SEAS Space Surveillance Study

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Colorado Springs Co 718-683-8733 11/23/2014 Space Radar & FCS - BCT System Effectiveness Analysis SMDC Study Approved for Public Release 09-SMDC-4814 (2 SEPT 07)

Transcript of SEAS Space Surveillance Study

Page 1: SEAS Space Surveillance Study

Colorado Springs Co

718-683-8733

11/23/2014

Space Radar & FCS-BCT

System Effectiveness

Analysis

SMDC Study

Approved for Public Release

09-SMDC-4814 (2 SEPT 07)

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Agenda

• Study Objectives Overview

– Review of Study Issues, MOE, and Analysis Products

• FCS-BCT Scenario Overview

• Assumptions Update

• SEAS Force Composition

• Space Radar Composition

• ISR Collection Scheduler

• Run Matrix Summary and Changes

• Overview of Results (all study cases)

• Conclusion & Recommendations for Further Study

• Detailed Analysis (Base Case – 100 Runs)

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Study Issues

• Study Issue 1. What are the impacts on BCT ground effectiveness with varying priorities of Army FCS BCT information requests?

– Objective 1. [Effectiveness] Can the BCT meet mission vignette objectives, given varying priorities of information requests?

– Objective 2. [Efficiency]. How long does it take the BCT to achieve mission vignette objectives given varying priorities of information requests?

– Objective 3. [Lethality] What is the loss exchange ratio of the BCT to Threat while achieving the mission vignette objective, given varying priorities of information requests?

– Objective 4. [Survivability] How many BCT systems are lost achieving the mission vignette objectives, given varying priorities of information requests?

• Study Issue 2. What are the impacts on BCT ground effectiveness with varying schedule algorithms? (with similar objective.) Varying inputs?

• Study Issue 3. What are the impacts on BCT ground effectiveness with varying ISR collection agents/platforms? (with similar objective.)

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Measure of Effectiveness (MOE)

• (1) Mission accomplishment. Does the BCT achieve the minimum requirements for mission accomplishment defined by the mission vignettes?

• (2) Time to Complete Mission. What is the time required for the BCT to achieve the minimum requirements for mission accomplishment defined by the mission vignettes?

• (3) Loss Exchange Ratio (LOE). What is ratio of Blue to Threat system losses incurred while the BCT achieves the minimum requirements for mission accomplishment defined by the mission vignettes?

• (4) System Loss. How many BCT platforms are lost while the BCT achieves the minimum requirements for mission accomplishment within the vignettes?

• (5) Detection History. What is the per minute record of sensor-target detections while BCT achieves the minimum requirements for mission accomplishment defined by the mission vignettes?

• Make sure scenario, blue TTPs, and threat TTPs provide an opportunity to measure OPTEMPO.

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Required Analysis Products

Optimization

• Developing a simulated scheduler that

– takes pre-planned inputs based on global deck for all ISR

systems

– schedules information requests based on constraints from SR

constellation capabilities

– evaluates Army FCS information requests for collection.

• Develop a BCT and below maneuver vignette to support

analysis using information requests as part of the global

collection plan.

• Show impacts of System Response in terms of ground

maneuver measures of effectiveness (MOE).

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Study Assumptions - Update

• FCS-BCT with organic UAV & UGS Sensors

provide continuous coverage (unrealistic)

• Red Force has comparable force capabilities,

including satellite access

• Communication time delays are constant

(unrealistic)

• UAVs are un-killable (unrealistic)

• SR is the only global ISR collection asset

(unrealistic)

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SEAS FCS-BCT & SR Scenario

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SEAS Overview

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System of Systems

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Satellites ● UAVs ● GSR ● Attack Help ● Dismount Units ● Mounted Units ● TBMs

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Where SEAS “Fits In”

SEAS represents an important tool for military utility

analysis with emphasis on space based ISR and

communication systems that provides unique capability

to conduct trade studies and “what if” analyses

Study Plan

• Scenario

• Data

• Tool(s) Selection

Find areas or trends

that warrant more

detailed exploration

SEASLarge Trade Space

Other ModelsExtended Air Defense Simulation (EADSIM)

Vector-in-Commander (VIC)

JANUS

Satellite Tool Kit (STK)

Extended Air Defense Testbed (EADTB)

Simulation Location & Attack of Mobile Enemy

Missiles (SLAMEM)

Joint Conflict and Tactical Simulation (JCATS)

Analyze SEAS Results

Few Runs

“Tends to Cause

and Effect”

Answer

“Cause and Effect By

This Much” Answer

Study Issue

Analyze ResultsStudy Complete

Numerous Runs

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SEAS Overview

● SEAS is a study-driven, agent-based, military utility analysis tool

● Physics-based, stochastic, Monte Carlo simulation

● Initially developed to support the military space acquisitions

community

● Used to explore the effects of space and C4ISR system

performance characteristics and concept of operations upon combat

outcomes

● Part of the Air Force Standard Analysis Toolkit (AFSAT)

● Part of the Air Force Space Command M & S Toolkit

● 100% Government-owned software

● Runs on Windows (PC) computers

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● A core team of government, FFRDC, and

SETA contractors guide the development of

SEAS based on the needs of the user

community

● The SEAS user community is quickly

growing and includes several organizations

across government and industry0

TEAM

SEAS

SMC/TDGov’t SponsorModel Manager,

TEAM SEAS Lead

AerospaceFFRDC

Core TEAM SEAS

Member

SPARTA, Inc.SETA Contractor

SEAS Developer,

Core TEAM SEAS

Member

RAND

CorporationCore TEAM SEAS

Member User

Community

SEAS User Community

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Operations

Other Than

War

Homeland

Defense/

Security

Special

Operations

Small Scale

Contingencies

Architecture Evaluations

System Performance Analysis

CONOPS Exploration

Requirements Determination/Analysis

Wargame Analysis

Trade-Off Analysis

Force Mix/Force Structure Analysis

Applications of SEAS

Major

Combat

Operations

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Example: SEAS Simulation of Maneuver Behavior (24 Tanks)

Multi-Agent Simulation

of Complex Systems

Self Organized Behavior Emerges from Local Rules

Yes, Ants can be modeled in SEAS…

Observe

Orient

Decide

Act

If no enemy detected:

• Stay in formation

• Move Towards Objective

If enemy detected:

• Task Other Sensors

• Engage it

When fired upon:

• Take Defensive Action

• Task Sensors

• Return Fire or Call Fire

Support

When Operational Picture

Changes

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SEAS Model Construction

Graphic illustration taken from Multi-Agent Systems, Jacques Ferber, Addison-Wesley, 1999.

• SEAS provides an N-dimensional “playground” for exploration

Slide adapted from EINSTEIN: An Artificial Life Approach to War, Andy Illachinski, CNA, 2000.

Aggregated forces

(agents)

Individual combatants

(agents)

FORCE

The SEAS User

UNITagent

PLATFORMagent

Agents interact with each other and their

environment through user-defined sensors,

weapons, communications gear (devices)

SEAS models contain hierarchies

of user-defined agents

Agents contain user-defined

rules (programmable logic)

which define their actions

and behaviors

Outcomes emerge from the

complex interactions of agents

Variable Resolution

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SEAS Virtual Battlespace

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• Units can own other units (sub-units), platforms and equipment

• There are four key concepts that apply to unit agent actions and

interactions:– The Local Target List (LTL)

– The Local Orders List (LOL)

– The Target Interaction Range (TIR)

– The Broadcast Interval (BI)

Unit Agent Overview

- Commands

- Target

Sightings

- Broadcast

Variables

Target

Weather

Terrain

Day/Night

I’d better

surrenderUnit Agent

Comm

Owned

Platforms

Weapons

Sensors

Local

Target List• TOS 1• TOS 2• etc.

User Programmed

Behaviors• Perception

• Awareness

• Knowledge

• Understanding

• Decisions

Local

Orders List• Formation Column• Move Location• etc.

Moving

Personnel

Owned

Sub-units

Broadcast

Variables_____________________

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The Local Target List

● Each unit maintains a Local Target List (LTL) containing all enemy

platforms/units that it is aware of

● This LTL forms the unit’s sensed tactical picture of the battlefield

● Enemy plaftforms/units enter the LTL through:─ Detection by onboard sensors

─ Via communications channels

● Enemy targets not updated by one of the two above methods within the unit’s

“Threat_Hold” time are removed from the LTL

● Enemy targets that are killed and BDA'd are also removed from the LTL

UAV

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The Local Orders List

● Each unit maintains a Local Orders List that contains a

stack of orders for execution

● Orders enter the list from onboard programmed behavior or

flow down from higher echelons via communications

channels

● Locally issued orders take precedence over externally

generated orders

UAV

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Target Interaction Range

& Broadcast Interval

● Targets outside the unit’s interaction range are not posted on

the LTL even though sensor sightings for that target are

available on the communications channel

● The maximum target range is set by default to 2.5 times the

maximum owned sensor or weapon range whichever is larger,

however the analyst can override this default behavior using

the “Max_Target_Range” parameter for units and platforms

● The agent broadcasts all targets on its LTL at an interval

defined by the “Broadcast_Interval”

Max

Target

RangeAK

A Inte

ractio

n R

ange

Max

Sensor

Range

Max

Weapon

Range

UAV

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The FCS BCT

Scenario

Caspian Sea 20 Vignette 1

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Caspian Sea Strategic Context

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FCS BCT – A Unit Task Organization

UA

HHC BIC FSBNLOS

V

FCS (Manned):

ICV

C2V

R&SV

MCS

NLOS Mortar

FCS Cannon

FCS MV-Evac

FCS MV-T

FRMV

FCS (Unmanned):

ARV-RSTA

ARV A (L)

ARV-Assault

MULE –

Transport/Retrans

NLOS LS

SUGV

MULE w/ GSTAMIDS

Trucks/Trailers:

HMMWV (C2)

HMMWV (SPT)

HEMTT – LHS

HEMTT – Fueler

HMMWV – CMT

HMMWV - AMB

HEMTT Wrecker

Trailers – PLS

FRS (Includes LHS)

Tank Racks (POL)

Hippos

Camels

SATS Trailers

UAVs:

UAV CL I L/C Units

UAV CL I Aerial Vehicles

UAV CL II L/C Units

UAV CL II Aerial Vehicles

UAV CL III L/C Units

UAV CL III Aerial Vehicle

UAV CL IVa L/C Units

UAV CL IVa Aerial Vehicles

UAV CL IVb L/C Units

Other:

RAH-66 Comanche (or

alternate)

81mm Mortar

Forklift – 10K

Forklift – 4K

E-Q36 Radar

Q64 Radar

AAFARS

HTARS

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Caspian Sea 20 – Vignette Overview

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SEAS FCS-BCT Scenario Forces

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Space Radar

• Built-in Sat files– SR1-SR12

– Sensor "BluIMINT_narrow“• Min_Range 0

• Break_Range 2600

• Max_Range 2600

• Az_Width 1

• El_Min -.50

• El_Max .50

• TLE 10

– Comm "BlueSatRadio_Tr"

– Comm "BlueSatRadio_Rc"

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ISR Collection Scheduler

• Modeled in TPL as a

Scheduler vehicle

• Tasks are read from

external file

• Read into an array through

TPL

• Prioritized based upon user

priority variable

• Predetermined task

duration

• If no active task is in the

queue, then SRs look at

default locs

• Broadcasts LookLoc to the

SRs

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Comparative Results

SMDS Study

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SMDC Study

Test Cases

- Alt 2 and Alt 3 (no Sensor Fusion) were not run

- Exc 2 (Limited Assuredness) was run for 50%, 10%, and 1% Assuredness

- Exc 3 (Partial Constellation) was run for 6 radars, 3 radars, and 1 radar

- An Additional Case (Exc 4) was run with No Space Radar

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Base Case

No Space

Radar

No UAV/

UGS

Box-Plot Comparison - MOU

Blue Vehicles Lost & Battle Duration

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SMDC Study Comparative Results

MOU – Avg Time to Withdraw or Defeat

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Conclusions &

Recommendations

For Further Study

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Conclusions

• The combination of FCS-BCT organic sensors and

Space Radar generate a ISR collection dynamic that

increase system effectiveness.

• The combination of FCS-BCT organic sensors and

Space Radar “minimize” blue casualties and battle

duration. Neither alone are as effective.

• There are sensor interactions that cannot be

explained by the current analysis. These require

further investigation.

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Recommendations for Further Study

• Variable communication delays – sensor

information latency

• Stochastic UAV survivability modeled

• Non-continuous FCS-BCT UAV coverage

• Global UAV ISR collection assets (e.g., Warrior)

• Varying schedule algorithms – more complexity