SECURITY COUNCIL - beb45aktif.files.wordpress.com · Supplement No. 17, Annex42 Letter dated 30...
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NATIONS UNIES
SECURITY COUNCIL
OFFICIAL RECORDS
SECOND YEAR
CONSEIL DE SECURITE
PROCES-VERBAUX OFFICIELS
DEUXIEME ANNEE
No. 76
183rd and 184th meetings14 August 1947
Lake Success
New York
183eme et 184eme seances14 aout 1947
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Hundred and eighty-third meetingPage
299. Provisional agenda 1967
300. Adoption of the agenda 1967
301. Continuation of the discussion on thereport by the Commission of Investigation concerning Greek Frontier Inci-dents 1967
Hundred and eighty-fourth meeting
302. Provisional agenda 1978
303. Adoption of the agenda 1979
304. Continuation of the discussion on theIndonesian question 1979
Documents
The following documents, relevant to the hundredand eighty-third and hundred and eighty-fourthmeetings appear as follows:
Official Records of the Security Council, SecondYear:
Supplement No. 16, Annex 40
Letter dated 30 July 1947 from the acting representative of Australia on the Security Counciladdressed to the Secretary-General (document3/449)
Supplement No. 16, Annex 41
Letter dated 30 July 1947 from the PermanentLiaison Officer of India addressed to the President of the Security Council (document S/447)
Supplement No. 17, Annex 42
Letter dated 30 July 1947, from the permanentrepresentative of Greece to the United Nationsaddressed to the Acting Secretary-General, andenclosed letter dated 31 July 1947, from theMinister of Foreign Affairs of Greece (document S/451)
Special Supplement No. 2
Report of the Commission of Investigation concerning Greek Frontier Incidents to the Security Council (document S/360)
TABLE DES MATIERES
Cent-quatre-vingt-troisieme seancePages
299. Qrdre du jour provisoire 1967
300. Adoption de l'ordre du jour 1967
301. Suite de la discussion sur le rapport dela Commission d'enquete sur les incidents SUIvenus a la frontiere grecque.. 1967
Cent-quatre-vingt-quatrieme seance
302. Ordre du jour pl'Ovisoire 1978
303. Adoption de l'ordre du jour 1979
304. Suite de la discussion sur la questionindonesienne 1979
Documents
Les documents suivants, se rapportant aux centquatre-vingt-troisieme et cent-quatre-vingtquatrieme seances, figurent dans Ies publicationssuivantes:
Proces-verbaux officiels du Conseil de securite,Deuxieme Annee:
Supplement No 16, Annexe 40
Lettre, en date du 30 juillet 1947, adressee auSecretaire general par le representant par interim de I'Australie au Conseil de securite(document S/449)
ISupplement No 16, Annexe 41
Lettre, en date du 30 juillet 1947, adressee "auPresident du Conseil de securite par I'agent deliaison permanent de I'Inde (document 8/#7)
Su }plement No 17, Annexe 42
Ll;l:tre, en date du 31 juillet 1947, adressee auSecretaire general par interim par le representant permanent de la Grece aupres de 1'01'ganisation des Nations Unies, et Iettre jointe,en date du 31 juillet 1947, du Ministre desAifaires etrangeres de Grece (document 8/451)
Supplement special No 2
Rapport pL';sente au Conseil de securite par laCommission d'enquete sur les incidents survenus a la frontiere grecque (document 8/360)
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1978
representative of the USSR. However, if no othermember has asked to speak, my delegation wouldbe quite prepared to have a vote taken now.
The PRESIDENT: If there is any member whowishes to speak on this subject but who is notprepared to do so at this time, I shall put thematter off until next week.
, '"Mr. KATZ-SUCHY (Poland): As I understand
it,there are other members who would like tospeak on the subject. I would therefore suggest anadjournment at this time.
Colonel HODGSON (Australia): In addition tothe Australian'resolution, there are two, UnitedStates amendments before the Coui'lci1. On behalfof my delegation, I should like to make a fewobservations on those amendments, and I shouldalso like to make a few observations on ~hat wassaid this morning by the representative of the
,USSR. I therefore support the view expressed bythe Polish representative that we should adjournat this time.
The PRESIDENT: The proposal fo/ adj~urnment
will be voted on without debate. If the Councildecides to adjourn now, the next meeting devotedto this subject will be held on Tuesday, 19 August,~3~~ .
Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): What is thereason for taking a vote? A suggestion was madethat the Council should adjourn, and no objection was expressed. I see no reason for voting onthat simple question. In order to avoid wastingtime, let us simply adjourn. It i,; already past 1o'c.1ock.
The. PRESIDENT: I shall accept that suggestionand declare the meeting adjourned.
The meeting rose at 1.05 p.m.
HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-FOURTHMEETING
Held at Lake Success, New York,.on Thursday, 14 August 1947, at 3 p.m.
President: Mr. F. EL-KHOURI (Syria).
Present: The representatives of the followingcountries: Australia, Belgium, Brazil, China, Colombia, France, Poland, Syria, Union of SovietSocialist Republics, United Kingdom, UnitedStates of America.
302. Provisional ag~nda (d6~ument S/491).: l"
1. Adoption o! the agenda.2. The Indonesian question:
(a) Letter dated 30 July 1947 from the acting representative of Australia on theSecurity Council addressed to the Secretary-General (?ocument S/449);1
(b) Letter dated 30 July 1947 from the Permanent Liaison Officer of India addressedto the President' of the Security Council(document Sj447)."
&tats-Unis et le representant de l'URSS. Nea.'1.moins, si aucun autre membre ne tient a prendrela parole, ma delegation. est disposee a accepterque le vote ait lieu maintenant.
Le PRESIDENT. (traduitde l'anglais): Si que!qu'un desire se prononcer sur cette question, sansetre en mesure de la faire aujo!1rd'hui-meme,j'ajournerai le debat a la serilaine prochaine.
M. KATZ-SUCHY (Pologne) (traduit de l'anglqis): 11 me semble que d'autres membres desireraient prendre la parole au sujet de cette reso.lution. Je'propose donc l'ajournement.
Le colonel HODGSON (Australie) (traduit del'anglais): En plus de la resolution de l'Australie,le Conseil est saisi de deux amendements desEtats-Unis. J'aimerais, au nom de ma delegation,faire quelques observations au sujet de ces amendements, et j'aimerais egalement dire quelquesmots a propos de ce qu'a declare ce matin le representant de l'URSS. C'est pourquoi j'appuie laproposition d'ajournement avancee par le repre-sentant de la Pologne. .
Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): La motiond'ajournement sera mise aux voix sans discussion.Si le 'Conseil decide l'ajournement, la prochaineseance consacree a cette question aura lieu lemardi 19 aout, a 15 heures.
M.GROMYKO (Union des Republiques socialist~s' sovietiques) (traduit du ru'Sse): Pour quelleraison procederait-on a un vote? On a proposel'ajGumement et aucune objection n'a ete formulee. Je ne vois aucune raison de voter sur cettequestion tres simple. Pour eviter de perdre dutemps, ajournons simplement la seance. Il est dejaplus de 13 heures. .
Le PREsIDE~T (traduit de l'anglais): J'acceptecette proposition et declare que la seance est ajournee.
La seance e~t levee a13 h. 05.
CENT-QUATRE-VINGT-QUATRIEMESEANCE
Tenue aLake Success, New-York,le jeudi 14 aout 1947, a15 heures.
President: M. F. EL-KHOURI (Syrie).. Go
Presents: Les representants des pays suivants:Australie, Belgique, Bresil, Chine, Colombie,.France, Pologile, Syrie, Union des Republiquessocialistes sovietiques, Royaume-Uni, Etats-Unisd'Amerique.
302. Ordre du jour provisoire(document S/491)
1. Adoption de l'ordre du jour.2. La question indonesienne:
a) Lettre, en date du 30 juillet 16l47, adrfJsee au Secretaire general par le representant par interim de l'Australie au ConseiJde securite (document S/449)';
b) Lettre, en date du 30 juillet 1947, adressee au President du Conseil (le securitepar l'agent de liaison permanent de l'Inde(document S/447)". -
.' See Official Records of the Security Council, Se~Ond] 1 Voir les Proces-verbaux officiels du Conseil de secu-Year, Suppicment No. 16, Annex 40. rite, Deuxieme Annee, Supplement, No 16, Annexe 40.
• Ibitl., SupIfement No. 16, Annex 41.· " Ibid., Supplement No 16, Annexe 4l.
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...1979
303. Adoption of the agenda
The agenda was adopted.
304. Continuation of the dis'cussion on theIndonesian question
The PRESIDENT: At the last meeting of theCouncil on this subject: we decided to invite therepresentative of the Indonesia:n Republic to takehis place at the Council table. His credentials havebeen distributed to the members of the Counciland, in the opinion of the Secretariat, these cre-dentials" are in order. ,
At the invitatio.n of the President3 Mr: Pillai,representative of India3 Mr. Sjahrir3 Ambassadorat-large of the Republic of Indonesia3 and Mr.van Kleffens3 representative of the Netherlands,took their places at the Council table.
The PRESIDENT: At the last meeting on thissubject I mentioned that we had received a newapplication from the' representative of the Philippines requesting to be invited to participate inthe .discussions of the Indonesia,n question. TheCouncil did not approve the first application:and the representative of the Philippines has repeated hid request, which has been distributed tothe members of the Council (document S/485).'His request was supported by the representativeof Australia at our last meeting on this subject.
We have to take decision now regarding thisapplication; we have to decide whether or not therepresentative of the Philippines should be invited to participate in this discussion.
Mr. NISOT (Belgium) (translated from French) :I do not want to interfere in the conduct of ourdebates, since tha" is the President's responsibility.I would merely recall that there has been a Belgian proposal to the effect that the Republic ofEast Indonesia and the Republic of Borneo shouldalso be invited to participate in our work.
The PRESIDENT: I was going to pass on to thatpoint after I had disposed of the application ofthe Philipp~es.
Sir Alexander CADOGAN (United Kingdom):As one who did .not approve of this proposalwhen it was first put forward, may I explain that! refrained from approving it on that occasionsimply because I do not think the application wasbacked by. sufficient evidence. I thought the
.Council, in a case such as this, ought to considerthe matter very carefully before inviting any nonmember of the Council under the appropriateArticle of the Charter.
Ha¥ing read the letter addressed to· the President by the Philippine representative, I am gladto be able to say that I think this letter sets forthsufficient reasons to enable the Council to issuethe invitatiop.. As far as I am concerned: I amprepared to join i!j, such an invitation.
Mr. JOHNSON (United States o( America) :When the application of the Philippines was before the Council at an earlier meeting, the United
y 1 See Official Records of the Security Council, 8econd~ar, ~o. 74, 181st meeting.
~NO. 72, 178th meeting, document 8/458.
303 Ad . d l' .. .J •. optIOn e orure ""U Jour
L'ordre du jour est adoptee
304. Suite de la discussion sur la questionindonesienne
Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Aucours'de la denuere seance que le COIl..seil a consaereea cette question, nous avons decide d'inviter lerepresentant de la Republique d'Indonesie'. Descopies de ses lettres de creance ont ete distribueesaux membres du Conseil et le Secr£tariat estimeque ces pouvoirs sont suffisants.
Sur l'invitation du President, M. Pillai3 representant de Ondej M, Sjahrir3 Ambassadeur extraordinaire de la Republique d'lndonesie, etM. van Kleffens, representant des Pays-Bas3 prennent place cl la table du Conseil.
Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Au coursde la derniere seance, j'ai annonce que_nous avionsrec;u une nouvelle demande du representant desPhilippines" qui desire etre invite a' prendre parI;aux discussions du Conseil sur la question indonesienne. Le Conseil avait rejete sa premiere-demande" et le representant des Philippines En apresente une nouvelle, dont les membres d!! Conseil ont pu prendre connmssance tJans le document 8/485' et que le representant de l'Australiea appuyee au cours de la derniere seance consacree .a la question indonesien..ne.
Il nous faut maintenant prendre une decision a.l'egard de cette demande; nous devonsdecider sinous inviterons ou non le representant des Philippines a prendre part a la discussion..
M. NISOT {Belgique): Je ne veux pas intervenir dans l'ordre de notre d6bat qu'il appartientau President de reglei. Jerappelle simplementqu'il existe une proposition presentee par la Belgique et tendant a ce que la Republique de l'Indonesie orientale et la Republique. de Borneosoient egaIement invitees a participer a nos travaux.
Le Fp.ESIDENT (traduit de l'angll2is): J'avins1'illtention de passer acette proposition apres avoirregIe la question de la demande des Philippines.
Sir Alexander CADOGAN (Royaume-U ni) (traduit de l'I'mglais): Etant de ceux qui se sont pr6nonces contre cette proposition au moment oudIe a d'abord ete presentee, je tiens a donner laraison de mon attitude: si je n'ai pas appuye laproposition, c'est uniquement parce que les arguments fournis alol's a l'appui de b demande neme semblaient pas suffisants. J'estimais que leConseil, dans un cas de· ~e genre, devait etudier laquestion soigneusement avant d'inviter un Etat nonmembre du Conseil a prendre part aux discussions,
I aux termes de l'Article pertinent de la Charte.
. Apres avoir lu la lettre adressee au Presidentpar le representant des Philippines, jesuls heureuxde reconnaitre qu'elle fournit des arguments suffisants pour 'permettre au Conseil de donner. suitea la demande. d'invitation. Je suis pret a donnermon appui a cette invitation. ..
M. JOHNSON (Etats-Unis. d'Amerique) . (traduit de l'anglais): Quand la demande des Philippines a ete soumise au Conseil au coilrs d'une
1 Voir les Proces-verbaux officiels du Conseil de slcurite, Deuxieme Annee, No 74, 18H:me seance.
• Ibid., No 72, 178eme seance, document 8/458.
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UJHU
A vote u;as taken by show of hands and themotion was adopted by 9 votes to none, with 2a~stenti:nu.
Votes for: Australia, Belgium, Brazil, China,Colombia, France, Syria, United Kingdom, UnitedStates of America.
Abstentions: Poland, Union of Soviet SocialistRepublics. -
At the invitation of the President, GeneralRomulo, representative of the Philippines, tookhis seat at the Council table.
The PRESIDENT: The Assistant Secretary-General will explain the situation with regard to thePhilippine representative's credentials.
Mr. KERNO (Assistant Secretary-General incharge of the' Department of Legal Affairs):According to rule 14 of the provisional rules ofprocedure of the Security Council" the credentialsQf representatives who are invited to participatein a meeting. or meetings of the Security Councilshall be communicated to the Secretary-Generalnot less than twenty-four hours before the firstmeeting which they. are invited to attend. If wewere to interpret this rule strictly, of course, the
. represe~tative of the Philippines could not atten~
before the'meeting following tlVs one. But exception was made in the case of the Netherlands and
, Indi~n representatives, when the Council treatedthis matter on the occasion of the first meeting.which they attended, and the Council requestedthat they should 'take their seats at the Council itable immediately and send their credentials tothe Secretary-General as soon as possible.
It is perhaps a deviation from the strict letterof this rule, but I suppose that the Council, inview of the special circumstances, decided to interpret the rule broadly. I make this statement Ibecause it is my duty to direct the attention ofthe Council to the rUles of procedure, but I repeatthat an exception was made on the occasion ofthe seating of the Netherlands and Indian representatives.
,States voted for the admission of the Philippinerepresentative to the discussions. I did not~ however, say anything in support of the proposal, because it did not occur to me at that time thatthe request would be declined. I shQuld like nowto give the hearty .support of my delegation to
'this request. '
Mr. NISOT (BelglUm) ~translated from French):In view of the information given us in the letterjust :r.eceived from the representative of the Philippines, I shall willingly vote in favour of invitingthe Philippines.
The PRESIDENT: As there is no other commenton the subject, I shall put to a vote the questionas to whether the Council agrees to invite therepresentative of the Philippines, in accordaI).cewith the new application and the new reasonswhich are presented in the later letter.
I
. May I add that rule 16 of the provisional rulesof proceduteseems to point in the same direction.as rule 14.'. ,
The PRESIDENT: In rule 16 it is stated that suchrepresentatives shall he seated provisionally with
seance anterieure, les Etats-Unis ont vote en faveur de l'admission du representant des Philippines aux discussions. Toutefois, je n'ai rien diten faveur de la prgposition, car je ne pensais pasa ce moment que la demande serait rejetee. Jetiens maintenant a appuyer chaleureusement cetteproposition au nom de ma deleg~tion.
M. NISOT (Belgique): En raison des elementsque nous.apporte la nouvelle lettre du representant des Philippines, c'est tres volqntiers que jevoterai pour qu'il soit invite a participer a la
.discussion.
Le PRESIDEN'):' (traduit de 'l'anglais): Aucun.membre ne desirant plus faire de remarques surla question, je vais demander au Conseil de decider par un vote si~ a la suite de la nouvelle demande du representant des Philippines, et enconsideration des nouvea.ux arguments qu'il a fournis dans sa derniere lettre, nous accepton,s del'inviter a participer aux discussions.
11 est procede au vote amain levee. Par 9 voixcontre zero, avec 2 abstentions, la proposition estadoptee. .
V:Jtent pour: Australie, Belgique, Bresil, Chin~~Colombie, France, Royaume-Uni, Syrie, EtatsDnis d'Am6rique.
S'abstiennent: Pologne, Union des Republiquessocialistes sovietiques.
Sur l'invitation du President, le general Romulo,representant. des Philippines, prend place a latable du Conseil.
!Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Le Secre
taire general adjoint va exposer la question despouvoirs du representant des Philippines.
M. KERNo (Secretaire general adjoint chargedes questions juridiques) (traduit' de l'anglais) :Conformement a l'article 14 du reglement interieurprovisoire du Conseil de securite, tout represen-
. tant invite a prendre part a une ou plusieursseances du Conseil de securite doit presenter sespouvoirs au Secretaire general vingt-quatre heuresau moins avant .la .premiere seance a laquelle itest· invite. Si nous appliquons cet article d'unefac;on strictc, le representant des Philippines nepourrait assister qu'a la prochaineseance.. Mais,dans un cas semblable, leCons'eil a fait une exception en faveur des representants des Pays-Baset de l'Inde au moment Oll ce prqbleme s'est posea I'occasion de la premiere seance a laquelle ceuXrci ant assiste; le Consdl a demande qu'ils prennentpla:ce a la table imm6diatement et qu'ils presentent leurs pouvoirs' au Secretaire genera! le plusrapidement possible.
Cettc fa~on d'appliquer l'article en questions'eloigne peut-etre de la lettre du texte, mais jepense que, en raison des circonstances exceptionnelles, le Conseil a decide de l'interpretl';r dansson sens le plus large. Je fais cette declarationparce qu'iI est de mon devoir d'attirer l'attentiondu Conseil sur le reglement interieur, mais jerepete\que le Conseil a deja fait exception pourl'admission des representants des Pays-Bas et del'Inde.
J'ajouterai que l'article 16 du reglement interieul' semble redige dans le meme esprit quel'article 14.
Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): L'article16 stipule que les representants designes c,onfor-
..........
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--. 1981 •
the same rights as other representatives, pending'the approval of their credentials.
~
The next subject for consideration' is the pJ.:Oposal ol the Netherlands representative, supportedby the Belgian member of the COlOncil ta inviterepresentatives from East Indonesia and
e
Borneoto be seated at the Council table.
I should ,like to ask the Belgian representativeunder which of the rules of procedure he presentsthis request;
Mr. NISOT (Belgium) (translated from French) :'I based my proposal on the same reasoning whichled the Security Council to send an invitation tothe representative of the Indonesi:m Republic, Atthat time the question of the applicability of Article 32 of the Charter was completely reversed:It was clearly stated that that Article did notapply to the;: present case. I invoke the same reasoning: I do so 'on the basis of equity and of theconsideration that the same case cannot be dealtwith in two different ways.
Mr. LOPEZ (Colombia): I should merely liketo raise li question, and that is whether the Gov~rnments of these two territories have been recognized de facto, as in the case of the IndonesianRepublic, by- the Netherlands Government itselfand by some other Governments. '
In askfug this question, I am not in any way,opposing the motion to have the other representatives admitted to the Council table.
Mr. VAN KLEFFENS (Netherlands): Perhaps'Ishould be best qualified to reply to this, question,and therefore, I shall be quite happy to do so.
The point was mentioned in the lasot meetingon this subject that the Netherlands Governmenthas recognized those two Governments for whatthey 'are,' namely, States in exactly the same position as the Republic of Indonesia with which theyare ultimately to take their place in the UnitedStates of Indonesia. '
The Republic of Indonesia appears to have beenacknowledged as having a de facto Governmentby few States. I submit t.~at it is not for any organ
, of the United Nations to say that a State is recognized as either a de jure or de facto Government.That is the exclusive prerogative of .individualStates. There is nothing in the Charter which givesthe United Nations or any of its organs, the abilityto raise a p'olitical entity to the status, of a Staterecognized de facto' or de jure, or to raise theGovernment of such a political entity to the statusof a Government recognized de facto or de jure.
, I submit that the number of Governments whichhave recognized' the 'Republic of Indonesia ashaving a de facto Government is so infinitesimal,that it means not-lUng. There are perhaps threeor four Governments which have done so, bute,:en if there were five or six, there are still aboutfif~ States or more in this world, and certainlythe vast majority of the Members of the United
Y1 See Official Records of the Security Council, Second
. . .. ear, No. -74, 181st meeting. .
IItttr 1Ii '""••""",.,,~ ...-.
mement a: l'article 14 siegent. a- titre p;rovisoireavec Ies memes droits que les autres representantsen attendant que leurs pouvoirs soient reconnus.
La question que nous -devons examiner ensuiteest la proposition du representant des Pays-Bas,appuyee par la Be1gique, qui est membre du Con.sell, d'inviter les representants de l'Indonesie orier,tale et de Borneo a- prendre place a- la table duConsell. e, /
Je prie le representant de la Belgique d'indiquersur quel article du reglement interieur il se fOI.ldepour presenter cette requete. •
M. NIS0T (Be1gique): Je fonde ma propositionsur le meme raisonnement que celui qui a amenele Conseil de securite a- adresser une invitation aurepresentant de la RepubJique indonesienne. A.cemoment, l'on a reserve compI(:tement la questionde savoir si l'Article 32 de la Charte etait applicable. On a dit expressement que cet article ne.s'appliquait p~ dans ce cas. J'invoque la memeraison: je me fonde pour le fake sur unebased'equite, sur la consideration qui veut .que I'onne traite pas un meme cas de deux fa~ons differentes.
M. LOPEZ (Colombie) (traduit de l'anglais) :J e desire simpiement poser une question. Ces deux:pays out-ils ete reconnus, comme la Republiqued'Indonesie, a titre de Gouvernements de factO'par le Gouvernement des Pays-Bas et certains au-,tres Gouvernements? ' ,
Cette question n'implique d'ailleurs de ma partaucune opposition a- l'egard des motions" visant a'inviter les autres representants u'la table du Con-sell. ' . .
M. VAN KLEFFENS (Pas-Bas) (traduit de l'anglais): C'est ,moi qui suis probablement le mieuxen mesure de repondrea- cette question, et je senatres heureux de le fah-e.
Au cours de la derniere se~.nce consacree a- cettequestion, on a declare que le Gouvemement' desPays-Bas avait reconnu aux deux Gouvernementsen question une qualitequ'ils possedent' effective- I
ment' : celle d'Etats semblables en tous points ala Republique d'Indonesie, avec'Iaque1k Us cons~titueront plus tard les Etats-Unis d'Indonesie.
11 semble' que certains Etats, en ,petit nombre,aient accorde au Gouvernement de la Republiqued'Indonesie une reconnaissance de facto. Je mepermets d'affirmer qu'aucun otgane des NationsUnies n'est cOI\lpetent pour declarer que le .Gouvernement d'un Etat est reconnu de jure Oll defacto. Cette reconnaissance est une des prerogatives exclusives de chaque ~tat pris en particulier.Aucun Article de la Charte ne donne pouvoir aI'Organisation des Nations Unies, ni a- aucun deses organes, d'accorder le statut d'Etat reconnu defacto ou de jure a- une entite politique, ni4'engerle Gouvemement d'une telle entite en Gouverne-,ment reconnu de facto ou de jure.
Je pretends que le nombre de Gouvemementsquiont accorde au Gouvemement de la Republique d'Ind.onesie une reconnaissance de facto esttellement restreint que cette reconnaissance n~a
aucune valeur. Trois ou quatre Gouvemementspeut-etre ont ainsi reconnu la Republique d'Indomnesie, mais, meme s'ils etaient cinq. ou six, il resterait encore dans le monde cinqu~te Etats ou
1 Voir les Proces-verbaux officiels du COf~seil desecurite, Deuxieme Annee, No 74, 181eme seance.
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• 1982
,Nations have -not given recognition in -any shapeor fbrm to the, Republic of Indonesia or its Government;
I. therefore thi~ that the Belgian ,representative,if I may' say so, was complet~ly correct when hesaid that if you ask the one, namely the Republic,to, come to this table, you must in equity andJustice, which I have always thought was the primarY.consideration of this Council, ask the othersas well.
Mr. LOPEz' (Colombia) :" As I said before, Iam not opposing the .admission of the other ~ofutur'i' members of the Indonesian Federation toour discussion, but I simply wanted to have aclear understanding of how we might invite them.The Belgian representative supported his motionby saying that we should apply the reasons thatled us to admit the Indonesian Republic; arid asI am insufficiently posted on conditions in Indo-
, nesia,I felt free to request an explanation.'\
After listening to the representative of the N~therhmds,.I must admit that I am not yet clear asto whether the conditions are the same as in thecase of the Indonesian Republic. There is, anagreement between Indonesia and the Netherlands.Government, which recognizes the Indonesian Republic as' a de facto c:;overnment over that territory. Inadditi~n to that recognition, there is therecognition of the· Indonesian Republic by otherGovernments, one of these Governments beingthat of the United States of America, which, atthe present time, is offering'its good offices forthe settlement of this dispute. .
The representative of th~ Netherlands now saysthat the .Council is nbtcalledupon, under anyArticle of the Charter, to decide the nature of aI:lYgiven Goverrtment. I must say that I had notraised that point; I simply wanted to establisnwhether the other future partners of the Federation were in the same position as 'the IndonesianR~~~. .
"~'~::"~'!"~
Then the representative of the Netherlandsstated that the Indonesian Republic has beenrecognized by an infinitesimal number of States,but he did not say'whether' the other States havebeen'recognized even by an infinitesimal numberof States; That was my question, but my doubtsremain the same. In principle, I am in favour ofbeing liberal and, having all the in£ormation wecan obtain before we take action. But if in suchan important matter we are going to be in anyway more liperal,. and if we are going to establisha ,precedent, I should like to know how we areto, establish such a precedent.
. That was the' only purpose of my question, andif, .after listening to the representative 'of theNetherlands, the Council wishes to invite therepresentatives of these other two territories, I amperfectly willing to accept this course. I shall nothave to change my general attitude,C and I amstrongly in favour of mobilizing public opinion. Ithink it is. really im~ortant for our purpose to
n
plus, p<\rmi lesquels l'enorme majorite des Melllbres des Nations Unies, qui n'ont accorde de reconnaissance d'aucune sorte a la Republique d'lu-donesie ou a son Gouvernemeni. '
S'il m'est permis d'exprimer mon opinion, jecrois donc que le representant de la Belgiquc aparfaitement raison de dire que, si vous invitezun des Etats en question, c'est-a-dire la Republique d'Indanesie, a sieger a la table du Conseil, __~vous devez inViter egalement les autres aunom del'equite et de la justice qui, je crois, ont toujoursete les principales preoccupations du Conseil desecurite.
M. I LOPEz (Colombie)' (traduit ,de l'ang1ais) :Comme je l'ai deja dit, je ne m'oppose pas a ceque les deux autres futurs membres de la Federation bdonesienne prennent. part •aux discussionsdUo Conseil; je voudrais simplement tIu'on m'expliquat' clairement quel moyen nous permettra deles inviter, Le representant de la Belgique a defendu sa. motion en deClarant que nous devrionsinvoquer, dam le cas present, les memes argumentsque ceux sur lesquels nous nous sommes fond~s
pour admettre la Republique d'Indonesie au ConseiI. Or, etant insuffis~ent informe de la situation de l'Indonesie, je me suis cm autorise a demander une explication.
Apres avoir ecoute le representant des Pays-Bas,je dois avouer que je ne comprends pas encoreclairement en quoi le cas a l'etude ressemble acelui de la Republique d'Iridonesie. Il existe entre'l'Indonesie et le, Gouvernement des Pays-Bas unaccord aux termes duquel la Republique d'Indonesie est reconnue comme le Gouvernement defacto de ce territoire. Outre le Gouvernement desPays-Bas; d'autres Gouvernements ont reconmr laRepublique d'Indonesie, parmi lesquels celui desEtats-Unis d'Amerique,Jqui vient d'offrir ses bonsoffices pour le reglement du differend.
Le representant des Pays-Bas declare maintenant qu'aucun Article de la Charte ne p~rmet auConseil de decider du statut d'un Gouvernement'quelconque. Je tiens a dire que c'est la une question que jen'ai pas soulevee. Je desirais simplement savoir avec certitude si les autres membresde la future Federation sont dans la meme situation que la Republique d'Indonesie.
Le'representant des Pays-Bas' a ensuite declareque la Republique d~Indonesie n'a ete reconnueque pat un tres peti,t 'nombre d'Etats, mais 11 n'apas dit si les autres territoires ont ete reconnus dutout, meme par un tres petit nombre d'Etats. Telleest la' question que j'ai posee, et mes doutes ne sont
, pas eclaircis. En, principe, je suis toujours f:nfaveur d'une attitude libei-ale, et j'estime qu'ilfaut; toujoUrs reunir tous les renseignements possibles avant de pFendre une decision. Mais, si nousdecidons d'adopter d'une fa~on queIconque uneattitude plus genereuse a l'egard d'une questionaussi importante et si nous devons creer un precedent, je ,desirerais savoir de quelle fa~on nOlfsallons proceder.
Tel etait le sew but de ma question, et si, apresavoir entendu le. representant des Pays-Bas, letConseil desire inviter les representants -des deuxautres territoi.res" je suis tout ,pret a approuvercette fa~on d'agir. Je n'aurai pas a modifier monattitude generale, et je suis toujours resolUlllentfavorable a une intervention active de l'opinion
publique.J'estirne qu'il est ~:,:::. ~po:tan~
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-- 1'983
have public opinion mobili;z;ed. That is why I wasalways strongly in favour Of inviting the Philipeine representative to our discussion to tell us howthe Philippines are affected and interested in whatis happening in that part' of the world, so thatwe may reach ,more intelligent conclusions.
The PRESIDENT: I believe it is important tobring to the attention of the Council the rulesof procedure and Articles of the Charter whichguide the Security Council in the matter of inviting representatives who are not members ofthe Council to participate in its discussions. Thereare four categories of persons who may be invited to take part in the Council's deliberations.
The first category, under ~le 37 of th~ rulesof procedure, covers any Member State whichbrings a matter to the attention of the SecurityCouncil. Such a State, as is the case with Indiain respect of this question, may be invited to bepresent at the discussion of the case. .
"The second category includes any other Mem-ber of ~e United Nations whose interests. arespecially affected. This is the case with the Government of the Philippines, which has explained tothe Council that its interests are specially affectedby the matter under discussion, and" which accordingly:has been invited to participate.
The third category, under Article 32 of theCharter, includes any other State which is a partyto the dispute under consideration. Such a Stateshould be invited because it is a party to the dispute.
The fourth category, under rule 39 of the rulesof procedure, includes members of the Secretariator other persons who may be 'invited by the Security Council to give information, to give evidence,oranything of that nature. '
\Those are 'the categories of persons, States or
representatives who may be invited to take partin the Security Council's deliberations. In the casewhich is presented to us, the Council must knowwhich of these four categories may be applied tothe representatives of East Indonesia'and Borneo.Are they Member States of the United Nations?No. ~e they parties to the dispute under consideration, coming under Article 32? No. Are theyMembers who brought the matter to the attentionof the Security Council under rule 37? No. Thereremains njle 39, covering the invitation of anyperson whom the .Security Council deems usefula.sa source of information. That is another question.
Outside these four categories, I think it wouldnot be proper for the Security Council to set aprecedent which could be quoted afterwards, asthe representative of Colombia has said. We haveto respect the rules of procedure and, the Articlesof the Charter and act accordingly. .
Mr. NrsoT (Belgium) (translated fr0111 French):I must a~t that I do not, understand why therep~es~n~ative of Colombia raised the question ofrecogD1!i0n and why he used an argument basedon ~rtI~le 32 of the. Charter. The Council didnot InVIte the Indonesian Republic on .the basiS....-
pour les fins que nous pourtluivdns, d'interesserl'opinion publique a I'affaire. C'est pourquoi j'aitoujours ete en faveur d'inviter le representant desPhilippines a participer a nos discussion~; i1 peutnous dire queUes ont ete les repercussions auxPhilippines des evenements qui se deroulent danscette partie du monde et de queUe fa~on ces evenements atteignent et interessent 'sqn pays. Possedant ces renseignements, nous pourrons porter surla question un jugement plus eclaire.
Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Il importe,je crois, d'attirer l'attention du Conseil sur lereglement et les Articles de la Charte qu'il doitobserver quand il desire inviter des representantsqui ne sont pas membres du Conseil a prendrepart aux discussions. Le Conseil peut inviter quatrecategories de personnes.
Conformement a l'article 37 du reglemel'lt interieur, la premiere categorie comprend tout EtatMembre qui attire l'attention du Conseil de seeurite sur une affaire. Un te1 Etat, et c'est le cas del'lnde apropos de la question qui nous occupe, estinvite a assister a la discussion de I'affaire.
La deuxieme categorie comprend tout autreMembre des Nations Unies, dont les interets sontparticulierement en jeu. Td est le cas des Philip-
, pines, qui ont explique au Conseil que l'affaireactuelIement en discussion touche de fa~on paInculiere a leurs interets, et dont le, representant a,en consequence, ete invite a participer aux debaits.'La troisiem~ categorie, definie par l'Article 212
de la Charte, comprend tout autre Etat qui elltpartie au differend. Un te1 Etat est invite en qua,lite de paJ,iie au differend.
En vertu de l'article 39 du reglement interieuJr,la quatrieme categorie comprend les meIIlbres dIllSecretariat ou toute autre personne que le Consei\!de securite peut inviter a fournir des renseignements, des temoignages ou une aide quelconque dl~nafure analogue.
Telles sont les categorie de personnes, d'EtaUIou de representants que le Conseil de securite peutinviter. Dans le cas qui nous occupe, le Conseildoit savoir dans laquelle de ces quatre categoriesil serait possible de dasser I'Indonesie orientaleet Borneo. Sont-ils de!: Etats Membres des NatioI,lsUnies? Non. Sont-ils parties ~u diff~rend,de sortequ'on puisse leur appliquer les dispositions de l'Article 32?' Non. Sont-ils les Membres qui ont attireI'attention du Conseil de securite sur l'affaire envertu de l'article 37? Non. Reste I'article 39, qui,perm,et au Conseil de securite, d'inviter toute personne qu'iI' juge P011VOir 'lui donner des renseignements utiles. C'est la una autre. question.
En dehors de cesquatr~ categories, je ne croispas que le Conseil de securite puisse,sans inconvenient, creer un precedent qui pourrait ctre invoque plus tard, comme l'a fait 'remarquer le'repres~ntant de la Colombie. Nous devoris respecter le reglement interieur et Ies Articles de laCharte, et agir en conseque.nce.
M. NISOT (BeIgique): Je ne cOIl1prends pas, jel'avoue,'que le representant de la Colombie aitsouleve la question de la reconnaissance etqu'ilait evoque un critere qui 'repose sur l'Article 32de la Charte. Ce n'est pas sur la base de I'Article32 de la Charte que IeConseil a invite la
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1984
of Artid~'32 of the Charter. The President him;,self described the basis on which we invited theIndonesian Republic. as follows:
"I should like toaddtha~ an invitation totberepreSel1tative$ of the Indonesian Republic to participate in this discusllion' would not 'bind anyState to recognize the independenc~or sovereigntyof the. Indonesian: Republic ... We are not now~cussing the admission of the Indonesian Republic to membership in the United Nations; we aresimply discussing an invitation to the representa- .tives of the Republic to participate in discussionof the matter before the Council.'t'
c· tN5W«-
'. Sir Alexander CADOGAN (United Kingdom):As members of the Council know, I have gravedoubts abOut the correctness of having invited.the represent!ltive,of the Indonesian Republic tosit at theCouJlcil table, such grave -doubts that,in fact, I voted against it at out last ~eeting onthis subject. I still think that by acting as we didwe technically, violated Article 32 of the Charter,and I believe it was mlcorrect to do so.
Republique dtIndonesie. yoici comment le President lui-meme a indique la base s~r laquelle nousavons invite !aRepublique· dtlndonesie:
"Je voudJ::ais ajouter qu'une invitati,on adresseeaux representants'de la ,Republique dtlndonesiea partiCiper a la discus~onntobligerait. aucun Etata reconnaitre l'independance ou la souverainetede la Republique d'Indonesie .•. Nous ne discutons pas en ce moment Padmission de la Republique dtlndonesie a rOrganisation des ·NationsUnies; nous discutons simplement Penvoi d'uneinvitation aux representants de la Republique, enwe de leur participation a la discussion de laquestion au sein du Conseil'.n
Je demande que les deux Republiques que j'aimentionnees tout a Pheure soient invitees sur lameme base. ,
Sir Alexander CADOGAN (Roymme-Uni) (traduit de l~anglais) :' C01nJI!.e les membres du Conseille sl:l-vent deja, je-doute ll'es serieusementqu'ilconvenait. d'inviter le representa,nt de la Republique ~rlndonesie a sieger a la table du Conseil; mes doutes sont si .serieuxque, en fait, j'ai
I vote contre cette invitation au cours de la der-niere seance que nous avons consacree a cette
.question. Je pense encore que, .en,agissant commenous l'avons fait, nous avons~ d'un point de vuestrict, viole rArticle 3~ de la Charte, et j'estimeque ce futunefaute. '
Nous nous trouvons mainten~nt en face de la.situation suivante: on nous cijt que les' deux autres territoires, rlndonesie onentale et Borneo, sontdans la meme situation etpossedent le 'meme statut que ,li;\ R~publique d'lndonesie. S'il en estainsi,' je me sens tenu, au nom de Pequite, devoter en fave;ur de la proposition tendant a mviter les representants de ces pays et ales mettresur un pied cregalite. avec le representant de laRepubhque d'Indonesie, quoique, a mon sens,cette decision constitue, une nouvelle violation deItArticle 32 de la Charte. On voit par la que, du'moment quel'on steloigne des bornes exactes fixeespar;la Charte, on se trouve entraine fort loin;mais, au nom de l'equite, je ne vois pas commentnous .poUl'rions agir differemment.
.On peut se dema~der si le statut de ces deuxterritoire;s estexactement le meme que celui dela Republique dtIndonesie. Sur ce point, je nepeux me poser en specialiste. J e crois que le criterium est le suivant: la Republique d'lndonesie aete admise au Conseil en raison de son' statut qui,me semble-toil, resulte dtunaccord avec le Gouvernement des Pays-Bas. Le statut des autres territoires etant le meme et ayarit ete fixe de la memefa~on, il me semble qutil faut les mettre sur unpied de cOplplete egalite. .
Je voudrais faire encore une autre temarque,qui sera la derniere: quand le President a passeen rewe les categories d'organes et dtindividus quele Conseil peut inviter a sieger a sa table, il acite les cas vises a l'article 39 de notre reglementinterieur; Mais je ferai respectueusement remarquer qutil y a une difference notable entre Parti- .cle 39 et les Articles de laCharte. Les Articles dela Chartc autorisent le Conseil ainviter certainsEtats a prendre part ~. ses discussions. Varticle.39du reglement ne donne ,nullement cette autonsa-,noli. 11 stipule seulement que le Conseil peut
'Voir les Proces-verbaux officiels du 'Conseil de secu,ite• .DeuXieme Annee, No 74t 18leme seance.
I aSk that $e two Repubijcs .I- ha.ve just mentioned should be, invited on the same basis. .
I Now we are faced with this situation. We areto.ld that these two othex territories, East Indonesia and Borneo, are in the same·position andhave the same status as the Republic of Indonesia.n that is so, I think ~t in the name of fairness,I must vote in·favour of' inviting their representa~ves also, and putting them on -the same footingas, the representative of the Indonesian R,epublic,although in this case again I think we are probably violating Article 32 of the Charter. It justShows how, 'once one departs from the straight andnarrow p~th of the Charter, he if? led a very longway; but in the name of fairness, I do not see howI can do anything else.
There may he. a qJlestion as to whether thestatus of these two territories is e~actly the sameas ,that of the Republic of /Indonesia. On that,I cannot set myself up to ~e an expert. It seemsto me that the criterion is this: the Republic ofIndonesia has been admitted here because of itsstatus, which, as' I understand, is derived fromsome agreeme~t with the Netherlands Government. AS the status of the other territories is' thesame, and has beelllreached by the same process,it seems to me they ought to be put on e~actlythe same footing. _ ~ .
I should 'like to' make only .one other comment,land that is, .that in the Presidentts review of thec1assesofbodies and .individuals that may be invited to sIt at the Council table, he included suchcases as .migh~ be dealt with under rule 39 of our
.provisipnal rules of procedure. With'all due re. spect,-}iowever, I, should like to point out that. rule 39 is rather different from the .Articles of theCharter. The Articles 'of the Charter empower ·the~uncil to invite certain States to partitipate in.the discussions of the Council. Rule -39 does notauthorize that at all: It only says that the Coun-
1 See9fficiat Records of the $.ecurit" Counc.il, SecondYear. No. 74. 181st meeting.. . I
. t
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1985
cil may obtain certain information from certainbodies- and certain individuals. I think, therefore,that if tlieRepublic of Indonesia was invited under rule 39 of our ,rules of procedure, .it is notentitled to' participate in the Council's discussions.I sha:ll repeat once more, however, that I thinkwe have taken a wrong step, and I am going tobe quite illogical and try to take another wrongstep merely in the Dar-tie of fairness. Because oneinterested, party is allowed to participate' in ourdiscussions, I think other parties-if they are infact equally interested-should be given exactlythe same rights.
The PRESIDENT: I think the representative of'the United Kingdom omitted to mention that theIndonesian Republic is a. party to the dispute under discussion.
Colonel HODGSON (Australia): I wish to makethe position of IlJY delegation clear. We do notdesire this Council to create a F-~cedent. We believe that eyerything the Council has done so farhas been correct and proper, and that the Councilhas had competence for everything it has done.,
( ,
We do Jsee a big difference in this case, because,as we pointed out'in our original statement, thisde facto recognition was given not by an infinitesimal .number of States, but by Egypt, Syria, Iraq,the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, the UnitedStates of America and Australia, countries of greatimportance an.d wide geographical distribution.That recognition has not been withdrawn. It stillexists, and we say that this was a State recognizedas such in international law.,
As far as the two States we are now considering,are concerned, no State apart from the Netherlands has given them de facto recognition. Theopinion of my delegation is that we ha.d no reservation when we voted with regard to ArtiCle 32.We believed it was within the competence of thisCouncil to admit the Republic of Indonesia toparticipate in the discussions under Article 32, andthat is still our belief. '
For that· .reason, we do not desire to create aprecedent, and we do desire to observe the Charter ~ully. We cannot support this applicatiron' underArticle 32, but we do want to have all the infor~~ation that can be forthcoming on this particulardispute. As far as my delegation is concerned, wewant to see what these representatives can produce in this Council.
My delegation is therefore quite prepared to~ul?port their admission under rule 39, so long, asIt IS ma~e clear that it is under rule 39 that theyare adIllltted. Alternatively, they may be invited tosup.ply us with information and any statementswhich they may wish to submit to the Council.
Mr. JOHNSON (United States of America)'~f, as. is supposed to be the case, these two Repub:
cs ,of Borneo and East Indonesia are to JlCCupythe .same: st.atus in the projected Indonesian Fed- [Ill;;; as ~at~.b.~:,::~~ie~,,~y the Indonesian
demander des renseignements a. certains organismes et a. certaines personnes. Je pense done que,si la Republique d'Indonesie est invitee en' vertude l'article 39 denotre reglement interieur, elIen'a pas le droit de participer aux discussions duConseil. Mais je repeteque, a mon avis, nousavons commis une erreur, et je vais cependant encOIXlIIlettre une nouvelIe et agir d'une fagon absolument illogique, simplementau nqm de l'equite. ,Si un~ des :parties interessees est admise a. nos dis-
.cussions, j'estime que les autres parties - si dIessont en fait egalement interessees - doivent joni!'exactement des memes droits.
Le PRESIDENT (traduit 'de l'anglais): Je croisque le representant du Royaume-Uni a omis dementionner que la Republique d'Indonesie estpattie au differend. /
,Le colonel HODGSON (Australie) (traduit del'anglais): Je voudraisexposer clairement la position de ma delegation. Nous ne voulons pas quele Conseil cree un prece,dent. Nous estimon!!' quetOl}.t ce que le Conseil a. fait jusqu'a. maintenantest parfaitement correct et convenaqle, et qU'ilavait la competence necessaire pour ptendre tou-tes les decisions qu'il a prises. ..
Le cas cl 1'6tude nous parait tres different;. dansnotre premiere declaration, nous avons fait remarquer que ce n'est pas un nombre infune depays qui ont accorde la reconnaiss~nce de facto a.la Republique d'Indonesie, mais. bien l'Egypte,la Syrie, I'Irak,les Pays-Bas, l~ Rbyaume-Uni, le~Etats-Unis d'Amerique et l'Australie, pays fortimportants et repartis dans les differentes partiesdu monde. Cette reconnaissance n'a pas ete annulee. elle est toujours valable, et nous soutenonsque la Republique d'Indonesie est un Etat reconnu comme ~el conformement aux regles dudroit international.
Quant aux deux Etats qui nous occupent actuellement, hormis les Pays-Bas, aucun autre Etatne les a reconnus de facto. Ma deIegationesPmequ'il n'y avait aucune reserve a. [aire quandnousavons vote en nous, fondant sur l'Article 32. Nous .pensions que le Conseil avait la competence necessaire pour admettre la Republique d'Indonesie a.prendre part' aux discussions, en vertu de l'Arti~cle 32, etnous persistons dans cette opinion.
C'est pour cette raison que, ne voulant pascreer un precedent, nous tenons a. nous conformerstrictement cl la Charte. Nous ne pouvons appuyerla dt;mande en qu~stion en nous fondant sur l'Article 32, mais nous, desironsl obtenir tous les ren"seignements qu'il est possiOle de reunir sur cccas en particulier. Ma delegation desire avoircQnnaissance de tous les renseignements que -lesrepresentants de ces pays peuvent fournir au Conseil.
En consequence, ma delegation est tout a. faitdisposee a voter en faveur de leur admission envertu· de l'article 39 du reglement interieur, a.condition qu'il soit specifie que c'est en vertu decet article que I'invitation est faite, ou, en d'autres termes, que les representants, des pays enquestion sont invites afin de nous fournir des renseignements et de faire au Conseil toute dec1ar~-tion qu'ils jugent souhaitable.
M. JOHNSON (~tats-Unis d'Amerique) (tra......duit de l'anglais): Si, comme il semble, les deuxRepubliques de Borneo et de I'Indonesie orientaleont le meme statut que la Republique d'Indonesiedans la future Federation indonesienn~a. notre
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"
Republic, it seem.s to me that they should certainly be admitted to the Council as I paTties witha contingent interest, and on the same basis asthat on which we admitted the Indonesian Republic, although that Republic was in fact in thesituation of being involved in hostilities.
Certainly the admission of these two Republicsor States is within the spirit of Article 32 of theCharter, and, as we have admitted the IndonesianRepublic, I do not see how we can consistentlyrefuse to hear the views of these two sister States,or deny that they have a genuine interest in thissituation.
The reference made by the representative ofAustralia to rule 39 of our rules of procedure is,I think, relevant. I suggested, at ,our last meetingon this subject that, if it would make the passageof this matter any easier for certain members ofthe Council who had qualms about the invocationof Article 32, they could quite pmperly hear theviews of these interested States under rule 39.
..I would be quite prepared simply to invite them
to the Council table on the same basis as we didthe Republic of Indonesia, in the belief that to doso was in the spirit of Article 32, and withoutimplying by that decision a ruling on any juridicalquestions. If, however, that should be objected toby any members of the Council, I would be prepared to accept the view of the representative ofAustralia that we should invite those States tocome and express their views under rule 39 of therules of procedure, or take whichever course wouldcommand the largest measure of support in theCouncil.
Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): I shouldwelcome any proposal which would enable theSecurity Council to hear the voice of the free peoples of any region or any territory. Presumablywe shall some time hear the free voice of thepeoples of the territories with which we are nowconcerned, but meanwhile it has to be adm,ittedthat the adoption of the proposal to invite representatives of these territories does not mean"thatwe shall hear the free voice of the peoples of thoseterritories.
In 'discussing this question, it is evident thatan invitation can be given only under Article 32of the Charter, that is to say, the invitation canbe extended only. to the representatives of Governments or States, whose function it is to express theviews of the people. '
As regards rule 39 of our rules of procedure,this rule provides for the invitation of individuals,whether members of the Secretariat or other perso~s. I do not think the Security Co :tcil is interested in this case in hearing the opi-ilons of private persons, individuals or experts. The SecurityCouncil is interested in hearing the views of Governments,the views of representatives who reflectthe mind and feelings of the peoples. That is themeaning of rule 39 of the ~les of procedure. Irepeat that it provides for the .invitation of privatepersons.
I do not think che Secm"ity Council is interestedin hearing the views of private persons or' experts
avis, il faut sans aucun doute les inviter au Conseilen qualite de parti~s eventuellement interessees etde la m.8me fa~on que la Republique d'Indonesie;bien qu'il convienne d'ajouter que cette demiereprenait, en fait, part aux hostilites.
L'admission de ces deux Republiques ou Etatsest iI1discutablement conforme a l'esprit de I'Article 32 de la Charte, et, puisque nous avons admisla Republique d'Indonesie, je ne vois pas comment nous pourrions logiquement refuser d'entendre le point de vue des deux Republiques sceursou nier que la question comporte pour eIles uninter8t reel. ,
Les observations du representant de l'Australie,relatives a I'article 39 de.notre reglement interieur,sont, a mon avis, tres justes. Au cours de la derniere seance que nous avons consacree a cette ques~
tion, j'ai signale aux me.mbres du Conseil qui sefont scrupule d'invoquer l'Article 32 qu'ils peuvent, sans hesitation, accorder audience acesEtats interesses en se fondant sur I'articlc 39 dureglement interieur, s'ils croient pouvoir ainsi serallier plus aisement a l~ pl'Oposition faite.
Je cons{'ntirais volontiers pOUT lua part a inviter Borneo et I'Indonesie orientale a la table duConseil dans les memes conditions que la Republique d'lndonesie, conformeme:nt a l'esprit del'Article 32, et sans que cette decision impliqueune prise de position juridique quelconque. Si,toutefois, certains menibres du Conseil y voientdes objections, je serais dispose a accepter le pointde vue du representant de l'Australie, d'apres lequel nous inviterions les Etats interesses a venirexposer leur cas en vertu du I'article 39 du reglement interieur, ou cl. agir de toute autre fa~on quientralnerait l'adhesion du plus grand nombre desmembres du Conseil.
M. GROMYKO (Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques) (traduit du russe): J'accueilleraisvolontiers toute proposition qui permettrait auConseil de securite d'entendre la vone d'un peupIe libre, a quelque region ou territoire qu'il appartienne. 11 est probable qu'un jour les peuplesdes territoires dont nous parlons en ce momentpourront s'exprimer librement. Mais, pour I'instaJ;lt, il faut reconnaitre que I'adoption d'une resolution !nvitaI1t les representants de ces territoiresne sigplfie pas que nous entendrons la voix libredes peuples qui y vivent.
En examinant la question, on voit que l'invitation ne peut etre faite qu'en vertu de l'Article 32de la Charte; en d'autres termes, dIe ne peutetre adressee qu'aux representants de Gouvernements.ou d'Etats qui expriment les vuesdes peupIes.
En ce qui concerne l'article 39. du reglementinterieur, celui-ci prevoit I'invitation de membresduo Secretariat ou d'autres personnes. Je ne pensepas que, dans le cas present, le Conseil de securite desire connaitre l'opinion de particuliers oud'experts. Le Conseil de securite s'interesse auxvues des Gouvernements, aux vues des representants qui expriment les opinions et les sentiinentsdes peuples. Tel est le sens de I'article 39 dureglement interieur. Je repei,.; ':lu'll prevoit l'invitation de particulieres. .
Je n~ pense pas que, dans le cas present; enetudiant une question d'une importance p~l~:~
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in this case~ when we are discussing a most impor- Itant political question•.
Mr. VAN KLEFFENS (Netherlands): I think Ican completely reassure those members of the Council who wanted to know about this matter~ thatthe States of East Indonesia and Borneo~ whichis called West Borneo at the present time~ are fullyco-equal with the Republic Df Indonesia. Article IV of the Linggadjati Agreement: bearing thesignature of the Republic of Indonesia togetherwith the others~ states that the compon~nt Statesof the United States of Indonesia shall includethe Republic of Borneo and the Great East. Thatwas the name then of what is now known as EastIndonesia. East Indonesia and Borneo have· allthe public rights~ prerogatives and duties whichmake them States able to take their place on afooting of complete equality with the Republic ofIndonesia in the future United States of Indo-. \
neSla.
In the case of the Indonesian Republic~ thereis the ILinggadjati Agreement. In the case of theothers~ there are constitutive acts just as~ for instance, there was a constitutive act on the part ofthe United States which resulted in the independence of t&e Philippines. I think,· therefore, that,legally ,speaking, this is completely in order, andsurely if the United States of America could dowhat is a little more in'respect of the Philippines,then we surely could do what is a little less-togive full self-government to East Indonesia andBorneo.
I want to point out that these people are vitallyinterested in this matter, more so perhaps, becauseof proximity, than the Philippines themselves.Must they be precluded from stating their views?I submit that at the last meeting of the Councilon this subject, the President said that he wasgoing to put to a vote only the matter of the invitation of the representatives of the IndonesianRep!,!blic who were to appear before the SecurityCouncil during the discussion of this question,without any definition or determination of theirstatus, and it was on that basis that "he Councilwent along and admitted these represe.ntatives.Why should there be no definition or determination in the case of one, but a painstaking scrutinyof text in the case of the other? I trust that theseremarks will suffice to put at rest the minds· ofthose representatives who still had any doubts asto the admissibility of these two States. .
The PRESIDENT: I still have three names on mylist of speakers: the representatives of Colombia,P<;lland and the USSR. I think after they havecompleted their remarks we may dispose of thisquestion.
Mr. LOPEZ (Colombia): I believe this shortdebate has been very useful and I am glad to havehelped in promoting it. I fully believe that thes~tuation is becoming clearer and dearer all thetime and t!lat it will become quite clear once weadmit that there is a very fundamental differencebetween the Indonesian Republic and the othermembers of the future Indonesian Federation. Ido not ,want to become involved in a legal argu-
',See Th.~ Political Events in the Republic 'of Indo-
Nilesla, published by the Netherlands Information Bureau
ew York, page 34. . , .
~
aussi grande~ le Conseil de securite desire connal"re l'avis de particuliers ou d'experts.
M. VAN KLEFFENS (Pays-Bas) (traduit de l'an_ ;s): J e crois que je suis en mesure de donnera ..:e sujet une reponse bien" nette aux membres duConseil qui desireraient savoir si les Etats' deI'Indonesie orientale et de Borneo (ce dernierappele ac(uellement Borneo occidental) ont unstatut absolument identique a celui de la Republique d'Indonesie. L'article IV de l'Accord deLinggadjati', qui porte la signature de la Republique d'Indonesie ainsi que les autres, stipule queles Eta.ts qui formeront les Etats-Unis d'IndonesiecOlliprendront la Republique de Borneo et leGrand-Est. Tel etait alors le nom de l'actuelleIndonesie orientale. L'Indonesie orientale et Borneo jouissent de tous les droits publics, de toutesles prerogatives. et assument toutes les obligationsqui font d'elles des Etats capables d'occuper unrang egal a celui de la Republique d'Indonesiedans les futurs Etats-Unis d'Indonesie.
Dans le cas de la Republique d'Indonesie, ily a l'Accord de Linggadjati, mais, pour les autresterritoires, il existe des actes constitutifs semblables, par exemple, a celui par lequelles Etats-Unisont accorde l'independance aux Philippines. Enconsequence, je pense que, du point· de vue juridique, la sit\1.ation est parfaitement normale, et,si les Etats-Unis d'Amerique ont pu faire plus enfaveur des Philippines, nous pouvons, a coup sur,faire moins pour l'Indonesie orientale et Borneo"c'est-a-dire leur donner l'autonomie complete.
Je tiens a faire remarquer que ces peuples sontdirectement interesses a la question, et plus peut- 'etre, en raison de leur proximite, que les Philippines elles-memes. Doit-on les 'empecher d'exposerleur point de vue? A mon sens, lors de la derniere'seance du Conseil sur cette question, avant-hier,le President a· declare qu'il mettrait simplementaux voix la question de l'invitation a adresser auxrepresentants de la Republique d'Indonesie appeles a se presenter devant le Conseil de securitepour la discussion de la question indonesienne sansque leur statut soit defini. C'est dans ces conditions que le Conseil a, par la suite, admis cesrepresentants. Pourquoi laisserait-on sans defini-tion le statut de l'une des parties, alors qu'onprocederait a une minutieuse etude de textes pourdeterminer celui de l'a.utre? J; pense que ces observations suffiront a calmer les scrupules des representants qui concevaient encore quelques doutesquant a la possibilite d'inviter ces deux Etats.
Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): J'ai encore trois orateurs inscrits sur ma liste: les representants de la Colombie, de la Pologne et del'URSS. Je crois que, lorsqu'ils auront termine \leurs commentaires, nous pourrons nous pronon- 'cer sur cette question.
M. LOPEZ (Colombie) (traduit d:e l'anglais) :Je crois que cette breve discussion a ete tres utile,et je suis heureux d'avoir contribue a la provoquer. Je suis convaincu que.la situation devientsans cesse plus c1aire, et qu'elle sera definitivementeclaircie quand nous aurons admis qu'il existe unedifference fondamentale entre la Republique d'Indonesie et les autres membre!l de la future Federation indonesienne. Je ne veux pas me lancer dans·
'Voir The Political Events in thfJ Republic of Indonesia, pub,lication du Bureau d'information des Pays-Bas,New-York, page 34.
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ment for which I am not prepared and in whichI find myuelf at a great disadvantage, but I sub'mit that tue three members, of the future Indonesian Fe-Jerarlon may be co-equa:ls in the eyesof the Netherlands Goyernmellt, while heing definitely not so in the eyes of the Security Council.
In the eyes of the Security Council, the Indonesian Republic is a party to an international dispute. We are acting in the matter of the Indonesian Republic because there is a threat to thepeace. There are active hostiliti«::s between theIndonesian Republic and the Netherlands Government; but we have not heard that they extend tothe territory of the other two members of thef1,lture Federation. We have taken action, according to m¥' understanding, because, under Article 39of the Charter, "the Security Council shall detel'-
'mine the existence of any threat to the peace,breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shallmake recommendations, or decide what measureshall. be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and42, to maintain or restore international peace andsecurity". , .
I believe we have taken action because theSecurity Council believes that there' is a definitethreat to the peace. That is why we have calledupon the' Indonesian Republic and the Nether
'lands Government to cease hostilities, and further,to settle their dispute by arbitration or by otherpeaceful means and keep. the Security Councilinformed about the progress of the settlement.
I believe that when one is party to an international dispute which is under consideration by theSecurity Council, there is a very'substantial difference between being involved in actual open hostilities and not being involved in such hostilities.
I' can very well understand that once the Security Council admits that they are co-equals in theeyes of the Netherlands Government, they mightclaim, admission to the Council table as Stateswho have a vital interest in the matter. In myopinion, if they are to be invited to the table, theyshould be invited because they have a vital interest in the matter, or in accordance with our rule39; and certainly not on the grounds that theydefinitely have the same status and are co-equalsin the eyes of the Security Council in respect ofthis dispute. ,
Moreover, whether the Council decides to admit! them under any of the Articles of the Charter or
under rule 39 of our rules of procedure, I am inclined to think that once we invite the representatives of East Indonesia and Borneo to the Counciltable-which- I do not oppose, because I believewe should try to be as fair as possible and giveeverybody an opportunity to present his case, provided we do not appear to. be openly. actingagainst the Charter or our tules of procedurewe are very likely to have considerable confusionin our discussions. I \\iould be very much surprisedif we did not have them contending here thatwhat is actually proceeding in Indonesia is theexercise of what has been, called "police action"on the part of the Netherlands Government. Iwould be very much surprised if we did not have
une'discussion d'ordre juridique, a laquelle je nesuis pas prepare et ou je 'ne me trouverais pas amon avantage, mais j'affirme que, si les troismembres de la future Federation indonesienne sontegaux aux yeux du Gouvernement des Pays~Bas,
ils ne le sont certes pas aux yeux du Conseil desecurite.
, Le Conscil de secudte considere la Republiqued'InQonesie comme une des parties aun differendinternational. Nous nous occupons de l'affairede la R&publique d'Indonesie parce qu'elle constitue une menace a .la paix. Des hostilites sont encours entre la Republique d'Indonesie et le Gouvernement des Pays-Bas, mais le Conseil n'a pasete informe qu'elles se soient etendues au territoire des deux autres membres de la future Federation. Sauf erreur, nous sommes intervenus ennous fondant sur l'Article 39 de la Charte quistipule: "Le Conseil de securite constate l'existence d'une menace contre la paix, d'une rupturede la paix ou d'un acte d'agression ~et fait desrecommandations ou decide queUes mesures serontprises conformement aux Articles 41 et 42 pourmaintenir ou retablir la paix et la securite internationales."
Nous nous dccupons de l'affarre parce que,semble-toil, le Conseil de securite estime qU'il y a,sans aucun doute possible, menace contre la paix.C'est pourquoi nous avons demande tout d'aborda la Republique d'Indonesie et au Gouvernementdes Pays-Bas d'arreter les hostilites et, en outre, deregler leur differend par voie d'arbitrage ou partout autre moyen pacifique, et de tenir le Conseilde securite au courant du progres des negociations.
Je crois qu'il y a une grande difference entreetre partie a un. differend international dont estsaisi le Conseil de securite, prendre' part en faita des hostilites ou ne pas y prendre part.
Je comprends tres bien que, si le Conseil desecurite reconnalt que ces territoires sont egauxaux yeux du Gouvernement des Pays-Bas, ces territoires seront en droit de demander leur admission au Conseil en qualite d'Etats directementinteresses ala question. A mon avis, si nous devonsles inviter a sieger au Conseil, il faut le faire enraison de l'interet vital que la question presentepour eux, ou en nous appuyant sur l'article 39 denotre reglement interieur, mais certainement pasen invoquant 19identite de leur statut ou leur egalite devant le Conseil de securite a l'egard de crdifferend.
De plus, que le CQnseil decide de les inviter enverfu d'un Article quelconque de la Charte ou envertu de l'article 39 ~e notre reglement interieur,je ser:ais tente de croire que, si nous invitons lesrepresentants de l'Indonesie orientale et de Borneoa sieger au Conseil - decision a laquelle je nefais pas d'obj~~tion, car je crois que nous devonsnous efforcer d'etre aussi equitables que possibleet de donner a tout le monde la possibilite a'exposer son point de vue, dans toute la mesure 011hous pouvons le faire sans violer ouvertemimt laCharte ou notre ,reglement interieur - nos discussions deviendront vraisemblablement .fort con-
. fuses. Je serais tres surpris que ces Etats'n'affirment pas id que les evenements d'In5jlonesie nesont que ce qu'on appelle' "une operation de p~lice" du Gouverne~ent des Pays-Bas. Je serms
,~
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an acrimonious controversy between the representatives of the future Indonesian Federation.
I am fairly certain that there is not one singlemember of the Council who does not have veryhigh regard for the Netherlands Government, forthe Netherlands people, and for the representative of the Netherlands in the Council personally.But I should be very much surprised if we didnot, as a result of the invitations we are discussing,find more' difficulty in using the good offices andthe intervention of the Security Council in helping
. the Indonesian Republic and the NetherlandsGovernment to come as rapidly as possible to asatisfactory solution of this question.
As the matter stands, in accepting at their facevalue and without reservation the declarationswe have heard from the Netherlands .Governmentin favour of going ahead with these-arrangementswith the Indonesian RepubliC, I very confidentlybelieve that it should not prove so ~ifficult forthe Security Council, with the help and goodoffices of such Governments as those of the UnitedStates of America and Australia, which have volunteered their assistance, to reach through eithermediation or arbitration, a satisfactory solutionof the present problem.
I repeat, I feel very confident that just as wewere successful in bringing about a cessation ofhostilities, we are very likely to be successful inbringing about a satisfactory peaceful solution ofthis problem. I do not know if I am more frankthan I should be, but.I must repeat that I am notopposing the admission of the representatives ofthese other two members of the future Indonesian Federation. If they have to be admitted, Ishould like to know under what Article of theCharter or what provision of our rules of procedure they should be admitted. When the President. of the Security Council informs us of themanner in which we shall vote, I shall then makeup my mind.
In the meantime, I have my doubts, such doubts<IS I have already e~pressed, as to whether itwould be useful to have them here at the Council table.'
Mr. KAT.z"SUCHY (Poland): Since the last, meeting at which we discussed the question of
the admission of the representative of the Indonesian Republic, a surprising change of opinionhas occurred. Many of the arguments which wereheard at that time against the admission of therepresentative of the Indonesian Republic havebeen used today in support of the admission ofthe representatives of Borneo and East Indone~a. I do not know whether legal arguments arestrictly connected here with geographical reasons,or why such a surpri~ing change has occurred.
At .tPe beginning of this discussion, the representative of the Netherlands argued that themilitary ~ction in Indonesia was entirely an internalquestion and merely police action; and he pointed.o~t !hat ,the position of the Indonesian RepublicWIthin the Netherlands Empire was the same asthe position of East Indonesia and Borneo. Heobs~rved that not one of the three enjoyed sovereIgnty; they were parts of the Empire and,
....~"".'"~>_ ...
tres etonne'que nous n'assistions pas a une controverse acrimonieuse entre les representants de lafuture Federation indonesienne.
Je suis a peu pres sur que tous les membres duComeil sans exception professent une haute admiration pour le Gouvernement des Pays-Bas, pourle peuple des Pays-Bas et pour le representant desPays-Bas au Conseil personnellement. Mais, si nousprocedions aux invitations qu'on nous proposemaintenant, je serais tres surpris qU'il ne surgissepas de nouvelles difficultes a l'utilis~tion des bonsoffices et it l'intervention du Conseil df! securite envue d'aider la RepuQlique d'Indonesie et le Gouvernement desPays-Bas a arrivcl' le plus rapidement possible a une solution satisfaisante de ceprob!eme.
Dans les circonstances presentes, si nous acceptons sans verification et sans reserve les declarations du Gouvernement des Pays-Bas qui affirmequ'il desire poursuivre les negociations avec laRepublique d'Indonesie, je crois qu'il ne seraitpas tellement difficile pour le Conseil de securitc,avec l'aide des Gouvernements des Etats-Unisd'Amerique et d'Austtalie qui ont offert volontairement leur assistance de decouvrir une solutionsatisfaisante au probleme actuel, par mediation ouarbitrage. '
Je me declare a nouveau convaincu que, ayantreussi a arreter les hostilites, nous reussirOllS tresprobablement de meme a trouver une solutionpacifique et satisfaisante a ce probleme. Je ne saissi je suis plus franc qu'il ne convient, mais jerepete que je ne fais aucune objection.a l'admission des representants des deux autrea membres dela future Federation indonesienne. S'il faut les admettre au Conseil, je desirerais savoir en vertu dequel Article de la Charte ou de quelles dispositionsde nutre reglement interieur ils seront admis.Quand le President du Conseil de securite nousaura fait savoir de quelle fa~on nous devons voter,je prendrai une decision.
En attendant, je doute, pour les raisons que j'aiexposees, qu'il soit profitable d'inviter ces representants a la table du Conseil.
M. KATz-SUCHY (Pologne) (traduit de l'anglais): Depuis la derniere seance ou nous avonsdiscute la questi<?n de l'admission du representantde la Republique indonesienne, l'opinion du Consell a change d'une fa~on etonnante. La plupartdes arguments invoques contre 'le projet tendanta inviter le representant de la Republique hidonesienne ont servi aujourd'hui a appuyer le projetd'admission des representants de' Borneo et del'Indonesie orientale. Je ne sais si les'raisons d'ordre juridique ont des rapports etroits avec lesraisons d'ordre geographique, ni pourquoi s'estpro~uit un changement aussi etonnant.
A,U debut des presents debats, quand le representant des Pays-Bas a declare que les operationsmilitaires qui se deroulent en Indonesie constituentune affaire d'ordre interieur, une simple operationde police, il a fait remarquer que la situation dela Republique indonesienne dans l'Empire neerlandais est exactement la mertle que celle de rIndonesie orientale et de Borneo. Il a souligne lefait qu'aucun de ces trois territoires ne jouit de la
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therefore, the question was an'internal matter forthe Netherlands Government to settle. .
The Security Council, with regard to the Indonesian Republic, took qdte a different view, because it admitted the Indonesian question underArticle 39 and, later on, with soine reservations,invited the representative of the Indonesian Republic, under Article 32, to take part in the· discussion. At the beginning of the discussion whichtook place at the last meeting on this subject, therepresentatlve of the Netherlands explained whyhe was not in favour of the admission of the representative of the Indonesian Republic. I believehis explanation is sufficient reason for not admitting the representatives of Borneo and East IndQnesia to the Council table.
The fact that the' two regions may join somefuture United States of Indonesia does not makethem States; or even entitle them to be consideredunder Article 32 of the Charter. We do nnt knowwhether such a United States of Indonesia willcome into being, or when it will come into being,nor do we know whether the Indonesians arehappy about' the plans which the NetherlandsGovernment is making for them.
At the moment, hostilities are continuing in Indonesia, and the main concern of this Council isto secure the cessation of hostilities. So far as ourknowledge goes, there' are no hostilities-at least,not yet-either in Borneo or in East Indonesia.There is, therefore, another reason for not admitting these representatives. I believe that under theCharter, East Indonesia and Borneo can be treatedonly as Non-Se'f-Governing Territories, and thatis another reason why they cannot be dealt withunder Article 32.
My delegation cannot support the admission ofthe representatives of East Indonesia and Borneo,not even under rule 39 of our rules of procedure.We believe, as the ,representative' of Colombiarightly pointed out, that this would only bringconfusion into our deliberations and prolong thediscussions, and probably change them into an argument between the representatives of the variouscountries concerned.
We believe that, under rule 39, the SecurityCouncil may invite them only in the capacity ofprivate citizens, and' under this rule we could startdiscussing an invitation to them only if someonesubmitted that certain persons coming from EastIndonesia or some other place in that part of thewo!ld should be invited in their private capacityfor a hearing, and not. for participation in theCouncil's discussions. Therefore, the Polish dele-
• gation cannot support the Belgian repre.sentative'sproposal. '
Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics): I have before me a telegr;:un dated
I '
. souverainete, qU'ils font tous trois partie de rEmpire, et que, en consequence, la question est uneaffaire interieure 'qu'il appartient au Gouvernement desPays-Bas de regler.
A l'egard de la Republique d'Indonesie, le Conseil de securite a adopte un point de vue tout afait different, car il s'est occupe de la questionindonesienne en 'se fondant sur l'Article 39 de laCharte et, plus tard,' avec certaines reserves, il ainvite le representant de la Republique d'Indonesiea prendre part a la discussion, en se fondant surl'Article 32. Au debut de la discussion qui eut lieulors de la derniere seance sur cette question, lerepresentant des Pays-Bas a e.'Cplique pourquoi ils'opposait a l'admission du representant de la Republique d'Indonesie. Je pense que son explicationconstitue un argument suflisant pour ne pas admettre a la table du Conseil les representants deBorneo et de l'IndonCsie orientale.
Le, fait que ces deux pays peuvent eventuellement faire partie d'Etats-Unis d~Indonesie, quin'existent pas encore, ne confere pas aces territoires la q'uaIite d'Etat et ne permet pas de lesclasser dans les categories de territoires dont leConseil peut s'occuper en vertu de 1'Article 32 dela Charte. Nous ne savons pas si ces Etats-Unisd'Indonesie existeront jamais, ni quand ils existeront, et nous ne savons pas non plus si les Indonesiens sont satisfaits des plans que le Gouvernementdes Pays-Bas prepare pour eux.
Pour 1'instapt, les hostilites se pourSuivent enIndonesie, et le principal objectif du Conseil estde les faire cesser. D'apres les renseignements quenous possedons, il n'y a pas d'operations militairesen cours - tout au moins, pas encore - ni aBorneo, ni en Indonesie orientale. C'est une' nouvelle raison de ne pas inviter les representants deces territoires. Je crois que, en vertu des dispositions de la Charte, le Conseil ne peut considererl'Indonesie. orientale et Borneo autrement quecomme des ter::itoires non autonomes, et voila encore une raison de ne pas leur appliquer l'Article 32.
Ma delegation ne peut approuver l'admissiondes representants de l'Indonesie orientale et deBorneo, meme foncIee sur I'article 39 de notrereglement interieur. Nous estimons, comme le representant de la Colombie I'a fait tres justementremarquer, que cette invitation ne·servirait qu'aapporter confusion dans nos debats et ales prolonger,. et que nos discussionsdegenereraient tresprobablement en disputes .entre les representant.des differents territoires interesses.
A notre avis, en vertu de I'article 39 du regiement, le Conseil de securite ne peut inviter cesrepresentants qu'en qualite de citoyens, sans titreofficiel, et, en vertu de ce meme' article, nous nepouvons aborder la discussion sur le projet te~dant ales inviter que SI un membre du Conseilpropose d'inviter a titre prive certaines personnesoriginaires de 1'Indonesie orientale ou d'aiIleurs,aux fins de connaltre leur point de vue et non paspour les faire participer 'awe discussions du Consell. C'est pourquoi la delegation ~e la Pol?gnene peut appuyer la motion du representant de laBelgique.
M. GROMYKO (Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques) {traduit du l'anglais) : J'ai sous les
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1991
6 August 1947 addressed by 'Mr. van Klefferts,Netherlands. Ambassador in Washington, to thePresident of the Security Council: The telegramcontains what I think is a very interesting com~
munication received fwm the Prime Minister andthe President of East..Indonesia. There is one veryinteresting passage in this communication signedby the Prime Minister 'of the East Indonesian Gov~
ernment-it is so called in the communication. Ishall quote it:
"The East Indonesian Government through itsPrime Minister, Nadjamoeddin, has expressed itsagreement with the decision of the NetherlandsGovernment to initiate police action against those.elements of the Republic which obstruct the exe-
, cution of the Linggadjati Agreement. The EastIndonesian Government, impeded for a consider-
1 The following is the text of the telegram:Document s/474 7 August 1947
[Original text: Englisn]I have the honour to inform you that I have been in
structed to transmit to you the following message of thePresident and the Prime Minister of East Indonesia:
"The East Indonesian Government has taken cognizance with sUIFrise of reports regarding the requestsaddressed b}l the Governments of Australia and India tothe Security Council to intervene in the conflict betweenthe Net.lJ.!lrlands and the Indonesian Republic. The EastIndonesian Government considers these requests to be amisapprehension of the essential character of the conflictand an interference in the internal affairs of Indonesia,which may result in a threat to world peace.
"The East Indonesian Government, through its PrimeMinister, Nadjamoeddin, has expressed its agreement withthe decision of the Netherlands Government to initiatepolice action against those elements of the Republicwhich obstruct the execution of the Linggadjati Agreement. The East Indonesian Government, impeded for aconsiderable period in the exeoution of this' task bybreaches of the peace emanating from the Republic ofIndonesia, recognizes the legitimacy and inevitability ofthe Netherlands action, which aims at the creation ofconditions which will make po~sible tile execution of the
. Linggadjati Agreement, which, in the opinion of theEast Indonesian Government, must remain, in the futurealso, the guiding principle of Indonesian policy,
"The East Indonesian Government wishes to drawattention to the fact that in accordance with the Linggadjati Agreement, the Republic of Indonesia is one ofthe States of the future United States of Indonesia, andconsequently cannot be considered a sovereign State,Consequently, the action of the Netherlands Governmentmust be considered as a measure of a domestic characteraimed at the re-establishment of peace and order.
. "The East Indonesian Government has serious objec~Ions to the steps taken by the Australian Government,masmuch as these steps may create' the impression thatthe Republic is a sovere5gn State. It deems this possibilityto !Je a serious danger to the creation of the sovereignUmted States of Indonesia as accepted in the LinggadjatiAgreement.
. "The Government of East Indonesia is ~urprised thatthe Government of India sees fit to intervene whilst therestoration of law and order in one of the constituentStates of Indonesia can never be a threat to world peace~nless foreign intervention and, in particular, the formatIOn of !nternational brigades and acts of boycott causesuch actIon to have repercussions within the internationalsphere.
"Taking this into account, the East Indonesian Govern~ent !Dust raise grave objections to any foreign intervention m a matter which is of an entirely internalnature a,nd which aims at creating guarantees for aPTrhompt Implementation of the Linggadjati Agreement.
.e •East Indonesian Government, therefore, is of theopm~on ~hat a speedy solution for the termination of thisconflIct IS necessary and that such a solution must be
Ifoudnd within Indonesia itself. It urges that the Nether.an
fs Government and the Security Council should be
m ormed of its p~int of view."
IllII.-..
yeux le texte d'un ielegramme, en date du 6 aout1947, adresse au ,President du Conseil de securitepar M. van Kleffens, Ambassadeur des Pays-Basa Washington'. Ce telegramme contient une communication - fort interessante a mon avis emanant du Premier Ministre et du President del'Indonesie orientale. Je voudrais citer un -passagetres inter-essant de cette comniunkation, qui estsignee par le Premier Ministre du Gouvernementde l'Indonesie orientale - ce sont, du moins, lestermes qu'emploie la communication.
"Le Gouvernement de l'Indonesie orientale,par l'intermediaire du Premier Ministre Nadjamoeddin, a fait savoir 'qu'il approuvait la decision du Gouvernement des Pays-Bas, de prendredes mesures de police contre l~s elements de b.Republique qui font obstacle a l'e.xecution de
, Voici le texte de ce teIegramme:Document S/474 7 aout 1947
[Texte original en ,mglais]J'ai l'honneur'de VollS faire savoir que je SulS charge
de vous transmettre le message suivant. emanant duPresident et du Premier MiIiistre de l'Indonesie arientale:
"Le Gouvernement de l'Indonesie orientale a apprisavec surprise que les Gouvernements de l'Australie et del'Inde avaient demande au Conseil de securite d'intervenir dans le conflit qui oppose les Pays-Bas et la Republique d'Indonesie. Le Gouvernement de l'Indoncsieorientale considere que ces demandes traduisent une interpretation inexacte du caractere 'essentie1 de ce conflit etune ingerence dans les affaires interieures de l'Indonesie.d'oll il peut resulter une menace contre la paix dOlmonde.
"Le Gouvernement de l'Indonesie orientale, par l'intermediaire du Premier Ministre Nadjamoeddin, a. fait sav9irqu'il approuvait la decision du Gouvernement des PaysBas, de prendre des inesures de police contre les elements de la Republique qui font obstacle a l'executionde l'Accord de Linggudjati. Le Gouvernement de l'Indonesie orientale, empeche depuis tres longtemps d'executercet Accord en raison de ruptures de la paix dues a laRepublique d'Indonesie, reconnait le caractere legitimeet inevitable des mesures prises par les Pays-Bas, quivisent a creer des conditions permettant l'execution deI'Accord de Linggadjati. De l'avis du Gouvernement deI'Indonesie orientale, cet Accord doit demeurer a l'avenir le principc; directeur de la politique indonesienne.
"Le Gouvernement de I'Indonesie orientale desire attirer l'attention sur le fait que. confonnement a fAccordde Linggadjati, la Republique d'Indonesie est l'un desEtats qui devront constituer les Etats-Unis d'Indonesieet que, en consequence, eHe ne saurw.t etre considereecomme un Etat souverain. L'action du Gouvernementdes Pays-Bas doit donc etre consideree comme ime mesure de caractere interieur dont le but est de retablirl'ordre et la paix.
"Le Gouvernement de l'Indonesie orientale estime quel'initiative du Gouvernement australien appelle de serieuses objections dans la mesure all eUe peut creer l'impression que la RepubliQue est un Etat souverain. LeGouvernement de I'Indonesie orientale considere quecefait constitue un danger scrieux pour la creation desEtats-Unis souverains d'Indonesie; projet accepte parl'Accord de Linggadjati.
"Le Gouvernement de l'Indonesie orientale constateavec surprise que le Gouvernement de l'Inde croit devoir intervenir alors que le retablissement de la Iegaliteet de l'ordre dans l'un des Etats constituant l'Indonesiene pourra jamais constituer une menace contre la paixdu monde, a moins que l'intervention etrangere, et· enparticulier la formatidn de brigades internationales ainsique les actes de boycottage. n'entrainent des repercussions sur le plan international.
"En consequence, le Gouvernement de l'Indonesie orientale se voit oblige d'elever des objections serieuses contretoute intervention etrangere dans une affaire de caracterepurement interieur, alors que le but cherche est d'etablirdes garanties assurant la mise en reuvre rapide de l'Accord de Linggadjati. C'est pourquoi le Gouvernement deI'Indonesie orientale croit a la necessite d'une solutionrapide permettant de mettre fin a ce conflit, et estimequ'une l.elle solution doit etre cherchee en Indonesiememe. j,1 demande instamment que son point de vue soitporteJ. la connaissance du Gouvernement des Pays-Baset du Conseil de securite."
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............
able period in the execution of this task bybreaches of the peace emanating from the Repub"lie of Indonesia . . ."
The "poliqe action" mentioned in this communication, we know very well, means war, war declared and carried out by the Netherlands againstthe Republic of Indonesia. I just draw the attention of the Security Council to this fact in orderthat we may be clear as to whom the NetherlandsGovernment' recommends us to invite to the Secu"rity Oouncil.,
The PRESIDENT: The Syrian delegation votedin favour of the invitation extended at the lastmeeting on this subject to the representative ofthe Republic of Indonesia. It based its vote firston the situation created by the existence of theAgreement of March 1947 with the Netherlands,which recognized that the Republican GDvernmentexercised de facto authority. The second reason forits vote was that as a result of that Agreement,many Member States .recognized the internationalexistence of the Republic of Indonesia. The thirdreason was that the RepUblic of Indonesia wasinvolved in hostilities and was a party to the dis"pute whicll had been brought before the Council.
As those three reasons for which the Syriandelegation gave its affirmative vote at the lastmeeting are not operative in the present case ofEast Indonesia ap.d Bomeo, which are to be mem"bers of the future federati0ll:~ the Syrian delegation cannot vote for the Belgian representative'sproposal, which states "that the Security Councildecides to invite the representatives of East Indonesia and Borneo to participate in the work of theCouncil on the same grounds as the representativesof the Republic of IndQnesia".
That is the proposal submitted by the Belgiandelegation, and it is now to be voted upon•
.Mr.NlSOT (Belgium) (translated from French) :Ishotild like to move an amendment to my pro"posal, consisting in the deletion of the words "onthe same grounds as the representative of the Indo"nesian .Republic". These words were introducedinto my text by tpistake.
I repeat that I should like the werds "on thesame grounds as the representative of the Indo-nesian Republic" to be dele~ed. I
_ The PRESIDE1'1T: Then the amended proposal.would read: "The Security Cou,ncil decides toinvite the representatives of East Indonesia andBorneo to participate in the work of the CounciL"
We shall now vote on the Belgian proposal inthe form in which,it has been read.
•A vote was taken by show of hands. There were
4 VfJtes in favour, none against and 7 abstentions.The proposal was not adopted, having failed toobtain the affirmative votes of seven members. .
Votes'for: Belgium, France, United Kingdom,United States of America. .
Abstentions: Australja, Brazil, China, Colombia,Poland, Syria, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
I'Accord de Linggadjati. Le Gouvernement del'Indonc'sie orientale, €;;;;..peclle depuis tees longtemps d'executer cet Accord en raison de ruptures de la paix dues a la Republique d'Indonesie ..."
Les mots "mesures de police" qu'emploie cettecommunication signifient, nous le savons tres bien,la guerre, la guerre qu'ont declaree et que menentles Pays-Bas contre la Rcpublique d'Indonesie,J'attire simplement l'attention du Conseil sur cepoint, afin que nous sachions clairement qui leGouvernement aes Pays"Bas nous recommanded'inviter au Conseil de securite.
Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'angla:J): La delegation de la Syrie a vote en faveur de l'invitationadressee au cours de la derniere seance a ce sujetau representant de la Republique indonesienne.Son attitude se fonde, tout d'abord, sur le faitq,u'il existe un accord, signe en mars 1947, auxtermes duquel les Pays-Bas reconnaissent de factol'autorite du Gouvernement de la Republiqued'Indonesie. Le second argument est que, a lasuite de .cet accord, de nombreux Etats Membresont reconnu la Republique d'Indonesie commeune d~s nations du monde. Le troisieme arguQ1entest que la Republique d'Indonesie prend part ades hostilites et est partie au differend dont leConseil a ete saisi.
Ces trois arguments, sur lesquels la delegationsyrienne a fonde son vote affirmatif au cours dela derniere seance, ne peuvent s'appliquer, ni al'Indonesie orientale, ni a Borneo, qui doivent devenir membres de.la future Federation; la delegation syrienne ne peut 'donc voter en faveur de laproposition du representant de la Belgique, quistipule que "le Conseil de securite decide d'jnvitelrles representants de l'Indonesie orientale' et deBorneo a prendre part aux travaux du Conseildans 'les memes conditions que le representant dela Republique d'Indonesie".
Te1 est le texte de la proposition de la delega.tion de la Belgique sur lequel nous allons voter.
M. NISOT (Belgiqu6): Je desire apporter unemodification a ma proposition. Elle consisterait asupprimer les mots "dans Ies memes conditionsque le representant de la Republique d'Indonesie".
·C'est par erreur que ces mots figuren~ dans mantexte.
Je repete que je desire voir supprimer les mots"dans les memes conditions que le representant dela Republique d'Indonesie".
Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): La proposition modifiee serait donc redigee de la fa~on
suivante: "Le Conseil de securite decide d'inviterles representants de l'Indonesie orientale et de Borneo aprendre part aux travaux du Conseil."
Nous alIons maintenant voter sur la propositionamendee de la Belgique, telIe que je viens de lalire.
.Il est procCde au vote a main levee. Il :; a 4voix pour et 7 abstentions. N'ayant pas obtenu levote affirmatif de sept membres, la propositionn'est pas adoptee.
Votent pour.: Belgique, France, Royaume-Uni,Etats"Unis d'Ameriqu~.
S'abstiennent: Australie, Bresil, Chine, Colom"bie, Pologne, Syrie,Union des Republiqu6s sQcia"listes sovietiques.
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1993
The PRESIDENT: We pass noW to the seconditem ori our agenda today. It is the Australiandraft resolution contained in document 8/488.'
Mr. TSIANG (China) : B~fore I discuss the Australian draft resolution, I wish to make a brie~
reference to a detail in the telegram dated 6 August 1947 from Mr. Gani, Deputy Prime-Ministerof the Republic of Indonesia, to the President ofthe Security Council.: .
The telegram, in describing an attack by Netherlands forces against Gombong on 5 August,asserts that one unit of Chinese troops took part.I deny categorically the truth of that assertion.The Chinese Consul-General at Batavia used theradio to broadcast on 6 Augu~t a similar denialto the people of Indonesia. '
My Government has all the reasons which otherGovernments represented here have in wishing anearly restoration iDf peace in Indonesia. In addition, we' have one special reason. It is generally
.known that there are three million Chinese peopleliving on the various islands in the Archipelago.They have suffered immense losses in life _and
'See Official Records of the Security Council, SecondYear, No. 74, 1815t meeting.
: The .following is the text of the telegram:Document S/475 7 August 1947
[Original text: English], This cable was' picked up frOm Jogjakarta's morsecast.
We are forwarding it to you in case Jogjakarta's radiotelegram does not reach you first.
On 5 August, at 02.30' hours, a Netherlands forceconsisting of one-and-a-half companies of infantry, 17armoured cars, 20 trucks, and one unit of Chinese troopsattacked Gombong after heavy fighting at Idjo, 15 kilometers west of Gombong and a subsequent clash at apoint 5 kilometres west of Gombong. .
On 5 August, at 16.00 hours, Pingit was taken underifire by Netherlands artillery.
On 5 August, Netherlands aircraft carried out observations over the area south of Malanga.
The Netherlands radio in Djakatra on 5 August, alleged that "in West and Central Java mopp~ng-upoperations are being continued. Gombong was occupied by the·Netherland~ army' after reports had been received thatacts of terror were carried out against Chinese residents.Ih East Java, Netherlands forces occupied Grissee and arenow mopping up the area. Similar operations are beingcarried out in Madura Island. At Sumatra clearing-upoperations are in progress to restore law and order. Kisaran, Tandjoengbalai, Kulahmedan on the Asahan River,Tandjoengpoera, and Nguli near Lake Toba have beenoccupied. In Central Sumatra, Loebo Kaloeng was occupied because of terrorism prevailing there. In SouthSumatra, clearing-up operations by Netherlands troopsare meeting with 'minor opposition".
According to army intelligence, the landing on MaduraIsland by Nethe!'lands forces was staged on a majorscale, with 7 tanks and heavy artillery. Fighting was stillin progress on 5 August. Landings were commenced on4 August, at 08.20 hours. In Central Java on 4 August,at 15.55 hours, Netherlands troops made a landing westo.f Demak with aircraft suprort. On 5 August, the operatIOn was extended to 3 kilometres from Babatan, nearKoedoes, where the Netherlands forces encountered Indonesian resistance. The ·military movements of Netherlandstroops after. the cease-fire order had been issued were inno way different from the movements prior to the issuance of the ceaSe-fire order. It was stated b)' the Netherlands Government and military commands that thesecccl~aring_up operations" would be continued in the 'territorIes under their occupation whete, in their opinion,law:. and order were non-existent. The Republican Government reiterll,ted its' request that the Security Counc,ilshould send a commission composed of reuresentatives ofother nations to Indonesia in the shortest possible time.
Le PREsIDEkT (traduit de l'anglais) : Nous passons maintenant au second point de I'ordre dujour, c'est-a-dire au projet de resolution de I'Australie qui figure au ddcument S/488'.
M. TSIANG (Chine) (traduit de l'anglais) :Avant d'examiner le projet de resolution de I'Australie, je desire signaler brievement un detail duteIegramme adresse le 6 aout 1947 au Presidentdu ConseiI de securite par ,M. Gani, Vice-PremierMinistre de la Republique d'Indon~sie:. .
Decrivant une attaque des forces neerIandaisessur Gombong le 5 iiout 1947, le telegramme de~
clare qu'une unite militaire chinoise a pris part acette attaque. J'affirme que cette assertion estfausse. Le 6 aout 1947, le Consul general de Chinea Batavia a diffuse par radio un dementi semblable a l'adresse du peuple d'Indonesie.
Mon Gouvernement ales memes raisons que lesautres Gouver'1ements representes ici de souhaiterque la paix soitretablie :rapidement en Indonesie.Mais nous avons, de plus, une raison particulierede faire des vceux pour la paix. Tou,t le mondesait que trois millions, de Chinois vivent dans lesdifferentes lIes de !'ArchipeI. IIs ont subi des pertes
'Voir les Proces-verbaux officiels du Conseil de secu-rite, Deuxieme Annee, No 74, 18H~me seance. .
: Voici le texte de ce telegramme:Document S/475 7 aout 1947
[Texte original en anglais]Ce ciiblogramme a ete capte en morse, provenant de
la station de Djokjakarta; nous nous empressons de vousI'expedier pour le cas ou vous n'auriez pas encore re!<ule radiogramme de Djokjakarta.
Le 5 aout a 2 h. 30, des forces armees neerIandaisescomprenant une compagnie et'demie d'infanterie, 17 voitures bIindees, 20 camions et une unite militaire chinoise .ont attilque Gombong apres de durs combats a Idjo, a15 'kilometres a I'ouest de Gombong, et un brusque engagement ulterieur en un point situe a 5 kilometres al'ouest de Gombong. I
Le 5 aout a 16 heures, Pingit a ete pris sous le feu del'artillerie neerIandaise.
Le 5 aout des avions neerlandais ont accompli, desmissions d'observation ·au-dessus du secteur au sud deMalanga.. La radio neerIandaise de Djakatra a pretendu le 5aout que "des operations de n6ttoyage se poursuiventdans les parties centrale et occidentale de Java. Gombonga ete occupe par l'armee neerlandaise apres reception derapports faisant connaitre" que des actes de terrorismeetaient perpetres contre les residents chinois. Da~s lapartie orientale de Java, les' Hollaudais ont occupe Grissee et procedent actuellement au nettoyage ,de ce secteur.Des operations analogues se poursuivent dans rUe deMadoura. On procede a Sumatra a des operations de
'nettoyage destinees a retablir l'ordre et la loi. Kisaran,Tandjoengbalai et Kula1lmedan sur l'Asahan ont eteoccupees ainsi que Tandjoengpoera et Nguli pres du lacToba. Dans la partie centrale de Sumatra, des actes deterrorisme a Loebo Kaloeng ont conduit a occuper cetteville. Les operations neerlandaises de nettoya~e ne rencontrent qu'une faible opposition au sud de. Sumatra".
D'apres le service de renseigne~ents de l'armec, led6barquement neerlandais dans l'Ue de Madoura se deploya comme une operation importante appuyee par 7chars et par de l'artillerie lourde. Des combats avaientencore. lieu le 5 aout, les operations de debarquementayant 'commence le 4 aout a 8 h. 20. Dans la partie centrale de Java, les Hollandais ont procede le 4 aoilt, a16 h. 55, a un debarquement soutenu par l'aviatifln al'ouest, de Demak. Le 5 aout, les operations ont ete por- ..tees ~ 3 kilometres de Babatan pres de Koedoes ou les
.Hollandais se sont heurtes a la resistance indonesi'enne.Apres l'ordre de cesser le feu, les mouvements des,tmupesneerlandaises n'ont ete en rien differents de ce qu'ilsetaient avant. Le Gouvernement et le commandementneerlandais ont declare que ces "operations de nettoyage"se poursuivraient dans les territoires qu'ils occup.ent ou,selon ewe, ne regnent ni l'ordre ni la loi. Le Gouvernement de la Republique a renouvele. sa demande pourque le Conseil de securite envoie en Indonesie, dans lesplus brefs delais possible, une commis~ion composee derepresentants de diff6rentes nations.
." r * ¥ «tb
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I
property during the course of hostilities. In theconfusion which has prevailed in certain parts o.fIndonesia, it is not always clear where the responsibility for the protection of life and property lies.Where that responsibility has been clear, my Government has resorted to the usual means of seekingredress.
Understanding the inherent difficulties of the. situation, my Government has chosen to makesome allowances for failure to live up to the obligations -which public authorities in any countrymust fulfil. We have chosen to believe that them~n cause of the loss of life and property whichmy fellow-countrymen have suffered in Indonesia,has been the hostilities, and' that therefore themain remedy lies in the restoration of peace.
•I hope the actual events in Indonesia will notforce mt GOvernment to revise its views on thisaspect of the problem. For this special reason aswell as for the general reasons which we all share,my delegation has whole-heartedly and singlemindedly supported the earlier Australian resolution to stop hostilities: I have urged the Councilon-different occasions to lay aside the legal questions involved and to meet a practical problemw;.th practical common sense.
My Government rejOICeS that' the resolutionadopted by the Council' has been accepted byboth parties. The accusations and counter-accusations of violations of the Council's resolution byone party against the other, though very regrettable, could be explained in part by t.~e state ofconfusion which· usually follows a war. But, ifthese accusations and counter-accusations continue, our whole work might be imperilled. It isfor this reason that my delegation supports thedraft resolution introduced by the representativeof Australia.
IThe draft resolution before us really proposes
a new step, the establishment of a commission too~serve and report directly to the Security Council on' the situation in Indonesia. In the view ofII!y delegation, such a commission would be veryuseful. It would observe and report O:Q the actualsituation in Indonesia. Its very presence in Indonesia would enhance the public authorities' senseof respoIfsibility ~Qr keeping the peace. I understand that the work of this commission would beadditional' to the good offices which the Government of the United States is offering the twoparties.
6 Like the first resolution, this resolution does nottake sides. It has. the single objective of helpingto keep the peace. I cannot praise this resolutiontoo highly, both for what it commits the Councilto do and for what it omits. In view of the importance of this question, the efforts to establish acommission of this kind are certainly worthwhile.
t See Official Records of the Security Council, SecondYear, No. 68, 173rd meeting. For the text of the resolu-tion see ibid., No. 72, 178th meetings. .
humaines et financieres enormes'du fait des hosti.lites. En raison de la confusion qui a regne danscertaines parties de I'Indonesie,·il n'est pas toujours facile de savoir exactement qui est respon.sable~e la protection de la vie et des biens deshabitants. Partout 011' il a pu determiner sanserreur possible quelles etaient les autorites aux·queUes incombait cette. tache, mon Gouvernementa suivi la procedure habitueUe pour demander lareparation des dommages.
Mon Gouvernement comprend les difficultesinherentes a. la situation. Il a, en consequence,decide de ne pas faire grief aux autorites den'avoir pas rempli les fanctions que les autoritespubliques doivent normalement assurer dans tousles pays. Nous preferons croire que les pertes devies et de biens que roes compatriotes ont subiesen Indonesie sont du~s aux hostilites; le remedele plus sur est donc la restauration de la paix.
]'espere que les evenements qui se deroulent actuellement en Indonesie n'obligeront pas mon Gou- •vernement a. modifier son point GC vue sur cetaspect du probleme. C'est pour cette raison particuliere, aussi bien que pour des raisons generalescommunes a tous, que ma· delegation a appuyechaleureusement et sans reserve la precedenteresolution de l'Australie qui. demandait -la cessation des hostilites'. Tai demande au Conseil a differentes reprises de ne pas s'occuper pour l'instant des principes juridiques mis en cause et de I
cthercher la solution d'un probleme pratique enutilisant son bon sens.
Mon Gouvernement est heureux que les deuxparties aient accepte la resolution adoptee par leConseil'. Quoiqu'il soit fort regrettable que lesdeux parties s'accusent mutuellement d'avoir violela resolution du Conseil, ces accusations peuvents'expliquer en partie par la confusion qui suit ordinairement une guerre. Mais, si ces accusationsmutuelles se poursuivent, elles risquent de menacer tout notre travail. C'est pour cette raisoD quema delegation appuie le projet de resolution durepresentant de l'Australie.
Le projet de resolution qui nous est presenteconstitue vraiment un pas en avant; il tend acreer une commission chargee d'observer et de fairerapport au Conseil de securite directement surla situation existant en Indonesie. De l'avis de madelegation, cette commission serait fort utile. BIleobservera la situation de fait qui regne en Indonesie, et elle en rendra compte. Le seul fait de sapresence sur les lieux fera prendre aux autoritespubliques un sens accru de leurs responsabilitesdans le maintien de la paix. Je considere que lacreation de cette coIDmission est ~ne mesure quicompIetera l'offre de bons offices que le Gouvernement des Etats-Unis a faite aux deux parties.
,Cette . resolution, redigee dans le meme esprit
que la premiere, ne prend pas parti. Son sew but I
est d'aider a maintenir la paix. Je ne peux dire aque! point je l'apprecie, a la fois pour ce qu'elleengage le Conseil a faire et pour ce qu'elle omet.Cette question est tellement importantequ'eIlevaut que nous prenions la peine de creer une
'Voir les Proces-verbaux offidiels du Conseil de securite, Deuxieme Annee, No 68, 173eme seance. Pour letexte de la ResolutioD~voir H'id., No 72, 178eme seance._....
I .........
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I therefore.appeal to the members of the Councilto accept the resolution.
The PRESIDENT: I shall now call upon the representative of the Indonesian Republic to makewhat will certainly be a very valuable statement.
Mr. SJAHRIR (Indonesia): At the very outset,on behalf of the Government of the Republic ofIndonesia, I thank the President and the members. of the Council for their sense of fair playand justice in granting me the opportunity toparticipate in the discussions of the SecurityCouncil on the Indonesian question.
In my capacity as representative of the RepubliC, of Indonesia, I am going to address the members
of this Council on behalf of a country which, forthe common people of the occidental world, hasonly recently come into existence, or even on behalf of a people considered as having just startedon the road to nationhood. Such being the case,it may be fitting for me to point out that I amhere to represent a people whose history goes backmore than a thousand years.
In the fburteenth century, my people constituted th~ Empire of Majapahit which embracedall the islands of South East Asia and extendedfrom Papua to Madagascar. This kingdom had anefficient administration, and-in those daysmaintained relations with countries as' far distantas China and Europe. 1,0 the sixteenth century,my people first came in contact with people ofthe West. It was most unfortunate that this contact should have taken place at a time when wewere on the decline. Western influence began tomake itself felt and kept on increasing in proportion to the rate at which we were falling backward.
. The rapid expansion of western pow~r led tothe de.cline and fall of my people, and in thisprocess my country lost its freedom. By this time
. the Dutch East India Company had establisheditself. Later, it was transformed into the DutchColonial Government and as such, held sway fornearly one-and-a-half centuries. By this time thedegradation of my people was. complete. Thesefactors must be borne in mind when any evaluation is being made of our relations with the Dutch.It must also be remembered, however, that as a~eople we have had our own history and tradihons-both as a nation and as a State-goingback many centuries.
DUI' history books and the great stone relicsscattered about our islands bear evidence of theciyilizati<?n and culture we achieved in the past.However, under Dutch domination and colonialrule, our history took a tragic turn. Not only didDutch oppression and exploitation account for ourbackwardness and degradation, but they also ledto the fall of my country ftom its ancient proudplace to that of a weak, dejected colony.
.Long after we as a people had, so to speak,dls~~peared from th~ face of the earth, the generalpol.ltical awakening of Asia, the rebirth .of theOnent, affected us also. At the end of the nineteenth century we began to regain our soul, and,
~"'i6-;""",,,
comrmssIOn de ce genre. En consequence, je demande aux membres du Conseil d'adopter la resolution.
Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Je vaismaintenant donner la parole au representant ,dela Republique d'Indonesie pour une declarationqui sera certainement tres utile.
M. SJAHRIR (Indonesie) (traduit de l'anglais):Au nom du Gouvernement de la Republique d'Indonesie je tiens tout d'abord a remercier le President, ainsi que les membres du Conseil, du sensde l'equite et de la justice dont ils ont fait preuveen me procurant la possibilite de prendre part auxdiscussions du Conseil de securite sur la questionindonesienne.
"-En qualite de representant de la Republique
d'Indonesie je viens m'adresser aux membres duConseil au nom d'un pays qui, dans l'opinioncourante des gens d'occident, ¥ient seulement denahre, ou, si vous voulez, qui vient seulement des'engager sur la voie conduisant a l'etat de nation.Dans ces conelitions, il me faut tout d'abord souligner le fait que je represente ici un peuple dontl'histuire est vieille de plus de mille ans.
Au XIVeme siecle, mon peuple constituait l'empire de Madjapahit, qui s'etendait sur toutes lesilesdu sud-est de l'Asie, de la Papouasie jusqu'aMadagascar. Ce royaume possedait une administration competente et, meme en ces temps recules,entretenait des relations avec des contrees aussilointaines que la Chine et l'Europe. Au XVlemesiecle, mon peuple est entre pour la premiere foiscn contact avec les peuples occidentaux. I1 esttout a fait regrettable que ce contact ait eu lieua l'epoque de notre decadence. L'influence occideni:ale a commence de se faire sentir et n'a cessede croltre a un rythme proportionnel a celui denotre decadence.
L'extension' rapide du pouvoir occidental a ac';centue le declin et cause la chute de mon peuplequi, par le fait meme, 'a perdu sa liberte. A cemoment-la, la Compagnie des lodes orientalesneerlandaises s'etait installee ad~meure. Plus tard,dIe s'est trAnsformee en Gouv,ernement colonialneerlandais et, a cetitre, a excrce le pouvoir pendant plus d'un siecle et demi. L'asservissementde mon peuple fut alors complet. II faut se souvenir de ces faits avant de porter un. jugement surnos relations avec les Hollandais. II ne faut pasnon plus oubIier qu'en tant que peuple - en tantque nation 'et en tant qu'Etat - nous avons unehistoire et des traditions vieilles de' plusieurssiecles.
Nos livres d'histoire et les vestiges architecturaux qu'on trouve partout dans nos iles temoignentdu niveau de civilisation et de culture que nousavions atteint dans le passe. Mais par suite de ladomination neerlandaise, et de l'administrationcoloniale, notre histoire a tragiquement change.Non seulement l'oppression et l'exploitation neerlanpaises sont responsables de notre recul et denotre degradation, mais elles ont egalement faittomber mon pays du rang qu'il occupait orgueilleusement a celui de colonie faible et deprimee.
Longtemps apres q.le nous clImes, si je puism'exprimer ainsi, disparu en tant que peuple dela surface du globe, l'eveil politique de I'Asie etla renaissance de l'orient nous ont atteints. A lafin du XIXeme siecle, nous avonn conimence a
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gave birth to a national movement which aimed atfreedom from. Dutch colonial rule. From.that timeon, it has been our' constant desire, our one ideal,our strife and struggle, to become a nation again.
By 1918, our nation'al· movement had gainedgreat strength, and the desire to free Indonesiafrom Dutch rule had become universal.
. In common with those participating in siplllarmovements in other countries, my people bent alltheir energies to achieve the status of anindependent nation. But as in other countries, the nationalmovement was not popular with colonial rulers.Nationalists were imprisoned and exiled, but thestruggle went on. In 1926, the Dutch carried outlarge-scale military actions against Indonesians.Those taken prisoner who could not 'be convicted
'by the courts were sent to the Dutch concentration.camps in New Guinea. And as these oppressivemeasures were carried out against thousands ofnationalists all over the wide territory of th,eArchipelago, it is apparent that opposition toDutch rule was widespread.
When tl).e Japanese attacked the Netherlandsforces in Asia, our nation.al movement had alreadybeen in existence for decades in all the islands ofthe Archipelago. Since 1918 our national movement for. freedom has chosen democracy as thegoal of the country from among all the currentpolitical ideologies; In the Second World War, weplaced. ~>ur reliance on the democracies in theirfight against the fascist countries. We accordinglyasked the Netherlands Colonial Government toassign our national movement an .active role inthat war. Our offer, however, was turned downby the Netherlands and thus ,was 'destroyed a goodchance to bring about a new and bett~ relation-ship. '
At the time when the Netherlands forces weredefeated by the Japanese, the Indonesian peoplewas not given a chance by the Dutch to manifest,as a people, what its attitude and desires werein the field of global relations. Eventually we weresacrificed to the might of the Japanese. The resultwas three-and-a-half years' of misery for my 'peopIe;. and for all that happened during the Japaneseoccupation the Dutch must be held responsible.Our sufferings were in no way less th~m those ofother countries which fell victim to fascist aggres,sion.
During the Japanese occupation, our nationalgovernment was continually seeking opportunitiesto organize itself as a force with which to endJapa~ese dorilinanon. We were convinced .that thedemocracies were bound to win. Our people placedtheir faith in the .promises of the Atlantic Charter;its meaning for us was that we should be set freefrom colonial domination. The Japanese were k~en
to win over the nationalists, but ouI' people werebent on the achievement of full nationhood, rejecting each and every kind of alien leadershipor tutelage.
When, in the middle of 1945, it'was plain thatthe Japanese were going to lose the war, theIndonesian democratic movement. took, steps to
reprendre cprisciel1~e de notre ame; de' ce reveilest ne un mouvement. natio.nal qui visait a affranchir le pays de la domination coloniale neerlandaise. A partir/de' ce moment, nous ne nous sommes' battus et nous n'avens lutte qu'avec un seuldesir et pour un seul ideal: redevenir une nationlibre.
En 1918 notre mouvement national avait acquisune grande force, et le desir d'affranchir l'fndonesie de la domination neerlandaise efait devenu
, general.
Comme ce fut le cas pour des mouvements semblables dans d'autres .pays, mon peuple a consacre toutes ses forces a obtenir le statut de nationindependante. Comme ailleurs, le mouvementnational n'etait guere populaire aupl'es de l'admi-
, nistration coloniale. Les nationalistes etaient emprisonnes, et exiles, mais la lutte se poursuivait. En1926, les Hollahdais ont entrepris des operationsmilitaires de grande envergure contre lesIndonesiens. Ceux qui furent faits prisonniers, mais queles tribunaux ne pouvaient condamner, furentenvoyes dans des camps de concentration neerlandais en Nouvelle-Guinej::. Le fait que ces mesures ,de repression aient ete appliquees a des milHers de nationalistes repartis sur tout l'Archipelprouve, que l'opposition a la domination neerlandaise etait fort repandue.
Quand les Japonais ont attaques les .Hollandaisen Asie, notre mouvement national existait dejadepuis plusieures decennies dans toutes les lIes del'Archipel. A partir de 1918, ce'mouvement natio-
_nal en faveur de la. liberte avait choisi, parmi lesdifferentes ideologies politiques, la democratiecomme but ·supreme. Au cours de la secondeguerre mondiale, nous nous sommes attaches a la
, fortune des democraties dans la lutte contre lespays fa:scist~s. Nous avons done demande au Gou,vernement colonial neerlandais ne confier a nptremouvement national un role actif dans cetteguerre. Mais les Hollandais ont repousse notre demande, detruisant ainsi une excellerite occasiond'etablir des relations nouvelles et meilleures.
Quand les Hollandais ont ete vaincus par lesJaponais, ils n'ont pas donne au peuple indonesien la possibiIite de prendre position et d'exprimerses volontes et ses preferences en tant que peupIe,en matiere de politique internationale. Now avonsfini par etre s~crifies a la pul'ssance japonaise. 11en est resulte trois ans et demi de souffrances pourmon peuple; les Hollandais sont responsables de ,tout ce qui s'est passe sous l'occupation j<lponaise.Nos souffrances n'ont pas ete moindres que cellesdes autres pays qui ·ont succombe a l'agressionfasciste.
-: Sous i'ocC!!pation japonais;;, notre mouvementnational a sans cesse cherche toutes les. occasionsde ce constituer en force de combat pour abatt:rela domination japonaise. Nous etJons· convaincusque les democraties remporteraient la victoire.Notre peuple a place sa foi dans les promesses dela Charte de l'Atlantique. Cette Charte etait pournous une promesse d'affranchissement de la domination coloniale. Les Japonais s'effor~aient de g'lgner les nationalistes a leur cause, mais notre peupIe etait decide a obtenir une independancenationale .complete et a repousser -toute formede domination ou de tlltelIe etrangere..
Quand, au milieu de l'annee -1945, il devintevident que les Japonais alIaient perdre la,guerre,le mouvement democratique indonesien a pris des .
....all
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act for the', people and' take their future in itsown hands; Therefore, it. is not the conversationof some Indonesian leaders with the Japanese atSaigon in July 1945 which, lies' at the. root of .theconstitution of the IndoneSIan Republic; the brrthof the Republic was a result of positive action bythe national movement in the country.
It can be proved conclusively that at the timeof the conversations at Saigon, and even later,the Japanese had no real i~tention of settin~ upany kind of a free IndoneSIa, let alone the mdependent Rypublic of Indonesia. On the contrary,some time before the Japanese surrender, therewas every indication that the Japanese were trying to prevent and counteract Indonesian activitytowards that end. In February 1945, there was amutiny of Indonesian troops of the National Voluntary Defence Forces under the Japanese com"mand. Subsequently the Japanese started graduallyto disarm all Indonesian ~oops.
From my own knowledge I ca.n say that thedeclaration of Jndonesian independence, on 17 August 1945, was the work of the democratic movement of which I have spoken. From the big townsdown to. the smallest villages, the people seizedpower from the Japanese and handed it over tothe Republic. Is there in the course of history anycountry as democratic as this, where the people,having seized power, handed it over to their gov-ernment as the lawful authority? .
The past twenty-lour months have revealed theextraordinary longing and desire of the Indonesianpeople to set up a peaceful State. The peoplehanded over to the Government the arms they hadcaptured fr.om the Japanese, and thus the Repub- .lican.,regular al'IIly came into existence.
When the Allied fprces landed in Indonesia,the people regarded' them as friends who had
. c:>me to liquidate the Japanese occupation. Alliedtroops were therefore received in all friendliness.The people never for a moment thought that thearmed forces of the democracies were going toendanger the freedom of the Republic which theIndonesian people had WOll for themselves.
Tens of thousands of Netherlands nationals concentrated in camp~ by the Japanese were not regarded by the Indonesians as enemies. It wasonly when several hundred Netherlands soldierswho had landed with the British were guilty ofvarious acts of enmity iD, 13atavia that troubledeveloped with the Indonesians. It was only thent~~t my people began to question and distrust theattItude of the Netherlands towards the Republic.
, Tens of thousands of Netherlands internees werestill in Japanese concentration camps. When theNetherlands soldiers in Batavia started trouble,t~e ~.lIied army of occupation. became suspect.FI~hting broke out in Soerabaja on a big scale.WIt? th~ landing of large numbers of Netherlandssoldiers m Java, relations deteriorated more andmore between the Republic and the Allied armyof occupation. Clashes became' frequent and theatmosphere tense.
mesures en vue d'agir dans l'interet dupeuple et de prendre son avenir en main. Ce ne sont donepas les entretiens que certains chefs indonesiensont eus avec les Japonais a. Saig9D en jl.lilIet 1945qui ont constitue le point de depart de la ConstitUtion de la Republique d'Indonesie. La Republique est nee de l'action positive du mOllvementnational dans le pays.
'On pourrait indiscutablement prouver que, aumoment 'des entretiens de Saigon, et· meme plustard, les Japonais n'avaient pas reellement l'intention de faire de l'Indoncsie un piays libre sous uneforme quelconque, sans meme p2~rler d'une Republique independante d'Indones~e. Au contraire,quelques temps avant leur reddition, tout indiquait que les Japop.ais s'effor<;aient d'entxaver etde contrecarrer l'activite des Indonesiens dans cedomaine. En fevrier 1945, les tmupes indonesiennes des Forces volontaires de la Defens~ nationale,commandees par !es Japonais, se sont mutinees, a.la suite de .quoi les Japonais ont commence a. de·sarmer piogJ;essivement toutes les troupes indonesiennes.
Les renseignements que je possooe me permettent d'affirmer que la declaratiop d'independancede l'Indonesie, prononce!} le 17 aout, 1945, estl'reuvrc du mouvement democratique dont je pade. ~
Dans les grandes villes comme dans les plus petitsvillages, le peuple a eilleve le pouvoir aux Japonaispour le remettre a. la Republique. Y a-t-il.dansl'histoire un exemple de pays aussi democratiqueque l'Indonesie OU le peuple, apres s'etre emparedu pouvoir, l'a remis a. son Gouvernement parcequ'il le considerait comme autorite legitime? .
Les vingt~quatre derniers mois ont reveIe l'immense desir du peuple indonesien d'instaurer unEtat pacifique. Le peuple a remis au Gouvernement les armes qu'ilavait prises aux Japomus, etc'est ainsi qu'est nee l'armee reguliere deja Repu~blique. .
Quand les forces aIliees ont debarque en Indonesie, le peuple les a considerees c~mme des amiesvenues pour mettre fin a l'occupation japonaise.Les troupes alliees ont done ete re<;ues. tree ami.calement. Pas un instant le peuple n'a soupl;ionneque les forces armees des democraties alIaientmettre en danger la libe!"te de la Republique' quele peuple de l'Indonesie avait conquise.
Les Indonesiens n'ont pas traite en ennemis lesdizaines de milliers de ressortissants aeerlandaisdetenus dans des camps de concentration japonais.Ce n'est qu'apres que plusieurs centaines de soldats neerIandais, debarques avec les troupes britanniques, se furent rendus coupables de diversesmanifestations d'hostilite a Batavia, que des, incidents ont commence a. se produire entre Indon~
siens et Hollandais.> Mon peuple n'a commencequ'a. ce moment a. se mefier de l'attitude des Hollandais vis-a.-vis de la Republique. .' .
Des dizaines de nuIliers de Hollandais etaientencore internes dans des camps de concentrationjaponais. Quand les soldats neerlandais ont commence a. provoquer des troubles a. Batavia, l'armeealliee d'occupation est devepue suspecte. Des combats de grande envergure ontedate a. Sourabaya.A la suite du debarquement a. Java d'importantscontingents de troupes neerIandaises, les relationsentre la Republique et l'armee alliee d'occupationn'ont cesse de s'envenimer. Les frictions se sontmultipliees et l'atmosphere s'est'tendue.
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However, eVl::n in those circumstances, theyoung Republic went ahead in its task of achievingpeace and security. At the same time it was extending all-out .aid to the Allied army of occupation to help it carry out its tasks in Java andSumRtra. Dl ng a period of fourteen months theRepublic disarmed 70,0011 Japanese troops andevacuated them from Republican territory. In addition to this the Republic evacuated more than30,000 Dutch and other Allied civilianJnternees.Both these tasks were delegated by the Alliedcommand to the Republican Army.
In a statement to this Council tlle other day,'the representative of the Netherlands accused theRepublic of holding 700 hostages;' but this accusation has 'no basis in truth. There are no moreinternees left in Republican territory. The hostageswhich the representative of the Netherlands hassuddenly discovered were never before alluded toor mentioned in official Netherlands statements,either in Indonesia or in the Netherlands.
The work completed by the Republic of evacuating tens of thousands of Japanese prisoners ofwar, as well as Dutch and Allied civilian internees, provides a good illustration of the disciplineand ability of the Republican troops to carry outtheir appointed duties. It also furnishes an indication of the ability of the RepUbliC itself to imple
·ment its undertakings, and of its willingness todo so.
When the Netherlands civilian administrationlanded in Java in October 1945, there were noDutdl troops there. The whole of Java, Sumatraand Madpra was under the complete control ofthe Republican Government. In spite of the greatmilitary advantage the Republic enjoyed, the Republic was willing to enter into negotiations withthe Netherlands. From then on, the Republicmade repeated attempts to come to an understanding with the Netherlands. The ~etherlands, at thestart, refused to have any discussions.
Finally, in Marrh 1946, through ilie active intervention of the United Kingdom Government,there arrived in Batavia Sir Archibald Clark Kerr,nc',; Lord Inverchapel, who was sent to place hisgood offices at the disposal of both sides. Thanksto the patience, t<i.ct and ability of that Britishdiplomat-and not forgetting the earnest desireof the Republic to come to a settlement withthe Netuerlands-a draft agreement was finally
. reached. I, in my capacity as Premier, acted forthe Republic; Mr. van Mook, the NetherlandsLieutenant Governor-General, acted for the Neth-erlands Government. .
This draft ag,:eemu,t was ninety per cent thebrain-child of ML. van Mook, but my Governmentaccepted it in order to facilitate a quick settlement. Sir Archibald Clark' Kerr, an Indonesiandelegation under Mr. Suwandi, and a Netherlandsdelegation I headed by Mr. van Mook left for theNetherlands to get the approval of the Netherlands Government. Mr. van Mook told us whenhe was leaving for Holland tha. he would be backin a couple of weeks with the assent of his Government. But the Netherlands cabinet comptetelyignored the draft agreement. Two months went
'See Official Records of the Security Council, SecondYear, ~o. 67, l7lst meeting.
Mais, meme dans ces conditions, la jeune Republique a poursuivi sa tl1che, s'effor~ant d'etabIirla· paix et la securite. En meme temps, elle aidaitdans toute la mesure du possible l'armee aIIieed'occupation a remplir sa mission a Java et aSumatra. En quatorze mois, la RepubIique a desarme 70.000 Japonais et les a evacues du territoire de la Republique. En outre, la Republiquea evacue plus de 30.000 Hollandais et autresciviIs allies internes dans des camps de concentration. C'est le Commandement allie qui avait confieces deux taches a l'armee republicaine.
Dans une declaration faite au Conseil l'autrejour', le representant des Pays-Bas a accuse laRepublique de conserver 700 otages. Cette accusation est denuee de tout fondement. Il n'y a plusd'internes sur le territoire de la Republique. Il n'ajamais €~e que~tion anterieurement, clans aucunexpose officiel, pas plus en Indonesie qu'aux PaysBas, de ces otages que le representant des Pays-Basvient soudainement de decouvrir.
La tache accomplie par la Republique, qui aevacue des dizaines de milliers de prisonniers deguerre japonais en meme temps que des internesneerlandais et allies, est une excellente preuve dela discipline et de la competence dont sont capables les troupes republicaines dans l'accoPlplissement des missions dont elles sont chargees. C'estegalement l'indice que la Republique elle-memeest capable, et desirp1lsc, de remplir ses engagements.
Quand I'administration civile neerlandaise adebarque a Java en octobre 1945, il ne s'y trouvait pas de troupes neerlandaises. Java, Sumatraet Madoura, dans leur totalite; etaient soumisesau Gouvernement de la Republique. En depit dugrand avantage militaire dont disposait la' Republique, dIe etait prete a entrer en negociationsavec les Hollandais. En fait, a partir de 'ce moment, la Republique a essaye it plusieurs reprisesd'arriver a une entente avec les Hollandais, maisceux-ci, des le debut, onto absolument refuse de
. discuter.
Enfin, en mars 1946, grace a I'intervention active du Gouvernement du Royaum.e-Uni, SirArchibald Clark Kerr, maintenant Lord Inverchapel, est arrive a Eatavia, envoye pour mettre sesbons offices a It' position des deux parties. Graceit la patience, au tact et it I'habiIete de ce diplomate britannique, grace aussi a l'ardent desir dela Republique d'aboutir a une entente avec lesHollandais,· un projet ,d'accord a pu enfin etreelabore. En qualitede Premi~Ministre, je representais la Republique; M. van Mook, LieutenantGouverneur general neerlandais, representait leGouvernement des Pays-Bas.
Ce projet d'accord etait, pour les neuf dixiemes, l'ceuvre de M. van Mook. Mais man Gouvernement l'a accepte pour permettre de reglerla question rapidement. Sir Archibald Clark Kerr,une delegation indonesienne dirigee par M. Suwandi, et une delegation neerlandaise dirigee parM~ van Mook, sont partis pour les Pays-Bas afind'obtenir l'approbation du Gouvernement neerlanrlais. Quand i1 est parti, M. van Mook nous a ditqu'il serait de retour dans deux semaines et ra~-,
porterait l'assentiment de son Gouvernement. Mmsle Cabinet neerlandais n'a tenu aucun compte ~;I
1 Voir les Proces-verbaux officiels du Conseil de securite, DeUlaeme Annee, No 67~ l7leme seance.
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by before Mr. van Mook returned-with a cam'- I . ..,jet d'accord. M. van Mook n'est rentre quepletely new set of proposals. deux l'lois plus tard, avec une serie de propositions entierement nouvelles.
After a complete breakdown in the negotiations, and a period of continuous military activityby the ever-increasing Netherlands forces, the timehad come for .the British army of occupation toleave Indonesia. Accordingly, Lord Killearn, British Special Commissioner in South East Asia, cameto Indonesia to act as mediator in a new attemptto bring both parties to a settlement.
This was in October 1946. Shovtly after hisarrival, on 14 October, a truce'agreement wassigned whereby the Netherlands Government undertook not to increase its armed forces in Indonesia beyond the figure of Allied strength on thatdate, which stood at 91,000 men.
Mter weeks of patient negotiations betweenIndonesian and Netherlands representatives, withLord Killearn in the chair, a compromise wasarrived at and the Linggadjati Agreement wasinitialled by both parties, Indonesian and Netherlands, on 15 November 1946. The NetherlandsCommissioljl-General, which had come to· Indonesia from the Netherlands to negotiate this agreement, then left for the Netherlands with the intention of coming back before Christmas of the sameyear.
The Commission-General finally did return toIndonesia, but not earlier than March of this year,four months later. They had not come to sign theLinggadjati Agreement, however. They came witha demand that the Republic should accept theinterpretation of the Agreement placed unilaterally upon it by the Netherlands Government. Thisinterpretation is known as the Jonkman interpretion, after the name of the Netherlands Ministerfor the Colonies.· The Republic refused to acceptthe Jonkman interpretation and, after prolongedhaggling,' the Agrct'ment' was finally signed on25 March 1947, four months and ten days after
. the initialling at Linggadjati, on the understanding that the Jonkman intepretation was not to bebinding upon the Republic.
In th~ meantime, the Netherlands had alreadyviolated the status quo established by the Octobertruce. Netherlands troops seized and occupied thetowns of Buitenzorg and Palembang. They starteda full-scale military action in East Java whichculminated in the occupation by Netherlandsforces of the Republican towns of Sidoardjo andKrijan. Meanwhile, Netherlands military activityhad increased along all perimeters. Simultaneously,the Netherlands maint:-inl1d an intensive blockadeof Indonesian ports.
In this connexion, it will be remembered thatan American merchantman, the Martin Behrman,proceeded to the IndOl"~sian port of Cheribon withthe approval of the United States Department ofSt~t~ in Washington. The ship also received perll1Isslon from the Netherlands Trade Commissionerin Washington to load cargo at Cheribon. In spiteof these undertakings, the Netherlands ColonialGovernment seized the cargo of the M arJin Behrman after completion of the Io:ding at Cheribon.
In carrying out this naval bJ'_J'~kade, the Netherlands not only prevented the reconstruction andIIIIIlIilI' _
Aprcs un arret total des negociations et uneperiode ininterrompue d'operations militaires menees par des troupes neerlanqaises sans cesse renforcees, la date du depart de l'armee d'occupationbritannique est arrivee. En consequence, LordKillearn, Commissaire special britannique en Asiedu Sud-Est, est arri\'~ en Indonesie pour servirde mediateur et tenter a nouveau d'arnener lesdeux parties aun accord,
Cela se passait· en octobre 1946. Peu apres I'arrivee de Lord KiIlearn, le 14 octobre, un armisticea ete signe, aux termes duquel les Pays-Bas s'engageaient a ne pas accroitre l'effectif de leurstroupes en Indonesie au dela. du chiffre des troupes "alliees a. ce moment-la., c'est-a.-dire 91.000.hommes.
Apres des semaines de patientes negoeiations entre les representants indonesiens et neerlant;laissous la presidence de Lord Killearn, on aboutita. une solution de compromis, et, le 15 novembre1946, les deux parties parapherent I'Accord deLinggadjati. La Commission generale neerlandaisevenue des Pays-Bas pour negocier cet accord, estalors repartie pour les Pays-Bas avec l'intention de'revenir avant Noel de la meI]1e annee.
La Commission generale finit par revenir enIndonesie, mais seulement en mars 1947, avec quatre mOls de retard, et nullement dans l'intention designer l'Accord de Linggadjati. Elle revenait pourexiger que la Republique accepte l'interpretationde l'Accord donnee unilaterakment par le Gouvernement des Pays-Bas. Cette interpretation estconnue sous le nom d'interpretation Jonkman, dunom du Ministre neerlandais des colonies. La Republique a refuse d'accepter l'interpretation Jonkman et, apres des marchandages interminables,l'Accord a ete finalementosigne le 25 mars 1947,soit quatre mois et dix jours apres !'<!-ppositiondes paraphes a. Linggadjati, avec r:ette reserve ex- .'plicite que l'ivterpretation Jonkman ne liaie pasla Republique.
Dans l'intervalle, les Hollandais avaient dejaviole le statu quo etabli par l'armistice d'octobre.Les troupes neerlandaises s'etaient emparees desvilles de Buitenzorg et Palembang et les occupaient. Elles commencerent, dans l'est de Java,des operations militaires de grande envergure quiaboutirent a. l'occupationneerlandaise des villesrepublicaipes de Sidoardjo et Krijan. Pendant cetemps, l'activite militaire des Hollandais augmentait sur tous les points du territoire, et ils maintenaient un blocus intensif de tous les ports d'Indonesie.
A ce propos, k rappelle qu'un vaisseau do': commerce americam, le Martin Behrman, s'etaitdirige vers le port indonesien de Cheribon avec-l'approbation du Departement d'Etat des EtatsUnis. Le bateau avait egalement re~u de l'Attachecommercial neerlandais a. Washington '. la permission de prendre une cargaison a. Cheribon. En de~pit de ces engagements, le Gouvernement colonialneerlandais a saisi la cargaison du Mart~n Behrman lorsque le chargem.ent en eut ete termine aCheribon.
Le blocus naval neerlandais n'a pas seulementempeche la reconstruction t:;t la remise en eta.t de
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rehabilitation of Indonesia, but went so far· as toseize as contraband sorely needed medicinesshipped to Indonesia from outside ports. Ships,mostly Chinese owned, plying between Singaporeand bdonesian ports, were seized on the high seasoutside territorial wate~s. It was generally recognized that this Netherlands blockade was aimedat strangling the Repuplic economically.
.But this was not all. Two days before the sign
ing of the Linggadjati Agreement on 25 Marchlast, Netherla.nds forces moved i~to and occupiedthe East Java town of Modjokerto. Fighting subsequently flared up in this area, and the consequence of that action was the destruction ofproperty. so eloquently described, to this Councilby the representative of the Netherlands in theafternoon of 31 July:
In spite of repeated Nethedands violatio~s, andin spite of ,the occupation of Buitenzorg, Palem-:
, bang, Sidoardjo, Krijan and Modjokerto by theNetherlands army, the Republic signed the Linggadjati Agreement in the sincere belief that Dutcllaggression would be brought, to an end. It was'mur hope, that, \\~th the political situation stabilized, we could .go ahead with the urgent task ofreconstruction and rehabilitation.
One of the points agreed upon between theNetherlands and tr..e Rept1.blic when the Linggadjati Agreement ,was initialled in November 1946was that the future State of the United States ofIndonesia was to be 'brought into being by co-operation between th~ Governm('.nts of the Republicof Indonesia and tli~ Netherlands. .
Subsequent to this date., however, the Netherlands Colonial Government, without the~ knowledge or approval of the Republic of Indonesia andin violation of the Agreement, set up the puppetStates of East Indonesia' and West Borneo, together with other political entities as depend~nciesof the Netherlands in the Dutch-controlled partsof Indonesia. These creations, it will be clear,were. brought into being for the express purpose ofusing them as bargaining counters against the Republicof Indonesia. Because of this fact, it is notsurprising that the representative of the Netherland!! has· asked this Council to permit officialsof these so-called States to be present here to backhis statements. These men, however, are representatives of feudal' systems which. are being perpetuated by the Netherlands. These me~ are mereofficials, appointed by and owing all~giance to theNetherlands Colonial Government.
Mter the signing of the Lihggadjati Agreementcame the question of its implem~ntation. Here itbecame apparent that the Netherlands Government was adhering to dle Jonkman interpretation,which the Republic had rejected as being unilat-
. era!. A new crisis developed and. came to a headon 28 May of this year, when the Netherlands is~ued an ultimatum demanding that the Republicshould accept new proposaIs,evidently based onthe Jonkman interpretation .of the LinggadjatiAgreement..
1 See' Official Records of the Security Council, SecondYear, No. 67....
l'Indonesie. Les Hollandai~ sont alles jusqu'a sai.sir, sous pretexte de contrebande, des medicamentsdont les populations avaient un besoin urgent etqui avaient ete expedies de ports etrangers. Desbateaux, pour 1", plupart appartenant a des Chi.·nois, qui assuraient la' liaispn entre Singapour etles ports indonesiens, ont ere saisis au large, horsdes eaux territoriales. On reconnaissait generale.ment que le blocus neerlandais visait a ~touffer,
economiquement la Republique.
Mais ce n'~st pas tout. Deux jours avant lasignature de l'Accord de Linggadjati, le 25 marsdernier, des troupes neerlandaises sont entrees dansla ville de Modjokerto, situee dans la partie orientale de Java, et 1'ont occupee. A la.suite de cetteoccJ.lpation, des combats ont eclate dans la region"combats qui ont cause les pertes marerielles quele representant des Pays-Bas a decrites avec tantd'eloquence devant ce Conseil, l'apres-midi du
. 31 juillee. \
En depit de ces violations repetees de l'armis- .tice par les Hollandais et en depit de 1'ocGupationde Buitenzorg, Palembang, Sidoardjo, Krijan etModjokerto, la Republique a signe l'Accord deLinggadjati, en croyant sincerement que les attaques neerlandaises cesseraient. Nous esperionsque, apres avoir stabilise la situation politique,nous pourrions poursuivre natre tache de reconstruction et de remise en valeur, dont l'urgence sefaisait sentir.
Au moment Oll l'Accord de Linggadjati a eteparapbe, en novembre 1946, les Hollandais et laRepublique s'etaient mis d'accord sur un pointentre autres: le Gouvernement de la Republiqued'Indonesie et le Gouvernement des Pays-Bas collaboreraient, a la creation des futurs Etats-Vnisd'Indonesie. .
Mais, apres cette date, le Gouvernement colonial neerlandais, sans l'approbation et a l'insu dela Republique d'Indonesie, en violation des termesde l~Accord, a. cree, dans les regions d'Ind,onesieregies par les Hollandais, les Etats fantoches d'Tn_donesie orientale et du Borneo' occidental, en meme
. temps que d'autres entites politiques a titre dedependantes du Gouvernement neerlandais. Onverra que les Hollandais avaient cree ces Etatsdans le seuI dessein de s'en servir comme demoyens de pression sur la RepuUique d'Indonesie.I1 n'est donc pas e~onnant que le representant desPays-Bas ait demande au Conseil de securit'; depermettre au.x representants de ces pretendusEtats de venir id pour appuyer ses declarations.Ces hommes sont Ies representants du systeme feodal que maintiennent les Hol1andais. Ces hommessont de simples fonctionnaires nonunes par le.Gouvernement colonial neerlandais et qui dependent de lui.
I •Apres la signature de l'Accord' de Linggadjati,la question de son execution s'est posee. I1 devintalors evident que le~ Pays-Bas s'en tenaient al'interpretation Jonknian, que la Republique avaitrejetee parce qu'elle l'estimait unilatera:Ie. VnenouvelJe ,criseeclata, qui atteignit son point cuI·minant le 28 mai 1947, quand les Hollandais lancerent un ultimatum' exigeant. que la Republiqueacceptat de nouvelles propositionsmanifestementinspirees'de I'interpretation Jonkman.
1 Voir les Proces-verbaux officiels du Conseil de secu-rite, Deuxieme Annee, No 67.' .
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> 2001•The Republic replied with a counter-statement
dated 7 June, in which the Republic l?~t forn:ardconstructive propo~als(based on the orIgmal Lmggadjati Agreement.
At this point in the di~cu~sions, th~ representatives of the Netherlands mdIcated that they werenot prepared to negotiate with us any further. Asdeadlock followed deadlock, the Republic calledupon the Netherlands to implement article XVIIof the Agreement, which provides for arbitration.These repeated Republican requests were ignoredby the Netherlands. By this time, Netherlands military strength had increased by 30,000 above thepermitted figure of 91,000, and stood at 120,pOO.It was apparent that the Netherlands were prepared to make use of their military strength andforce us into a complete surrender. We, on theother hand, anxious. to preserve peace af anyprice, conceded nearly all the Netherlands demands, in spite of their being contrary to theLinggadjati Agreement, excep... for some veryminor points. Included among these' was theNetherlands demand for the appointment of ajoint const~bulary for Republican areas.
On 19 Jhly, we were confronted with anotherset of demands, Including one. to the effect thatwithin twenty-four hours all Indonesian troopsshould withdraw ten kilometres from the positionsthey then held. At this time, it was common }mowledge that the Netherlands had mustered greatstrength at these very perimeters. The Republicasked for another twenty-four hours in which toconsider the matter. This request was refused bythe Netherlands.
On 20 July, the Republican Government,through its Deputy Prime Minister, Mr. Gani,.then at Batavia, handed to the Netherlands Colonial Government a written request from the Republic_for implementation of article XVII of theLinggadjati Agreement. The Nei11erlands Colonial
'Governmeilt stated in reply that the Indonesianrequest had been forwarded to th~ NetherlandsGovernment in the Netherlands. This was at 8 p.m.on 20 July. At 11 p.m. the same rught, one hourbefore the Netherlands ultimatum expired, Mr.Gani was handed a letter from Mr. van Mook,acting Governor-General, which stated that theNetherlands Government did not consider itselfbound :;ny more by the Linggadjati Agreement.It was thus at this juncture that the Netherlandsrepudiated the Linggadjati Agreement.
Simultaneously, the Netherlands army commenced military operations against the Republic.The Netherlands forces seized all communicationsfaCilities and arrested 200 prominent Indonesiansin Batavia. Among those arrested was Mr. Gani,who was therefore-apart from the lack of communications _facilities-unable to transmit theNetherlands note to the Rep~blican Governmentin Jogjakarta. ' .
In view of these facts, it appears that theNetherlands Government has never at any timesincerely desired a peaceful s€ttlement with theRepublic.. On the· other hand, all Netherlandsaction-...!..political, military and economic-wasnotJ.Uhg·but preparation for aggressive actionagatnst its partner in an agreement. Although theRepublic has been forced to defend itself, mili-
htb"'""-'
La Republique repondit par une contre-declaration, datee du 7 juin, dans 1aque1le la Republique soumettait des propositions fondees sur letexte original de I'Ac~ord de Linggadjati.
A cette phase de l'affaire, les representants desPays-Bas ont fait comprendre qu'ils ne ~oulaientplus negocier avec nous. Les conversations sortaient d'une impasse pour retomber dans une autre; la RepubJique a alors demande aux Hollandais d'appliquer l'article XVII de I'Accord, quiprevoit le reglement par voie d'arbitrage. LesHollandais n'ont tenu aucun compte des demandes reiterees faites par la Republique a. ce propos.A ce moment-la, re..lfectif des troupes neerlandaises dcpassait de 30.000 le chiffre convenu de91.000 et s'elevait a. 120.000 hommes. Il etait evident que les Hollandais etaient prets a utiliserleuts troupes pour nous amener a. une redditioncomplete; D'autre part, nous 'voulions preserver lapaix a. tout prix: nous avons accede'a. la presquetotalite des exigences neerlaodaises, excepte ·surquelques points secondaires, bien qu'elles fussenten contradiction avec l'Accord de Linggadjati. Aunombre des demandes auxquelles nous n'avons pasaccede, figure la question de la nomination d'unegendarmerie mixte dans les regions sous le controle de la Republique.
Le 19 juillet, les Hollandais nous ont presenteune nouvelle serie de revendications; ils nous de
.mandaient,· notamment, que toutes les· troupes}ndonesiepnes se replient, clans les 24 heures, a.dix kilometres des positions qu'elles occupaient.Tout le monde savait, a. cette date, que les Hollandais avaient masse des effectifs importants a.proximite de CeS positions. .La Republique demanda vingt-quatre heures supplementaires pouretudier la question. Les Hollandais repo~sserentsa demande.
Le 20 'juillet, le Gouvernement republicain, parla voix de son Vice-Premier Ministre, M. Gani,qui se trouvait a. Batavia, tranljpit au Gouvernement colonial neerlandais une aemande ecrite dela Republique exigeant i'application de l'articleXVII de I'Accord de Linggadjati. En reponse, leGouvernement colonial neerlandais declara que lademande de l'Indonesie avait ete transmise auGouvernement des Pays-Bas, dans la metropole.Cela se passait a 20 heures, le 20 juillet. A 23
'heures, la meme nuit, une· heure avant· l'expira-tion de l'ultimatum I neerlandail;l, M. Gani regut
.une lettre de M. van Mook, Gouverneur geReralpar interim, declarant que le Gouvernement desPays-Bas ne se considerait plus lie par I'Accord deLinggadjati. C'est a ce moment critique que !esHollandais den~ncerent l'Accord de Linggadjati.
En meme temps, l'armee neerlandaise engageaitdes operations militaires contre la Republique. LesHollandais s'emparerent de tous les moyens decommunications et arrett:rent 200 Indonesiens demarque a Batavia. Parmi eux se trouvait M.Ganiqui, de ce fait, independamment de l'absence demoyens de communications, ne put transmettre lanote neerlandaise au Gouvernement republicainqui se trouvait a DjoI-.,_.......rta.
A la lunuere de ces fait~ il semble qu'a aucunmoment le Gouvernement neerlandais n'a desiresincerement regler le differe~d par des mO~1?spacifiques. D'autre part, toutes les mesures prisespar les Hollandais, politiques, militaires ou economiques, n'etaient qu'une preparation a l'attaquepar ks armes du co-signataire. d'un accord.Quoique la Republique ait ete obligee de se defen-
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tarily, it. still hopes to achieve a settlement bypeaceful means..(i)ur Government therefore askedthe Security Council to issue the cease-fire orderwith ·the undertaking that the Republic wouldabide by the Council's decision.
Now that the Security CouI?-cil has alreadycalled upon both parties to cease hostilities fOl'thwith, and now that both parties have acceptedthe Council's order, there has been an increase inthe hopes of the Republic for a peaceful solution.So long, however, as Netherlands troops remain inRepublican territory, there remains the threat tothe very existence of the Republic, and also, therefore, to lasting peace. The Republic of Indonesiaasks, therefore, that the Security Council of theUnited Nations order the complete ·withdrawal ofNetherlands troops from all Republican territories.
In this connexion, I would like to go back tothe conditions obtaining in Indonesia shortly afterthe Republic was set up on 17 August 1945. It isconceded by all impartial observers that law andorder reigned throughout the country, that themachinery of government turned over smoothly,and that not a single untoward incident marredthe cordial relations existing between differentgroups of the population.
However, when Netherlands troops began landing in Indonesia the whole picture changed. Thequiet was rudely shattered. Conflict broke out~
Law and order were upset, and confusion and disorder increased with the increase in the number'of Netherlands troops in Indonesia., Such conflictwas inevitable. The Republic states categorica~ly
that the possibilities of conflict and interferenceswith law and order have been many times multiplied by the presence of Netherlands troops inlarge areas of Republican territory. The Republicalso states without qualification that if Netherlands troops are completely removed from Republican territory, cdltditions will once more be establish€d for a peaceful a~d orderly life and themaintenance of lawand order; and, if this is done,the Republic assures the Security Council that itwill hold itself responsible for law and order in allRepublican territory.
The Republic can produce responsible witnesses-Dutch as well as others-to show that beforethe pl'esent Nethedands occupation of Republicanterritory, disorders were present only along theperimeters, where Indonesian and Netherlandstroops faced each other. Elsewhere in the Republican territory, life moved along in quiet, peaceand security.
The first step towards the restoration of law andorder in Indonesia would be the withdrawal ofNetherlands troops to the positions allocated tothem by the truce agreement of 14 Oc~ober 1946.
The Republic of Indonesia also asks for a commission to be appointed by the Security Councilof the United Nation;; to pliOceed immediately toIndonesia to superv~e implementation of theCouncil's order of 1 August for the cessation ofhostilities. Troops of the Republic of Indonesiaceased .fire llnconditionally, but Netherlands troopsare still continuing what the Netherlands ColonialGovernment' calls "mopping-up" operations. Inaddition, conflicting reports of the situation areemanating from both sides in Indonesia; and this
dre par les armes, nous esperons encore parvenira regler le differend par des moyens pacifiques. Enconsequence, notre Gouvernement a demande auConseil de securite de donner l'ordre de cesser lefeu, en prenant l'engagement de se conformer aladecision du Conseil. ..
Le Conseil de securite a demande ami deux parties de cesser imniediatement les hostilites, et,maintenant que les deux parties ont donne leur
. adhesion a cet ordre, l'espoir de la Republiqued'aboutir a une solution pacifique s'en trouveaccru. Mais, aussi longtemps que les troupes neer.landaises resteront sur le territoire de la Republique, l'existence meme de celle-ci restera menacee en meme temps que la stabilite de la paix. LaRepublique d'Indonesie demande, en consequence,au Conseil de securite des Nations Unies de donnerl'ordre que toutes les troupes neerlandaises soientr.etirees des territories de la Republique.
, A ce propos, je voudrais rappeler queUes condi·tions regnaient en Indonesie peu apres l'etablissement de la Republique, le 17 aout 1945. Tous lesobservateurs impartiaux reconnaissent que l'ordreet la Iegalite regnaient dans tout le pays, que leGouvernement fonctionnait sans a-coup et qu'aucun incident ne venait troubler les relations cordiales qu'entretenaient entre eux les difl'erentsgroupes de population.
Mais, quand les 1:!0upes neerlandaises ont commence a debarquer en Indonesie, tout a change.Le calme a brutalement cesse. Un conflit a eclate..L'ordre et la legalite se sont u'Quves bouleverses.La confusion et le desordre ont cm en meme tempsque l'efl'ectif des troupes neerlandaises en Indonesie. Ce conflit etait inevitable. La Republiquedeclare formellemeLt que la presence des troupesneerlandaises en de nombreuses regions du terri.toire de la Republique a mul1;iplie de be'aUcouples occasions de conflit· et de bouleversement del'ordre et de la Iegalite. La Republique declareegalement que, si les troupes ne.erlandaises evacuent completement le territoire republicain, leGouvernement retablira la paix et maintiendral'ordre et la Iegalite. Si cela se realise, le Gouvernement de la Republique donne au Conseil desecuIjte l'assurance qu'il assumera la responsabiJitedu maintien de l'ordre et de la Iegalite sur tout leterritoire republicain.
La Republique peut citer des temoins - neerhindais et autres -: qui prouveront que, avant lapresente occupation des territoires republicains par·les Hollandais, les incidents ne survenaient qu'auxpoi~ts de contact entre les troupes indonesienn~s
et neerlandaises. Dans les autres par.ies du terntoire republicain, la vie s'ecoulait dans le calme,'la paix et la securite.
Le repli des troupes neerlandaises sur les positions que l'armistice du 14 octobre 1946 leur assignait constitueraitun premier pas vers la resta~-'
ration de I'ordre et de la legalite.
La Republique d'Indonesie demande egalementque le Conseil de, securite des Nations Uniesnomme une commission qui partira immediatement pour l'Indonesie afin d'y surveiller l'execution de l'ordre de cessation des hostilites donnepar le Conseil le.. 1er ~ofj.t; Les troupes de If,l.Republique d'Indonesie ont cesse le feu sans .c?ndition, mais les troupes neerlandaises pourSUlventencore ce que le Gouvernement colonial neerlandais appelle des "operations de nettoyage". Enoutre, les rapports que les deux parties presentent
tF?'4
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makes it all the more desirable that there shouldbe present on the spot an authoritative commission appointed by the Security Council to supervise the cessation of hostilities and report its findings to the Security Council, so that the Councilwill have before it, at all times, impartial andauthoritative reports on the day-to-day situationin Indonesia.
Eventually, when the withdrawal of Netherlands troops to the positions assigned them by thetruce agreement has taken place, this same commission might report on law and order in thoseareas recently seized by Netherlands forces in theirpresent campaign. This commission could alsosuggest the measures to be taken in case of necessity to guarantee that law and order should prevail and ensure the absence of retaliations. Inview of this, the Republic of Indonesia asks theSecurity Council to conclude its valuable workon the Indonesian question by appointing acommission to arbitrate on all points of dispute between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Government of the Netherlands asthe one and only means of ensuring a peacefuland stable solution of the Indonesian question.
J
I wish it to be placed on record that my Government has gratefully accepted the offers of boththe United States' good offices and the AlfstralianGovernment's mediation or arbitration as a constructive step towards the setting-up of such acommission.
Once again I reiterate the pledge of the GOveminent of the Republic of Indonesia, as I publicly stated it in New Delhi. It reads: "I am authorized to declare that the Government of theRepublic of Indonesia will ,accept any impartialarbitration, and will abide by decisions of theSecurity Council with regard to obligations, dutiesand responsibilities imposed by the United Nations Charter."
On behalf of the Government of the Republicof Indonesia, I tender to the President and themembers of the Security Council my thanks forthe opportunity given me to speak at this Council.
The PRESIDENT :', There are still two representatives who wish to speak.
Mr. TSIANG (China): I wish to raise a pointof order. I wonder, in view of the lateness of thehour, if the Chair would not entertain a motionfor adjournment. I formally move the adjournment of this meeting of the Council.
The PRESIDENT: I think the representative ofthe Netherlands can speak at the next meeting ofthe Council.
Mr. VAN KLEFFENS (Netherlands): I am verysorry. I do not want to be difficult but I am veryanxious to speak tonight because at the end ofwhat, I have to say I have an announcement tomake of some importance. I am very anxious forthe meeting not to adjourn after only one of theparties has been able to state his case. I shall notbe any longer than can be helped.
The PRESIDENT: If we adjourn now, we co~IQhave another meeting on the same subject tomor-
~:jr:::~~::~postpone the meeting on con-
sur la situation sont contradictoires, ce qui rendd'autant plus souhaitable la presence sur placed'une commission nommee par le Conseil de securite et ayant autorite pour veiller a la cessationdes hostilites et communiquer ses constatations auConseil. Le Conseil de securite disposerait ainsi atout moment de rapports impartiaux et faisant foisur le deroulement jour par jour des evenementsd'Indonesie.
Cette commission pourrait meme eventuellementfaire un rapport sur la situation, au point de vuede l'ordre et de la legalite, dans les regions recemment envahies par les Hollandais au cours de leurpresente campagne, lorsque les troupes neerlandaises se replieront sur leE p::,o:~:0n~ C]ue leur assigne l'accord d'armistice. Cette commission pourrait egalement, en cas de necessite, prop9ser desmesures destinees a proteger l'ordre et la Iegaliteet a empecher les represailles. C'est pourquoi laRepublique d'Indonesie demande au Conseil desecurite d'achever l'reuvre remarquable que constitue son action a l'egard de la question in<:lonesienne en nommant une commission chargeed'arbitrer tous les points en litige entre le Gouvernement de la Republique d'Indonesie et leGouvernement des Pays-Bas, seul moyen d'arrivera une solution pacifique et durable de la questionindonesienne.
Je desire voir consigner au proces-verbal quemon Gouvernement a accepte avec reconnaissancel'offre de bons offices des Etats-Unis et la mediation ou l'arbitrage du Gouvernement de l'Australie, mesures qui constituent a nos yeux une etapeconstructive vers l'etablissement de la commissiondemandee.
Je rappelle a nouveau la promesse que j'ai faitepubliquement aNew-Delhi au nom du Gouvernement de la Republique d'Indohesie, et qui est lasuivante: "Je sills autorise a declarer que leGouvernement de la Republique d'Indonesie acceptel'a tout arbitrage impartial et respectera lesdecisions du Conseil de securite qu~nt aux obligations, devoirs et responsabilites qu'impose laCharte des Nations Unies."
Au nom du Gouvernement de la Republiqued'Indonesie, je remercie le President et les membres du Conseil de securite de m'avoir permis de _parler devant ce Conseil.
Le PRESIDENT (tradu1it de l'anglais): Deux representants desirent encore parler.
M. TSIANG (Chine) (traduit ae l'anglais) : -Jesouleve une question d'ordre. Je me demande si,en· raison de l'p-eure tardive, le President n'accepterait pas une motion d'ajournement. Je proposel'ajournement de la seance du Conseil.
Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Je croisque le representant des Pays-Bas pourra parler aucours de la prochaine seance.
M. VAN KLEFFENS (Pays-Bas) (traduit de l'anglais): Je suis desoIe. Je ne voudrais faire aucunedifficulte, mais je tiens beaucoup a pader ce soirparce r.;ue, a la suite des remarques que j'ai afaire, j'ai une nouvelle importante a annoncer. Jetiens a ce que la seance ne soit pas ajournee apresqu'une des parties' seulement ait expose son pointde vue. Je serai aussi bref que possible.
Le PRESIDENT (tmduit de l'anglais) :Si nousajournons la seance maintenant, nous pourronsconsacrer une autre seance a la meme question
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2004·
venuonal armaments which was set for tomorrow.Apart from tomorrow afternoon, we do not haveany space on our time-table for a discussion of theIndonesian question until Thursday afternoon ofnext week.
Mr. TSIANG (China): I can very well understand why the representative of the Netherlandswould wish to speak as soon as possible. However,I think the suggestion of the President is a verygood one. We can adjoorn now and discuss theIndonesian question tomorrow afternoon.
The PRESIDENT: The moqon that this meetingof the Council should be adjourned will be put toa vote without discussion. First, however, I shouldlike to fix thf; next meeting of the Council fortomorrow at 3 p.m. We shall now vote on themotion to adjourn. '
Colonel HODGSON (Australia): That is on theunderstanding that a meeting of the Council willbe held tomorrow afternoon?
The PRESIDENT: Yes.
A vote was taken by show of hands and themotion was adopted by 9 votes. to none, with 2abstentions.
Votes for: Australia, Brazil, China, Colombia,Poland, SyTia, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom, United States of America.
Abstentions: Belgium, France.
The PRESIDENT: The meeting is now adjourneduntil tomorrow at 3 p.m., when the Indonesianquestion will again be disc;ussed.
The meeting rose at 6.25 p.m.
demain apres-midi et remettre a plus tard laseance sur les armements de type classique quietait prevue pour demain. En dehors de l'apresmidi de demain, notre horaire ne nous permettraitpas de reprendre la question indonesienne avantl'apres-midi du jeudi de la semaine prochaine.
M. TSIANG (Chine) (traduit de l'anglais): Jecomprends fort bien pourquoi le representant desPays-Bas desire parler le plus tot possible, maisje pense pourtant que la proposition du Presidentest excellente. Nous pouvons ajourner la seancemaintenant afin de discuter la question indonesienne demain apres-midi.
Le PRESIDENT (traduit ,:e l'anglais): Je vaismettre aux voix sans discussion la motion d'ajournement de la seance. Mais, auparavant, je fixela prochaine seance du Conseil a demain, 15 heures. Nous allons maintenant voter sur la motiond'ajournement.
Le colonel HODGSON (Australie) (traduit del'anglais): Il est entendu que le Conseil se reunirademain apres-midi?
Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Oui.
11 est procede au vote cl main levee. Par 9 voixcontre zero, avec 2 abstentions, la motion d'ajournement est adoptee.
Votent pour: Australie, Bresil, Chine, Colombie,Pologne, Syrie, Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques, Royaume-Uni, Etats-Unis d'Ame-rique. '
8'ahstiennent: Belgique, France.
Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): La seancees't ajournee jusqu'a demain, 15 heures. Nous reprendrons alors la discussion de la question' indonesienne.
La seance est levee cl 18 h. 25.
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