SOBOTA, Katharina. Don't Mencion the Norm!

7/25/2019 SOBOTA, Katharina. Don't Mencion the Norm!

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International Journal for the Semiotics of Law W / IO [1991]

D O N ' T M E N T I O N T H E N O R M

y

KATHARINA SOBOTA

Johannes Gutenberg-Universit~t, Mainz

In mod ern democrac ie s mos t peop le seem to be conv inced tha t l aw

is a sy s tem co ns t i tu t ed by exp l ic i t no rms . Th i s op in ion i s ve ry com-

m on in s t at e s, such a s Germ any , wh ic h conce ive o f themse lves f rom

t h e b e g i n n i n g a s l eg a l e n t i t i e s - w h e r e t h e le g is la t iv e L o w e r H o u s e

o f pa r l i amen t , t he Bundes tag , i s t aken to be the mos t impor tan t in -

s t i tu t ion o f the po l i ty , and where pa t r io t i c f ee l ings a r e iden t i f i ed

wi th a p r ide in the Cons t i tu t ion (D. S te rnbe rge r : Verfassungs-

patriot ismus ).

This normative outlook i s the eve ryda y -ve r s io n o f a theo re t i ca l

concep t ion wh ich i s an o u tg ro wth o f the spi r it o f the En l igh tenm en t

and admi ra t ion fo r the successes o f sc i ence , r e f l ec ted in the pos i -

t iv is t ic m ov em en t of the la te 19 th and the ear ly 20 th cen tur ies . The

under ly ing idea o f th i s movemen t was to d i scove r (o r r ed i scove r ) a

r e a s on a b l e s y s t e m w h i c h c o u l d r e g u la t e h u m a n b e h a v i o u r b y m e a n s

o f a un ivoca l, comple te and com prehen s ive legal sy s tem, no t depen -

den t on the a rb i t ra ry med ia t ion o f judgesA

On e o f the f i rs t s ign if i can t r e su lt s o f th i s l ine o f though t w as a

s t a tu te in sp i r ed by the Pruss ian k ing Fr i ed r i ch I I , who was sympa-

the t ic wi th the French En l igh tenmen t . Th i s code , the Pruss ian Ge-

nera l Code of 1794 (Preu~isches Allgemeines Landrecht), was in -

t ended to de f ine eve ry l ega l r e l a t ionsh ip in the Pruss ian coun t r i e s .

I t wa s to be a l l -encompassing , reasonable and b ind in g for a ll t ime. I t

con ta in ed a t leas t 19 ,000 sec t ions , se l f -con f ident ly cro w ne d w i th

gene ra l p roh ib i t ion o f jud ic ia l in t e rp re ta t ion . Ul t ima te ly , a s con -

temp ora r i e s no ted , th is suppo sed ly pe r f ec t code tu rned ou t to be an

u n w i e l d y , a n d s o m e t i m e s r i d ic u l ou s , h e a p o f r ul es , w h i c h w a s o u t -

1 Franz Wieaker , Privatrechtsgeschichte der Neuzeit (G6tt ingen:

Va nde nho eck & R uprecht, 1967, 2. ed.), 322ff.


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46 KATHARINA SOBOTA

date d in its chief parts even before being published.2

This experience should have foreshadowed the dubiousness of an

omni-c ompete nt law, which seems to foresee each individual con-

flict and to organize huma n communa l life as an engineer constructs a

machine. Nevertheless, this ideal became a part of the stock of so-

cial delusions. Concurre ntly, a basic belief develope d that legal

decision-making was a process of finding and ap plying these instru-

mental norms -- norms which were thought to define and direct the

realm of the Ou gh t as exactly and logically as the laws of

classical physics once were deemed to direct nature.3

At the theoretical level, this mixture of rationalism and scien-

tism became the nutrient for all positivistic methodo logy, and

provid ed the ideological backdr op for the move men t of codification

beginning in the 18th century,4 as well as for the pure , 5 logicar 6 or

analytical 7 schools, which have survived until today.8

A second source for the belief in the heg emo ny of explicit norms

lies in the unweake ned plausibility of syllogisms. The every day

informal concept of syllogisms that was developed in late antiquity

and the middle ages holds that the norm is a universal attribution

linking two abstract terms. (All A s are Bs . A norm of this type is

des igned to be the major premise of a syllogism. (All

As

are

Bs;

this

C is an A; therefore, this C is a B.)

2 Ibid 334. This critique should not conceal that the Prussian General

Code (ALR) had its merits; inter alia it effected a remarkable progress in the

question of the rule of law and legal protection.

3 Cf. Hannah Arendt, Vita Activa (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1960), 44.

4 E.g., the

Codex juris Bavarici judicalis

of 1753, the

Codex Maximilianus

Bavaricus civilis of 1756, the Prussian Gerichts-Ordnung of 1793, the ALR of

1794, the Code Civil of 1804 and the Austrian ABGB of 1811.

Hans Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre (Wien: Franz Deuticke, 1960, 2 ed.).

6 E.g., Ulrich Klug, Juristische Logik (Berlin: Springer, 4th ed., 1982, 1st

ed., 1950); Hans Joachim Koch, Helmut Rfit~mann,Juristische Begrand-

ung sleh re. Eine Einflihrung in Grundprobleme der Rechtswissenschafl

(Mfinchen: C.H. Beck, 1982).

7 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961).

8 Peter Goodrich, Legal Discourse (New York: MacMillan Press, 1987), 3,

15ff., 33ff.


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DO N'T MENTION THE NORM 47

R h e t o r i c i a n s 9 a r e s c e p ti c a l a b o u t t h e s e i n t e ll e c t u al s y s t e m s .

F r o m t h e i r p e r s p e c t i v e , n e i t h e r u n i v e r s a l a t t r i b u t i o n s n o r i n s t r u -

m e n t a l r u l e s c o n s t i t u t e t h e m a i n f r a m e w o r k o f l e ga l d i s c o u rs e . ~

T h e y a r e o n l y o n e o f v a ri o u s d e v i c e s w h i c h a r e p r o d u c e d f o r c o n -

s t ruc t ing the ar t i fic ia l, bu t e f f icac ious rea l i ty ca l led law.

N e v e r t h e l e s s , a c a d e m i c d is c o u r se t e n d s t o i d e n ti f y n o r m a t i v e

ph en om en a w i th the ac tua l i za t ion o f in s t ru me n ta l r u le s . 1~ M ore -

ove r , t h i s mod ern pos i t ion i s r e in fo rced by the po w er o f an anc ien t

concept , the con cept o f the sy l log ism.

In ana ly t i ca l r he to r i c , we do no t be l i eve in e i the r o f these con -

cep ts . We do no t th ink tha t lega l p r ac t i ce i s go ve r ned e i the r by

major premises or by ins t rumenta l norm s.

W e p r e f e r th e w e a k e r c o n c e p t o f regularities. Regu la r i t i e s , a s

w e u n d e r s t a n d t h e m , a r e n e i t h e r a s g e n e r a l n o r a s p e r m a n e n t a s

those o f c l ass ica l phys ic s were supp osed to be . The y a r e dyna mi c

c y b e r n e t i c f o rm a t io n s l ike the l iv ing ne twork of a ce l l o r l ike sea-

sons , fash ions , r i tua ls o r beh avio ur pa t te rns . Regular i t ies a re pa t -

t e r n s , n o t s t r u c t u r e s o r r u l e s - - p a t t e r n s c o n s t r u c t e d b y a n

obse rve r , o r cons t ruc ted by an obse rv ing d imen s ion wi th in the sy s tem

i t se l f .

Regu la r i ti e s do not direct or control n a t u r e a n d t h e y g iv e no uni-

versal description of na tu re . The y a r e pa r t o f a ll l i v ing act ion , they

o rgan ize these act ions and they a r e p ro duc ed by these ac t ions.

I th ink tha t the p rocess o f lega l dec i s ion -mak ing i s no t gove rn ed

b y u n i v e r s a l n o r m s , b u t i s s h a p e d a n d c o n s t i tu t e d b y s u c h c h a n g e -

ab le , se l f -o rgan ized pa t t e rn s , wh ich a r e o f t en a r t i cu la t ed a s ru le s ,

bu t a r e r ea l ly on ly r egu la r i t ie s .

A c c o r d i n g l y , w h o e v e r w a n t s t o d i s c l o s e t h e b a s i c p a t t e r n s o f

n o r m a t i v e c o m m u n i c a t i o n s h o u ld e x a m i n e t h e r h e t o ri c o f j u dg e s a n d

9 Cf. Ot tm ar Ballweg, Ana lytica l Rhetoric, Semiotic and Law , in R.

Kevelson (ed.), Law and Semiotics,Vol. I (New York and London: Plenum,

1987), 25-33: En tw urf eine r an alytisch en R hetorik , in H. Schanze (ed.),

Rhetorik und Philosophie {M~inchen: Fink, 1989), 223-247.

10 Jam es Boyd White, Heracles Bow. Essays on the Rhetoric and Poetics

of the Law, (Madison: Un iversit y of Wisconsin Press, 1985), 29f, 97L

11 j. B. White, ibid., 27; Bernard S. Jackson, Law, Fact and Narrative

Coherence

(Merseyside: Deborah Charles Publications, 1988), 3, 89, 106.


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48 KATHA RINA SOBOTA

la w ye r s 12 r a the r than the soc ia l eng inee r ing o f ou r d ays o r the d i -

a lec t ica l s tu d ies of log ic ians .

In do ing th i s , one shou ld no t igno re the f ac t tha t a t a ce r t a in

l e v e l o f c u l t u r a l c o m p l e x i t y m a n y d i s c o u r s e s b e c a m e i n t e r t w i n e d

with the rhe tor ic of expl ic i t ru les : e .g . , Egypt ian tax orders , the Ten

C o m m a n d m e n t s o r t h e C o d e s o f D r a c o n a n d S o lo n. H o w e v e r , t h e s e

n o r m s w e r e o n l y a n a r r o w s e g m e n t o f t h e ci rc le o f o t h e r n o r m a t i v e

fo rma t ions , such a s r i tua l s , cu s toms , pa rab le s , emo t ive s igna l s , o r

p rec eden t s . Tod ay , wi th the vas t p ro l i f e r a t ion o f s t a tu te s , t h is

quan t i t a t ive r e l a t ion has pe rhaps been r eve r sed . Bu t st il l, j ud ic ia l

dec i s ion -mak ing is based on nea r ly the sam e pa t t e rn s a s in the ea r l -

ies t day s o f jud ic ia l rhe tor ic .

To w ork ou t these rhe to r ica l pa t t e rn s , it migh t be u se fu l to ana -

l y z e t h e inner form of spec i f i c types o f l ega l d i scou r se , such a s

p lead ings o r dec i sions in Ge rma n p roceed ings .

In con t r a s t to ju r i sp ruden t i a l in t e rp re ta t ions , r he to r i cal ana ly s i s

conceives of a legal tex t as a

concrete technique

used by a pa r t i cu la r

pe rso n in a specif ic si tuation. 13 The

situation

i s r ega rde d a s an open

sys tem, wh ich i s cons t i tu t ed by va r ious in f luences , whe the r soc ia l ,

eco nom ic , cu l tu ra l o r b io log ica l . The

inner form

of the spe ech is re -

ga rded a s a f l ex ib le r egu la r i ty , r a the r than a s a pe rmanen t s t ruc -

ture . The

method

fo r iden t i fy ing rhe to r i ca l pa t t e rn s i s a r a the r im-

pe r f ec t , bu t consc ious combina t ion o f sc ien t if i c e l em en t s ex te rna l

po in t o f v iew) wi th the t r ac ing o f t r ad i tiona l he rme neu t i c s in t e rna l

poin t o f v iew) .

II

Even thou gh the rhe to r ica l app roac h p roceeds on the a ssum pt ion

tha t lega l d i scou r se is shaped by r egu la r i t ie s and no t by in s t rumen -

ta l ru les or un iversa l a t t r ibu t ions , there i s no doubt tha t i t i s some-

t imes in f luenced by the idea of un ive r sa l and pe rmanen t s t ruc tu res .

Legal dec i s ions a r e o f t en fo rmu la ted in t e rms o f in s t rumen ta l no rms ,

12 For th e emph asis on concre te decisions: Jackson, ibid. 98ff., 106ff.

13 Fun dam entally about the situative character of law: The odor Viehwe g,

Topik und Jurisprudenz

Mfinchen: C.H. Beck, 1974, 5. Aufl.), Engl. v ers ion ,

trans. W ayne C. Durham,

Topic and Law

Frank furt/M .: P eter Lang, 1991),

forthcoming.


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DO N T MENTION THE NORM 49

fac tua l p remises , no rma t ive sy l log is tic conclusions , and so on .

1. The f i rs t dom ain o f such fo rmu la t ion is the f i eld o f modern

legislation. I n t h i s f i e l d t h e c o n c e p t o f m e c h a n i c a l , i n s t r u m e n t a l

r u l e s i s t h e u n d e r l y i n g i d e a o f l e g i s la t i v e a c t i vi t y . O f c o u r s e ,

s t a tu te s do no t func t ion l ike the ru le s o f c l ass ica l mechan ics o r th e

p r o g r a m o f a c o m p u t e r , b u t s o m e t i m e s t h is i d e a is r e fl e c t ed i n a

s t r ic t ly r egu la ted a r ea o f soc ia l rea l ity . Exam ples o f wh a t I have in

mind migh t be : mi l i t a ry se rv ice , t r a f f i c r egu la t ions in Swi tze r l and ,

but no t necessar i ly in Rom e or Par is.

2 . The second dom ain in wh ich un ive r sa l no rm s seem to appea r

is the rhetoric of reasoning e s p e c i a l l y t h e r h e t o r i c o f l a w y e r s a n d

judges. I n th is dom ain we sense the fo rce and pe rvas iveness o f sy llo -

gisuls

As I wi l l a t tempt to show in what fo l lows, the concept o f sy l lo -

g ism is no t mere ly an il lus ion . I t

is

an i l lus ion , bu t an i l lus ion wi th

ve ry pow er fu l e f fec ts . I t i s one o f the s t ronges t unde r ly in g ideas o f

w e s t e r n t h o u g h t a n d l eg al d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g , a n d a s s u ch it m o u l d s

lega l d i scou r se , som et imes to such an ex ten t tha t i t i s con fused w i th

rea l i ty i t se l f - - as

if

lega l reasoning were sy l log is t ic .

Wh a t i s the d i f f e r ence be tw een the academic t h e o r y o f t h e n o r -

m a t i v e s y l l o g i s m a n d t h e

rhetorical

app roach r e f e r r ing to the in -

f luence o f the idea o f the no rm a t ive sy l log i sm?

From the rhe to r i ca l po in t o f v iew , the sy l log ism is not a method

of deciding

but a

style of presenting

the legal dec is ion .

The sy l log ism is a rhe tor ica l

form

and no t a subs tan t ive , o r ob -

jec t ive order .

T h e d i f f e r en c e b e t w e e n t h e a c a d e m i c v i e w o f t h e s y l lo g i s m a n d

i t s p r a c t i c a l u s e c a n b e i l l u s t r a t e d w h e n o n e l o o k s a t t h e m a j o r

prem ise o f the a l leged sy l log isms in legal texts .

A c a d e m i c t h e o r ie s p o s t u l a t e t h e

verbaIisation

o f t h e u n d e r l y i n g

p remises . Aca dem ics t end to be l i eve e i the r in an ove r ly ph ilo so -

ph ica l concep t o f sy l log i sm o r in a pos i t iv i s t i c concep t o f in s t ru -

men ta l p r inc ip le s o r in a mix tu re o f bo th . I n an y even t , t hey a sk

the i r s tuden t s to exp l ica te no rm s f rom wh ic h they p re ten d to de r ive

the i r dec i s ion . Th ey a sk yo un g ju r i st s

to mention the norm. Thi s

t endency r e f l ec t s a be l i e f in the p r inc ip le s o f r a t iona l i ty , t r ans -

pa rence and the sp i ri t o f En l igh tenmen t .

As I wa n t to demons t r a t e , a good judge in an ex tens ive ly cod i fi ed

l e g a l s y s t e m

never indulges in citing the major premises

o f m o s t o f


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50 KATHARINA SOBOTA

the sy l log i sms he pretends to be the bas i s fo r h is dec i s ion .

M y h y p o t h es i s i s t h a t i n l eg a l s y s t em s wh i ch a re ex t en s i v e l y

codi f i ed a judge never verba l i zes any major p remise . In l ega l sys te ms

wi t h a l o we r d eg re e o f co d if i ca ti o n t h e j u d g e o f t en ex p l i ca t e s o n e o r

two prem ises o f the t en , twen ty o r f if ty he i s a l lud ing to .

Acco rd i n g l y , acad em i c ad v i ce t o m ak e a l l n o rm s ex p l i c i t i s v e ry

counterproduct ive .

T h u s , i f o n e w a n t s t o s u p p o r t l e g al c u lt u r e, i t w o u l d b e v e r y

p a rad o x i ca l t o o p t fo r t h e v e rb a li s a t io n o f n o rm s . Co n v er s e l y , i f o n e

wan t s t o co n fu s e t h e s t u d en t s an d u p s e t t h e l eg a l s y s t em , t h e m o s t

d ev i o u s ap p ro ach wo u l d b e t o r eq u i r e a l l t h e j u r i s t s t o s t a t e a l l t h e

n o rm s t h ey i m ag i n e t h ey a re u si n g . As a rhe t o ri c ian , I d o n ' t wa n t t o

as s es s p ed ag o g i ca l a i m s - - I s i m p l y wan t t o ex p l a i n rh e t o r i ca l co n -

sequences.

T o g i v e a n e x a m p l e o f t he c o u n t e r p r o d u c t i v e p o w e r o f no r m - e x-

p l i ca t i o n , we can ex am i n e a v e ry t y p i ca l p as s ag e f ro m a d ec i s i o n ,

w h i c h a l so s h o w s t h e s c h e m e o f t h e r e a s o n s f o r th e d e c i s i o n ,

whic h i s usual ly em plo ye d b y Ge rma n t r ia l cour t s ( t ex t A). 14

As b ac k g ro u n d i t s h o u l d b e n o t ed t h a t t h e Germ a n Ci v i l Co d e ,

i .e . the B 6rger l i ch es Ge se tz bu ch (BGB), con ta ins a ser ies o f ru les

co n ce rn i n g t h e

negotiorum gestio

( in German,

'Gesch~ftsfiihrung ohne

Auftrag ; wh i ch can p e rh ap s b e t ran s l a t ed a s i m p l i ed ag en cy ) , is

On e o f t h es e s ec ti o n s ( 6 83 BGB) p ro v i d e s t h a t W h o e v e r co n d u c t s

an o t h e r ' s a f f a i rs w i t h o u t au t h o r i t y t o d o s o , ac t i n g in acco rd an ce

wi th the in teres t and in ten t ion of the person concerned , i s en t i t l ed to

c l a i m co m p en s a t i o n fo r h i s ex p en s es , e .g . : f o r t h e am o u n t h e s p en t

for ca l l ing the f i remen and requ es t ing the m to ex t ingu ish the f i re a t

h i s n e i g h b o u r ' s h o u s e .

Th e r ep res en t a t i v e p as s ag e we wi l l u s e a s an ex am p l e r ead s a s

fo l l o ws :

Text A: (1) The action is well fou nde d. (2) The plaintiff is entitled to

claim 10,000 DM as com pensation for his expenses. (3) The facts as

prov ed in the proceed ings comply with the requirements of Section 683

of the Ge rman Civil Co de ( BGB ). (4) In particular, the court had to

recognize that th e plaintiff is an ag ent w ho con ducte d the affairs of the

defendant .

14 Of course the translation is imperfect, bu t I hop e that the rhetorical

schem es will be satisfactorily con vey ed.

15 Gesc h/ifts~hru ng ohne Auftrag, ~677ff. BGB.


7/16


Read i n g t h i s t ex t , a j u r i s t w i t h s em i o t i c i n t e r e s t can d i s co v e r a

hir,,t - - o r a re ference - - to one a ckn ow ledg ed norm: Sect ion 683 BGB.

W h a t i s n o t e w o r t h y h e r e i s t h a t t h e t e x t d o e s n o t q u o t e t h e e n t i r e

tex t o f th i s norm; i t on l y quotes f ragmen ts ( a f fa i rs , ' com pensa t ion

fo r ex p en s es ) . Wh a t i s ev en m o re i n te re st in g , h o w ev er , is t h a t if we

a re p a r ti c i p an t s i n t h e leg a l d i s co u r s e - - p a r t i c ip a t i n g o b s e rv e r s - -

we f ee l t h a t t h e t ex t i m p l i e s m an y o t h e r r e f e ren ces t o m an y o t h e r

norm at ive cons truc ts .

W hat a re these cons t ruc t s l ike? In m y op in ion , i t i s s im ply non-

sensical

an d d es t ru c t i v e t o m ak e t h es e i m p l i ed n o rm a t i v e c o n s t ru c t s

exp l ic i t. But jus t fo r sc ient i fi c fun (and to p r ov e my hyp othe s i s ) I

s h a l l t ry t o l i s t s o m e o f t h e n o rm s wh i ch s eem t o b e i m p l i ed b y t h e

fo reg o i n g p as s ag e - - a l t h o u g h t h i s wo u l d b e i m p o s s i b l e i n o rd i n a ry

l i f e .

1. If a pla inti ff is entitled to claim what he claims his action is

well founded.

[ T h i s p r e m i s e s e e m s t o b e i m p l i e d b y s e n t e n c e

nu mb er 1 and 2 of text A].

2. If the facts as proved comply with the requirement of Section 683

BG B, the plaintiff is entitled to claim c ompensation for his ex-

penses. [This m us t be the prem ise that conn ects senten ce 2 an d 3.]

3. If the facts comply with the requirement of a norm, the norm is

appl icable .

4. If facts exist, they can be a precondition for the application of a

norm.

5 . [The wo rd i n g o f Sec ti o n 6 83 BGB:] W h o e v e r co n d u c t s an o t h e r ' s

a f f a i r s w i t h o u t au t h o r i t y t o d o s o , ac t i n g i n acco rd an ce w i t h t h e

i n t e re s t an d i n t en t i o n o f th e p e r s o n c o n ce rn ed , i s en t i tl ed t o

c l a im co m p en s a t i o n fo r h is ex p en s es .

6. If the plaintiff is an agent who conducts an other s affairs, on e

fact exists which complies with one of the requirements of

Section 683 BGB.

7. If a fact exists wh ich complies w ith the mos t problematic requi-

rement of Section 683 BGB, all facts com ply wi th the requir-

ements of Section 683 BGB. [This i s a l lu ded by sen tence 3: In

p a r t i cu l a r . . . ' ]

8. If a fact exists, the court has to recognize the existence of this

fact. [Sentence 2 and 3.]

9 . [Possibly:]

If a judge is qualified, he is able to recognize facts.


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52 KATHAR INA SOBOTA

If we examine o the r l ega l t ex t s , we a r e s t ruck by the same t en -

dency . Somet imes , 6 the r eason ing is no t so compressed an d the re fo re

con ta in s le ss ex tens ive no rm a t ive r e f e r ences . Never the le ss , i t seem s

t o b e a w i d e s p r e a d p a t t e r n not to mention the norm, i . e . the impl ied

majo r p r em ise o f an a l l eged sy l log i sm. 17 Wh a t i s ve rba l i zed i s the

mi nor pre mis e (e .g .: The p la in t i ff i s en t i t led to c la im 10 ,000 DM or

The f ac t s comply wi th the r equ i r emen t o f Sec t ion 683 BGB ) and

som et ime s the conc lus ion ( e.g. : The ac tion i s we l l f ound ed ) . Are

the re an y r easons fo r th is?

A f i rs t poss ible exp lana t ion i s tha t the no rm s , wh ich see m to be

i m p l i e d , a r e s o self-evident t h a t it w o u l d b e f u t il e t o m e n t i o n t h e m .

For exam ple , it goes wi thou t say ing tha t an en t i t l emen t can foun d a

lega l a c t ion ( tex t A , no rm 1); l i kewise , it i s supe r f luou s to c i t e

Sect ion 683 BGB, s ince eve ry bo dy is ab le to look i t up in the Civ i l

Cod e (A, nor m 5).

Wha t we can in any even t no te i s tha t a rhe to r i ca l t ex t l ike a

judge me n t con ta in s m an y a l lu s ions to sy l log i sms , bu t d oes no t ac tu -

a l ly con ta in a ny comp le te and exp li c it sy l log i sm.

Wha t i s i t t hen tha t g ives one the feel ing o f c o m p l e t e n e s s a n d

logica l coh eren ce? I sug ges t tha t th is i s the ef fec t o f a speci f ic

g rammat ica l cons t ruc t ion and moda l i ty o f a sen tence , o f t en l inked

wi th word s l ike thus , so , t he re fo re , e tc ., and wi th tex tua l o r

contex tual h in ts to th e rea lm o f genera l p roposi t ions .

So , n orm at iv e sy l log isms in legal tex ts appea r , i f a t al l , in f rag-

men t s and in t ima t ions . Mos t ly the i r ma jo r p r emises and the i r con -

c lusions are concealed .

Ar i s to t l e ca l l ed th i s spec ia l type o f a rgumen ta t ion an en thy -

merne . 18 E n t h y m e m e s a r e a m o n g o t h e r t h i n g s c h a r a c t e r i z e d b y

l e a v i n g o u t t e r m s o f t h e r e f e r e n c e d s y l lo g i s m . N o r m a l l y t h e s e

16 Especially within the rhetoric of the Federal Constitution Court (Bund-

esverfassungsgericht ).

17 Kath ar ina Sobota , Sachlichkeit, Rhetorische Kunst der Juristen

(Fran kfurt/M .: Peter Lang, 1990), 47ff.

18 Aristoteles, Rhetoric 1.1.3.2 (1354 a), 1.2.10. (1356 b), 1.2.13 (1357 a),

II.21.15 (1395 b), cL also: 1.11.1. (1356 b) an d III.17.8.1. (1418 a); Jfirgen Sp rute,

Die Enthymemtheorie der aristotelischen Rhetorik,

(G6 t t ingen :

Va nde nho eck & Ruprecht, 1982), 130f., 32; Ar thur B. Miller and John D.

Bee, Enthym eme s: Body and Soul , Philosophy and Rhetorik 5/4 (1972),

202-214.


9/16

D O N ' T M E N T IO N T H E N O R M 5 3

o m i t t e d t e r m s r e f e r t o t h i n g s w h i c h a r e o b v i o u s . T h e a d v a n t a g e o f

t h is t e c h n i q u e l i es in a v o i d i n g b o r i n g r e p e t i t i o n s a n d t h e t e d i o u s

p r o p a g a n d a o f tr iv i a l tr u t h s.

T h e e s s e n c e o f t h i s f i r s t p o i n t i s t h u s t h a t j u r i s t s o f t e n c o n c e a l

t h e ir n o r m s , s i m p l y b e c a u s e n o r m s a r e o b v i o u s t r u is m s .

I d o n o t t h i n k t h a t t h i s e x p l a n a t i o n i s t h e m a i n p o i n t ; I b e l i e v e

t h a t j u d g e s d o n o t m e n t i o n n o r m s , b e c a u s e i t w o u l d b e embarrassing

a n d

dysfunctional

t o v e r b a l i z e t h e a l l e g e d p r e m i s e s .

T h i s c a n b e s e e n v e r y w e l l in a d e c i s i o n o f t h e h i g h e s t G e r m a n

F e d e r a l C o u r t ( B G H N J W 6 1 , 35 9 )2 c o n c e r n i n g i m p l i e d a g e n c y

negotiorum gestio, ~ 8 3 B G B ) a s w e l l. T h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s o f t h i s

c a s e w e r e r a t h e r b r u t a l . T h e l o w e r c o u r t s t a te d t h e f a c t s a s f o ll o w s :

One night at abou t one o 'clock , the p lain t i ff heard a cr y for help f rom a

ruin in the neighbourho od. As it was prov ed later , a psycho path was

beat ing a wo man w i th a hammer. The plain t if f rushed in to the decay ed

house and t r ied to he lp the v i c tim . For tuna te ly , he was u l t imate ly

successful and was able to save the wom an, b ut in the course of doing

so, he w as in jured and could not wo rk for a cer tain t ime. Being sel f-

employed , he was in t e res t ed in ob ta in ing compensa t ion fo r h i s l o s t

earn ings . As ne i ther t he psychopath nor t he woman had an y money ,

he ad dres sed his claim to the heal th ins urance fund of the v ict im. ~9

The insu rance company refused to pay and argued tha t t he f ac t s d id

not just ify a claim unde r Sect ion 683 BGB. Saving the in jured w om an

was no t in the insuran ce com pa ny ' s in terest . I f the p lain t i f f had no t

he lped the v i c tim , she wou ld have been k i l led ; be ing dead , she wou ld

have burden ed the insu rance wi th f ew er expenses .

T h e F e d e r a l C o u r t f o u n d f o r t h e p l a in t if f . D i s c u s s i n g t h e d e f e n -

d a n t ' s o b j e c t i o n s i t s a i d, inter alia:

Text B: (1) C ondu cting the affair ( i.e. helpin g Mrs. B.) was acco rding to

the de fen da nt ' s in terest . (2) This resul t s f rom a s ingle reason: The

plainti f f in tended by his act ion to get the in jured w om an as quickly as

possib le to medical t reatment ; and offer ing medical t reatment w as the

de fe nd an t ' s concern . (3) I t i s i r relevant whe ther or not the p lain t i f f' s

ac t ion en ta i led a cos t advan tage in f avour o f t he i nsu rance compan y .

(4) An in terest wi th in the meaning of Sect ion 683 does not necessar i ly

imp ly an econom ic in terest . (5) Therefore, i t does not ma t ter wheth er

or not the act ion of the p lain t i f f actual ly helped to reduce compl icat ions

dur ing the heal ing process , or actual ly accelerated the cure, and thus

econ omize d medical t reatment . (6) Likewise the cour t d ismissed the

19 St r ictly speaking: the co mp an y 's heal th insurance fund, to which the

woman ' s husband be longed .


10/16

54 KATHARINA SOBOTA

the strange objection that the insurance company would have a cost

advantage without the interference of the plaintiff.

If we consider the norms that are implicit in the foregoing pas-

sage, those that one wou ld i dentify are neither repetitions of the

explicit text, nor truisms .

1. If it is an insurance company's concern to offer medical treatm ent

it is also its concern to get an injured person as quickly as possible

to medical treatment.

2. If a pl ai nt iff s action intended to get an injured person as quickly

as possible to medical treatme nt, he is acting in accordance wi th

the interest of the health insurance company concerned.

a) [More abstractly:] If an involuntary principal (that is the

insu rance company) is concerned with a certain affair,

conducting this affair is in accordance with its interest.

[questionable equation of concern wit h interest ].

(b) [In connection wit h sentence 3 and 4 of text B:] If a health

insurance compan y is concerned wit h a certain affair,

conducting this affair is an action in accordance with its

interest, whether or not this entails a cost advantage in the

insurance company's favour.

(1) ... whether or not the action helps to reduce compli-

cations during the healing process.

2) ... whether or not the action helps to accelerate the

c u r e

3) ... whe ther or not the action economizes medical treat-

ment.

3. If a qualified jud ge interprets the meanin g of Section 683 BGB,

he wil l consider that the in te re st withi n the meaning of

Section 683 does not necessarily imply an economic one.

[See

sentence 4 of text B].

4. If an objection sounds strange, the court will dismiss it.

5. If an insurance comp any is concerned wi th offering medical

tr ea tm en t, its main interest ought not to be economical but

therapeutical, although it clearly claims the contrary.

6. [Abstract version:] If something ought to be it is the case.

7. If a health insuranc e com pany objects that the death of a person

would be a cost advantage, it argues in a strange way.


11/16

DON'T MENTION THE NORM 55

Non e of these assess ments is trivial. Even Nor m 4 ( If an ob-

jection soun ds strange the court will dismiss it ) is not self-evident ,

because the strange sound of an argument does not itself give a judge

a reason to reject it.

In addition to this, none of the implied sentences is a common-

place. Most of them do not reach a high level of abstraction; they

keep in touch with the concrete circumstances. Howev er, there is no

doub t that the court implies general rules (see the general attribu-

tion in sentence 4: The 'In terest ' wi thin the mea nin g of Section 683

BGB does not necessarily imply an economic one ). Furthermore, none

of the referenced norms is part of legal doctrine. On the contrary,

some are rather dubious - - not only from the viewpoint of jurispru-

dence but also from the perspective of daily rationality.

For example, if one looks at Norm numb er 2, one sees that it ap-

pears in six versions; this reflects the redun dancy in sentence 2 to 5.

In nor m numbe r 2 a), supported by no rm 5, one can discover the

equation of con cer n with inter est . However, 683 BGB em-

phazises the difference between these notions: something can be you r

concern (e.g., cutting you r hair), but nor your interest ; if you wan t

to have a beard and a m ad hairdresser shaves it off, it is not in your

inter est , and you don 't appreciate havi ng to pa y for it. 2 In this

case, the judges used the equa tion of concern with interest, to bridge

the greater difference between affair and interes t

Affair [i.e.: to arrange medical treatment] = concern [i.e.: du ty to offer

medical treatment = to get the injured woman as quickly as possible to

medical treatment] = Interest [i.e.: the insurance company's interest,

including economical interests] (see Norms B, number 2-2e).

This implication contradicts not only the defendant's strict in-

tention but also the traditional legal definition of the term

Interest which normally involves a

benefit

Not less questionable than no rms 2 and 5 are norms 4 and 7, which

rely on a mere emotional reaction ( strange feeling). Anot her strik-

ing predication is articulated in norm number 6: The equation of

Ough t and Is. This attribution seems to be a very pervasive and yet

20 German jurisprudence has redeemed itself in more recent doctrinal

developments, which have worked out a basis for resolving the case that

was more consistent with the norms of the Civil Code; cf. Dieter Medicus,

Bfirgerliches Recht

(K61n: Carl Heymanns, 1989, 14th ed.), 247.


12/16

56 KATHARINA SOBOTA

v ery we l l h i d d en p rem i s e .

H o w ev er , i n s p i te o f a l l t h e h i d d en co n t r ad ic t i o n s, t h e i m p l ica -

t io n o f al l th es e p re m i s es p ro v i d es a

plausible result. The

a r g u m e n t

i s no t coh eren t in re la t ionsh ip to the c iv il l aw. But i t i s p laus ib le in

re la t ionsh ip to the s i tua t ion , to ou r fee l ings m par t i cu la r ly beca use

of ou r ind ignat ion a t the insurance co mp an y ' s pos i t ion .

I I I

Wh a t can o n e co n c l u d e f ro m o f a ll th i s? I s u g g es t t h e fo l l o wi n g

answe r : In da i ly l ega l rhe toric i t is typ ica l o f no rm s tha t the y on ly

ex i st w i t h i n a s p h e re o f in t i m a t i o n o r i m p l ica t i on . Th i s r ea l m l i es

s o m e w h e r e i n b e t w e e n t h e r e a l m o f

verbal explication

a n d t h e r e a l m

of to ta l silence.

Realm of s i l ence

Rea l m o f i m p l i ca t i o n

Rea l m o f v e rb a l ex p l i ca t io n

Th e r ea l m o f i m p l i ca t i o n i s ch a rac t e r i zed b y a r e l a t i v e l y cer

tain form

and a re la t ive ly

uncertain content.

I t h a s m u c h i n c o m m o n w i t h th e N a r r a t i v e S t r u c t u re s a s c o n -

t e m p l a t e d b y B e r n a r d J a c k so n , 21 a l t h o u g h i n m y v i e w t h e t e r m

narra t ive cou ld som e t imes l ead in the wro ng d i rect ion , insofar as a

n a r r a t i v e i s u s u a l l y s o m e t h i n g b e i n g t o l d - - s o m e t h i n g b e i n g m ad e

e x p li c it - - w h e r e a s f o r t h e m o s t p a rt , t h e c o h e r e n c e o f n o r m -

i m p l i ca t i o n s , a s m o re g en e ra l l y t h e en t i re r ea l m o f i m p l i ca ti o n , is

g ro und ed ch ief ly on s il ence .

Ra t h e r t h an a t t em p t i n g t o g i v e a co m p l e t e d e f in i t i o n o f n o rm a -

t i v e i m p l i c a t i o n s , I t h i n k i t m a k e s m o r e s e n s e to s k e tc h th e

functionality o f t aci t n o rm s . Le t m e l i st s o m e o f t h e ad v an t ag es o f

t h i s ap p ro ach :

( i ) First advantage. I f j u d g es an d l awy er s d o n o t v e rb a l i ze t h e

21 Cf. Jackson, supra n.11, at 101ff, wh o concentrates on patterns w hich he

calls narrative , but which include also non-verbalized schem es (such as

symp athy with defra uded elderly maidens ), 104.


13/16


a l l e g e d m a j o r p r e m i s e s , t h e y c a n conceal the inconsistency o f t h e

w h o l e n o r m a t i v e s y s t e m ( f o r e x a m p l e , t h e C i v i l C o d e o r C o m m o n

Sen se ) . An ex am p l e o f th e in co n s i s t en cy o f n o rm a t i v e s y s t em s is th e

co n f l i c t b e t ween t h e co m m an d , "Th o u s h a l t n o t k i l l " an d t h e n o rm

"Defen d y o u r co u n try "

On t h e co n t r a ry , i f j u d g es v e rb a l i zed t h e n o rm s t h a t a r e i m p l ic i t

i n t h e i r j u d g e m e n t s , t h e y w o u l d e v o k e flagrant contradictions to at

l eas t f ive ty pe s o f re qu i re me nts : (1) c lass ica l log ic ; 22 (2) l ega l

s y s t e m a t i za t i o n ; (3) t h e r i g h t t o eq u a l t r ea t m en t ; (4) p o s i t i v i s ti c

l eg a l i t y ; an d f i n a l l y (5 ) , t h ey wo u l d r ev ea l t h e n a i v e t y o f o u r b as i c

bel ie fs , suc h as :

that fa cts exist (text A, norms 4, 7-9); that the c our t is able to recog nize

facts and mean ings (A 8 and 9, B 3); that n orm s are applicab le (A 3 and

4); that facts can comply with the requirements of a norm (A 2 and 3);

that legal texts ha ve a me aning (B 3); that wh atev er ou ght to be, is (136).

( i i ) Second advantage: An o ra t o r can change the alleged mean

ing o f t h e n o r m a n d ad a p t i t f ro m s i t u a t i o n t o s i tu a t io n . Th i s i s t h e

r e a s o n w h y i n l e ga l s y s t e m s w i t h a l o w e r d e g r e e o f c o d i f ic a t io n

j u d g e s t e n d t o v e r b a l i z e a n d e x p l i c a t e a t l e a s t s o m e o f t h e i r

p r e m i s e s : t h e y c o m p i l e a n d c r e a t e t h e s e p r e m i s e s w i t h i n t h e p a r -

t i cu l a r si t ua t i on . Th e l eg al s y s t em i s s o co m p l ex an d u n m et h o d i ca l

t h a t n o o n e i s ab le t o co m p are t h e m u l t i t u d e o f p o t en t i a l s o u rces o f

l aw . Becau s e t h e re is n o m ech an i ca l w ay t o i d en t i fy a f ix ed s e t o f

ap p l i cab l e p rem i s es , t h e s e lec t io n o f p rem i s es t h em s e l v e s can n o t b e

s u b j ec t ed t o s y s t em -wi d e "n e u t r a l " c r it ic i sm . Th e r e s u l t i s t h a t i t i s

p o s s i b l e t o i n v o k e a n y p r e m i s e t h a t s e e m s a p p r o p r i a t e t o t h e

par t i cu lar s i tua t ion .

( i i i )

Third advantage:

t ac i t n o rm s can b e a

l ink

b e t w e e n t h e

a r c h a i c w o r l d o f e m o t i v e , n o n - v e r b a l i z e d r e g u l a r i t ie s a n d t h e

v e rb a l i zed r a t i o n a l i t y o f t h e c l a ss i ca l o cc i d en t . Th e y a re j an u s -

f a c ed . O n t h e o n e h a n d , t h e y a p p e a r a s a n a b s tr a c t r ul e; o n t h e

o t h e r h an d , t h e y wo rk a s a r e f e ren ce t o a co n c re t e r eg u l a r i ty . As

regards our t ex t B, I want to ment ion two of these regu lar i t i es , which

one can ca l l "un der ly ing soc ia l va lua t ions" .

Th e f ir s t o n e co u l d b e d es c r i b ed a s t h e "p ri o r i t y o f h u m an i t y o v e r

22 _. and of course also mod ern symbolic logic, al though no ordina ry

lawyer would attempt to present normal legal arguments using symbolic

logic.


14/16

58 KATHA RINA SOBOTA

mer e pecun ia ry inte r es t s . To r ew ard som eone fo r he lp ing ano the r

perso n , a nd to re jec t the f inancia l in teres ts o f a business en t i ty , is no t

an exp l i c it doc t rina l no rm , bu t the ephem era l em o t ions o f a ce r t a in

cour t in a par t icu lar case . I t cann ot be a genera l ru le , becau se i t runs

coun te r to o the r p r inc ip le s o f the C iv i l Code . I t p rov ides the back -

g r o u n d o n l y i n th is ca se , i n th is s i t u a t i o n - p e r h a p s o n l y b e ca u s e

t h e i n s u r a n c e c o m p a n y m a d e t h e m i s t a k e o f re v e a l i n g i ts m a t e r i a l-

i st ic int en t ions . I t h ink the in su rance com pan y ' s p l igh t cons t i tu t e s a

good exam ple o f the des t ruc t ive consequences o f exp li ca ting under ly -

ing max ims .

T h e s e c o n d u n d e r l y i n g v a lu a t i on i s s y m p a t h y f o r t h e p a t t e r n o f

m a l e b e h a v i o u r im p l ic it in d e f e n d i n g w o m e n w h o c r y f or h e l p. M o s t

o f u s unconsc ious ly app rove o f th i s behav iou r , bu t in these days o f

wo me n ' s r igh ts nob ody d a res to ve rba li ze it.

T h e a p p r o p r i a t e v e r s i o n o f t h i s o l d - f a s h i o n e d c u s t o m , w h i c h

d o e s n o t o f f e n d a g a i n s t t h e r i g h t t o e q u a l t r e a t m e n t , w o u l d b e :

Wh oever de fends a no the r pe r son aga in s t c r imina l conduc t, ac ts in a

m a n n e r t h at d e s e r v e s to b e r e w a r d e d . I n t h e h a m m e r - c a s e t h is

w o u l d m e a n : t h e p l a i n t i f f m a y d e m a n d c o m p e n s a t i o n f o r h i s e x -

penses . For tunate ly , a t leas t f rom the perspect ive of a jur is t wo rk in g

in a sy s tem w i th a s t rong sense o f p r ec i se ru le s such a s the G erm an

system , the judges d id no t a r ticu la te such a norm. Some years la ter , a

Regional Appeal Cour t (OLG Kar lsruhe , VersR 77 , 936) had to de-

c ide ano the r case in wh ich a man r i sked h i s l i f e and hea l th no t to

save a wo m an c ry ing fo r he lp , bu t to a ss is t a bank . The re the c rimi -

na l conduc t invo lved wa s a bank robbery . The m an was a cus tomer o f

t he b a n k w h o s a w t h a t a ro b b e ry w a s u n d e r w a y a n d j u m p e d o n t h e

r o b b e r f r o m b e h i n d , v i e w i n g h im s e l f as a n i m p l i e d a g e n t a c t i n g o n

beha l f o f the bank . As the bank i t se lf had o rde re d i t s emp loyee s no t

to ri sk the i r l i ves in the even t o f a bank robbe ry w he re on ly mo ne y

w a s a t s t a k e , t h e h e r o i c e f f o r t s o f t h e c u s t o m e r s e e m e d a l i t t l e

e x c es s iv e a n d d i d n o t e v o k e t h e s a m e d e g r e e o f n a tu r a l s y m p a t h y a s

t h e m a n h e l p i n g t h e c r y i n g w o m a n . B e c a us e t h e h i g h e s t F e d e ra l

C o u r t d i d n o t m a k e a b i n d i n g g e n e r a l ru l e i n t h e h a m m e r c a se , t h e

Reg iona l Cour t cou ld more eas ily suppo r t i ts v i ew tha t the he ro

w a s m e r e l y s o m e o n e w h o h a d o v e r re a c t e d u n d e r t h e c ir c um s t a nc e s .

A co mm on l aw cou r t migh t have had l ess d i ff i cu lty in th is s i tua t ion ,

because the com mo n l aw judge is more accus tomed to adap t ing no rm s

to f it par t icu lar cases . The pr ice of such com for t , ho w ev er , i s tha t


15/16


t h e a l l e ge d n o r m s m u l t i p l y a n d b e c o m e d i f fu s e .

A f ina l though t : l ega l d i scou r se depends on a t echn ique wh ich

makes i t s poss ib le to c r ea te the

illusion of certainty in a realm o f un

certainty. One

o f t h e m a i n t o ol s f o r b r i d g i n g t h e c o n t r a s t b e t w e e n

c e r t a i n t y a n d u n c e r t a i n t y i s t h e u s e o f h i d d e n p r e m i s e s t h a t m o v e

wi th in the r ea lm o f imp l i ca t ion .

Th i s i s ove r looked on th e one h and by the posi t iv i st ic app roach ,

w h i c h t e n d s t o o v e r e m p h a s i z e t h e i l lu s io n o f c e rt a i n t y , a n d m i s -

t akes i t f o r r ea l i ty , and on the o the r hand by mos t o f the scep t i ca l

a p p r o a c h e s , w h i c h t e n d t o o v e r e m p h a s i z e u n c e r t a i n t y a n d n e g l e c t

the va lue o f c r ea t ing the i l lus ion o f ce r t a in ty , inc lud ing a m ong o the r

th ings th e ac tua l t rus t -genera t ing effec ts o f such const ruc ts .

A d i sc ip l ine such a s rhe to r i c has a long t r ad i t ion o f accep t ing

c o n t r a d i c t i o n s , e s p e c i a ll y t h e c o n t r a di c t i on s w i t h i n h u m a n n a t u re .

Rhe to r i c has no p re jud ice aga in s t r ecogn iz ing tha t human l i f e con -

s is ts in l a rge me asu re o f

deception

and se l f -decept ion .23 I t at tempts,

r a th e r , t o look these r eal i ti e s in the face and to ana lyze how such

d e c e p ti o n s a r e u s e d , w h i c h t e c h n i qu e s t h e y e m p l o y , a n d u n d e r w h a t

cond i t ions they have good o r bad r e su l ts . Acco rd ing ly , i t does no t

sha re the v iew o f En l igh tenmen t r a t iona l i sm, tha t a l l r easons mus t

be uncovered and ve rba l ized a t any p r i ce . Rhe to ri c canno t de te rm ine

w h e r e t h e b o u n d a r i e s b e t w e e n v e r b a l i z a t i o n , h i d d e n i m p l i c a t i o n s ,

and mere s i lence l ie . The ques t ion o f exp li c itness mus t be dec ided in

t h e c o n c re t e s i tu a t io n . I n th i s r e g a r d - - a n d h e r e t h e c o n c e p t o f

Berna rd Jackson i s to be fu l ly accep ted - - the re r ema ins n o th ing bu t

to ho pe for the pe rsonal in tegr i ty of eac h ind iv idua l . 24

F i n a l l y , o n e c o u l d r e m e m b e r th a t n o r m s a l l u d e d t o b y l e ga l

rhe to r i c 25 be long to a specia l type o f no rm s wh ich one shou ld no t

con fou nd wi th the type o f no rm s d i scussed by logic ians o r advan ced

by c la ss i ca l phys ic s o r p romulga ted by l eg i s l a to r s , f o l lowing the

mod e l o f sc iences . Norm s used wi th in the p rocess o f ad jud ica tion a r e

23 F. Nietzsche, Ober Wahrheit und Lfige im au~ rm ora lis ch en Sinne

1 , in G. Colli un d M. Mon tinari, eds.,

Die Geburt der Trag6die.

Un ze itg em ~e Betrachtungen. Nachgelassene Schriften 1870 1873.

Kritische Studienausgabe

(Mfinchen und Berl in/New York: de Gruyter ,

1988, 2. Aufl.), 873ff.

24 Jackson,

supra

n.11, at 5, 189, 193.

25 ... and othe r forms of rationalizing discourses.


16/16

60 KATHARINA SOBOTA

mo st ly a l lu s ions , som et imes p regn an t w i th soc i al know ledge , bu t

som et ime s a lso red uce d to a genera l a t t r ibu t ion , whic h ma y be f i l led

wi th unexpressab le fee lings, casua l va lue a ssessmen t s , and casua l

ac tual iza t ions of t rad i t ional evaluat ion-pat terns .

As rega rds the d i f fe rent func t ions o f imp l i ci t no rms , on e cou ld

gather tha t tac it re ferences are an indica t ion of socia l confide nce in

non-verbal regular it ies . No one d iscusses wha t he takes to be se lf -

e v i d e n t ; n o b o d y s e e k s fo r t h e v e rb a l i z a t i o n o f h i s e v e ry d a y b e -

h a v i o u r p a t t e rn s ; a n d n o b o d y a s k s fo r a u n i v e r sa l a n d e x p l ic i t

scheme o f a p l aus ib l e va lua tion . On the con t ra ry , whenev er a no r m

is ma de expl ic i t, we bec om e aware of a rhe torica l t r ick , or an effor t

to d i rec t people in a mechanica l , non-discurs ive way.

How ever , no law professor g ives the advice : Do not men t ion the

nor m . Perh aps they ac t in th is wa y because they bel ieve in a con-

cep t o f l aw which i s ra the r abs t rac t and fo l lows the t rad i t i ona l

v i ewp o in t o f Ra t iona l ism, En l igh tenmen t and Pos i ti v ism. They ig -

nore the s i lence and open ness of jur i st ic norm at iv i ty and they c lose

thei r eyes to the rhe tor ica l charac ter of law and to the condi t ions of

i ts embedd in g . On the o the r hand , du r ing the i r act iv i ti es a s judges ,

l awyers o r academ ic consu l t an t s , t hey intuitively c o mp l y w i t h t h e

rhetor ica l pa t terns which are denied by the i r theore t ica l const ruc ts .

The re su l t is a li fe o f unwi t t i n g con t rad ic t ions . They th ink tha t

t h e y n a m e n o rm s , b u t t h e y d o n ot ; th e y t h i n k th a t t h e y a p p l y

s y l l o g i s ms , b u t t h e y u s e e n t h y me m e s ; t h e y t h in k t h a t t h e y fo l lo w

ra t iona l i t y , bu t t hey a re the ones wh o o r ig ina l ly p rodu ce ra t ional -

i ty by act ing in a rhetorical way.

One cou ld guess tha t t h i s juristic ignorance widens the horizon

for normative notions:

i t i s much eas ier to genera te the i l lus ion of a

sy l logis tic norm -appl ica t ion , i f one nee ds not a r t icu la te one ' s major

p remises . L ikewise, t he ex i st ence o f a no rm at ive sys t em is m uc h

eas i er t o p re t end , i f one nee ds no t l i st t he e leme n t s o f t he sys t em

c l a i me d .

In v i ew o f t h i s t endency , t he pa radox ica l i n t e rp l ay o f ve rba l -

i zed and una r t i cu l a t e d concep t ions appea r s t o be the re su l t o f a

highly functional naivety w h i c h s u p p o r t s s o c i a l o rg a n i z i n g b y

me ans of conceal ing i ts funda men ta l devices . As long as the s tages of

legal ac t ing are furn ished wi th th is dupl ic i tous ground, people wi l l

fee l the ru le of norms .

SOBOTA, Katharina. Don't Mencion the Norm!

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