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Bibliography

Philosophy of Science, Annotated Stanford, Fall, 1980

Prepared by Lindley Darden of the Committee on the History and Philosophyof Science, University of Maryland, College ParkPrepared for Seminar on Theory Constaiction and Analogical Reasoning, cotaught with BruceBuchanan

BOOKS

A. Old but with selections still worth readin

John Stuart Mill, A System of Logic, Book 111, "Of Induction"an old but useful source, especially for the methods of experimental inquiry, a discussion of theirlimitations and the role of hypotheses and analogical reasoning

William Whewell's Theory of Scientific Method, cd. Robert Butts (University ofPittsburgh, 1968)a good selection from Whewell's numerous writings; see especially Whewell'sidea of a "consilience of inductions," namely cases in which a single hypothesisexplains two classes of different kinds of facts. For example, Newton'shypothesis of tlie existence of the force of universal gravitation explains bothKepler's laws and laws of falling bodies.

Charles Peirce: .Selected Writings, cd. Philip Wiener (Dover, 1958)

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this book is one of several that contain selections from Peirce's writings inphilosophy of science. Especially pertinent is his work on abduction (alsocalled rctroduction) which, he argued, is a method of reasoning that is differentfrom induction and deduction; it yields new hypotheses.

J. M. Keynes, A Treatise on Probability (London, 1921), Chs.lB and 19 onanalogical argument

B. Classics of Twentieth Century Philosophy of Science

Carl Hcmpcl, Aspects of Scientific Explanation (Free Press, 1965)contains essays that are usually taken as definitive statements of the logical empiricist analyses ofscience; particularly relevant is "The Theoretician's Dilemma: A Study in the Logic of TheoryConstruction."

Carl Hempel, Philosophy of Natural Science (Prentice-Hall, 1966)a simplified and quick introduction to logical empricism; contains a brief statement of the problemof obtaining new theoretical terms via induction.Ernest Nagcl, The Structure of Science (Harcourt-Brace, 1961)another logical empiricist classic with more material on biology and social science thanAspects.

Karl Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (actually Logik der Forschuung which isbetter translated Logic of Scientific Investigation) (Hutchinson, 1959)this statement of falsification ism may be the most influential philosophy of science work of thetwentieth century; it is logical empiricist in character but stresses falsification rather thanconfirmation; does more with modus tollens than one would have thought possible.

Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd cd. (Chicago, 1970)a different paradigm in philosophy of science: less concern with the logical form of science and

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more with scientific change; argues that changes occur as the result of revolutionary change ofworld view; vague and much criticized but very influential, especially in the soft sciences.Readings in the Philosophy of Science, cd. Baruch Brody (Prcntice-Ha11,1970)a bit dated but still the best single collection of articles by diverse authors;a heavy emphasis onlogical empiricism and its critics but some newer matieral also, including one of Fcyerabend's sanerarticles "How to be a Good Empiricist-A Plea for Tolerance in Matters Epistemological," and anabsolutely essential article by N. R. Hanson "Is There a Logic of Scientific Discovery?

Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, cd. Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave (Cambridge, 1970)a collection of articles discussing Kuhn's work and also a defmtive piece by Lakatos "Falsificationand tlie Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes" in which a more sophisticated Popperianposition is used in discussing the growth of scientific knowledge.

C. Other books

Current Research in Philosophy of Science, cd. Peter Asquith and Henry Kyburg (Philosophy ofScience Association, East Lansing, Michigan, 1979--may be ordered directly from PSA)this book was the result of a recent conference to determine the state of the field. It and the PSAvolumes ( also published by the Association) , which are proceedings of the bienniel meetings, are agood way of finding out about current research in the field

Max Black, Models and Metaphors (Cornell, 1962)argues for an "interactional" view of metaphor: both things become changed as a result of the.metaphorical relation

Richard Blackwcll, Discovery in the Physical Sciences (Notre Dame, 1969)a disappointing book that is nonetheless useful as a guide to some of the discovery literature; it isvery poor when Blackwell tries to develop his own view

Ronald Giere, Understanding Scientific Reasoning (Holt, Rinchart and Winston, 1979)a new textbook with a very narrow view of science but useful for its flawed, but still interesting,attempt at providing a formalism for testing theories and causal hypotheses

iClark Glymour, Theoty and Evidence (Princeton, 1980) '

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>die newest attempt at confirmation Uieory; has a strong logical empiricist flavor.

Norwood Russell Hanson, Patterns of Discovery (Cambridge, 1965)one of the very few books in philosophy of science dealing with the logic of discovery (rather thanthe logic of justification) but the discussion of rctroduction was superceded by Hanson's article "Is>There a Logic of Scientific Discovery?"

Rom Harre, The Principles of Scientific Thinking (Chicago, 1970)a bit dated but quite useful for Ch. 2, "Models in Theories," which contains some usefuldistinctions and a somewhat baroque classification of different types of models..Mary B. Hesse, Models and Analogies in Science (Notre Dame, 1970)although written in an annoying dialogue style, this book has been influential in discussions ofmodels and analogies and has made standard the terminology of positive, negative and neutralanalogy; she stresses the importance of neutral analogy in theory construction.

Larry Laudan, Progress and Its Problems. Towards a Theory of Scientific Growth (University ofCalifornia, 1977)a new book currently getting a lot of attention that argues that the growth of science is to be seenas the solution of empirical and conceptual problems; much of the book consists of old ideasexpressed in new terminology.

W.H. Lcathcrdalc, The Role of Analogy, Model and Metaphor in Science (North Holland, 1974)

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a useful introduction to the diverse views on the topic; a large, eclectic bibliography.

Scientific Discovery, Logic andRationality and Scientific Discovery:Case Studies, cd. Thomas Nickles(Rcidel, 1980)These volumes are the proceedings of a good conference in 1978 and include very recent discussionson logic of discovery work in philosophy of science.

The Sttvcture of Scientific Theories, cd. Frederick Suppe, 2nd. cd. (University of IllinoisPress, 1977)This book is tlie proceedings of a conference in 1969 \. itli an extremely useful "Introduction" thattraces the history of much of twentieth century philosophy of science and, in the second edition, hasa very useful "Afterward-1977" that updates that history and discusses some very recent work,especially on tlie problems of theory structure and the growth of scientific knowledge.

Stephen Toulmin, Hitman Understanding, V. I, The Collective Use and Evolution of Concepts(Princeton, 1972)a vague and diffuse book that does too much but has sections mat are very suggestive, especially inChs. 2 and 3 on the evolution of intellectual disciplines and their explanatory goals

ARTICLES (in alphabetical order)

Peter Achinstein, "Inference to Scientific Laws," in Historical and Philosophical Perspectives ofScience, Roger Stuewer, cd., v. 5, Minnesota Studies in tlie Philosophy of Science, University ofMinnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1970.a useful article for considering the additions necessary to simple induction in order to get auniversal generalization; uses Guy-Lussac's law as an example.

Richard Boyd, "Metaphor and Theory Change: What is 'Metaphor' a Metaphor for?"in AndrewOrtony, cd., Metaphor and Thought, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1979, pp. 356-408.a dense article that takes on many complex problems of twentieth century philosophy; the firstsection is useful for the claims about the roles of metaphors in scientific dieories; later sectionsdefend a causal theory of reference.

Lindley Darden,"Reasoning in Scientific Change: Charles Darwin, Hugo de Vries, and theDiscovery of Segregation," Studies in the Histoty and Philosophy of Science 7 (1976) 127-169.a long article that proposes a schema for hypothesis construction and traces an episode of theorychange.

Lindley Darden,"William Bateson and the Promise of Mendelism," Journal of the History of Biology10 (1977) 87-106.discusses why Bateson was able, when many of his contemporaries were not, to see the newconceptions of Mendelism as promising for future work; proposes several general reasons forregarding new ideas as promising for future research.

Lindley Darden and Nancy Maull, "Interfield Theories," Philosophy of Science 44 (1977) 43-64.discusses Dardcn's concept of a scientific field and discusses the generation and function of theoriesthat bridge two different fields of science; examples arc from twentieth century biology: tliechromosome theory of Mendelian heredity, the operon theory of gene regulation and the theory ofallostcric interaction.

Lindley Darden, "The Heritage from Logical Positivism: A Reassessment," PSA 1976, v.2, cd. F.Suppe and P. Asquith (Philosophy of Science Association Publication, 1977) pp. 242-258.discusses ways that study of case studies has provided alternatives to some positivistic categories fordiscussing science: fields provide a broader category than theory; theory construction andmodification replaces the dichotomy between discovery and justification; and interfield theoriesprovide an alternative to derivational reductions as an analysis of progress and unification in science.

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Lindley Darden," Commentary on J. Hciman's, 'Hugo de Vries and the Gene Theory,' in HumanImplications of Scientific Advance, cd. E.G. Forbes, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh,Scotland, 1978, pp. 444-446.discusses a case that illuminates tlie relation between claims about the way tlie world is and thescientific fields that develop to study it: if de Vries's mutation theory had been true then the fieldof genetics and evolutionary biology would not have developed separately.

Lindley Darden/'Discoveries and the Emergence of New Fields in Science, "PSA 1978, v. 1, cd.P.Asquith and I. Hacking, Philosophy of Science Association Publication, 1978, pp. 149-160.traces a pattern of reasoning from the diiscovery of a new kind of entity, to its generalization inu atheory, to tlie emergence of a new field to study it; found in tlie cases of the emergence of thefields 'of cytology and biochemistry.

Lindley Darden, "Theory Construction in Genetics," Scientific Discovery: Case Studies, cd. T.Nickles, Reidcl, forthcoming 1980.argues tiiat the schema for hypothesis construction found in the Darwin-dc Vries case can also beapplied to the early construction of the theory of the gene and that scientists making use ofinterfield connections rather than analogies produced a better theory; suggests that, a good strategyin theory constaiction is to search for appropriate interfield relations prior to search for analogicrelations.

Lindley Darden, "Aspects of Theory Construction in Biology " Invited Symposia, 6th InternationalCongress of the Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, Hanover, 1979, forthcoming,using an example from classical genetics, the paper argues for steps to be used in modifying atheory when an anomaly is found, beginning with investigation of the generality of the anamolousevidence to a simple complication of a single postulate to more fundamental changes in thepostulates of -tlie theory.

Lindley Darden, "Theory Construction and Classical Genetics: The Anatomy of the Theory of theGene and Constraints on Its Modification," presented at the History of Science Society Meetings,Toronto, 1980. .outlines tlie structure of the theory of the gene and argues that constraints on theory modificationare of different kinds: empirical, theoretical, interfield and general adequacy constraints; suggeststhat we should develop a strategy of systematically enumerating and altering constraints to generate

alternative hypotheses.

PK Fcyerabcnd, "How to be a Good Empricist-a Plea for Tolerance in MattersEpistcmol'ogical/'originally appeared in Philosophy of Science: The Delaware Seminar, 11, reprintedin Readings in the Philosophy of Science, cd. Barach Brody,(Prcntice Hall, 1970), pp. 319-342.one of his saner articles: argues against consistency and meaning invariancc; proposes that science

should have numerous mutually inconsistent frameworks; provides no way of choosing among themand thus is a position of conceptual relativism; concludes with the remark that absurdity is

desirable.

G. K. Gilbert, "The Inculcation of Scientific Mediod by Example, with an illustration drawn fromtlie Quaternary Gclology of Utah," American Journal of Science, 3rd Series 31 (1886) 284-299.an old bur very interesting discussion of the teaching of scientific method; argues for theimportance of analogies in hypothesis formation and suggests that the person who is acquaintedwith the largest number of different types of hypotheses will have the best basis for drawinganalogies. Gives an example of his own reasoning in the construction of hypotheses in geology.

G X Gilbert, "The Origin of Hypotheses, Illustrated by the Discussion of a Topographic Problem,"Science NS 3 (1896) 1-13.argues that hypotheses arc always suggested by analogy; proposes that one should always start withas many hypotheses as one can devise and then proceed to devise crucial experiments to chooseamong them.

Gary Gutting, "The Logic of Invention," in Scientific Discover)', Logic, and Rationality, cd. T.

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Nickels (Rcidcl, 1980), pp. 221-234.a good discussion of the relations between a hypothetico-deductive mode of inference and anabductivc (retroductive) one; argues for the importance in discovery of the following: heuristicprinciples (analogy and simplicity), scientific intentions (goals of the scientific activity), andcosomological principles (e.g. matter has an atomic structure)

Gary Gutting, "Science as Discovery," in Revue Internationale de Philosophic, Revue Trimestrielle34 annee, no. 131-132, 1980, pp. 26-48.argues that methods of discovery are also methods of justification; proposes tiiat discovery takesplace in a question-context constituted by three main types of elements: empirical facts to beexplained; theoretical concepts, laws and models; and methodological considerations such as"heuristic tricks" (e.g. faiitful oversimplifications, intuitively helpful analogies), mathematical andexperimental techniques and substantive assumptions about the nature of the world and of scientificinquiry (search for conservation laws; look for reductive explanations; prefer simpler hypotheses).

Norwood Russell Hanson, 1960, "Is There a Logic of Scientific Discovery?" in Current Issues in thePhilosophy of ScienceM. H. Feigl and G. Maxwell (Holt, Rinehart, Winston, 1960), pp. 20-42,reprinted in Readings in the Philosophy ofScience, cd. Baruch Brody (Prentice Hall, 1970), pp. 620--633.now a classic article in the logic of discovery literature which discusses Hanson's view of Piercesabductivc (retroductive) inference as a means of inferring a plausible hypothesis of type H; thisarticles supercedes eh. 4 of his book, Patterns of Discovery.

N.R. Hanson, "Retroductive Inference," in Philosophy of Science, The Delaware Seminar, v. 1, cd.Bernard Baumrin, (John Wiley, 1963), pp. 21-37argues that the hypothetico-deductive(HD) and retroductive(RD) modes of inference areconceptually (not merely psychologically) different; HD is top down argument; RD is bottom upargument.

N.R. Hanson, "An Anatomy of Discovery," Journal of Philosophy 64 (1967) 321-352more like a classification of discovery acts than an anatomy, e.g., discover an X, discover X, discoverdiat X, discover an X as a V, etc.

Gerald Holton, Thematic Origins ofScientific Thought: Kepler lo Einstein (Harvard Press, 1973) andThe Scientific ImaginatioivCase Studies (Cambridge University Press, 1978)argues that scientists arc often guided by very general themata (e.g. simplicity) in their work;unfortunately presents no way of evaluating themata

Carl Kordig, "Discovery and Justification," Philosophy of Science 45 ((1978)110-117argues that the context of discovery should be broken down into two parts: the initial thinking upof a hypothesis and tlie judgment that it is plausible and worthy of test. The former he relegates topsychology to study; the judgment of plausibility he argues follows reasoning patterns similar tothose in the context of justification, both of which are subjects for philosophy of science.

Robert Monk, "The Logic of Discovery," Philosophy Research Archives 3 (1977) AlO-E6 (53 pageson microfiche cards)an excellent article criticizing Hanson's work and proposing a more developed view of discovery asbeginning with a vague idea which gets elaborated in further work.

Thomas Nickles, "Theory Generalization, Problem Reduction and the Unity of Science " in PSA1974, cd. R.S. Cohen, el. a/.(Rcidel, 1974), pp. 33-75.argues that problem reduction is an important component in scientific progress; proposes some kindof step of generalization in theory formation; this view may have relations to the pattern ofreasoning in (Darden, 1978) but neither Nickles nor Darden has fingured out exactly what therelations are.

Thomas Nickles, "Scientific Problems and Constraints," in PSA 1975. cd. P. Asquith and I. Hacking(Philosophy of Science Association Publication, 1978), pp. 134-148.

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begins development of a typology of constraints on problem solution in science.

Thomas Nickles, "Introductory Essay," and "Can Scientific Constraints be Violated Rationally?"inScientific Discovery, Logic and Rationality, cd. T. Nickles (Reidel, 1980), pp. 1-59 and pp. 285-315.a very useful essay about logic of discovery and a good article about when we can reasonablyviolate reasonable constraints.

Michael Ruse, "The Nature of Scientific Models: Formal v. Material Analogy," Phil Soc Sci 3(1973) 63-80.discusses Darwin's use of Malthus's essay in tlie theory of natural selection; argues for theimportance of material analogy in this case.

Michael Ruse, "The Value of Analogical Models in Science," Dialogue 12 (1973) 246-253argues that analogical models can play a role in justification; discusses Darwin's discovery of thetheory of natural selection.

Kenneth Schaffncr, "Logic of Discovery and Justification in Regulatory Genetics," Studies in theHistory and Philosophy of Science 4 (1970) 349-383.an excellent article that argues for a unitary logic of scientific inquiry in both discovery andjustificatorycontexts; analyzes the discovery of the operon theory of gene regulation and shows theimportance of analogical and deductive reasoning in the discovery of new hypotheses.

Dudley Shaperc, "Scientific Theories and Their Domains,"in The Structure of Scientific Theories,2nd cd., cd. Frederick Suppe (University of Illinois Press, 1977)discuss the concept of a scientific domain as a group of related items to be explained by a singletheory; discusses .patterns of reasoning leading to the formation of new scientific domains.