Do Enlargements Make the European Union Less Cohesive? An …homes.ieu.edu.tr/~aburgin/IREU 426...

Do Enlargements Make the European UnionLess Cohesive? An Analysis of Trust betweenEU Nationalities*

JAN DELHEYJacobs University Bremen

Abstract

This article analyses the impact enlargements have had on the social cohesion of theEuropean Union (EU), measured as generalized interpersonal trust between EUnationalities. Based on a quantitative-dyadic approach, Eurobarometer surveys from1976 to 1997 are utilized. The key result is that enlargements do not necessarilyweaken cohesion, but southern enlargement and the recent eastern enlargement did.The integrative effect of enlargement depends on the extent to which acceding nationsdiffer from existing club members in three main dimensions: the level of modern-ization (mechanisms: prestige), cultural characteristics (mechanisms: similarity) andtheir power in the international system (mechanisms: perceived threat).

Introduction

Although a certain degree of diversity is unavoidable in supranationalcommunity building (Zielonka and Mair, 2002, p. 103), eastward enlarge-ment in particular has been accompanied by fears that a European Union(EU) of 25 will be too heterogeneous – socio-economically, politically andculturally – to continue along the road to political integration. Scholarshave mainly dealt with the problem of diversity at the institutional level of

* I wish to thank Jens Alber, Wolfgang Merkel, Roland Habich and the anonymous referees for valuablecomments on an earlier version of this article. I am also grateful to Ulrich Kohler for providing excellentadvice in statistical matters.

JCMS 2007 Volume 45. Number 2. pp. 253–279

© 2007 The Author(s)Journal compilation © 2007 Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148,USA

the EU system (e.g. De Witte, 2002). The present article, in contrast, analy-ses the impact of enlargements on the level of social trust people havevis-à-vis other EU nationalities, thereby linking the issue to the broaderproblem of achieving social cohesion as a heterogeneous multi-nationalcommunity.

Whereas some of the founding fathers of integration studies, headed byKarl Deutsch, were very much concerned with the role a sense of commu-nity among the broad mass of citizens plays in the success of regionalintegration projects, later research agendas have largely ignored such issues(Cram, 2001). True, there is a small flood of literature on citizens’ attitudestowards the EU and European identity. However, little attention has beenpaid to how Europeans perceive each other. In this article I look at thestrength of horizontal relations between the Member States’ populations,measured as trust. Scholars from a variety of disciplines, including politicalscience, economics and sociology, claim that trust, as a core element ofsocial capital, is conducive to co-operation, the production of collectivegoods and solidarity. My premise is that trust is also beneficial at the Euro-pean level and that it tells us something about how cohesive the EU as apolitical community is.

Despite its potential importance, there is little information available onthe effects the several waves of enlargement have had on the EU’s socialcohesion as defined by mutual trust. This article analyses whether there isa trade-off between the two goals of enlarging membership to include evermore and heterogeneous countries, on the one hand and building an evercloser ‘union of peoples’, on the other. More specifically, are the stretchingof borders and the increasing diversity of member countries underminingsocial cohesion of the EU at large? I draw on selected Eurobarometersurveys from 1976–97 and adopt a new, dyadic approach in order to analysethe level of generalized interpersonal trust flowing between the EU nation-alities. The key result is that enlargements do not necessarily weakencohesion, but that enlargement to the South and, more recently, the Eastdid. The integrative effect of enlargements depends on the extent to whichacceding nations differ from existing members in three dimensions: thelevel of modernization, cultural similarity and their power in the interna-tional system. Section I starts with some conceptual considerations regard-ing the use of trust as a means of measuring social cohesion. Section IIdiscusses why a trade-off between enlargements and cohesion should comeas no surprise. Section III describes the database. Section IV tracks thedevelopment of trans-national trust over enlargement steps. Section Vanalyses the reasons why nations trust each other. The final section drawssome conclusions.

254 JAN DELHEY

© 2007 The Author(s)Journal compilation © 2007 Blackwell Publishing Ltd

I. Trust as an Indicator of Social Cohesion at European Level

It is important to make clear at the outset that this article deals with the EU asa community of peoples, not a system of co-ordinating governments. It isequally important to stress its concern with how cohesive the EU is as awhole, not how cohesive the individual Member States’ societies are. Finally,the focus is on how the populations feel about each other, not how they feelabout EU institutions or about the idea of an overarching European identity.For the purpose of this article, the Community’s social cohesion is defined asthe quality of relations between the Member States’ populations, measured astrust. This notion is completely different from the one the European Com-mission uses in their periodic ‘Report on Social and Economic Cohesion’,which provides a detailed picture of national (and regional) differences inincomes, economic structure and unemployment across the EU. From asociological perspective, the Commission equates cohesion with the absenceof marked territorial inequalities (Delhey, 2004a).

In contrast, departing from the classic work of Durkheim (1988), mostsociologists refer to social cohesion in a very different way, namely in termsof the extent to which people in a given society hold together (Chan et al.,2006). Two main approaches to cohesion can be distinguished. The first onehighlights shared norms and values across a group of people. A recent analy-sis (Gerhards, 2005) shows that the population of the EU-15, the ten acces-sion countries of 2004 and the three candidate countries do not adhere to thesame extent to a defined set of values. The recent accessions, and those tocome in the future, have a tendency to undermine cohesion in terms of sharedvalues. The second approach treats cohesion as a truly relational concept(Chiesi, 2002; Delhey, 2004a; Chan et al., 2006), a perspective which isadopted also in this article. In doing so, we are concurring with the followingreservation about shared values expressed by Karl Deutsch:

The populations of different territories might easily profess verbal attach-ment to the same set of values without having a sense of community thatleads to political integration. The kind of sense of community that is rel-evant for integration [. . .] turned out to be rather a matter of mutual sym-pathy and loyalties; of ‘we-feeling’, trust and mutual consideration; ofpolitical identification in terms of self-images and interests; of mutuallysuccessful predictions of behaviour and of co-operative action in accor-dance with it. (Deutsch et al., 1966, p. 17)

In building upon Deutsch, Delhey (2004a) has defined social cohesion as thequality of relations between members of a social system, whereby ‘relations’can refer to both solidary attitudes and their behavioural manifestations. Fromthis it follows that the EU’s level of cohesion depends, first of all, on the

AN ANALYSIS OF TRUST BETWEEN EU NATIONALITIES 255


quality of inter-group relations between the different national collectivitiesthat are assembled together. Hence the perspective applied is a trans-nationalone.1

The literature provides several possible indicators for social cohesion.Why choose trust? The main practical reason is availability of data. Of thekind of mutual perceptions we are interested in, trust is the only indicator thatis sufficiently widely available. However, there are also convincing theoreti-cal reasons. Whether as a part of social capital (Putnam, 2000) or in its ownright, trust has attracted interest from a variety of disciplines and virtually allthe research suggests that trust has a beneficial effect on human organizations.Trust is the expectation that others will behave in a predictable and friendlymanner (Inglehart, 1991). This includes the expectation that they will notknowingly do one harm and will look after one’s interests, if possible. Thebasic claim is that trust reduces transaction costs (Fukuyama, 1995) andevokes positive actions towards others (Sztompka, 1999), which facilitateshuman relations at all level, from small communities to large-scale entities.The main arguments can be summarized as follows (Sztompka, 1999;Uslaner, 2002a; Welch et al., 2005). Since, in a climate of distrust, many fearthat others will take advantage of their commitment, trust makes it easier tosolve problems requiring collective action. Trust is also said to include amoral commitment to others’ well-being. If we trust, we feel an obligation tohelp those who are in difficulties. In this sense, trust is a moral resource formutual solidarity. It is further argued that it strengthens the bonds of indi-viduals with the wider community, leading to a stronger collective identity.And finally, it is expected to increase our readiness to accept strangers, mainlybecause trust allows us to perceive them in a non-threatening manner. Trustworks against inter-group conflicts and xenophobia.

The very idea of a supra-national community of Europeans demands thatEU citizens feel positively about each other. Hence the kind of trust that isrelevant for the EU is the generalized trust in people from other MemberStates, which I refer to as trans-national trust. Its relevance seems plausibleon general grounds. First, the EU is a deliverer of collective goods and it hasbeen repeatedly argued that trust makes people more willing to take part intheir production. Second, EU membership implies solidarity with the otherMember States and their citizens, one concrete manifestation of which is theredistribution of financial resources from richer to poorer areas. Third, EUcitizenship opens up the legal boundaries of what were once relatively closed

1 The quality of relations (cohesion) can be distinguished from the mere quantity of relations (mutualrelevance), which can both be treated as two sub-dimensions of European social integration (Delhey,2004a). In this article, however, I deal with the former sub-dimension only, the quality of relations.

256 JAN DELHEY


national societal communities to mobile people from other Member States,who are provided with a status of quasi-nationals (Bartolini, 2005; Ferrera,2005). Finally, the European project involves handing over a good deal ofnational sovereignty to European bodies. This brings with it the risk ofdecisions being taken that are perceived to be against national interest. Politi-cal philosophers argue that, if such decisions are to be accepted, a strongsense of community is needed (Taylor, 2003). Precisely because the EUcannot rely on a kind of mechanical solidarity among its citizens (Münch,1993), trust can be assumed to be a valuable synthetic force. True, high levelsof trust should not be equated with an urgent longing for political unification.However, research underscores the political implications of social trust.Trusting personalities were found to have more confidence than misanthropesin co-operation between states as a means of resolving conflicts (Rosenberg,1957; Brewer et al., 2004). Genna (2003) found support for political integra-tion among EU citizens to be driven, among other things, by the level of trustin the other Member States. These findings suggest that supranational com-munities benefit from trans-national trust – and suffer from its erosion.

II. Geographical Extension and Increased Heterogeneity

Stepwise enlargements (see Table 1) have extended the EU’s territory inconcentric circles (Vobruba, 2003). In consequence, a sense of communityhas to be established between ever more distant and different units. In theoriginal EC, Brussels was a morning’s train ride or less from five capitals(Rose, 1996). By definition, all enlargements have increased geographicaldistances between the members. Average distance between their capitals hasincreased from 660 km (EC-6) to 780 (EC-9), 1,240 (EC-12), 1,350 (EU-15) and 1,420 (EU-25).2 The number of pairs of Member States sharingborders has decreased dramatically from 60 per cent in the EC-6 to 31 percent (EC-9), 20 per cent (EC-12), 15 per cent (EU-15) and finally 10 percent (EU-25). It is perfectly possible that the mere geographical expansionis a first barrier to trust, especially if one accepts the argument that prox-imity and familiarity breeds trust (Sztompka, 1999; Fukuyama, 1995).Putnam (1995) argues that it is difficult to maintain high levels of trustwithin large-scale forms of human organization. On the other hand, severalresearchers find no evidence that social trust in ‘most people’ is more wide-spread in smaller countries (Knack and Keefer, 1997; Delhey and Newton,2005). Moreover, in the modern world of the Internet and high-speed trains,

2 Note that this calculation actually underestimates the increase, since Berlin, not Bonn, was entered as theGerman capital for the EC-6, 9 and 12 as well.



Tabl

e1:

The

Step

sto

war

dsC

omm

unity

Enl

arge

men

t

Size

EC

-6E

C-9

EC

-12

EU

-15

EU

-25

Yea

r19

5719

7319

81/1

986

1995

2004

Wav

eFo

undi

ngm

embe

rsN

orth

wes

tern

Sout

hern

Nor

ther

nE

aste

rn

Cou

ntri

esB

elgi

um(B

E)

Fran

ce(F

R)

W-G

erm

any

(DE

)It

aly

(IT

)L

uxem

bour

g(L

U)

Net

herl

ands

(NL

)

plus

Den

mar

k(D

K)

Irel

and

(IE

)U

K

plus

Gre

ece

(GR

)Po

rtug

al(P

T)

Spai

n(E

S)

plus

Aus

tria

(AT

)Fi

nlan

d(F

I)Sw

eden

(SE

)

plus

Cze

chR

epub

lic(C

Z)

Cyp

rus

(CY

)E

ston

ia(E

E)

Hun

gary

(HU

)L

atvi

a(L

V)

Lith

uani

a(L

T)

Mal

ta(M

T)

Pola

nd(P

L)

Slov

akia

(SK

)Sl

oven

ia(S

I)

Sour

ce:A

utho

r’s

own

data

.

258 JAN DELHEY


common boundaries are no longer a prerequisite for intensive exchangesand maybe not for trust either (Inglehart, 1991).3

A second consequence of the enlargement pattern is the incorporationof heterogeneity. Historically, Europe was always characterized by diversity(Therborn, 1995; Rokkan, 1999). The main cultural divisions have beenbetween western and eastern Christianity (the 1054 divide) and later betweennorthern Protestantism and southern Catholicism. Language communitiesand language families demarcate further cultural divisions. The mainpolitical-economic division has been between the developed West and the lessdeveloped East. Even today, these differences have not been levelled out.Through enlargements, the Community has gradually incorporated this diver-sity, converting previously external differences into internal ones.

The founding EC members were all Catholic or mixed Catholic-Protestantcountries with largely similar levels of welfare, with the partial exception ofItaly. The first enlargement incorporated two predominantly Protestant coun-tries, Denmark and the UK, as well as Ireland, then a relatively poor andbackward country, but now a leading country in economic terms. With thesouthern enlargement of the 1980s, three less wealthy and more agrariancountries with recent experience of political authoritarianism becamemembers. Cultural heterogeneity also increased, particularly because Greecewas the odd one out, with its Greek Orthodox religion and own script. Withnorthern enlargement, three highly developed countries with a lengthy recordof well-established social democracy acceded, all of them well known – andsometimes even admired – for their neutrality and social harmony. Theaccession of Sweden and Finland swelled the ranks of the Protestant coun-tries. Linguistic diversity was also increased with the addition of the Finno-Ugric language family. The recent enlargement towards the East was of adifferent kind from previous enlargements and not only because ten countriesentered at the same time (Schmitter and Torreblanca, 2001). For the first time,former Communist countries joined the EU. The economic and social contrastwith Western Europe is striking (Heidenreich, 2003; Alber and Fahey, 2004),although some post-Communist countries are catching up at high speed.Slavic and Baltic languages have been added to the existing cultural diversity.Survey research has also found considerable differences in political orienta-tions and values (Fuchs and Klingemann, 2002; Gerhards, 2005).

Since similarity on specific attributes like values, interests or identities isusually seen as a precondition for trust (Earle and Cvetkovich, 1995) and the

3 Even more fundamentally, the relation between closeness and trust might be more complex than depicted.When tensions between two peoples are strong, a certain geographic distance might in fact be verywelcome because it makes them feel more comfortable with each other.



absence of prejudice (Rokeach et al., 1960), growing inequality and diversitywithin the Community might constitute a second barrier to European-levelcohesion. Empirical evidence is to a large extent supportive of this claim.Research in local communities found levels of trust to be lower in ethnically(Putnam, 2000) and racially (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002) diverse commu-nities. Cross-national research suggests that the ethnic fragmentation of agiven society complicates the emergence of trust (Delhey and Newton, 2005),just as marked social inequalities do (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002; Uslaner,2002b; Bornschier, 2001). The main question, however, is the extent to whichthese results can be generalized to a supra-national entity. To sum up, the 25national collectivities assembled together within the EU today are not onlymore distant but also more heterogeneous than ever before. To the extent thata sense of community is dependent on proximity and similarity, it is likelythat the enlargements have had a detrimental effect on the EU’s level ofcohesion.

III. Data and the Measurement of Trust

We rely on data from the European Commission’s Eurobarometer surveyprogramme (EB) and the related Central and Eastern Eurobarometer (CEEB).The Standard Eurobarometer is a biannual set of public opinion polls thathave been carried out in the Member States since the early 1970s. The surveysare representative of the population aged 15 and over in each country. Samplesizes are usually around 1,000 respondents per country, except for Luxem-bourg, with a sample size of 600, Germany, with 2,000 (since unification) andthe UK, with 1,300. The CEEB was conducted from 1990 to 1997 in Centraland Eastern Europe. In each country, around 1,000 interviews were con-ducted. Questions on trust in people from other European countries are notincluded among the core questions in either survey, but were included ninetimes between 1976 and 1997 in the EB and once in the CEEB (1990). Theanalysis is mainly based on EB 47.0 and CEEB 1, the most recent surveysavailable that include questions of the kind we are interested in. Additionalanalysis has been carried out using EB 46.0, EB 33.0 and EB 6 (see Table 2).4

The central indicator of trust reads as follows (EB 47.0):

‘Now, I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have inpeople from various countries. For each, please tell me whether you (1) tendto trust them or (2) tend not to trust them?’

4 Detailed information about the surveys can be obtained from the web page of the Central Archive,Cologne.

260 JAN DELHEY


A list of the 15 EU nationalities at that time (Belgians, Danes, Germans, etc.)follows, plus the Poles, Hungarians and Czechs as additional targets of trust.Hence, each respondent delivered a judgement about the trustworthiness ofpeople from the EU countries, plus some accession countries. The othersurveys employed provide similar information. Using this material, a second-order data set was constructed in which the unit is each nationality’s rating ofthe trustworthiness of each of the target nationalities (one-directional dyadictrust). For each pair of countries, an index of trust ranging from +100 to -100was computed, using the procedure developed by Merritt (1968). A value of+100 indicates that all members of a judging collectivity tend to trust peoplefrom the target country, whereas the score –100 indicates a complete lack oftrust. A score of zero indicates a balance between equally strong shares oftrusters and non-trusters.

The number of dyads to be observed increases sharply with the number ofMember States: six members result in 30 unidirectional dyads; nine membersin 72 dyads, 12 members in 132 dyads, 15 members in 210 dyads and 25members in 600 dyads, while 28 members would result in 756 dyads. Up tothe EU-15, the available data make it possible to draw a complete sociometricnetwork of trust relations, so that each nation can be analysed in two ways, asboth judge and target. For the EU-25, coverage decreases to 55 per cent (327dyads), because, firstly, not all the 2004 accession countries were included inthe list of target nationalities in the EB and, secondly, the CEEB trust questionwas put to respondents in three of the accession countries only. For the futureEU-28, coverage decreases slightly further to 50 per cent (375 dyads).

The construction of a second-order data set on the basis of informationfrom different sources is complicated by a slight change in the instrument. EB47.0 provides two answer categories, while the other surveys provide four.

Table 2: Trust Ratings Employed for this Study

Survey Year Judges: rating nation Targets: people from . . .

EBb 47.0 1997 EU-15 countries EU-15 countries plus PL,HU, CZ

EB 46.0 1996 EU-15 countries SK, TKEB 33.0 1990 EC-12 countries BG, ROCEEBc 1 1990 SK,a CZ,a PL EU-15 countries plus CZ,

LT, PL, BG, RO, TKEB 6 1976 EC-9 countries EC-9 countries

Sources: Standard Eurobarometer and Central and East European Barometer.Note: a The Czechoslovakian sample has been split into the two parts; b Eurobarometer; c Central and EastEuropean Eurobarometer.



This made it necessary to dichotomize the four answer categories.5 Althoughsome argue that four-point scales generally produce higher trust scores thantwo-point scales (Jagodzinski and Manabe, 2004), a cross-check betweentrust scores derived from EB 44.0 (four-point scale, dichotomized) and EB47.0 (two-point scale) yield an almost perfect correlation of .962, with a meandifference of only 1 on our scale from -100 to +100. Hence it is acceptableto dichotomize the answers.

Comparisons over time with EB 6 are additionally complicated by achange in wording:

‘Now, I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have inpeople from different countries. For each country please say whether, inyour opinion, they are in general (1) very trustworthy, (2) fairly trustworthy,(3) not particularly trustworthy, or (4) not at all trustworthy?’ (EB 6)

Although the term ‘trustworthy’ was removed from the question wording inlater surveys, I assume that the formulation in the more recent Eurobarom-eters also captures the respondent’s assessment of the trustworthiness of therecipient.

Do survey questions on trust deserve our confidence? Experimentalresearch has shown that customary dichotomous trust questions are indeedrelated to trusting behaviour (Fehr et al., 2002). Moreover, it can be argued thatthe EB instrument has advantages over the standard trust question frequentlyemployed in other surveys (‘Do you think that most people can be trusted, orthat you can’t be too careful in dealing with people’). Whereas there remainssome ambiguity about what is meant by ‘most people’, in the EB the targetgroup is clearly named, which increases comparability across time and space.The weakness both instruments share is the dichotomous scale, which may beregarded as a rather unsubtle measure. However, in this analysis the aggrega-tion of individual answers for each country delivers a more subtle measure.Finally, it would be preferable to have more than just one trust measure for eachtarget group (Rost, 2005). However, multiple approaches to trust are notunproblematic either (Jagodzinski and Manabe, 2005).

IV. Trust Among Europeans: Descriptive Analysis

Centrifugal and Centripetal Enlargements

Below, a Union of 6, 9, 12, 15 and – as far as possible – 25 Member States issimulated, following the historical expansions and using current (1997 or

5 EB 47.0: answer categories ‘(1) tend to trust them or (2) tend not to trust them?’ EB 46.0, EB 33.0, CEEB1: answer categories ‘(1) a lot of trust in them, (2) some trust, (3) not very much trust or (4) no trust at all?’

262 JAN DELHEY


latest) trust relations. The objective is to classify enlargements with respectto their impact on cohesion: some might have strengthened it (centripetalenlargements), others might have weakened it (centrifugal enlargements). Foreach stage of extension, Figure 1 displays distributions of dyadic trust: thosebetween established members (dotted line), those which are added due to newcountries joining in (dashed line) and the universe of trust ratings after eachenlargement wave (bold line). Additional information is provided in Table 1;for each enlargement step, dyads are broken down into four groups: commu-nity at large, members’ ratings of newcomers, newcomers’ ratings ofmembers and newcomers’ ratings of other newcomers.

To a large extent, the publics of the six founding Member States trusteach other, which is indicated by an average trust barometer of 48 (seeTable 3, mean trust score). For example, people from Luxembourg arestrongly trusted by the Belgians (the maximum score of 93) and by theFrench and Dutch. Only the Italians are rated by the Dutch as ratheruntrustworthy (-10, minimum score). North-western enlargement barelychanged the overall situation. The EC-6 population vest considerable trustin people from Denmark, Ireland and the UK and vice versa. In contrast,southern enlargement was a centrifugal one, especially because the south-ern countries vest below-average trust in the existing members of the EC-9and in each other. The Greeks show the lowest levels of trans-national trust,particularly towards the Germans and the British. Northern enlargementstrengthened overall trust. Highly consensually, people from these countriesare seen as trustworthy and they in turn exhibit high levels of trans-nationaltrust (the Swedes and Finns more so than the Austrians). Eastern enlarge-ment is comparable to southern enlargement. The surveys show a rather lowlevel of trust on the part of old EU members in citizens from the new,post-socialist Member States. Germans and Austrians seem to be especiallyworried about eastward enlargement for specific reasons, mainly massimmigration and job competition (Weiss and Strodl, 2003). Interestinglyenough, relations within the accession region are moulded by non-trustrather than trust. Whereas Western Europe is largely a region of mutualtrust and security, Central and Eastern Europe is not – or at least was notin the 1990s.

To sum up, the EU would today enjoy a higher level of cohesion measuredas trust if it were still composed of the nine countries of which it consisted in1973. The EU-25 is least cohesive. A key message from this descriptiveaccount is that enlargements might give rise to integration costs (as was thecase with the southern and eastern enlargements) but do not necessarily do so(e.g. the western and, particularly, the northern enlargement). Mere size andgeographical proximity seem not to be crucial. Rather, it depends on which



Figure 1: Trust over Enlargement Steps, Using Current Trust Ratingsa

0

.005

.01

.015

.02

dens

ity

−100−80 −60 −40 −20 0 20 40 60 80 100trust score, −100 to +100

EU−6, 1997

0

.005

.01

.015

.02

dens

ity

−100 −80 −60 −40 −20 0 20 40 60 80 100trust score, −100 to +100

EU−9, 1997

0

.005

.01

.015

.02

dens

ity

−100 −80 −60 −40 −20 0 20 40 60 80 100trust score, −100 to +100

EU−12, 1997

0

.005

.01

.015

.02

dens

ity

−100 −80 −60 −40 −20 0 20 40 60 80 100trust score, −100 to +100

EU−15, 1997

0

.005

.01

.015

.02

dens

ity

−100 −80 −60 −40 −20 0 20 40 60 80 100trust score, −100 to +100

EU−25, 1997

0

.005

.01

.015

.02

dens

ity

−100 −80 −60 −40 −20 0 20 40 60 80 100trust score, −100 to +100

EU−28, 1997

Sources: EB 47.0, EB 46.0, EB 33.0, CEEB 1.Notes: Solid line: total; Dotted line: existing dyads (prior to respective enlargement step); Dashed line:accessory dyads (due to respective enlargement step); a Current trust ratings = most recent available.

264 JAN DELHEY


countries are brought together. The candidate countries Bulgaria, Romaniaand Turkey are universally seen as rather unreliable both by EU-15 andAC-10 citizens. Thus it is foreseeable that the coming south-eastern enlarge-ment will bring increasing difficulties for the EU’s social cohesion. It is worthmentioning that the classification into centripetal and centrifugal enlarge-ments also holds if, instead of absolute levels of trans-national trust, we userelative levels, with trust in co-nationals serving as a kind of ‘natural’ yard-stick. Also in terms of relative trust, the southern and eastern (and probablythe south-eastern) enlargements weakened overall cohesion, while northernenlargement strengthened it. Enlargement to the north-west had virtually noimpact. Given this accordance of results, we feel justified in focusing onabsolute trust levels.

Table 3: Trust in Other EU-Nationalities: Decomposing the Impact ofEnlargements

Observations(dyads)

Meantrust score

Std. Dev. Mintrust

Maxtrust

Community at largeEU-6 30 48 24 -10 93EU-9 72 49 25 -10 93EU-12 132 36 28 -41 93EU-15 210 43 29 -41 96EU-25 327 29 36 -71 96EU-28 375 22 40 -79 96

Members acceding countriesNorth-western enlargement 18 46 23 3 93Southern 28 27 16 -1 55Northern 36 58 24 -12 96Eastern 60 07 26 -56 44South-eastern 48 -30 25 -80 10

Acceding countries membersNorth-western enlargement 18 49 29 -9 83Southern 27 15 31 -41 69Northern 36 47 29 -2 91Eastern 45 19 39 -71 76South-eastern = = = = =

Acceding countries acceding countriesNorth-western enlargement 6 61 18 38 79Southern 6 15 13 0 33Northern 6 79 9 65 90Eastern 12 -29 35 -70 47South-eastern = = = = =

Sources: EB 47.0, EB 46.0, EB 33.0, CEEB 1.Notes: Based on current (most recent) trust relations; italics denote incomplete coverage of dyads.



Some caution is warranted in evaluating eastward enlargement because wedo not have the information to fully assess its impact (section III). Onesolution is to project the missing trust ratings from those at hand. If we do so(see Table 4), the projected trust barometer of the EU-25 is 16, considerablybelow the value of 43 for the EU-15. This strengthens the impression of acentrifugal effect. On the other hand, only pre-enlargement data are available,which might not accurately reflect today’s trust climate in Europe. That is, thefeeling that neighbouring countries posed a threat to their national security,which was widespread in the post-Communist countries in the immediateaftermath of the break-up of the Soviet bloc, declined sharply in the course ofthe 1990s (Haerpfer, 2002). Likewise, Polish surveys reveal that sympathyamong Poles for several west and, particularly, east European nationalitieshas increased since 1994 (CBOS, 2005). In the old Member States, themassive, and by and large friendly, media coverage of enlargement in therun-up to May 2004 might have rubbed off on public attitudes towards thenewcomers. However, since German feelings of sympathy towards the acces-sion countries grew only slightly between 2001 and 2005 (Infratest, 2005),the latter effect should not be overestimated. We incorporated possibleupward trends in trust levels into three scenarios (Table 4). Even in the mostoptimistic scenario, however, the projected trust barometer for the EU-25climbs no higher than 24, still far below the level of the EU-15.

Table 4: Trust within the EU-25: Projections and Scenarios for 2004

TrustEU-15EU-15

TrustEU-15AC-10

TrustAC-10EU-15

TrustAC-10AC-10

Average(projected)trust score

Available dyadsNo. of observations from

EB / CEEB210 60 45 12 Total 327

Mean trust score 43 07 19 -29 29

ProjectionsNo. of projected dyads 210 150 150 90 Total 600Projected mean trust

scores43 07 19 -29 16

Scenario 1, mean trustscores raised by

+0 +5 +5 +5 18


+0 +10 +10 +10 22


+0 +10 +10 +20 24

Sources: EB 47.0, EB 46.0, EB 33.0, CEEB 1.Note: AC-10 = accession countries of 2004.

266 JAN DELHEY


Comparisons Over Time

It might be fairer to compare eastward enlargement with the EC-9 imme-diately after the first expansion. The data allow for such a diachronic com-parison.6 A comparison of this kind does put the impression that eastwardenlargement had a strongly centrifugal impact into perspective (Figure 2,left-hand graph). The distribution of trust ratings for the EC-9 of the 1970slooks not very different from that for the EU-25 in the 1990s. The EC-9’strust barometer was 36, compared to 29 for the EU-25. For example, theGermans now trust the Poles less but trust the Czechs and Hungarians morethan they did the Italians in the 1970s. Again, however, caution is warrantedbecause we do not have the information to assess fully the impact of east-ward enlargement. The projections have indicated that the ‘real’ level oftrust for the EU-25 supposably ranges somewhere between 16 and 24, sug-gesting that, at least in the short run, the social trust that may be needed tounderpin the ‘European project’ is in short supply, even when applying adiachronic standard.

6 The time series does not start until 1976, three years after the first enlargement.

Figure 2: Comparisons of Trust Levels over Time

0

.005

.01

.015

.02

dens

ity

−100 −80 −60 −40 −20 0 20 40 60 80 100trust score, −100 to +100

EC−9 EU−25

EC−9 in 1976 vs. EU−25 in 1997

0

.005

.01

.015

.02

dens

ity

−100 −80 −60 −40 −20 0 20 40 60 80 100trust score, −100 to +100

1976 1997

EC−9 in 1976 vs. EU−9 in 1997

Sources: EB 6, EB 46.0, EB 47.0.



Some cause for optimism might be derived from the fact that the WestEuropean barometer of trust has been on a largely upward trend (Inglehart,1991; Niedermayer, 1995; Delhey, 2004b). Figure 2 (right-hand graph)demonstrates this development for the EC/EU-9 with the help of two snap-shots taken more than 20 years apart. In 1976, a handful of dyads existedthat were moulded by low trust. At that time, the Germans, Dutch andLuxembourgers had a particularly negative stereotyped image of the Ital-ians, as did the Luxembourgers with regard to the Irish. Twenty years later(1997), prevailing non-trust in particular has become rare (for instance, theBritish still slightly mistrust the Germans and French and the Dutch slightlymistrust the Italians). Across all dyads, the trust barometer of the EC/EU-9has risen from 36 to 49.

The $64,000 question is: can we expect a similar development in the caseof Eastern enlargement? Some optimism can be derived from the fact that inthe past, those nationalities that were initially received with some scepticism– the Italians, Greeks, Portuguese, Spanish and Irish – did experience gains inattributed trustworthiness. In so far as this was connected either with mem-bership status or catch-up modernization, citizens from the ten new MemberStates may well come to inspire greater trust over time as well.

V. Why Do Nations Trust Other Nationalities?

In order to forecast the impact of coming enlargements on a more systematicbasis, it is helpful to learn more about the rationale behind the trust ratings.The analysis is based on the 375 most recent trust ratings available for theEU-25, plus the candidate countries Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey. Thedependent variable is the level of dyadic trust the single nations vest in otherindividual nationalities. The following considerations are tested against data.

• Does trust diminish with spatial distance? For the computations, thedistance between the capitals and the existence of common borders areused as predictor variables.7 Simple correlation suggests that geographi-cal distance is negatively associated with trust, while common borders isunrelated to trust (see Table 5, column ‘Gross effect’).

• Does EU membership contribute to trust? It is perfectly possible thatstate-level co-operation is converted into stocks of trust between people.This idea is empirically tested by introducing a variable measuring thecommon membership years of each pair of countries. The simple cor-relation indeed suggests that trust increases with common membershipyears.

7 A detailed description of predictor variables is provided in the Appendix.

268 JAN DELHEY


Table 5: OLS Regression on Dyadic Transnational Trust

Gross effect Model 1b/t

Model 2b/t

Geographical proximityDistance capitals -.195* 0.346

(0.21)0.006

(0.00)Common borders .042 = =EU membershipCommon EC/EU years .336* -3.135*

(-2.34)-1.004

(-0.70)

Cultural similaritySame language family .399* 5.435***

(4.16)5.456***

(4.24)Similar religious tradition (RELIGION 1) .186* = =Similar religious tradition (RELIGION 2) .508* 6.887***

(4.08)7.505***

(4.40)Value difference, post-materialism -.138* -1.123

(-0.80)-0.692

(-0.49)Value distance -.052 = =Perceived threatPopulation size, rating country -.012 = =Population size, target country -.0158* -5.175***

(-4.19)-5.489***

(-3.96)Enemies in WWII -.039 = =Modernization levelHuman development, rating country .360* = =Political freedom, rating country .278* = =Corruption, rating country -.331* = =Modernization (factor), rating country .339* 16.915***

(9.33)13.994***(7.15)

Human development, target country .669* = =Political freedom, target country .623* = =Corruption, target country -.655* = =Modernization (factor), target country .687* 24.715***

(14.40)22.759***

(11.49)

Geographical identifiersRating country = Nordic = = 3.869***

(3.17)Target country = Nordic = = 2.757*

(2.07)Target country = Turkey = = 1.897

(1.37)Constant 10.881***

(7.53)10.796***(7.56)

r2 0.654 0.668N 375 375 375

Sources: EB 47.0, EB 46.0, EB 33.0, CEEB 1.Notes: Gross effects: correlation coefficients, * = significant at .05 level (one-sided); Regressions Models1 and 2: independent variables are standardized, hence the b’s are directly comparable; significance levels* < .05; ** < .01; *** < .001 (one-sided).



• Is cultural similarity a necessary precondition for trust? Empirically,both language affinity and religious affinity (see Appendix for defini-tions), as two crucial aspects of cultural similarity, are positively asso-ciated with trans-national trust, but language more so than religion(RELIGION 1). The association for religious affinity becomes strongerif one distinguishes only between three religious backgrounds (RELI-GION 2), following Huntington’s idea of ‘civilizations’ (Huntington,1997). This may point to the fact that it is not religious divisions as suchthat impact only weakly on trust, but rather the division betweenWestern Catholic and Protestant countries. In another approach, a moresubtle and direct measure of shared values was created by using Ingle-hart’s index of post-materialism. There is indeed a significant but onlymild tendency to rate populations holding less similar values as lesstrustworthy. Another direct measure employed, a dissimilarity index ofvalues derived from a 28-country study by Gerhards (2005), turns outnot to be associated with ratings of trustworthiness.8 The correlationssuggest that citizens use simple heuristics (language, religion) ratherthan complex ones (values).

• Are big and powerful nations perceived as a threat? When populationsize is taken as a measure of power, populous countries indeed receiveless trust than less populous ones (Inglehart, 1991). In contrast, thepopulation size of the nation doing the rating is not associated with trust.Since wars are often mentioned as being of paramount importance for anation’s collective memory (Cerruti, 2001), we investigated whetherenmity in the Second World War draws people apart. However, across alldyads, former enemies are not rated as any less trustworthy than non-enemies. Obviously, the European project has been quite successful inovercoming the destructive rivalries of the past.

• The last consideration concerns the level of modernity. From the descrip-tive account of enlargement steps it is evident that wealth and democraticinstitutions are important for trans-national trust in two ways. First, assenders, modern (rich, democratic) societies seem to have generallystronger ‘trust cultures’ (Sztompka, 1999). Second, as targets, it isobvious that modern (rich, democratic) nations are trusted more, which isclose to the idea that prestige and reputation are the main criteria forattributed trustworthiness (Sztompka, 1999). I have collected three dif-ferent measures: the Human Development Index (HDI) as a measure ofsocio-economic development, the Freedom House index as a measure ofdemocratic freedom and the corruption perception index (CPI) as an

8 I am very grateful to Jürgen Gerhards and Michael Hölscher for sharing their database with me.

270 JAN DELHEY


inverse measure of good governance. Each of the three measures corre-lates strongly with trust in the expected way, particularly as a character-istic of the target nation. Although theoretically divisible, empiricallythey form a tight-knit syndrome of modernization (Inglehart and Welzel,2005). Thus they have been factor analysed into one single factor thatreflects each country’s level of modernization (see Appendix).

After the inspection of correlation coefficients (as reported above), the‘winning’ variables were entered in regression analyses (OLS). Two modelswere computed, which explain 65 per cent and 67 per cent, respectively, of thevariance in trust between nationalities. The key results for Model 1 are shownin Table 5.

• The target nationality’s level of modernization is of paramount impor-tance. The more developed a nation is, the more trusted its people are.9

• The more developed a society is, the more its citizenry trusts othernationalities. Existential security and reliable institutions of account-ability might help to solve the problem of the free delivery of trust,which is a central problem in human relations (Coleman, 1990).

• Trust is higher between culturally related countries, with both religiousand language ties being conducive to trust. In contrast, the more sophis-ticated measure of post-materialism loses significance in the regression.

• Perceived threat complicates trust. Small nationalities usually inspirehigher levels of trust, whereas powerful nations are perceived with somecaution, no matter how culturally close or modern they are.

• Trust between nations does not significantly decline with spatial dis-tance. Hence it is not proximity as such that explains why trust is higheramong less distant countries but the increasing commonalities that oftengo along with spatial closeness.

• The shared experience of working together within the framework of EUinstitutions has only a small effect on trust. Surprisingly, the regressioncoefficient is actually negative; however, this is an artefact caused by thefact that people from the Nordic countries give and receive more trustthan other Europeans. Since it happens to be that two of the three Nordiccountries involved here, Sweden and Finland, joined the EU relativelyrecently, the effect of common membership years shows up as a negativeone.

In a second model, geographical variables have been added in order to takeaccount of ‘Nordic exceptionalism’ (Delhey and Newton, 2005). This

9 The same results are obtained when the individual components of the modernity factor – humandevelopment, political freedom and corruption – are used in turn.



inclusion removes the negative effect of EU membership years, but does notchange the other main messages derived from Model 1. Yet it shows thatthere is indeed something special about the Nordic countries, beyondthe fact that they are rich, democratic, almost free from corruption andsmall. Another variable included is one identifying Turks as targets, becausetrust in Turkish people is low in most places. Since in the full modelthis identifier turns out to be not relevant, it can be concluded that thisrelative lack of trust in the Turks can be explained by the usual mecha-nisms: Turkey is less modernized, culturally dissimilar to the EU countriesand populous.

To sum up, dyadic trans-national trust depends heavily on three factors:level of modernization, cultural affinity and perceived threat. What deter-mines trust in the first place is a universalistic attribute which can be subjectto change, namely the degree of modernity. However, cultural particularism isanother important source of cohesiveness, so that cultural overstretch inconsequence of enlargements might indeed pose a threat to the Commission’saim of forming a cohesive community.

Finally, we take a closer look at the question of whether Communitymembership produces a positive balance on what might be called the ‘trustaccount’. To find an answer, a longitudinal approach was chosen by collectingfrom the EB and CEEB surveys every dyad for our set of 28 countries. Thisgives a total of 1,667 dyads, the earliest from 1976, the latest from 1997.10 Ina stepwise procedure, the effect of common membership years was testedagainst these data. The method used was a panel regression that holds con-stant those dyadic characteristics that do not change over time, such asdistance between capitals, language similarity and religious similarity.11 Thedifficulty, however, is to distinguish between two confounded effects: lengthof common EC/EU membership and time. A first computation (computationsnot shown) revealed that trust within a country dyad increases both withlength of membership and survey year when entered separately, but increasesmore strongly for the former, indicating that membership does more for senseof community than a simple time effect.

The next step was to look separately at dyads of members and of non-members (at least one of the two countries involved not being EC/EUmember at the time of the survey). For the former group, with every yearthat passes, trust increases slightly but significantly. Ten years of commonmembership result in a 3-point increase in trust (on a scale from -100 to

10 The ten surveys employed are EB 6, EB 14, EB 25, EB 33, EB 39.0, EB 41.1, EB 44.0, EB 46.0, EB 47.0and CEEB 1.11 The method is discussed under various names in the econometric literature, with ‘Covariance Model’ and‘Fixed-effects Panel Regression’ being the most frequent ones (Balestra, 1996).

272 JAN DELHEY


+100). For the non-member dyads, time has no such positive effect (in fact,it has a negative one).12 Hence, membership matters. Finally, it is crucial toknow whether membership status as such is responsible for the increase intrust, or another determinant which is somehow connected to EU member-ship and susceptible to change over time. This was tackled by taking thecountries’ level of modernization into consideration, measured by thehuman development index (HDI). With almost no exception, our 28 coun-tries have developed over time, which is indicated by increasing HDIscores. Computations for the dyads among EC/EU members suggest thatmembership as such is not conducive to trust, whereas an increase inhuman development is, particularly on the part of the nation doing therating. Hence what strengthens bonds between Community members is firstof all the socio-economic modernization effect that membership brings withit, rather than membership status as such.

Conclusion: Enlargements vs Cohesion?

My starting question was this: what has been the impact of successiveenlargements upon the EU’s level of social cohesion, measured in terms ofinterpersonal trust between EU nationalities? The key result is that enlarge-ments do not necessarily weaken cohesion. Northern enlargement actuallystrengthened trust levels. Southern and eastern enlargement, however, werecentrifugal expansions. The integrative effect of enlargement depends on theextent to which acceding nations differ from the present club members inthree main dimensions: level of modernization (mechanisms: prestige), cul-tural characteristics (mechanisms: similarity) and power in the internationalsystem (mechanisms: perceived threat). What produces a trade-off betweenenlargement and social cohesion is the ‘calculated inclusion’ (Vobruba, 2003)of less modernized and recently democratized countries. Recent enlargementhas made an already diverse Community even more diverse, particularly withrespect to modernization levels and culture. Without much doubt, the comingenlargements will also qualify as centrifugal, given the big economic gap andthe cultural differences between the southeast European applicant countriesand the Member States. Turkey surely is especially problematic, since it alsohas a large population.

12 The main reason for the negative impact is that the bulk of dyads in this group are ratings of EastEuropeans by West Europeans. East Europeans as targets were included for the first time in EB 33 from1990, shortly after the peaceful revolutions. In this honeymoon period, trust in East Europeans was quitehigh but cooled down afterwards (Delhey, 2004b).



The results point also to a certain degree of tension between the formal andinformal processes involved in creating a European societal community. Informal terms, EU citizenship grants certain rights and entitlements to all EUcitizens, irrespective of nationality. Informally – and in stark contrast – thereadiness to trust others varies according to nationality. The formal inclusive-ness of EU citizenship and the informal demarcations based on graded levelsof trust might come into conflict with each other. Moreover, inasmuch as astrong sense of community – common identity, empathy, trust – among thegeneral public is necessary to get further measures of political amalgamationaccepted (Genna, 2003), enlarging the Union weakens the opportunities fordeepening it. It must be admitted, however, that the individual Member Stateshold very different opinions about whether deepening is a valuable goal andit has been argued that, so far, each expansion has strengthened the EU as aninstitution (Lewis, 2001).

The data cannot tell us whether Eastern and the coming South-Easternenlargement will simply postpone or impede the emergence of a well-integrated community of Europeans. Some optimism can be derived fromthe fact that trans-national trust is not constant, but variable. There are goodreasons for saying that the best remedy against distrust of ‘distant’ peoplesis the modernization effect that goes along with EU membership. To someextent, Western Europe is exporting its political institutions and way of lifeto the Eastern countries and thus turning ‘Easterners’ into ‘Westerners’ inthe long run. However, the social psychological literature on group conflictreminds us that there is one crucial condition for growing trust, which isthat the new EU citizens should not be perceived as competitors for scarceresources, which is exactly how they are perceived in some old MemberStates (Rippl et al., 2005). Hence, in faltering economies, there is a dangerof growing anti-EU resentment, which might be directed against thenewcomers.

Correspondence:Jan DelheyJacobs University BremenSchool of Humanities and Social SciencesP.O. Box 750561D-28725 Bremen, GermanyTel + 49 421 200 3492 Fax +49 421 200 3303email: [email protected]

274 JAN DELHEY


mailto:[email protected]

Appendix: Coding of predictor variables

Geographical distance Distance between the capitals of each pair ofcountries (km, as the crow flies)

Common membershipyears

Number of shared years of EC/EU membership ofeach pair of countries, 1997 as reference year(scores from 0 to 40 years)

Language affinity Dummy variable with 1 = same and 0 = differentfamily of languages. The following groups wereidentified: Germanic, Romance, Greek,Finno-Ugric, Slav, Baltic and Turkish. France andBelgium were coded as belonging to the samefamily of languages

Religious affinity Dummy variable with 1 = same and 0 = differentreligions traditions. For RELIGION 1, fourtraditions were identified: Protestant, Catholic,Orthodox and Islamic. Bi-confessional countries,e.g. mixed Protestant-Catholic countries like theNetherlands and Germany, are coded as ‘similar’to both Protestant and Catholic countries. In asecond version, RELIGION 2, Protestant andCatholic countries are combined under the label‘Western Christian’, hence only three religioustraditions are identified

Value distance,Inglehart index

Dissimilarity index of shares of post-materialists.Database: European Value Study 1995–96

Value distance,Gerhards/Hölscher

Dissimilarity index of values across six areas oflife (religion, family and partnership, economy,welfare, democracy, civil society), followingGerhards/Hölscher (2005, Figures 7.1, 7.2, 7.3).The dissimilarity index has been computed fromdata provided by Gerhards/Hölscher. Original datasource was the European Value Study from 1999to 2000

Power The number of inhabitants (in millions) in 1997Enemies in SecondWorld War

Based on the classification allies, axis powers andneutrals, a dummy variable was created, with 1=enemies and 0 = not enemies



Human development Human Development Index 1997, combiningGDP per capita, life expectancy and grossenrolment ratios. Source: Human DevelopmentReport 2005

Level of corruption Corruption Perception Index (CPI) fromTransparency International, 1997 or later years,index reversed (10 = ‘highly corrupt’, 0 = ‘freefrom corruption’)

Political freedom Based on Freedom House ratings of politicalrights and civil liberties (7-1 each), for eachcountry a combined score of political freedomwas cumulated over 20 years (1976–97). Thehigher the score, the greater the freedom. Forcountries newly established during this timeperiod, the scores of the predecessor country weretaken for the missing years.

Factor scoremodernization level,rated nation:

Constructed from (factor loadings in brackets):HDI (.954); cumulated Freedom House score1972–96 (.924); Corruption level (-.869)

Factor scoremodernization level,rating nation:

Constructed from (factor loadings in brackets):HDI (.951); cumulated Freedom House score1972–96 (.936); Corruption level (-.778)

References

Alber, J. and Fahey, T. (2004) ‘Perceptions of Living Conditions in an EnlargedEurope’. Dublin, European Foundation for the Improvement of Living andWorking Conditions.

Alesina, A. and La Ferrara, E. (2002) ‘Who Trusts Others?’ Journal of PublicEconomics, Vol. 85, No. 2, pp. 207–34.

Balestra, P. (1996) ‘Fixed Effect Models and Fixed Coefficients Models’. InMatyas, L. and Sevestre, P. (eds) The Econometrics of Panel Data. AHandbook of the Theory with Applications (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Pub-lishers).

Bartolini, S. (2005) Restructuring Europe. Centre Formation, System Building andPolitical Structuring between the Nation-State and the European Union (Oxford:Oxford University Press).

Bornschier, V. (2001) ‘Gesellschaftlicher Zusammenhalt und Befähigung zurSozialkapitalbildung – Determinanten des generalisierten Vertrauens im explor-ativen Vergleich demokratischer Marktgesellschaften’. Swiss Journal of Sociol-ogy, Vol. 27, No. 3, pp. 441–73.

276 JAN DELHEY


Brewer, P.R., et al. (2004) ‘International Trust and Public Opinion About WorldAffairs’. American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 48, No. 1, pp. 93–109.

CBOS (2005) Stosunek Do Innych Narodów. (Warszawa: Centrum Badania OpiniiSpolecznej).

Cerruti, F. (2001) ‘Peace and War in the European Conscience’. In Cerutti, F. andRudolph, E. (eds) A Soul for Europe. Vol. 1, A Reader (Sterling: Peeters Leuven).

Chan, J., et al. (2006) ‘Reconsidering Social Cohesion: Developing a Definition andAnalytical Framework for Empirical Research’. Social Indicators Research, Vol.75, No. 1, pp. 273–302.

Chiesi, A.M. (2002) ‘Social Cohesion and Related Concepts’. In Genov, N. (ed.)Advances in Sociological Knowledge (Paris: International Social ScienceCouncil).

Coleman, J.S. (1990) Foundations of social theory (Cambridge: Harvard UniversityPress).

Cram, L. (2001) ‘Imagining the Union: a Case of Banal Europeanism?’ In Wallace, H.(ed.) Interlocking Dimensions of European Integration (Houndmills: Palgrave).

De Witte, B. (2002) ‘Anticipating the Institutional Consequences of Expanded Mem-bership of the European Union’. International Political Science Review, Vol. 23,No. 3, pp. 235–48.

Delhey, J. (2004a) ‘European Social Integration. From Convergence of Countries toTrans-National Relations between Peoples’. Discussion Paper SP I 2004-201,Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB).

Delhey, J. (2004b) ‘Nationales und trans-nationales Vertrauen in der EuropäischenUnion’. Leviathan, Vol. 32, No. 1, pp. 15–45.

Delhey, J. and Newton, K. (2005) ‘Predicting Cross-National Levels of Social Trust:Global Pattern or Nordic Exceptionalism?’ European Sociological Review, Vol.21, No. 4, pp. 311–27.

Deutsch, K.W., et al. (1966) ‘Political Community and the North Atlantic Area’. InDeutsch, K.W., et al. (eds) International Political Communities. An Anthology(Garden City: Anchor Books).

Durkheim, E. (1988) Über soziale Arbeitsteilung. Studie über die Organizationhöherer Gesellschaften (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp).

Earle, T.C. and Cvetkovich, G.T. (1995) Social Trust. Towards a CosmopolitanSociety (Westport, CT: Praeger).

Fehr, E., et al. (2002) ‘A Nation-Wide Laboratory. Examining Trust and Trustworthi-ness by Integration Behavioral Experiments into Representative Surveys’. DIWDiscussion Papers, German Institute for Economic Research (DIW), Berlin.

Ferrera, M. (2005) The Boundaries of Welfare. European Integration and the Terri-torial Restructuring of Social Protection (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

Fuchs, D. and Klingemann, H.-D. (2002) ‘Eastward Enlargement of the EuropeanUnion and the Identity of Europe’. In Mair, P. and Zielonka, J. (eds) The EnlargedEuropean Union. Diversity and Adaption (London: Frank Cass).

Fukuyama, F. (1995) Trust. The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity (NewYork: Free Press).



Genna, G.M. (2003) ‘Images of Europe and Europeans: In-Group Trust and Loyaltyfor European Integration’. Paper presented at the 2003 annual meeting of theMidwest Political Science Association.

Gerhards, J. (2005) Kulturelle Unterschiede in der Europäischen Union. Ein Vergle-ich zwischen Mitgliedsländern, Beitrittskandidaten und der Türkei (Wiesbaden:Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften).

Haerpfer, C.W. (2002) Democracy and Enlargement in Post-Communist Europe. TheDemocratization of the General Public in Fifteen Central and Eastern EuropeanCountries, 1991–98 (London: Routledge).

Heidenreich, M. (2003) ‘Regional Inequalities in the Enlarged Euroland’. Journal ofEuropean Social Policy, Vol. 13, No. 4, pp. 313–33.

Huntington, S.P. (1997) The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order(New York: Touchstone).

Infratest (2005) ‘Ein Jahr EU-Osterweiterung’.Inglehart, R. (1991) ‘Trust Between Nations: Primordial Ties, Societal Learning and

Economic Development’. In Reif, K. and Inglehart, R. (eds) Eurobarometer. TheDynamics of European Public Opinion. Essays in Honour of Jacques-RenéRabier (Houndmills: Macmillan).

Inglehart, R. and Welzel, C. (2005) Modernization, Cultural Change and Democracy.The Human Development Sequence (New York: Cambridge University Press).

Jagodzinski, W. and Manabe, K. (2004) ‘How to Measure Interpersonal Trust? AComparison of Two Different Measures’. ZA-Informationen, Vol. 55, Nov. 2004,pp. 85–98.

Jagodzinski, W. and Manabe, K. (2005) ‘Warum auch Mehrfachindikatoren manch-mal nicht helfen: Überlegungen zu einem multiplen Indikatorenmodell für inter-personales Vertrauen im Anschluss an die Anmerkung von Jürgen Rost’.ZA-Informationen, Vol. 56, May 2005, pp. 8–17.

Knack, S. and Keefer, P. (1997) ‘Does Social Capital have an Economic Payoff? ACross-Country Investigation’. Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 112, pp.1251–88.

Lewis, P. (2001) ‘The Enlargement of the European Union’. In Bromley, S. (ed.)Governing the European Union (London: Sage).

Merritt, R.L. (1968) ‘Visual Representation of Mutual Friendliness’. In Merritt, R.L.and Puchala, D.J. (eds) Western European Perspectives on International Affairs(New York: Praeger).

Münch, R. (1993) Das Projekt Europa. Zwischen Nationalstaat, regionaler Auton-omie und Weltgesellschaft (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp Verlag).

Niedermayer, O. (1995) ‘Trust and Sense of Community’. In Niedermayer, O. andNewton, K. (eds) Public Opinion and Internationalized Governance (Oxford:Oxford University Press).

Putnam, R.D. (1995) ‘Bowling Alone: America’s Declining Social Capital’. Journalof Democracy, Vol. 6, No. 1, pp. 65–78.

Putnam, R.D. (2000) Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of AmericanCommunity (New York: Simon & Schuster).

278 JAN DELHEY


Rippl, S., et al. (2005) ‘Die EU-Osterweiterung als Mobilisierungsschub fürethnozentrische Einstellungen? Die Rolle von Bedrohungsgefühlen im Kontextsituativer und dispositioneller Faktoren’. Zeitschrift für Soziologie, Vol. 34, No. 3,pp. 288–310.

Rokeach, M., et al. (1960) ‘Two Kinds of Prejudice or One?’ In Rokeach, M. (eds)The Open and Closed Mind (New York: Basic Books).

Rokkan, S. (1999) State Formation, Nation-Building and Mass Politics in Europe:the Theory of Stein Rokkan. Based on his Collected Works, Selected and Rear-ranged by Peter Flora, Stein Kuhnle and Derek Urwin (Oxford: Oxford Univer-sity Press).

Rose, R. (1996) What is Europe? (London: HarperCollins).Rosenberg, M. (1957) ‘Misanthropy and Attitudes towards International Affairs’. The

Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 1, No. 4, pp. 340–5.Rost, J. (2005) ‘Messen wird immer einfacher!’ ZA-Informationen, Vol. 56, May

2005, pp. 6–7.Schmitter, P.C. and Torreblanca, J.I. (2001) ‘Eastern Enlargement and the Transfor-

mation of the European Union’. In Loth, W. and Wessels, W. (eds) Theorieneuropäischer Integration (Opladen: Leske und Budrich).

Sztompka, P. (1999) Trust. A Sociological Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress).

Taylor, C.L. (2003) ‘Religion, politische Identität und europäische Integration’.Transit, Vol. 26, pp. 166–89.

Therborn, G. (1995) European Modernity and Beyond (London: Sage).Uslaner, E. (2002a) The Moral Foundation of Trust (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-

sity Press).Uslaner, E.M. (2002b) ‘Trust, Democracy and Governance: Can Government Poli-

cies Influence Generalized Trust?’ In Hooghe, M. and Stolle, D. (eds) GeneratingSocial Capital. Civil Society and Institutions in Comparative Perspective(Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan).

Vobruba, G. (2003) ‘The Enlargement Crisis of the European Union: Limits of theDialectics of Integration and Expansion’. Journal of European Social Policy, Vol.13, No. 1, pp. 35–62.

Weiss, H. and Strodl, R. (2003) ‘Das Thema “EU-Osterweiterung” in Österreich undseinen nord- und südöstlichen Grenzregionen. Zur Wirksamkeit kollektiverIdentitäten’. SWS-Rundschau, Vol. 43, No. 2, pp. 233–35.

Welch, M.R., et al. (2005) ‘Determinants and Consequences of Social Trust’. Socio-logical Inquiry, Vol. 75, No. 4, pp. 453–73.

Zielonka, J. and Mair, P. (2002) ‘Introduction: Diversity and Adaptation in theEnlarged European Union’. In Zielonka, J. and Mair, P. (eds) The EnlargedEuropean Union. Diversity and Adaptation (London: Frank Cass).



Do Enlargements Make the European Union Less Cohesive? An …homes.ieu.edu.tr/~aburgin/IREU 426...

Documents

Transcript of Do Enlargements Make the European Union Less Cohesive? An …homes.ieu.edu.tr/~aburgin/IREU 426...