SKETCHSKETCH

CONSCIOUSNESS AND CONSCIOUSNESS AND REALITYREALITY

My aim is to make explicit the My aim is to make explicit the internal link between the internal link between the

concepts of consciousness concepts of consciousness and of reality. This link seems and of reality. This link seems to be something essential to to be something essential to be preserved in any form of be preserved in any form of

consciousness.consciousness.

The original insight is the following:

IT SEEMS INTUITIVEINTUITIVE THAT CONSCIOUSNESS IS AWARENESS OF AWARENESS OF HOW THINGS REALLY AREHOW THINGS REALLY ARE.

- A REASON TO THINK SO IS THAT, AS AN EVOLUTIONARY PRODUCT CONSCIOUSNESS MUST REFLECT REALITY IN ORDER TO ALLOW THE CONSCIOUS ORGANISM TO DEAL TO DEAL SUCESSFULLYSUCESSFULLY WITH THE EXTERNAL AND EVENT WITH THE INTERNAL WORLDWORLD.

I. CONSCIOUSNESS AS I. CONSCIOUSNESS AS INVOLVING VERIDICAL INVOLVING VERIDICAL

REPRESENTATIONREPRESENTATION

Owen Flanagan:Owen Flanagan:

(i) “phenomenologically, consciousness is (i) “phenomenologically, consciousness is experience”experience”

As conscious experience seems to have always a representational character, we could also say:

(ii) “consciousness at least involves (ii) “consciousness at least involves representation”representation”

This brings to my main point: the relation between consciousness and reality.

We can get there by means of the introduction of some concepts and the introduction of some concepts and the folowing argument:folowing argument:

1) Representations can be veridicalveridical or non-veridical.non-veridical.

Veridical = correct Veridical = correct (for a thing)(for a thing) or true or true (for facts)...(for facts)...

Veridical representationVeridical representation (Df) = the representation that represents what is aimed represents what is aimed

to represent.to represent.

- Remark about the word ‘aim’:

When I say that a veridical representation is a representation that represents what is aimed to represent,

I use the word ‘aim’ insted of ‘intention’ because the concept of intention often presupposes often presupposes consciousness, showing to be inadequate when we consciousness, showing to be inadequate when we wish to elucidate consciousness.wish to elucidate consciousness.

The word ‘aim’ is humble enough:

We can say that the spider aims to build its web, without implying that the spider has this intention.

The spider is evolutionary constructed in order to serve to this aim (what might be teleologicalteleological without being mental).

2) My main thesis:

consciousness is only consciousness as it involves some kind of veridical representation.(and correspondingly, lack of consciousness involves lack of veridical representation.)

This brings us (finally) to the connection between consciousness and reality:

By representing what it aims to represent, By representing what it aims to represent, the veridical representation represents the veridical representation represents things things as they really are.as they really are.

But what are things or facts as they really are?

Answer: they are the things or states of

affairs that we arewe are interpersonally and reasonably able able

to acceptto accept that they that they really are what they are,really are what they are,

or which we are willing to accept as belonging to a certain domain of realitydomain of reality.

Ex: suppose I believe to see a snake near to my feet.I believe to see a snake near to my feet.

Intuitivelly: One can say that I am consciousconscious of a snake near to my feet, when this state of affairs is realreal. If my experience is delusory, one cannot say that I am conscious of a snake near to my feet, since this state of affairs is not real.

In other words: I am conscious of a snake near to my feet, when I have a veridical veridical representationrepresentation of a snake, namely, when it represents what is aimedaimed to represent, that is, when what is aimed to be represented is interpersonally and reasonably acceptable interpersonally and reasonably acceptable as belonging to a certain domain of reality.as belonging to a certain domain of reality.

There are some other properties of consciousness that it would be usefull to add:

1) The creature must be sufficiently complex:1) The creature must be sufficiently complex: Once I read in a newspaper: “Scientists

discovered that the fly is conscious”. As with psychological concepts like experience, intentionality… We are willing to say that a mouse can have experiences. But what about a bee or shrimp or a worm? (Weismann)

2) Conscious representation must be integrated:2) Conscious representation must be integrated: The conscious representations or experience The conscious representations or experience

must be linked with the set of beliefs held by the must be linked with the set of beliefs held by the conscious creature. Unconscious representations conscious creature. Unconscious representations are typically are typically isolatedisolated from the others, they are not from the others, they are not accessible by means of the association with accessible by means of the association with others.others.

(The unity of consciousness)(The unity of consciousness)

Indeed, we are only able to have a veridical a veridical perceptual representationperceptual representation as far as it coheres with coheres with the awareness of other things in the surroundings the awareness of other things in the surroundings and with the related information.and with the related information. (ex: this table)

…………………………………………………3) Finally, consciousness is an evolutionary 3) Finally, consciousness is an evolutionary

biological phenomenon:biological phenomenon: Biological beings are too differenttoo different from physical

automatons (we can guess that non-biological beings are for ever unable to represent anything in a veridical way).

Ex: Although a picture is able to represent something,

this is not done by the picture alone, since the picture lacks the aim, the intention. In order to do this, it requires an interpreter, the person who sees the picture as representing something)

Summarizing our view:Summarizing our view:

Consciousness should involve a biologically a biologically grounded sufficiently complex and grounded sufficiently complex and integrated veridical representations of states integrated veridical representations of states of affairs.of affairs.

……Veridical representations are those Veridical representations are those representing to what they are aimed to representing to what they are aimed to represent.represent.AndAnd

the representations that represent what they the representations that represent what they are aimed to represent are those we are are aimed to represent are those we are interpersonally and reasonably willing to interpersonally and reasonably willing to accept as depicting the represented states accept as depicting the represented states of affairs as they really are.of affairs as they really are.

It seems that

a person is conscious as far as she is able to held a sufficient a sufficient amount of veridical representation.amount of veridical representation.

This is valid even to moral This is valid even to moral consciousness:consciousness:

a person has moral consciousness as far as she is able to have a fair (that is, a fair (that is, a veridical) representation of the moral a veridical) representation of the moral facts involving her actions.facts involving her actions.

Philosophers have tried to map consciousness in many ways.

In what follows, I will try to confirm this view, considering 3 kinds of consciousness, which seem to cover all the field in the simplest way.

I intend to show, by examining them, that all all three kinds of consciousness involvea linkwith the real states of affairs by means of veridical representation. Moreover, we can guess that there is because of this common common linklink with reality that they are all called kinds of consciousness...

II. PERCEPTUAL II. PERCEPTUAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND CONSCIOUSNESS AND VERIDICAL VERIDICAL REPRESENTATIONREPRESENTATION

The first kind of consciousness is what I call, following The first kind of consciousness is what I call, following David Armstrong, David Armstrong, perceptualperceptual consciousnessconsciousness..

Perceptual consciousnessPerceptual consciousness = = being being awaked, perceptually aware of the world awaked, perceptually aware of the world around us and of our own bodies around us and of our own bodies (Armstrong).(Armstrong).

This sense of the word is usual: physicians speak about lost of perceptual consciousness when they talk about a patient in coma.

“What we get when we wake up in the morning and what we loose when we fall into a sleep without dreams, or when we die” (Searle)

Poets call it “walking consciousness”.

This is the most primitive kind of consciousness, because even mice can have it:

A mouse can be perceptually aware of the world outside and of its own body.

If you sedate the mouse with chloroform, the mouse can lose its consciousness, and the kind of consciousness we say that it loses is a perceptual one, called by poets the walking consciousness.

But shrimps and ants do not have it because its perceptual mechanism don’t have the kind of complexity afforded.

Comming to our point:

This kind of consciousness involves representation of things as they really are, confirming our general characterization.

We aim to represent things veridically, namely, as they really are, and when we succeed, we are said to be conscious.

Even the mouse aims to represent the cat as it really is, and not as a piece of cheese, for its own sake

(this aim can be read in the manifest behavior of the mouse).

Exs:

1) Imagine a person with delirium tremens. He is lying, trembling, sweating, unable to speak and having all kind of tactile and visual hallucinations of disgusting animals attacking him and involving his body while he try to defends himself…

He has a totally wrong perception of what is going on around him,

and we would say that he lacks (perceptual) lacks (perceptual) consciousness of the world around her.consciousness of the world around her.

2) This is also a reason why we usually don’t say we usually don’t say that dreams are conscious.that dreams are conscious. Dreams are non-non-veridical representations,veridical representations, because they do do not not correspond to what they are aiming to representcorrespond to what they are aiming to represent. They are representations of what we are not willing not willing to accept as realto accept as real. Therefore they cannot be conscious.

However, a really prophetic dreamreally prophetic dream, forecasting a real state of affairs, would be seen as “a product of consciousness”, since it would be veridical.

3) A day-dream, however, is something conscious as far as it is veridical! It is veridical because it is it is aimed as the representation of imagined thingsaimed as the representation of imagined things,

The day-dream is successful in representing its imagined things as we are interpersonally and reasonably willing to say that they really are.

In order to explain this contrast, we can distinguish between two realms of reality:

1) The realm of CONCRETE REALITY (the reality as such): of things involving us, of our bodies, and even of qualitative subjective states like our sensations and feelings as they are originally given to us.

2) The realm of FICTIONAL REALITY (reality as if): which is in the level of the dream-images, figments of the imagination, halucinations, projected images, fictional reality that we can see in a screem.

The lack of consciousness in dreams arise from a category category mistakemistake: the dreamer aims to represent the concrete reality, though she gets only fictional reality. Therefore the representations are non-veridical, lacking consciousness.

By the day-dream, on the contrary, the realm of fictional reality is aimed as such, as we are willing to say that they as we are willing to say that they really are.really are. Therefore the representations are veridical, apt to be called conscious.

III. REFLEXIVE III. REFLEXIVE CONSCIOUSNESS AND CONSCIOUSNESS AND VERIDICAL VERIDICAL REPRESENTATIONREPRESENTATION

The second and more important form of consciousness is what I wish to call reflexive reflexive consciousnessconsciousness (following Locke) and needs more explanation.

Reflexive consciousnessReflexive consciousness can be defined as can be defined as the representation or experience of the the representation or experience of the own internal mental states, like own internal mental states, like sensations, feelings and even other sensations, feelings and even other thoughts.thoughts.Reflexive consciousness is a kind of Reflexive consciousness is a kind of self-consciousness.It was called by Armstrong introspective consciousness, under a perceptual model, and was particularly explored by David Rosenthal, under a meta-cognitive model, as the result of higher order (linguistic or non-linguistic) thoughts.

I prefer the meta-cognitive model because I am convinced by Rosenthal’s argument that there are no second order qualitative statesno second order qualitative states, which would be necessary to a perceptual model.

It seems that in order to have reflexive consciousness we need to have meta-cognitions of meta-cognitions of our sensations, feelings and even thoughtsour sensations, feelings and even thoughts.

We can see that we are conscious of them, using the word consciousness in a relational wayrelational way (also called transitivetransitive consciousness), but when this occurs, we can also say that these mental states are conscious, using the word ‘consciousness’ in a non-relational waynon-relational way (also called intransitiveintransitive consciousness). So, for example, if I have a very weak toothache during all day, I get a relational consciousness of this state, though I can say that when I think about it the toothache is made made conscious (a non-relational state).conscious (a non-relational state).

As Rosenthal saw, these meta-cognitions make us conscious of these mental states of the first level (in a relational sense), but they are notnot able to make us conscious of themselvesof themselves.

For this they would need meta-meta-cognitions, and so on. The top level remains always beyond The top level remains always beyond consciousnessconsciousness, making total consciousness impossible.

(Maybe, we can guess, it is this impossibility of total consciousness that gives us our strong feeling of free will when we take a decision, the feeling of being always above the causal determination of our decision.)

The reflexive consciousness is consciousness with capital letters, consciousness in the important sense, as Armstrong also noted.

It is typically human. It seems that big apes can have it, but it is very improbable that mice can be conscious in that way.

Moreover, we can only get conscious of our perceptual consciousness because we have reflexive consciousness – because we are able to have meta-cognitive experience of our perceptual states. Therefore, under this perspective, perceptual consciousness is, paradoxically, an unconscious kind of consciousness.

Armstrong compared this last kind of consciousness with thewith the self-scanning self-scanning procedure of a computer.procedure of a computer.Moreover, he gives an evolutionary reasonevolutionary reason for its emergence:

Since more developed living beings have Since more developed living beings have more and more complexes mental processes, more and more complexes mental processes, they need to be they need to be monitored, monitored, that is,that is,controlled and planned by a higher instance, controlled and planned by a higher instance, which forms what we prefer to call the which forms what we prefer to call the reflexive consciousness.reflexive consciousness.

The adoption of the concepts of reflexive + perceptualreflexive + perceptual consciousness helps us to explain some interesting empirical phenomena.

1) SonambulismSonambulism: hier the system of reflexive consciousness is turned off, while the system of perceptual consciousness remains working.

(ex: the truck-driver of Armstrong)

2) The blind-sight. Although with a blind half of her visual field, the person is able to guess the correct answers to questions about appears in this field.

The answer is that, although the person still has perceptual visual perceptual visual consciousnessconsciousness, she has lost the lost the introspective consciousness of her introspective consciousness of her visual statesvisual states. This is the reason why she is not conscious of seeing anything.

3) Another phenomenon explained by reflexive consciousness is Libet’s experiments. These experiments have shown that the redness potential corresponding to the decision to act occurs ~350 milliseconds before the before the awareness of the decisionawareness of the decision, which occurs ~200 ms before the action.

The explanation is that by the time of the decision there is only perceptual perceptual consciousness.consciousness. The reflexive reflexive consciousnessconsciousness comes only somewhat later, but is still able to direct or stop the reaction.

No news, given its function.

4) The theory of reflexive consciousness also gives an explanation for the lucid lucid dreamsdreams, also called conscious dreamsconscious dreams,

those dreams that occur when we are half-awake and that we can drive in some directions.

They are lucid because there is some some reflexive consciousness of the dream reflexive consciousness of the dream processesprocesses,

and this explains their higher clarity higher clarity and our higher capacity of memorize and our higher capacity of memorize them.them.

My point again:My point again:

As much as the perceptual consciousness, the reflexive consciousness also involves veridical representationsveridical representations.

The difference is that they are true true representation of the mental states that representation of the mental states that they represent.they represent. We can say that they are they are conscious states (intransitive), conscious states (intransitive), but also that wewe are conscious of them (transitive). are conscious of them (transitive).

If the representations are not veridical, we are not reallynot really, or only partiallyonly partially conscious of the things represented by them.

For example:

1) if I continuously lie to myself about my sensations, feelings, thoughts, if I methodically read them falsely in my mind, I will be identified with a person who lacks self-consciousnesslacks self-consciousness…

2) Consider again the case of lucid dreams. Dreams, as we said, are not conscious. But a lucid dream has a certain level of consciousness.has a certain level of consciousness. Why?- It is because there is - It is because there is a veridical meta-cognition of a veridical meta-cognition of the dream-process as a dream-processthe dream-process as a dream-process,

- Or of the fictional reality as it is.

We can even say to ourselves: “This is only a dream”, what shows unmistakenly our awareness that they belong to a ficcional realm.

3) A special case is given when the object of the representation by the reflexive consciousness is a perceptual representation (belonging to the perceptual consciousness),In this casethe meta-cognitive representation must be the meta-cognitive representation must be veridical in a double way. It must be aimed veridical in a double way. It must be aimed as the veridical representation of a veridical as the veridical representation of a veridical representation of a state of affairs…representation of a state of affairs…

Example:if I am aware that I am perceiving a snake near to my feet, I must be aware of my perception of the real snake near to my real feet.

IV. DISCURSIVE IV. DISCURSIVE CONSCIOUSNESS AND CONSCIOUSNESS AND VERIDICAL VERIDICAL REPRESENTATIONREPRESENTATION

Finally, I would like to suggest something more Finally, I would like to suggest something more controversial,controversial, adding a third kind of adding a third kind of consciousness, which I call consciousness, which I call discursivediscursive consciousnessconsciousness..

Very often we are said to be conscious of things that are neither object of present perceptual experience nor present mental states.

For example, I am conscious that 12 + 12 = 24, that Schliemann discovered Troy, that the Moon is full of stones.

To think and to say these things MIGHT be accompanied accompanied with reflexive consciousness.

- But many philosophers of mind sustain that our conscious states and thoughts are ALWAYS SELF-REFLEXIVE, THAT THIS IS INTRINSICAL TO THEM.

However, 1) there is no clear intuitive evidenceno clear intuitive evidence of this.

Moreover, 2) even if I don’t have the reflexive consciousness that 12 + 12 = 24, when I think this thought, this does not mean that this thought is not does not mean that this thought is not in any way conscious…in any way conscious…

When I think that 12 + 12 = 24 or that Schliemann discovered Troy, these thoughts seem to be conscious because they involve representations supported by involve representations supported by information, which is ultimately grounded information, which is ultimately grounded on reason or experience…on reason or experience…Therefore they belong to discursive consciousness (for it is neither perceptual nor reflexive).

In this case too, our general thesis is confirmed. Consciousness must involve the true true representation of a state of affairsrepresentation of a state of affairs,

since we cannot say that someone is conscious we cannot say that someone is conscious that 12 + 12 = 42 or that Moon is made of green that 12 + 12 = 42 or that Moon is made of green cheese…cheese…

For this kind of consciousness the concept of representation turns to be fundamental, and the concept of experience goes to the background.

When I say that I am conscious that p, I am not saying that I am having an experience, except when p is an observational sentence.

Since discursive consciousness involves representation without involving directly experience, there is a a suplementary reasonsuplementary reason to ground consciousness on representation.

Now one could still object that subliminallysubliminally perceptions are veridical, though they are not conscious.We can answer this appealing to the lack of reflexive consciousness and/or to the lack of integration of conscious states:We can speculate whether the representation involved must be integratedintegrated with the other mental states building the stock of beliefs held by the person, in order to be conscious.

An isolated representation, one could argue, would not be conscious, because it could not be object of a meta-cognitive representation; it must be integrated within a system, which ultimately integrated within a system, which ultimately controls the actions of thecontrols the actions of the organismorganism.Since the subliminally perception is not integrated, it cannot be object of reflexive consciousness, though they are veridical.

I hope to have shown in what ways consciousness can be seen as awareness of reality…

It is awareness of reality in the sense of being build up by veridical representations of things and states of affairs, representations of things as we are willing to accept that they really are.

The veridicality of the representation is essentialessential in the sense of being a necessary feature of the three general kinds of consciousness examined:

And the requirement of veridicality of the representation, we can guess,

is what links these kinds together as what links these kinds together as KINDS OF CONSCIOUSNESS.KINDS OF CONSCIOUSNESS.

Fim...