Science, Security, and the Cold War: The Case of E. U. Condon

Science, Security, and the Cold War: The Case of E. U. CondonAuthor(s): Jessica WangSource: Isis, Vol. 83, No. 2 (Jun., 1992), pp. 238-269Published by: The University of Chicago Press on behalf of The History of Science SocietyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/234506 .

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Science, Security, and the

Cold War

The Case of E. U. Condon

By Jessica Wang*

ON 1 MARCH 1948 A SUBCOMMITTEE of the House Un-American Activ- ities Committee (HUAC) issued a report labeling the physicist Edward U.

Condon, director of the National Bureau of Standards, "one of the weakest links in our atomic security."' The case immediately became national news and a pressing cause for concern among American scientists. Condon was one of the first scientists in the postwar years to come under fire as a security risk, and his ordeal signaled the beginning of a time of difficulty for many scientists, especially those engaged in research related to atomic energy. Throughout the late 1940s and early 1950s, thousands of scientists were subjected to varying degrees of harassment concerning their loyalty, sometimes from HUAC, but more often from the federal government's loyalty and security program. But although the Condon case was one of the best-known, most highly publicized anticommunist persecutions of the Cold War era, there has been little historical research either on Condon's troubles or on the general effects of the growth of domestic anticommunism on the American scientific community.2

* Program in Science, Technology, and Society, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cam- bridge, Massachusetts 02139.

I thank Deborah Fitzgerald, Loren Graham, Lily Kay, Peter Kuznick, Walter LaFeber, and Charles Weiner for their comments, advice, and encouragement at various stages in the preparation of this article. I would also like to thank the Cornell Undergraduate Research Program and the Dibner Institute for their generous assistance in underwriting research costs.

1 House Committee on Un-American Activities, Special Subcommittee on National Security, Re- port to the Full Committee of the Special Subcommittee on National Security of the Committee on Un-American Activities, 80th Cong., 2nd sess., 1 Mar. 1948, p. 1 (hereafter cited as Report to Full Committee).

2 Alice Kimball Smith has called the Condon case "the scientists' cause celebre until the Oppen- heimer case overshadowed it": Smith, A Peril and a Hope: The Scientists' Movement in America, 1945-47 (Chicago/London: Univ. Chicago Press, 1965), p. 424. Most of the literature on scientists and anticommunism focuses on the Oppenheimer case. There are few accounts of the Condon case available in the current literature, none of them very extensive. Robert K. Carr, The House Commit- tee on Un-American Activities, 1945-1950 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press, 1952), pp. 131-153, 384-390, contains a detailed analysis of HUAC's 1948 report on Condon and a discussion of news- paper coverage of the case. Richard M. Freeland, The Truman Doctrine and the Origins of McCar- thyism (New York: Knopf, 1972), pp. 313-318, has a short account of the case that places it in the context of tensions between HUAC and the Truman administration over the loyalty and security issue. Walter Goodman, The Committee (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1968), pp. 231-239, has a short, general discussion of the Condon case. On scientists and the loyalty and security program, Walter Gellhorn's early study, Security, Loyalty, and Science (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press, 1950), is still very useful. On the more general problem of scientists and McCarthyism, Ellen

ISIS, 1992, 83 : 238-269 238



THE CASE OF CONDON 239

' . .. _. .i-_ _ ~ ~~ ~ ~~~~~~ ~ ~ ~~~~~~~~~~ .i ..........

E. U. Condon, National Bureau of Standards, 21 January 1948.

. ....... .

......ii.i

.. ..

(Reproduced from the collection of the National Academy of Sciences Archives.)

In this essay I provide a detailed account of the attack on Condon from 1947 to 1954 and address the reasons why he was targeted by HUAC. Partisan politics provided the immediate rationale for HUAC's scrutiny of Condon, but the committee's charges derived their force and power from Cold War perceptions of the relationship between science and national security. There was a fundamental contradiction between an ideology, espoused by many scientists, of intellectual freedom and international cooperation in science and the postwar preoccupation with national security and protection of the " secret of the atom." The perception among policymakers and the public that the atom'ic bomb was the center of military and diplomatic strategy, combined with the widespread belief that the U.S. atomic monopoly could be maintained indefinitely, made scientists particularly vulnerable to efforts to forestall supposed attempts at atomic espionage. 3

J. Robert Oppenheimer, Condon, the Berkeley Radiation Laboratory scientists, Linus Pauling, Martin Kamen, HUAC's 1947 investigation of Oak Ridge, Senator Joseph McCarthy's 1953 investigation of Fort Monmouth-the possibil- ities for interesting case studies seem virtually endless, and relatively little attention has been paid to the experiences of scientists other than Oppenheimer. The case studies approach has its limitations, however. It must be augmented by attempts to understand how Cold War politics affected relations between science and the government and how the scientific community responded to domestic

Schrecker, No Ivory Tower: McCarthyism and the Universities (New York/Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1986), contains relevant information.

3 On the postwar faith in the atomic bomb's ability to ensure American security and the belief that the "secret of the atom" could be maintained indefinitely see Gregg Herken, The Winning Weapon: The Atomic Bomb in the Cold War, 1945-1950 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1988); and Paul Boyer, By the Bomb's Early Light: American Thought and Culture at the Dawn of the Atomic Age (New York: Pantheon, 1985), esp. Chs. 25-27.



240 JESSICA WANG

anticommunism. In this essay I go beyond the Condon incident itself to consider, in a preliminary manner, the general response of American scientists to the problems with loyalty and security requirements they faced throughout the Cold War period. I argue that the scientists' response, while couched in strong rhetoric, was actually restrained and cautious in character. Scientists made dramatic statements against Cold War security policies, but as a group they did not establish effective policies to defend individual scientists or challenge the assumptions of the national security state.4

Historians of American science often speak of "science in the postwar period." While they recognize the significance of the Cold War context, until recently they have rarely spoken explicitly of "science in the Cold War period." Recent works have emphasized the effects of military patronage upon the content of postwar science, but this literature has yet to address sufficiently how the politics of domestic anticommunism and the rise of the national security state affected relations between science and the government and the lives and careers of politically liberal scientists.5 There is still a great deal of fruitful research to be done. How are historians to understand and evaluate the roles of scientists in American politics and policy-making during this period? To what extent does the experience of the scientific community during the early Cold War years simply echo that of other groups, such as labor, the State Department, and the entertainment industry, and to what extent does it represent something different? Were scientists a threat to the Cold War political order, or did they acquiesce to it? Scien- tists became politically prominent and influential in this period, but which scientists? Who was left out? As a political community, should scientists be seen as united or fragmented during the postwar years? This paper is intended as a con- tribution to the developing discussion on postwar science, but it, like other recent work, only scratches the surface of a fascinating area for future research.

I use the phrase "national security state" in much the same sense as Daniel Yergin, to refer to the "unified pattern of attitudes, policies, and institutions" to be used to prepare the United States for a period of "perpetual confrontation and war" with the Soviet Union; see Yergin, Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1977), pp. 5-6. Recent work in the social and cultural history of Cold War America has emphasized the commitment to anticommunism at every level of American life. See, e.g., Elaine Tyler May, Homeward Bound: American Families in the Cold War Era (New York: Basic Books, 1988); and Stephen J. Whitfield, The Culture of the Cold War (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1991). These works lend credence to the view that the period of the Cold War in America was a time of mobilization for ever- lasting conflict with the Soviet Union.

5 The growth of the relationship between science and the federal government during World War II has been well documented; for information on the development of such relations since the beginning of the century, Daniel J. Kevles, The Physicists: The History of a Scientific Community in Modern America (1977; rpt. Cambridge, Mass./London: Harvard Univ. Press, 1987), is a good place to start. Two important recent accounts are Paul Forman, "Behind Quantum Electronics: National Security as Basis for Physical Research in the United States, 1940-1960," Historical Studies in the Physical and Biological Sciences, 1987, 18:149-229; and Kevles, "Cold War and Hot Physics: Science, Security, and the American State, 1945-56," ibid., 1989, 20:239-264, which is in part a reply to Forman. Forman provides a short discussion of the scientists' reaction to the loyalty and security issue (pp. 173-177), but both Forman and Kevles are primarily concerned with the effects of military patronage on the content and direction of physics research. Neither delves very deeply into the effects of national Cold War politics upon the lives and careers of American scientists or the response of the scientific community to the loyalty and security issue.




EDWARD UHLER CONDON: BIOGRAPHICAL BACKGROUND AND POLITICAL BELIEFS

In choosing to attack Edward U. Condon, the House Un-American Activities Committee picked a prominent target.6 Condon was a highly regarded physicist, recognized for his theoretical contributions to quantum physics in the 1920s. He also coauthored two well-known advanced physics texts: Quantum Mechanics with P. M. Morse in 1929, and Theory of Atomic Spectra with G. H. Shortley in 1936. The latter remained the standard text in its field for many years. By the 1940s Condon was an elder statesman of American physics. He was elected to the National Academy of Sciences in 1944, and he served as president of the American Physical Society in 1946. He was also famed in the physics community for his cheerful demeanor, sharp wit, and love of telling humorous stories, tales whose humor usually came at someone else's expense.

Condon was born on 2 March 1902 in Alamogordo, New Mexico. In an anec- dote typical of his style, he once claimed that a suspicious senator wanted to know how he had come to be born so near the location of the Trinity explosion, the first test of the atomic bomb. His parents separated when he was young, and in his early years he led a somewhat nomadic life with his mother, moving from town to town in the western United States. He identified with his western upbringing, and later in life his friendly, boisterous attitude seemed in marked con- trast to the more ascetic character of his East Coast colleagues. Philip M. Morse, one of his students at Princeton and textbook coauthor, later recalled that Con- don's "western vocabulary, the proletarian outlook, the rough-edged kindliness" seemed out of place among "the eastern establishment manners that were then the Princeton norm."7

Condon and his mother eventually settled in the San Francisco Bay Area, where Condon attended junior high and high school. As a youth he was interested in science, but upon graduating from high school he spent three years as a news- paper reporter before going to college. As a reporter for the conservative Oak- land Enquirer in 1919, he wrote what he recalled as "lurid and sensational" stories about the Communist Labor Party of California. The stories resulted in an indictment against the Communist Labor Party, and Condon was brought up to testify against its members during their trial. He found the experience disillusion- ing, and he turned to science.8

Condon received both his undergraduate and graduate degrees at the Univer- sity of California at Berkeley. He studied at Gottingen and Munich on a National Research Council fellowship after receiving his Ph.D. in 1926. Before leaving for Gottingen, Condon accepted an assistant professorship at Berkeley, but he changed his mind upon his return to the United States in 1927. Feeling a need for exposure to the eastern intellectual establishment, he instead lectured in physics

6 Biographical information has been drawn primarily from Philip M. Morse, "Edward Uhler Con- don," in Biographical Memoirs of the National Academy of Sciences, Vol. 48 (Washington, D.C.: National Academy of Sciences, 1976), pp. 125-151; Wesley E. Britten and Halis Odabasi, Topics in Modern Physics: A Tribute to Edward U. Condon (Boulder: Colorado Associated Univ. Press, 1971), esp. preface, pp. vii-xx; and Edward U. Condon, interviews by Charles Weiner, 17 Oct. 1967, 27 Apr. 1968, and 11-12 Sept. 1973, transcript, Oral History Collection, Niels Bohr Library, American Institute of Physics (AIP), New York.

7 Morse, "Condon," p. 129. 8Ibid., p. 126.



242 JESSICA WANG

at Columbia University before becoming assistant professor of physics at Prince- ton University in 1928.9 He left Princeton in 1929 to become professor of physics at the University of Minnesota, but he returned in 1930 and remained at Prince- ton for the next seven years as associate professor. He left in 1937 for the associate directorship of the research laboratories of the Westinghouse Electric and Manufacturing Company, where he established a program in research in nuclear physics, solid state physics, and mass spectroscopy. After June 1940 Condon was placed in charge of Westinghouse's research program in microwave radar, which soon led to his work in wartime physics research.

The 1930s were years of intense political activity for many American scientists. A strong core of liberal and leftist scientists, through organizations such as the American Committee for Democracy and Intellectual Freedom (ACDIF) and the American Association of Scientific Workers (AASW), promoted a broad political agenda. Their concerns were not limited to science and socially responsible ap- plications of research. They were just as interested in the larger issues of the day, and they promoted activities meant to fight fascism overseas and guarantee civil rights and the protection of civil liberties for religious and racial minorities in the United States.10 Condon had a generally civil libertarian outlook, but he does not appear to have been particularly active during this period. He participated as a local organizer in the 1939 Lincoln's Birthday Committee for Democracy and Intellectual Freedom (LBCDIF), the forerunner of the ACDIF, but he was not a member of the national committee of the LBCDIF, and there is no evidence indicating that he was a leading member of the organization.11 Possibly he attended meetings and signed petitions throughout the 1930s, but he was not a leading organizational figure like Franz Boas, Harold Urey, L. C. Dunn, and others. When he became active and vocal in the 1940s, he was concerned primarily with problems related specifically to science: atomic energy, security and secrecy requirements, and international cooperation in science.

In the fall of 1940 Condon began to work full time on military research projects. As a consultant to the National Defense Research Committee, he helped to or- ganize the Radiation Laboratory at MIT, the project responsible for the development of radar. Then he turned to work on the atomic bomb. In 1943 Condon

Raymond T. Birge provides an idiosyncratic description of Condon's rejection of a Berkeley assistant professorship for a position at Princeton; see Birge, History of the Physics Department, University of California, Berkeley, Vol. 2: The Decade 1918-1928 (Berkeley, Calif.: Privately printed, 1966), p. 8.42. Condon felt that the Berkeley physics department never forgave him for reneging on his acceptance. See Edward U. Condon to R. T. Birge, 9 Jan. 1967, J. Robert Oppen- heimer Papers, Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.; and Condon, interview by Weiner, 17 Oct. 1967, transcript, pp. 47-49, AIP.

10 For the political activities of liberal and leftist scientists in the 1930s, Peter J. Kuznick, Beyond the Laboratory: Scientists as Political Activists in 1930s America (Chicago/London: Univ. Chicago Press, 1987), has become the standard source. Kuznick documents the political activity of scientists in the 1930s, correcting the misperception that they were politically inert before the end of World War II. See esp. Chs. 6 and 7 for the general political agenda of the ACDIF.

" On Condon's participation in the Lincoln's Birthday Committee for Democracy and Intellectual Freedom activities see ibid., p. 190; and LBCDIF press release, 5 Feb. 1939, box 1 lA, ACDIF folder, Harlow Shapley Papers, Nathan Marsh Pusey Library, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachu- setts. A search of the voluminous materials in the Shapley Papers dealing with the National Council of Soviet-American Friendship, the ACDIF, and the Independent Citizens Committee of the Arts, Sciences, and Professions did not indicate any high-level activity on Condon's part in these organizations; his name did not appear on the letterhead as a sponsor of any of these organizations, and there was no correspondence between Shapley and Condon concerning them.




spent six weeks as associate director of the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory under J. Robert Oppenheimer. At Los Alamos he quickly earned the animosity of General Leslie Groves after several arguments about security regulations, and in his resignation letter he cited his opposition to the policy of compartmentalization as one of his main reasons for leaving. Like many of the Manhattan Project scientists, Condon considered compartmentalization, the idea that scientific information on the atomic bomb could be shared only with those considered to have a demonstrable need for it, an impediment to research. He also found other conditions, such as the censorship of mail and telephone calls and the possibility of complete militarization of Los Alamos, "extreme" and "morbidly depress- ing. ",12

After leaving Los Alamos Condon worked from August 1943 to February 1945 as a part-time consultant on the separation of U-235 from U-238 at the University of California at Berkeley. In October 1945 he was nominated for the position of director of the National Bureau of Standards by President Truman, on the advice of Secretary of Commerce and former Vice-President Henry A. Wallace. The bureau was one of the most important scientific research agencies of the federal government. Its primary responsibility was to establish standards and methods of measurement and to conduct research in new instrumentation for purposes of measurement. The bureau was also engaged in fundamental and applied research in a wide range of areas in chemistry, physics, and engineering. Condon was confirmed by the Senate without dissent and took over the directorship of the Bureau of Standards in November 1945.13

Politically, Condon described himself as a liberal. An independent thinker, he subscribed to no set ideology beyond a faith in the ability of human beings to act generously and rationally and an impatience with opinions he found small-minded and self-serving. He was confident in his own opinions and unafraid of controversy. Not impressed by authority, he felt no reluctance in confronting or criticizing individuals in powerful positions, such as General Groves and, at the height of the postwar Red scare, members of HUAC and President Eisenhower, if he felt them misguided or wrong.

While he held a generally liberal outlook, Condon, like most politically active scientists in the immediate postwar period, took up causes more narrowly fo- cused around science. He was particularly vocal on the subjects of atomic energy, secrecy, and international cooperation in science. He became a leading figure in the postwar atomic scientists' movement, which sought to educate the public about the dangers of the nuclear age and influence legislation relating to atomic energy. Condon helped lead the atomic scientists' efforts to oppose the May-Johnson bill, which contained strict secrecy regulations and placed atomic energy under military control, and he and Leo Szilard were the primary organiz- ers of scientists' efforts to publicize and lobby for civilian control of atomic en-

12 Condon to J. Robert Oppenheimer, 26 April 1943, Oppenheimer Papers. On the Manhattan Project scientists' reactions to the security regulations at Los Alamos see Martin J. Sherwin, A World Destroyed: The Atomic Bomb and the Grand Alliance (1975; rpt. New York: Vintage Books, 1977), esp. Ch. 2.

13 For a detailed history of the National Bureau of Standards see the official history: Rexmond C. Cochrane, Measures for Progress: A History of the National Bureau of Standards (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Commerce, 1966).



244 JESSICA WANG

ergy.14 Condon's association with Szilard also led to his introduction to Secretary Wallace and his appointment as director of the National Bureau of Standards. Condon's activities also led him to become technical advisor to the Senate Spe- cial Committee on Atomic Energy in November 1945. In that role he helped draft the McMahon bill, which passed in August 1946 and established control of atomic energy in the hands of the civilian Atomic Energy Commission.

Condon held an internationalist conception of science. To his mind, intellectual freedom and international cooperation were intimately linked. Scientific progress required open communication, free from military requirements of secrecy. Fur- thermore, since discoveries made by scientists in one country could be rediscov- ered by those in another, attempts to keep such discoveries secret were bound to fail over time. Secrecy could only retard research efforts without securing any advantages. Attempts to monopolize information would also create a suspicious mind-set that would damage international relations. In Condon's view, the only sensible alternative was open scientific cooperation between nations, and he pur- sued this goal through his public writings and his membership in the American- Soviet Science Society, an organization dedicated to information exchange between the United States and the Soviet Union. Cooperation would create goodwill as well as spread the benefits of science to the entire world. If an internationalist course were followed, Condon predicted in 1946, "the outcome will be world friendship and cooperation and not atomic war and the destruction of civ- ilization." In his later writings Condon continued to promote an internationalist outlook, and as the Cold War progressed, he increasingly lamented the rise of anticommunist hysteria and its attendant obsession with atomic secrets.15

MARCH 1947-MARCH 1948: HUAC'S INITIAL ATTACK

Condon's views were not very radical, especially when compared to those of Boas, Dunn, Harlow Shapley, or other 1930s activist scientists. Nevertheless, his internationalism, opposition to secrecy in science, and positions on atomic energy, combined with his prominence in government and a partisan political atmosphere, were enough to earn him long-term and heavy scrutiny from Represen- tative J. Parnell Thomas (R.-New Jersey) and the House Un-American Activities Committee. To the conservative Thomas, chairman of HUAC, Condon was an obvious target.

14 For a detailed history of the postwar scientists' movement, Smith, A Peril and a Hope (cit. n. 2), remains the standard source. Some useful supplementary information is found in Donald A. Strick- land, Scientists in Politics: The Atomic Scientists Movement, 1945-46 (Indianapolis: Purdue Univ. Studies, 1968). Documentation on Condon's activities can be found in Edward Uhler Condon Papers, boxes labeled "Atomic Energy," American Philosophical Society Library, Philadelphia, Pennsylva- nia.

15 E. U. Condon, "Science and Our Future," Science, 5 Apr. 1946, 103:415-417, on p. 417. For Condon's further views on secrecy and the internationalism of science consult his articles and speeches: "Science and International Cooperation," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 15 May 1946, 1:8-1 1; "Is War Research Science?" Saturday Review of Literature, 15 June 1946, 29:6; "Science and Security," Science, 25 June 1948, 107:659-665; "Science, Secrecy, Security," Harper's Magazine, Feb. 1949, 200:58-63; and "Reflections on Government," Bull. Atomic Sci., June/July 1949, 5:179- 181. For his criticisms of the loyalty and security system and the problems faced by scientists in the 1950s see "Problems of Scientists," Science News Letter, 12 Apr. 1952, 61:230; and "Scientists and the Federal Government," Bull. Atomic Sci., Aug. 1952, 8:179-182.




Thomas was Condon's political opposite. In general, he was opposed to liberal politics. According to Lewis H. Carlson, "Besides the Communists, [Thomas's] particular aversions were organized labor, New Deal 'bureaucrats,' and 'fuzzy- minded' liberals, all of whom, he considered, in one way or another, to be a threat to his America." His political views came from his personal background. He was strongly influenced by the conservative, old-stock New England heritage of his mother's family, and his later experiences reinforced his upbringing. After high school he attended the Wharton School of Finance at the University of Pennsylvania for two years. He then went on to law school at New York Uni- versity, but he quit to join the army in 1917. From his wartime service he gained a background in military intelligence and a lifelong admiration for the armed forces. After the war he found employment on Wall Street at the investment house of Paine Webber Company, and he quickly rose through the ranks to become manager of the bond department. His conservative upbringing combined with his military and business background perhaps explain the anti-New Deal, antilabor, anticommunist attitudes he brought to his congressional career right from the start. Campaigning in 1936 for a House seat, he attacked the New Deal as the product of "socialist dreamers," and as a freshman congressman in 1937 he accused the Congress of Industrial Organizations of being a labor union dominated and controlled by Communists.16 In his first term Thomas became a member of the newly formed Dies Committee, which later became HUAC. Thereaf- ter, most of his twelve-year congressional career centered on containing the supposed communist threat.

Thomas's views on atomic energy were typical of the postwar belief in the atomic secret. He supported military control of atomic energy and saw exchanges of scientific information with other nations as the surrender of American technology and military advantage. In an article about patents he argued that the legal acquisition of descriptions of U.S. patents by the Soviet Union constituted "legal espionage." Scientists contended that there were no real secrets in science; J. Parnell Thomas warned that knowledge of patents might help the Soviets discover "the great secret of the atomic bomb.",17 This mind-set was exactly what the atomic scientists opposed as a total misunderstanding of how science worked, and it is indicative of the tensions between the beliefs held by many scientists, especially those involved in the scientists' movement, and the ideology of national security.

Thomas was particularly suspicious of scientists. During the debate over the McMahon bill, he wrote in Liberty, "Our scientists, it seems, are well schooled in their specialties but not in the history of Communist tactics and designs. They have a weakness for attending meetings, signing petitions, sponsoring commit- tees, and joining organizations labeled 'liberal' or 'progressive' but which are

16 Lewis H. Carlson, "J. Parnell Thomas and the House Committee on Un-American Activities, 1938-48" (Ph.D. diss., Michigan State Univ., 1967), abstract, pages not numbered; biographical material is drawn from the abstract and from pp. 1-9. As the location of Thomas's personal papers is unknown, and access to most HUAC records and correspondence is restricted under a fifty-year rule, detailed information on Thomas's life from sources other than Carlson's dissertation is difficult to find.

17 J. Parnell Thomas, "Russia Grabs Our Inventions," American Magazine, June 1947, 143:16-19, 112, on p. 18.



246 JESSICA WANG

actually often Communist fronts." 18 He cited the efforts of individual scientists and scientists' organizations to oppose secrecy and military control of atomic energy as evidence of their naive and unreliable character, and he insisted that many of the atomic scientists were under communist influence. Thomas concluded that the only way to safeguard atomic energy was to insist upon strict military security.

In March 1947 the Washington Times-Herald published two articles that accused Condon of having associations with suspected communist-front organizations.19 Both were based on information supplied by Representative Thomas. Soon Thomas began to attack Condon more openly. In the June 1947 issue of American Magazine the congressman wrote an article in which he denigrated Condon for his membership in the American-Soviet Science Society and accused the Soviet Union of conspiring to exploit American scientists.

The 1947 attacks were only a warning. On 1 March 1948, from a bed in Walter Reed Hospital where he was recovering from gastrointestinal hemorrhages, Thomas issued a special subcommittee preliminary report to the House Un- American Activities Committee. The subcommittee, consisting of Thomas, Rep- resentative Richard B. Vail (R.-Illinois), and Representative John S. Wood (D.- Georgia), accused Condon of being a security risk. Exploiting the postwar fever over the atomic bomb and the need for preservation of its supposed secret, the report contended, "From the evidence at hand, it appears that Dr. Condon is one of the weakest links in our atomic security. "20

The subcommittee listed several reasons for its suspicions of Condon, but provided little support for its claim that he was a security risk. Most of the criticisms concerned either Condon's political views or his association with persons deemed suspicious. The report attempted to portray Condon as a suspect character because of the pending status of his security clearance with the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC); his association, according to a confidential 1947 letter from FBI director J. Edgar Hoover to Secretary of Commerce W. Averell Harriman, with "an individual alleged, by a self-confessed Soviet espionage agent, to have engaged in espionage activities"; his general associations with foreigners; and his connections with the American-Soviet Science Society, alleg- edly a communist-front organization.21 The subcommittee concluded the report with a recommendation that Condon be removed from his position or that the Secretary of Commerce prepare a statement defending his continued presence in the Bureau of Standards in the face of the evidence against him.

The report was written in such a way that the allegations sounded grave, but in actuality they carried very little weight.22 For example, the charge that as of

18 Liberty article (21 June 1946) by Rep. J. Parnell Thomas, New Jersey, included in the Congres- sional Record by Rep. John McDowell, Pennsylvania: Congressional Record, 80th Cong., 1st sess., 9 June 1947, 93, pt. ll:A2729.

19 William Odlin, Jr., "Condon Duped into Sponsoring Commie-Front Outfit's Dinner," Washing- ton Times-Herald, 23 Mar. 1947, Sect. A-2, p. 1; and Odlin, "Condon Facing U.S. Probe into Soviet Society Affiliation," ibid., 25 Mar. 1947, p. 2.

20 Report to Full Committee, p. 1. 21 Ibid., p. 4. 22 The shortcomings of the report have been discussed in great detail by Robert Carr, so I will not

consider all of the committee's accusations here. See Carr, House Committee on Un-American Ac- tivities (cit. n. 2), pp. 131-153.




November 1947 Condon only had "pending" security clearance and had not received clearance from the AEC to work on atomic projects reflected a routine bureaucratic backlog. The Atomic Energy Act of 1946 allowed employees cleared under the Manhattan Project regulations to retain their security clearance while the newly created Atomic Energy Commission carried out its own investigations. "Pending status" meant only that the AEC had not yet completed a new investigation of Condon, not that he had been denied clearance.23 As for Condon's "associations," one commentator noted that HUAC's allegations were "like saying that Condon is alleged to have associated with a man who is alleged to beat his wife."24 Pointing to associations based upon anonymous, hearsay testimony was a common HUAC tactic, meant to cast Condon in a subversive light without having to accuse him of any actual impropriety or intrigue.

Possibly the most serious charge in the report concerned Condon's association with alleged communist-front organizations. After noting there was no evidence that Condon was a member of the Communist Party, the subcommittee went on to denounce his membership on the executive committee of the American-Soviet Science Society (ASSS), an organization formed at the height of the wartime alliance between the United States and the Soviet Union to promote exchanges of information and scientific personnel. HUAC contended that the ASSS was affiliated with the National Council of American-Soviet Friendship (NCASF), which had been placed on the attorney general's November 1947 list of eighty-two organizations designated totalitarian, fascist, communist, or subversive. This charge was potentially serious, not because there was evidence that the NCASF was actually dangerous or subversive, but because under President Truman's Executive Order 9835, defining the government's loyalty program, membership in any organization on the attorney general's list was enough to justify dismissal from a government position.25 When later confronted with the claim that the ASSS had become an independent organization in 1946 and therefore had no connection with the NCASF, HUAC contended that any claimed separation was

23 House Committee on Un-American Activities, Testimony of Dr. Edward U. Condon: Hearing Before the Committee on Un-American Activities, 82nd Cong., 2nd sess., 5 Sept. 1952, 3848 (hereafter cited as Testimony of Dr. Edward U. Condon). The AEC furnished a similar explanation to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy in 1948: AEC to Bourke B. Hickenlooper, 10 Mar. 1948, folder on Edward U. Condon, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) Records, Box 1205, RG 326, U.S. Department of Energy Archives, Germantown, Maryland.

24 "Louis Welborn," "The Ordeal of Dr. Condon," Harper's Magazine, Jan. 1949, 200:46-53, on p. 50. "Louis Welborn," according to the article, was "the pen name of a correspondent of a well-known news organization which prefers that members of its staff not be identified with the presentation of their individual views on controversial subjects." I have not yet been able to identify him (or her).

25 President Truman's 1947 loyalty order and the dismissal standards under Executive Order 9835 are described in Gellhorn, Security, Loyalty, and Science (cit. n. 2), pp. 129-133. For the Nov. 1947 list see 13 Federal Register 1471, 1473 (20 Mar. 1948). On the origins and mechanics of the attorney general's list consult Eleanor Bontecou, The Federal Loyalty-Security Program (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cor- nell Univ. Press, 1953), Ch. 5. The original list of eighty-two organizations grew to almost two hundred by 1950. HUAC had a similar list that classified over six hundred organizations as communist, but HUAC's list did not have the legal ramifications of the attorney general's list (ibid., p. 171).

It should be noted that after a massive drop in membership and support, the NCASF and two other organizations sued for redress. The Supreme Court, in a 5-3 decision, ruled that the basis for the attorney general's listings was arbitrary and therefore unconstitutional and remanded the case to the district court, leaving the district court to determine the reasonability of the attorney general's as- sessments of the listed organizations. See Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, Attor- ney General, et al., 341 U.S. 123 (1950); and Bontecou, Federal Loyalty-Security Program, pp. 231-233.



248 JESSICA WANG

window dressing, arguing that the fact that the two groups shared the same address and telephone number in the Manhattan telephone directory clearly indicated that they were still affiliated.26

The evidence indicates that the separation was actual and unequivocal. The 28 May 1946 minutes of the Executive Committee of the ASSS stated: "It was formally agreed that since the Society has been in practise [sic] an independent organization, the society express its gratitude to the Council for having furnished most of the aid for the organization to grow and henceforth the Society be considered disaffiliated and independent." The confusion over the address and telephone number seems due primarily to a clerical error. After the separation the ASSS moved from 114 East 32nd Street to 58 Park Avenue; but since it was in financial disarray, it did not order a new phone number and neglected to notify the phone company to cancel the old listing.27

The HUAC subcommittee, however, was more interested in touting the dangers of internationalism than in formulating a carefully crafted, legalistic, technical analysis of Condon's ASSS membership. Condon's internationalism was at the heart of HUAC's attack. The subcommittee claimed that his participation in the ASSS indicated "the dangerous extremes to which Dr. Condon has gone in an effort to cooperate with Communist forces in the United States." But in specify- ing what those extremes were, the subcommittee quoted Condon's own remarks in a speech given on 5 March 1946 (the same day on which Winston Churchill gave his "Iron Curtain" speech in Fulton, Missouri), in which he emphasized the need for scientific cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union.28 To most scientists, with their beliefs that science was not bound by national borders and that international cooperation was an important way of promoting scientific research, Condon's words were only reasonable. But to J. Parnell Thomas, Condon's speech must have seemed naive at best and subversive at worst. To one with Thomas's attitudes, the American-Soviet Science Society had a subversive purpose whatever its relationship to the National Council of American-Soviet Friendship. Given Thomas's staunch support for secrecy and the subcommittee's focus on Condon's remarks in favor of scientific cooperation and his ASSS membership, it is reasonable to conclude that Condon's internationalist beliefs were at issue. To those who believed that "atomic secrets" had to be preserved at all costs, scientific cooperation could only be subversion.

1948: THE SCIENTISTS' RESPONSE

Condon responded to the subcommittee report immediately. He said, "I have nothing to report. If it is true that I am one of the weakest links in atomic security that is very gratifying and the country can feel absolutely safe for I am completely

26 The charge concerning the address and telephone number was made explicit in the 1952 Condon hearing: Testimony of Dr. Edward U. Condon, 3888.

27 Minutes of the Executive Committee, 28 May 1946, box "American P, no. 2-Ando," American- Soviet Science Society, folder 7, Condon Papers. On the address change see Gerald Oster to Condon, 25 Mar. 1948, box "American P, no. 2-Ando," American-Soviet Science Society, folder 10, ibid.

28 Report to Full Committee, p. 6. For the full text of Condon's speech see Condon, "Science and Our Future" (cit. n. 15), pp. 415-417.




reliable, loyal, conscientious and devoted to the interests of my country, as my whole career and life clearly reveal." A few days later he addressed the more general issue of the effects of loyalty investigations on science. In an open letter to Senator Bourke B. Hickenlooper (R.-Iowa), chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, he warned that "there has been a mounting tension of threats of purges, spy-ring exposures, publicity attacks and sudden dismissals without hearings," all of which made scientists "increasingly reluctant to work for the Government."29 The threat that scientists would be deterred from government service would eventually become a common theme in the reaction of scientists to loyalty and security investigations.

The Commerce Department expressed its confidence in the Bureau of Stan- dards director when it announced on 3 March that its loyalty board had cleared Condon in a report dated 24 February.30 Over the next several months Condon received public support from the American Civil Liberties Union, Henry A. Wal- lace, and Representatives Helen Gahagan Douglas (D.-California) and Chet Holifield (D.-California). Scientists and scientists' groups rallied in his defense. Albert Einstein and Harold Urey, speaking for the Emergency Committee of Atomic Scientists, pronounced HUAC's accusations "a disservice to the interests of the United States." Robert E. Marshak, chairman of the Federation of American Scientists (FAS), charged the committee with laying a "deliberate smear" against Condon, "contrary to the American instinct for fair play and to the democratic ideal expressed in the Bill of Rights." FAS also sent a letter to members urging them to write to Senator Hickenlooper, Representative Thomas, and Secretary Harriman.31 President Truman received scores of letters and tele- grams expressing confidence in the scientist and criticizing HUAC for unfairly publicizing its charges without having first provided Condon with a formal oppor- tunity to reply. Among them were letters from Hans T. Clarke, president of the American Society of Biological Chemists, the entire physics department faculty of Harvard University, the Physical Society of Pittsburgh, and the Association of Pittsburgh Scientists, and a resolution from the Association of New York Scien- tists with 250 signatures. The American Physical Society issued a statement in support of Condon on 5 March. The American Association for the Advancement of Science followed suit in late April, and the National Academy of Sciences in mid-May.32 On 12 April the Emergency Committee of Atomic Scientists held a

29 William S. White, "Soviet Spy Links Laid to Dr. Condon, High Federal Aide," New York Times, 2 Mar. 1948, p. 3; and "Condon's Letter Professing Loyalty," ibid., 5 Mar. 1948, p. 4 (open letter to Hickenlooper).

30 William S. White, "Subpoena Seeks Data on Dr. Condon," New York Times, 4 Mar. 1948, p. 8. On the furor over whether the Commerce Department board had made its decision after 1 Mar. and predated it see White, "Commerce Report on Condon Scored," ibid., 11 Mar. 1948, p. 11. Condon later recalled that he believed the report had been predated: Condon, interview by Weiner, 11-12 Sept. 1973, transcript, pp. 187-188, AIP.

31 Press release, 3 Mar. 1948, Emergency Committee of Atomic Scientists Papers, box 6, folder 8, Special Collections, Joseph Regenstein Library, University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois; press release, 4 Mar. 1948, Federation of American Scientists (FAS) Papers, box 69, folder 12, Special Collections, Joseph Regenstein Library, University of Chicago; and FAS letter, 6 Mar. 1948, copy in file on Edward U. Condon, AIP Public Information Office Files, AIP.

32 Condon file, President's Secretary's Files, Harry S. Truman Papers, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri; both the Association of New York Scientists and the Association of Pitts-



250 JESSICA WANG

dinner to show their support of Condon. The dinner was sponsored by some 150 scientists, including nine Nobel Prize winners and seventy members of the Na- tional Academy of Sciences; among them were Hans Bethe, Karl T. Compton, Albert Einstein, Linus Pauling, Leo Szilard, Edward Teller, and Harold Urey.

The scientists' groups also approached the case by mounting efforts to consider the more basic problem of loyalty procedures. As early as 1947 AAAS had created a Special Committee on Civil Liberties for Scientists to study the shortcomings of the federal government's loyalty program and make recommendations for change. The FAS Committee on Secrecy and Clearance, consisting of a group of Cornell University physicists, was also formed in 1947, and it sought to gather information on the clearance policies of individual government agencies, examine the experiences of individuals, and suggest procedural changes where necessary. The attacks on Condon seemed to point to an even greater need to examine the general problem of loyalty and security. A 24 March 1948 FAS memorandum discussed action in the Condon case: "Our follow-through should be explicit and thoroughly objective. This is being done by getting the reaction of scientists with regard to the whole general principle of secrecy and loyalty procedures and to determine their future willingness to accept responsible positions in the Govern- ment in light of the Condon incident."33

While the scientists' response was widespread and supportive, at the organizational level it was also somewhat cautious and conservative in character. Iron- ically, the effort to examine the basic issue of loyalty and security weakened the scientific community's support for individuals. As the 1948 FAS memorandum indicates, the scientists' organizations felt they had to appear objective. They could provide information and criticize procedural problems, but they could not afford to defend directly individuals under attack. The Scientists' Committee on Loyalty Problems, an FAS committee formed in response to the Condon case, was created "to provide organized information to both scientists and the public, and to act as a clearing house for questions which arise in connection with clearance procedures." A stand on an individual's loyalty would interfere with the committee's purpose. The minutes of the committee's first meeting stated:

[The committee] could take no stand on whether any individual was "subversive," or [a] "security risk," it did not propose to defend any individual's loyalty, character or discretion. There was a general feeling among the Committee that this attitude toward the individual would not and should not interfere with the committee's duty to use the most effective and vigorous methods to help an individual get a fair hearing, nor should it interfere with the committee's responsibility to criticize what it regards as bad procedure or faulty criteria.34

burgh Scientists were local chapters of the FAS. APS press release, 4 Mar. 1948, Oppenheimer Papers; "Princeton Groups Support Condon," New York Times, 5 Mar. 1948, p. 4; "Scientists Criti- cize Attack on Dr. Condon," ibid., 26 Apr. 1948, p. 5; and "Academy Issues Statement Criticizing Condon Attack," Science News, 15 May 1948, p. 312.

33 Memorandum, R. L. Meier, Executive Secretary of FAS, to member associations and members- at-large, 24 Mar. 1948, Oppenheimer Papers.

34 "Prospectus: Scientists' Committee on Loyalty Problems," undated, box "Science, No. 2- Security, no. 1," Scientists' Committee on Loyalty Problems, folder 1, Condon Papers; and Minutes of the Scientists' Committee on Loyalty Problems, 25 Sept. 1948, ibid.




This insistence on objective neutrality may have been admirable, but the scientific community's lack of commitment to advocacy left individual scientists to their own defenses against a large security establishment in a highly charged political atmosphere.

The story behind the National Academy of Sciences' statement on Condon illustrates the restrained response of scientists to loyalty and security issues particularly well. On 31 March 1948, in response to HUAC's 1 March report, A. N. Richards, president of the National Academy of Sciences, distributed a strong statement in condemnation of HUAC's procedure to NAS members and asked them to evaluate it before public release. The Columbia University geneticist L. C. Dunn welcomed the statement, but felt that it did not go far enough. In reply to Dunn's objections Richards answered, "With respect to the charges made against Condon, the statement is intentionally completely neutral. The Academy is not in a position to act either as a judge or as an attorney for defense. We haven't the facts and it is not our duty to discover the facts." The academy was willing to criticize HUAC on procedural grounds only. It would not stand to defend Condon directly.35

Ultimately, 310 academy members responded to the statement: 275 were in favor of public release and only 35 against. Despite this show of mass support, Richards and the council of the academy decided against release of the statement. The leaders of the academy were not eager to risk the loss of influence with government officials by criticizing HUAC too strongly. Richards spoke to Repre- sentative Thomas on 14 April and concluded, "I think that the interview was more effective than publication would have been and feel sure that by refraining from publication possible danger to relations between the Academy and Govern- ment has been avoided." In the end, the academy issued a much weaker statement that expressed grave concern over HUAC's procedure in the Condon case but also reported that "Mr. Thomas authorized [Richards] to assure the members of the Academy that Dr. Condon would be treated with complete fairness in the hearing which, at that time, had been set for April 23." Condon lamented, "I doubt very much that Prof. Richards will do anything effective.... It is amazing to me how some of the older scientists seem to be so completely lacking in perception of what is going on."36 Despite the considerable support Condon received from individuals, the scientific community, as represented by its organizations, did not take a strong stand on the loyalty and security issue. The distinc- tion is important. The opinions of individuals at best serve as an indicator of what a community feels on a given issue. I would suggest, however, that the commitment of a community to mobilize and take action is best measured through its organizational response. A scientist of stature could be assured of considerable public outcry despite the organizations' cautious response. But relatively un-

35 A. N. Richards to L. C. Dunn, 6 Apr. 1948, box "Columbia #2-DA," Condon case materials, L. C. Dunn Papers, APS Library. The March APS statement and April AAAS statement were similarly worded. They avoided challenging the content of HUAC's charges and limited themselves to criticisms of HUAC's procedures.

36 Richards to members of the National Academy of Sciences, 20 Apr. 1948, Ernest 0. Lawrence Papers, Bancroft Library, University of California at Berkeley, Berkeley, California; National Acad- emy of Sciences statement released 3 May 1948 (copy in the Lawrence Papers); and Condon to Martin J. Kamen, 24 May 1948, box "K-Las," Kamen, Martin J., folder 1, Condon Papers.



252 JESSICA WANG

known scientists, whose cases were not publicized, could count on little assistance and support from the official policies of the scientists' organizations.

IMMEDIATE MOTIVES: HUAC BUDGETS AND ELECTION POLITICS

HUAC's attack on Condon did not occur merely out of a desire to persecute him for his political beliefs. Many scientists held similar views; Condon's internationalism was not sufficient motivation for HUAC to single him out. The release of HUAC's 1 March report on Condon was motivated by larger political concerns. HUAC appropriations, opposition to President Truman, and election-year politics provided the real incentives for fingering Condon as a security risk.

The most clearly visible reason for HUAC's attack was that it was part of the committee's strategy to support its appropriations request for fiscal year 1949. HUAC had asked for a record $200,000 appropriation, double that of the previous year. Representative Arthur G. Klein (D.-New York) noted on 8 March, "A sure sign of preparations for making a new request for funds is the release of sensational charges against some public figure."37

The next day, debate over the appropriations request drew bitter comments about HUAC and statements in defense of Condon from several congressmen. Among them, Representative Leo Isacson (American Labor-New York) declared, "It is no coincidence that this attack on Dr. Condon-an attack abhorred and shamed in all responsible opinion of press and science, comes at this moment when the House Committee on Un-American Activities seeks the most swollen appropriation it has ever ventured to ask of a Congress." Further argument revealed the rising Cold War tension between security and democratic freedoms. Representative John A. Blatnik (D.-Minnesota) accused HUAC of denouncing scientists in an attempt to stifle political dissent and prevent them from speaking to the American public. "Scientists," he said, "who know better than anyone else the destructive forces which might be let loose by another war, sometimes feel it their duty to speak their minds. The Committee on Un-American Activities has taken it upon itself to guard the American people from such uncensored statements from men whose opinions might command respect." On the other side, HUAC member John E. Rankin (D.-Mississippi) stood by his committee's han- dling of the Condon case and announced that "there are enemies in this country today plotting to get their hands on the atomic bomb," enemies who hated HUAC almost as much as some of his fellow congressmen. He concluded, "This committee is rendering one of the greatest services ever rendered by any committee of the Congress of the United States. We are not out to persecute any- body, but we are trying to protect this country."38 Congressional debate reflected the growing conflict between scientists and the supposed need to guard atomic secrets in the name of national security.

In the end the vote was not even close. The House voted 337 to 37 to grant the $200,000 appropriation to HUAC. Joined by the two American Labor Party members and thirty-four Democrats, Representative Jacob K. Javits of New York was the lone Republican to oppose the appropriation.

37 Congressional Record, 80th Cong., 2nd sess., 8 Mar. 1948, 94, pt. IO:A1464. 38 Congressional Record, 80th Cong., 2nd sess., 9 Mar. 1948, 94, pt. 2:2407 (Isacson), 2412 (Blat-

nik), and 2405-2406 (Rankin).




In addition to assisting HUAC's appropriations request strategy, the Condon attack represented a way of discrediting President Truman in a presidential election year. Not only was Condon a Truman appointee, but when Truman decided to withhold the 15 May 1947 Hoover-Harriman letter from Congress, he played into the committee's hands. The 1 March report on Condon included an excerpt from a confidential 1947 letter from FBI director J. Edgar Hoover to W. Averell Harriman. The letter concerned Condon's associations. The most serious allega- tion was in the opening paragraph: "The files of the Bureau reflect that Dr. Ed- ward U. Condon has been in contact as late as 1947 with an individual alleged, by a self-confessed Soviet espionage agent, to have engaged in espionage activities with the Russians in Washington, D.C. from 1941 to 1944." The HUAC subcommittee neglected to quote the sentence in the letter stating, "There is no evidence to show that contacts between this individual and Dr. Condon were related to this individual's espionage activities."39 Immediately after issuing the subcommittee report, HUAC attempted to gain access to the records of the Department of Commerce board that had cleared Condon in order to obtain a copy of Hoover's letter. In connection with the Condon case, Truman issued an executive order on 14 March forbidding the release of department loyalty files to Congress on the grounds that release of such confidential files would violate the civil rights of employees and would compromise the FBI's investigatory capabilities. Ten days later Secretary Harriman refused to hand over the Department of Commerce records, citing executive privilege. On 22 April the House passed H.R. 522, or- dering Truman to release the loyalty files on Condon, by a vote of 300 to 29. Truman refused. On 27 April he ordered all copies of the letter transferred to him from the Commerce Department and the Justice Department.40

The resolution never came to a vote in the Senate, so the president was not legally obligated to release the letter. But H.R. 522 quickly created a political uproar. Truman's actions became both a major source of criticism of the president and a defense for HUAC. Some of Condon's defenders had criticized HUAC for failing to provide him a hearing before publicizing its charges. HUAC attempted to shift the blame for the lack of a hearing to the Truman administration, contending that if Truman would only hand over HUAC's main source of evidence against Condon, the committee would be happy to give him an open hearing.41

Other statements threatened more serious political fallout. In early March Rep- resentative Rankin had made a dramatic appeal calling for the impeachment of "top-flight bureaucrats who are protecting people on the Federal payroll whose loyalty is questioned." On 1 May Republican national chairman Carroll Reece, exploiting the election-year atmosphere, echoed Rankin's sentiment and listed impeachment as one of several steps that Congress could take to force the issue over the letter from Hoover to Harriman. Condon, sensing the damage being

39 Report to Full Committee, p. 4. HUAC claimed that the investigator sent to examine Condon's Department of Commerce file in Dec. 1947 was only able to copy part of the letter before being asked to stop; thus HUAC's copy of the letter was incomplete. See Goodman, The Committee (cit. n. 2), p. 235.

40 William C. Foster to Harry S. Truman, 27 Apr. 1948; and memorandum, attorney general's office to Truman, 3 May 1948, President's Secretary's Files, Truman Papers.

41 See, e.g., John E. Rankin, in Congressional Record, 80th Cong., 2nd sess., 10 Mar. 1948, 94, pt. 2:2476.



254 JESSICA WANG

done by the situation, sent a note to Under Secretary of Commerce William C. Foster on 5 May asking that Truman release the letter. He wrote, "The situation resulting from the President's action is somewhat embarrassing to me, because Congressman Thomas is using this to create the impression I am trying to conceal something." He then expressed confidence that, although he had not seen the letter, it contained no damaging information about him.42

Truman did not release the letter, but on 1 June he drafted a speech to Con- gress detailing his reasons for refusing to obey H.R. 522. The draft was consistent with his previous statements that release of such confidential letters violated the civil rights of government employees and compromised the investigatory capabilities of the FBI. By this time, however, the controversy surrounding the letter had abated, and Truman never delivered the speech.43 There was no long-term political damage to the Truman administration from the incident, but it served to lend an air of legitimacy to HUAC's position.

More than a few scientists and legislators suggested that HUAC's denunciation of Condon constituted the first step in a renewal of attacks on the McMahon Act and civilian control of atomic energy. In 1946 Thomas had been a staunch oppo- nent of the McMahon bill. He had denounced the bill as "the creature of imprac- tical idealists," and he had pointed to Condon as an example of the unreliable character of supporters of civilian control. To the FAS and Representatives Chet Holifield and Helen Gahagan Douglas, Thomas's opposition to civilian control and Condon's role in the formulation of the McMahon bill seemed to indicate that civilian control of atomic energy was also about to come under fire.44

The imagined battle over civilian control of atomic energy never materialized, and FAS Executive Secretary R. L. Meier admitted that the belief among reporters, most scientists, and Condon himself that the attack on Condon foreshad- owed renewed opposition to civilian control was mistaken. In a 10 March memorandum he informed FAS members, "Since the first blast [at Condon], however, there has been no follow-up and the diligence of a dozen or more top grade

42 Samuel A. Tower, "Atomic Committee Takes Up Charges against Dr. Condon," New York Times, 7 Mar. 1948, p. 17 (quoting Rankin); "Condon Data Issue Pushed by Reece," ibid., 2 May 1948, p. 32; and Condon to Foster, 5 May 1948, President's Secretary's Files, Truman Papers.

43 Both Secretary of Commerce Charles Sawyer and Acting Attorney General Phillip B. Perlman suggested that Truman not deliver the speech because six weeks had gone by since the passage of H.R. 522 and the issue seemed "quiescent." Phillip B. Perlman to Clark Clifford, 2 June 1948, Pres- ident's Secretary's Files, Truman Papers; and Charles Sawyer to Clifford, 2 June 1948, file on Dr. Edward U. Condon, Office of the Secretary, General Records of the Department of Commerce, box 1086, file 104475, RG40, National Archives, Washington, D.C.

44 Congressional Record, 79th Cong., 2nd sess., 17 July 1946, 92, pt. 7:9257 (Thomas). On fears about renewed attacks on the McMahon Act see, e.g., Washington Association of Scientists, "The Condon Case and Its Implications," undated, approx. 8 Mar. 1948, box 69, folder 12, FAS Papers; and Helen Gahagan Douglas, in Congressional Record, 80th Cong., 2nd sess., 14 Apr. 1948, 94, pt. 4:4464. Holifield conveyed similar suspicions: Chet Holifield, speech before the House of Represen- tatives, "Sabotage of American Science: The Full Meaning of the Attacks on Dr. Condon," 9 Mar. 1948, copy in box 69, folder 12, FAS Papers. According to Condon's recollections, most of the speech was written by Condon's assistant, Hugh Odishaw: Condon, interview by Weiner, 11-12 Sept. 1973, transcript, p. 191, AIP. Condon himself believed for many years afterward that his support of the McMahon bill was one of the primary causes of his troubles. See Condon to Oppenheimer, 22 Jan. 1954, Oppenheimer Papers. In a draft of his unfinished autobiography, probably written sometime in the 1960s, Condon still cited his support of the McMahon bill as one of the motivations for HUAC's persecution of him: draft of Condon autobiography, p. 10, box "Atomic Energy, no. 5-Autobiogra- phy, no. 1," Autobiography, folder 11, Condon Papers.




reporters has not uncovered any real connection between the two issues as yet. By now it seems probable that no coordinated program exists in that quarter." Thomas latched on to Condon's position on atomic energy to target him specifically, but he does not appear to have planned a larger assault upon the AEC. But while the McMahon Act emerged unscathed, there was a sense among some scientists that the attacks on Condon were part of a larger plot to persecute scientists for their political views. The Washington Association of Scientists noted that the increasing importance of scientific research to military advance- ments had been accompanied by "a tendency for distrust of scientists to arise," because scientists' "deep belief in freedom of intellectual activity and free exchange of information [is] regarded with suspicion by some who do not understand how science operates."45 Pleas for scientific freedom were more and more frequently confronted with the doctrine of national security and the idea that atomic secrets had to be protected. Scientists had accepted security restrictions as a necessity during World War II. As the Cold War became firmly embedded in American political life, they were beginning to find the attitudes formed during World War II virtually impossible to reverse.

Meanwhile, the Atomic Energy Commission had conducted its own investigation of Condon's loyalty. On 15 July the AEC cleared him for access to restricted information required for his duties as director of the National Bureau of Stan- dards. In a three-page memorandum concerning the decision the AEC stated, "After examining the extensive files in this case, the commission has no question whatever concerning Dr. Condon's loyalty to the United States." The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists applauded the AEC decision and sharply criticized the House Un-American Activities Committee. The Bulletin declared, "This House Committee has the practice of never stating clearly that a man they have 'investigated' has proved his innocence; but drops the investigation if it becomes 'un- profitable,' leaving lingering suspicions. "46 With the AEC report, the Condon case was temporarily laid to rest. But those "lingering suspicions" remained to be rekindled in the coming years.

1948-1950: ENTRENCHMENT OF THE COLD WAR

After the release of the AEC report, the Condon case entered a state of relative quiescence. After the 1948 election, with Representative Thomas incapacitated by charges of payroll padding and Representative Vail out of Congress, no major action was taken concerning Condon's security status for almost three years. The problems faced by other scientists, however, mounted steadily throughout this period. As the pace of the Cold War quickened, scientists increasingly became the targets of loyalty investigations.

The 1948 elections gave little hint of what was to come. The elections went well

45 Memorandum, R. L. Meier to member associations and members-at-large, 10 Mar. 1948, box 2, folder 3, Washington Association of Scientists Papers, Special Collections, Joseph Regenstein Li- brary, University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois; and Washington Association of Scientists, "The Con- don Case and Its Implications," undated, approx. 8 Mar. 1948, box 69, folder 12, FAS Papers.

46 "Memorandum of Decision," 15 July 1948, box 1205, folder on Edward U. Condon, RG 326, AEC Records; and "Condon Is Cleared by Atomic Energy Commission," Bull. Atomic Sci., Aug. 1948, 4:226 (quotation), 255.



256 JESSICA WANG

for the Democratic Party, and neither the Hiss case nor the controversy surrounding Condon seemed to affect the Democrats adversely.47 They regained control of Congress, and Truman was reelected over Republican Party candidate Governor Thomas E. Dewey of New York and Progressive Party candidate Henry A. Wallace despite almost unanimous predictions that Dewey would win the presidency. HUAC Republicans, on the other hand, fared poorly. Two members of the House Un-American Activities Committee, Vail and McDowell, failed to win reelection. Thomas was reelected but was indicted on charges of payroll padding that same month. The indictment made it difficult for him to play a very active role in the committee, and Democrat John S. Wood replaced him as chairman. The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists met the personnel changes on the committee resulting from the 1948 election with guarded optimism.

These personnel changes, and the general attitude of the voters expressed in the election, make the hope justified that the investigating procedures of the Committee on Un-American Activities will become less objectionable than they have been under Mr. Thomas' chairmanship. We can hope that the still pending "Condon case" will be speedily and satisfactorily disposed of, and that the practice of casting aspersion on scientists and other intellectuals without sufficient public basis in fact and without chance of rebuttal in open hearing will be abandoned.48

The Bulletin's hopes were not to be met. Condon's case remained unresolved while investigations of other scientists increased. Events conspired to increase fears about atomic espionage, and in the next election the voters made quite a different statement.

A wave of shocks that struck America's sense of security began to spread in August 1949, when the State Department revealed that China was falling to communist rule. An even greater blow fell on 23 September, when President Truman announced that the Soviet Union had detonated an atomic device. America's monopoly was gone. How had the Soviet Union, with its inferior technology and knowledge, succeeded in building an A-bomb? The mentality of the vital secret suggested that atomic espionage was the obvious answer. The arrests of Klaus Fuchs in February 1950 and Julius and Ethel Rosenberg the following summer lent further credence to the atomic spy theory, and anxiety over the costs of atomic espionage spread quickly.4

4 The Condon case did not become a major campaign issue, but Truman did make use of it to woo the support of civil libertarians. At the Sept. 1948 AAAS meeting, four days before beginning his whistle-stop campaign tour, Truman greeted Condon on stage and blasted smears against scientists. For a press account of the speech see William L. Laurence, "Truman Charges Smears and Gossip Hinder Scientists," New York Times, 14 Sept. 1948, p. 1. The speech can be found in Public Papers of the Presidents: 1948 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964), p. 485. Appar- ently Condon and Odishaw wrote an early draft of the speech: see Dael Wolfle, "The Centennial Annual Meeting, Starring Harry Truman and Civil Liberties," Science, 6 Oct. 1989, 246:130-131; and, for Condon's own recollections, Condon, interview by Weiner, 11-12 Sept. 1973, transcript, pp. 196-198, AIP.

48 "The Committee on Un-American Activities Feels the Effect of November 2," Bull. Atomic Sci., Dec. 1948, 4:376. Thomas resigned from Congress on 2 Jan. 1950, after being convicted in federal court.

49 For the reaction to Klaus Fuchs's arrest see David M. Oshinsky, A Conspiracy So Immense: The World of Joe McCarthy (New York: Free Press, 1982), pp. 102, 106; and Robert Chadwell Williams, Klaus Fuchs, Atom Spy (Cambridge, Mass./London: Harvard Univ. Press, 1987), p. 153.




As fears about atomic espionage progressed, fundamental changes in U.S. foreign and domestic policy escalated the Cold War with the Soviet Union. In April 1950 NSC-68, a review by the National Security Council of U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union, recommended a massive military buildup and stressed the need for a worldwide halt to the spread of communism. NSC-68 was soon tested out in Korea. On the home front, the McCarran Act, or Internal Security Act, was passed in September. It required federal registration of "communist-action" groups and made political beliefs, not just actions, grounds for deportation. It also provided for the detention of members of subversive groups, defined by a Subversive Activities Control Board, in concentration camps in times of "national emergency." Truman immediately vetoed the act, but the House overrode his veto.

In February 1950 a virtually unknown senator gave a speech in Wheeling, West Virginia, in which he contended that the State Department contained 205 Com- munist Party members. In a matter of months, Senator Joe McCarthy rocketed from being an obscure Wisconsin senator unlikely to win reelection in 1952 to a nationally known figure. With the ascendancy of McCarthy, domestic anticommunism was in full force by the end of 1950.

THE PERSECUTION OF SCIENCE: SCIENTISTS, SECURITY, AND THE COLD WAR

As fears about atomic espionage grew and the Cold War intensified, scientists increasingly became the targets of investigations conducted sometimes by HUAC, but more often by the government's loyalty boards. Despite Truman's avowed commitment to civil liberties, he was also committed to policies that examined every government employee as a potential threat to the security of the United States. The loyalty and security program applied to all federal employees. It affected scientists in the armed services, government scientists working for civilian agencies on military projects, and industrial and university scientists subject to loyalty and security checks by the Industrial Employment Review Board. By the end of 1952, one estimate concluded, the AEC alone had investigated 400,000 personnel.50

Attacks came from all directions. In 1949 HUAC launched hearings on the wartime activities of physicists then at the Berkeley Radiation Laboratory. These hearings resulted in a perjury indictment for Joseph Weinberg and indictments for contempt of Congress for Giovanni Rossi Lomanitz and David Bohm. All were ultimately acquitted, but all three lost their university positions as a result of their testimony. Frank Oppenheimer, J. Robert Oppenheimer's younger brother, es- caped a contempt indictmeiii, but after his testimony he was dismissed from his assistant professorship at the University of Minnesota.51

50 David Caute, The Great Fear: The Anti-Communist Purge under Truman and Eisenhower (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1978), p. 456.

51 Weinberg's indictment resulted from his denial of ever having known Steve Nelson, a leading member of the Communist Party in both California and Pennsylvania. Lomanitz and Bohm were indicted after invoking the Fifth Amendment when asked if they were members of the Communist Party or acquaintances of Steve Nelson. For details of the Berkeley Radiation Laboratory hearings consult Caute, Great Fear, pp. 466-469; and Schrecker, No Ivory Tower (cit. n. 2), pp. 126 ff. For the hearings themselves see House Committee on Un-American Activities, Hearings Regarding Commu- nist Infiltration of Radiation Laboratory and Atomic Bomb Project at the University of Calif.-Vol. 1,



81st Cong., 1st sess., 22, 26 Apr., 25 May, 10, 14 June 1949; and House Committee on Un-American Activities, Report on Atomic Espionage (Nelson-Weinberg and Hiskey-Adams Cases), 29 Sept. 1949 (original release date), 26 Apr. 1950 (ordered to be printed). Some of Frank Oppenheimer's recollections of his dismissal subsequent to the hearings are found in Frank Oppenheimer, interview by Charles Weiner, 9 Feb. 1973, transcript, pp. 72-74, and 21 May 1973, transcript, p. 1*-9*, Oral History Collection, Niels Bohr Library, American Institute of Physics, New York.

52 Committee on Secrecy and Clearance, Federation of American Scientists, "Some Individual Cases of Clearance Procedures," Bull. Atomic Sci., Sept. 1948, 4:281-285. The information from the New York Times is cited in Gellhorn, Security, Loyalty, and Science (cit. n. 2), pp. 93-94.

53 For the scientists' response to the AEC fellowship requirements see Eugene Rabinowitch, "The 'Cleansing' of AEC Fellowships," Bull. Atomic Sci., June/July 1949, 5:161-162; and Caute, Great Fear (cit. n. 50), p. 464. Gellhorn, Security, Loyalty, and Science, pp. 188-200, contains a detailed discussion of the requirements for the AEC fellowships.

54 The impact of the McCarran Act was widespread. According to Ellen Schrecker, "Almost every single academic who had political problems during the late forties and fifties could not get a passport": Schrecker, No Ivory Tower (cit. n. 2), p. 296. One particularly interesting case is that of Martin Kamen, who sued for his passport. See ibid., pp. 138-145; and Martin D. Kamen, Radiant Science, Dark Politics (Berkeley: Univ. California Press, 1985), pp. 209 ff., 241 ff., 264 ff., for Kamen's own account. On the scientists' problems in obtaining visas see Victor F. Weisskopf, "Report on the Visa Situation," Bull. Atomic Sci., June/July 1949, 5:221-222.

258 JESSICA WANG

In addition to such well-known horror stories, scientists were faced with seem- ingly endless numbers of smaller annoyances from normal clearance procedures. In the September 1948 issue of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, the FAS Committee on Secrecy and Clearance reported that in a survey of FAS members seventy-six had reported cases of unfair security clearance procedures, fifty-six involving scientists. The scientists reported delays of months or outright denials without explanation in their attempts to obtain clearance. One scientist hired by the U.S. Army reported that the birthplace of his parents, his FAS membership, his membership in the Independent Citizens Committee of the Arts, Sciences, and Professions, and his acquaintance with too many left-wing people had been enough to deny him clearance. In 1949 the New York Times reported that 20,000 to 50,000 technicians, engineers, and scientists were either not working or working with interim clearance because they were waiting to be cleared.52

Scientists faced other problems as well. After a graduate student holding a $1,600 AEC fellowship was found to be a member of the Communist Party, the AEC withdrew his fellowship and required a loyalty oath and noncommunist affidavit from all future award recipients, even from students engaged in nonclas- sified research.53 After the passage of the McCarran Act, growing numbers of American scientists were denied passports and were thus unable to travel to conferences in foreign countries. Some foreign scientists were also unable to obtain entry visas to attend meetings in the United States.54 Such incidents caused scientists increasingly to suspect that they were being singled out for persecution. Just as the attacks on Alger Hiss and Owen Lattimore seemed to suggest a larger plot to denounce intellectuals and the New Deal generation, attacks on the Berkeley Radiation Laboratory physicists, the AEC fellows, and others seemed to be part of a general plan to abuse scientists. Several observers noted that, whether by accident or design, scientists seemed more susceptible to security restrictions than any other group.

Part of the problem rose from the nature of scientists' work. Their tendency to travel abroad was in itself suspicious. The identification of the atomic bomb with national security meant that scientists engaged in military research were per-




ceived as requiring particularly close scrutiny. Scientists were well aware of their position. Condon noted in an address before the American Physical Society in April 1949 that scientists "received more than their proportionate share of attention from the old House Committee," in part because of the "sensational news value of the atomic bomb project." The AAAS Special Committee on Civil Lib- erties for Scientists also pointed out that because scientists were equated in the public mind with military research, they were exposed "more than most occupa- tional groups to sustained and stringent limitations upon their professional freedom. "55 Eugene Rabinowitch, editor of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, observed with dismay that the myth of the vital secret refused to die. He noted that the atomic scientists' educational campaign immediately after the war had stressed the theme "There is no secret of the atomic bomb." That campaign had briefly been successful. But, he lamented, "The revelation of the spy ring has undone this education. Those who always 'knew' that the Soviet scientists could not build an atomic bomb by themselves, but only 'steal' it from America, felt themselves vindicated; scientists who had minimized the importance of atomic 'secrets,' have become suspect of having-willingly or unwillingly-minimized or covered up atomic espionage."56 The public perception remained that the atomic monopoly had been lost to atomic espionage.

Early on, the security clearance policy provoked many scientists to warn that it could only force scientists to leave government laboratories. In 1948 the FAS Committee on Secrecy and Clearance reported, "We have learned that many loyal scientists, lacking either knowledge of the criteria for clearance or confidence in the fairness of their application, have considered leaving the employ of the Commission for positions where they would be secure against unfounded accusations." In March 1948 Condon wrote Senator Hickenlooper that it was difficult enough to keep scientists in the government because of low salaries and heavy administrative duties. The threat of attacks on their loyalty could make a bad situation worse and discourage scientists from engaging in government research. Similarly, at the 12 April 1948 dinner held in support of Condon, Harold Urey noted that secrecy restrictions alone were bad enough. If "character assas- sination by innuendo" were added to the list of disadvantages of government work, he feared that "we will not be able to recruit the type of men so badly needed for this work." On 6 September 1948 eight prominent scientists wrote to Truman about HUAC's actions. They warned, "The Committee is creating an atmosphere that makes men shun government work, thereby threatening us all."57 In April 1948 a poll of the Atomic Scientists of Chicago suggested that the

55 E. U. Condon, address to banquet of the American Physical Society, 28 Apr. 1949, copy in the Oppenheimer Papers; and Special Committee on Civil Liberties for Scientists, "Civil Liberties of Scientists: Report of AAAS Committee," Bull. Atomic Sci., Nov. 1949, 5:298-299, on p. 298. Maurice B. Visscher was chairman of the AAAS committee, with Philip Bard, Robert E. Cushman, Richard L. Meier, and James R. Newman as the other members and Walter Gellhorn as consultant.

56 Eugene Rabinowitch, "Atomic Spy Trials: Heretical Afterthoughts," Bull. Atomic Sci., May 1951, 7:139-140, on p. 139.

57 "Protest Loyalty Procedures," Science News Letter, 10 Apr. 1948, 53:229; Harold Urey, from "In Defense of Science and Freedom-Speeches at the Condon Dinner," Bull. Atomic Sci., June 1948, 4:173-175, on p. 175; and "Eight Scientists Protest Thomas Committee's Methods," ibid., Oct. 1948, 4:290, 320. The eight scientists were Harrison Brown, Karl T. Compton, Thorfin R. Hogness, Charles C. Lauritsen, Philip M. Morse, George B. Pegram, Harold C. Urey, and John C. Warner.



260 JESSICA WANG

attack on Condon was discouraging scientists from accepting government positions. To the question, "How did the manner in which the charges were made against Condon affect your willingness to accept responsible Government positions?" 12 percent of the respondents said that the case "made me decide to decline any such offer," and 63 percent replied that it "made me reluctant to accept." By 1955 almost half of physics graduate students responding to a survey reported that they would accept a job with a lower salary if it did not require security clearance, while only one in twelve wanted a government job.58

The actual effect of loyalty clearance procedures on the government employment of scientists is difficult to gauge, but it appears that few scientists left government positions because of the clearance situation. Some evidence indicates that after a 1947 HUAC investigation of Oak Ridge, 20 to 40 percent of senior physicists and chemists left for other positions in the first six months of 1948. In a letter to FAS Executive Secretary R. L. Meier, however, Ray Stoughton of the Association of Oak Ridge Scientists admitted that the main reason scientists left was the AEC's December 1947 decision to move Oak Ridge's reactor program to Chicago. Stoughton felt that the loyalty investigations had been a contributing factor in the senior scientists' decisions to leave, but they were not the main reason.59 General employment data, furthermore, indicate that the percentage of scientists and engineers employed by the federal government, as compared with the percentage in the universities and industry, actually rose slightly between 1950 and 1952 and declined only slowly after that. The total number of scientists employed by the government continued to grow, but at a slower rate than in private industry or the universities.60 The meaning of these data is arguable, but at the very least it can be said that, while some individuals may have left because of the security situation, there was no mass exodus of scientists from government laboratories. Despite scientists' insistence that unfair clearance procedures would force their fellows to abandon government positions, there is little evidence that large numbers of scientists left government employment out of opposition to clearance policies.

As 1952 drew to a close, the situation appeared grim. The United States was firmly entangled in the Korean War, and losses of lives grew daily. The atomic monopoly was gone, and work on the hydrogen bomb was proceeding slowly. Events and political battles created the impression that disloyalty and espionage were rampant throughout the government, and the politics of anticommunism dominated American political life. Although Condon's case remained quiescent, his reprieve would soon be at an end.

APRIL 1951-SEPTEMBER 1952: THE RENEWED ATTACK AND THE HEARING

On 23 April 1951, in an hour-long speech before the House, Representative Rich- ard Vail renewed the attack on Edward U. Condon. After losing in the 1948

58 "Condon Case Deters Scientists on Posts," New York Times, 23 Apr. 1948, p. 14; "Loyalty Investigations-A Poll of the Atomic Scientists," Bull. Atomic Sci., July 1948, 4:218; and M. Stanley Livingston, "Employment Problems of Young Physicists," Physics Today, Mar. 1955, 7:20-21.

59 Caute, Great Fear (cit. n. 50), p. 465. See also R. E. Stoughton, chairman, Association of Oak Ridge Engineers and Scientists, to Senator Bourke B. Hickenlooper, 15 Oct. 1948, box 65, folder 10, FAS Papers; and Stoughton to Meier, 12 Oct. 1948, ibid.

60 The data are drawn from National Science Foundation, Employment of Scientists and Engineers in the United States, 1950-66 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1968), pp. 20-21.




elections, Vail had been reelected to the House in 1950. He seemed determined to make the Condon case his personal cause, despite the fact that he was no longer a member of HUAC. Little is known about Vail's brief, two-term congressional career, and his obscurity makes his motives difficult to determine. In his first term he occasionally spoke about veteran's issues or rent control before Congress, but by his second term he was concerned almost exclusively with identifying supposed sources of communist activity. His usual method was to make lengthy pronouncements before Congress in which he accused an organization or individual of having subversive inclinations, and then he quoted ex- tended excerpts from old HUAC reports to back up his assertions.6'

Vail's 1951 attack on Condon followed his usual pattern of oratory. The charges rehashed information that HUAC had held since 1948. On the basis of these old charges, Vail demanded Condon's immediate suspension. He declared, "The evidence and sworn testimony is sufficiently strong to warrant immediate suspension of Condon as Director of the Bureau of Standards, and I propose formal hearing[s] to develop the additional facts that may well expose another source of vital information to the Soviet Government." He added defensively, "The committee has persecuted no one. It has prosecuted none but the deserv- ing.",62

Vail's tirade made little impact in the news. The New York Times covered Vail's lengthy denunciation of Condon in a four-paragraph story on page 9. Un- characteristically, Condon made no response to Vail's attack. He later said that Vail's speech was given at a time when he was busy preparing for a celebration of the bureau's semicentennial. He added, "As no one seemed to pay attention to it, I decided at the time to ignore it. "63

Five days after Vail's speech, Truman signed Executive Order 10241. The order weakened the loyalty program's standard for dismissal, a move that the Loyalty Review Board and the Justice Department had pressured Truman to make since 1949.64 The dismissal provision was changed so that doubt of loyalty rather than evidence of actual disloyalty became enough to discharge a government employee. Hundreds of loyalty cases were reopened because of this revision. On 19 July on the basis of Executive Order 10241, Representative Harold H. Velde of HUAC requested reconsideration of the Condon case by the Com- merce Department's loyalty review board.

On 10 August Condon suddenly announced his decision to resign from the Bureau of Standards in order to become director of research and development at the Corning Glass Company. He cited his low government salary as his reason for leaving, but more likely the continual burden of having to respond to HUAC's

61 Information on Vail is scarce. The location of his papers is unknown, and access to most HUAC records and correspondence is restricted under a fifty-year rule. I have pieced together Vail's congressional career from his statements in the Congressional Record; a copy of his 1952 campaign flyer in box "United States, no. 2," House Special Committee on Un-American Activities, folder 36, Condon Papers; and a letter from the Atomic Scientists of Chicago to members of the friends of the ASC concerning the 1952 election, ibid.

62 Richard B. Vail, in Congressional Record, 82nd Cong., 1st sess., 23 Apr. 1951, 97, pt. 3:4220, 4221.

63 Statement of Edward U. Condon, in Congressional Record, 82nd Cong., 2nd sess., 24 Mar. 1952, 98, pt. 2:A1828.

64 Athan Theoharis, Seeds of Repression: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of McCarthyism (Chi- cago: Quadrangle Books, 1971), p. 170.



262 JESSICA WANG

accusations had grown to outweigh the appeal of public service. Representatives Vail and Velde immediately charged Condon with resigning "under fire" and contended that the reasons given for his resignation were "an effort to cover up the real cause of separation," namely, that he could no longer deny the accusation that he was a security risk. In response Condon angrily challenged the committee to call a hearing and prove its accusations. When he officially resigned on 27 September, he criticized the committee's "unfair procedures" and "nonsensi- cal excesses."65

The attacks on Condon did not end with his resignation from government service. In December 1951 Condon was elected to the presidency of the AAAS for 1953. On 14 January 1952 Vail responded to his election by attacking both Con- don and Kirtley F. Mather, the retiring AAAS president. Of Condon he said, "The simple truth is that Condon chose to resign rather than face a Loyalty Board inquiry.... His documented record ... is flagrantly pro-Soviet and I am confident that had the hearing been held, it would have disclosed a culpability rivaling that of Alger Hiss." He had evidently forgotten that the lack of a hearing had been HUAC's fault, not Condon's. Condon had expressed his willingness to be subpoenaed from the beginning, but HUAC had postponed planned hearings. Vail then claimed, "Additional and shocking material involving Condon has been unearthed and is now in the possession of a congressional committee-material that will serve, when released, to remove the last vestige of doubt concerning him and will thoroughly demoralize and confound his defenders."66

Condon responded to Vail in a statement sent to the representative of his congressional district, W. Sterling Cole (R.-New York). He accused Vail of again resorting to election-year posturing and stated his willingness to testify under oath at any time that he was not and never had been a member of the Communist Party and that he had never disclosed classified information to any unauthorized person. He then went through a detailed criticism of Vail's April 1951 diatribe and confessed confusion over Vail's motives. "For my part, I am not quite sure what Mr. Vail wants. He wanted me out. Well, I am out, but apparently that is not enough for him since he sees that I am alive, happy, and well."67

On 19 August 1952 Condon was finally subpoenaed to appear before the House Un-American Activities Committee. The hearing was held on Friday, 5 Septem- ber 1952, in Chicago before a HUAC subcommittee consisting of Velde, Francis E. Walter (D.-Pennsylvania), Morgan M. Moulder (D.-Missouri), and Donald L. Jackson (R.-California). It lasted from 2 P.M. to 8 P.M., interrupted by a ten- minute recess and an hour-long dinner break. Most of the issues raised in the hearing had been brought up in previous attacks on Condon. The subcommittee questioned Condon on his reasons for leaving Los Alamos, the reasons for the revocation of his passport to Russia in June 1945, the circumstances of his appointment to the National Bureau of Standards, his pending security status as of February 1948, and the circumstances of visits by Russian and Polish nationals to the bureau. Condon explained that he had had major objections to the security

65 Richard B. Vail, in Congressional Record, 82nd Cong., 1st sess., 10 Aug. 1951, 97, pt. 14:A5038; and "Dr. Condon Retires," New York Times, 28 Sept. 1951, p. 11.

66 Richard B. Vail, in Congressional Record, 82nd Cong., 2nd sess., 14 Jan. 1952, 98, pt. 1:154. 67 Statement of Dr. Edward U. Condon, in Congressional Record, 82nd Cong., 2nd sess., 24 Mar.

1952, 98, pt. 8:A1826, A1828 (quotation).




requirements at Los Alamos and that his passport had been revoked upon the request of General Groves in the name of security but specifically without prej- udice regarding his loyalty; he described his relations with foreign nationals as a natural part of work at the Bureau of Standards. The committee and Condon then engaged in several sharp exchanges over his relationship with the Berkeley Ra- diation Laboratory scientists and the physicist Bernard Peters. The hearing concluded with questioning about the nature of Condon's relationship with Nathan Gregory Silvermaster, a government economist who had been named by Eliza- beth Bentley as the leader of a Soviet spy group, and about Condon's membership in the American-Soviet Science Society. When asked directly, Condon flatly denied ever giving government documents to Silvermaster or any other alleged communist spies. When questioned about the ASSS, he explained the nature of the severance between the ASSS and the NCASF.68

The hearing was conducted politely, but the bearing of Frank S. Tavenner, Jr., counsel for HUAC, was often confrontational and had the tone of cross- examination rather than questioning for information-gathering purposes.69 For example, at one point Tavenner asked Condon about his associations with the Berkeley Radiation Laboratory physicists who had been investigated by HUAC in 1949. The HUAC lawyer noted that Condon had housed the scientists in Wash- ington during the 1949 hearings and had prepared a statement for the Congres- sional Record in which he said, "Of course, I do not know of all their activities and associations, especially prior to the fall of 1943, when I went out there. But I do know that they worked diligently and hard to make their part of the atomic bomb project a success, and I do not believe that any of them engaged in espionage activities." Tavenner asked Condon what basis he had for his belief that none of the scientists had committed espionage. Condon replied, "The statement refers to what I believe on the basis of my contacts with them, and nothing more," but he admitted he had not seen the testimony from the hearings. Taven- ner seemed incredulous. "And you would make the public statement with regard to those matters without making any inquiry or investigation of your own from sources that you might be enlightened by?" he asked. Condon replied firmly, "It is a correct statement about the present state of my personal belief, and it doesn't go any further, and maybe it is true." After a ten-minute recess, Tavenner continued to press Condon on his responsibility of inquiry. Phrasing a statement as a question, he asked, "In other words, you permitted your personal confidence in these individuals to supersede the duty of inquiry into these matters, didn't you?" Condon answered, "I had no duty of inquiry, because I had no connection with these men as affecting any improper behavior." The debate continued. Tavenner

68 Testimony of Dr. Edward U. Condon, 3833-3897. The Atomic Scientists of Chicago issued a request for members to appear at the hearing and provide a supportive presence for Condon. See Alexander Langsdorf, Jr., and Arthur H. Rosenfeld for the Executive Committee of the ASC, "Atomic Scientists of Chicago Call to Action," 28 Aug. 1952, box "United States, no. 2," House Special Committee on Un-American Activities, folder 30, Condon Papers. I do not know what kind of a response the ASC's request received.

69 Condon recalled the appearance of the committee's conduct in the printed version as very different from the actual hearing. He said, "If you read the printed transcript, it isn't so bad, because the Congressmen have a talent for saying things with nasty insinuations and tones of voice which, when you just take it as straight verbiage and don't know how it was said, doesn't sound so bad." Condon, interview by Weiner, 11-12 Sept. 1973, transcript, p. 224, AIP.



264 JESSICA WANG

insisted, "When you attempt to give them a clean bill of health in the Congres- sional Record, don't you think that there is a duty of inquiry?" Condon responded sharply, "I didn't give them a clean bill of health; I said so far as my contact with them there was no reason to doubt that they were perfectly all right. "70 Tavenner then asked if he used such a lack of inquiry in dealing with all of the employees at the Bureau of Standards. Condon denied the charge.

Representative Jackson then interrupted the exchange with some questions about the Berkeley scientists. He wanted to know how Condon had reacted when Giovanni Lomanitz and David Bohm invoked their Fifth Amendment rights and refused to reply when asked if they had ever been members of the Communist Party. Condon's reply indicated his firm commitment to civil liberties. He said that refusing to answer was their constitutional right and did not affect his feelings about them in any way. When asked if a similar situation arose in the present how he would react, Condon said, "I think the person has a right to exercise his constitutional rights and otherwise it isn't a right." Jackson, who had admitted "I can understand your trust and your faith" in a witness up to the point before he invoked the Fifth Amendment, was displeased with Condon's reply. He declared,

I am surprised, actually, Doctor, at your inability or your unwillingness to state at this time whether or not under the same set of circumstances which prevailed with these young scientists, if you found a young scientist in your organization who refused to answer today whether he was a member of the Communist Party, I am somewhat surprised that you are unable to state at this time if your feelings would be the same as they were then or not.

Condon was unimpressed. "That is not a question, you are surprised," he said. Jackson replied, "No; I am surprised. I don't surprise very easily, I might add.",71 Condon's and Jackson's views were completely at odds. Condon insisted upon the inviolability of individual rights guaranteed by the Constitution, while Jack- son insisted that invocations of the Fifth Amendment were tantamount to threats to national security.

The hearing had been carefully timed with the 1952 elections in mind. It was held in Chicago; Illinois was the home state of both Vail and Velde. A flyer from the 1952 campaign shows that Vail listed HUAC's investigation of Condon as one of his primary accomplishments as a congressman.72 Any startling revelations from the hearing of the sort Vail had promised in January would have been front-page news in a year without a major spy case. But the hearing took place quietly, with no hint of the shocking information promised. Although Condon flatly denied ever giving government documents to Silvermaster or any other alleged communist spies, and denied having known any of his friends to be communists when he was acquainted with them, HUAC concluded in its annual report that Condon was unqualified for "any security position" because of his "pro- pensity for associating with persons disloyal or of questionable loyalty and his

70 Testimony of Dr. Edward U. Condon, 3853-3854, 3857. 71 Ibid., 3858-3859. 72 Campaign flyer prepared and distributed by the "Non-Partisan Vail for Congress Committee,"

box "United States, no. 2," House Special Committee on Un-American Activities, folder 36, Condon Papers.




contempt for necessary security regulations." Condon quickly and angrily responded. "The House committee's lying dishonesty and its attitude toward me is a shocking thing to all decent Americans.... The committee says my friends are of 'questionable loyalty,' but nobody has questioned it but the committee itself." He concluded, "Disgusting as the Committee's antics are, I am sure the country's scientific program is strong enough to forge ahead despite the harm that is done to it by these dishonorable representatives of the people."73

Three days after the release of HUAC's annual report, on 30 December 1952, Condon was installed as the president of the AAAS for 1953. At the annual meeting of the society he was greeted with a rousing ovation. The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists stated, "The tremendous ovation by his fellow members ac- companying his induction was a further affirmation of their faith in his loyalty and integrity."74

Condon's troubles seemed to be over. Not only had he left government service, but he had successfully defended himself in a HUAC hearing. Although he had once again been condemned by HUAC, he had not had to invoke the Fifth Amendment or face perjury charges, as other witnesses had. He worked quietly at the Corning Glass Works for the next two years. Unannounced to the public, his security clearance was lifted on 10 February 1953, as part of normal procedure upon termination of government service. But his ordeal was not yet finished.

1954: "THE SITUATION WAS HOPELESS . . ."

Eisenhower ascended to the presidency in January 1953 after winning a landslide victory in the November elections. One of his first acts as president was to revise the federal government's loyalty program. He introduced his standards for a new loyalty program in his first cabinet meeting, on 23 January. On 27 April he issued Executive Order 10450, which established a new employee security program and further weakened the dismissal standard from "reasonable doubt as to the loyalty of the person involved to the Government of the United States" to requiring an individual's employment to be demonstrably "clearly consistent with the interests of the national security."75 Now employees could be dismissed without charges, and the burden of proof was on the employee to demonstrate that he or she was not a security risk.

Corning Glass Works was involved with one small classified project for the U.S. Navy, so Condon reapplied for security clearance under the new loyalty program. He had a hearing before the Eastern Industrial Security Board in Feb- ruary 1954, and in June he was cleared by the board for access to classified information in connection with the navy project. Corning did not publicly an- nounce that Condon had obtained security clearance. But a Washington Post reporter somehow found out, and on 20 October the press reported that Condon had been granted security clearance. The next day his "Q" clearance was suddenly revoked by Charles S. Thomas, Secretary of the Navy.

7 House Committee on Un-American Activities, Annual Report of the Committee on Un-American Activities for the Year 1952, 82nd Cong., 2nd sess., 1952, 74; and "Scientists Defend Themselves on Loyalty Charges," Bull. Atomic Sci., Feb. 1953, 9:2.

74 "Scientists Defend Themselves on Loyalty Charges." 75 Ralph S. Brown, Loyalty and Security: Employment Tests in the United States (New Haven,

Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, 1958), p. 31.



266 JESSICA WANG

Vice-President Richard M. Nixon, then campaigning in Montana, took credit for a strong role in the revocation of Condon's clearance. He felt that the facts in Condon's case were not yet fully known and believed that he should not be given routine security clearance. Instead, he thought, a special board should review Condon's file.76 Secretary Thomas, however, insisted that Nixon had had no influence on his decision to revoke the clearance.

Condon at first gave every indication of being prepared to pursue his case. After noting that he had been cleared four times by four different boards he said, "I will be pleased to be cleared a fifth time, confident that one more honest, objective review of my record can only lead to this result." But on 13 December 1954 Condon announced that he was giving up the fight. He stated, "At the present time I do not feel there is any possibility of my securing a fair and independent judgment in a reconsideration of the decision by the Eastern Indus- trial Personnel Security Board of last July in favor of my security clearance.... I now am unwilling to continue a potentially indefinite series of reviews and re-reviews."77

Given the censure of Senator Joseph McCarthy on 2 December, Condon's decision might seem surprising. The censure seemed to be an indication that anticommunist persecutions were coming to an end. But the revocation of Op- penheimer's security clearance only six months earlier, in June 1954, showed all too clearly, especially to the atomic scientists, that while McCarthy himself might have disappeared from the political scene, McCarthyism was alive and function- ing. Considering the amount of time and energy Condon devoted to his own security clearance case, explaining past actions over and over again, one also senses mounting frustration and exasperated fatigue on his part. Furthermore, he had nothing but disdain for the Eisenhower administration's security policies and felt that with Eisenhower as president there was little hope for a permanent resolution of his case. While he had found fault with the loyalty program under Truman, especially after the April 1951 revision, he was a loyal Truman appointee and always defended the president himself. In a 1952 article he had criticized the "reasonable doubt" standard but implied that Truman was not the primary figure at fault. He asserted that the standard was changed because "the President was persuaded to change the rules." Even twenty years later, Condon continued to defend Truman. He did not have so charitable a view of Eisenhower. In 1958, explaining his reasons for ending his security clearance battle, Condon accused the Eisenhower administration of perpetrating a plot against scientists, or at the very least of ignoring the smear campaigns that scientists faced. He wrote: "I decided then [1954], and I still think correctly, that the Administration was committed by policy to persecution of scientists, or, at the very least, to a callous indifference toward what others were doing to attack and discredit them. I decided the situation was hopeless, and that I had done all that could be reasonably expected of me in having resisted these forces for seven long years. "78

76 William R. Conklin, "Nixon Warns Foes of Reds in Party," New York Times, 23 Oct. 1954, p. 7. 77 Elie Abel, "Dr. Condon Loses Clearance Again; New Review Set," New York Times, 22 Oct.

1954, p. 13; and "Condon Abandons Clearance Fight," ibid., 14 Dec. 1954, p. 20. 78 E. U. Condon, "Scientists and the Federal Government," Bull. Atomic Sci., Aug. 1952, 8:179-

182, on p. 181; Condon, interview by Weiner, 11-12 Sept. 1973, transcript, p. 183, AIP; and Condon, "Time to Stop Baiting Scientists," Bull. Atomic Sci., Feb. 1958, 14:80-82, on p. 81.




It was no wonder Condon had had enough. A fundamental political transfor- mation had taken place in the decade after the war. With the rise of the national security state, domestic anticommunism had condensed from unpleasant possibility into unyielding reality. By 1950 the Cold War mentality was firmly in place in American politics, and subsequent years brought few expectations of change. Under such circumstances, Condon and others subjected to the adversities of the loyalty and security system had little hope that their difficulties would be resolved in a positive and final manner.

CONCLUSION

In the political climate of the Cold War, scientists, especially those engaged in research related to atomic energy, were particularly vulnerable to anticommunist persecutions. People with liberal politics in general were considered suspect under the government's security apparatus, but scientists carried an extra burden because of the postwar linkage drawn between technology and national security. Not only well-known figures such as Condon endured attacks; hundreds of less prominent scientists experienced problems with obtaining security clearance. Stories of scientists like Frank Oppenheimer and David Bohm, who were forced to leave research for years, increased the tension of scientists. Condon was lucky in this respect. After leaving Corning in 1954, he had some trouble obtaining an academic position because of HUAC's accusation, but in the end he was able to secure a professorship. In January 1955 he was offered the chairmanship of the physics department at New York University, but the offer was rescinded because one of the university's trustees was told by a government official that if Condon were hired the university would lose its federal funding. He spent the remainder of the 1955 spring semester as a visiting professor at the University of Pennsyl- vania, but the intervention of Thomas Gates, who was the new Secretary of the Navy as well as a university trustee, prevented Condon from taking a permanent position there. Instead, he was hired by Washington University in 1956 without apparent difficulty.79 A few years later he went to the University of Colorado at Boulder. By 1966 the U.S. Air Force found him sufficiently loyal to head its investigation of unidentified flying objects.

The reasons for the House Un-American Activities Committee's long persecution of Edward U. Condon are a complex tangle of ideology and political parti- sanship. Condon's internationalist beliefs, opposition to secrecy, and support of civilian control of atomic energy were antithetical to an ideology of national security that emphasized international conflict and the need to preserve the "secret of the atom." Condon's attitudes, common to many scientists immediately after the war, came to be perceived as a threat to security as the Cold War mentality took root and political dissent became equated with disloyalty. The ideological reasons for the choice of Condon as a target were fairly typical of the motivations of those concerned with the federal loyalty and security program and other government agencies. Condon's ordeal differed from the general experience of scientists subject to the security system in its political significance. HUAC sought cases that it could turn to political advantage, and Condon's position as

7 Condon, interview by Weiner, 11-12 Sept. 1973, transcript, pp. 230-232, AIP.



268 JESSICA WANG

director of a major government agency under a Democratic administration made him a tempting target. HUAC's attacks on Condon were often timed to various political maneuvers, especially election-year politics. It should be stressed, however, that the controversy surrounding Condon never grew into a campaign issue of national proportion. There were occasional attempts by some politicians to exploit the case in favor of broader party campaign strategy, most notably Pres- ident Truman's defense of Condon and civil liberties before the AAAS in Sep- tember 1948 and Vice-President Nixon's invocation of Condon's loss of security clearance while campaigning for the Republicans in October 1954. The attacks on Condon, however, usually served more local, personal political ambitions such as HUAC's appropriations request for FY1949 and Vail's congressional campaign in 1952.

Given the political motivations of the charges and the flimsiness of the evidence against Condon, it is difficult to understand why his defenders were generally so ineffective. Truman's failure lay in his dual position toward anticommunism. In his support of Condon, both through his withholding of the Hoover-Harriman letter and in his 1948 speech before the AAAS, President Tru- man appeared as a firm supporter of individual rights and a voice of calm against rampant anticommunism. But simultaneously his loyalty and security policies lent support to attacks upon the loyalty of scientists. HUAC's targets were more spectacular, but more scientists experienced difficulties under Truman's loyalty program than from HUAC or McCarthy. Even Condon's resignation from the Bureau of Standards was prompted in part by the president's April 1951 revision of the loyalty program. While Truman publicly opposed the excesses of HUAC, his own policies lent support and legitimacy to them. Although he tried to main- tain control over the issue of internal security, the communist takeover of China, the Soviet acquisition of the atomic bomb, and other events of 1949 and 1950 thwarted his efforts, and anticommunism became the centerpiece of American political life.80

The scientists' response to the loyalty issue also had a somewhat two-sided character. As individuals the scientists protested strongly, but as a group they relied upon a strategy of rational neutrality. Provocative gestures, such as the elections of Kirtley Mather and Condon to the AAAS presidency, meant little when overall organizational policies were aimed at procedural reform within the ethos of the loyalty and security system. Their arguments that existing security procedures endangered individual rights and that security restrictions were more likely to hinder research than to protect national security were unpersuasive against the emotionally charged accusations of communist sympathies and atomic espionage so prevalent in the Cold War period. There were no obvious solutions. The scientists' threat to leave government laboratories was never a

80 For more on this point see Athan Theoharis, "The Rhetoric of Politics: Foreign Policy, Internal Security, and Domestic Politics in the Truman Era, 1945-1950," in Politics and Policies of the Tru- man Administration, ed. Barton J. Bernstein (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1970), pp. 196-241; and Theoharis, "The Escalation of the Loyalty Program," ibid., pp. 242-268. See also Richard M. Freeland, The Truman Doctrine and the Origins of McCarthyism (New York: Knopf, 1972). Freeland argues that Truman's need to mobilize support for his foreign policy led him to pursue a course of domestic anticommunism. On Truman's loss of control over the internal security issue see ibid., Ch. 8, sect. 2.




very realistic one. They very likely would have had nowhere else to go.81 By the 1950s anticommunism had pervaded every sector of American life and had placed a stranglehold on any political discourse that questioned the assumptions of the national security state. Under the circumstances, rational argument alone could not defeat McCarthyism, but more radical action ran the risk of further repression. Nevertheless, the equivocal nature of both Truman's policies and the scientists' response as a group to the loyalty and security issue left individual scientists with few defenses. Without an atmosphere of firm, unequivocal political support for individual rights, scientists under attack as loyalty and security risks had little hope for relief from frustration and harassment.

81 The universities, e.g., were far from immune to the ravages of McCarthyism. In No Ivory Tower (cit. n. 2), Ellen Schrecker defends the thesis that, with few exceptions, the academic community capitulated to McCarthyism. She concludes, "The academy did not fight McCarthyism. It contributed to it .... In its collaboration with McCarthyism, the academic community behaved just like every other major institution in American life" (p. 340).



Science, Security, and the Cold War: The Case of E. U. Condon

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