Russo-Japanese WarThis article is about the war between the RussianEmpire andthe Empire of Japan. For the conictbetween the Soviet Union and Japan in the 1930s, seeSovietJapanese border conicts. For the war in 1945,see SovietJapanese War (1945).The Russo-Japanese War (8 February 1904 5September 1905) was fought between the Russian Em-pire and the Empire of Japan over rival imperial ambi-tions in Manchuria and Korea. The major theatres ofoperations were the Liaodong Peninsula and Mukden inSouthern Manchuria, and the seas around Korea, Japan,and the Yellow Sea.Russia sought a warm-water port on the Pacic Ocean fortheir navy and for maritime trade. Vladivostok was op-erational only during the summer, whereas Port Arthur,a naval base in Liaodong Province leased to Russia byChina, was operational all year. Since the end of the FirstSino-Japanese War in 1895, negotiations between Russiaand Japan had proved impractical. Russia had demon-strated an expansionist policy in Manchuria dating to thereign of Ivan the Terrible in the 16th century.[4] Throughthreat of Russian expansion, Japan oered to recognizeRussian dominance in Manchuria in exchange for recog-nition of Korea as within the Japanese sphere of inu-ence. Russia refused and demanded Korea north of the39th parallel to be a neutral buer zone between Russiaand Japan. The Japanese government perceived a Russianthreat to its strategic interests and chose to go to war. Af-ter negotiations broke down in 1904, the Japanese Navyopened hostilities by attacking the Russian Eastern Fleetat Port Arthur in a surprise attack.Russiasuerednumerous defeats toJapan, but TsarNicholasIIwasconvincedthatRussiawouldwinandchose to remain engaged in the war; at rst, to await theoutcomes of certain naval battles, and later to preserve thedignity of Russia by averting a humiliating peace. Thewar concluded with the Treaty of Portsmouth, mediatedby US President Theodore Roosevelt. The complete vic-tory of the Japanese military surprised world observers.The consequences transformed the balance of power inEast Asia, resulting in a reassessment of Japans recententry onto the world stage. Scholars continue to debatethe historical signicance of the war.1 BackgroundIn 1853 Commodore Perry of the US Navy arrived inJapanandbrought anendtoJapans policyof self-isolation by forcing the Tokugawa shogunate to sign theConvention of Kanagawa the following year. This en-counter with a modern Western power served to portraythe West as having a confrontational and imperialist po-litical agenda, which Japan viewed with respect throughWorld War II.[5] Japan sought to maintain its autonomyand resisted colonialism by Western nations. The MeijiRestoration in 1868 served as an early Japanese responseto the challenges of the modern world.After the Meiji Restoration in 1868, the Meiji govern-ment endeavored to assimilate Western ideas, technologi-cal advances and customs. By the late 19th century, Japanhad transformed itself into a modernized industrial state.The Japanese wanted to preserve their sovereignty and berecognized as equal with the Western powers.Tsarist Russia, as a major imperial power, had ambitionsin the East. By the 1890s it had extended its realm acrossCentral Asia to Afghanistan, absorbing local states in theprocess. The Russian Empire stretched from Poland inthe west to the Kamchatka Peninsula in the east.[6] Withits construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway to the portof Vladivostok, Russia hoped to further consolidate itsinuence and presence in the region. In the Tsushima in-cident of 1861 Russia had directly assaulted Japanese ter-ritory. Fearing Russian expansion, Japan regarded Korea(and to a lesser extent Manchuria) as a protective buer.1.1 Sino-Japanese War (18941895)Main article: First Sino-Japanese WarBetween the Meiji Restoration and its participation inChinese generals in Pyongyang surrender to the Japanese, Octo-ber 1894.12 1 BACKGROUNDWorld War I, the Empire of Japan fought in two signif-icant wars. The rst was the First Sino-Japanese War,fought in 1894 and 1895. The war revolved around theissue of control and inuence over Korea under the ruleof the Joseon dynasty. A peasant rebellion led to a re-quest by the Korean government for the Qing dynasty tosend in troops to stabilize the country. The Empire ofJapan responded by sending their own force to Korea andinstalling a puppet government in Seoul. China objectedand war ensued. Hostilities proved brief, with Japaneseground troops routing Chinese forces on the LiaodongPeninsulaandnearlydestroyingtheChineseNavyinthe Battle of the Yalu River. Japan and China signedthe Treaty of Shimonoseki, which ceded the LiaodongPeninsula and the island of Taiwan to Japan. After thepeace treaty, Russia, Germany, and France forced Japanto withdraw from the Liaodong Peninsula. Soon after,Russia occupied the Liaodong Peninsula, built the PortArthur fortress, and based the Russian Pacic Fleet in theport. Germany occupied Jiaozhou Bay, built the Tsingtaofortress, and based the German East Asia Squadron in thisport.1.2 Russian encroachmentInDecember 1897aRussianeet appearedoPortArthur. After three months, in 1898, China and Russianegotiated a convention by which China leased (to Rus-sia) Port Arthur, Talienwan and the surrounding waters.The two parties further agreed that the convention couldbe extended by mutual agreement. The Russians clearlyexpected such an extension, for they lost no time in oc-cupying the territory and in fortifying Port Arthur, theirsole warm-water port on the Pacic coast and of greatstrategic value. A year later, to consolidate their position,the Russians began to build a new railway from Harbinthrough Mukden to Port Arthur. The development of therailway became a contributory factor to the Boxer Rebel-lion, when Boxer forces burned the railway stations.[7]The Russians also began to make inroads into Korea. By1898 they had acquired mining and forestry concessionsnear the Yalu and Tumen rivers,[8] causing the Japanesemuch anxiety. Japan decided to attack before the Rus-sians completed the Trans-Siberian Railway.1.3 Boxer RebellionMain article: Boxer RebellionThe Russians and the Japanese both contributed troopsto the eight-member international force sent in 1900 toquell the Boxer Rebellion and to relieve the internationallegations under siege in the Chinese capital, Beijing. Rus-sia had already sent 177,000 soldiers to Manchuria, nom-inallytoprotect itsrailwaysunderconstruction. Thetroops of the Qing Empire and the participants of theBoxer Rebellion could do nothing against such a mas-Troops of the eight-nation alliance in 1900. Left to right: Britain,UnitedStates, Australia,[9]India, Germany, France, Austria,Italy, Japan.sive army and were ejected fromManchuria. The Russiantroops settled in[10] and despite assurances they would va-cate the area after the crisis, by 1903 the Russians had notestablished a timetable for withdrawal[11] and had actuallystrengthened their position in Manchuria.1.4 Pre-war negotiationsThe Japanese statesman It Hirobumi started to negoti-ate with the Russians. He regarded Japan as too weak toevict the Russian militarily, so he proposed giving Russiacontrol over Manchuria in exchange for Japanese controlof northern Korea. Meanwhile, Japan and Britain hadsigned the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1902, the Britishseeking to restrict naval competition by keeping the Rus-sian Pacic seaports of Vladivostok and Port Arthur fromtheir full use. The alliance with the British meant, in part,that if any nation allied itself with Russia during any waragainst Japan, then Britain would enter the war on Japansside. Russia could no longer count on receiving help fromeither Germany or France without there being a dangerof British involvement in the war. With such an alliance,Japan felt free to commence hostilities, if necessary.On 28 July 1903, the Japanese minister in St. Peters-burg was instructed to present his countrys view oppos-ing Russias consolidation plans in Manchuria. On 12 Au-gust, the Japanese minister handed in the following doc-ument (quoted verbatim) to serve as the basis for furthernegotiations:[12]1. Mutual engagement to respect the independence andterritorial integrity of the Chinese and Korean em-pires and to maintain the principle of equal oppor-tunity for the commerce and industry of all nationsin those countries.2. Reciprocal recognitionof Japans preponderatinginterests in Korea and Russias special interests inrailway enterprises in Manchuria, and of the rightof Japan to take in Korea and of Russia to take inManchuria such measures as may be necessary for1.4 Pre-war negotiations 3the protection of their respective interests as abovedened, subject, however, to the provisions of arti-cle I of this agreement.3. Reciprocal undertaking on the part of Russia andJapan not to impede development of those indus-trial and commercial activities respectively of JapaninKoreaandofRussiainManchuria, whicharenot inconsistent with the stipulations of article I ofthis agreement. Additional engagement on the partof Russia not to impede the eventual extension ofthe Korean railway into southern Manchuria so asto connect with the East China and Shan-hai-kwan-Newchwang lines.4. Reciprocal engagement that in case it is found nec-essary to send troops by Japan to Korea, or by Rus-siatoManchuria, forthepurposeeitherofpro-tecting the interests mentioned in article II of thisagreement, or of suppressing insurrection or disor-der calculated to create international complications,the troops so sent are in no case to exceed the actualnumber required and are to be forthwith recalled assoon as their missions are accomplished.5. Recognition on the part of Russia of the exclusiveright of Japan to give advice and assistance in theinterest of reform and good government in Korea,including necessary military assistance.6. Thisagreement tosupplant all previousarrange-ments between Japan and Russia respecting Korea.On3October, theRussianministertoJapan, RomanRosen, presented to the Japanese government the Rus-sian counterproposal as the basis of negotiations, as fol-lows (quoted verbatim):[13]1. Mutual engagement to respect the independence andterritorial integrity of the Korean Empire.2. Recognition by Russia of Japans preponderating in-terests in Korea and of the right of Japan to give ad-vice and assistance to Korea tending to improve thecivil administration of the empire without infringingthe stipulations of article I.3. Engagement on the part of Russia not to impede thecommercial and industrial undertakings of Japan inKorea, nor to oppose any measures taken for the pur-pose of protecting them so long as such measures donot infringe the stipulations of article I.4. Recognition of the right of Japan to send for thesame purpose troops to Korea, with the knowledgeof Russia, but their number not to exceed that actu-ally required, and with the engagement on the part ofJapan to recall such troops as soon as their missionis accomplished.5. Mutual engagement not to use any part of the ter-ritory of Korea for strategical purposes nor to un-dertake on the coasts of Korea any military workscapable of menacing the freedom of navigation inthe Straits of Korea.6. Mutual engagement to consider that part of the ter-ritory of Korea lying to the north of the 39th parallelas a neutral zone into which neither of the contract-ing parties shall introduce troops.7. Recognition by Japan of Manchuria and its littoralas in all respects outside her sphere of interest.8. This agreement to supplant all previous agreementsbetween Russia and Japan respecting Korea.Negotiationsthenfollowed; althoughbyearlyJanuary1904, the Japanese government had realised that Russiawas neither interested in settling the Manchurian nor Ko-rean issues. Instead, Russias goal was buying time - viadiplomacy - to further buildup militarily.[14]Neverthe-less, on 13 January 1904, Japan proposed a formula bywhich Manchuria would be outside the Japanese sphereof inuence and, reciprocally, Korea outside Russias. By4 February 1904, no formal reply had been received andon6FebruaryKurinoShinichiro, theJapaneseminis-ter, called on the Russian foreign minister, Count Lamb-sdor, to take his leave.[15] Japan severed diplomatic re-lations with Russia on 6 February 1904.[14]Potential diplomatic resolution of territorial concerns be-tween Japan and Russia failed; historians have argued thatthis directly resulted from the actions of Tsar Nicholas II.One crucial error of Nicholas was his mismanagement ofgovernment. Although certain scholars contend the sit-uation arose from the determination of Tsar Nicholas IIto use the war against Japan to spark a revival in Russianpatriotism, no historical evidence supports this claim.[16]The Tsars advisors did not support the war, foreseeingproblems in transporting troops and supplies from Euro-pean Russia to the East.[17] Convinced that his rule wasdivinely ordained and that he held responsibility to God,Nicholas II held the ideals of preserving the autocracyand defending the dignity, honor, and worth of Russia.[18]This attitude by the Tsar led to repeated delays in negotia-tions with the Japanese government. The Japanese under-standing of this can be seen from a telegram dated 1 De-cember 1903 from Japanese minister of foreign aairs,Komura, to the minister to Russia, in which he stated:"...the Japanese government have at alltimes during the progress of the negotiationsmadeit aspecial point togiveprompt an-swers to all propositions of the Russian govern-ment. The negotiations have now been pend-ingfor noless thanfour months, andtheyhave not yet reached a stage where the nal is-sue can with certainty be predicted. In these4 3 CAMPAIGN OF 1904circumstancestheJapanesegovernmentcan-not but regard with grave concern the situationfor which the delays in negotiations are largelyresponsible.[19]Errors by Nicholas II in managing the Russian govern-mentalsoledtohismisinterpretingthetypeofsitua-tioninwhichRussiawastobecomeinvolvedinwithJapan. Some scholars have suggested that Tsar NicholasII dragged Japan into war intentionally, in hopes of re-viving Russian nationalism. This notion is disputed by acomment made by Nicholas to Kaiser William of Ger-many, saying there would be no war because he did notwish it.[20]This does not reject the claim that Russiaplayed an aggressive role in the East, which it did, ratherthat Russia unwisely calculated that Japan would not goto war against its far larger and seemingly superior navyand army. Evidence of Russias false sense of securityand superiority to Japan is seen by Russian reference toJapan as a big mistake.[21]2 Declaration of warGreater Manchuria. Russian (outer) Manchuria is the lighter redregion to the upper rightJapan issued a declaration of war on 8 February 1904.[22]However, three hours before Japans declaration of warwas received by the Russian government, the JapaneseImperial Navy attacked the Russian Far East Fleet at PortArthur. Tsar Nicholas II was stunned by news of the at-tack. He could not believe that Japan would commit anact of war without a formal declaration, and had been as-sured by his ministers that the Japanese would not ght.When the attack came, according to Cecil Spring Rice,rst secretary at the British Embassy, it left the Tsar al-most incredulous.[23] Russia declared war on Japan eightdays later.[24] Japan, in response, made reference to theRussian attack on Sweden in 1809 without declarationof war, and the requirement to declare war before com-mencing hostilities was not made international law untilthe Second Hague Peace Conference was held in October1907.[25]TheQingEmpirefavouredtheJapanesepositionandeven oered military aid, but Japan declined it. How-ever, Yuan Shikai sent envoys to Japanese generals sev-eral times to deliver foodstus and alcoholic drinks. Na-tive Manchurians joined the war on both sides as hiredtroops.3 Campaign of 1904Port Arthur, on the Liaodong Peninsula in the south ofManchuria, had been fortied into a major naval base bythe Russian Imperial Army. Since it needed to control thesea in order to ght a war on the Asian mainland, Japansrst military objective was to neutralize the Russian eetat Port Arthur.3.1 Battle of Port ArthurMain article: Battle of Port ArthurOn the night of 8 February 1904, the Japanese eet underJapaneseinfantryduringtheoccupationofSeoul, Korea, in1904.Admiral Togo Heihachiro opened the war with a surprisetorpedo boat destroyer[26] attack on the Russian ships atPort Arthur. The attack heavily damaged the Tsesarevichand Retvizan, the heaviest battleships in Russias far East-ern theater, and the 6,600 ton cruiser Pallada.[27] Theseattacks developed into the Battle of Port Arthur the nextmorning. A series of indecisive naval engagements fol-lowed, in which Admiral Togo was unable to attack theRussian eet successfully as it was protected by the shorebatteries of the harbour, and the Russians were reluctantto leave the harbour for the open seas, especially after thedeath of Admiral Stepan Osipovich Makarov on 13 April1904. Although the actual Battle of Port Arthur was in-decisive, the initial attacks had a devastating psychologi-cal eect on Russia, which had been condent about theprospect of war. The Japanese had seized the initiativewhile the Russians waited in port.[28]These engagements provided cover for a Japanese land-ing near Incheon in Korea. From Incheon the Japaneseoccupied Seoul and then the rest of Korea. By the endof April, the Japanese Imperial Army under Kuroki Itei3.3 Siege of Port Arthur 5was ready to cross the Yalu River into Russian-occupiedManchuria.3.2 Blockade of Port ArthurBattleelds in the Russo-Japanese WarTheJapaneseattemptedtodenytheRussians useofPort Arthur. During the night of 1314 February, theJapanese attempted to block the entrance to Port Arthurby sinking several cement-lled steamers in the deep wa-ter channel to the port,[29] but they sank too deep to be ef-fective. A similar attempt to block the harbour entranceduring the night of 34 May also failed. In March, thecharismatic Vice Admiral Makarov had taken commandof the First Russian Pacic Squadron with the intentionof breaking out of the Port Arthur blockade.On 12 April 1904, two Russian pre-dreadnought battle-ships, the agship Petropavlovsk and the Pobeda, slippedout of port but struck Japanese mines o Port Arthur.ThePetropavlovsksank almost immediately, while thePobeda had to be towed back to port for extensive re-pairs. Admiral Makarov, the single most eective Rus-sian naval strategist of the war, perished on the battleshipPetropavlovsk.On 15 April 1904, the Russian government made over-tures threatening to seize the British war correspondentswho were taking the ship Haimun into warzones to reportfor the London-based Times newspaper, citing concernsabout the possibility of the British giving away Russianpositions to the Japanese eet.The Russians quickly learned, and soon employed, theJapanesetacticofoensiveminelaying. On15May1904, twoJapanesebattleships, theYashimaandtheHatsuse, were lured into a recently laid Russian mine-eld o Port Arthur, each striking at least two mines.The Hatsuse sank within minutes, taking 450 sailors withher, while the Yashima sank while under towtowards Ko-rea for repairs. On 23 June 1904, a breakout attempt bythe Russian squadron, now under the command of Ad-miral Wilgelm Vitgeft, failed. By the end of the month,Japanese artillery was ring shells into the harbour.3.3 Siege of Port ArthurMain article: Siege of Port ArthurThe Siege of Port Arthur commenced in April 1904.Bombardment during the Siege of Port ArthurJapanesetroopstriednumerousfrontalassaultsonthefortied hilltops overlooking the harbour, which were de-feated with Japanese casualties in the thousands. Eventu-ally, though, with the aid of several batteries of 11-inch(280 mm) Krupp howitzers, the Japanese were able tocapture the key hilltop bastion in December 1904. Fromthis vantage point, the long-range artillery was able toshell the Russian eet, which was unable to retaliate ef-fectively against the land-based artillery and was unableor unwilling to sail out against the blockading eet. FourRussian battleships and two cruisers were sunk in suc-cession, with the fth and last battleship being forced toscuttle a few weeks later. Thus, all capital ships of theRussian eet in the Pacic were sunk. This is probablythe only example in military history when such a scale ofdevastation was achieved by land-based artillery againstmajor warships.Meanwhile, attempts to relieve the besieged city by landalso failed, and, after the Battle of Liaoyang in late Au-gust, the northern Russian force that might have been ableto relieve Port Arthur retreated to Mukden (Shenyang).Major General Anatoly Stessel, commander of the PortArthur garrison, believed that the purpose of defendingthe city was lost after the eet had been destroyed. Ingeneral, the Russian defenders were suering dispropor-tionate casualties each time the Japanese attacked. In par-6 3 CAMPAIGN OF 1904Japanese assault on the entrenched Russian forces, 1904ticular, several large underground mines were explodedin late December, resulting in the costly capture of a fewmore pieces of the defensive line. Stessel, therefore, de-cided to surrender to the surprised Japanese generals on2 January 1905. He made his decision without consult-ing either the other military sta present, or the Tsar andmilitary command, who all disagreed with the decision.Stessel was convicted by a court-martial in 1908 and sen-tenced to death on account of an incompetent defense andfor disobeying orders. He was later pardoned.3.4 Battle of Yalu RiverMain article: Battle of Yalu River (1904)IncontrasttotheJapanesestrategyofrapidlygainingground to control Manchuria, Russian strategy focused onghting delaying actions to gain time for reinforcementsto arrive via the long Trans-Siberian railway, which wasincomplete near Irkutsk at the time. On 1 May 1904, theBattle of Yalu River became the rst major land battle ofthe war; Japanese troops stormed a Russian position aftercrossing the river. The defeat of the Russian Eastern De-tachment removed the perception that the Japanese wouldbe an easy enemy, that the war would be short, and thatRussia would be the overwhelming victor.[30] This battlewas also the rst battle in decades to be an Asian victoryover a European power and marked Russias inability tomatch Japans military prowess.[31] Japanese troops pro-ceeded to land at several points on the Manchurian coast,and in a series of engagements, drove the Russians backtowards Port Arthur. The subsequent battles, includingthe Battle of Nanshan on 25 May 1904, were marked byheavy Japanese losses largely from attacking entrenchedRussian positions.3.5 Battle of the Yellow SeaMain article: Battle of the Yellow SeaWith the death of Admiral Stepan Makarov during thesiege of Port Arthur in April 1904, Admiral WilgelmVit-geft was appointed command of the battle eet and wasordered to make a sortie from Port Arthur and deploy hisforce to Vladivostok. Flying his ag in the French-builtpre-dreadnought Tsesarevich, Vitgeft proceeded to leadhis six battleships, four cruisers, and 14 torpedo boat de-stroyers into the Yellow Sea in the early morning of 10August 1904. Waiting for him was Admiral Togo and hiseet of four battleships, 10 cruisers, and 18 torpedo boatdestroyers.At approximately 12:15, the battleship eets obtained vi-sual contact witheachother, andat 13:00withTogocrossing Vitgefts T, they commenced main battery re ata range of about eight miles, the longest ever conductedup to that time.[32]For about thirty minutes the battle-ships pounded one another until they had closed to lessthan four miles and began to bring their secondary bat-teries into play. At 18:30, a hit from one of Togos bat-tleships struck Vitgefts agships bridge, killing him in-stantly.With the Tsesarevich ' s helm jammed and their admiralkilled in action, she turned from her battle line, causingconfusion among her eet. However, Togo was deter-mined to sink the Russian agship and continued pound-ing her, being saved only by the gallant charge of theAmerican-built Russian battleship Retvizan, whose cap-tain successfully drew away Togos heavy re from theRussianagship.[33]Knowingoftheimpendingbattlewith the battleship reinforcements arriving from Russia(the Baltic Fleet), Togo chose not to risk his battleshipsby pursuing his enemy as they turned about and headedback into Port Arthur, thus ending naval historys longest-range gunnery duel up to that time and the rst modernclash of steel battleship eets on the high seas.3.6 Baltic Fleet redeploysRoute of Baltic Fleet, to and backMeanwhile, theRussians werepreparingtoreinforcetheir Far East Fleet by sending the Baltic Fleet, underthe command of Admiral Zinovy Rozhestvensky. After a4.2 Battle of Mukden 7false start caused by engine problems and other mishaps,the squadron nally departed on 15 October 1904, andsailed half way around the world from the Baltic Sea tothe Pacic via the Cape of Good Hope in the course ofa seven-month odyssey that was to attract worldwide at-tention. The eet was forced to take this longer routeaftertheDoggerBankincident on21October1904,where the Russian eet red on British shing boats thatthey mistook for enemy torpedo boats. This caused theBritish to deny them access to the Suez Canal, thus forc-ing them around Africa, and nearly sparking a war withGreat Britain (an ally of Japan, but neutral, unless pro-voked by a non-combatant nation).4 Campaign of 1905Retreat of Russian soldiers after the Battle of Mukden.Withthefall ofPort Arthur, theJapanese3rdArmycouldcontinuenorthwardtoreinforcepositionssouthof Russian-held Mukden. With the onset of the severeManchurian winter, there had been no major land en-gagements since the Battle of Shaho the previous year.The two sides camped opposite each other along 60 to 70miles (110 km) of front lines south of Mukden.4.1 Battle of SandepuMain article: Battle of SandepuThe Russian Second Army under General Oskar Gripen-berg, between 25 and 29 January, attacked the Japaneseleft anknearthetownofSandepu, almost breakingthrough. This caught the Japanese by surprise. How-ever, without support from other Russian units the attackstalled, Gripenberg was ordered to halt by Kuropatkinand the battle was inconclusive. The Japanese knew thatthey needed to destroy the Russian army in ManchuriabeforeRussianreinforcements arrivedviatheTrans-Siberian railroad.4.2 Battle of MukdenMain article: Battle of MukdenThe Battle of Mukden commenced on 20 February 1905.An illustration of a Japanese assault during the Battle of Mukden.In the following days Japanese forces proceeded to as-sault the right and left anks of Russian forces surround-ing Mukden, along a 50-mile (80 km) front. Approxi-mately half a million men were involved in the ghting.Both sides were well entrenched and were backed by hun-dreds of artillery pieces. After days of harsh ghting,added pressure from the anks forced both ends of theRussian defensive line to curve backwards. Seeing theywere about to be encircled, the Russians began a gen-eral retreat, ghting a series of erce rearguard actions,which soon deteriorated in the confusion and collapse ofRussian forces. On 10 March 1905, after three weeks ofghting, General Kuropatkin decided to withdraw to thenorth of Mukden. The Russians lost 90,000 men in thebattle.The retreating Russian Manchurian Army formations dis-banded as ghting units, but the Japanese failed to destroythem completely. The Japanese themselves had sueredheavy casualties and were in no condition to pursue. Al-though the Battle of Mukden was a major defeat for theRussians and was the most decisive land battle ever foughtby the Japanese, the nal victory still depended on thenavy.8 5 PEACE AND AFTERMATH4.3 Battle of TsushimaMain article: Battle of TsushimaAfter a stopover of several weeks at the minor port ofJapanese battleship Mikasa, the agship of Admiral Tg Hei-hachir at the Battle of Tsushima.Nossi-B, Madagascar, that had been reluctantly allowedby neutral France in order not to jeopardize its relationswith its Russian ally, the Russian Baltic eet proceededtoCamRanhBayinFrenchIndochinapassingonitsway through the Singapore Strait between 7 and 10 April1905.[34][35]The eet nally reached the Sea of Japanin May 1905. The logistics of such an undertaking inthe age of coal power was astounding. The squadron re-quired approximately 500,000 tons of coal to completethe journey, yet by international law, it was not allowedto coal at neutral ports, forcing the Russian authorities toacquire a large eet of colliers to supply the eet at sea.The weight of the shipsstores needed for such a longjourney was to be another major problem.[36] The Rus-sian Second Pacic Squadron (the renamed Baltic Fleet)sailed 18,000 nautical miles (33,000 km) to relieve PortArthur. Thedemoralizingnewsthat Port Arthurhadfallen reached the eet while it was still at Madagascar.Admiral Rozhestvenskys only hope now was to reach theport of Vladivostok. There were three routes to Vladi-vostok, with the shortest and most direct passing throughthe Tsushima Straits between Korea and Japan. However,this was also the most dangerous route as it passed be-tween the Japanese home islands and the Japanese navalbases in Korea.Admiral Togo was aware of Russian progress and under-stood that, with the fall of Port Arthur, the Second andThird Pacic squadrons would try to reach the only otherRussian port in the Far East, Vladivostok. Battle planswere laid down and ships were repaired and retted tointercept the Russian eet.The Japanese Combined Fleet, which had originally con-sisted of six battleships, was now down to four (two hadbeenlost tomines), but still retaineditscruisers, de-stroyers, and torpedo boats. The Russian Second PacicSquadron contained eight battleships, including four newbattleships of the Borodino class, as well as cruisers, de-stroyers and other auxiliaries for a total of 38 ships.Bythe end of May, the Second Pacic Squadron wason the last leg of its journey to Vladivostok, taking theshorter, riskier route between Korea and Japan, and trav-elling at night to avoid discovery. Unfortunately for theRussians, while in compliance with the rules of war, thetwo trailing hospital ships had continued toburn theirlights,[37]whichwerespottedbytheJapanesearmedmerchant cruiser Shinano Maru. Wireless communica-tion was used to inform Togos headquarters, where theCombined Fleet was immediately ordered to sortie.[38]Still receiving naval intelligence from scouting forces, theJapanesewereabletopositiontheireet sothat theywould cross the T"[39] of the Russian eet. The Japaneseengaged the Russians in the Tsushima Straits on 2728May 1905. The Russian eet was virtually annihilated,losingeightbattleships, numeroussmallervessels, andmore than 5,000 men, while the Japanese lost three tor-pedo boats and 116 men. Only three Russian vessels es-caped to Vladivostok. After the Battle of Tsushima, acombined Japanese Army and Navy operation occupiedSakhalin Island to force the Russians to sue for peace.5 Peace and aftermath5.1 Treaty of PortsmouthMain article: Treaty of PortsmouthThe defeats of the Russian Army and Navy shook upNegotiating the Treaty of Portsmouth (1905). From left to right:the Russians at far side of table are Korostovetz, Nabokov, Witte,Rosen, Plancon; andtheJapaneseat nearsideoftableareAdachi, Ochiai, Komura, Takahira, Sato. The large conferencetable is today preserved at the Museum Meiji Mura in Inuyama,Aichi Prefecture, Japan.Russian condence. Throughout 1905, the Imperial Rus-sian government was rocked by revolution. The popula-tion was against escalation of the war. The empire wascertainly capable of sending more troops, but the poorstateoftheeconomy, theembarrassingdefeatsoftheRussian Army and Navy by the Japanese, and the relativeunimportance of the disputed land to Russia made thewar extremely unpopular.[40] Tsar Nicholas II elected tonegotiate peace so he could concentrate on internal mat-5.3 Political consequences 9ters after the disaster of Bloody Sunday on 22 January1905.Japan-Russia Treaty of Peace, 5 September 1905Bothsidesacceptedtheoer ofAmericanpresident,Theodore Roosevelt, to mediate; meetings were held inPortsmouth, New Hampshire, with Sergius Witte lead-ing the Russian delegation and Baron Komura, a graduateof Harvard, leading the Japanese delegation. The Treatyof Portsmouth was signed on 5 September 1905 at thePortsmouth Naval Shipyard on Seaveys Island, Kittery,Maine, while the delegates stayed in Portsmouth, NewHampshire.[41] Witte became Russian Prime Minister thesame year.After courting the Japanese, Roosevelt decided to sup-port the Tsars refusal to pay indemnities, a move thatpolicymakers in Tokyo interpreted as signifying that theUnited States had more than a passing interest in Asianaairs. Russia recognized Korea as part of the Japanesesphere of inuence and agreed to evacuate Manchuria.Japan would annex Korea in 1910 (JapanKorea Treatyof 1910), with scant protest from other powers.[42]Russiaalsosignedoverits25-yearleaseholdrightstoPort Arthur, including the naval base and the peninsulaaround it, and ceded the southern half of Sakhalin Islandto Japan. Sakhalin would be taken back by the SovietUnion following the defeat of the Japanese in World WarII.[43][44]Roosevelt earnedthe Nobel Peace Prize for his ef-fort. George E. Mowry concludes that Roosevelt han-dled the arbitration well, doing an excellent job of bal-ancing Russian and Japanese power in the Orient, wherethe supremacy of either constituted a threat to growingAmerica.[45]5.2 CasualtiesSources do not agree on a precise number of deaths fromthe war because of a lack of body counts for conrma-tion. ThenumberofJapaneseArmydeadincombatis put at around 47,000 with around 27,000 additionalcasualties from disease, and between 6,000 and 12,000wounded. Estimates of Russian Army dead range fromJapanese propaganda of the war: woodcut print showing TsarNicholas II waking froma nightmare of the battered andwounded Russian forces returning from battle. Artist KobayashiKiyochika, 1904 or 1905.around 40,000 to around 70,000 men. The total num-ber of army dead is generally stated as around 130,000 to170,000.[46] China suered 20,000 civilian deaths, and -nancially the loss amounted to over 69 million taels' worthof silver.During many of the battles at sea, several thousand sol-diers being transported drowned after their ships wentdown. There was no consensus about what to do withtransported soldiers at sea, and as a result, many of theships failed or refused to rescue soldiers that were leftshipwrecked. ThisledtothecreationofthesecondGeneva Convention in 1906, which gave protection andcare for shipwrecked soldiers in armed conict.5.3 Political consequencesThis was the rst major military victory in the modernera of an Asian power over a European nation. Russiasdefeat was met with shock in the West and across the FarEast. Japans prestige rose greatly as it came to be seenas a modern nation. Concurrently, Russia lost virtuallyits entire Pacic and Baltic eets, and also much inter-national esteem. This was particularly true in the eyes ofGermany and Austria-Hungary before World War I. Rus-sia was Frances and Serbia's ally, and that loss of prestige10 5 PEACE AND AFTERMATHPunch cartoon, 1905; A cartoon in the British press of the timesillustrating Russias loss of prestige after the nations defeat. Thehour-glass represents Russias prestige running out.had a signicant eect on Germanys future when plan-ning for war with France, and Austria-Hungarys war withSerbia.IntheabsenceofRussiancompetition, andwiththedistractionof Europeannations duringWorldWar I,combined with the Great Depression that followed, theJapanese military began eorts to dominate China andthe rest of Asia, which eventually led to the Second Sino-Japanese War and the Pacic War theatres of World WarII.5.3.1 Eects in RussiaAlthough popular support for the war had existed follow-ing the Japanese attack on Port Arthur in 1904, discon-tent occurred following continued defeats at the hands ofJapan. For many Russians, the immediate shock of un-expected humiliation at the hands of Japan, caused theconict to be viewed as a metaphor for the shortcom-ings of the Romanov autocracy.[47] Popular discontent inRussia after the war added more fuel to the already sim-mering Russian Revolution of 1905, an event NicholasII had hoped to avoid entirely by taking intransigent ne-gotiating stances prior to coming to the table. Twelveyears later, that discontent boiled over into the FebruaryRevolution of 1917. In Poland, which Russia partitionedin the late 18th century, and where Russian rule alreadycaused two major uprisings, the population was so rest-less that an army of 250,000300,000larger than theone facing the Japanesehad to be stationed to put downtheunrest.[48]Somepolitical leadersofthePolishin-surrection movement (in particular, Jzef Pisudski) sentemissaries to Japan to collaborate on sabotage and intelli-gence gathering within the Russian Empire and even plana Japanese-aided uprising.[49]In Russia, the defeat of 1905 led in the short term toa reform of the Russian military that allowed it to faceGermany in World War I. However, the revolts at homefollowingthewarplantedtheseedsthat presagedtheRussianRevolutionof1917. ThiswasbecauseTsarNicholas II issued the October Manifesto, which includedonly limited reforms such as the Duma and failed to ad-dress the societal problems of Russia at the time.[50]5.3.2 Eects on JapanJapan had become the rising Asian power and had proventhat its military could combat the major powers in Europewith success. Most Western powers were stunned that theJapanese not only prevailed but decisively defeated Rus-sia. In the Russo-Japanese War, Japan had also portrayeda sense of readiness in taking a more active and leadingrole in Asian aairs, which in turn had led to widespreadnationalism throughout the region.[47]Althoughthewar hadendedinavictoryfor Japan,Japanesepublicopinionwasshockedbytheveryre-strained peace terms which were negotiated at the warsend.[51] Widespread discontent spread through the popu-lace upon the announcement of the treaty terms. Riotserupted in major cities in Japan. Two specic require-ments, expected after such a costly victory, were espe-cially lacking: territorial gains and monetary reparationsto Japan. The peace accord led to feelings of distrust,as the Japanese had intended to retain all of Sakhalin Is-land, but were forced to settle for half of it after beingpressured by the United States, with President Rooseveltopting to support Nicholas IIs stance on not ceding ter-ritory or paying reparations. The Japanese had wantedreparations to help families recover from lost fathers andsons as well as heavy taxation from the government.[52]Without them, they were at a loss.The U.S held strength in the Asian region from aggravat-ing European imperialist encroachment. To Japan, thisrepresented a developing threat to the autonomy of theregion. U.S.-Japanese relations would recover a bit in theearly 20th century, but by the early 1920s, few in Japanbelieved that the United States meant anything positivefor the future of Asia.[53] By the 1930s, the U.S. presencein Asian aairs, along with the instability in China andthe collapse of the Western economic order, Japan wouldact aggressively with respect to China, setting the prece-dent that would ultimately culminate in the Greater EastAsian Co-Prosperity Sphere. Some scholars suggest that5.5 Reception around the world 11Japans road to World War II had begun not upon winningthe Russo-Japanese War, but when it lost the peace.[54]5.4 Historical signicanceThe eects and impact of the Russo-Japanese War in-troduced a number of characteristics that came to dene20th century politics and warfare. Many of the techno-logical innovations brought on by the Industrial Revolu-tion rst became present on the battleeld in the Russo-Japanese War. Weapons and armaments were more tech-nological than ever before. Technological developmentsof modern armaments, such as rapid ring artillery andmachine guns, as well as more accurate carbine ries,were rst used on a mass scale in the Russo-JapaneseWar. The improved capability of naval forces was alsodemonstrated. Here was the introduction of iron-clad,steam driven boats, equipped with large and heavy guns.Military operations on both sea and land demonstratedthat warfare in a new age of technology had undergonea considerable change since the Franco-Prussian War of1870-71.[54] Most army commanders had previously en-visioned using these weapon systems to dominate the bat-tleeld on an operational and tactical level but, as eventsplayed out, these technological advancements forever al-tered the capacity in which mankind would wage war.[55]For East Asia it was the rst confrontation after thirtyyears involving two modern armed forces.The advanced weaponry led to massive casualty counts.Neither Japan nor Russia had prepared for the number ofdeaths that would occur in this new kind of warfare, orhad the resources to compensate for these losses. Thisalso left its impression on society at large, with the emer-genceoftransnational andnongovernmental organiza-tions, like the Red Cross, becoming prominent after thewar. The emergence of such organizations can be re-garded as the beginning of a meshing together of civi-lizations through the identication of common problemsand challenges; a slow process dominating much of the20th century.[56]Debate with respect to the Russo-Japanese War preludingWorld War II is a topic of interest to scholars today. Ar-guments that are favorable toward this perspective con-sider characteristics specic to the Russo-Japanese Warto the qualities denitive of total war.[57] Numerous as-pects of total war characterize the Russo-Japanese War.Encompassed on both ends was the mass mobilization oftroops into battle. For both Russia and Japan, the warrequired extensive economic support in the form of pro-duction of equipment, armaments, and supplies at such ascale that required both domestic support as well as for-eign aid.[54] The conclusion of the Russo-Japanese Waralso demonstrated the need for world leaders to regarddomestic response to foreign policy, which is argued bysome scholars as setting in motion the dissolution of theRomanov dynasty by demonstrating the ineciencies oftsarist Russias government.[54]5.5 Reception around the worldTo the Western powers, Japans victory demonstrated theemergence of a new Asian regional power. With the Rus-sian defeat, some scholars have argued that the war hadset in motion a change in the global world order withtheemergenceofJapanasnotonlyaregional power,but rather, the main Asian power.[58] Rather more thanthe possibilities of diplomatic partnership were emerging,however. The Japanese success returned self-condencetothe colonised Asian peoples Vietnamese, Indone-sians, Indians and Filipinos and to those countries likeTurkey and Iran in immediate danger of being absorbedby the Western powers. It also encouraged the Chinesewho, despite having been at war with the Japanese onlya decade before, still considered Westerners the greaterthreat. We regarded that Russian defeat by Japan as thedefeat of the West by the East. We regarded the Japanesevictory as our own victory, declared Sun Yat-sen. AndJawaharlal Nehru, Japans victory lessened the feeling ofinferiority from which most of us suered. A great Euro-pean power had been defeated, thus Asia could still defeatEurope as it had done in the past.[59]In Europe too, subject populations were similarly encour-aged. James Joyce's novel Ulysses, set in Dublin in 1904,contains hopeful Irish allusions as to the outcome of thewar.[60] And in partitioned Poland the artist Jzef Mehof-fer chose 1905 to paint his Europa Jubilans (Europerejoicing), which portrays anapronedmaidtakingherease on a sofa against a background of Eastern artefacts.Executed following demonstrations against the war andRussian cultural suppression, and in the year of Russiasdefeat, its subtly coded message looks forward to a timewhen the Tsarist masters will be defeated in Europe asthey had been in Asia.[61]Thesignicanceof thewar for oppressedclasses aswell as subject populations was clear too to the Social-ist thinker Rosa Luxemburg: The Russo-Japanese Warnow gives to all an awareness that even war and peace inEurope its destiny isnt decided between the four wallsof the European concert, but outside it, in the giganticmaelstrom of world and colonial politics. And its in thisthat the real meaning of the current war resides for social-democracy, even if we set aside its immediate eect: thecollapse of Russian absolutism. This war brings the gazeof the international proletariat back to the great politicaland economic connectedness of the world, and violentlydissipates in our ranks the particularism, the pettiness ofideas that form in any period of political calm.[62] It wasthis realisation of the universal signicance of the warthat underlines the historical importance of the conictand its outcome.5.6 Assessment of war resultsRussia had lost two of its three eets. Only its Black SeaFleet remained, and this was the result of an earlier treaty12 6 MILITARY ATTACHS AND OBSERVERSthat had prevented the eet from leaving the Black Sea.Japanbecamethesixth-most powerful naval force,[63]while the Russian Navy declined to one barely strongerthan that of AustriaHungary.[63] The actual costs of thewarwerelargeenoughtoaecttheRussianeconomyand, despite grain exports, the nation developed an exter-nal balance of payments decit. The cost of military re-equipment and re-expansion after 1905 pushed the econ-omy further into decit, although the size of the decitwas obscured.[64]The Japanese were on the oensive for most of the warand used massed infantry assaults against defensive posi-tions, which would later become the standard of all Eu-ropean armies during World War I. The battles of theRusso-Japanese War, in which machine guns and artillerytook a heavy toll on Russian and Japanese troops, were aprecursor to the trench warfare of World War I.[65] AGer-man military advisor sent to Japan, Jakob Meckel, had atremendous impact on the development of the Japanesemilitary training, tactics, strategy, and organization. Hisreforms were credited with Japans overwhelming victoryover China in the First Sino-Japanese War of 18941895.However, his over-reliance on infantry in oensive cam-paigns also led to a large number of Japanese casualties.Militaryandeconomicexhaustionaectedbothcoun-tries. Japanese historians regard this war as a turningpoint for Japan, and a key to understanding the reasonswhy Japan may have failed militarily and politically later.After the war, acrimony was felt at every level of Japanesesociety and it became the consensus within Japan thattheir nation had been treated as the defeated power dur-ing the peace conference.[51] As time went on, this feel-ing, coupledwiththesenseofarroganceatbecom-ing a Great Power, grew and added to growing Japanesehostility towards the West, and fueled Japans militaryand imperial ambitions. Only ve years after the war,Japan de jure annexed Korea as part of its colonial em-pire. In 1931, 21 years later, Japan invaded Manchuriain the Mukden Incident. This culminated in the inva-sion of East, Southeast and South AsiainWorldWarII, in an attempt to create a great Japanese colonial em-pire, the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. Asaresult, most Chinesehistoriansconsider theRusso-Japanese War as a key development of Japanese mili-tarism.Following the victory of the Battle of Tsushima, Japanserstwhile English ally presented a lock of Admiral Nel-son'shairtotheImperial JapaneseNavy, judgingitsperformance then as on a par with Britains victory atTrafalgar in 1805. It is still on display at Kyouiku Sank-oukan, a public museum maintained by the Japan Self-DefenseForce. Nevertheless, therewasaconsequentchangeinEnglishstrategicthinking, resultinginen-largement of its naval docks at Auckland, New Zealand;Bombay, British India; Fremantle and Sydney, Australia;Simons Town, Cape Colony; Singapore and British HongKong.[66]The naval war conrmed the direction of theBritish Admiralty's thinking in tactical terms even as itundermined its strategic grasp of a changing world.[67]Tactical orthodoxy, for example, assumed that a navalbattle would imitate the conditions of stationary combatand that ships would engage in one long line sailing onparallel courses; but more exible tactical thinking wouldnow be required as a ring ship and its target maneuveredindependently.[68]The US reaction to the war had also been mixed, withfears of a Yellow Peril eventually shifting from China toJapan.[69] American gures such as W. E. B. Du Bois andLothrop Stoddard saw the victory as a challenge to whitesupremacy.[70]6 Military attachs and observersMainarticle: Militaryattachs andobservers intheRusso-Japanese WarMilitary and civilian observers from every major powerJapanese general, Kuroki, and his sta, including foreign ocersand war correspondents after the Battle of Shaho (1904).closely followed the course of the war. Most were able toreport on events from the perspective of embedded posi-tions within the land and naval forces of both Russia andJapan. These military attachs and other observers pre-pared rst-hand accounts of the war and analytical pa-pers. In-depth observer narratives of the war and morenarrowly focused professional journal articles were writ-ten soon after the war; and these post-war reports con-clusively illustrated the battleeld destructiveness of thisconict. This was the rst time the tactics of entrenchedpositions for infantry defended with machine guns andartillery became vitally important. Both would becomedominant factors in World War I. Even though entrenchedpositions had already been a signicant part of both theFranco-Prussian War and the American Civil War, it isnow apparent that the high casualty counts, and the tac-tical lessons readily available to observer nations, werecompletely disregarded in preparations for war in Europe,and during much of the course of World War I.[71]In 19041905, Ian Standish Monteith Hamilton was themilitary attach of the British Indian Army serving withthe Japanese Army in Manchuria. As one of the severalmilitary attachs from Western countries, he was the rst13to arrive in Japan after the start of the war.[72] He there-fore would be recognized as the dean of multi-national at-tachs and observers in this conict, although out-rankedby British eld marshal, WilliamGustavus Nicholson, 1stBaron Nicholson, who was later to become chief of theImperial General Sta.7 Anglo-Japanese intelligence co-operationEven before the war, British and Japanese intelligencehad co-operated against Russia.[73] Indian Army stationsin Malaya and China often intercepted and read wirelessand telegraph cable trac relating to the war, which wasshared with the Japanese.[74] In their turn, the Japaneseshared information about Russia with the British with oneBritish ocial writing of the perfect quality of Japaneseintelligence.[75] In particular, British and Japanese intel-ligence gathered much evidence that Germany was sup-porting Russia in the war as part of a bid to disturb thebalance of power in Europe, which led to British ocialsincreasingly perceiving that country as a threat to the in-ternational order.[76]8 FinancingDespite its gold reserves of 106.3 million pounds, Rus-sias pre-war nancial situation was not enviable. Thecountry had large budget decits year after year, and waslargely dependent on borrowed money.[77]Russias war eort was funded primarily by France, in aseries of loans totalling 800 million francs (30.4 millionpounds); another loan in the amount of 600 million francswas agreed upon, but later cancelled. These loans wereextended within a climate of mass bribing of the Frenchpress (made necessary by Russias precarious economicand social situation and poor military performance). Al-thoughinitiallyreluctanttoparticipateinthewar, theFrench government and major banks were co-operativesince it became clear that Russian and French economicinterests were tied. In addition to French money, Rus-sia secured a German loan in the amount of 500 millionmarks (24.5 million pounds).[77]Conversely, Japans pre-war gold reserves were a modest11.7 million pounds; a major portion of the total cost ofthe war was covered by money borrowed from the UnitedKingdom,[78] Canada, and the United States.During his canvassing expedition in London, theJapanese vice-governor of the Bank of Japan met JacobSchi, an American banker and head of Kuhn, Loeb &Co.. Schi, in response to Russias anti-Jewish pogromsand sympathetic to Japans cause, extended a critical se-ries of loans to the Empire of Japan, in the amount ofUS$200 million (41.2 million).[79][80]Japans total war expenditurewas 2,150million, ofwhich 38%, or 820 million, was raised overseas.[81]9 List of battles1904 Battle of Port Arthur, 8 February: naval battleinconclusive1904 Battle of Chemulpo Bay, 9 February: navalbattle Japanese victory1904Battleof YaluRiver, 30April to1May:Japanese victory1904 Battle of Nanshan, 25 to 26 May, Japanese vic-tory1904 Battle of Telissu, 14 to 15 June, Japanese vic-tory1904 Battle of Motien Pass, 17 July, Japanese vic-tory1904 Battle of Ta-shih-chiao, 24 July, Japanese vic-tory1904 Battle of Hsimucheng, 31 July, Japanese vic-tory1904 Battle of the YellowSea, 10 August: naval bat-tleJapanesevictorystrategically, tacticallyincon-clusive1904BattleoUlsan, 14August: naval battleJapanese victory19041905 Siege of Port Arthur, 19 August to 2January: Japanese victory1904 Battle of Liaoyang, 25 August to 3 September:inconclusive1904 Battle of Shaho, 5 to 17 October: inconclusive1905 Battle of Sandepu, 26 to 27 January: incon-clusive1905 Battle of Mukden, 21 February to 10 March:Japanese victory1905 Battle of Tsushima, 27 to 28 May naval battle:Japanese victory10 Cultural legacy10.1 Graphic artsThe Russo-Japanese War was covered by dozens of for-eign journalists who sent back sketches that were turned14 10 CULTURAL LEGACYGetsuz's woodblock print of The Battle of Liaoyang, 1904intolithographs andother reproducibleforms. Pro-pagandaimages werecirculatedbybothsides, oftenin the form of postcards and basedon insulting racialstereotypes.[82]Thesewereproducednot onlybythecombatants but by those from European countries whosupported one or the other side or had a commercial orcolonial stake in the area. War photographs were alsopopular, appearing in both the press and in book form.[83]In Russia, the war was covered by anonymous satiricalgraphicluboksforsaleinmarkets, recordingthewarfor the domestic audience. Around 300 were made be-fore their creation was banned by the Russian govern-ment. Their Japanese equivalents were woodblock prints.These had been common during the Sino-Japanese war adecade earlier and celebrations of the new conict tendedto repeat the same imagery and situations. But by thistime in Japan postcards had become the most commonform of communication and they soon replaced prints asa medium for topographical imagery and war reportage.In some ways, however, they were still dependent on theprint for their pictorial conventions, not least in issuingthe cards in series that assembled into a composite sceneor design, either as diptychs, triptychs or even more am-bitious formats. However, captioning swiftly moved fromthe calligraphic side inscription to a printed title below,and not just in Japanese but in English and other Euro-pean languages. There was a lively sense that these im-ages served not only as mementoes but also as propagandastatements.[84]War artists were to be found on the Russian side and evengured among the casualties. Vasily Vereshchagin wentdown with thePetropavlovsk, Admiral Makarovs ag-ship, when it was sunk by mines. However, his last work,a picture of a council of war presided over by the admi-ral, was recovered almost undamaged.[85] Another artist,Mykola Samokysh, rst came to notice for his reportsduring the war and the paintings worked up fromhis diarysketch-books. Other depictions appeared after the event.The two by the Georgian nave painter Niko Pirosmanifrom 1906 must have been dependent on newspaper re-ports since he was not present.[86] Then Yury Repin madean episode during the Battle of Yalu River the subject ofa broad heroic canvas in 1914 at the outset of World WarI.[87]10.2 MusicOn either side, there were lyrics lamenting the necessityof ghting in a foreign land, far from home. One of theearliestofseveral Russiansongsstill performedtodaywas the waltz Amurs Waves (Amurskie volny), whichevokes the melancholy of standing watch on the frontierbetween Russia and Manchuria.[88]Two others grew out of incidents during the war. "Onthe hills of Manchuria" (Na sopkah Manchzhurii) (1906)is another waltz composed by Ilya Shatrov, a decoratedmilitary musician whose regiment suered badly in thebattle of Mukden. Originally only the music was pub-lished, under the longer title The Mokshansky Regimenton the Hills of Manchuria"; the words by Stepan Petrovwere added later.[89] These lyrics mourned the fallen ly-ing in their graves and threatened revenge.[90]Anothersong, Variag, commemorates the Battle of Chemulpo Bayin which that cruiser and the gunboatKorietz steamedout to confront an encircling Japanese squadron ratherthan surrender. That act of heroism was rst celebratedin a German song by Rudolf Greintz in 1907 but wasquicklytranslatedintoRussianandsungtoamartialaccompaniment.[91]Nikolai Rimsky-Korsakov also reacted to the war by com-posingthesatirical operaTheGoldenCockerel, com-pleted in 1907. Although it was ostensibly based on averse fairy tale by Alexander Pushkin written in 1834,the authorities quickly realised its true target and imme-diately banned it from performance.10.3 PoetrySome Japanese poetry dealing with the war still has a highprole. General Nogi MaresukesOutsidetheGold-land fortress was learned by generations of schoolchil-dren and valued for its bleak stoicism.[92] The army sur-geon Mori Ogai kept a verse diary which tackled suchthemesasracism, strategicmistakesandtheambigui-ties of victory which can now be appreciated in historicalhindsight.[93] Nowadays too there is growing appreciationof Yosano Akikos parting poem to her brother as he leftfor the war, which includes the critical lines.Never let them kill you, brother!His Imperial Majesty would notcome out to ght ...How could He possibly make thembelievethat it is honourable to die?[94]Even the Emperor Meiji himself entered the poetic lists,writinginanswer toall thelamentationsabout deathinaforeignlandthat thepatrioticsoul returnstothehomeland.[95]10.4 Fiction 15European treatments were similarly varied. Jane H. Oak-leyattemptedanepictreatment oftheconict inthe86 cantos of her contemporaryARusso-JapaneseWarPoem (Brighton 1905).[96] The French poet Blaise Cen-drars was later to represent himself as on a Russian trainon its way to Manchuria at the time in his La prose duTranssibrien et de la Petite Jehanne de France (1913) andenergetically evoked the results of the war along the way:I saw the silent trains the black trains returningfrom the Far East and passing like phantomsAt Talga 100,000 wounded were dying for lackof careI visited the hospitals of KrasnoyarskAnd at Khilok we encountered a long convoyof soldiers who had lost their mindsIn the pesthouses I saw gaping gashes woundsbleeding full blastAnd amputated limbs danced about or soaredthrough the raucous air[97]Much later, the Scottish poet Douglas Dunn devoted anepistolary poem in verse to the naval war in The DonkeysEars: Politovskys Letters Home (2000). This follows thevoyage of the Russian Imperial Navy agship Kniaz to itssinking at the battle of Tsushima.[98]10.4 FictionFictional coverage of the war began even before it wasover. An early example was Allen Upwards The Interna-tional Spy, being the secret history of the Russo-JapaneseWar (1904). Set in both Russia and Japan, it ends with theDogger Bank incident involving the Baltic Fleet.[99] Thepolitical thinking displayed there is typical of the time.There is great admiration for the Japanese, who were En-glish allies. Russia is in turmoil, but the main impetustowards war is not imperialism as such but commercialforces. Every student of modern history has remarkedthe fact that all recent wars have been promoted by greatcombinations of capitalists. The causes which formerlyled to war between nation and nation have ceased to op-erate (p.40). The true villain plotting in the background,however, is the German Emperor, seeking to destabilisethe European balance of power in his countrys favour.Towards the end of the novel, the narrator steals a Ger-man submarine and successfully foils a plot to involve theEnglish in the war. The submarine motif reappeared inGeorge Griths science ction novel, The Stolen Sub-marine (1904), although in this case it is a French super-submarine which its developer sells to the Russians foruse against the Japanese in another tale of internationalintrigue.[100]Though most English-language ction of the period tookthe Japanese side, the Rev. W. W. Walkers Canadiannovella, Alter Ego (1907), is an exception. It features aCanadian volunteer in the Russian army who, on his re-turn, agrees to talk about his experiences to an isolatedupcountry community and relates his part in the battle ofMukden.[101] Though this incident only occupies two ofthe books six chapters, it is used to illustrate the mainmessage there, that war is anti-Christian and barbarous,except in a defensive sense (Ch.3).Painting of Admiral Togo on the bridge of the Japanese battleshipMikasa, before the Battle of Tsushima in 1905.Various aspects of the war were also common in contem-porary childrens ction. Categorised as Boys Own ad-venture stories, they oer few insights into the conict,being generally based on news articles and sharing unre-ectingly in the contemporary culture of imperialism.[102]Amongthese, HerbertStrangwasresponsiblefortwonovels: Kobo: A Story of the Russo-Japanese War (1905),told from the Japanese side,[103] and Brown of Moukden(1906), viewed from the Russian side.[104]Three morewerewrittenbytheprolicAmericanauthor, EdwardStratemeyer: UndertheMikadosFlag, orYoungSol-diers of Fortune (1904);[105]At the Fall of Port Arthur,or a young American in the Japanese navy (1905);[106]and Under Togo for Japan, or Three Young Americanson Land and Sea (1906). Two other English stories be-gin with the action at Port Arthur and follow the eventsthereafter: ASoldier ofJapan: ataleoftheRusso-Japanese War by Captain Frederick Sadleir Brereton, andThe North Pacic (1905) by Willis Boyd Allen (1855-1938).[107]Twomorealsoinvolveyoungmenghtingin the Japanese navy: Americans in For the Mikado,aJapanese Middy in Action (1905)[108]by Kirk Munroe,and a temporarily disgraced English ocer in Under theEnsignoftheRisingSun (1916)[109]by Harry Colling-wood, the pen-name of WilliamJoseph Cosens Lancaster(1851-1922), whose speciality was naval ction.Russian novelist Alexey Novikov-Priboy really did servein the Baltic Fleet and wrote about the conict on his re-turn, but his early work was suppressed. It was not untilthe changed political climate under Soviet rule that he be-gan writing his historical epic Tsushima, based on his per-sonal experiences on board the battleship Orel as well as16 13 REFERENCESon testimonies of fellow sailors and government archives.The rst part was published in 1932, the second in 1935,and the whole novel was later awarded the Stalin Prize. Itdescribes the heroism of Russian sailors and certain of-cers whose defeat, in accordance with the new Sovietthinking, was due to the criminal negligence of the Impe-rial Naval command. A German novel by Frank Thiess,originally published as Tsushima in 1936 (and later trans-lated as The Voyage of Forgotten Men), covered the samejourney round the world to defeat.Later there appeared a rst-hand account of the siege ofPort Arthur by Alexander Stepanov (18921965). Hehad been present there as the 12-year-old son of a batterycommander and his novel, Port Arthur: a historical nar-rative (1944), is based on his own diaries and his fathersnotes. The work is considered one of the best historicalnovels of the Soviet period.[110] A later novel in which thewar appears is Valentin Pikuls The Three Ages of Okini-San (1981). Centred on the life of Vladimir Kokovtsov,who rose through the ranks to admiral of the Russianeet, it covers the period from the Russo-Japanese Warthrough to the February and October Revolutions.[111] Amuch later Russian genre novel uses the period of the waras background. This is Boris Akunins The Diamond Ve-hicle (2003), in the rst part of which the detective ErastFandorin is charged with protecting the Trans-SiberianRailway from Japanese sabotage.Themainhistorical novel dealingwiththewar fromtheJapanesesideisShibaRyotarosimmenseCloudsabove the hill, published serially in several volumes be-tween 1968-72.[112]The closely researched story spansthedecadefromtheSino-ChineseWartotheRusso-Japanese War and went on to become the nationsfavourite book.[113]11 FilmographySee also lm list about Russo-Japanese warPort Arthur (1936)Kreiser Varyag (1946)Nichiro sens shri no hishi: Tekich dansanbyaku-ri (1957)Meiji tenn to nichiro daisenso (1958)The Battle of the Japan Sea (1969,: ,Nihonkai-Kaisen) depictsthenaval battlesofthewar, the attacks on the Port Arthur highlands, andthe subterfuge and diplomacy of Japanese agents inSweden. Admiral Togo is portrayed by Toshiro Mi-fune.The Battle of Tsushima (1975) [documentary], de-piction of the naval Battle of TsushimaThe Battle of Port Arthur (1980, sometimes referredas203Kochi[114])depictionoftheSiegeofPortArthurNihonkai daikaisen: Umi yukaba (1983)Reilly, AceofSpies (1983). Russian-born Britishspy Sidney Reilly's role in providing intelligence thatallowed the Japanese surprise attack that started theSiege of Port Arthur is dramatised in the secondepisode of this TV seriesBogatstvo (2004)Saka no ue no kumo (2009)12 See alsoKentaro KanekoBaron RosenImperialism in AsiaLiancourt RocksList of warsList ofwarshipssunkduringtheRusso-JapaneseWarRussian Imperialismin Asia and the Russo-JapaneseWarSergius Witte13 References[1] Montenegro, Japan to declare truce, United Press Inter-national (US); Montenegro, Japan End 100 Years War,HistoryNewsNetwork(US). citingWorldPeaceHer-ald, 16June 2006; Montenegrina, digitalnabibliotekacrnogorske kulture (Montegreina,digital library of Mon-tenegrin culture), Istorija: uro Batrievi, citing Batrie-vi, uro. (1996). Crnogorci urusko-japanskomratu(Montegegrans in the Russo-Japanese War); compare DrAnto Gvozdenovi: general u tri vojske. Crnogorci u rusko-japanskom ratu (Dr. Anto Gvozdenovic: General in ThreeArmies; Montegegrans in the Russo-Japanese War)[2] Samuel Dumas, Losses of Life Caused By War (1923)[3] Erols.com, Twentieth Century Atlas Death Tolls andCasualty Statistics for Wars, Dictatorships and Genocides.[4] John Steinburg, WastheRusso-JapaneseConict WorldWar Zero?. p. 2.[5] Rewriting the Russo-Japanese War: A Centenary Perspec-tive, Schimmelpenninick van der Oye, p. 80.[6] University of Texas: Growth of colonial empires in Asia17[7] Connaughton, pp. 19-20[8] Paine, p. 317[9] Example of Australian uniform of the period[10] Connaughton, pp. 78.[11] Paine, p. 320.[12] Text in Japanese Ministry of Foreign Aairs, Correspon-dence Regarding Negotiations ... (19031904) pp. 79.[13] Text in Correspondence Regarding Negotiations ... (19031904) pp. 2324.[14] Koda, Yoji (1 April 2005). The Russo-Japanese War:Primary Causes of Japanese Success. Naval War CollegeReview. Retrieved 6 April 2015 via HighBeam. (sub-scription required (help)).[15] Connaughton, p. 10.[16] RaymondEsthus, NicholasIIandtheRusso-JapaneseWar,RussianReviewvol. 40, No. 4(Oct., 1981),Accessed on 13 May 2014. http://www.jstor.org/stable/129919 , p. 411.[17] Robert W. Tolf (1976). The Russian Rockfellers. HooverPress. p. 156. ISBN 0-8179-6583-1.[18] Esthus, p. 397.[19] Text in Correspondence Regarding Negotiations ... (19031904) p. 38.[20] David Schmmelpenninck van der Oye, The ImmediateOrigins of the War, in David Wol et al. (eds), TheRusso-JapaneseWarinGlobal Perspective: WorldWarZero (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2005), 42.[21] Jukes, The Russo-Japanese War, p. 21.[22] Somescholarlyresearcherscredit EnjiroYamazawithdrafting the text of the Japanese declaration of war seeNaval Postgraduate School (US) thesis: Na, Sang Hyung.The Korean-Japanese Dispute over Dokdo/Takeshima,p. 62 n207 December 2007, citing Byang-Ryull Kim.(2006). Ilbon Gunbu'ui Dokdo Chim Talsa (The Plunderof Dokdo by the Japanese Military), p. 121.[23] SpringRicetoRobert H. M. Ferguson,inStephenGwynn, The Letters, (March 2, 1904). and Friendships ofSir Cecil Spring Rice: A Record, 2 vols. (Boston, 1929),p. 402.[24] Connaughton, p. 34.[25] YaleUniversity: LawsofWar: OpeningofHostilities(Hague III); October 18, 1907, Avalon Project at YaleLaw School.[26] Grant, p. 12, 15, 17, 42[27] Shaw, Albert (March 1904). The Progress of the World Japans Swift Action. The American Monthly ReviewofReviews (New York: The Review of Reviews Company)29 (3): 260[28] Jukes[29] Grant, p. 4850[30] Connaughton, p. 65[31] Connaughton, p. 86[32] Forczyk p. 50[33] Forczyk p. 53[34] The Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser(18841942), 8 April 1905, Page 2, http://newspapers.nl.sg/Digitised/Article/singfreepressb19050408-1.2.6.aspx[35] The Straits Times, 8 April 1905, Page4, http://newspapers.nl.sg/Digitised/Article/straitstimes19050408-1.2.32.aspx[36] Japan at War - An Encyclopedia, Louis G. Perez, editor;Santa Barbara, California, 2013, p. 345.[37] Watts p. 22[38] Mahan p. 455[39] Mahan p. 456[40] Connaughton, p. 109,342[41] Connaughton, p. 272; Text of Treaty; Signed by the Em-peror of Japan and Czar of Russia, New York Times. 17October 1905.[42] Cox, Gary P. (2006). Review of The Russo-Japanese War in Global Perspective: World WarZero". Journal ofMilitaryHistory70(1): 250251.doi:10.1353/jmh.2006.0037.[43] http://www.taiwandocuments.org/sanfrancisco01.htm ,Chapter 2 Section C[44] Eugene P. Trani, The Treaty of Portsmouth: An Adventurein American Diplomacy (1969).[45] George E. Mowry, The First Roosevelt, The AmericanMercury, (November 1946) quote at p 580 online[46] TwentiethCenturyAtlas DeathTolls andCasualtyStatistics for Wars, Dictatorships and Genocides[47] Schimmelpenninck van der Oye, p. 86.[48] Abraham Ascher, The Revolution of 1905: Russia in Dis-array, StanfordUniversityPress, 1994, ISBN0-8047-2327-3, Google Print, p.157158[49] For PolishJapanese negotiations and relations during thewar, see:Bert Edstrm, The Japanese and Europe: Imagesand Perceptions, Routledge, 2000, ISBN 1-873410-86-7,pp.126133Jerzy Lerski, A Polish Chapter of the Russo-JapaneseWar, Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan, III/7p. 6996[50] Warner, p. 575-76[51] Japans Present Crisis and Her Constitution; TheMikados Ministers Will Be Held Responsible by the Peo-ple for the Peace Treaty Marquis Ito May Be Able toSaveBaronKomura,NewYorkTimes. 3September1905.18 13 REFERENCES[52] Connaughton, p. 342[53] Schimmelpenninck van der Oye, p. 86[54] Steinburg, p. 7.[55] Schimmelpenninck van der Oye, p. 84.[56] Steinburg, p. 6.[57] Steinburg, p. 3.[58] Schimmelpenninck van der Oye, p. 83.[59] Quora[60] EishiroIto, UnitedStates of Asia, James JoyceandJapan, in A Companion to James Joyce, Blackwell Pub-lishing 2013, pp.195-6[61] David Crowley, Seeing Japan, Imagining Poland: Polishart and the Russo-Japanese war, Faktograa July 4, 2012[62] Le Socialiste, 1-8 May 1904[63] Sondhaus, Lawrence, Naval Warfare, 18151914, p. 192[64] Strachan, p. 844.[65] Keegan p. 179, 229, 230[66] Strachan, p. 384.[67] Strachan, p. 386.[68] Strachan, p. 388.[69] Lyman, StanfordM. (Summer 2000). TheYellowPeril Mystique: Origins and Vicissitudes of a Racist Dis-course. International Journal of Politics, Culture, and So-ciety (Springer Publishing) 13 (4): 699. ISSN 0891-4486 via JSTOR. (subscription required (help)).[70] Heale, M. J. (April 2009). Anatomy of a Scare: Yel-low Peril Politics in America, 19801993. Journal ofAmerican Studies (Cambridge University Press on behalfof the British Association for American Studies) 43 (1):21. ISSN 1469-5154 via JSTOR. (subscription required(help)).[71] Sisemore, James D. (2003). CDMhost.com, The Russo-Japanese War, Lessons Not Learned. U.S. Army Com-mand and General Sta College.[72] Chapman, John and Ian Nish. (2004). On the Peripheryof the Russo-Japanese War, Part I, p. 53 n42, Paper No.IS/2004/475. SuntoryToyotaInternational CentreforEconomics and Related Disciplines (STICERD), LondonSchool of Economics and Political Science (LSE).[73] Chapman, John W. M. Russia, Germany and the Anglo-JapaneseIntelligenceCollaboration, 18961906pages4155 from Russia War, Peace and Diplomacy edited byMark & Ljubica Erickson, London: Weidenfeld & Nicol-son, 2004 page 42.[74] Chapman, John W.M. Russia, Germany and the Anglo-JapaneseIntelligenceCollaboration, 18961906pages4155 from Russia War, Peace and Diplomacy edited byMark & Ljubica Erickson, London: Weidenfeld & Nicol-son, 2004 page 55.[75] Chapman, John W.M. Russia, Germany and the Anglo-JapaneseIntelligenceCollaboration, 18961906pages4155 from Russia War, Peace and Diplomacy edited byMark & Ljubica Erickson, London: Weidenfeld & Nicol-son, 2004. p. 54.[76] Chapman, John W. M. Russia, Germany and the Anglo-JapaneseIntelligenceCollaboration, 18961906pages4155 from Russia War, Peace and Diplomacy edited byMark & Ljubica Erickson, London: Weidenfeld & Nicol-son, 2004. pp. 5254.[77] Sherman, A. J."German-JewishBankersinWorldPol-itics, The Financing of the Russo-Japanese WarLeo Baeck Institute Yearbook(1983) 28(1): 5973doi:10.1093/leobaeck/28.1.59[78] British Assistance to the Japanese Navy during theRusso-Japanese War of 1904-5. The Great Circle (Aus-tralian Association for Maritime History) 2 (1): 44. April1980. Retrieved 9 March 2015 via JSTOR. (registrationrequired (help)).[79] Schi, Jacob Henry. Dictionary of American Biogra-phy. New York: Charles Scribners Sons. 19281936.pp. 430432.[80] Steinberg, JohnW. (January2008). WastheRusso-Japanese War World War Zero?". The Russian Review(Wiley on behalf of The Editors and Board of Trusteesof the Russian Review) 67 (1): 5. ISSN 1467-9434 viaJSTOR. (subscription required (help)).[81] Ion, A. Hamish; Errington, E. J. (1993). Great Powers andLittle Wars: The Limits of Power. Westport, CT: PraegerPublishers. pp. 146, 152. ISBN 978-0275939656. Re-trieved 8 August 2015 via Questia. (subscription re-quired (help)).[82] John W. Dower, 2010[83] Dower, Yellow Promise/ Yellow Peril[84] Dower, Yellow Promise/ Yellow Peril[85] State Historical Museum Opens 'The Year 1812 in thePaintings by Vasily Vereshchagin', Art Daily, March 11,2010; War Lasted 18 Months ... Russian Miscalculation,New York Times, August 30, 1905.[86] Wikiart and Wikiart[87] Chuliengcheng. In a glorious death eternal life, Wikimedia[88] Words at Armchair General; a performance on YouTube[89] Editions Orphe[90] There is a translation at Mudcat and a performance onYouTube[91] Thewordsandadescriptionofthenaval actionisatArmchair General; there is a performance on YouTube[92] War Poets Association[93] Intersections issue 419[94] See Janine Beichmans 2006 lecture to the Asiatic Societyof Japan[95] Takashi Fujitani, Splendid Monarchy: Power andPageantry in Modern Japan, University of California1996, p.126[96] Internet Archive[97] SelectedWritingsofBlaiseCendrars, NewDirections1966, p,93[98] David Wheatley gives an account in his article for TheLondon Review of Books, 21 June 2001, pp.40-41[99] Gutenberg[100] E.F. and R. Bleiler, Science Fiction: The Early Years,Kent State University 1990, p.308[101] Gutenbeg[102] The Russo-Japanese War and Boys Own Adventure Sto-ries, The Russo-Japanese War Research Society 2003[103] Gutenberg[104] Gutenberg[105] Hathi Trust[106] Gutenberg[107] Gutenberg[108] Internet Archive[109] Gutenberg[110] Details in the Russian 1978 edition, 'About Author' sec-tion[111] NoviiRusskii[112] Translated in 2013, introduction and excerpts on GoogleBooks[113] Hiroaki Sato, The Japan Times, 27 July 2013[114] The Battle of Port Arthur (203 Koshi) in the Internet MovieDatabase14 BibliographyChapman, John W. M. (2004). Russia, Germanyand the Anglo-Japanese Intelligence Collaboration,18961906. InErickson, Mark; Erickson, Lju-bica. Russia War, Peace and Diplomacy. London:Weidenfeld & Nicolson. pp. 4155. ISBN 0-297-84913-1.Connaughton, R. M. (1988). The War of the RisingSun and the Tumbling BearA Military History ofthe Russo-Japanese War 19045. London. ISBN 0-415-00906-5.Dower, John W., Throwing o Asia III, Woodblockprints of the Russo-Japanese War, 2008, MIT Visu-alizing CulturesDower, JohnW., YellowPromise/YellowPeril,Foreign postcards of the Russo-Japanese War, 2008,MIT Visualizing CulturesDower, John W., Asia Rising, Japanese postcardsof the Russo-Japanese War, 2010, MITVisualizingCulturesForczyk, Robert (2009). Russian Battleship vsJapanese Battleship, Yellow Sea 190405. Osprey.ISBN 978-1-84603-330-8.Grant, R. Captain (1907). Before Port Arthur in aDestroyer; The Personal Diary of a Japanese NavalOcer. London: John Murray. First and secondeditions published in 1907.Keegan, John (1999). The First World War. NewYork: Alfred A. Knopf. ISBN 0-375-40052-4.Mahan, Alfred Thayer (1906). Reections, His-toric and Other, Suggested by the Battle of the JapanSea. US Naval Proceedings magazine. US NavalInstitute, Heritage Collection 36 (2).Olender, Piotr (2010). Russo-Japanese Naval War19041905, Vol. 2, Battle of Tsushima. San-domierz, Poland: Stratus s.c. ISBN 978-83-61421-02-3.Paine, S. C. M. (2003). TheSino-JapaneseWarof18941895: Perceptions, Power, andPrimacy.ISBN 0-521-81714-5.Papastratigakis, Nicholas (2011). Russian Imperi-alism and Naval Power: Military Strategy and theBuild-UptotheRusso-JapaneseWar. I.B.Tauris.ISBN 1-84885-691-1.Simpson, Richard (2001). Building The MosquitoFleet, TheUSNavysFirst TorpedoBoats. SouthCarolina: Arcadia Publishing. ISBN 0-7385-0508-0.Strachan,Hew (2001). The First World War: ToArms. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-926191-1.Watts, AnthonyJ. (1990). TheImperial RussianNavy. London, Great Britain: Arms and ArmourPress. ISBN 0-85368-912-1.15 Further readingCorbett, SirJulian. MaritimeOperations InTheRusso-Japanese War 19041905. (1994) Originallyclassied, and in two volumes, ISBN 1-55750-129-7.20 16 EXTERNAL LINKSBay, Alexander. Beriberi inModernJapan: TheMaking of a National Disease. University ofRochester Press (2012). ISBN 978-1-58046-427-7Hough, Richard A. The Fleet That Had To Die. Bal-lantine Books. (1960).Jentschura, Hansgeorg; Dieter Jung, Peter Mickel.Warships of the Imperial Japanese Navy, 18691945. UnitedStates Naval Institute, Annapolis,Maryland, 1977. Originally published in Germanas Die Japanischen Kreigschie 18691945 in 1970,translated into English by David Brown and AntonyPreston. ISBN 0-87021-893-X.Jukes, Geory. TheRusso-JapaneseWar19041905. Osprey Essential Histories. (2002). ISBN978-1-84176-446-7.Kowner, Rotem (2006). Historical Dictionary of theRusso-JapaneseWar. Scarecrow. ISBN0-8108-4927-5.Kowner, Rotem (2007). The Impact of the Russo-Japanese War. Routledge. ISBN 0-4155-4582X.Matsumura Masayoshi, Ian Ruxton (trans.), BaronKanekoandthe Russo-Japanese War (190405),Lulu Press 2009 ISBN 978-0-557-11751-2Morris, Edmund (2002). Theodore Rex,Books.Gooble.com. NewYork: Random House.10-ISBN0-8129-6600-7; 13-ISBN978-0-8129-6600-8Novikov-Priboy, Aleksei. Tsushima. (An accountfrom a seaman aboard the battleship Oryol, whichwas captured at Tsushima). London: George Allen& Unwin Ltd. (1936).Nish, Ian Hill. (1985). The Origins of the Russo-JapaneseWar. London: Longman. 10-ISBN0-582-49114-2; 13-ISBN 978-0-582-49114-4Okamoto, Shumpei (1970). The Japanese Oligarchyand the Russo-Japanese War. Columbia UniversityPress.Pleshakov, Constantine. The Tsars Last Armada:The Epic Voyage to the Battle of Tsushima. ISBN0-465-05792-6. (2002).Saaler, Sven und Inaba Chiharu (Hg.). DerRussisch-Japanische Krieg 1904/05 im Spiegeldeutscher Bilderbogen, Deutsches Institut frJapanstudien Tokyo, (2005).Seager, Robert. Alfred Thayer Mahan: The ManAnd His Letters. (1977) ISBN 0-87021-359-8.Semenov, Vladimir, Capt. The Battle of Tsushima.E. P. Dutton & Co. (1912).Semenov, Vladimir, Capt. Rasplata (The Reckon-ing). John Murray, (1910).Tomitch, V. M.WarshipsoftheImperialRussianNavy. Volume 1, Battleships. (1968).Warner, Denis & Peggy. The Tide at Sunrise, A His-tory of the Russo-Japanese War 19041905. (1975).ISBN 0-7146-5256-3.Japanese Ministry of Foreign Aairs,Correspondence Regarding the Negotiations be-tween Japan and Russia (19031904), Presented tothe Imperial Diet, March 1904 (Tokyo, 1904)16 External linksRussoJapaneseWar.com, Russo-JapaneseWar re-search society.BFcollection.net, Database of Russian Army Jewishsoldiers injured, killed, or missing in action fromthewar.BYU.edu, Text of the Treaty of Portsmouth:.Flot.com, Russian Navy history of war.Frontiers.loc.gov, Russo-Japanese Relations in theFar East. Meeting of Frontiers (Library ofCongress)CSmonitor.com, Treaty of Portsmouth now seen asglobal turning point fromthe Christian Science Mon-itor, by Robert Marquand, 30 December 2005."Russo-Japanese War, The". The NewStudents Ref-erence Work. 1914.Montenigrina.net, Montenegrins in the Russo-Japanese War (Montenegrin).Stanford.edu, Lyrics, translation and melody ofthe song On the hills of Manchuria (Na sopkahManchzhurii).GoogleMapwithbattlesofRusso-JapaneseWarand other important events.2117 Text and image sources, contributors, and licenses17.1 Text Russo-Japanese War Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russo-Japanese_War?oldid=675404717 Contributors: AxelBoldt, MatthewWoodcraft, The Epopt, David Parker, ClaudeMuncey, Mav, Bryan Derksen, Amillar, Roadrunner, Ktsquare, Olivier, Rickyrab, Leandrod,Infrogmation, Michael Hardy, GABaker, Fred Bauder, Darkwind, , Nikai, Jiang, JidGom, Vanished user 5zariu3jisj0j4irj,Molinari, WhisperToMe, Tpbradbury, Dogface, Ann O'nyme, Kmlawson, Lord Emsworth, Bcorr, Hajor, JorgeGG, Owen, Jni, Sbbhat-tacharyya, Robbot, Chris 73, Kristof vt, Xiaopo, Donreed, Kokiri, Meelar, Roscoe x, Caknuck, SoLando, PBP, GreatWhiteNortherner,DocWatson42, Aphaia, MSGJ, Monedula, Everyking, Varlaam, Per Honor et Gloria, Siroxo, Bobblewik, Comatose51, Andycjp, Junuxx,Quadell, Antandrus, Beland, Piotrus, Kusunose, Vina, Martin Wisse, PFHLai, Neutrality, TakaD~enwiki, Irpen, Adashiel, Lacrimosus,Kate, Mike Rosoft, Ularsen, KNewman, Ardonik, Wikiacc, Vapour, ArnoldReinhold, Pavel Vozenilek, Paul August, Bender235, Kelvinc,Czrisher, Ylee, CanisRufus, Yasis, MBisanz, El C, Kross, Shanes, Tom, RoyBoy, Sf, Andreww, Russ3Z, Nesnad, SpeedyGonsales, Lagoutte de pluie, TheProject, BillyTFried, Sam Korn, Tms, Perceval, Alansohn, Eleland, LtNOWIS, Sherurcij, Arthena, Trainik, Fornadan,Bz2, Echuck215, Mailer diablo, BernardH, Avenue, Historian, Melaen, WojciechSwiderski~enwiki, Axeman89, Cosal, Larry Dunn, Gos-good, Bastin, Bobrayner, Simetrical, Woohookitty, Doctor Boogaloo, Sandius, Spettro9, PatGallacher, Zealander, ^demon, WadeSimMiser,Ardfern, KevinOKeee, Miwasatoshi, Haunti, Gimboid13, TAKASUGI Shinji, BD2412, Rjwilmsi, Koavf, Jake Wartenberg, Carl Logan,Adamblang, XP1, Himasaram, Valip, Bhadani, Nandesuka, MChew, Watcharakorn, CCRoxtar, FlaBot, Raijinryu, Kmorozov, Moro-boshi, RexNL, Jorbian, BjKa, NoSeptember, Wgfcrafty, Russavia, Chobot, Secant, Loco830, YurikBot, Wavelength, BuddyJesus, Sceptre,A.S. Brown, Mnewmanqc, Rowan Moore, Fabartus, Matt01, Conscious, Hede2000, Chaser, Akamad, Ksyrie, Alex Bakharev, Donald-Duck, NawlinWiki, Dysmorodrepanis~enwiki, Wiki alf, Pproctor, Leutha, Danielchin, Tmueck, Btnheazy03, Mhartl, Todwork, Rjensen,Howcheng, Awiseman, DelftUser, Renata3, Brian Crawford, JiBB, CaliforniaAliBaba, Mlouns, Molobo, Aaron Schulz, Mkill, Lockes-donkey, Bota47, Rallette, Calcwatch, Errabee, Arthur Rubin, Abune, CWenger, Shawnc, Whobot, Paul White, Kaicarver, Katieh5584,Kungfuadam, Jonathan.s.kt, GrinBot~enwiki, NiTenIchiRyu, YubYub41, Tom Morris, Deuar, Attilios, SmackBot, YellowMonkey, Mo-eron, Nihonjoe, Lcarsdata, C.Fred, Kussh, AndyZ, Rokfaith, Davewild, Delldot, Eskimbot, Kintetsubualo, Geo B, Srnec, Peter Isotalo,Gregjgrose, Hmains, Zytsef, Ajpappal, Durova, Izehar, Chris the speller, Skookum1, vitrigaila, Jprg1966, Djln, Moshe Constantine HassanAl-Silverburg, Ben-Velvel, RomaC, Baronnet, Colonies Chris, Scwlong, Xeryus, Zsinj, Derekbridges, DavidHay, Keith Lehwald, AP1787,Chlewbot, Raynethackery, GRuban, RJN, BrandonPhilipczyk, Jklin, Computermacgyver, Jtm71, Curly Turkey, Will Beback, MayerG,Cyclopaedic, IronGargoyle, Volker89, SimonATL, Mr Stephen, Dustek, Waggers, Andrwsc, Jrt989, Jose77, Rvastronomia, Peyre, Jjok,Michael Keenan, Amplusquem, Joseph Solis in Australia, N-jack, Esn, Tawkerbot2, Dlohcierekim, Plasma Twa 2, Ghaly, JForget, TORR,CmdrObot, Aherunar, Arco de Rayne, Banedon, CWY2190, Grr, Devatipan, Malamockq, Cydebot, JNZ, Dnjkirk~enwiki, Quibik, Jasjus-towned, LondonJae, Hello17, Englishfun, Thijs!bot, Epbr123, DulcetTone, Staberinde, The Proesor, Amitprabhakar, RFerreira, Grayshi,Sturm55, AntiVandalBot, Luna Santin, Seaphoto, Jj137, Fayenatic london, Robsmyth40, John Boxer, Killerman2, JAnDbot, James oshima,Arch dude, Igodard, R27182818, Geniac, Magioladitis, WolfmanSF, Bongwarrior, VoABot II, Dentren, Adam keller, Elsp, Freefry, Pre-stonmcconkie, Beansy, Ahecht, Allstarecho, Spellmaster, Hawkcm17, Pere prlpz, Ekki01, 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