SMARTxAC / Network Polygraph

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SMARTxAC / Network Polygraph “A Network Visibility Service born at Anella Científica” Maria Isabel Gandía – [email protected] Josep Sanjuas – [email protected]

Transcript of SMARTxAC / Network Polygraph

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SMARTxAC / Network Polygraph

“A Network Visibility Service

born at Anella Científica”

Maria Isabel Gandía – [email protected]

Josep Sanjuas – [email protected]

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Companies depend on Networks

e-mail, databases, shared folders, VoIP, cloud...

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Networks are complex and hard to manage

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Network Downtime equals Cost

$42,000/havg cost of downtime

$5,600/minavg cost of downtime(datacenters)

87 hoursavg downtime per year

200 minMTTR per medium outage itpi

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Network Visibility

• To properly manage a network, you need to

see what happens inside it

• First step to...– identify congested links

– remove unwanted network traffic

– disconnect bandwidth hogs

– troubleshoot performance issues

– plan for future needs

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New User Interface

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Network Visibility Technologies

• Hardware-based («Deep Packet

Inspection»)

– Brute-force approach: inspect all packets

– High visibility, but very high cost

• Software-based (NetFlow, SNMP)

– Use traffic statistics exported by routers

– Mid visibility & low cost

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Network Polygraph - Technology

• Best of both worlds: high visibility, low cost

• How? NetFlow + artificial intelligence

NetFlow on steroids: application identification, SSL domain ID, attack & anomaly detection capabilities

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History: SMARTxAC to Polygraph

Commercial

Internet

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1999-2003: Inception

Previous monitoring and analysis projects:

• CASTBA

• MEHARI

• MIRA

With the colaboración among several universities

• UPM (Universidad Politécnica de Madrid)

• UC3M (Universidad Carlos III de Madrid)

• UPC (Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya)

And the participation of:

• RedIRIS

• CESCA

• Telefónica Investigación y Desarrollo

• Institut Català de Tecnologia

Focus: monitoring ATM networks

Approach: deep packet inspection with sampling

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2003: The Birth of SMARTxAC

Collaboration: CESCA + CCABA/UPC

Objective: monitoring Anella Cientifica-RedIRIS connection

Roles

• CESCA: requirements, testbed

• CCABA/UPC: research, development

Objectives:

• Low-cost platform

• Continuously monitor Anella Científica

• Detect anomalies and irregular usage

• Multi-tenant: accessible by many institutions– each institution can see their own traffic only

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2003: Architecture

CaptureEndace

DAG card

Optical Spitter

Analysis

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Port Number Machine learning

2003: User Interface

47.39%

10.34%

0.43%

0.10%

19.65%

7.97%

0.08%

2.48%0.55%

1.84%

2.26%

0.10%

0.53%

6.04%0.23%

40.07%

2.43%

2.97%

18.47%

0.30%8.17%

0.48%

9.67%

1.22%

0.51%

0.30%

1.52%

8.48%

5.42%

A_UKNWN

DNS

FTP

GAMES

IRC

MAIL

MULTIMEDIA

NETFS

NETWORK

NEWS

NO_TCPUDP

OTHERS

P2P

T_UKNWN

TELNET

UNIX

WWW

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2003-2011: Network Scales Up

More network interfaces monitored at Anella Científica:

• RedIRIS

• Commercial internet connection

• CATNIX

Internal traffic not monitored

Increasing bandwidth usage

Realization: DPI is not cost effective!

Last straw: switching to 10Gbps links

Distributed core with to main nodes (Campus Nord &

Telvent)

Solution: NetFlow

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2011: Upgrade to 10Gbps - NetFlow

Flow-based analysis

2x10GbpsNetFlow

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User Interface Redesign

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2013: Commercial Stage & Spin-off

• Research group gathers commercial interest

• Received public funding for tech transfer

– SMARTxAC to generalized product

• From a research product to a commercial one

– Talaia Networks, S.L.: a spin-off of UPC

– Network Polygraph: «spin-off of SMARTxAC»

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Network Polygraph

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Deployment Models: Cloud

Customer Network

Cloud

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Deployment Models: On-Premises

Customer’sDatacenter

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Multi-Tenancy Module

Customer A

Customer BCustomer C

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Subscription Models

Service (SaaS)

• Monthly or yearly billing

• Includes support

• Externally managed

• Regularly updated

Perpetual License

• Payable upfront

• Support & maintenance fee

• Not accessible by our personnel

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The SaaS Advantage

• No upfront costs for end customer

– Lower barrier of entry (esp. small-mid customers)

– No need to “commit” to our solution

– Simply configure routers to send NetFlow to us

• Managed solution

– Zero maintenance, zero hardware, zero software

– Always upgraded to latest version

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Main Large-scale Deployments

• CSUC (Anella Científica network)– Connects ≈90 public institutions in Catalonia

– Offered as value-added service to >80 admins

• Red.es (RedIRIS network)– Handles all Spanish academic network traffic

– Connects ≈450 public institutions in Spain

– Won as customer in competitive tender

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Use Cases

• Small-medium companies

– Bandwidth is a precious resource, Polygraph helps optimize its usage

• “Why is the network so slow? Should we invest in more bandwidth?”

• Found 1 user constantly downloading files from Mega

• Link was shared with other offices, affecting whole company

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Use Cases (2)

• Large companies– Moving a single “hardware DPI probe” around

• Deploying full DPI was too expensive

• With Polygraph they could cover all branches!

– Realized most attacks come from China• ISP can block certain IP subnets

• Attacks do not consume customer bandwidth

– Detected covert bitcoin mining operations• Users were pumping the electricity bill for their

personal gain

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Use Cases (3)

• ISP & Managed Network Service Providers– Important customer with an office in North Africa:

• Bandwidth: precious resource

• Wanted to check it is spent wisely – no unwanted traffic

– Receiving large # of copyright violation notices!?• Traffic analysis reveals P2P traffic

• Particularly, upstream traffic: serving illegal content!

– Use our product to detect network attacks• Offer product as value-added service to corporate

customers

• Sell anti-virus solutions to their own customers

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Deployment at CATNIX: Proposal

Member A

Member BMember C

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Website + On-Line Demo

https://polygraph.io

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Network Polygraph

Talaia Networks, S.L.

K2M – Parc UPC Campus Nord

Jordi Girona, 1-3

Barcelona (08034)

Spain

Telephone: +34 93 405 45 87

[email protected]

https://polygraph.io

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traffic volume, breakdown by application

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protocol breakdown

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top talkers (addresses, ports, autonomous systems)

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traffic geolocation

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anomaly and attack detection with automatic baselining

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indexed traffic database for forensic analysis

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automated downloadable reports