 'insiders' and 'outsiders' in the labour market;shifting taxes away from labour; delivering tailored support for the unemployed to re-enter the labour market; and improving education and lifelong learning. It also called fordeeper integration of national labour markets by facilitating geographic and professionalmobility, improving coordination of social security systems, and further promotingsystems for better recognition of qualifications.

For the second stage the document envisaged mechanisms that were more binding andthat would be based on 'a set of common high level standards' that would lead to'harmonisation' in some areas' and individual solutions in others.

As social governance takes shape mainly in 'soft mechanisms', the following chapters willbe focusing mainly on these.

2.1. Soft governance tools2.1.1. Open method of coordination

The OMC originates from the 1990s when European employment policy gained moreimportance. The employment title (Title IX) of the TFEU, comprising Articles 145-150TFEU, committed Member States and the Union to work towards 'developing acoordinated strategy for employment and particularly for promoting a skilled, trainedand adaptable workforce and labour markets responsive to economic change' with aview to achieving the objectives defined in Article 3 of the TEU. Further, Article 9 TFEUstated that EU policies and practices should take into account the promotion of a highlevel of employment. The tool used to achieve these objectives has been the Europeanemployment strategy (EES). The employment title of the TFEU (specifically Article 148)set out the specific process, called the OMC, for implementing the EES. The OMC foundits expression in the employment guidelines. In 2005 they were integrated into the broadeconomic policy guidelines and then, in 2015, into the integrated guidelines.

The OMC is an intergovernmental method through which the EU's Member States areexamined by one another (peer pressure). While the Commission's role is limited tosheet surveillance, the European Parliament (Parliament) and the Court of Justice playno, or very little, part in the process. The OMC allows Member States to define commonobjectives (including with the agreement of the Council), monitor progress towardsthose objectives, generally through commonly designed benchmarks and targets. It alsovery often works through the method of peer-learning, peer-counselling7 and the

7 Peer learning at EU level is a method of observing both positive and negative examples of policyreforms adopted in other countries in order to draw lessons from them. Its strength lies in thecontextualisation of policies, the broadness and flexibility of discussion themes, the qualitative natureof information, and low levels of politicisation, based on mutual trust between the Member States.Peer counselling is an instrument that brings together professional peers from a small number of

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identification of good practices. It aims to achieve more convergence towards the mainEU goals. It functions in stages: first the Council agrees on policy goals, second these aretranslated by Member States into national and regional policies, and finally specificbenchmarks and indicators are agreed upon to monitor progress towards the goalsdefined by the ministers.

Whereas with this mechanism the competence remains with the Member States, thereare links between the employment title, Community policy and labour regulation. Forexample, Article 147 TFEU includes an explicit provision according to which 'the objectiveof a high level of employment shall be taken into consideration in the formulation andimplementation of Community policies and activities'. Further, in framework agreementsreached in the EU social dialogue and transformed into Union directives, the socialpartners have explicitly regarded their agreement as for example, 'a contribution to theoverall European strategy on employment'.

Parliament has only a very limited role within the OMC, mostly constituting giving advice,and has therefore repeatedly expressed its concerns in relation to soft law in general asit can have a detrimental effect on Community legislation and institutional balance. Ithas called the OMC 'legally dubious as it operates without sufficient parliamentaryparticipation and judicial review'. Thus, it continued, it should be used only in exceptionalcases, and the possible participation of Parliament in the process should be furtherdiscussed. In 2010, in relation to economic governance, it clearly called for a movebeyond the OMC and for broader use of binding measures.

Despite its origins in employment policy the OMC is also used in other policy areas, suchas research, development, education and training, immigration, and social policy. Somecritics have pointed out that putting social policy into the EES reduced it to issues ofpoverty reduction and of having a skilled workforce. They have also emphasised thatsocial and employment ministers are excluded from the final decision making processesconcerning important issues of EU (economic) governance. Others have explained theextent to which the OMC has worked as an 'amplifier for reform strategies', a hard policytool that could lead to 'substantive and procedural effects' at EU and Member State level.Case studies looking into the effects of the social OMC in Belgium and Flanders haveshown multiple effects. When looking at changes in regulations the effects wereinsignificant; when looking into the effects in terms of processes, however, the changeswere significant. On the one hand, the OMC had led to procedural changes, includingpromoting monitoring and evaluation, and related to that, to better quality socialstatistics; it had strengthened coordination between various actors, between regions aswell as at the federal level; it had further strengthened NGO involvement in policymaking in Belgium; and it had improved cross-sector coordination and cross-fertilisation.On the other hand, it had also led to a shift in policy priorities, for example, it had raisedthe profile of social inclusion-related issues, such as poverty. Finally, the study pointedout that the success of OMC did not depend on the original institutional settings and theinitial uploading efforts of a given country. The main mechanisms identified throughwhich these results are achieved were 'leverage' (i.e. actors creatively appropriating

national administrations to provide a country with external advice in the policy development process.It is intended to go beyond information-sharing and provide a forum for finding solutions to nationalchallenges in a participatory workshop (European Commission, information note).

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various instruments from the OMC toolbox to legitimise their own preferences), policylearning and external pressure.

2.1.2. Impact assessment8

Measuring the social impact of policies and programmes has become an increasinglyimportant element of the policy process at European level. However, there is no realconsensus on the definition of the concept and very diverse methodologies and metricsare used. While social scientists look at the impact of policies and programmes, often interms of social progress, social investors tend to look for the non-financial (i.e. social andenvironmental) returns on their investments, which they tend to quantify and/or expressin monetary terms, if possible. The European Commission and European Parliament havetheir own mechanisms for impact assessment with which they also assess social impact.

Impact assessment, part of the Commission's better regulation agenda, examineswhether there is a need for EU action and analyses the possible impacts of the availablesolutions before a proposal is put forward. Better regulation is a shared commitment ofall three institutions, European Commission, Parliament and Council. They signed a newagreement on 13 April 2016 in which they committed to deliver high-quality Unionlegislation that is efficient, effective, simple and clear, and that avoids overregulationand administrative burdens for citizens, public authorities and businesses, especiallySMEs.

Impact assessment is required in the case of legislative and also non-legislativeinitiatives9 and implementing and delegated acts that are likely to have a significanteconomic, environmental or social impact. The methodology used for making an impactassessment involves a number of steps, as laid out in a 2009 Commission guidance paper.The paper identifies the main areas in which impact assessment is carried out and theissues that need to be addressed, including what evidence and techniques can be usedto measure potential impact. It also recommends starting by examining whether thereare any systematic impacts on well-defined groups. The guidance paper was revised firstin 2015 and then again in 2017. The 2015 guidelines did not introduce many changes,but provided further instructions as to how impact should be assessed and presented.They were accompanied by a toolbox containing 59 tools, coupled with practical advice.Several tools were presented to facilitate the identification of specific social impacts,among other things, on employment and working conditions; income distribution andsocial inclusion; social protection, education, culture and youth; as well as health andsafety. It also put great emphasis on the transparency of the process and broadstakeholder involvement, including SMEs and other end-users. In 2017 although therewere no major changes compared with 2015, some new tools relating to the socialaspects of impact assessment were further developed. The tools dealing withemployment, working conditions, income distribution, social protection and inclusion(tool 29) and with the digital economy and society were strongly revised. Moreover, evenmore emphasis was placed on the impact on SMEs and there was a call to quantify andmonetise the costs and benefits of an initiative wherever possible.

A 2010 paper by the Belgian Presidency pointed out that the impact assessment ofproposals with the involvement of broad groups of policy makers and practitioners cancontribute to 'maximising the long-term socio-economic development benefits for civil

8 This topic will be further discussed in chapter 2.2, on the European Semester.9 Such as financial programmes and recommendations for negotiations of international agreements.

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society' in Member States' communities and regions, and thus to implementing thehorizontal social clause.

A 2011 Parliament resolution called for independent impact assessment (both ex anteand ex post) to be guaranteed, and argued for its application throughout the policy cycle,from the design of legislation to its implementation, evaluation and possible revision.The Parliament regularly carries out initial appraisals of the quality and methodologicalstrengths and weaknesses of the impact assessment reports accompanying legislativeproposals that the Commission submits. These take into consideration the Commission'sown guidelines, as well as other quality criteria, and assist the parliamentary committeesin their work. The Parliament's impact assessment handbook sets out the requirements,inter alia, for more detailed consultation with stakeholders before impact assessmentsare prepared, to offset any lack of methodology or data. It requires a balanced analysisof the impact on the economic, social and environmental pillars and on public health,details of the impact on SMEs and micro-enterprises and regional and local impacts, andas far as possible, qualitative criteria, such as the impact on vulnerable social groups(social benchmarking), and gender equality. The earlier mentioned subsequent revisionof the Commission guidelines took many of these issues on board.

2.1.3. Renewed social dialogue

The main aim of social dialogue is to improve European governance through theinvolvement of European social partners in decision making and in the implementationprocess. The origins of the social dialogue go back to 1985 when the then CommissionPresident Jacques Delors invited social partners represented by the European TradeUnion Confederation (ETUC), the Union of Industries of the European Community(UNICE) and the European Centre of Public Enterprises (CEEP), to join the internal marketprocess. The Single European Act created a legal basis for the development of a'Community-wide social dialogue'. In October 1991, UNICE, ETUC and CEEP adopted ajoint agreement that called for mandatory consultation of the social partners on thepreparation of legislation in the area of social affairs and a possibility for the socialpartners to negotiate framework agreements at Community level. This was then builtinto the Treaty of Amsterdam, which finally provided for a single framework to apply tosocial dialogue within the EU.

According to Article 152 of the TFEU 'the Union recognises and promotes the role of thesocial partners at its level, taking into account the diversity of national systems. It shallfacilitate dialogue between the social partners, respecting their autonomy'. Article 154states that 'before submitting proposals in the social policy field, the Commission shallconsult management and labour on the possible direction of Union action'. Article 154states that 'if, after such consultation, the Commission considers Union action advisable,it shall consult management and labour on the content of the envisaged proposal.Management and labour shall forward to the Commission an opinion or, whereappropriate, a recommendation'. And finally, Article 155 provides the procedure for EU-level social partner agreements, stating that 'should management and labour so desire,the dialogue between them at Union level may lead to contractual relations, includingagreements'. While the agreement reached needs to be implemented through nationalprocedures and mechanisms in the Member States, Article 155 of the TFEU also allows

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social partners to ask the Commission to take a proposal to the Council, which leads inpractice to implementation by Council directive.10

The social dialogue mechanism suffered a set-back during the economic and financialcrisis, leading the new Juncker Commission to relaunch and strengthen it. In June 2016 ajoint statement on a 'new start for social dialogue' was signed. In thatValdis Dombrovskis, Vice-President for the Euro and Social Dialogue, and MarianneThyssen, Commissioner for Employment, Social Affairs, Skills and Labour Mobility agreedwith social partners to involve them more in the European Semester and in EU policy andlaw-making. In addition to the social dialogue the Tripartite Social Summit for Growthand Employment meets at least once a year and enables consultation between theCouncil, the Commission and the social partners on economic, social and employmentaffairs.

In Parliament, the Employment and Social Affairs (EMPL) Committee in particular has puta great emphasis on social dialogue and, as a result, frequently invites EU-level socialpartners to present their views before a report or opinion on any relevant issues isdelivered. In several resolutions, Parliament has emphasised the importance of socialdialogue particularly in relation to economic governance and the European Semester.Regarding the economic adjustment programmes in the countries most affected by thecrisis, a 2014 Parliament resolution on employment and social aspects of the role andoperations of the Troika (the European Central Bank, the Commission and theInternational Monetary Fund) with regard to euro-area-programme countries, stressedthat the social partners at national level should be consulted or involved in the initialdesign of programmes. Moreover, in its resolution on the employment and social aspectsof the 2017 European Semester the Parliament once again stressed the importance ofsocial dialogue and called for reinforcement of the role of social partners in the neweconomic governance process. Finally, in its 2017 resolution on a European pillar of socialrights, Parliament called on the Commission to step up concrete support forstrengthening and respecting social dialogue at all levels and in all sectors. In addition,both the European Committee of the Regions (CoR) and the European Economic andSocial Committee (EESC) have in several opinions emphasised the importance of soundsocial dialogue and collective bargaining, particularly when it comes to the negotiationof labour reform.

The Commission evaluation on the renewed social dialogue after the first year called forthe institutional framework for national social dialogue to be improved and pointed outthat bipartite social dialogue, at both EU and national level, was a prerequisite oftripartite consultation involving public authorities.

A 2016 study looking into the mechanisms of social dialogue across the EU found that,owing to new challenges, social partners were taking up new practices in order toaddress them across several policy fields. The study showed that older and newerMember States differed significantly in terms of the scope of new topics addressed andin their motivation to address them. It identified three groups of countries: those wherenational social partners mainly addressed issues raised by the EU policy agenda (thosewho had joined the EU since 2004 and the UK); those that went beyond the 'minimumcatalogue' and addressed new groups in the labour market, low wages, skills and social

10 If the social partners do not manage to reach an agreement, the Commission can launch a normallegislative procedure.

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security issues (mainly central, eastern and southern European countries), and a thirdgroup with a broader range of new topics (northern and western European countries).The study saw a strong relationship between the social partners' innovative strength andpotential and their autonomy.

2.2. European SemesterThe European Semester process set up in 2010 enables Member States to coordinatetheir economic policies throughout the year and address the economic challenges facingthe EU. According to its original aims it is supposed to ensure sound public finances(avoiding excessive government debt), prevent excessive macroeconomic imbalances inthe EU, support structural reforms to create more jobs and growth, and boostinvestment. The annual cycle of the European Semester allows Member States to discusstheir economic and budgetary plans with their EU partners at specific times in the firstpart of the year, so that national action could be taken accordingly in the second part ofthe year, notably with the adoption of the budgets for the subsequent year. The annualcycle starts in November and includes the publication of the annual growth survey (AGS),the alert mechanism report (AMR), the draft joint employment report (JER) andrecommendations for the euro area. In addition, in 2016 – for the first time – theCommission also presented a communication on the euro area fiscal stance. Whilerecommendations for the euro area are published in February the following year,individual country reports are prepared by the Commission on the state of play of theireconomic situation and the progress they have made in relation to their plannedreforms. Those countries that run the risk of possible imbalances undergo an in-depthreview. In April Member States submit their national reform programmes, and based ontheir assessments the Commission drafts country specific recommendations (CSRs) foreach Member State. These policy recommendations are discussed between MemberStates in the Council. EU leaders endorse them in June before Council adopts them inJuly. Governments then incorporate the recommendations into their reform plans andnational budgets for the following year. Budgetary monitoring intensifies in the autumnfor euro area Member States: they must submit to the Commission their Draft BudgetaryPlans for the following year by 15 October. After the Commission's assessment andopinion the budget plans are discussed by the Economic and Financial Affairs (ECOFIN)Council.

The European Parliament monitors the assessment twice: in late autumn, it expresses itsopinion on the on-going European Semester cycle, and in February, on the AGS and theAMR. In addition, the Parliament holds several economic dialogues with other EUinstitutions and representatives of countries subject to CSRs (such as in the annualEuropean Parliamentary Week).

While social issues are not the primary focus of the Semester cycle, they have started tofeature more prominently over the years, partly through some modifications to theSemester process and partly through its analyses and recommendations.

As foreseen in the Five President's Report, the European Commission presented concretesteps to strengthen EMU, including proposals for a revamped European Semester. Theserevamping measures were to affect the EU-28 as well as the euro area. The documentproposed to integrate euro-area aspects and national dimensions more effectively andto address spill-over effects. Accordingly, the euro-area recommendations 2016 were forthe first time published at the very beginning of the Semester process in November 2015.

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Several steps were taken so as to address the social consequences of economicadjustment more effectively. The new Commission proposal wished to strengthen therole of other institutions, including the European and national parliaments. It suggestedinvolving them more in discussions about the AGS and the CSRs. The new proposal alsoreinvigorated 'stronger involvement of social partners' during the drafting of nationalreform programmes (NRP) and the development of common benchmarks for upwardconvergence, e.g. measuring the quality of labour contracts. In its 2015 resolution, theParliament generally welcomed the Commission proposal but 'regretted' that it did notensure sufficient parliamentary oversight. Since then it has come forward with newproposals. In its resolution on the 2017 AGS, Parliament urged the Commission to launchnegotiations on an interinstitutional agreement on economic governance, stressing thatthis agreement should, within the framework of the Treaties, ensure that the structureof the Semester allows for meaningful and regular parliamentary scrutiny of the process,in particular as regards the AGS priorities and euro area recommendations. In addition,in its 2017 resolution on the social and employment aspects of the AGS, Parliament calledfor greater consideration of its views before Council takes decisions, and put the EMPLCommittee on an equal footing with the Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON)Committee when it is called upon to give an opinion at any stage of the Semester. It alsoreiterated the idea of introducing a social imbalances procedure when designing theCSRs. Endorsed by Parliament, the CoR called for the Semester to have a strongerterritorial dimension, both in terms of its analysis and its implementation, as regionalauthorities are crucial players in policy in these domains of policy making and are closestto the citizens. In this context it suggested adopting a code of conduct, to be developedby all relevant EU institutions. This would give the Semester a more territorial dimensionthat could then be implemented by the various Member States according to their'constitutional competences' and the 'sharing of competencies between national andsubnational level'.

For better monitoring within the Semester, after the Commission had launched thedebate with the 2012 Four Presidents' Report 'Towards a genuine economic andmonetary union', in February 2013 the Council agreed on systematically detecting andaddressing key employment and social challenges in the EMU. The October 2013Commission communication 'Strengthening the social dimension of the Economic andMonetary Union' drew the attention of policymakers to the fact that a deterioration inthe employment and social conditions in one Member State could hamper economicgrowth and well-being not only in the country concerned, but throughout the euro area.The Commission therefore proposed a scoreboard of key employment and socialindicators to allow for better and earlier identification of major employment and socialissues, especially those that ran the risk of generating effects extending beyond nationalborders. The scoreboard is now fully integrated into the EU economic governanceframework and was used for the first time during the 2014 European Semester process.It includes five indicators: the unemployment rate, the youth unemployment and not ineducation, employment or training (NEET) rate, gross disposable household income, the'at risk of poverty' rate of the working age population, and inequality in the distributionof income. Partly in response to Parliament's request, further emphasis was put on socialand employment issues in the analysis and the design of the CSRs in 2015. In the sameyear the Commission also decided to add three indicators relating to labour market

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adjustment issues to the MIP scoreboard11 headline indicators: activity rate, the long-term unemployment rate and the youth unemployment rate. Parliament urged theCommission to put these indicators on a 'genuinely equal footing with the existingindicators and suggested a possible social imbalances procedure in the design of theCSRs. The ECOFIN Council expressed concerns about the inclusion of the three additionalindicators claiming that 'the MIP procedure was established to focus on theidentification, prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances'. The 2016 AMRas part of the MIP included in its scoreboard three new social and employment-relatedindicators on activity rate, long-term unemployment and youth unemployment.

In its 2017 resolution on the European Semester and the social and employment aspectsof the AGS, Parliament welcomed progress towards achieving more balance between theeconomic and social dimensions of the Semester but called for more effort so as to'improve the political visibility and impact of the scoreboard of key employment andsocial indicators'. It also welcomed the Commission proposal for amending theregulation on the European statistical programme by including new social indicators topresent employment and social data in relation to macroeconomic data, and stressedthat employment indicators should be put on equal footing with macroeconomic ones,thus allowing them to trigger an in-depth review and corrective action.12 This is not thecase to date.

For more social fairness, to ensure that the impact of the new macroeconomicadjustment programme is spread out equitably, and to protect the most vulnerable,Parliament also called for social impact assessments to be carried out prior to imposingmajor reforms in the programme countries and to consider the spill-over effects of thesemeasures. This was followed up in the case of Greece in August 2015 and was supposedto be carried out also in relation to any further structural support reform programmes.In order to avoid conflict between economic and social objectives, an EESC opinion from2015 suggested that 'all measures suggested in the European Semester – in accordancewith the horizontal social clause – must be subject to social impact assessment'. As formore economic convergence, the plan is for the Commission to progressively suggestbenchmarks and cross-examination exercises across policy or thematic areas, to foster acommon understanding of challenges and policy responses and to increase reformimplementation.

Looking at development of the content of the CSRs it has been shown that on account ofthe more developed monitoring methods an increasing number of CSRs have focused onsocial and employment issues. These studies explain that although the number of CSRsin general has been reduced over the years, CSRs can target social and employmentissues both directly and indirectly. Moreover, the increasing involvement of theEmployment Committee (EMCO) and then the SPC and the Directorate-General forEmployment and Social Affairs at the European Commission (DG EMPL), as well as the

11 The MIP scoreboard consists of a set of key (or headline) and auxiliary indicators on economic,employment and social trends that can severely undermine economic growth, employment, socialcohesion and human capital. It now consists of 11 headline indicators and 28 auxiliary indicators. Outof the 28, 10 are social and employment-related. The employment and social indicators included in theauxiliary MIP indicators are drawn from the scoreboard of key and auxiliary indicators developed bythe Commission for the Joint Employment Report (JER) and the social OMC. Within the 11 headlineindicators only the three-year backward moving average of unemployment rate, with a threshold of10 % is employment and social-related.

12 This proposal was adopted on 25 October 2017, as Regulation (EU) 2017/1951.

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adoption of the principle of 'reinforced' qualified majority voting13 for the amendmentson the CSRs to support changes to the Commission's proposal, added to this trend.Further important organisational steps have included the reinvigoration of the socialOMC and preparation of the Joint Assessment Framework by EMCO and SPC at therequest of the Employment, Social Policy, Health and Consumer Affairs (EPSCO) Council.All of this has helped the EU's social and employment policy actors to be more influentialin the discussions on the CSRs and in the revision of the rules for the European Semesterprocess.

The Semester process and its development have raised issues around the relationshipbetween economic and social policy coordination. Critics of the social dimension of theprocess have developed three claims: that social objectives are subordinated toeconomic goals, where the main emphasis is on macroeconomic policies,competitiveness and fiscal discipline; that economic policy actors dominate social andemployment players in the decision making process, noting that economic actorsdominate in fields where there is 'hard' legislation at EU level, whereas their socialcounterparts are in fields where there are only 'soft' tools available; and finally, that formany the Semester process is a centralised mechanism that imposes structural reformson Member States including in areas of national competence (such as social andemployment policy) strengthened by threats of sanctions under the Stability and GrowthPact (SGP) and the MIP.

In contrast to these criticisms, another body of research argues that there has been agradual socialisation of the European Semester. They see a growing emphasis on socialobjectives in the AGS and the CSRs, intensified monitoring of national and EU policies bysocial and employment actors and their enhanced role in drafting, reviewing andamending CSRs, and finally less hierarchical decision-making arrangements within theSemester.

Moreover, a recent study points out that striking a better balance between economicand social issues is a necessity in terms of economics (to counterbalance possibleasymmetric shocks), social policy (to have more investment in human capital so as tocombat inequalities and poverty) and politics (great divergences can undermine thecredibility of the EU project), particularly in the euro area.

2.3. Funds and programmesSeveral European funds support the strengthening of the social aspects of governance,foremost among them the European structural and investment funds (ESI funds).14 Theyaccount for about a third of the EU budget in the 2014 to 2020 programming period.Their objectives, conditionalities and budget allocation strongly influence how theobjectives of EU economic governance are and will be achieved in the future.

Since their creation the ESI funds have been the EU's main instrument when it comes tostrengthening its economic, social and territorial cohesion. To make them more effectivethey were built into the Common Strategic Framework in the 2014 to 20 programming

13 Under the Lisbon Treaty, when the Council takes a decision based on a majority comprising 72 % ofMember States accounting for 65 % of the Union's population.

14 There are five ESI funds: the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF); the European Social Fund(ESF); the Cohesion Fund (CF); the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) and theEuropean Maritime & Fisheries Fund (EMFF).

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period. They are managed by the Member States by means of partnership agreementsand they are implemented through operational programmes. In 2010, the Europe 2020strategy declared as its objective to achieve smart, sustainable and inclusive growth, i.e.higher levels of employment, productivity and social cohesion. The Common StrategicFramework translated the five headline targets of the strategy (employment, researchand innovation, education, poverty reduction and climate change and energy) intoeleven objectives to be supported by the ESI funds.

In the aftermath of the crisis the development of the funds has been linked increasinglyto economic governance and macroeconomic conditionality. The adoption of the newESI funds regulation (Common Provisions Regulation (CPR)) in 2013 further aligned thefunds with the economic governance objectives. The regulation aimed to promote theimplementation of structural reforms in the Member States, target the regions most inneed, and aimed to ensure that no less than 23.1% would be spent on social inclusion,thus targeting the most vulnerable groups in society. It also introduced new procedures,including CSRs and relevant Council recommendations. The Commission aimed toimprove the link between reforms in the Member States and the ESI funds. In practicalterms it attempted to link the ESI funds to the achievement of the objectives of the CSRsin the respective Member States, and thus support structural reforms. Moreover, itintroduced additional instruments, such as ex-ante conditionality and strongermacroeconomic conditionality. In this way the funds increasingly became an importanttool to defend the macroeconomic environment of EMU. Critics of this developmenthave concluded that this 'policy overload' has led, in part, to the loss of the funds'solidarity function.

A 2013 Parliament resolution found that the new provision of macroeconomicconditionality might 'penalise regions and social groups already weakened by the crisis,with a suspension of payments possibly having disproportionate effects in severalMember States' (CPR Article 23). Nevertheless, after having introduced amendments tothe proposal that guaranteed that the Parliament would be informed in detail about anyplanned measures, and would be able to scrutinise all decision making proceduresleading to the suspension of funds, Parliament agreed to the proposal. Moreover,Parliament succeeded in introducing amendments ensuring that the suspension of fundswould be adjusted in line with the social and economic circumstances of the MemberState concerned. In its 2015 resolution on the ESI funds and economic governance,Parliament considered 'that Article 23 of the CPR must only be used as a last resort tocontribute to an efficient implementation of the ESI funds'. In this context Parliamentasked the Commission to 'immediately inform Parliament of the CSRs and Councilrecommendations that are relevant in the context of the ESI funds', as well as 'anyreprogramming request under Article 23'. In addition the Parliament has called in severalresolutions for a specific Council formation for cohesion policy, stating that such aninstitutional development would lead to a better flow of information and faster cohesionpolicy development.

The revision of EU cohesion policy is currently under way. The seventh cohesion reportconcluded, that as there had so far been no need to trigger Article 23, it was notnecessary to revise the proposal.

Assessment of the above described developments of the funds, however, is notstraightforward. A study taking stock of these developments and their results concludedthat the lack of evidence to date is partially the result of an insufficient alignment of the

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ESI funds and structural reforms, including their timelines, i.e. the yearly economicgovernance cycle and the longer-term perspective of the ESI funds. However, itpresented emerging evidence that ex-ante conditionality could improve investment andpositively impact public administration. Nevertheless, it also stressed that MemberStates and regions needed to take ownership of the reforms. As for the role ofmacroeconomic conditionality, it pointed to the need for a more comprehensive reviewso as to see how it contributed to structural reforms. In sum, it showed that the piling upof different objectives in relation to the ESI funds (i.e. macroeconomic stability or realeconomic and social convergence) had 'blurred the rationale and the primary goal ofstructural reforms'. Moreover, the extension of economic governance to cover cohesionpolicy may hinder its ability to deliver on long-term growth and investment, and its ethosof solidarity. It is in this context that ideas have emerged of making more use of socialindicators in the MIP as well as monitoring territorial development more closely andmaking cohesion policy part of a broader policy direction.

The European Fund for Strategic Investment (EFSI) launched in 2015 might alsocontribute to more investment in human capital. While, the fund was based mainly ontwo components between 2015 and 2017: innovation and infrastructure, and SMEs, theCommission proposed to strengthen and extend the fund by 2020. The original plan wasaimed at mobilising €315 billion of public and private investment so as to boost growthand employment. In the second phase, by adding an additional €26 billion guarantee, thetarget has grown to €500 billion mobilisation by 2020. EFSI has been criticised for notproviding enough incentives for social investment, apart from investment in purelyphysical infrastructure such as social housing, innovative infrastructure and the trainingof personnel. In 2016 social investment was modest: less than 4 % was used for socialinfrastructure and 1 % for social services. Some would also argue that the focus of thesocial dimension of the fund should go beyond social investment, be much more cross-sectoral and focus on promoting social cohesion. In a recent paper the European PoliticalStrategy Centre (EPSC) argued that the solution could be that a dedicated instrument beadded to EFSI providing pooled finance for additional investment in existingprogrammes, such as Erasmus+ or the Employment and Social Innovation Programme(EaSI). This could be a response to much of the criticism raised in relation to EFSI notbeing understandable enough for social actors, while also avoiding duplication betweenthe aims of funds, particularly that of the ESF, and thus rather reinforce them.

According to Article 25 of the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) Regulation, theCommission must present a proposal for the post-2020 MFF by 1 January 2018. In thiscontext the post-2020 development of cohesion policy is all the more important. Aresolution by the Parliament on the subject called for: better synergies between fundsand for EFSI not to 'undermine the strategic coherence, territorial concentration andlong-term perspective of cohesion policy programming'. It also called for harmonisationbetween cohesion policy and competition policy, in particular regarding state aid rules;and for grants to remain the basis of cohesion policy financing, whilst stating that loans,equity and guarantees can play a complementary role but 'should be used with caution'.Along similar lines a CoR opinion called for a new common strategic framework to coverall EU policies and funds having a territorial dimension, so that there is strategicconsistency in aims and instruments so as 'to avoid duplication and lack of coordinationof these interventions at both EU and national level'.

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3. OutlookOn 1 March 2017, the European Commission launched a white paper process on thefuture of the EU. For the transition stage between stages 1 and 2 in the process ofdeepening EMU, a white paper was planned in the Five President's Report to assessprogress made in stage 1 and to outline the next steps needed, including measures of alegal nature to complete EMU in stage 2. As a result of the size and extent of thechallenges the EU has been facing, by the time the white paper was published, it hadbecome a white paper on the future not only of EMU but also of Europe. Accompanyingthe white paper, five reflection papers were published too, also developing scenarios onspecific topics of particular importance at European level, notably on the socialdimension of the EU, on harnessing globalisation, on deepening the EMU, on the futureof European defence and on the future of European finances.

While the white paper explained the major challenges Europe is up against and describedfive subsequent scenarios for the way forward and their implications, the subsequentreflection papers provided scenarios on their particular subjects in relation to thesescenarios. The overall reflection process with a broad participation of stakeholders andcivil society should run until the next European parliamentary elections to be held in 2019and give a clear mandate from Member States for further European action. PresidentJuncker's State of the Union address in September already presented preliminaryoutcomes of the plans for the way forward. Moreover the Commission's 2018 workprogramme put forward concrete plans also in relation to the future of the socialdimension of European policies. These included: measures for better social protectionand working conditions within a social fairness package as well as a comprehensiveproposal for the new MFF beyond 2020, followed by proposals for the next generationof programmes and new own resources. It also envisaged further use of the EuropeanSemester process to promote quality growth and structural reforms as well as capacitybuilding in Member States' public administration.

When it comes to social governance, the main issues are how to combine and furtherdevelop existing European tools, both in terms of processes and content, so that theysupport the idea of quality growth in which economic growth is coupled with qualitysocial standards. In practical terms, this implies the questions of whether and how tomake certain existing governance mechanisms more participatory and binding, as wellas, whether any new mechanisms or tools are necessary, and if so, which.

The latest opinion of the EESC on the impact of the social dimension and the Europeanpillar of social rights – as the main future EU framework for social policies at EU level –on the future of the European Union, suggests a fourth scenario beyond the threesuggested by the Commission. The three scenarios of the Commission range fromfocusing exclusively on the free movement of workers, to developing what wouldessentially be a multispeed Europe, or genuinely deepening EMU across the 27 remainingMember States. The EESC's fourth scenario would focus on 'deepening the socialdimension where possible and focusing more on outcomes'. This would in turn supportmore upward convergence. In this context the opinion called for more binding measureswithin the European Semester and for a roadmap of joint initiatives in key areas whereEU action provides clear added value, particularly in relation to their outcomes.

Meanwhile, avoiding a multispeed Europe, if possible, seems to be an important elementwhen envisaging Europe's future and this is supported by Parliament and the CoR. Thusthey support the idea that the European pillar of social rights should become a reference

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framework not only for the euro area countries, but, eventually for all EU Member States.The proclamation on the pillar, finally adopted by Commission, Parliament and Councilto be officially signed at the Gothenburg Social Summit in November 2017, reflects thisview: the pillar was 'conceived for the euro area but it is addressed to all Member States'.

Better, i.e. adequate and suitable, indicators for monitoring social progress, possibly onan equal footing with economic ones is still an important issue. Several initiatives areaimed at measuring the social dimension of growth beyond GDP, arguing that GDP initself does not hold enough information on social progress. Moreover there is also a callto measure the social returns of policies and programmes. This, in turn, leads to thesearch for evaluation frameworks that integrate both economic and social criteria forevaluation. The CoR in the above mentioned opinion called for a 'social progress protocolin any future Treaty change, aiming at putting social rights on a par with economic rights'.The Commission work programme for 2018 sets the ambition of a 'social standardsunion' and promises to integrate the social scoreboard accompanying the pillar into theEuropean Semester so as to monitor progress. However, the relationship between thisscoreboard and the existing scoreboard is not clarified. The earlier mentioned EESCopinion called for more adequate and suitable indicators for the new social scoreboard.In addition, the debate about an equal footing for economic and social indicators withinthe MIP has still not been resolved. The additional three indicators added to the mainindicators were 'neutralised' in practice, i.e. transgressing them does not lead to an in-depth-review, whereas in the case of the other main indicators, trespassing theirthresholds might lead to an in-depth-review. The Commission decides after the in-depth-review whether macroeconomic imbalances exist in the country under review.

Some ideas are also emerging in relation to funds for strengthening social governance.In Parliament's above-mentioned resolution on the pillar as well as in other resolutionson the future of EU institutions there is a recommendation to introduce a 'convergencecode', i.e. targets, such as in the areas of taxation, labour mobility and pensions. Thiswould serve to strengthen the links between meeting these targets relevant for socialgovernance and access to EU funds, and other EU economic reform instruments incombination with fiscal incentives. Another idea emerging – mainly from socialstakeholders – is that of a 'golden rule' for public social investment. This would givehigher flexibility in the SGP and enable governments throughout the economic cycle toborrow only to invest and not to fund current spending. This, in turn would allowMember States to maintain productive social investment that might otherwise becometarget to budget cuts, so as to comply with the SGP deficit targets.

Finally, social governance can be also strengthened by giving EU social and employmentpolicy actors a greater role in monitoring, reviewing and amending the CSRs. This processhas been ongoing and as a result the Semester has become less hierarchical and moreinteractive, and the CSRs less uniform and less prescriptive. However, the Parliament'sresolution on the social pillar called for more joint meetings between the EPSCO andECOFIN Council formations with a view to promoting better coordinated socio-economicpolicies, as well as for regular meetings of euro-area labour and social affairs ministersserving to improve policy coordination within the Eurozone and address socialimbalances properly.

Given its complexity, the current EU governance system and its complex processescannot 'narrowly predetermine the outcomes of political struggles, but typically offermultiple opportunities and resources for strategic agency by contending groups of

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actors, whose effective exploitation depends on the latter's ability and willingness toidentify and act upon them'.15 Thus implementation remains in the hands of the MemberState actors but good framework conditions and incentives can be created for that atEuropean level. Research indicates the importance of improving understanding of theimplementation mechanisms of European policies. Finally, both the economy and societyare complex systems and understanding their interactions is crucial in order to rise tothe challenges posed by inequalities and other global issues.

4. Main referencesEuropean Committee of the Regions opinion, The European pillar of social rights and reflectionpaper on the social dimension of Europe, 10 October 2017.

European Economic and Social Committee opinion, Impact of the social dimension and theEuropean pillar of social rights on the future of the European Union, 19 October 2017.

European Parliament resolution on a European pillar of social rights, 19 January 2017.

European Parliament resolution on the European Semester for Economic Policy Coordination:employment and social aspects in the Annual Growth Survey 2017, 15 February 2017.

European Parliament resolution on the European Semester for Economic Policy Coordination:employment and social aspects in the Annual Growth Survey 2016, 25 February 2016.

Fernandes S., Social investment and the Juncker plan, Jacques Delors Institute, 17 July 2017.

Huguenot-Noël R., Hunter A. and Zuleeg F., Can the EU structural funds reconcile growth,solidarity and stability objectives? A study on the role of conditionalities in spurring structuralreforms and reducing macroeconomic imbalances, EPC Issue Paper, No 83, October 2017.

Love P. and Stockdale-Otárola J. (eds), Debate the Issues: Complexity and Policy making, OECD, 6June 2017.

Mainstreaming social and employment indicators into macroeconomic surveillance, Study forthe European Parliament's Committee on Employment and Social Affairs, Policy department forEconomic and Scientific Policy, European Parliament, 2016.

Milotay N., Social convergence and EU accession, EPRS, European Parliament, September 2017.

Redesigning European welfare states – ways forward, Vision Europe, 2015.

Taylor-Gooby P., Leruth B. and Chung H. (eds.), After austerity: welfare state transformation inEurope after the great recession, Oxford University Press, August 2017.

The macroeconomic imbalance procedure: Rationale, process, application: A compendium,European Commission, November 2016.

Zeitlin J. and Vannhercke B., 'Socializing the European Semester: EU social and economic policycoordination in crisis and beyond', Journal of European Public Policy, Taylor and Francis, 2017.

15 J. Zeitlin and B. Vannhercke, 'Socializing the European Semester: EU social and economic policycoordination in crisis and beyond', Journal of European Public Policy, Taylor and Francis Online, 2017,p.21.

Whereas economic governance is now undertaken inthe EU through a regulated, 'hard' framework, there isno equivalent framework for social governance. Atpresent, social governance in the EU functions mainlywithin the 'soft', unregulated realms, although it is alsomarked by some 'hard' governance mechanisms. Thispaper aims to give an overview of the social aspects ofEU governance. It looks at existing EU socialgovernance mechanisms and tools, including theircurrent state of play, the debates that surround themand possible avenues for their further development.

This is a publication of theMembers' Research Service

Directorate-General for Parliamentary Research Services, European Parliament

This document is prepared for, and addressed to, the Members and staff of the EuropeanParliament as background material to assist them in their parliamentary work. The contentof the document is the sole responsibility of its author(s) and any opinions expressed hereinshould not be taken to represent an official position of the Parliament.

PE 614.579

ISBN 978-92-846-2232-0

doi:10.2861/85290

QA

-06-17-270-EN-N