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2020

Giorgi Bilanishvili

Security Review

Turkey-Greece Confrontation and Georgia: Threats and Challenges

Zurab Batiashvili

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All rights reserved and belong to Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International

Studies. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form, including electronic

and mechanical, without the prior written permission of the publisher. The opinions and

conclusions expressed are those of the author/s and do not necessarily reflect the views of

Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies.

Copyright © 2010 Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies

Relations between Turkey and Greece have never been easy but since the summer of 2020,

tensions between them rose sharply. If during June and July of 2020 the parties were arguing over the

conversion of the Hagia Sophia Museum into a mosque, in August-September the center of controversy

shifted to the Eastern Mediterranean and the Aegean Sea. Many unresolved issues have accumulated

over the decades in this "space" - the problem of Cyprus, the problem of the separation of maritime

economic zones (hence, the natural resources located there), the issue of 12 islands and airspace, the

matter of ownership of uninhabited small islands and more. In addition, recently, one can observe

increasingly aggressive rhetoric in both countries which creates the danger of small incidents escalating

into a major military confrontation that, in turn, creates serious threats and challenges to regional security

(including Georgia).

Escalation of the Situation

The stalemate over the conversion of turning Hagia Sophia into a mosque had not yet subsided

when on August 10 official Ankara declared so-called NAVTEX (Warning for Ships) zones several times in

the Eastern Mediterranean. The purpose was to conduct mineral (Natural Air) explorations in the

maritime space that Greece considers its own domain.1 NAVTEX2 and the military exercises continued

through September.3

It is noteworthy that Turkey signed an agreement with Saraj’s Libyan government on November

27, 2019. By this agreement, the two countries have demarcated their special economic zones in the

Mediterranean. According to Ankara, this agreement also allows Turkey to extract natural resources

within its new maritime borders. However, Egypt, Greece and Cyprus consider this agreement illegal and

a violation of their national interests.4 Official Athens is particularly active in this regard, stating that

Turkey is trying to expand precisely at the expense of Greece’s special economic zone.5

1 Türkiye'den yeni bir NAVTEX ilanı! 10-11 Ağustos tarihi verildi, https://haberglobal.com.tr/dunya/turkiye-den- yeni-bir-navtex-ilani-10-11-agustos-tarihi-verildi-62364 2 “Turkey Issues New Navtex for East Med Drills until Sept. 11,” https://www.dailysabah.com/politics/turkey- issues-new-navtex-for-east-med-drills-until-sept-11/news 3 “Turkey and Turkish Cypriot Forces to Start Military Drill,” https://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-and- turkish-cypriot-forces-to-start-military-drill-157995 4 Zurab Batiashvili, "Syriaization of the Libyan Crisis: Threats and Challenges," https://www.gfsis.org/ge/publications/view/2815 5 “Greece on Alert as Turkey Sends Survey Ship to Disputed Waters,” https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe- 53723984

Turkey and Greece consider their own the same maritime space.

Official Athens has also been able to acquire the support of Paris in this conflict. Paris has already

started to view the strengthening of Ankara's positions in the Mediterranean with suspicion. As a result,

France has openly supported Greece and sent a serious military force to the region (Charles de Gaulle

aircraft and military aviation),6 thereby changing the military balance which had previously been clearly

on the side of Turkey.

It is noteworthy that the Western concerns are less problematic for Ankara and it continues to act

according to its own agenda. The doctrine of the so-called Blue Homeland7 introduced by the former

6 “France Deploys ‘Battle Ready’ Aircraft Carrier Charles de Gaulle to East Mediterranean,” https://www.keeptalkinggreece.com/2020/08/31/charles-de-gaulle-aircraft-carrier-france-mditerranean 7 CEM GÜRDENİZ/ Neden Mavi Vatan?, https://www.aydinlik.com.tr/arsiv/neden-mavi-vatan

Admiral of the Navy, Cem Gurdeniz, has been elevated to the state level in Turkey. It aims to expand

Turkish naval space, mainly at the expense of Greece.

A map depicting the doctrine of the "blue homeland" of Turkey, which also "swallows" the Greek islands.

In addition, it is noteworthy that on August 29cDevlet Bahçeli, the leader of the Nationalist

Movement Party (MHP) which is in coalition with the ruling party in Turkey, said that the issue of 12 islands

(the same Dodecanese archipelago consisting of 12 large and more than 150 small islands. Italy took these

islands away from the Ottomans in 1912 and handed them over to Greece in 19478) is "an open wound

for the Turkish nation." According to the same Bahçeli, these islands were given to Athens "illegally" and

their status needs to be reconsidered.9

For decades, the transfer of the islands to Greece has been seen by Turkish conservative and pro-

Islamic forces as a violation of national interests and the surrender of positions. They never liked the

Treaty of Lausanne (which established the Turkish-Greek border) which they consider to be the legacy of

Ataturk (hence the Kemalists).10

8 United Nations Treaty Series 1956; No. 3297 9 Bahçeli'den 12 Ada açıklaması, https://www.iha.com.tr/haber-bahceliden-12-ada-aciklamasi-863803 10 Murat Yetkin, “What’s Wrong With the Lausanne Treaty?,” https://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/opinion/murat- yetkin/whats-wrong-with-the-lausanne-treaty-104424

Thus, Turkey has indirectly raised the issue of the Lausanne Treaty and, consequently, a revision

of the borders of the neighboring country (which is at the same time its NATO ally and an EU member

state).

The islands transferred to Greece by Italy in 1947 are marked in red. The matter of their ownership was

questioned by Erdogan's coalition ally.

As in the case of turning Hagia Sophia into a mosque, many commentators have suggested that

the ruling party may be preparing for the early parliamentary elections and trying to consolidate the

conservative voters 11 It should also be noted that at this stage the issue of postponing the elections is not

being considered and, therefore, we can assume that Erdogan acted not to gain occasional points but to

bring another issue on the long-term agenda to the fore.

This policy of Turkey is a matter of concern in the European Union which naturally sided with the

member state (Greece). In European capitals, the calls for the need to take decisive action against Ankara

11 Burhanettin Duran, Erdoğan’ın Müjdesi ve Erken Seçim, https://www.sabah.com.tr/yazarlar/duran/2020/08/21/erdoganin-mujdesi-ve-erken-secim

are becoming increasingly frequent.12 An emergency EU summit is scheduled for September 24-25, 2020

where the issue of imposing sanctions on Turkey will be discussed.13 It should be noted that a consensus

on sanctions has not yet been reached. France, Greece, Cyprus and Austria are in favor of the tougher

measures while Germany, Spain and Italy are taking a more moderate position.14

Washington, which is not in favor of confrontation within NATO, has a relatively balanced

position. That is why US President Donald Trump, despite being intensively involved in the election

campaign and the fight against the coronavirus, held telephone talks with the Turkish and Greek leaders

to ease the situation.15 On the other hand, Washington’s decision to lift the arms embargo on the Republic

of Cyprus indicates that in the current situation it is leaning more towards the Greek side.16

Russia also called on the parties to negotiate.17 However, Moscow also announced plans to hold

a naval exercise in the Eastern Mediterranean on September 8-22 and 17-25.18 The exercises will be held

next to the Turkish Navtex zones (in some places, even with overlaps) which, in the context of Ankara's

confrontation with the West, is perceived as a kind of support from Moscow.

Thus, many believe that despite the numerous disagreements between Moscow and Ankara, the

situation will, at least somewhat, resemble that of 100 years ago when Bolshevik Russia greatly aided

Kemalist Turkey in its fight against Western forces.19

12 Fransa açıkladı: 'AB liderler zirvesinin ana gündemi Doğu Akdeniz olacak, https://ahval.me/tr/dogu- akdeniz/fransa-acikladi-ab-liderler-zirvesinin-ana-gundemi-dogu-akdeniz- olacak?utm_term=Autofeed&utm_medium=Social&utm_source=Twitter#Echobox=1599421512 13 “EU Threatens Turkey with Sanctions over Mediterranean Drilling,” https://www.dw.com/en/eu-turkey- sanctions-mediterranean/a-54746538 14 Steven Erlanger, “Rising Tensions Between Turkey and Greece Divide E.U. Leaders,” https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/27/world/europe/greece-turkey-eu.html 15 “Pompeo Urges Diplomatic Talks as Turkey Eyes Kastellorizo,” https://ahvalnews.com/eastern- mediterranean/pompeo-urges-diplomatic-talks-turkey-eyes-kastellorizo 16 Ayla Jean Yackley, “Russia Enters EastMed Fray, Offers to Mediate with Turkey,” https://www.al- monitor.com/pulse/originals/2020/09/russia-east-mediterranean-mediate-turkey-greece-oil-gas.html 17 Ayla Jean Yackley, “Russia Enters EastMed Fray, Offers to Mediate with Turkey,” https://www.al- monitor.com/pulse/originals/2020/09/russia-east-mediterranean-mediate-turkey-greece-oil-gas.html 18 “Turkey Issues Navtex in Eastern Mediterranean for Russia Drill,” https://www.trtworld.com/turkey/turkey- issues-navtex-in-eastern-mediterranean-for-russia-drill-39433 19 Yunanistan'la olası çatışmada neler olur? Cem Gürdeniz yorumladı - Hafta Sonu 05.09.2020, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9erqXu1flG0&fbclid=IwAR1uAWO2m0NoB0Pz-tv0dtfe4Czclr169wQg- Y2NZ8dTETNBg5fl2LL-BLo

Purple - Navtex Zones Announced by Turkey, Pink - Exercise (Shooting) Zones Announced by Russia,

September 2020

Turkey-Greece Tensions and Georgia

Official Tbilisi has not commented on the recent Turkish-Greek confrontation which is

understandable - a conflict between its two allies is not in Georgia's interests. It seems that Tbilisi is leaning

towards neutrality on this issue.

Nevertheless, there are a number of nuances due to which the current tension in the

neighborhood still has a negative impact on our country.

After the European countries supported Greece, Ankara and Moscow showed signs of

rapprochement, albeit cautious.

An interesting response in Ankara was provided on the announcement of a Russian shooting

exercise in support of Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean. In an interview with the pro-government CNN

Türk, the author of the Blue Homeland doctrine and former Admiral, Cem Gurdeniz, who is quite close to

the Turkish government, advanced the idea that since, in his words, Russia and Turkey are "attacked" by

the West, the sides should move closer to each other. And for this purpose, Moscow should recognize the

so-called Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and Ankara should return the favor by recognizing the so-

called "independence" of Georgian occupied territories.20

It should be noted that Dogu Perincek, the leader of the Homeland party which is friendly to the

Turkish government, also made a similar call earlier and even visited Sokhumi.21

Conclusions:

- The controversy between Ankara and Athens is not an isolated issue - it is part of a larger process

that can be conditionally called the process of Turkey’s return to its "own roots."

- Turkey, as a member of NATO, and Greece, as a member of NATO and the European Union, are

important allies for Georgia. Therefore, the conflict between them is not in Tbilisi’s interest.

- The confrontation within NATO is very favorable for the Kremlin which has been trying for years

to create a rift in the ranks of the alliance. Thus, Moscow will try to increase the rift within NATO

and continue to encourage the parties to this end.

- Escalated confrontation with the West will drive Ankara even closer to Moscow which is not in

Georgia's interests.

- The confrontation between Turkey and Greece will not be resolved soon. The problems between

them are of a fundamental nature. Consequently, if an agreement is reached between these two

countries, it will be a positive, however, more of a temporary event.

- Unlike the previous tensions, Greece has been able to gain the support of European countries

(especially France) which makes Athens more confident and courageous in its actions.

- There is also a danger of a military escalation between the parties. However, it is hard to imagine

the West allowing the likelihood of a long-term military conflict between them. Hence, if a conflict

occurs, it is likely to end soon which does not mean that the parties will be able to resolve the

problems soon.

- In case the of the West evaluating Turkey's policy as an aggressive action, the imposition of certain

sanctions cannot be ruled out. In such a scenario, Turkey, already in a difficult economic situation,

will suffer greatly. Its economy had already shrunk by 9.9% in the second quarter of 2020, the

devaluation of the Turkish lira is continuing, unemployment is rising, etc. All this, in turn, has a

negative impact on the economy of Georgia for which Turkey is the number one trading partner.

- Georgia should be particularly attentive to the recent rapprochement process of Russia and

Turkey and the views expressed in the circles close to the Turkish authorities on the recognition

of the so-called "independence" of Georgian occupied territories. It is desirable for official Tbilisi

to clearly underscore its "red lines" with Ankara, making it aware that a violation of those lines

will precipitate serious retaliatory steps.

20 Yunanistan'la olası çatışmada neler olur? Cem Gürdeniz yorumladı - Hafta Sonu 05.09.2020, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9erqXu1flG0&fbclid=IwAR1uAWO2m0NoB0Pz-tv0dtfe4Czclr169wQg- Y2NZ8dTETNBg5fl2LL-BLo 21 Doğu Perinçek: Türkiye Abhazya'yı tanıyacak, http://vatanpartisi.org.tr/genel-merkez/haberler/dogu-perincek- turkiye-abhazya-yi-taniyacak-28830