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Islam and Democracy: The Evolution of Secularism in Egypt and Turkey

Amanda Schmitt

September 20, 2013

“If you don’t have a vision, you’re going to get lost.” Marwan Ezz Al Arab of the World

Bank Cairo explained the perils and promise of Egyptian and Turkish politics: vision.1 Egyptian

citizens have grown increasingly adamant and active about their quest for democracy, but

without a cohesive vision for the details of that democracy, they will struggle to reach their goal.

Likewise, Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan’s visionary reforms over the past decade have

propelled the progress of Turkish democracy, but at what point can vision be abused for the sake

of power? Both nations are in need of a balanced, lasting vision of democracy that can only be

achieved through collaboration and dialogue.2 With numerous ethnic, religious, and

socioeconomic factions of society fighting for their voices to be heard, pluralism may be the next

critical factor in a successful vision for Egypt and Turkey.

Of course, the role of religion remains a fundamental, yet highly disputed affair for both

states as they push towards their democratic ideal. While Turkey has historically followed a

French laïcité model of secularism separating religious practice from the public sphere, segments

of the population argue that Prime Minister Erdogan’s recent seemingly religiously motivated

reforms stray from this standard.3 In contrast, Egypt must work to translate its pious history into

a relationship between religion and government that embraces rather than marginalizes the

minority groups within its diverse religious community.

Evaluating piety in Egypt, treatment of religion in Turkey, and the pseudo-religious

institutions of mythology and Kemalism will facilitate a more thorough assessment of their

governments’ attitudes and constitutional approaches toward religion. By analyzing government,

public, and constitutional attitudes toward religion, along with the role of faith based institutions

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in civil society, I will evaluate the role religion played in the build-up to the overthrow of

Mohamed Morsi in Egypt and assess the concurrent appreciation yet indignation toward Recep

Tayyip Erdogan in Turkey. In both cases I also aimed to synthesize our interviews along with

scholarship and public opinion sources to envision each country’s homegrown understanding of

secularism moving forward towards a model of liberal, pluralistic democracy that promotes a

sustainable relationship between religion and government while protecting the rights of all of its

citizens.4

Piety, Both Religious and Secular

Located in the birthplace of one of the oldest civilizations in the world, Egyptians are

extremely proud of their heritage. With Egyptology,5 the myriad of artifacts in museums, and the

architectural feats of the pyramids, history is glorified in Egypt. The strong emphasis on divinity

and faith inherent in Egyptian mythology also parallels many Muslims’ similar mentality toward

Islam, thus enhancing the population’s respect for history and reinforcing their piety.

Egyptian religiosity looks to the heavens, while Turkey’s secular pseudo-religious

ideology, Kemalism, looks to Ataturk. After the fall of the Ottoman Empire, Mustafa Kemal

Ataturk founded the Turkish Republic in 1923 on ideals of equality, nationalism, and

secularism.6 As president, Ataturk instituted drastic reforms to build the Turkish economy and

society. As is often the case in extremely religious societies, governance shifted between polar

opposites in their approach to religion due to dissatisfaction with the previous status quo. Since

the Ottoman Sultans closely linked Islam with the government, Ataturk completely separated the

two. Furthermore, he planted the seed for unbridled nationalism through emphasis on the modern

Turkish language and a bountiful display of Turkish flags, creating an aura of deification around

Ataturk, as he represented all that was Turkishness.7 In his book, Crescent & Star, Stephen

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Kinzer quotes an interviewee affirming this deification of Ataturk, stating, “In this country it is

allowed to say bad things about God, but it is not allowed to say bad things about Ataturk.”8

Kemalism set the groundwork for Turkey’s emphasis on strict secularism, which instigated the

ongoing tension with the religious needs of an almost entirely Muslim population.9

Affected by this ongoing secularist struggle with religion, the majority of Turkish women

choose not to wear head coverings;10 however, throughout Egypt, the majority of women wear

hijabs or niqabs.11 In both largely Muslim nations, the Call to Prayer echoes from atop the

mosque minarets five times per day. The Five Pillars of Islam—belief in one god, Allah

(shahadah), prayer five times each day (salat), fasting during Ramadan (sawm), charity (zakat),

and the pilgrimage to Mecca (hajj)—dictate the morals, and often the schedules, of the Muslim

populations of Egypt and Turkey.12 Turkish Muslims range in their observance of Islam, whereas

Egyptian Muslims tend to be more conservative and pious. Turkey’s Muslim women endured a

period of repression by their government during which they were banned from wearing

headscarves in the public sector, particularly in government jobs and at universities. Provost

Yesim Arat of the Bogazici University Political Science Department explained a central issue

behind the ban: “those who were not covered were very much in a majority, and they were

imposing their understanding of how religion should be on a group that did not share it.”13 To

many Muslim women, it is a tradition and religious practice, but to secularists, it is a religious

infringement on secular public space.14 On the other end of spectrum, the topic of Islamization of

politics further polarizes Egyptian Muslims’ opinions. Some Muslims are proponents of Islamist

political parties, such as the Freedom and Justice Party of the Muslim Brotherhood or Al-Nour

Party of the Salafis, while others want the freedom to practice Islam without negotiating its

interpretation with the Islamists in power.

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With around 10% of the Egyptian population practicing Christianity, Islamist lawmakers

repress not only fellow Muslims, but Christians and other minorities, as well.15 A longstanding

sectarian battle between Coptic Christians and Muslims has been the root of much violence in

Egypt and a large motivator for Christians to demand more secular policies.

Philosophies of life, whether religious or secular, are intrinsic to the cultures of both

Egypt and Turkey. With Muslim citizens totaling 90% of the Egyptian population and 99% of

the Turkish population, prayer, whether overtly or privately, is ingrained in the collective psyche

as a demonstration of reverence and devotion to Islam and Allah.16 Egyptians and Turks mirror

their dedication to Islam with their reverence of Egyptian mythology and Kemalism

respectivelytheir respect for the sanctity of the history behind both ideologies sets this tone.

Their dedication to these pseudo-religions extends beyond nationalism to a level equivalent to

that of organized religion.17 The combination of Islam and mythology or Kemalism makes for

especially morally-driven and deferential societies. Fostering values of ambition and loyalty,

Ataturk’s Kemalism stood for progress and a sense of national identity.18 Egyptian mythology

nurtured values of humility and respect for the past. The capacity that Egyptians and Turks

shareto be able to find pride in their history and develop cultures dedicated to celebrating that

historyparallels and enhances their religious morality and deference.

The Egyptian and Turkish tendency to often refer to or commemorate history, in both

secular and religious senses, creates a contagious nostalgia for each nation’s past prosperity.

When looking at history through rose-colored glasses, present hardships seem even more

challenging. Nonetheless, this nostalgia acts as a motivator for the citizens, showing them their

potential whether romanticized or realistic and catalyzing their protests to enact the change they

desire.

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Government Approaches to Religion

Although Turkey and Egypt both have predominantly Muslim populations, their

governments’ are at opposite ends of the spectrum in regard to their involvement with religion.

In Turkey, repression of religious expression in the public sphere is the central issue, whereas

over-inclusive religious regulation takes place in Egypt; therefore, the debates hinge on the

definition of secularism in Turkey and the choice of whether to shift toward secularism in Egypt.

The two main secular models of the relationship between religion and government are the Anglo-

Saxon model, promoting freedom of religion, and the French model, providing freedom from

religion.19 The Anglo-Saxon model, employed by the United States, includes all religions in the

public sphere, while the French model, found in Turkey, excludes all religions from the public

sphere. In dealing with the relationship between religion and government, the bodies in place to

interpret law—such as the Supreme Constitutional Court and al-Azhar in Egypt and Prime

Minister Erdogan and the Constitutional Court in Turkey—are as important as the text of the

constitutional law itself.

Egypt: Incorporating Religion in Governance

The Egyptian government is an Islamic democracy. In the most recent constitution

created under the governance of the Muslim Brotherhood, Article 2 stated that “‘principles of

Islamic Sharia’” were “‘the main source of legislation.’”20 Sharia law includes definitive rules

explicitly defined in the Quran and speculative rules introduced by various scholars. Former

Judge Ahmed Tawfik described how under Muslim Brotherhood leadership, the use and

interpretation of Sharia expanded into the realm of speculative rules.21 The Supreme

Constitutional Court, however, countered this momentum with their own unusual, more liberal

perspective on Sharia, to the surprise and dismay of the Salafis.22

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A second significant article of the constitution was Article 219, which further emphasized

the use of Islamic scholarship in governance. Article 219 employed almost exclusively scholarly

terminology, stating, “‘The principles of the Islamic Sharia include its adilla kulliya, qawa`id

usuli and qawa`id fiqhiyya and the sources considered by the Sunni madhhabs.’”23 Adilla kulliya

was used to teach jurists how to compute scriptures, such as the Quran, hadith literature, and

scholarly records, into Islamic law, and qawa`id fiqhiyya included the “underlying principles” of

Islamic scholarship.24 Therefore, the article reinforced the use of Islamic scholarship in the

interpretation of Sharia law, leading to a more constraining regulation of religious practice

through this more conservative approach to religion when creating laws.

The implications therein are best understood through an analysis of the three main

approaches to Sharia law. Muslims who believe in the Islamic scholarship and interpretation of

various Islamic literature follow the neotraditional approach, often deferring to the knowledge

and authority of the religiously moderate al-Azhar university.25 Conversely, modernists think in a

more utilitarian manner, such as those in the Supreme Constitutional Court, creating new

interpretations of law directly from scripture.26 Lastly, the Salafis “share elements of

traditionalism and modernism” but defer to the practices of the earliest Muslims.27 They rely on

traditional literature, yet they question the interpretations of non-explicit texts. Evidently,

Islamists and more conservative Muslims, such as the neotraditionalists and Salafis, demand the

inclusion of article 2 in the constitution, and non-Islamists are not threatened by this inclusion if

the modernist approach of the Supreme Constitutional Court continues.

The Muslim Brotherhood has elements of all three approaches, so their aims during their

leadership were more centered around creating a new constitution rather than debating the

semantics of religious language.28 They could rely on the Salafi Al-Nour Party to necessitate the

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amount of Islamic language they desired in the constitution. Article 4 of the constitution gave

interpretive control to al-Azhar, which also appeased moderate and conservative Muslims.29

Since the power positions for religious interpretation and regulation lie in al-Azhar, Parliament,

the Presidency, and the Supreme Constitutional Court, the Muslim Brotherhood employed an

alternative tactic of influence by attempting to slowly shift the makeup of the Supreme

Constitutional Court. Adjusting the age limit in the judiciary from sixty-nine to sixty would

mandate the replacement of most of the modernist judges, allowing the Muslim Brotherhood to

nominate new, more conservative judges.30 Fortunately for the modernists, this plan did not come

to fruition. Ambassador Aly Maher ElSayed, a foreign affairs official at the Library of

Alexandria, reiterated the concern of many modernist Muslims toward the current system: “I

don’t accept that [the Muslim Brotherhood has] the monopoly over explaining what religion is...

Islam in my view is my relationship between myself and God.”31

A major issue in a religiously affiliated country is the ability to differentiate between a

sin and a crime.32 The limits of a crime can be clearly defined in criminal law, but the extent of

what constitutes a sin and the interpretation of the literature’s punishment are fluid. Hakan

Altinay of the Brookings Institution elaborated on this: “With secularism, at the end of the day,

you are asking people to put the brakes on their sense of right and wrong, for example,

[convincing] people that not every sin is a crime.”33 However, in states where religion is

integrated in governance, if the two are equated, religious morality becomes state-mandated

ethics, and the judicial system is no longer able to arbitrate independently, as decisions become

divine in nature. Al Azhar may be considered moderate, but the application of their religious

interpretations in a legal context still politicize Islam in a manner unappreciated by many

modernist Muslims. Furthermore, if the Muslim Brotherhood had successfully transitioned

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judges in the Supreme Constitutional Court, the issue of the line between a sin and a crime would

have become a more drastic concern for non-Islamists.

Turkey: Excluding Religion from Governance

In Turkish politics, sins and crimes are completely separate. Secularists have fought long

and hard to keep religious language, practice, and influence out of government and the public

sphere. The Diyanet is the sole religiously-affiliated bureaucratic department which regulates

expenditures for building mosques and paying the salaries of Imams, enabling religious practice

without dictating interpretation to the extent controlled in Egypt.34 However, in the eyes of more

observant Muslims, the government stifled religious practice instead of creating more freedom

through stringent laws toward public religious practice.

The 1982 constitution, created by a military coup government after a publicly Islamic

Prime Ministership, included a headscarf ban in the public sphere, further strengthened in 1998

when the ban was extended to also include university campuses.35 According to Didem

Collinsworth of the International Crisis Group, many women stopped working and attending

school, setting back the progress of conservative Muslim women.36 In 2008, an amendment

passed in parliament asserting the right to education; however, the Constitutional Court blocked

this effort to absolve the headscarf law.37 It was not until 2010 that the universities lifted the ban

on headscarves, creating more freedom and opportunity for observant Muslim women. “Islamic

sensitivity” is a more compassionate alternative that would allow Muslim women to wear

headscarves, maintaining equal opportunity regardless of religious preference.38 Beyond this,

there is little demand for political Islamic law in the constitution. Professor Hakan Yilmaz

described this central challenge as finding a happy medium between religion and modernity, as

modernity has always prevailed in Turkey.39

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Emboldened by his decade of success, Prime Minister Erdogan began crossing this

delicate line. He began instituting laws seemingly motivated by religious morals, such as

restrictions on abortion and the availability of the morning-after contraceptive pill.40 The alcohol

law was most blatantly contested by the public, although the restrictions were similar to those in

Western countries.41 While it enacted common restrictions on advertisements of alcohol, it also

mandated that alcohol be blurred out in television shows.42 Furthermore, common limitations on

the sale of alcohol at night (after 10 p.m.) or near schools and mosques were included in the

law.43 It exempted establishments with tourist licenses but still constrained average convenience

stores.44 Ferhat Boratav, Editor-In-Chief of CNN Turk, expressed his concern about the realistic

implications of how these laws affect the public’s general practices: “Something that starts as an

innocent health issue [such as a concern for alcoholism] slowly and slowly turns into some sort

of unwritten regulation.”45 While alcohol is not banned, he argues, these laws create the

circumstances under which “alcohol in public doesn’t exist.”46 Motivated by disliked for the

religious undertone to the new laws and Erdogan’s push for progressively greater authority,

Turks decided to take a stand.

Inside the Protests: Gezi Park

Gezi Park was a quiet urban park turned political rallying point, and the adjacent Taksim

Square became the Turkish Tahrir Square. As construction for a mall and Ottoman military

barracks began in Gezi Park, environmentalists occupied the area to prevent its destruction.

Momentum built as middle and upper class citizens joined to protest not only the environmental

demolition but also Erdogan’s ever-expanding control.47 While the initial protests were rather

small, the excessive use of force by riot police incited masses to gather in Gezi Park and Taksim

Square. The layers of participants in Istanbul began with the initial Generation Y

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Environmentalist, drew in their families and colleagues, incorporated the urban aggravated and

excluded, such as the Alevis and anti-AKP protesters, and was surrounded by the more vocal

illegal and legal organized groups.48 While illegal groups were involved in the protests (such as

the terrorist group that bombed the US embassy earlier in the year), they were not the majority—

simply the most violent and obvious to the media.49 In Ankara, physically separated from the site

in question, the core group of genuine environmentalists was absent from the protests, leaving

the political space available for the more violent illegal groups.50 As corroborated by Osman

Furkan Abbasoglu, who works for a financial institution in Istanbul, many demonstrators were

confused in their reasons for protesting—often due to misinformation or group-think—yet they

were united by their mistrust of Prime Minister Erdogan’s approach to the protests and

increasingly authoritarian leadership.51 The protesters’ demands began with saving Gezi Park

from destruction and ended with removing Prime Minister Erdogan from office; they achieved

the former, yet the latter was not a realistic goal. While the main protest site in Gezi Park was

cleared by riot police, minor protests and frustration with Erdogan’s leadership continue as of

August 2013.52

On the non-religious side of legislation, the 1982 constitution was extremely nationalistic

to the point of restricting freedom of press and civil protests. Article 301 was put in place to

protect Turkish identity by prohibiting attacks on “Turkishness;” however, this allowed too much

liberty to the Constitutional Court, restricting civil rights rather than protecting national

security.53 The text was later altered to outlaw attacks on the “Turkish nation” with a shortened

prison sentence.54 The existence of such issues demonstrates the level of restraint still placed on

civil rights and the progress Turkey still needs to fully develop its liberal democracy. Hakan

Altinay of the Brookings Institution offered the following analogy: “Turkey’s hardware is

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moving in the right direction, while its software is moving in the wrong direction.”55 Turkey’s

currently conflict-ridden political climate is working against the economic progress and reforms

it has achieved. Erdogan’s increasingly authoritarian and micromanaging methods cause public

outcry, and the ongoing debate over the definition of secularism, inclusive or exclusive,

continues to dominate the political landscape. Furthermore, the unfortunate irony cannot be lost

that the state takes an anti-religious stance, yet CNN Turk’s Editor-in-Chief Ferhat Boratav

described how the greatest minority issues in the predominantly Sunni Muslim nation are with

the Kurdish and Alevi groups that still represent about fifteen to twenty million citizens (one-

fifth of the population).56

New Constitutions: Opportunities and Issues

Despite their current challenges, both of the current Egyptian and Turkish governments

are in the process of drafting new constitutions. For Egypt, the interim government is drafting the

new constitution after the removal of President Morsi, most likely entailing a shift in a less

Islamist direction with fewer mechanisms of religious regulation.57 However, they are creating

the constitution under intense time constraints, so the usual debate that promotes greater

pluralism will not necessarily be allowed its full progression. AKP’s Vice Chairman of Foreign

Affairs, Erol Adayilmaz, discussed that the Turkish Constitutional Commission has been

working on the most recent constitutional draft since 2011, facing many roadblocks due to

intense debate over its central issues of the parliamentary versus presidential system alteration

and the Kurdish issue.58 Erdogan is pushing for a new constitution before the 2014 elections, as

AKP hopes to replace the 1982 military constitution with a new civilian constitution.59 He

asserted that he will put up the AKP draft for referendum if the Constitutional Commission does

not create their own before the summer Parliamentary recess, which concerns many purist

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secularists.60 Yet, keeping the old constitution may be a more prudent option than implementing

a rushed constitution that could incite further protests and unrest. Regardless whether or not

AKP’s constitutional draft was approved by a referendum, with the current distrust of Erdogan’s

intentions with the Presidential rather than Prime Ministerial system, any version of the

constitution not thoroughly debated could be perceived as dubious. Aly Maher ElSayed of the

Library of Alexandria expressed it best that the general Turkish population’s constitutional aim

is for a “clearer and more liberal constitution made in democratic manner to make social justice

and dignity for all.”61 Moving forward, both the Egyptian and Turkish governments must

carefully and pluralistically scrutinize their constitutional drafts to ensure this vision, as well as

the constitutions’ positive reception and effect.

Conclusion: Moving Forward in Egypt and Turkey

Egypt: Reducing Religious Control

The task for Egypt will be finding a way to balance government recognition of their

religious connection to Islam while simultaneously reducing the religious restrictiveness and

regulation of their previous regime. Article 2 remains a bulwark of the Egyptian constitution that

is unlikely to change in the near (or distant) future. Yet, the constitution can be based on Islamic

Sharia law without falling prey to the interpretations of more traditionalist Muslim groups like

the Salafis. If Article 2 included the only mention of Islam in the Egyptian constitution, Egypt

would continue to respect society’s “Islamic sensitivities” while also allowing the government a

more liberal interpretation of Sharia law that promotes religious freedom and tolerance. By

eliminating the authority of a religious body to regulate the interpretation of Sharia and therefore

Egyptian civil law (Articles 4 and 219), the government maintains control over civil law and the

people maintain control over their individual religious lives. In this model, Article 2 acts as a

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moral code, leaving no room for conservative religious groups to manipulate the law and

religion. Such religious groups do not usually have malicious intent in their desire to further

Islamicize Egyptian governance; however, as equal citizens, non-practicing Muslims should be

able to make their religious decisions independently, and Christian Egyptians should not be

subject to Islamic civil law.

Egypt may not be ready for this model post-2013 Revolution, as their current reform

priorities are more economically focused. Religious tolerance and authority over interpretation

present critical discussion points in the creation of a new constitution, but in a country where

25% of the population is under the national poverty line, citizens are more concerned with

electing an economically-savvy president and aiming at a few civil rights than wholeheartedly

targeting social reform.62 A 2006 Gallup poll asserted that 94% of surveyed Egyptians desired

freedom of speech in a new constitutional draft, so protection of rights, which enables dialogue

and pluralism, may be a more viable immediate option for inclusion in the constitution.63 Once

Egypt reaches an improved level of economic stability, such a model may provide the best path

towards a democratic future; however, considering the current economic state of the population,

it may take ten to twenty years before citizens can afford to prioritize cosmopolitan rights over

basic necessities like food and shelter.

From a more realistic viewpoint, short-term goals of religious tolerance should outweigh

a more official secular shift. Transitional government officials may create a more pluralistic

system of regulating religious interpretation to ensure that liberal Muslim voices are also

represented.64 If al-Azhar did not have full authority over interpretation—and the president, or

his party, did not have such unconstrained influence over laws, the legislature, and the judiciary

—citizens could feel more secure about their religious freedom. Furthermore, the new

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constitution should include better checks and balances on the executive branch, which include

eliminating the president’s exemption from judicial oversight, reinstating the lower house of

Parliament, the People’s Assembly, and creating an independent judiciary. These checks on

executive power and pluralistic measures create the political space for dialogue and tolerance.

The 2013 ousting of Morsi leaves Egypt with a blank slate—an opportunity for the people to

learn from their mistakes the first time around and take back their revolution. The secular debate

is only one of many obstacles that Egypt must overcome before achieving their democratic

vision, and both sides must break the poisonous cycle of marginalization in order to foster a

pluralistic environment for the future.

Turkey: Loosening the Reigns

After recent protests throughout Turkey, the political climate is sensitive. While

Turkey’s more developed democratic norms and rights would prevent any serious rebellious

threat, when compared to that of Egypt, citizens have demonstrated adamant indignation with the

response of their government to the protests in Gezi Park. The protests represented civilian

distaste for not only the police actions but also the increasingly religious and authoritarian

undertones to Prime Minister Erdogan’s leadership style. Citizens are struggling with the

juxtaposition of previously upheld Kemalist secular ideology, preventing religious expression in

the public sphere, and Erdogan’s more open expression of religion, particularly Islam. The

amount of effort if took to bolster adequate support behind annulling women’s headscarf laws

demonstrates the domestic debate over this sense of propriety and freedom of (or from) religion.

While the consensus seems to shift toward slightly softening restrictions on public

displays of religion to take Islamic sensitivity into consideration, government restrictions on

alcohol and birth control were not well received, as they seemed to overcompensate too far in the

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conservative direction. Given the context of their surrounding region, often home to extreme

religious regulation, some Turks may fear the alternative to exclusionary policies toward religion

in the public sphere and react to minor infractions on their sense of propriety. Therefore, any

changes to this delicate balance must be methodical and deliberated. This discussion would be

greatly advanced through the creation of a new political party to increase pluralism. Religious,

conservative parties and secular, liberal parties exist, but there is not a group that bridges the gap.

A new liberal party that encourages religious tolerance and Islamic sensitivity would be well

received and a critical contributor to the further development of a more liberal democracy in

Turkey.

The Key Factor: Pluralism

Religious and political debates in Egypt and Turkey are currently swayed by a lack of

appropriate representation of the variety of opinions. In Egypt, if the liberal, modernist religious

supporters largely represented in the revolutionary camp would coordinate themselves to create a

more centralized political position and party, they could be an effective and influential player in

determining their religious regulation and protection of rights. Likewise, if liberal Turks

supporting greater religious tolerance in the public sphere could organize, they could similarly

sway the political pendulum away from Erdogan and AKP’s stronghold to force greater

concessions to their political goals. Representation is one of the most integral mandates of an

effective democracy, and greater pluralism can only increase the ability of the government to

serve the needs and desires of its people.

1 Marwan Ezz Al-Arab, interview by Kapil Talwalkar and Steven Weier, World Bank, Cairo, Egypt, June 6, 2013. 2 We base our argument in Nader Hashemi’s definition of democracy (at its most basic level) as including consent, popular sovereignty, and individual liberty from Nader Hashemi. Islam, Secularism, and Liberal Democracy: Toward a Democratic Theory for Muslim Societies. 2009. Reprint (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 7.3 This article, 5. 4 While secularism is often thought of as the complete separation of religion from politics, we argue that there are many understandings of secularism that countries can mold to fit peacefully within the context of their society. We in no way propose that secularism means the absence or destruction of religion, but instead that religion and politics and find some middle ground of coexistence. For more on the definition of secularism as it pertains to this work see the section entitled “The Many Definitions of Secularism,” from pages 19-20. 5 Egyptology is the study of the history, civilization, and culture of ancient Egypt.6 Ibid, 10-14.7 Ibid, 12-13, 48-19.8 Ibid, 34.9 Semiha Topal, “Everybody Wants Secularism--But Which One? Contesting Definitions of Secularism in Contemporary Turkey,” International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society 25, no. 1-3 (2012).10Magali Rheault, “Headscarves and Secularism: Voices From Turkish Women,” Gallup, accessed August 7, 2013, www.gallup.com/poll/104257/headscarves-secularism-voices-from-turkish-women.aspx. 11 A hijab is a type of headscarf that covers the hair, but not the face; a niqab is another type of covering that covers all of the face except for the eyes. Michael Slackman, “In Egypt, a New Battle Begins Over the Veil,” New York Times, January 28, 2007, accessed August 7, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/28/weekinreview/28slackman.html.12 John L. Esposito, The Future of Islam (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 42-48.13 Yesim Arat , Provost of the Bogazici University Political Science Department, interviewed by Alexa Mencia and Melia Albrecht, Istanbul, Turkey, June 17, 2013.14 Topal, “Everybody Wants Secularism.”15 “The World Factbook.”16 "The World Factbook," Central Intelligence Agency, accessed July 15, 2013, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/.17 Stephen Kinzer, Crescent and Star: Turkey Between Two Worlds (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2001), 33-34.18 Dr. Ozgur Koca, Professor at Claremont University, Interviewed by Alexa Mencia, Istanbul, Turkey, June 13, 2013.19 Nader Hashemi. Islam, Secularism, and Liberal Democracy: Toward a Democratic Theory for Muslim Societies. 2009. Reprint (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 110-114.20 Clark Lombardi and Nathan Brown, “Islam in Egypt's New Constitution,” Foreign Policy: The Middle East Channel, accessed July 12, 2013, http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/12/13/islam_in_egypts_new_constitution.21 Ahmed Tawfik (LL.B, LL.M), Attorney at Law and International Arbitrator, interview by Amanda Schmitt and Katelyn Masket, Cairo, Egypt, June 3, 2013.22 Lombardi, “Islam in Egypt's New Constitution.”23 Ibid.24 Ibid.25 Ibid.26 Ibid.27 Ibid.

28 Ibid.29 Ibid.30 Ahmed Tawfik (LL.B, LL.M).31 Ambassador Aly Maher ElSayed, Library of Alexandria Ambassador, interview by Amanda Schmitt and Katelyn Masket, Alexandria, Egypt, June 9, 2013.32 Dr. Hakan Altinay, Chairman of the Open Society Foundation in Turkey, interview by Amanda Schmitt and Kapil Talwalkar, Boğaziçi University, Istanbul, Turkey, June 16, 2013.33 Hakan Altinay.34 Topal, “Everybody Wants Secularism.” Soner Çağaptay, “The Diyanet and laïcité: new Turkish exports to Europe,” Hurriyet Daily News, accessed August 7, 2013, www.hurriyetdailynews.com/default.aspx?pageid=438&n=diyanet-and-lacit-new-turkish-exports-to-europe-2010-02-07.35 Jonathan Head, “Quiet end to Turkey's college headscarf ban,” BBC, December 31, 2010, accessed July 15, 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-11880622 .36 Didem Collinsworth, International Crisis Group, interviewed by Sarah Cuevs, Istanbul, Turkey, June 17, 2013.37 Ibid.38 Professor Hakan Yilmaz, interview by Steven Weier, Boğaziçi University, Istanbul, Turkey, June 16, 2013. 39 Ibid.40 Ibid.41 Ibid.42 Peter Kenyon, “Not Everyone Cheers Turkey's Move To Tighten Alcohol Rules,” NPR, June 7, 2013, accessed July 16, 2013, http://www.npr.org/blogs/thesalt/2013/06/07/187334924/not-everyone-cheers-turkeys-move-to-tighten-alcohol-rules.43 Ibid.44 Ibid.45 Ferhat Boratav, CNN Turk Editor-in-Chief, interviewed by Melia Albrecht, Istanbul, Turkey, June 18, 2013.46 Ferhat Boratav.47 Ferhat Boratav. 48 Ibid.49 Didem Collinsworth, International Crisis Group, interviewed by Sarah Cueva, Istanbul, Turkey, June 17, 2013.50 Ferhat Boratav.51 Osman Furkan Abbasoglu, Teaching Assistant at the University of Southern California, interviewed by Steven Weier, Istanbul, Turkey, June 14, 2013. 52 “Erdogan retaining support despite protests,” Al Jazeera, accessed August 6, 2013, http://www.aljazeera.com/video/europe/2013/07/201373171635796492.html.53 Osman Furkan Abbasoglu.54 “Turkey: Freedom of Expression Still in Danger Despite Article 301 Reform – RSF,” BBC Monitoring Media, May 05, 2008, accessed July 15, 2013, http://search.proquest.com/docview/452254800?accountid=14749.55 Dr. Hakan Altinay.56 Ferhat Boratav.57 “Egypt starts on new constitution,” BBC, accessed July 17, 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-23394397.58 Erol Adayilmaz, AK Party Head of Foreign Affairs, interviewed by Rebecca Braun, Istanbul, Turkey, June 14, 2013.59 Ibid.60 Tulin Daloglu, “Turkish Parliament Faces Deadline On Draft Constitution,” Al-Monitor: The Pulse of the Middle East, accessed July 17, 2013,

http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/05/turkey-parliament-constitution-draft-deadline.html.61 Ambassador Aly Maher ElSayed.62 “Poverty headcount ratio at national poverty line (% of population),” The World Bank (2011), accessed August 7, 2013, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.NAHC/countries/EG?display=graph.63 Esposito, John L, and Dalia Mogahed. Who Speaks for Islam? excerpt. “Do Muslims Want Democracy and Theocracy?.” Gallup. Accessed August 7, 2013. http://www.gallup.com/poll/104731/Muslims-Want-Democracy-Theocracy.aspx.64 These short-term goals to promote the idea of tolerance within the religion of Islam parallel Hashemi’s claim that religious reformation prompts secularization and democratization. See Hashemi, Islam and Secularism, 67-102.