SECUR-ED White Paper on CBRN(E) Response and Recovery

Document name: CBRN Response and Recovery: Decontamination and Restoration Strategies and Solutions of 33

Reference: SCR-CBRN-E-D-TNO-003 Dissemination: PU Version: 3.0 Status: Issued

SECUR-ED White Paper on

CBRN(E) Response and Recovery Decontamination and Restoration Strategies and

Solutions

Document identification

Related SP / WP SP3 / WG CBRN-E Reference SCR-CBRN-E-D-TNO-003

Related Deliverable

D37.1 Dissemination Level

PU

Lead Participant TNO Lead Author TNO

Contributors Stephanie Meulenbelt, Arjan van Wuijckhuijse

Reviewers THALES

This document and its contents are the property of SECUR-ED Partners. All rights relevant to this document are determined by the applicable laws. Access to this document does not grant any right or license on the document or its contents. This document or its contents are not to be used or treated in any manner inconsistent with the rights or interests of SECUR-ED Partners or to their detriment and are not to be disclosed externally without prior written consent from SECUR-ED Partners. Each SECUR-ED Partner may use this document in conformity with SECUR-ED Consortium Agreement provisions.

This document is issued in the frame and for the purpose of SECUR-ED project. This project has received funding from the European Union’s Seventh Framework

Programme (FP7/2007-2013) under grant agreement n° 261605.



History

Version Status Date Author Main Changes

0.1 Draft 21/07/2014 TNO First internal draft

1.0 Draft 25/09/2014 TNO First draft

2.0 Under

review 04/11/2014 TNO Reviewed version

3.0 Issued 21/11/2014 THA Final version



TABLE OF CONTENTS

History ................................................................................................................................. 2

1 Abstract & Purpose ..................................................................................................... 4

1.1 Summary ................................................................................................................ 4

1.2 Purpose of the document ....................................................................................... 5

2 References ................................................................................................................... 7

2.1 List of acronyms ..................................................................................................... 7

2.2 Referenced documents .......................................................................................... 7

3 CBRN(E) Response and recovery .............................................................................. 8

3.1 Background ............................................................................................................ 8

3.2 Response and recovery phases ............................................................................. 9

3.2.1 Short-Term Response and Recovery .............................................................10

3.2.2 Intermediate-Term Response and Recovery ..................................................11

3.2.3 Long-Term Response and Recovery ..............................................................11

3.3 C, B and R/N response and recovery compared ...................................................12

3.4 Summary ...............................................................................................................14

4 Pre-incident preparedness ........................................................................................15

4.1 Planning factors ....................................................................................................15

4.1.1 Planning factors applicable to CBRN response in general ..............................16

4.1.2 C, B, R/N specific planning factors .................................................................17

4.2 Summary ...............................................................................................................18

5 Decontamination and clearance ................................................................................19

5.1 Decision-making scheme ......................................................................................20

5.2 Decontamination of people ....................................................................................22

5.2.1 Immediate decontamination ...........................................................................23

5.3 Decontamination of infrastructure ..........................................................................24

5.3.1 Methods and equipment .................................................................................25

5.4 Clearance ..............................................................................................................31

5.5 Summary ...............................................................................................................32



1 Abstract & Purpose

1.1 Summary

Public transportation networks have been and will certainly remain the targets of terrorist

groups. Such groups may use CBRN(E) agents to achieve their goals by disrupting services

and by killing or injuring travellers. Response and recovery from CBRN(E) incidents is a

complicated endeavour and consists of three phases; short-term, intermediate term and

long-term. These phases do not define a discrete transition, rather they overlap, sometimes

considerably, thus certain activities in the intermediate or long-term response and recovery

can occur while short-term activities are also being performed and vice versa. Activities

include: notification and first response (short-term), characterisation, decontamination and

clearance (intermediate term) and restoration and re-occupancy (long-term).

Since CBRN(E) response and recovery is a very challenging endeavour, PTOs will benefit

from taking precautionary measures and prepare responsive actions in case such an incident

would occur. Integral resilient planning factors taken prior to the incident have the potential to

substantially decrease response timelines as well as increase the (success) rate of recovery,

reduce recovery costs, improve public health and safety and address in advance potential

resource limitations or critical decisions. Since response and recovery will require an inter-

agency response, collaboration between stakeholders is essential. In stakeholder working

groups, for example, preparedness issues may be adequately addressed. Since areas that

have been exposed to CBRN materials are likely contaminated, the tasks of decontamination

and clearance are of particular concern. This includes actions to reduce or avoid (additional)

exposure to CBRN materials for the public and (first) responders and avoid danger of

uncontrolled spread. Many different methods (techniques) and equipment are available. Two

main categories of decontamination technology profiles have been identified: chemical

decontamination technologies and physical (or mechanical) decontamination technologies.

Again, specific activities are incident dependent, but generally, CBR(N) contamination may

be removed or be neutralised from areas or surfaces of facilities and objects:

Chemical agents are removed or destructed by a chemical decontamination agent;

Biological materials decontamination aims at inactivating the pathogens;

Radiological (and nuclear) materials may be decontaminated by physical removal of

the radioactive particles.

The required levels of efficiency have been and are still under debate, as different

stakeholders may have different views, in particular with regard to the “how clean is clean

(enough)” issue. Clearance goals determine the levels by which decontamination efforts are

considered acceptable for the return to normal use of facilities and material by unprotected

people. They may be met after thorough decontamination, using different techniques and

equipment. Validation measures may include:

samples taken and analysed;

test strips could be placed in various locations before decontamination and analysed

afterwards;



if the decontamination protocol (plan of action) has been strictly followed, one could

argue that an acceptable level of cleanliness has been achieved.

As soon as clearance goals have been met and recovery is complete, facilities may be re-

opened for unrestricted use and transportation services can be resumed.

1.2 Purpose of the document

PTOs may be faced with CBRN incidents that can injure passengers and immensely frustrate the operation of public transportation networks. Areas that have been exposed to CBRN materials likely need to be decontaminated. Response and recovery, including decontamination and clearance, is challenging, in particular because each individual incident has its own features. As such, it is extremely difficult to be prepared for any possible (CBRN) event. Although particular response and recovery activities will depend on the nature of an individual incident, there are generic measures and activities that could be (under)taken to ensure a timely and effective reaction to CBRN incidents. This document aims to provide an overview of such generic measures. This overview provides insight into the entire response and restoration process. In this way PTOs are able to anticipate efficiently in restoring regular operation. As such, it does not elaborate many details. It is specifically written for PTOs rather than CBRN experts and therefore does not include many technicalities. Additionally, the purpose of this study is to provide insight into the importance of a risk based preparation towards increasing resilience and decreasing vulnerability of public transport towards CBRN threats.

The document presents a work flow that can be used in preparation of the response on CBRN events to provide shorter restoration periods. However, not all incident response and recovery actions will be taken by public transportation companies themselves. In short, it would enable PTO’s (and other stakeholders) to increase preparedness and a more effective response and recovery by undertaking several actions:

- Performing a risk assessment

o Including analysis of resilience and vulnerabilities of facilities and processes

- Providing plans and protocols, shared with relevant stakeholders

o Identify tasks, roles and responsibilities to avoid duplication of efforts and fill possible gaps

- Ensure that proper equipment is in place or available

o Either purchase equipment or ensure its availability from other stakeholders

- Exercise and practice

o Make sure employees are aware of the protocols and agreements in place and know how to work with them. This includes the use of equipment and collaboration with other stakeholders (e.g. by organising inter-agency training and exercises)

N.B. Explosives (E) incidents are not part of the document’s main focus as response in recovery of an E-incident as such will not likely include decontamination activities. Rather than the release of C, B or R/N agents, a “regular explosion” will likely only result in immediate damage. In case of a CBRN incident with an explosive load the decontamination effort has to be selected as is the case in a C, B or RN incident respectively. Therefore, in



the remainder of this document we will talk about CBRN-incidents instead of CBRN(E) incidents.

In paragraph 3.2, The Response and recovery phase is discussed. A comparison of the specific C, B and R/N response and recovery is presented in paragraph 3.3.In Chapter 4, the various aspects from pre-incident preparedness are presented. When an incident with C, B and R/N agents has occurred, areas that have been exposed to the CBRN materials are likely contaminated. The tasks of decontamination and clearance which are of particular concern, are described in Chapter 5, together with some decontamination principles and decontamination methods.



2 References

2.1 List of acronyms

SECUR-ED Secured Urban Transportation – European Demonstration

CBRN Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear

CBRN(E) Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear (and Explosive)

PTO Public Transport Organisation

2.2 Referenced documents

The following documents are referenced:

R[1] Opinion of the Committee of Foreign Affairs (29-10-2010) for the Committee on Civil

Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs on strengthening chemical, biological,

radiological and nuclear security in the European Union – an EU CBRN Action Plan

<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=REPORT&reference=A7-

2010-0349&language=EN>.

R[2] U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency,

National Disaster Recovery Framework; Strengthening Disaster Recovery for the

Nation (September 2011), on page 8.

R[3] http://www.rivm.nl/rvs/Normen/Rampen_en_incidenten/Interventiewaarden (last

visited on 17-9-2014).

R[4] http://www.opcw.org/about-chemical-weapons/what-is-a-chemical-weapon/, (last

visited on 17-9-2014).

R[5] Sinclair, R., Boone, S. A., Greenberg, D., Keim, P., & Gerba, C. P. (2008).

Persistence of category A select agents in the environment. Applied and

Environmental Microbiology, 74, 555-563.

R[6] EPA-CDC (2012). Interim Clearance Strategy for Environments Contaminated with

Bacillus anthraces. July 2012.

R[7] http://www.remm.nlm.gov/red_metro.htm, (last visited on 17-9-2014).

R[8] SCR-WP34-D-TNO-007, D34.1 Needs, Applicability, Availability and Selection;

Sensor selection.

R[9] EDA launched such a study in 2014, called Risk Assessment for CB Exposure after

Decontamination (RACED).

R[10]

Security Research, Preparatory Action on the enhancement of the European

industrial potential in the field of Security research PASR (2004-2006), Review of

decontamination requirements (IMPACT WP600, deliverable D600.1).

R[11]

Chilcott, R.P. (2014) Managing mass casualties and decontamination, Environment

International, 72, 37-45.

http://www.rivm.nl/rvs/Normen/Rampen_en_incidenten/Interventiewaarden

http://www.opcw.org/about-chemical-weapons/what-is-a-chemical-weapon/

http://www.remm.nlm.gov/red_metro.htm



3 CBRN(E) Response and recovery

3.1 Background

In 1995, the Aum Shinrikyo cult released nerve agent sarin on several lines of the Tokyo subway in five coordinated attacks. It killed a dozen people, severely injured about fifty and caused non-fatal injuries to thousands others. Fortunately, this is the only example of a “successful” CBRN attack on public transportation systems. Nevertheless, the European Union has pointed out that the possibility of CBRN incidents in the public transportation sector should not be neglected. For example, in 2010, the Committee of Foreign Affairs stated that it “[r]egrets the lack of focus in the Commission Communication and Council Conclusions on the CBRN Action Plan on adequately protecting public transport networks and the health of their users, given the many terrorist attacks on transport in recent years and the generally increased risk of CBRN incidents occurring during transport of CBRN materials” R[1].

Besides attacks, the Committee refers to problems associated with CBRN materials during transportation. For example, on 4 May 2013, a freight train carrying highly toxic, flammable chemicals got in trouble as it changed tracks near the Belgian city of Ghent. Six of the train’s thirteen cars derailed and two were thrown on to their side by the force of derailment. The blaze led to a series of explosions in the railway cars, causing a major fire. Among the injured were people living well away from the scene of the accident who were affected by the toxic fumes from the highly flammable liquid chemicals. Ultimately, one person died and fourteen were injured. Nearly 300 people had to be evacuated from their homes. Similar accidents with vehicles carrying dangerous materials are not uncommon. This aspect thus deserves attention. Additionally, one needs to take into account the fact that infrastructures used for transporting persons are often also used for transporting goods.

These examples show that public transportation facilities have been identified as targets by terrorists – several large-scale attacks took place – and that a risk of accidents with dangerous substances exists. A large-scale or wide-area disaster, such as a bombing or a CBRN incident, within an urban area, at a critical infrastructure facility for example, will likely have severe impact Heavily crowded transportation infrastructures are of major concern in the sense of large numbers of potential victims, in particular major European cities’ subway systems and train stations during rush hour. Furthermore, the loss of public transportation continuity, problematic in itself, can lead to other severe long-term consequences such as supply chain disruption or severe reputational (and thus economic) damage. People may become reluctant to making use of public transportation means if a threat of an attack exists or if an attack actually occurred. Above all, one must try to prevent incidents from happening, but it is impossible to exclude all risks and threats. Thus, the next best thing is to make sure that, should an incident occur, effective response and recovery plans are in place. Obviously, not all incident response and recovery actions will be taken by public transportation companies themselves. Medical response, for example, will likely be performed by a different stakeholder (e.g. paramedics). Nevertheless, it is essential that public transportation companies are aware of issues associated with incident response and recovery. In contrast to an incident involving “regular explosives”, a CBRN incident will likely lead to contamination of the area including the people and objects within. Decontamination is thus needed to avoid danger of uncontrolled spread, to clear people and facilities. PTOs should



understand the implications of a CBRN attack and the different response and recovery activities required to, ultimately, restore regular operation. In this way, they can facilitate operations and determine when their assistance and actions are required to restore regular operation as soon as possible.

3.2 Response and recovery phases

Proper response to CBRN incidents (be they accidental or intentional) is needed in order to minimise the consequences and resume normal operations as soon as possible. Unfortunately, public transport facilities are technically very complex, involve many citizens as potential targets and generate political impact on any decision concerning their business continuity. This makes the resilience and vulnerability of public transport towards CBRN threat an urgent challenge for risk analysis. Public transport managers or organisations are therefore usually not solely responsible for such assessments and decisions, nor let alone for all response and recovery actions following an incident. In fact due to the political and societal impact, governmental agencies will have the lead in the overall response to a CBRN incident.

This section addresses the tasks associated with CBRN consequence management (response and recovery). As a basis, three primary phases of action following a disaster incident (short-, intermediate-, and long-term) are briefly discussed and provide a simplified depiction of the tasks and actions required in each phase. These phases do not define a discrete transition, rather they overlap, sometimes considerably. Thus, certain activities in the intermediate or long-term recovery can occur while short-term activities are also being performed and vice versa (see Figure 1, R[2]). The relative time-frames of the more or less distinct phases are highly dependent on the severity and on the nature of the CBRN incidents. Roughly, a biological incident has a longer lasting onset than a chemical or radiological type of incident. Exposure to a bio agent may remain unnoticed until first symptoms of illness start appearing, which may be days after exposure. Exposure to many chemical agents will be rapidly noticed and health symptoms can appear in seconds. These aspects will be analysed in chapter 3.3.

The reported approach is based on the approach adopted in the United States, in its National Disaster Recovery Framework and related documents. It has been chosen because it is well documented and provides a clear and comprehensive picture of response and recovery after an (CBRN) incident. Information has been retrieved from both the general approach [R2] as well as specific C, B and R(/N) approaches. Approximately thirty relevant open source documents, including non-U.S. documents, have been reviewed and analysed to identify main and remarkable issues as well as differences and similarities in response and recovery after an incident, including specific tasks and activities. This is processed to present a general overview of generic measures and CBRN specific activities. These activities could be (under)taken to ensure a timely and effective response to CBRN incidents. Additionally, these will provide insight into the importance of a risk based preparation towards increasing resilience and decreasing vulnerability of public transport towards CBRN threats.



The preparedness phase takes place prior to an incident and planning factors will contribute to take faster (and more efficient) actions in response to an incident (see chapter four). The coloured arrows at the bottom of the figure represent post-incident actions, which are divided into six principal activity categories, beginning with identification of an incident (notification activities) and ending with restoration and re-occupancy (unrestricted re-entry of a site or facility following completion of final restoration activities). As for the duration in time of these recovery activities, this may differ between C, B and R/N incidents.

3.2.1 Short-Term Response and Recovery

The initial response and recovery phase of an incident is the period in the first few hours up to a few days after the incident when immediate actions may be required to save and sustain life, including actions to reduce or avoid (additional) exposure to CBRN materials by the public and responders. Actions in this time period are likely to be conducted with minimal or incomplete (premature, unconfirmed) information on the nature and extent of the incident. The short-term recovery phase involves assessment of the nature and the scope of the incident, concerning the potential number of people at risk, the affected area and other consequences. A first estimate will be made of required response resources. Restoration of basic infrastructure and the mobilisation of recovery organisations and resources may be necessary in order to provide emergency personnel access to the scene. Two primary activities can be identified in this phase:

Notification: Notification activities commence when information about an incident is received by, for example, emergency services (‘112’). Severity and information confirmation reach the level for which the response systems are activated. Information gathering, by local authorities, but also through social media, and

dissemination to all relevant agencies are main tasks. As soon as the news of an incident is received, the affected site(s) needs to be identified. In case a CBRN incident is suspected, hazardous material units may be deployed to the incident scene to conduct first tests to identify the agent and its hazards. Simultaneously, medical personnel need to be notified and reach the scene(s). In accordance with relevant national protocols, which widely differ, other appropriate agencies need to be alarmed. Such protocols should contain information on which stakeholder agency will have to take charge of emergency operations and direct response and recovery operations.

First Response: Local emergency services (e.g. paramedics, police, fire fighters) arrive on the scene. Operations to evacuate individuals from the affected zone begin as soon as possible to



reduce the possibility of additional contamination and the loss of forensic evidence. Personnel and victim decontamination capabilities are set-up and staged near the incident scene (outside the danger zone). Simultaneously, further actions should be taken to contain the area and determine the agent and the extent of the contamination. The first response activities intend to stabilise the emergency situation. The short-term phase continues for as long as emergency personnel are present at the affected sites.

3.2.2 Intermediate-Term Response and Recovery

As the incident is stabilised, it will enter the next phase, which typically occurs in the days-to-weeks range, but it can follow the early-phase response within as little as a few hours in case response and recovery are well prepared and in case of relatively non-complex incidents with a known threat agent. Although protective actions may still be required in this phase to reduce or avoid exposure, immediate threats to public safety have been controlled and the general extent and nature of the incident has been established. The intermediate-term phase engages stakeholders to perform on-going assessment and evaluation of risks and to prioritise and make decisions for the entire response, including site-specific remediation.

Characterisation: A detailed characterisation needs to be conducted for remediation purposes. Agent characteristics, site specific characterisations and contamination as a result of an incident need to be determined. The latter mainly relies on

sampling technologies with an appropriate level of sensitivity to support characterisation of agents (in an urban environment)(R[8]). Early decontamination actions as part of the characterisation activities may commence when such actions can reduce or eliminate contamination that could lead to secondary transfer or surface and material sorption.

Decontamination: Decontamination of victims and personnel takes place outside the immediate danger zone and has been mentioned as part of the first response activities. With regard to decontamination of infrastructure, however, one should decide whether decontamination can be done in situ or whether objects

can/need to be (re)moved and, in the latter case, whether or not such items will be disposed or recycled/re-used. Multiple decontamination technologies are required as decontamination techniques differ between C, B and R/N incidents, but also because different surfaces may require different contaminants. A decontamination strategy must be developed, in which appropriate treatment is described. Ideally, such strategy (outlines) has already been developed in the pre-planning or preparedness phase (prior to an incident).

Clearance: Appropriate and reasonable clearance goals that will balance political/social priorities and public health protection against time and cost constraints must be observed. The more stringent the clearance goals and, the more extensive the decontamination process and clearance sampling are, the higher

the cost and the longer the timeline will be. If clearance goals have not been met, additional decontamination may be necessary or clearance goals may be modified. Additionally, one could consider initiating long(er)-term environmental monitoring actions (to ensure a site remains clear of contamination).

3.2.3 Long-Term Response and Recovery

The objective of the long-term phase is to revitalise, rebuild and repopulate/re-use affected areas. Appropriate clean-up (or clearance) levels and priorities, that have been established



through a process that includes community stakeholder input and sound risk management principles, must be met as well as re-occupancy/re-use criteria. In extreme cases, the long-term phase of recovery may continue for months or years. For example, when complete redevelopment and revitalisation of the impacted area is needed, and/or when rebuilding or relocating damaged/destroyed social, economic, natural and built environments and a move to self-sufficiency, sustainability and resilience is required.

Restoration and re-occupancy: Site specific recovery plans may be implemented, including necessary renovations and enhancements. Risk communication needs to be continued. Early community engagement in a prioritisation process is vital to generate support, trust and increased capability to move

forward (they may be able to assist or at least not frustrate operations). As soon as re-occupancy/re-use criteria have been met, recovery is complete. The site can then again be opened for unrestricted use.

It is noted that actions associated with the six principal category of activities described do not necessarily occur in strictly sequential order and may be concurrent. Furthermore, different areas within an incident scene may be in different response and recovery phases at the same point in time (this has to do with prioritisation issues, see section 4.1.1).

3.3 C, B and R/N response and recovery compared Although the general structure of the response and recovery will be the same for all CBRN incidents, the implementation and execution may differ. For example, timelines may be different. Figure 2 attempts to depict the differences (in time) in response phases and activities between the agents.



Although it is difficult to generalise timeframes for response and recovery activities after a CBRN incident, due to the many facets that may influence or affect different processes, Figure 2 attempts to provide an overview of differences and similarities between different phases in terms of time. As such, it depicts an overview of the general information derived from analysis of the response and recovery documents. It shows that the short term phase of chemical incidents response and recovery is (generally) longer than the short-term phase after biological incidents. This is partly due to the fact that the onset of symptoms will be different. Where people exposed to chemical agents will likely immediately show symptoms (or after a few hours), people exposed to biological agents may fall ill days after being contaminated. After numerous people with similar symptoms have reported to hospitals or General Practitioners, one could make a connection and reconstruct victim’s whereabouts and travel behaviour for the preceding days or weeks to find common areas where they may have been infected. The notification activity of a biological incident will thus be much longer than that of a chemical incident. However, one must not rule out the possibility of a perpetrator claiming an attack. In that case, the timeframe of notification activities will be substantially decreased, but it is essential to determine as quickly as possible whether a release has indeed taken place. One should rule out the possibility of a hoax by using threat analysis and quick detection means to prevent unnecessary use of resources, personnel and time. The first response activities in response to chemical and biological incidents will also be different; where victims of a chemical incident may need treatment immediately following the incident, possibly even at the incident scene, those exposed to (covert) biological attacks will likely report to hospitals themselves as soon as symptoms materialise (which may differ between different people). Paramedics will thus not likely rush to the incident scene (that is, if the source or affected area is known). As for radiological incidents, the short-term response and recovery phase may be similar as for either chemical or biological. If radiological materials are combined with explosives, the short-term phase will be similar to that of a chemical attack. In both cases, it will be immediately clear that an attack has taken place and that people may be injured and/or contaminated. The difference between such chemical and radiological attacks is that, in case of the latter, the direct injuries or deaths are more likely a result from the blast rather than the radiological materials. In the long term however the radiological agents may cause casualties. On the other hand, should a radiological source be hidden and not combined with an explosive, it is more likely that an attack will resemble a biological attack as the symptoms may not be immediately apparent (it takes time, in particular if small quantities of radiological materials are used). In terms of timelines, this is dependent on the category of agent (C, B or R/N) and may also differ per agent within a category. Recovery from chemical incidents will likely be the shortest. For example, restoration and re-occupancy of all five affected Tokyo subway lines after the release of sarin was accomplished after only 21 hours, but one must remember that no physical damage was done during these attacks (e.g. no damage due to explosions, no derailed trains, etcetera). Overall durations for completion of each phase and activity may thus vary substantially in different incidents and could last for a few hours only up to months or years. Figure 2 shows that the focus of response and recovery in a chemical incident will likely be short-term (combination of notification and first response activities). Typical actions include quickly helping the injured and containing the source to prevent further spread. In a biological incident, the focus will likely be on the intermediate phase. Although notification may take a long time, doctors will likely identify the agent that sickened their patients, which would shorten the characterisation activities. Decontamination, on the other hand, may take



considerable time and resources. This is partly due to technical difficulties as equipment may not be sophisticated enough to detect certain spores. Therefore, it may be difficult to establish with reasonable certainty whether an area contaminated with biological materials is clean and safe after decontamination efforts. Finally, the focus of response and recovery from a radiological incident will likely mainly be on long-term response and recovery. This is a result of the fact that radiological materials cannot be eliminated or transformed into less harmful products (in contrast to chemical and biological agents). Rather, it must be removed or allowed to decay to safe levels as there is no practically applicable way to influence radioactive decay. Depending on the material, this process can take decades or even centuries. As such, it may be considered beneficial to rebuild an entire facility rather than trying to clean it, which would seriously increase restoration and re-occupancy timelines.

3.4 Summary Response and recovery from CBRN incidents consists of three phases; short-term, intermediate term and long-term. These phases do not define a discrete transition, rather they overlap, sometimes considerably, thus certain activities in the intermediate or long-term response and recovery can occur while short-term activities are also being performed and vice versa. Activities include: notification and first response (short-term), characterisation, decontamination and clearance (intermediate term) and restoration and re-occupancy (long-term). Depending on the materials released, the short-term phase is the period in the first few hours up to days of the incident when the appropriate agencies are notified and immediate actions are taken to save and sustain life and contain the site. As the incident is stabilised, it will enter the intermediate phase, which typically occurs in the days-to-weeks range, but it can follow the early-phase response within as little as a few hours. In the intermediate-term phase, site-specific remediation and restoration begins. Finally, the long-term phase of recovery could continue for months or years as complete redevelopment and revitalisation of the impacted area may be needed. However, restoration and re-occupancy may also occur after a few hours or days.

In general, response and recovery from CBRN incidents consists of three (non-discrete) phases, each with its own activity categories:

- Short-term

o Notification o First response

- Intermediate term o Characterisation o Decontamination o Clearance

- Long-term o Restoration and recovery

Focus of response and recovery in terms of timelines will likely be on:

- Short-term for chemical incidents (mainly first response); - Intermediate term for biological incidents (mainly decontamination and clearance); - Long-term for radiological incidents (restoration and re-occupancy or re-use).

The entire response and recovery timeline is incident dependent.



4 Pre-incident preparedness

Generally, violent attacks are different from incidents that public transport managers may normally encounter, e.g. mechanical failure of certain equipment. Within the spectrum of violent attacks, potentially causing many casualties, CBRN incidents are even of a different category than attacks with explosives. CBRN would cause a different type of damage, cause heightened public anxiety, and result in substantial disruption to citizens’ lives and the economy. Consequence management for such disasters can escalate quickly into a substantially unmanageable problem. Therefore, planning and preparing response on CBRN threat events is critical to responding quickly and appropriately to such incidents. Pre-planning will shorten the response time and enable populations, governments and businesses to return to a (near) normal state much more quickly. More specifically, planning factors have the potential to increase the rate of recovery, reduce recovery costs, improve public health and safety and address in advance potential resource limitations or critical decisions. It facilitates (almost) all activities that need to be performed in response to a CBRN incident.

4.1 Planning factors In Figure 3, planning factors, which are elements (e.g. decisions or actions) contributing to a particular result, have been depicted in the basic framework as described in section 3.2. This figure is an example only. Planning factors may positively influence effective short-term response and recovery after an incident have been depicted in the red arrows on the left. The planning factors that may positively influence effective intermediate term response and recovery after an incident have been depicted in the orange arrows in the middle and the factors that may positively influence effective long-term response and recovery have been depicted in the green arrow at the right of the figure.

Figure 3 Planning factors



4.1.1 Planning factors applicable to CBRN response in general

Some planning factors are to be considered for all types of the agents. For example, an action could be to identify (all) stakeholders of public transport facilities and establish a working group. These stakeholder working groups could examine priorities, actions, interconnections and roles in case of accidents. Dialogue between different stakeholders is important in order to gain a balanced view on various aspects of response and recovery topics at the national, regional or local level. The objective is that all those concerned with the situation should be involved and given the opportunity to participate in the decision-aiding process under non-crisis conditions. It contributes to a common language and a shared understanding of the challenges to be developed. Additionally, it provides a forum to discuss stakeholders’ contribution during an incident, both as regards employees and resources. For example, a public transportation company will not likely have the necessary detection and identification equipment to characterise whether C, B or R(/N) materials have been released, but fire fighters may have basic equipment to do so.

In regard to prioritisation, if one is able to travel while avoiding an affected station by, for example, using alternatives to get to their destinations, recovery priority would be less high than in the case of a station that connects numerous other stations and disrupts entire services. Additionally, some recovery actions may positively affect more than one objective. Transportation of goods and people into and (through) out the recovery area is nearly always a top priority because it contributes to multiple objectives, including public health, public safety, economic and security objectives. Prioritisation should take place before, during and after an incident. Figure 4 shows several considerations in the prioritisation process.

Figure 4 Prioritisation considerations



Communication with the public is also an issue that should be considered prior to incidents. It is essential to mitigate the consequences of an incident, such as limit further spread of an agent by ensuring that people do not enter (potentially) contaminated zones, and to provide consistent guidance to the public on what immediate actions they should take to protect themselves. The establishment of a decontamination strategy and clearance strategy would also benefit from careful consideration prior to incidents. At the very least an outline of such strategies should be developed. An example of a decontamination strategy is depicted in figure 5. Essential for developing such strategies is knowledge on the background levels prior to an incident. Chemical, biological and radiological agents, which may interfere with the determination of the threat agent, are often already present in the environment. Similarly, a characterisation strategy may be developed. This may provide a helpful tool for pre-determining appropriate sampling methods, numbers and locations, decision support and modelling tools, analytical methods and laboratories and data quality objectives.

4.1.2 C, B, R/N specific planning factors

Many required activities are dependent on the characteristics of each individual incident. As such, planning factors will also differ between the CBRN categories of agents and even between different agents within the same category. Other highly determining factors are the scale of incident, the cause (deliberate violence of accident) and the target. Decontamination of an agent, for example, will depend on the method of agent distribution and its persistence (the length of time it remains a concern for health or environment). Chemical materials that are volatile and non-persistent will leave less contamination as would radiological agents that do not generally degrade rapidly in the environment. Radioactive materials decay with time, but this process can take decades or even centuries for certain radionuclides. Radioactive material cannot be neutralised or made non-radioactive, rather it must be removed or allowed to decay to safe levels, providing different decontamination challenges. On the other hand, persistent chemical agents and spore-forming biological agents (such as Bacillus anthracis) require more active decontamination methods. The overall decontamination timeline can be greatly reduced if the agencies involved can agree in advance that certain requirements may be expedited, exempted or waived throughout recovery. Although decontamination is not necessarily a task that public transportation companies will perform themselves, they should contribute to the pre-planning phase of this process by, for example, supplying information on building structures. Certain cleaning devices may not be suitable if the building consists of numerous small corners that such devices cannot reach. Similarly, if the materials used for building the walls are porous, certain other decontamination techniques may not be suitable. A stakeholder working group may be an excellent podium to discuss such issues. Additionally, it is recommendable to organise C,B or R/N specific inter-agency exercises, like e.g. the SECUR-ED demonstrations. Exercising will not only ensure that all stakeholders will be identified and get familiar with the plans, protocols and agreements as discussed, it will provide them the opportunity to put them in practice as well. In case of an actual incident, one will know how to work with them, but even more important to rely on the contributions of other agencies. The inter-agency aspect facilitates collaboration as it will be helpful to have an idea of how your fellow stakeholders operate and how they handle communications. This knowledge contributes to better understanding so that any delays or misunderstanding can be avoided in case response and recovery efforts need to be made after an actual incident.



4.2 Summary

Integral planning factors taken prior to the incident have the potential to substantially decrease response timelines as well as increase the rate of recovery, reduce recovery costs, improve public health and safety and address in advance potential resource limitations or critical decisions. In stakeholder working groups, for example, preparedness issues may be adequately addressed. In particular for public transportation companies, it may be crucial to be part of such working groups, as they are not likely to be involved in the entire process following an attack or incident. By participating in working groups, public transport organisations will gain insight into the response and recovery process and the required actions. Their operational knowledge in combination with good insight in this process will result in increased recovery rate and reduced recovery costs. For example, public transport managers may provide other stakeholders information on interconnectedness of different transport hubs, building plans and structures and as such make valuable contribution to the pre-planning decisions to be made on, for example, decontamination and clearance strategies.

Pre-incident preparedness contributes to a more effective response and recovery. By developing and implementing planning factors one can:

- substantially decrease response and recovery timelines; - reduce costs; - improve public health and safety; - address in advance potential resource limitations or critical decisions; - etc.



5 Decontamination and clearance

In case of a CBRN incident in a public transport context, people, infrastructure and vehicles within the affected area may have become contaminated and need to be cleaned. As follows from the previous chapters, decontamination and clearance are predominantly intermediate phase actions as the bulk of the work will take place after the incident has been stabilised. However, in the short-term response and recovery phase, some decontamination efforts may already be undertaken to ensure that access and exit routes, junctions and areas in use of emergency teams are safe and clean.

In general terms, main challenges of chemical, biological and radiological/nuclear

decontamination include R[10]:

- Chemicals are (relatively) easy to detect and isolate, but difficult to destroy and they

can generate toxic waste by-products;

- Biological substances are (relatively) moderately easy to destroy, but difficult to detect

and isolate and it is hard to confirm with certainty whether or not they have been fully

removed;

- Radiation is (relatively) easy to detect but impossible to destroy; radioactive materials

can only be removed and containerised.

In any case, mass decontamination is an extensive undertaking, not only regarding the actual clean-up efforts, but also in regard to decision-making, involving all stakeholders, e.g. first responders, medics, infrastructure managers, government agencies, a host of private- and public-sector experts as well as the general public. Discussion may not only rise on which procedure, equipment and decontaminant(s) to use, but in particular on the question when a person or site is no longer contaminated and thus clean again. For example, hospital staff may be reluctant to treat patients if there is a change that they may be contaminated. Or, an official declaration that a building is clean and safe for reoccupation is meaningless if the occupants and other stakeholders do not perceive it as safe. Section 5.4 elaborates on this issue. In addition psychological issues, social issues also need to be taken into account. Thorough decontamination of people (see section 5.2.1), for example, requires undressing, which is not acceptable for all people due to privacy reasons. In contrast, decontamination of worried-well, i.e. people who desire decontamination without objective need for it, must also be considered. The decontamination and clearance of people differs from that of infrastructure: 1. The decontamination of people: primary goal is to clean people to such extent that they

can be adopted into the regular health care and be treated in uncontaminated areas (e.g. hospitals) without forming a threat of spreading the contamination.

2. The decontamination of infrastructure: being able to release an affected area for (unrestricted) use.

This chapter describes both decontamination of people and infrastructure. First, the next section describes a decision-making scheme that could be adopted to ensure an efficient cleaning process, regardless whether it concerns people or material or objects. Ultimately, the execution will be performed separately, but the decision framework is likely similar.



5.1 Decision-making scheme

Decontamination can be defined as the removal and/or neutralisation of chemical, biological or radiological contamination from people, areas or surfaces of facilities or objects such as vehicles using cleaning techniques. In some cases of surface contamination one chooses not to actively decontaminate because natural attenuation may solve the problem (e.g. certain agents quickly evaporate or degrade in the environment), decontamination costs could exceed the price of a new building or object, or because dismantling or disposal of buildings or objects is the best available option. In particular after a radiological incident, decontamination may sometimes only be obtained through dismantlement and containment. In most CBRN incidents, however, decontamination efforts will have to be made. Proper decontamination includes the following core tasks:

- Analysis of the situation;

The nature, scope and (expected) development of the contamination must be determined. Information gathering is part of notification and first response actions, when first responders and hazardous material units have been deployed at the incident scene to rescue and treat the injured, determine the contaminated area and conduct tests to identify the agent. Additionally, they have collected information on the extent to which contamination has taken place. As part of characterisation activities, the information will have been put together and analysed and supplemented with information to provide a complete picture of the incident. For example, in regard to transportation systems, it is essential to take into account the possibility of vehicles running through the affected area and in doing so potentially further spread contamination.

- Drafting plan of action; As soon as the incident scene has been mapped, including an estimation of the number of victims, the affected infrastructure and vehicles, a plan of action for decontamination needs to be drafted. The plan of action details the tasks to be completed by the decontamination units. Often basic emergency or disaster plans already exist. The outlines will likely be rather rough, because it is impossible to prepare detailed plans for all possible contaminations. Their framework, however, will have to be used to fine-tune to the incident at hand. Collaboration between all stakeholders is essential as decisions regarding the required actions need to be made. Multiple decontamination technologies may be considered or required. For example, Agent X may be easily removed from substrate A but not from substrate B; sometimes decontamination of people or surfaces can take place in situ, but more likely they need to be removed to a place outside the immediate danger (hot) zone. In the case of objects, one must decide on whether or not such items will be disposed or recycled/re-used.

- Make available personnel and means; In case of a CBRN incident, additional (expert) assistance is needed as public transportation companies will not have the capacity and responsibility to respond and recover from CBRN incidents on their own. A massive event may even require assistance or professional equipment from neighbouring communities or countries. Therefore, it is extremely important to make arrangements to establish which institute will make available which personnel and/or equipment. Stakeholder working group meetings provide an opportunity to discuss collaboration (e.g. identify roles and responsibilities) as well as who can make available what types of equipment and how soon after it has become known that a CBRN incident is taking/took place. Such arrangements contribute to coordinate efforts more efficiently and reduce response and recovery timelines.



- Execution of the decontamination plan; As soon as the units have been informed and instructed on the situation, the execution of the decontamination plan may commence. An overall coordinator needs to supervise that the plan, as well as proper communication and collaboration, is upheld during the decontamination efforts.

- Informing the population and stakeholders;

Although not directly related to decontamination efforts, effective communication with the public can dramatically reduce the panic as a result of a CBRN incident. As such, it can facilitate recovery efforts, including decontamination. It will also help to enable resumption of public transportation services. Communication to the public is often a task of governmental authorities. For example, people should be stopped from trying to find family and friends in the danger zone and risk being contaminated themselves. Stakeholders also need to be considered in the overall remediation and communication efforts as they may be able to facilitate (or complicate) matters. For example, infrastructure owners need to open their facilities to emergency responders and make sure that operators necessary to run certain systems are at the emergency teams’ disposal. The decontamination core tasks as described in this section have been depicted in figure 5. Note that informing the public is not incorporated in the picture. Rather than a separate step in the scheme, this is a continuing activity.



Figure 5 Decontamination decision-making scheme

5.2 Decontamination of people

As soon as it has been determined that victims have been contaminated, immediate decontamination is required. In this report we limit ourselves to external body decontamination. Several relevant articles have been reviewed and a summary is provided below. A rather extensive picture of issues related to the decontamination of people and how several of these decontamination methods work in practice are described in more detail elsewhere R[11].



5.2.1 Immediate decontamination

Currently, three different immediate decontamination techniques are used:

- Disrobing (head to toe) The first function of decontamination is removal of the agent from the victim’s skin and clothing to reduce further exposure and effects among victims. A very effective way to reach this is to disrobe people as much as possible, preferably from head to toe, since people are most vulnerable to exposure by respiration. As mentioned earlier, disrobing could be challenging considering that (certain) victims may have privacy objections.

- Skin decontamination Several suppliers provide decontaminants for the skin. An example for decontamination of chemical warfare agents is RSDL®, a liquid decontamination agent that, to some extent, removes or neutralises all known chemical warfare agents within a few minutes. Research is ongoing to optimise decontamination protocols, e.g. attempting to find out the added value of repeated application. Such a material can be applied relatively easy;

o Identify contamination; o Open decontamination packet and remove applicator pad; o Wipe exposed skin with applicator pad; o Rinse treated skin with water when conditions permit.

In case of contamination with persisting liquid agents on the skin, but also in case of contaminated equipment, a treatment with an absorbing powder, e.g. “Fuller’s earth”, is applied. Fuller’s earth can be applied with a glove. The user’s hand is placed into a glove between the side containing the reservoir and the wiping site. The glove is secured to the user’s wrist. The powder is spread and tapped on the contaminated area to absorb the liquid. The absorbed toxic liquid is wiped up using the sponged side.

- Operator’s spray down In case of an incident during operational hours (e.g. rush hour), potentially large groups of people need to be decontaminated. Several suppliers offer personal decontamination units. These units are transportable by vehicle and contain supplies for showering contaminated people. Dependent upon the status of the people they can walk through the decontamination zones and/or be transported through the decontamination-zone on a stretcher. In general, these areas are built outside the contaminated area. People are brought to these areas as soon as possible to prevent further contamination and to leave the incident scene for forensic analysis. Examples of these “decontamination streets” for people are given in Table 1.



Table 1: Decontamination streets for people

Supplier Type/brand Description

OWR PDU120/15 Decontamination street capacity 120

walking persons/15 on stretcher/hour

Hispano Vema NBC Personnel

Decontamination

NBC-Sys CERPE

Kaercher Futuretech Decontamination Tent

Cristanini

TSDM, Shower tunnel,

portable shower system

Mavatech Mava300, Mava350 Safety shower to be used in

combination with a shower tent

5.3 Decontamination of infrastructure

After the victims have been removed from the immediate danger zone and forensic samples have been taken, decontamination of the affected area may properly commence. Similar to decontamination of humans, there is no single decontamination technology that would fulfil all requirements and is applicable to all CBRN incidents clean-up activities. In fact, no single decontamination means is effective against all CBRN agents. Two main categories of decontamination technology profiles have been identified: chemical decontamination technologies and physical (or mechanical) decontamination technologies. Chemical decontamination technologies aim to modify the structure of contaminants in order to reduce or eliminate their toxicity. For example, it includes those technologies that involve placing a liquid chemical or chemical solution in contact with a contaminated surface for a predetermined time. Physical methods aim at removing the contaminants from surfaces and include rinsing with water and solvents, accelerated evaporation by heating and the use of solid adsorbents and strippable coatings. Other categories also exist, e.g. enzymatic and energetic decontamination, but they are not generally applicable. They work similar to chemical decontamination methods and may be particularly valuable as an environmental friendly alternative of some of those that, although perhaps effective, are highly toxic and environmentally unsafe. Thus, if public transport systems have been exposed to CBRN materials, the proper decontamination technique needs to be identified and applied to abate the risk associated with CBRN contaminations. Which cleaning method will be most effective is dependent on many factors. For example, depending on the agent and its origin, a contamination can be present as a gas (which often disperses and evaporates almost immediately), a liquid or a solid (e.g. fine dust). If CBRN contamination occurs as a liquid, there is a risk of it sticking to whatever it touches while evaporating slowly. Low vapour pressure and high viscosity make it difficult to decontaminate. Furthermore, evaporation of liquid chemicals may take days and released vapour can spread over large areas. For decontamination purposes, radiological compounds, except for Radon, should be approached as a solid. The contamination can be removed by brushing or wiping, although one needs to take into account that brushing also might cause re-aerosolisation.



Apart from the characteristics of the agent, other examples of influence factors include the weather conditions (mainly if outdoor) and the type of material that is contaminated. Smooth and hard materials (e.g. glass, tiles) or peelable coated surfaces are easier to clean than soft, porous materials (e.g. brick, sand stone). As a precautionary measure to enhance the recovery speed, PTOs could treat all internal surfaces that are easily accessible with a non-porous coating. This can be a low porosity paint film but an ‘anti-graffiti’ type of paint system has the additional merit of providing an impermeable surface that is easy to clean. Restoration and re-occupancy activities include opportunities to decrease the vulnerability of facilities. In particular when certain parts have to be rebuild. Also, the design of a building (many “dead spaces” where material may accumulate) has influence on how easy a building can be decontaminated. When developing a train station, for example, it may thus be beneficial to take into account the possibility of CBRN accidents or attacks when making choices on design, surface materials and structure (the ‘security by design’ principle).

5.3.1 Methods and equipment

To be able to restore the public transport function, thorough decontamination is required. For thorough decontamination, a number of techniques as described in the previous section are offered by several suppliers. An overview of applied decontamination agents is presented in Table 2. A non-extensive overview of the techniques offered by the suppliers is given in Table 3. These overviews are inspired by the overview published in CBRNE-world supplement to the 2010 winter edition. Several decontamination agents are currently on the market. The decontamination principle varies for the different types of agents. Chemical agents are usually removed or destructed by formulations containing reactive chemical decontamination agents. The effectiveness of the decontaminant can vary in destruction efficiency for several toxic industrial compounds. In case of biological contamination, the decontaminant generally aims at inactivating the pathogens. In case of radiological decontamination, the decontamination procedure is aimed at removal of the radioactive particles, avoiding re-aerosolisation. Dependent on the philosophy of the different manufacturers, the agents can be used for a limited group of materials or for the entire CBRN spectrum.



Table 2: Overview decontamination agents and their decontamination principle

Supplier Type/brand Chemical Biological Radiological

Kaercher GDS2000 Detoxification

BDS2000 Disinfectant

RDS2000 Hot foam decontamination

Cristanini BX24(powder) Detoxification Detoxification Removal

BX29(liquid) Detoxification Detoxification Removal

BX40(liquid) Detoxification Detoxification Removal

Interlagard DF-200 Decontamination Decontamination

Mavatech E96

OWR GD-6



Table 3: Overview decontamination methods

Supplier Name Concept of

product

Pres-

sure

No stages

process

Agent

s

Dimen-

sions

(cm x cm

x cm)

Weight

(kg)

Volume

carried

(l)

Setup

time

Power

require-

ments

Water

requirements

Training

requirem

ents

Deploy

able

Intelagard Macaw Multi-

application

6.9

bar

1, 2 wash-

off

CBR 63.5*43.2

*35.6

29.2 18.9 2 mins On board Integral 1 h Man

Intelagard Merlin Multi-

application

6.9

bar

1, 2 wash-

off

CBR 127*41.4

*57.2

95.6 26.5 2 mins On board Integral/

external

1 h Man/

Vehicle

Intelagard Swift

Runner

Multi-

application

6.9

bar

1, 2 wash-

off

CBR Modular <568 3 mins Internal Integral/

external

<3 h Vehicle

Intelagard H1

Intercept

Multi-

application

6.9

bar

1, 2 wash-

off

CBR Modular < 756 l 3 mins Internal Integral/

external

<3 h Vehicle

Cristanini Portable

Thermal

Fogger

Interior,

Infrastructure

Low 1 CB 139.7*27.

9*39.3

12.2 3.8 < 1 min External N/A < 1 hour Man

Cristanini PSDS/10 90-120 m2 Low ? CBR 31*12 2.75 1.5 l <1 min N/A Not supplied <1 hour Man

Cristanini PRNDS 400 m2 Low ? CBR ? ? 12 l <1 min N/A - <1 hour Man

Cristanini Sanijet People,

Vehicle,

Infrastructure

High 3 CBR 85*85*80 220 Not

supplied

<1 min Internal External Light Vehicle

Kaercher AMGDS

1000

Infrastructure 150

bar

1 C 76*66*88 60 20 l 5 mins External N/A Light Man

Kaercher AMGDS

mini

Vehicle,

Infrastructure

Low 1 C 32*12*32 1.5 1 l 5 mins Internal N/A 1hour Vehicle/

Man




product

Pres-

sure

No stages

process

Agent

s

Dimen-

sions

(cm x cm

x cm)

Weight

(kg)

Volume

carried

(l)

Setup

time

Power

require-

ments

Water

requirements

Training

requirem

ents

Deploy

able

Kaercher DS 5 Vehicle,

Interior

Surface

3 bar 1 CBR 48*19 2.3 5 l <2 mins None Integral None Man

Kaercher DS 10 Vehicle,

Interior

Surface 50

m2

6 bar 1 CBR 21*73 cm 9.5 10 l <2 mins None Integral 1 hour Man

Kaercher SN 50

Decon

Interior of

vehicles/coac

hes

Mist

<0.4

bar

1 B 33*29*13

3

8.8 6.5 l 5 mins Petrol External Light Man

Kaercher SCS

1801 De

Vehicle, Non-

sensitive

item, Interior

Multi-

role

3 CBR 103*85*1

28

410 External 5 mins Internal External Light-

refreshed

Vehicle

Kaercher Decocont

ain 3000

Persons,

Vehicle,

Infrastructure

Multi-

role

3 CBR 243*243*

605 cm

12000 3000 l 30 mins Internal Integral/

External

moderate Vehicle

Kaercher TEP 90 Persons,

Vehicle,

Infrastructure

Multi-

role

3 CBR 372*255*

1031

32000 2760 l <30

mins

Internal Integral/

External

Extensive Vehicle

Kaercher AMGDS2

000

Infrastructure 10-

150

bar

1 C 78*60*70 130 60 l 5 mins Internal N/A Light Vehicle

Kaercher MPDS Vehicle, Non

sensitive

item, Interior

Low-

High,

mist

3 CBR 85*57.5*

125

220 External 5 mins Internal External Light-

refreshed

Vehicle




product

Pres-

sure

No stages

process

Agent

s

Dimen-

sions

(cm x cm

x cm)

Weight

(kg)

Volume

carried

(l)

Setup

time

Power

require-

ments

Water

requirements

Training

requirem

ents

Deploy

able

Kaercher SN-50

Decon

Vehicle

interior

Mist

<0.4

bar

1 B 33*29*13

3

17 6.5 5 mins Petrol External Light Man

Mavatech MAVA10 Vehicle, 2m2 7 bar 1 CB 365*89 3.6(Full) 1.1 - N/A Integral Light Man

Mavatech MAVA20

0

Multi-

application

5 bar 1 CBR 67*20.4 9.8 7 l 3 mins N/A Integral 1 hour Man

OWR DEDAS Vehicles,

Infrastructure,

Equipment

3 bar 3 CBR 140*71*1

10

340 N/A 10 mins Internal External 10 mins Vehicle

OWR SMGD

Raccoon

Vehicle,

Non-sensitive

item, Interior

Low 3 CB 110*75*1

20

260 60 l <5 mins Internal N/A <5 mins Vehicle

OWR Surf-Ex Vehicles,

Infrastructure,

Sensitive

equipment

Vacuu

m

extrac

tion

2 CBR 160*65*1

75

250 30 l < 10

mins

Internal N/A < 10 mins Vehicle

OWR Fogboost

er

Interior,

Sensitive item

0.5-3

bar

1 CB 20*13*57 6 1 l <5 min External N/A <5 mins Man

OWR COBRA Personal kit,

vehicles

Low 1 CBR 22*7 1.7 0.5 l <1 min N/A Integral <1 mins Man




product

Pres-

sure

No stages

process

Agent

s

Dimen-

sions

(cm x cm

x cm)

Weight

(kg)

Volume

carried

(l)

Setup

time

Power

require-

ments

Water

requirements

Training

requirem

ents

Deploy

able

OWR MPD100i Multi-

application

Low,

high,

fog,

dry,

extrac

tion

Modular CBR 600*244*

244

12000 3000 l < 30

mins

Internal Integral moderate Vehicle

Hispano

Vema

Aquiles

S21

Personnel,

Item, Vehicle

Varied 3 CBR 60*60*10

0

250 20 l < 1 min Internal External Light Vehicle

Hispano

Vema

Atila S21 Vehicle, Non-

sensitive

item,

Personnel

High-

Low

3 CBR 100*100*

100

350 External 2 mins Internal External Light Vehicle

Hispano

Vema

Sismode Interior

sensitive

items

Mist 1 CB 210*78*1

20

450 0.95 15 mins Internal N/A Moderate Vehicle

NBC Sys Meerkat Infrastructure,

Vehicles, Non

sensitive

items

High-

Low

3 CBR 1650*122

0*3030

700 20 l 5 mins Internal Integral Light Vehicle

NBC Sys Symoda Aircraft Low 3 CBR 233*205*

536

3500 120 l 15 mins Internal Integral Moderate Vehicle



The decontamination efficiency of techniques is usually determined by measurement of contaminating agent before and after decontamination (called the decontamination factor or DF). For this reason, it is essential to have information on background values of chemicals, biological agents and radiation in the environment prior to an incident as they cannot be measured after an incident. For example, a train station next to a large chemical industry may have a higher background level of certain chemicals, which could provide a distorted image of contamination levels in case of an incident involving chemical materials. It should be noted that the DF is only a measure of the efficiency of a technique in removing activity from a specific surface; it is not a measure of the reduction in the overall exposure from deposited material on all surfaces in the environment. Thus, it does not necessarily indicate whether it is safe or not to resume normal activities in the affected site (if a facility has been severely contaminated, a substantial decrease of contamination may still present a danger to the public).

5.4 Clearance

Clearance criteria determine the levels by which decontamination efforts are considered acceptable for the return to normal use of, in this case, a public transportation facility and vehicles by unprotected people. They thus determine whether or not a facility is clean and safe to enter, re-use or re-occupy. Over the past decades, much research efforts have addressed the questions of ultimate requirements on completeness of decontamination. Those studies that took an integral approach attempting to cover state-of-the-art analytical (bio) chemistry and understanding of residual hazards contribute to improved understanding R[9]. Appropriate and reasonable clearance goals should balance political/social priorities and public health protection against time and cost constraints. The more stringent the clearance goals are,, the more extensive the decontamination process and clearance sampling will be, the higher the cost and the longer the timeline. Complete elimination of CBRN contaminants from surfaces and materiel may not be possible due to limitations in current technologies. Clearance goals are thus needed to determine when clean is clean enough. Setting clearance goals is rather challenging as each release event will involve site- and incident-specific parameters requiring in-context evaluation regarding clearance goals and guideline applicability. Such parameters include: where, when, how much, by which means and under which circumstances the agent was released, its physical properties like persistency and the materials that are used in the infrastructure. The uncertainties of these parameters make it impossible to adopt standard contamination levels that could apply to, for example, all chemical incidents. Therefore, accurate clearance goals that determine when a site is sufficiently safe for the public tend to be generated on an incident-specific basis.

Despite there is no simple formula for setting clearance goals, collective, professional judgement of technical experts, applied within the context of the concerns of stakeholders could be used to set clearance goals appropriate to the site-specific circumstances. One may even decide to set separate clearance goals within a single site if this site is extremely complex or very large. A practical clearance goal is to reduce residual risk to levels that the appropriate authorities (and other stakeholders) deem reasonable when considering potential future use, technical feasibility, estimated costs and cost effectives as well as public acceptability. Since the many factors to take into account will often mean that many stakeholders are involved, each with its own (sometimes conflicting) opinions, the question of how clean is clean could also be considered a social question rather than a scientific one. In particular because experts opinions on the safety of re-using of infrastructure or buildings may be out of step with the ideas of building owners and users who are eager to reoccupy a structure. Therefore, discussing possible clearance levels prior to undertaking recovery



activities will reduce the overall recovery timeline. Stakeholder working groups would be a very suitable forum.

Additionally, it is important to use good, solid methods for validation of clearance goals being met. Equipment must be sophisticated enough to avoid a positive outcome when in fact decontamination has been inadequate. For example, detectors may be used to detect any contamination remains, or samples may be taken and analysed. Test strips that may have been placed in various locations before decontamination efforts commenced could also be analysed to check whether or not decontamination efforts had any effect. In particular, did decontamination lead to an anticipated decrease in the contamination. However, not in all cases sufficient test methods exist. In particular in the B-area, (detector) technology faces several operational challenges and there may be some gaps. Therefore, other methods of justifying re-use of facilities must also be explored. For example, one could argue that if the decontamination protocol (plan of action) has been strictly followed, one may assume that an acceptable level of cleanliness has been achieved. Indeed, as one may also assume that those experts and stakeholders that have established the plan of action have considered different options and made a well-informed decision on the one with which to proceed. Finally, public health officials will be able to provide information on the contamination levels that may be harmful for people or the environment. If detectors or samples suggest that the contamination is below this threshold, arguably, the site could be considered clean and PTOs may re-open their facilities for unrestricted use.

5.5 Summary

Areas that have been exposed to CBRN materials likely need to be decontaminated. An analysis of the situation should reveal the type of agent that has been released, its characteristics, the type of infrastructure, building or object that has been contaminated and any other circumstances to take into account. Based on this information, a plan of action should be drafted and personnel and means will have to be made available. By using suitable cleaning techniques and means, CBRN contamination may be removed or be neutralised from areas or surfaces of facilities and objects. Many decontamination techniques are available that can be divided into several categories. The major two categories are chemical decontamination and physical contamination. Before the facilities may be re-used or re-occupied, the question whether the site is clean (and safe) must be answered. Clearance goals will have to be observed. The more stringent the goals for the clearance and the more extensive the decontamination process and clearance sampling are, the higher the costs and the longer the timeline will be. Complete elimination of CBRN contaminants from surfaces and material may not be possible due to limitations in currently fielded technologies, procedures and existing background levels in the environment. Appropriate and reasonable clearance goals should balance political/social priorities and public health protection against time and cost constraints. Since different stakeholders may have different priorities, it would be best if stakeholders have discussed such goals prior to an incident.



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Decontamination: CBR(N) contamination may be removed or be neutralised from areas or surfaces of facilities and objects. In general:

- Chemical agents are removed or destructed by a chemical decontamination agent;

- Biological materials decontamination aims at inactivating the pathogens; - Radiological (and nuclear) materials may be decontaminated by physical removal

of the radioactive particles. Many different methods (techniques) and equipment are available. Two main categories of decontamination technology profiles have been identified: chemical decontamination technologies and physical (or mechanical) decontamination technologies. Clearance: clearance criteria determine the levels by which decontamination efforts are considered acceptable for the return to normal use of a facility and materiel by unprotected people. Validation measures include:

- detectors may be used to detect any contamination remains; - samples may be taken and analysed; - test strips could be placed in various locations before decontamination and

analysed afterwards; - if the decontamination protocol (plan of action) has been strictly followed, one

could argue that an acceptable level of cleanliness has been achieved.

SECUR-ED White Paper on CBRN(E) Response and Recovery

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Transcript of SECUR-ED White Paper on CBRN(E) Response and Recovery