Second-gift behaviour of first-time donors to charity: an empirical study

Second-gift behaviour of first-timedonors to charity: an empirical studyRoger Bennett*,y and Rehnuma Ali-ChoudhuryyLondon Metropolitan University, UK

� This study examined the second-time charity giving behaviour of a sample of 551 young

people during a 2-year period following the occurrence of their first ever significant

donation. It explored the factors that encouraged an individual to make a second gift, the

probabilities that a donation would bemadewithin certain time intervals after the initial

gift (3 months, 6 months, a year, etc.) and the variables that influenced whether the

second donation would go to the charity receiving the person’s first gift or to a different

charity. Relevant issues were investigated via a Cox proportional hazards regression

analysis and through a binary logistic regression. Covariates employed in the course of

the study included the degree of emotional uplift a person experienced and the level of

mind-set change that took place consequent to a first donation, donor confusion with the

range and variety of charities available and the reputation and image congruity of the

second charity to which the participant had contributed. The roles of personal inertia and

social pressure when making donation decisions were also examined.

Copyright # 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Introduction

Once an individual has taken a decision tomake his or her first-time ever donation to acharity there is a high probability that theperson will give again (see Sargeant andWoodliffe, 2007). Little is known howeverabout the factors that contribute to the timingand level of a follow-up donation, or of thelikelihood that the second gift will bemade to acharity that is different to the organisation thatrecruited the donor in the first place. Variables

associated with the attraction of fresh donorsand their subsequent conversion into long-term charity supporters have been the subjectof extensive academic research for many years(for reviews of relevant literature see, e.g.Hibbert, 1995; Bendapudi et al., 1996; Bennettand Sargeant, 2005; Sargeant and Woodliffe,2007), but studies have (to the best of theauthors’ knowledge) only examined donorrecruitment and retention from the perspect-ive of the single organisation that procured aninitial donation, rather than from the view-point of the charity sector as a whole. This hasresulted in a lacuna in knowledge regardingsituations where the follow-up gift of a first-time donor goes to a charity completelydifferent to the recruiting organisation andabout the circumstances that could explainwhy this phenomenon may occur.

International Journal of Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector MarketingInt. J. Nonprofit Volunt. Sect. Mark. 14: 161–180 (2009)Published online 2 December 2008 in Wiley InterScience(www.interscience.wiley.com) DOI: 10.1002/nvsm.347

*Correspondence to: Roger Bennett, Centre for Researchin Marketing, London Metropolitan Business School, 84Moorgate, London EC2M 6SQ, UK.E-mail: [email protected] Bennett and Rehnuma Ali-Choudhury are, respect-ively, professor and lecturer in the Centre for Research inMarketing at London Metropolitan Business School.

Copyright # 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Int. J. Nonprofit Volunt. Sect. Mark., August 2009

DOI: 10.1002/nvsm

The present study

This paper presents the outcomes to a study ofthe post-gift behaviour of a sample of ‘first-timedonors’ to charity, defined here as individualswho had never previously given to charity(other than having casually dropped a fewcoins in a collection box) and who then, forwhatever reason, decided to make a gift.Specifically, the investigation addressed thefollowing research questions among a sampleof 551 young first-time donors.

� On average, how long elapsed between aperson’s first and follow-up donations tocharity?

� What proportions of second donations wentto (a) the original charity that received thefirst gift, (b) a different charity but one thatwas in the same sector and (c) a differentcharity in a different sector (e.g. if the firstdonation went to a disaster relief organis-ation and the second donation went to ananimal welfare charity)? In the context of thepresent study a ‘second donation’ to theoriginal charity (i.e. the organisation receiv-ing the first gift) was defined to exclude thesecond payment of an ongoing standingorder set up at the time of recruitment.

� What factors helped explain the probabilitythat a personwould make a second donationwithin a certain time in each of the scenarioslisted in the abovementioned point (i.e. samecharity; different charity same sector; differ-ent charity different sector)?

� On average, how did the monetary value of afirst donation compare with that of a seconddonation?

� What factors contributed to the determi-nation of whether a second donation wentto the same or to a different charity?

These matters are important because fun-draising managers need to know whetherexpenditures on the attraction of first-timegivers are likely to lead to follow-up donationsto the recruiting organisation, or whether thisspending significantly assists other (possiblyrival) charities to obtain follow-up gifts. The

latter situation would be akin to thoseobserved in the commercial world wherebyan expensive advertising campaign undertakenby the supplier of a particular brand of ageneric product (e.g. tea or beer) actuallystimulates the sales of competing brands,because the initial campaign promotes thedesirability of consuming the general productrather than a specific brand. Another reason forinvestigating the abovementioned issues is thatif charity managers know the timing of theperiod following a first-time donation duringwhich the probability of a person making asecond gift is at its highest, they may thenschedule their contacts with the individualto occur mainly during this interval.

Cross-charity giving in general is a matter ofconcern for charity fundraisers because it isknown that large numbers of new donors tospecific charities never make a seconddonation to the organisation that recruitedthem in the first instance. Sharpe (2006)reported that 65% of all British people whogave to a charity on a particular occasion failedto give to the same charity a second time.Haxton (2007) observed that 30 of the60 biggest US charities obtained repeat giftsfrom less than a third of the donors they hadacquired in the previous 12 months. In thewords of Haxton (2007, p. 3) this implied ‘anendless cycle of seeking new donors to replaceones that have been lost’, a process that is bothdifficult and expensive (Emarketer, 2007).Flood (2006) cited commercial research whichsuggested that most large UK charities spenton average about half their marketing budgetson attracting new donors, undertaking aboutsix acquisition campaigns a year. For thefundraising charity sector as a whole howeverthe situation is mitigated if a successfulcampaign by one charity acts to some degreeas a ‘recruiting sergeant’ for another, therebyreducing the latter’s new donor recruitmentcosts.

The research questions were explored via aCox proportional hazards regression analysisand through amultinominal logistic regression.A number of covariates were applied in thecourse of the study relating, inter alia, to a


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162 Roger Bennett and Rehnuma Ali-Choudhury

first-time giver’s emotional experiences duringand after the initial donation; to subsequentfirst-donation communications received by theperson from charities; to organisation-relatedfactors such as image, reputation and donorconfusion and to psychological image con-gruency and inertia on the giver’s part.

First-time and repeat givers

The typical profile of a first-time donor, itseems, is that of someone who is young(Saxton, 2001; Emarketer, 2007), is respondingto a major national appeal (Gomes andKnowles, 2001) or to a face-to-face approach(Charity Times, 2003), and who gives online(presumably because the internet is usedextensively and intensively by young peoplewho may not have previously given tocharity—see Hall, 2000; Saxton, 2001; NFG,2006). Analyses of online fundraising cam-paigns undertaken by a number of charitieshave revealed that up to 50% of the donorswere making their first gift (Hall, 2000). Thishas been especially true of donations madefollowing humanitarian crises. Disaster andfamine relief appeals in particular are known toattract large number of first-time givers (Gomesand Knowles, 2001). For example, the Decem-ber 2004 Asian tsunami and the 2005 Asianearthquake appeals created hundreds of thou-sands of first-time donors to charity throughoutthe world, many of whom gave online (Fearn,2006). Also high-profile nation-wide televisedfundraising activities such as LiveAid, ‘RedNose Day’ and other ‘telethons’ are known tohave induced numerous individuals to makefirst-time donations.An issue that is worthy of investigation is

whether a first-time donor who gave to acharity concerned with, say, tsunami or earth-quake relief, might in a sense be said to havemade a ‘mental breakthrough’ vis-a-vis charitygiving and hence be substantially more likelythan before to donate to another charity (i) inthe same field, or (ii) in a totally unrelated area(a domestic violence charity for instance). Thesame question arises with respect to first-time

donors recruited via ‘chugging’ (i.e. ‘charitymugging’ involving face-to-face street cornerapproaches). Whilst chugging has attractedmuchmedia criticism on ethical grounds, it hasbeen highly successful in recruiting (oftenyoung) first-time givers. Indeed, the PublicFundraising Regulatory Association announcedin 2003 that 69 000 first-time donors hadcontributed to its member charities in theprevious 12 months as a result of theapplication of face-to-face and door-to-doormethods (Charity Times, 2003). Might a first-time donor obtained by a particular charitythrough chugging then be likely to support asecond and different charity? There is indeed abody of theory which suggests that this willprobably occur, based on the proposition thatthe very process of deciding to make the initialgift to a charity can cause the donatingindividual to change favourably his or her‘mind-set’ towards giving to charity in general.This matter is discussed in the followingsection.

Attitudes towards charitiesbefore and after a first-timedonation

The decision to donate to a charity possiblycreates within a person a particular mind-set

that directs the individual’s thoughts towardsthe good cause in question and (importantly)towards charities in general (cf. Xu and Wyer,2008). Once activated this mind-set mightincrease the probability that the individual willmake a further donation, possibly to a charityin a field that is completely unrelated to that ofthe organisation that triggered the mind-set inthe first instance. A mind-set, according to Xuand Wyer (2008, p. 1), involves ‘cognitiveprocesses and judgemental criteria developedin the course of performing a task’. It generatesan overall disposition towards an entity,activity or situation (Higgins, 1997) and there-after will affect responses to similar entities,activities or situations because, after initialjudgements have been made, they will beemployed as foundations for subsequent


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First-time donors to charity 163

decisions independent of the informationuponwhich the first judgements were founded(Forster and Liberman, 2007).This leads to the prediction that a second

donation to any type of charity is likely tooccur shortly after the first-time gift. Prior tothe initial donation the person’s mind-set vis-a-vis charity giving might be ‘deliberative’ innature, that is, concerned with weighing upthe pros and cons of making a donation (cf.Gollwitzer and Bayer, 1999). Cognitive pro-cesses will occur during the decision makingprocess involving, for example, the evaluationof the merits and ‘deservingness’ of the goodcause being considered, and perhaps thereassessment of previously held negativeopinions about charity giving. (Negativethoughts may have related to beliefs thatcharities spent most of their money onadministration, encouraged beneficiaries torely on handouts rather than seeking to lookafter themselves, etc.) Smith (1994) arguedthat the cognitive procedures employed whilemaking a decision about an entity would thenbe stored in a person’s memory and used totake decisions in later comparable situations.Thus, following the application of certaincognitive procedures when deciding to offera first-time gift to a charity, the same cognitiveprocedures, inferences and outcomes relatingto that initial decision will easily come to mindwhen the person is confronted in the futurewith a request to donate to another charity (cf.Shen and Wyer, 2008). Thoughts about thesecond charity could be favourable due to theresult of the cognitive decision processassociated with the first donation, even thoughlittle might be known about the secondorganisation.Dhar et al. (2007, p. 370) suggested in the

context of consumer buying behaviour that aperson who, for the first-time ever, purchaseda new and unfamiliar type of productwas likelyto move from a deliberative to an ‘implemen-tal’ mind-set. This implemental mind-set wouldpersist for a considerable period and focussedon the consideration of the actions needed toexecute a decision reached at the deliberativestage. An implemental mind-set, according to

Gollwitzer (1990), affected the encoding,interpretation and storage of informationabout an issue, and could be induced merelyby an individual thinking about the matter.Analogously it could be that consequent tomaking a first-time gift to a charity a donoracquires an implemental mind-set regardingcharity giving. This could last for some timeand be activated by the person simply thinkingabout charitable issues (e.g. after seeing anappeal on television or receiving direct mailfrom a fundraising organisation).

Time to the second donation

A literature review was undertaken to identifyvariables that could help explain whether andhow soon a first-time giver makes a seconddonation, and whether the second gift is to thesame or a different charity. This took as itsstarting point prior investigations into whypeople give, because in principle these shouldoffer insights relevant to the research ques-tions addressed by the present work. Literaturein the area is extensive and covers a plethora ofpotential explanatory variables (for details see,e.g. Bendapudi et al., 1996; Sargeant, 1999;Bennett and Sargeant, 2005; Sargeant andWoodliffe, 2007). However, a number ofsurveys have synthesised the available litera-ture into predictive models of how donorsbehave, and a consensus has begun to emergeregarding the key constructs involved (seeSargeant and Hudson, 2008). Of particularinterest in the context of the current investi-gation are studies that focussed on donor lapseand retention. In this connection, Sargeant andJay (2004) and Sargeant and Hudson (2008)highlighted the importance of post-donationservice quality, especially in relation tocommunications with donors, as a determinantof whether subsequent donations would bemade. Bendapudi et al’s. (1996) comprehen-sive review of (then) prior literature on helpingbehaviour distinguished between antecedentvariables that a charity could control (e.g. howthe organisation is regarded, the messages ittransmits, the monetary value of the ask) and


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uncontrollable variables such as donors’personal characteristics and traits. An obviousand critical trait that might affect the likelihoodof repeat behaviour is the degree of a donor’spersonal inertia, given that an individual who isnaturally prone to avoid initiating and execut-ing change might be expected to remain withthe charity he or she initially chose to support(cf.Marin, 1991; Piron, 1991; Roy et al., 1996).Relevant traits emphasised in the ‘why peoplegive’ literature include the intensity of thefeelings that a person experiences after makinga donation, and the individual’s susceptibilityto social influence when selecting a specificcharity for a gift. Sargeant et al. (2004) notedthe salience in past literature of a donor’sperceptions of a charity as a determinant ofgiving decisions, plus the person’s financialresources. Sargeant and Woodliffe (2007,p. 275) emphasised the need to considervariables that donors used to ‘evaluate between

the charitable alternatives available to them’. Itis relevant to observe in this connection thevery large number of fundraising charities inBritain (in excess of 100 000), the enormousamount of public information they transmitand hence the confusion this can create indonors’ minds (Bennett, 2005).In the light of the above it seems that

attempts to explore the main antecedents ofsecond-gift behaviour need to focus on past-donation communications received fromcharities, on the feelings an individual experi-ences while executing a gift, on the attrac-tiveness to the person of the organisationbenefiting from the follow-up donation, thedonor’s levels of inertia and susceptibility tosocial influence, and whether the personsuffers information overload so severe thathe or she is not able to differentiate betweencharities. As part of the procedure for pre-testing the instrument employed by thepresent study to gather information (seebelow), these candidate constructs werediscussed at lengthwith four senior fundraisersin two large and one medium sized UKcharities, all of whom possessed extensiveexperience of donor recovery management.The conversations confirmed the relevance of

the abovementioned variables (as did a pre-testusing 30 people drawn from themain samplingframe for the investigation). Each of thehypothesised independent variables is furtherconsidered below.

Personal inertia

Certain individuals are by nature inertial and, inconsequence, might simply not ‘get around’ tomaking a second gift (cf. Inria et al., 1998).Inertia, in the present context involves ‘astate of primary motivational impairment’ thatoperates independently of cognition oremotional situation (Marin, 1991, p. 245). Itdisinclines an individual to engage in goal-directed behaviour or to devote time and effortto ‘activities of interest’ (p. 250). Hence, aninertial person might not make a seconddonation as doing so is ‘too much bother’and because the individual ‘wishes to save thecost of thinking’ (Yanamandram and White,2006, p. 169). Moreover, an inertial first-timedonor who does make a second gift may beanticipated to donate to the same charity aspreviously so as to avoid the mental effortrequired to consider an alternative (Marin,1991). If an inertial person’s gift is made toa different charity it may well be to anorganisation that is perceptually very closeto the previous charity and which exhibits thesame attributes (cf. Inria et al., 1998).

Attractiveness of the second charity

Image and reputation

If a person has adopted an implemental mind-set towards charity giving, the choice of theorganisation receiving the follow-up gift mightdepend significantly on the organisation’simage and reputation. Indeed, Bendapudiet al. (1996, p. 37) suggested that a charity’sexternal image could comprise ‘the single mostcritical element of its promotional programme’,as a charitable organisation’s image frequentlydetermined whether the (donation) decisionmaking process would be initiated. Schlegel-milch (1988, p. 35) similarly argued that image


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made ‘the highest contribution’ to donationdecisions. A high-profile charity with a goodreputation will be familiar to a potential donorand regarded as efficient vis-a-vis its assistanceto beneficiaries and the deployment of its funds(Bendapudi et al., 1996). Communicationsfrom a well-regarded charity, Bendapudiet al. (1996) suggested, are likely to receivegreater attention and to be interpreted morefavourably. A charity’s pre-existing reputationmight give potential donors numerous cues asto how effectively it will perform (see Sargeantand Woodliffe, 2007). It follows that if thecharity to which a person made an initialdonation was not a high-profile organisationwith a well-established reputation then, ineffect, it might be acting as a recruiting sergeantfor another charity that is very well known.

Image congruence

To the extent that a first-time donation wasmade impulsively and without a detailedassessment of the recipient good cause ororganisation the possibility arises that, once animplemental mind-set has been adopted vis-a-

vis giving to charity, the fresh donor willcontribute to a second and quite differentcharity that better fits-in with his or her self-image. Sargeant and Woodliffe (2007, p. 284)cited a large number of studies which foundthat people often prefer to donate to charitiesthat possess symbolic meanings and imagescongruent with the ways in which they like tosee themselves. Supporting such a charity canmaintain and enhance a person’s self-identity,as it helps the individual demonstrate bothinwardly and to the outsideworld that he or sheis connected with certain modes of behaviour,attributes or values (cf. Graeff, 1996). Inparticular, research has demonstrated thatmany people want mainly to help those theyperceive as similar to themselves. Thus forexample the rich have been found to be proneto patronise the arts, education and healthcare,while avoiding ‘poor people’s’ causes such ashomelessness (Ostrower, 1996, p. 130).Allegedly, self-congruity motivates a person

to process information about a certain type of

charity and to heighten psychological involve-ment with it (Kressman et al., 2006); hencereinforcing the individual’s self-perception thathe or she has a specific social status or pursuesa particular lifestyle. According to Oskvisit andShaw (1987), a donation decision may be takenif just one of a charity’s attributes matchessome aspect of an individual’s self-concept. Itfollows that giving to the charity that attractsthe second gift may enable the individual tosatisfy a psychological need that making adonation to the original charity might not havebeen able to satiate (cf. Dhar et al., 2007).

Information overload

In Britain today there are so many charities(many of which directly compete against eachother—see Bennett, 2005) that members ofthe public may become confused regarding thedifferences between charitable organisationsand what each has to offer. People mightregard all charities as having very similarmissions and operations, and the latter mightnot be properly understood (cf. Wayne-Mitch-ell and Papavassiliou, 1999). Charity advertise-ments tend to be alike in form and content,especially vis-a-vis their application ofemotional messages and pathetic imagery.Perceptions of ‘overchoice’ allegedly causespeople to spend little time on the consider-ation of options resulting in a failure to act(Bakewell and Wayne-Mitchell, 2003, p. 97).Households receive large and constantlyincreasing amounts of mailshot literature fromcharities (half a million items in 2005 (Flana-gan, 2006)) and charity issues attract wide-spread media attention. Members of the publicmay be additionally confused by the largeamounts of information they are given aboutvarious organisations, leading to informationoverload, confusion, indecisiveness and reluc-tance to make a second-time gift (cf. Mitchelland Papavassiliou, 1997).

Donors’ contacts with charities

after the initial gift

A person might donate to a different charity onthe second occasion because the second


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charity asked for a donation whereas the firstdid not (Levis, 1990). (It is known that up to aquarter of all UK charities fail to acknowledgea donor’s first gift (Fearn, 2006).) Charitiessometimes exchange (or buy and sell) lists ofthe contact details of their known supporters.Hence, it is quite feasible for the originalrecipient of a gift not to follow-up with arequest for a repeat donation, whilst anothercharity that has obtained the first-time donor’sdetails does in fact make an approach.Repeat giving to the same charity can be

encouraged through the organisation ‘confirm-ing that a satisfactory outcome has resultedfrom the donation’ (Hibbert, 1995, p. 7) asthis will reduce the perceived level of riskassociated with future donation decisions. Thesense of personally having contributed tosolving a social, medical, humanitarian, etc.,problem is known to encourage donors to giveagain (Duncan, 2004). Indeed, Duncan (2004,p. 2160) identified a distinct philanthropicmotivation (‘impact philanthropy’) thatfocussed on an individual’s desire to ‘person-ally make a difference’. Thus feelings of havingmade a real difference may satisfy a powerfulcognitive need in certain individuals (Har-baugh, 1998). Such feelings might be incul-cated directly by exposing a first-time donor toa charity’s work via mailshots and emails, orindirectly through promotional campaigns andgeneral advertising.

Emotional uplift

Many studies have concluded that giving tocharity has a hedonistic component andproffers strong hedonistic rewards (see Sar-geant and Woodliffe, 2007 for details ofrelevant literature). A gift to a charity canprovide a person with a ‘psychological lift’ (cf.Hausman, 2000, p. 407), a deep sense ofpersonal satisfaction (Harbaugh, 1998), feel-ings of being energised (cf. Rook, 1987) and ageneral improvement in the donor’s generalmood (Piron, 1991). Giving to charity canbolster an individual’s self-image and this coulditself stimulate a ‘warm glow’ (Sargeant and

Woodliffe, 2007, p. 292). The term ‘helpers’high’ is sometimes used to describe the surgeof self-gratifying positive emotion that certainindividuals experience consequent to a chari-table act or donation (see Bennett and Gabriel,1999). Indeed, giving to charity has beencharacterised as ‘the monetary purchase ofmoral satisfaction’ undertaken for the egoisticreason of wanting to feel better (Strahilevitzand Myers, 1998, p. 435). People whoexperience intense helper’s high during orimmediately after making a first-time donationmay quickly give a second time in order torepeat the pleasurable ‘warm-glow’ feeling.Helpers’ high can also arise because the veryact of giving can cause people inwardly toassert that they are altruistic and possess highideals and moral values. The gift conveys asymbolic statement about the person that fitsin with his or her self-identity (Williamson andClark, 1989).

Social norms

Social pressure can have a strong influence oncasual decisions to donate (cf. Bearden et al.,1989; Gounaris and Stathakopoulos, 2004). Anindividual who hitherto had not given to andwas ignorant of charities may have been drawninto making a donation to a particular cause inconsequence of the social influence of peers,who themselves may have been affected bytelevision or newspaper reports or exposure tocharity advertisements. Thus it could be that awide-ranging charity fundraising campaignfollowing, for example, a natural disaster orsome other major humanitarian catastrophethat is accompanied by extensive mediapublicity will engender word-of-mouth aboutthe issue leading to a snowball effect ondonations from people who normally wouldnot think of giving to a charity (cf. Oliver,1999). Hence, many first-time donors to a high-profile good cause may be giving merelybecause relatives, friends and workmates aretalking about the matter and are seen to bedonating (cf. Bearden et al., 1989).The problem from the recipient charity’s

point of view is that a donation that resulted


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simply from the fact that other people wereobserved to be giving is unlikely to berepeated. Also, the probability of the individualdonating to other charities might be low.Support for a good cause in these circum-stances is context-bound and conveniencedriven and as such may disappear as soon asthe issue ceases to be in the public eye.

Research method

A questionnaire exploring the abovemen-tioned variables, constructs and certain socio-demographic attributes of first-time donorswas drafted consequent to discussions withfour senior fundraising managers in UKcharities and pre-tested on 30 individualsdrawn from the main sampling frame usedfor the investigation. The study concernedindividuals who had only recently startedgiving to charity. Normally the probability ofthis being the case will be higher among youngpeople, given that they have had fewer adultyears in which to begin making charitabledonations. Thus, a sampling frame of youngadults was deemed appropriate for thisparticular investigation. College students con-stitute a convenient set of young subjects fromwhich to draw a sample. Adult students do notin the main exhibit characteristics that differ-entiate them from other young people inrespect of any of the constructs and variablesdiscussed in the previous section, so there areno a priori reasons for not employing a largelystudent-based sample in the present study.Accordingly the investigation was completedusing a sample of 511 undergraduates at auniversity in Greater London. The institutionthat hosted the investigation is a large mass-market university that recruits (rather thanselects) its students. Hence, the student body ismore representative of the population ofBritish young people as a whole than wouldbe the case in more traditional institutions.Students enter the university from awide rangeof backgrounds, predominantly from lowersocio-economic groups. A variety of ethnicitiesattend the institution, reflecting the compo-

sition of the populations of most large cities inEngland. Sixty per cent of the university’sintake comprises people with matriculationqualifications that differ from those normallyaccepted by older British universities.

It follows from the above that the samplemembers can be regarded as reasonablyrepresentative of young donors (many ofwhom will be first-time donors) to charity.As a check on this, however, a separate sampleof young people who were not students wereasked to complete the questionnaire in streetlocations near Metro stations in the City ofLondon. Individuals were approached at ran-dom until 50 people satisfying the criteria forinclusion in the investigation had filled in thequestionnaire.1 The demographics of thestudent and non-student samples were similar.In both groups around half of the respondentsreported that their family’s total income was‘about the same’ as those of other families(Appendix 1[b]), with around 15% of eachsample, respectively, specifying ‘above aver-age’ and ‘below average’. The students had amean age of 22.9 years; the non-students wereon average 23.8 years old. Fifty per cent of thelatter were female (58% for the student group).No explicit data on the ethnicity of thenon-students were collected. However, thenon-student respondents were questioned inseveral different locations in central London sothere are no grounds for supposing that theirethnic mix would differ substantially from thestudent participants, who themselves weredrawn predominantly from the local inner-London community. Responses from the non-student group were compared to those ofthe main sample, no meaningfully significantdifferences emerging. Hence, the 50 com-pleted questionnaires were pooled with thestudent responses to form a 551-strong sample.

To collect the student data, questionnaireswere distributed in classes during each of twosemesters in 2007 to subjects who confirmedthat they had made their first ever donation (of

1The interviews were conducted by a class of under-graduate marketing research students as part of a groupassignment.


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more than £3 in value) to a charity more than2 years previously. The 2-year cut-off periodwas imposed on the grounds that if a personhad failed to make a second gift within 2 yearsof making the first then it was unlikely that heor she would do so thereafter. Hence, therespondents had been ‘allowed’ 2 years inwhich to decide to make a follow-up gift.Another reason for only considering peoplewho had given for the first time earlier than2 years before the data were collected was theneed to exclude individuals who had madetheir first donation to a charity just recently andwho therefore had not had time to get aroundto consider offering a follow-up gift. Smalldonations (defined as involving less than £3)made to street collectors or to charity collec-tion tins in bars or retail outlets wereproscribed on the grounds that (i) such giftsare typically made on impulse and without anysubstantial thought, (ii) the fundraiser will nothave provided information on the good causein question for evaluation by the giver and(iii) nearly everyone will have made a smalldonation of this nature at some point in theirlives (Hibbert, 1995). A note accompanied thequestionnaire explaining that monthly orquarterly standing orders counted as just onegift, that is, that the second payment of astanding order should not be regarded as asecond and separate gift to the first charity towhich the person had donated.The final questionnaire is summarised in the

Appendix to the paper, which also shows theliterature sources of the items in each section.Apart from the factual queries, all the itemswerescored using five-point agree/disagree scales.Where items had been adapted from otherinventories themodification procedure followedthat recommended by Engelland et al. (2000).Thus, the altered sales were scrutinised inde-pendently by two marketing academics toensure that (i) they fell well within the scopeof the domain of the construct under consider-ation, (ii) the outcomes anticipated from theamended scales matched those expected of theoriginals and (iii) the levels of abstraction ofthe initial and amended scales were the same.The final version of the questionnaire took about

5minutes to fill-in. Some of the items in theSection ‘Introduction’ of the Appendix (notably1[c] and 1[k]) required respondents to recallevents from memory, and the possibility arisesthat memory decay may have occurred. How-ever, research on memory decay has suggestedthat recalled information is biased predomi-nantly in situations where ‘bad’ events are thesubject of a recall request (Murray et al., 2004).Also, memory of routine transactions normallyextends to a couple of years with reasonablelevels of accuracy (Gold et al., 2005). The latterhas been confirmed by studies concerningmemories of the service quality of organisations(see Edvardsson and Roos, 2001). Giving morethan a trivial amount to a charity for the very firsttime will have represented a ‘good’ event formost individuals and may quite possibly havebeen accompanied by positive emotions andenhanced self-respect. Hence, it seems reason-able to suppose that the respondents’ self-reports of when theymade their first and (whereappropriate) second charity donations wouldnot have been unduly contaminated by memorydecay. It is relevant to note moreover thatcharities and charity giving are frequently in thenews (especially in relation to natural disasterssuch as the Asian tsunami) and it is known thatmatters surrounded by large amounts of pub-licity and information transmission are recalledmore readily and for longer periods than areothers (Edvardsson and Roos, 2001). Theresearchers did not detect evidence of studentsstruggling to remember time-related eventswhen answering relevant questions and noneof the respondents overtly complained of notbeing able to recall events whilst filling-in thequestionnaire. It is likely that individuals whowere unable to remember past donations wouldhave simply declined to complete the document.Responses to the items concerning each of

the constructs covered by the questionnaire(see the Appendix Sections 2–8) were factoranalysed, unidimensional solutions occurringin all cases2 except that item 3(c) in the

2In all cases, the first factor explained more than two-thirds of the total variation in the data and the Cronbach’sa value exceeded 0.81.


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personal inertia section was an outlier andhence was removed from the set of itemsmeasuring this proclivity. Composite scaleswere then formed for the seven constructs(two composites were created for responses toAppendix Sections 4 [image and reputation]and 5 [image congruence]: one for the firstcharity and one for the second). There are noa priori reasons for anticipating that the aboveconstructs should be interrelated, and sub-sequent statistical analysis did not provide anyevidence of multicollinearity among the vari-ables formed to reflect them. The possibledeterminants of a person making a seconddonation within the 2-year period consideredwere examined through a Cox proportionalhazards regression analysis, selected becausethe Cox model does not assume a particulardistribution of time periods before the secondevent and allows the inclusion of severalexplanatory variables. Individuals who didnot make a second donation within 2 yearsof the first were coded as such (i.e. ‘censored’in Cox regression terminology) and the modelestimated given that the maximum durationallowed (i.e. 2 years) was cut-off before asecond gift had been offered.

Results

General

The average age of the sample members was22.9 years (range of 18–41 years).3 Fifty-eightper cent of the participants were female;10% were from overseas. There were nomeaningfully significant differences in thepatterns of results according to the respon-dents’ age, gender or whether they weredomestic or foreign students. The median ageat which the participants had made their firstsignificant (i.e. more than £3) donation to acharity was 19 years (mean¼ 18.8), andthe median amount donated was £10(mean¼ £18.30) for ad hoc gifts (the largedifference between the mean and median

values was attributable to a number of highvalue donations) and £20 a year for standingorders (mean¼ £32). (Donations via standingorders accounted for 23% of all the first timegifts of the sample members.) Fifteen per centof the donations were made online, 40%through face-to-face collections (excludingchugging [see above] which was responsiblefor 20% of the standing orders signed by therespondents), 12% were made over the tele-phone and 10% by cheque.

It was not possible to ascertain accuratelythe proportion of the sampling frame that hadnever donated to charity (other than smallamounts of less than £3). Some of the studentsapproached would have failed to complete thequestionnaire because they had not donated;others because they refused or could not bebothered to participate; and yet more becausethey had followed the instruction not to fill-inthe document if they had started donatingduring rather than prior to the 2-year periodspecified. ‘Straw polls’ were conducted whichasked class members to indicate whether theyhad ever given (more than £3) to a charity. Insome classes barely 10% of the group assertedthat they had donated; in others the proportionwas over a third. The researchers gained anoverall impression that between 20 and 25% ofthe people approached had made a significant(more than £3) gift to a charity at some point.

Of the individuals who had given prior to the2-year cut-off point, only 15.2% had notmade asecond donation to a charity within 2 years ofmaking the first gift. Seventy-eight per cent ofthe second donations were to a different

charity than the one receiving the initialdonation. Of the second donations to differentcharities, 6% were to general ‘telethon’ eventscovering many good causes (e.g. ‘Red NoseDay’), and just 7% were to charities in the samesector as the charity benefiting from theoriginal gift. (Six per cent of the initialdonations were to general telethon typeevents.) The median value of the seconddonation was £10 (mean¼ £18) for ad hoc

gifts when the second donation went to thesame charity as received the first gift; £9(mean¼ £11.50) when the second donation

3In 2007, the average age of undergraduates entering theuniversity that hosted the investigation was 21.4 years.


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went to a different charity in the same sector;and £12.50 (mean¼ £20) when the second giftwent to a different charity in a different sector.The disparities in the mean values werestatistically significant at the .05 level. Standingorders accounted for 11% of second-time gifts(compared with 23% for first-time donations—see above) and had a median value of £26 perannum (mean¼ £35.50). The annual value of astanding order made in favour of a differentcharity was on average 10% higher than if thebeneficiary was the same organisation asreceived the first gift (p< .05).

Time to the second donation

Eighteen per cent of the sample made a seconddonation within 3 months of making the firstgift. Twenty-four per cent gave a second timebetween 4 and 6 months after the firstdonation; 15% between 7 and 9 months; and18% between 10 and 12 months. Thus, 75% ofthe sample had made their second donation toa charity within a year of their first-time everdonation. These all-sample percentages did notdiffer significantly according to whether thesecond gift was to the same or to a differentcharity.Table 1 shows the outcome to a Cox

proportional hazards regression completed toidentify significant influences on the likelihoodof a person making a second donation withinthe 2-year cut-off period. Initially all theconstructs listed in the Appendix were entered,and then removed if they failed to attainsignificance at the .05 level without diminishingthe explanatory power of the significant

variables. The regressors listed in Table 1retained their significance irrespective of theconfigurations of the other non-significantvariables that were included in the analysis atvarious stages. It can be seen from Table 1 thatthe likelihood was greater the higher thedegrees of emotional uplift (helpers’ high)and change in mind-set vis-a-vis charities thatpeople experienced consequent to the initialdonation, and the stronger the image andreputation and image congruity associated withthe second charity. Information overload(donor confusion) exerted a negative impacton the likelihood. Table 1 column headedExpBeta lists the ‘relative probabilities’ (‘hazardratios’ in Cox regression terminology)applicable to each of the independent variables.A relative probability figure indicates thechange in the probability that a person willhave made a second donation by the end of the2-year period consequent to a one unit changein the value of the relevant independentvariable. Thus, for instance, a one unit rise inthe value of the variable ‘emotional uplift’experienced by a person after the first donationleads to a near doubling of the probability that asecond donationwill occur in any given interval(see the Appendix item 1[k]) during the next 2years. There was no evidence of any of theTable 1 regressors exerting moderating effectson the impacts on the probability of making asecond gift of the other independent variables.Figure 1 plots the equivalent of the survival

function (termed as the ‘non-donation function’in the present context) derived from the Coxregression, computed at the mean values of theindependent variables listed in Table 1. The

Table 1. Cox regression

Beta Wald Chi-square (1 df) Sig ExpBeta

Emotional uplift .67 6.4 .01 1.96Image and reputation of the second charity .73 5.43 .02 2.07Change in mind-set after the first gift .39 4.87 .03 1.48Information overload �.47 4.35 .04 0.63Image congruity of the second charity .38 4.35 .04 1.46

Overall model �2LL (5 df)¼ 21.51. Sig¼ .001.


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figure shows how the ‘survival’ (as a non-second-time donor) of a hypothetical individual (withmean values in Table 1 independent variables)decreases over time. It can be seen from Figure 1that the probability of this theoretical person not

having made a second donation to a charity fallsto just over 60% within 6 months and to 30%within a year. The probability changes little overthe next 9 months, and then halves compared toits previous level. Hence, the critical periodsfrom the fundraiser’s point of view are about 3–6months, and then around 9–12 months after theinitial donation.

Choice of charity for a second

donation

Subjects whose first or second gift involved acontribution to a general ‘telethon’ type appeal

were removed, leaving just 21 people whosesecond donation was to the same category ofcharity as the first (e.g. if both gifts went to twodifferent animal charities). As this figure of 21subjects represented too small a number toinclude as a category in a logistic regression,the 21 cases were excluded, as were 34 otherswhose first or second gift had been made to ageneric telethon type event. This left 103people who had given to the same charity onboth occasions and 309 whose seconddonation was to a different charity. Table 2shows the outcome to a binary logisticregression completed to determine the vari-ables that significantly affected a person’schoice of the same or a different charity for hisor her second gift. Independent variables wereselected via the procedure described inrelation to Table 1. The variables listed were

0.0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1.0

0 6 12 18 24Time (months)

Cum

Non

-don

atio

n

Non-donation function at mean of covariates

Figure 1. Non-donation function.

Table 2. Logistic regression

Beta Wald Chi-square (1 df) Sig ExpBeta

Inertia �.38 6.74 .01 .68Social pressure .47 6.13 .01 1.6Image and reputation of the second charity .37 5.76 .02 1.5Image congruity of the second charity .31 4.49 .03 1.4

The dependent variable was coded as 1 of the person’s second gift was to the same charity and 2 if the second gift wasto a different charity. �2LL (487 df)¼ 509.7. Sig¼ .24. Nagelkerke pseudo-R square¼ .54. Percentage of correctlyclassified cases¼ 79%.


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those that retained statistical significance(p< .05) regardless of whichever other (insig-nificant) variables were incorporated into theregression. The results suggest that peoplewho were inert by nature were significantlyless likely to cross-donate, presumably prefer-ring to save themselves the mental effort ofhaving to choose an alternative good cause tothe one to which they had already given. If aperson had given to the first charity largelybecause of social pressure there was a highprobability that the individual would switch toa charity deemed more suitable for the personinvolved when making the second gift. Theimage and reputation of the second andalternative charity and its congruence with adonor’s self-image also contributed to de-cisions to give to a different organisation.Image congruence exerted an impact inde-pendently of personal inertia. There was noevidence that high inertia discouraged peoplefrom switching to organisations that betterfitted their self-image. This was confirmed byentering the product of these two variables(mean centred to avoid technical problemsarising from multicollinearity) as a moderatorin the regression. The resulting coefficient wasinsignificant (p¼ .59). Second and third ordermoderators were created for the other Table 2independent variables, no significant influ-ences emerging.Comparing the independent variables that

attained significance in Tables 1 and 2 it canbe seen that emotional uplift (helpers’ high)affected the probability of making a seconddonation to (any) charity but not the specificchoice of charity, indicating that pleasurablesensations resulted from giving to charitableorganisations of all types. Likewise for mind-setchange, which influenced the likelihood offurther giving irrespective of the charityinvolved (as predicted a priori). Informationoverload (presumably leading to donor con-fusion) impacted negatively on decisions togive for a second time to any charity. However,it did not influence whether a person trans-ferred his or her support to another organis-ation. Thus, the variable discouraged seconddonations in general rather than the choice of a

specific charity for follow-up gifts. Levels ofpersonal inertia only influenced switching

behaviour; not the propensity to give againto any charity. This suggests that high inertiapeople could not be bothered to make thecognitive effort associated with the transfer ofsupport to an alternative organisation. Never-theless, this did not imply that such individualscould not be bothered to make repeat gifts.Social pressure to donate to the first charity didnot discourage follow-up gifts to any charity,yet it was substantially associated with theprobability of dropping support for the firstcharity to which the person felt he or she hadbeen coerced to give.

Values of first and second donations

Correlations among the variables wereexamined to gain insights into the possibledeterminants of the values of first and secondgifts. Two variables correlated significantly(p< .05) with the monetary value of the firstdonation: social pressure (R¼ .42) and imagecongruence with the recipient organisation(R¼ .39). For people whose second donationwas to the same charity as received the firstgift, significant correlations occurred betweenthe financial value of the second donation andthe degrees of mind-set change (R¼ .38) andinformation overload (donor confusion)experienced (R¼�.4), and with inertia(R¼�.35). These variables also correlatedsignificantly (R¼ .38, �.43 and �.41) withthe monetary values of second donations toa different charity. There were further signifi-cant correlations between the value of thesecond gift to an alternative charity and thereputation of the second charity (R¼ .37) andits image congruence (R¼ .35). All the corre-lations among the constructs covered bythe questionnaire were inspected to assesswhether outcomes might differ with respectto sub-groups of the sample defined in terms ofthe donor’s age, income category (Appendix1[b]), charity sector receiving the first gift(1[e]) and mode of giving (1[f]). No significantdisparities emerged from this exercise.


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Conclusion and discussion

It appeared that between 20 and 25% of thesampling frame had made a donation to charityexceeding £3 in value. Nearly 85% of thepeople who had in fact given went on to makea second gift to the same or to a differentcharity. The overwhelming majority (78%) ofsecond gifts benefited charities other than theorganisation that received the first gift. Just 7%of the second donations that went to differentcharities were made to organisations in thesame sector as the first charity. The medianvalue of second gifts to different charities was(at £12.50) higher than the median value ofinitial donations. This disparity was explainedin part, perhaps, by people choosing for theirsecond gift a charity that better fitted their self-image and which they deemed to possess ahigh reputation (see Table 2). A person’sdecision to donate to a different charity wasalso influenced positively and significantly bythese two variables, and negatively by theindividual having felt pressurised by others togive to the first organisation. People who wereinert by nature were less inclined to botherswitching charities for the second donation.The probability of an individual making a

second gift within 2 years of the first wassignificantly greater among respondents whoexperienced a substantial level of helpers’ highwhen making the initial contribution, whoregarded the charity receiving their second giftas being congruent with their self-image and ashaving a good reputation, who did not feelconfused by the range and variety of charitiesseeking donations, and whose mind-settowards charities had changed (improved)substantially in consequence of making thefirst donation. The probability of a persongiving for a second timewas highest between 3and 6 months and between 9 and 12 monthsfrom the occurrence of the first donation.Seventy-five per cent of the sample made theirsecond gift within a year of making the first.

Discussion

These results are compatible with the prop-osition that the very act of donating to a charity

can itself generate a positive change in aperson’s mind-set vis-a-vis charity giving.Thirty-nine per cent of the sample’s responsesfell in the top two categories of the compositeformed for the mind-set construct and just 12%fell in the bottom two divisions, leaving 49% inthe intermediate response grade. Levels ofmind-set change were not significantly related(p< .05) to age, presumably meaning that thephenomenon occurred irrespective of the timein a person’s life that he or she started donatingto charity. Moreover, mind-set change failed tocorrelate significantly with whether or not aperson had received communications fromcharities after making an initial donation.(Forty per cent of the sample reportedreceiving a communication from the charityto which they had made their first gift; 18%stated they had received a communicationfrom some other charity.) This suggests thatmind-set change was not simply the result ofcharities’ post-donation marketing and com-munications efforts. On average, however, theparticipants tended to notice charity adver-tisements and media stories about charitiesmore than had been the case before the firstdonation. Forty-five per cent of the sampleagreed or strong agreed that this had happenedcompared with 32% in the bottom twocategories. This outcome is compatible withthe occurrence of significant mind-set change.

The influences on the likelihood of aperson making a second donation within a2-year period (see Table 1) that werestatistically significant had been anticipateda priori. Other expected determinants of thislikelihood (i.e. personal inertia, social influ-ence and ‘communications from charities’[Appendix Section 9]) failed to attain signifi-cance. Personal inertia was associated withthe tendency not to change charities whenmaking the second donation (see Table 2),but not with the timing of a second gift.Possibly the time scales employed in thestudy were not appropriate for capturing theimpact of personal inertia in this connection,or maybe the items used to measure theconstruct were not suitable for the task.Further research is needed into this matter.


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Likewise, people whose initial gift had beenheavily motivated by the sight of otherindividuals making donations to a particularorganisation were thereafter more inclinedthan others to switch charities, but not tomake a second gift within the specified 2-yearperiod. The finding that communicationsfrom charities did not exert a significantimpact on the propensity to give a secondtime means perhaps that the respondentspaid little attention to thank you letters, etc.,sent after a person had made a first gift. It isrelevant to note in this connection thatcommunications from the first charity corre-lated significantly (R¼ .38) with the financialvalue of a person’s donation. Higher valuegifts seemingly attracted follow-up communi-cations, yet the recipients of these communi-cations did not subsequently donate for asecond time faster than lower value donors.An implication of the non-significance of the

charity communications variable is that organ-isations could be mis-timing the transmissionof their messages. The finding that people havehigher probabilities of making second gifts inspecific periods following an initial donationsuggests that communications will be moreeffective if they are sent during these periods.Unfortunately, recipient charities have no wayof knowing whether a gift received from adonor on a particular day is or is not theperson’s first-time ever gift, unless the individ-ual is asked this question at the time the giftis offered. Thus, the inclusion of a ‘tick-box’option whereby individuals can furnish thisinformation when giving online, over thephone, or in response to direct mail advertisingmight be worthwhile. It is known moreoverthat certain types of campaign attract largenumbers of first-time donors, so it may beuseful to schedule follow-up communicationsto all who respond to such campaigns on atime scale relevant for first-time givers. Also, itmight be worthwhile for a charity to considerthe preparation of special welcome packs fordonors known to be under 21 years of agewhen they make their first donations, on thegrounds that many under-21s will be giving forthe first time.

Areas for further research

The outcomes to the study suggest several areasfor further research. A limitation of the studywas its reliance on respondents’ self-reportingof events and hence on the accuracy of theirmemories. Tracking studies that sampledgroups of individuals to ascertain the precisetimings of their first and second donationswould be useful, although the danger thenarises that ‘ideas will be put into the heads’ ofthe participants regarding how they shouldbehave as donors. Another limitation of theinvestigation was that it was completed in amass-market university that catered mainlyfor students from certain socio-economiccategories. It would be instructive to repeatthe study with groups of young people fromother (essentially higher) socio-economic back-grounds. Additional research is required more-over into methods whereby charities canidentify a specific donor’s location in the donorlife cycle (first time or repeat giver, long-standing supporter, etc.). The study concludedthat second donations weremost likely to occurduring two specific periods following a first gift.Why exactly was this the case, and can thetiming of these high second donation prob-ability periods be manipulated? The causes andconsequences of donor confusion is also an areathat is worthy of further investigation.To the extent that mind-set change

represents a significant phenomenon in thecharity giving context, research is needed intohow an implementation mind-set can beprimed and how pro-charity mind-sets canbe exploited (e.g. to facilitate the sale ofcharity-branded products). In particular, whatare the connections between levels of mind-setchange and the nature and extent of theinformation provided to first-time donors bycharities? The results indicate substantialdegrees of ‘donor promiscuity’ in relation tosecond-time giving. This is obviously a matterof concern for charities that spend consider-able sums of money on procuring initial gifts.How can the recipients of first-time donationminimise subsequent donor promiscuity?Might it be worthwhile offering to first-time


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donors material incentives to induce them togive again (wallets, free entry to prize draws,access to downloadable computer games,etc.)? Clearly, there is much to explore inthe field of cross-charity donation behaviour.

Biographical notes

Dr. Roger Bennett is a professor at LondonMetropolitan Business School. His researchinterests are in the area of nonprofit marketingcommunications, focusing particularly on theadvertising imagery employed by charitableorganisations. Roger’s career has includedperiods in the mining and metallurgical indus-tries, in a leading commercial bank and inmanagement consultancy. He is the author ofmany books and a large number of journalarticles on various aspects of marketing andbusiness management.Rehnuma Ali-Choudhury is a lecturer in theCentre for Research in Marketing at LondonMetropolitan University. She has researchinterests in the field of public sector marketing,particularly in relation to the analysis of thebrand identities and brand personalities ofpublic sector institutions. Rehnuma is cur-rently engaged on a wide ranging study ofthe branding strategies and policies of UKuniversities. She has published extensively inacademic journals in the nonprofit marketingarea.

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Appendix: The questionnaire

1. General(a) Please state your age: ______ years.(b) Would you say that compared to most other families your own family’s total income is

(please circle): well above average/above average/about the same/below average/wellbelow average?

(c) What was the monetary value of your first donation to a charity (ignore casual gifts of lessthan £3)? If your first donationwas through a standing order please use the value of the firstpayment of the standing order and state whether the amount is payable monthly orquarterly. Please insert: £ ___________.

(d) How old were you when you made your first donation to a charity? Please insert:____________ years.

(e) What was the name of the charity towhich youmade your first gift? If you cannot rememberthe name just state the general nature of the charity, for example, tsunami, cancer, animalwelfare, famine relief. If you responded to a general television fundraising event, for example,‘Red Nose Day’, ‘Live Aid’ or ‘Children in Need’, just indicate the nature of the event.

(f) How did you make the donation (please circle): online/cheque/collecting box/directdebit/other?

(g) Have youmade another donation to a charity sincemaking your first gift? (Please ignore thesecond payment of a standing order.) Please circle: Yes/No.

(h) If you did make another donation was the second donation to (please circle): (i) the samecharity as for your first gift (please ignore the second payment of a standing order) or (ii) adifferent charity?


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(i) If the charity towhich youmade your second donationwas not the same as that towhich youmade your first donation please give the name of the second charity, if you cannot rememberthenamespecify thecharity typeornatureof theevent, for example, ‘LiveAid_____________.

(j) What was themonetary value of your second gift to a charity? If you paid by standing orderplease state the amount of thefirst payment andwhether the standingorderwasmonthly orquarterly. Please insert: £ ___________.

(k) How long was the period that elapsed between the time youmade your first donation andwhen you made your second donation (please tick):

2. Change in mind-set consequent to the first donationSource: Adapted from Webb et al. (2000).

(a) After I hadmademy first gift to a charitymy image of charities in general wasmore positivethan it was before I made my first gift to a charity.

(b) After I made my first gift to a charity I had more favourable views on:

(i) charities’ general levels of efficiency in relation to how they spend their money;(ii) charities’ general levels of ability to help the needy and perform a useful function in

society.3. Inertia

Source: Adapted from Marin (1991).(a) Getting things done on time is not very important to me.(b) I have to confess that I am less concerned about my problems than I should be.(c) I am a person who is not particularly interested in having new experiences.(d) To be honest I am a person who needs someone to tell me what to do each day.(e) I really should put more effort into getting things done.

4. Image and reputationSource: Bennett and Gabriel (2003).(a) The first charity to which I donated:

(i) is very well known;(ii) has an excellent reputation for assisting its beneficiaries;(iii) can be trusted by the general public in relation to using its assets wisely;(iv) is well known among the general public for being capable and well managed.

(b) The above were repeated in relation to the second charity.5. Image congruence

Source: Adapted from Sirgy et al. (1997) and Ataman and Ulengin (2003).(a) The first charity that I donated to:

(i) has an image that is consistent with how I see myself;(ii) has an image that is consistent with how I like to see myself;(iii) is the sort of charity that people I admire would donate to.

(b) I can identify with the type of people who donate to this (first) charity.The above items were then repeated for the second charity.6. Information overload

Items were specially created for the current study.(a) There are somany charities aroundnowadays that I find it difficult to understandwhat each

of them does.(b) So many charities ask me for donations that I really do not know which are the most

deserving.

1–3 months 3–6 months 7–9 months 10–12 months 13–15 months

16–18 months 19–21 months 22–24 months Longer than 2 years


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(c) I am not sure what goes on in charities.(d) I get confused when I think about charities.

7. Emotional uplift (helpers’ high)Source: Adapted from Laurent and Kapferer (1985).(a) Donating to the first charity gave me a lot of pleasure.(b) After making my first donation to charity I felt that my own life had been made better.(c) I obtained deep inherent satisfaction from giving to the first charity.(d) I felt uplifted after making the donation to the first charity.(e) Giving to the first charity resulted inmy feeling that Iwas a better person that Iwas before I

made the gift.8. Social influence

Source: Adapted from Ajzen and Fishbein (1980).(a) To a large extent I was motivated to give to the first charity because so many other people

were giving to the charity at the time.(b) I was motivated to give to the first charity because I knew that my friends, family or

workmates approved of my making the donation.(c) Amajor reason I gave to the first charitywas that itmademe feel good to know that people I

know were also giving.9. Communications from charities

(a) After making your first donation did you receive a direct communication (e.g. an email, athank-you letter, a supporter’swelcome pack or a charity’s news sheet) from the charity towhich you made your first donation (please circle)? Yes/No.

(b) After making your first donation to a charity did you receive a direct communication fromsome other charity, that is, a charity different to the first (please circle)? Yes/No.

(c) After making your first donation to a charity did you tend to notice charity advertisementsand stories about charities in newspapers and on TV to a greater degree than before youmade your first donation to a charity?


DOI: 10.1002/nvsm


Second-gift behaviour of first-time donors to charity: an empirical study

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