Rosemary Benton - beatleyweb.simmons.edu€¦ · Web viewRepeating the opinion of his...

The Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950:Crafting Domestic Response in the Early

Years of the Cold War

byRosemary M. Benton

Table of Contents

Introduction --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2

The Problem of Panic, Deterrence and Civil Defense Programs -------------- 3

The Science Behind Civil Defense ------------------------------------------------ 14

Power and Authority in the Civil Defense Act----------------------------------- 27

How Civil Defense Imagines America ------------------------------------------- 39

The Civil Defense Education of America ---------------------------------------- 56

Conclusion ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 65

Bibliography ------------------------------------------------------------------------- 68

Acknowledgement

I would like to express my sincerest gratitude to my parents who provided me with the love and support which got me along my road to this moment. I would also like to profusely thank both

Professors Stephen Ortega and Zhigang Liu for their advice and input throughout the creation of this work. This paper would not have been possible without your help.

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In order to understand the national repercussions of the Cold War era it is imperative to

consider the use of the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950 as it was repeatedly called upon to

support or change the foundation of American policy - an intriguing balancing act of self-

preparedness and deterrence policy which, while intended to bring the United States together in a

time of crisis, created a gap between the people and the government that intended to protect

them. As it was created by the December 1950 Executive Order 10186, and functioned in

accordance with the authorities and duties outlined by the Civil Defense Act, the Federal Civil

Defense Administration (FCDA) served in a dual role as an agent of the United States’ civil

defense program and as a recipient of civil defense critique. For my purposes the focus of this

paper will be the study of the Civil Defense Act and its agency, the FCDA, between 1950 and

1958. It was during this span of time that the FCDA came into being, attempted to urge the

nation to prepare for the potential use of hostile nuclear weapons and subsequently perished

amidst a swath of confusion and frustration on the part of the Federal Government.

While there is not a substantial body of literature that has been written directly on the

Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950 - or as it would be known upon its January 1951 approval

from Congress, Public Law 920 or merely Civil Defense Act - there exists a tangible connection

between scientific research in America, the imagined concept of American identity, and the

power balance of leadership within the nation’s civil defense program, all of which coalesced

within the educational outreach of domestic defense. On a larger scale the civil defense program

formed part of America’s deterrence policy by creating a united civilian population that could

not easily by intimidated or derailed by the threat or execution of a direct enemy attack. That

being the case, the success of the FCDA’s efforts to create this home front defense would rely on

the agency’s ability to mold the nation into a state of constant readiness. This public disposition

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of American civil preparedness was believed to discourage any enemies from considering an

attack, although it likewise trained the American people to accept the event of direct physical

aggression. As I have found, the department attempted to accomplish this through public

education, building upon and disseminating information gained through their own weapons and

survival research, the perceived patriotism of the American national identity, and the

coordination of civil defense responsibilities within various federal departments. By looking at

the transcripts of Senate hearings specifically addressing the progress and legitimacy of the Civil

Defense Act and its program of civilian mobilization, it becomes clear that the FCDA’s success

or failure as a component of American deterrence policy hung on its ability to compile the

various resources at its disposal and convince the public to act using relevant survival

information and methods as a guide. If this could not be achieved, then not only would the

FCDA have failed, but the aspect of a civilian defensive in the nation’s two-front deterrence

policy would have proved insufficient as well.

The Problem of Panic, Deterrence and Civil Defense Programs

In order to understand the place civil defense held in United States policymaking, it is

necessary to look at the formative years following the official end of World War II. These events

would cumulatively create a mindset of fear that would set the precedence for the creation of the

Federal Civil Defense Administration. Like many studies on the Cold War, I am also of the

opinion that the driving force behind this conflict was one of competition between ideology and

technology, a race to outlast and out maneuver one’s opponents following the initiating violence

of the Korean War and the increased presence of Communism throughout Europe following

World War II. Jussi M. Hanhimäki and Odd Arne Westad characterize the Cold War as a,

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“competition between the United States and the Soviet Union to represent the best model for

future societies”, using the finesse and precision of weapons as a way to perceive a nation’s

intellect and modernity.1 As such, technology was both a means to and a measurement of a

superior society. Its continued existence could likewise hang in the balance of power derived

from comparative weapons technology.

Shows of power would become a common feature of the Cold War, such as the January

31, 1950 public announcement from President Truman that the Atomic Energy Commission

(AEC) had been directed continued development of various atomic weapons, but more

specifically they had been charged with the creation of the hydrogen bomb. Truman would later

say that the creation of the hydrogen bomb had not officially been a set directive of the AEC, but

its eventual construction was inevitable, “if only for bargaining purposes with the Russians”.2

His adherence to enlarging and perfecting the United States’ supremacy as an atomic power was

likewise embodied within the National Security Council Directive 68 (NSC 68) which, following

Truman’s January 31st proclamation of the development of the H-bomb, sought to answer

whether or not the country was prepared to fight against another atomic nation.

Produced in April 1950, NSC 68 presented the current state of international affairs as a

growing emergency that needed immediate and firm military action including the stockpiling of

atomic weapons, a renewed investment in the military establishment, and pursuit of alliances

with nations sympathetic to United States interests. This solidity of United States world influence

would, as Arnold Offner summarizes, “reduce Soviet power on its periphery, promote

independent countries in Eastern Europe, revive national aspirations within the Soviet Union,

1 Hanhimäki, Jussi M. and Odd Arne Westad, Ed. The Cold War: A History in Documents and Eyewitness Accounts. New York: Oxford University Press, 2004. 273.2 Offner, Arnold. Another Such Victory: President Truman and the Cold War, 1945-1953. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2002. 363.

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and foster fundamental change in the Soviet system”.3 In keeping with the directive’s assertion

that the United States remained the only impediment to Soviet power expansion following the

Berlin Crisis of 1948-1949 and the Communist Party of China’s victory over Chiang Kai-shek’s

Nationalist government, the closing line of the document speaks not only of the nation’s own

survival, but its responsibility to a higher world calling. “The whole success of the proposed

program hangs ultimately on the recognition by this Government, the American people, and all

free people, that the cold war is in fact a real war in which the survival of the free world is at

stake”.4 Despite the similarities between Truman’s view of the Soviet Union as a nation with

dangerously burgeoning power and influence that stood as the antithesis of the United States in

policy and practice, he was not as invested in the suggestion of militarization which the NSC 68

called for. Instead, Truman preferred to approach the situation from the position of preparing for

the possibility of an atomic attack rather than from the setting of certain parameters under which

the United States would be pushed to use its own weapons supply.

Although Truman’s administration did not have a high degree of confidence in the ability

of civilians to respond and regroup in the face of the tremendous destructive forces of

contemporary weapons, the use of both military and civilian defense as a force of deterrence

from enemy attack was implemented during his presidency. As a deterrent, civil defense is not as

effective as a strictly military defense but, as William Vogele describes in his 1993 article

“Deterrence by Civilian Defense”, it provides alternative solutions to a single form of deterrence

based on military strength. If successfully propagated it has to ability to harness and direct the

influence of widespread “social powers”, thus creating a commonly felt need to protect shared

3 Offner, Another Such Victory: President Truman and the Cold War, 1945-1953, 366.4 Grossman, Andrew D. Neither Dead Nor Red: Civilian Defense and American Political Development During the Early Cold War. New York, NY: Routlege, 2001. 38.

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territory, values, and institutions.5 Likewise, civil defense can act as a postponement of conflict

escalation, thus preventing what Stephen L. Quackenbush describes as “immediate deterrence”

or “crisis decision making”. In his article, Quackenbush offers the example of the Cuban Missile

Crisis as an example of how “general deterrence” aka “everyday decision-making in

relationships involving conflicts of interest” has failed, causing the implementation of

“immediate deterrence”.6 Andrew Grossman and Guy Oakes point out that a program of civil

defense did not merely act as an alternative to military deterrence, but supported and

strengthened it by offering the American public with information and action which they could

take in order to prepare for and accept any possible sacrifices military deterrence may require of

them.7 In any situation, the importance of the military as an aspect in the country’s policy of

national security would continue to play a crucial role especially during the formative years of

the Cold War. Not only would representatives of the Department of Defense continually reassess

their responsibilities in civilian mobilization between 1950 and 1958, but they would redefine the

very basics of what civil defense constituted.

As the American and Western European governments continued experimenting with the

capability of atomic power in the late 1940s via the American nuclear testing over the Marshall

Islands in Operation Crossroads in July 1946, followed by creating and activating the Graphite

Low Energy Experimental Pile (GLEEP) in August 1947, the realization came that nuclear

weapons held not only immense power for physical destruction, but they could also act as objects

of intimidation. Who directed this intimidation would hold power over anyone else. Having lost

their monopoly on nuclear weapons following the Soviet Union’s successful nuclear weapons

5 Vogele, William B. “Deterrence by Civilian Defense.” Peace & Change, 18, no. 1 (January 1993): 26. 6 Quackenbush, Stephen L. “Deterrence Theory: Where Do We Stand?” Review of International Studies, 37, no. 2 (February 2011): 752.7 Oakes, Guy and Andrew Grossman. “Managing Nuclear Terror: The Genesis of American Civil Defense Strategy.” International Journal of Politics, Culture & Society, 5, no. 3 (1992): 363.

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test in August of 1949, the United States adopted a policy of deterrence which assumed that the

possibility of continued armed violence was never far from consideration.

It cannot be denied that the response of the Federal Government in the event of an enemy

offensive was of great concern to civilians and government officials, but perhaps most intriguing

is the ever-present anxiety expressed by experts and federal employees regarding the civilian

response in a nuclear crisis. First, a public gripped in fear of nuclear war will not condone further

nuclear weapons research, thus putting their country at a marked disadvantage in an arms race

scenario. Second, in the event of a nuclear attack the country would be all but paralyzed with no

sense of, or intention to, proceed in an orderly fashion so that the country could make a swift

recovery. Nobel laureate Harold C. Urey believed that the ability of nuclear weapons to inspire

fear, irrationality and self-serving behavior, or passivity followed by surrender could ultimately

preempt any actual violence from either the Soviet Union or China.8 With regard to the United

States, this intimidation could translate into an issue of widespread panic among the public. As

such, in order to dampen American fears of atomic warfare and to give the impression that with

proper preparations such a war could be winnable, the Civil Defense Board was established by

the War Department on November 25, 1946. The conclusion of this committee was the Bull

Report (publicly available on February 2, 1948 as A Study of Civil Defense), which attested to a

plan to combat foreign enemies in the event of attack, and also to investigate internal threats

intent on undermining American liberty, life and the “will to fight”.9 A follow up report by

Russell J. Hopley, director of the Office of Civil Defense Planning (established March 27, 1948),

provided not only a guide for the establishment of civil defense offices for each state but stressed

that the public must be educated.

8 Oakes, Guy. The Imaginary War. New York: Oxford University Press, 1994. 34.9 Oakes, The Imaginary War, 37.

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The emphasis on education was a common conclusion amongst civil defense theorists,

and would later become the primary objective of civil defense throughout the United States.

Knowledge of proper evacuation procedures and distribution of any current declassified data on

the effects of a nuclear attack would in theory lessen the fear Hopley believed stemmed from

ignorance of current threats.10 The United States Civil Defense report (or Blue Book) submitted

in September of 1950 also confirmed the image of the American public as panic stricken masses

in an emergency scenario, thus recommending that all police forces be trained to “handle panic

situations” in exercises that would involve civilian participants and thus engender faith in the

abilities of the law enforcement.11 In theory, conditioning civilians to better appreciate the

gravity of what they could be facing would give them a feeling of safety and confidence in their

own knowledge; not to mention confidence in the competence of the government which had

taken the necessary steps to acquire and arm its citizens with valuable insight into their collective

situation. As those in power would soon learn, civilian cooperation was difficult to manage, but

ultimately essential to have in order to the support a policy of deterrence. In the same way a

strong, united public educated by a prominent civil defense program was essential to the image

of America’s deterrence policy. One could not exist without the other.

Guy Oakes, author of The Imaginary War, and Andrew D. Grossman, author of Neither

Dead Nor Red: Civilian Defense and American Political Development During the Early Cold

War, both argue that America’s policy of deterrence against potential foreign or internal attacks

required the adoption of a program of civil defense in order to manage the continued cooperation

of the civilian population. For Oakes, civil defense was the means by which the American people

could be convinced to, “pay the price for the failure of deterrence was civil defense”. 12

10 Oakes, The Imaginary War, 37.11 Oakes, The Imaginary War, 38.12 Oakes, Guy. The Imaginary War. 6.

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Grossman’s work expands upon this by exploring the FCDA under the belief that it was a vehicle

between the need to sell civilians on the necessity of nuclear deterrence and the agency which

would handle the information they would need to know about the nuclear weapons their

government planned to stockpile. Put simply, the involvement of the public in the process of

deploying a successful deterrence policy not only involved their acceptance of such a policy, but

required their participation in the framework of the strategy.

Theorists speculated that a public who believed in the possibility of self-protection during

a nuclear attack would strengthen, “the moral underpinnings of American national security”,

with consolation that even in the worst scenario in which deterrence failed, the quality of life

would be tolerable if proper steps were taken beforehand to prepare.13 A civilian population that

did not believe in the message of a civil defense program could prove to be highly dangerous not

only to themselves should an attack occur, but to the legitimacy of the America’s deterrence

policy. If the American public did not believe in the threat of attack, their ability to survive an

attack, or the acceptability of post-attack living conditions then they might rebel against their

government’s authority, or worse, self interest would cause people to, “withdraw into

isolationism”.14 While they did not want to find themselves in the same position as they were in

the period between World War I and World War II, where the efforts to demobilize were in fact

premature, the eventuality of another full-scale war was still in question. Americans still needed

to be on the defensive, yet they were facing the possibility of attacks being carried out with

weapons for which there was little known defense. It would come to be the responsibility of the

FCDA, as outlined in the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950, to address both the issues of

continued weapons research and the education of the population using this new found

13 Oakes, Guy. The Imaginary War. 37.14 Grossman, Andrew D. Neither Dead Nor Red: Civilian Defense and American Political Development During the Early Cold War. 30.

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information. Taking this into consideration the early deterrence policy was one based on the

ideal of a poised military offensive backed by the support and security of a unified American

population committed to the continuation of living under constant, but acceptable, nuclear threat.

The FCDA, as an educator and research coordinator, would be bridging the gap between the

civilian and military components of the deterrence strategy.

The Truman Administration overall held a low opinion of the public’s ability to

successfully prepare and weather the possibility of an atomic attack. Their emotional disposition

would require leadership and management if they were to be successful contributors to national

security. Truman and his national security planers attempted to enact a program for the

mobilization of civilians that would uphold contemporary economic and political structures

while at the same time prepare the nation for the possibility of severe upheaval in the event of an

attack.15 To this end, the National Security Act of 1947 in addition to creating the National

Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, and a War Council, the National Security

Resources Board (NSRB) was the integral agency which would apply itself to the task of home-

front mobilization.

The NSRB would act as the Federal Government’s response to the issue of emotional

containment, economic disruption, and a pioneer in the development of defense techniques. Prior

to the establishment of the FCDA in 1951 via the enactment of the Civil Defense Act of 1950,

the NSRB designated it the responsibility of its internal agency, the Office of Civil Defense

Planning (OCDP), to handle public education on civil defense, disaster planning and civil servant

training. The NSRB, on the other hand, would be more occupied with the “strategic-military-

15 Grossman, Andrew D. Neither Dead Nor Red: Civilian Defense and American Political Development During the Early Cold War. 116.

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economic facets” of the mobilization effort.16 Although short lived the NSRB, and subsequently

the OCDP, would bring in many agency representatives, ideas and data that the FCDA would

inherit. Within the December 1950 hearings for the Civil Defense Act it was evident that some of

the structural layout for the program’s administration was to be kept intact, such as the

appointment of State health officers, by the State’s governor, as the directors of health services.

In this way the proposed FCDA would be working with the Public Health Services to plan civil

defense procedures “down to the particular city, or target area”.17 Likewise, the FCDA would

receive such contacts as the Construction Industry Task Force which had strong ties to one of the

leading shelter design advisors, the American Institute of Architects; and the belief that the best

program for civilian preparedness was to first and foremost protect the American economy by

directing a slow civil preparedness outreach on the level of local and State governments.18 As

part of the concern for economic safety during home-front mobilization, the NSRB even

undertook a joint program with the U.S. Department of Commerce in 1951 to protect the

American economy by offering incentives to industries with defense contracts in order to

persuade them to place their factories away from urban areas as these were considered more

likely to be targeted in comparison to a more rural location.19 This decision would prove to be an

enduring theme within the evacuation and relocation techniques purported by the FCDA

throughout its lifetime.

The Civil Defense Act of 1950 holds to many truths of American policy at the time, but

primarily it can provide a glimpse at the Federal Government’s response to the fear which many

16 Grossman, Andrew D. Neither Dead Nor Red: Civilian Defense and American Political Development During the Early Cold War. 2.17 United States. Cong. Senate. Hearing before the United States Senate Committee on Armed Services. Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950. 81st Cong., 2nd sess. Washington: GPO, 1950. 100.18 United States. Cong. Senate. Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950. 35.19 Monteyne, David. Fallout Shelters: Designing for Defense in the Cold War. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2011. 11.

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experts believed existed in the minds of Americans. As a product of American policy during the

crucible of the Korean War and the emergence of the Soviet Union as a nation with nuclear

capabilities to rival the United States’, the bill encapsulates the anxiety of policymakers on all

tiers of American society, from local officials to state and federal employees. How could the

public reaction in the event of a nuclear attack be prescribed so as to avoid chaos? By 1950 the

power and influence of the NSRB was proving to not be enough to accomplish the civilian

mobilization efforts necessary to assuage public fear. NSRB was also considered by many to

have become unwieldy and confusing with numerous duplication of functions between the

NSRB and the OCDP.20 It was the objective of the Civil Defense Act of 1950, in establishing a

federal civil defense program to be enacted through the Federal Civil Defense Administration, to

provide a unified solution to this dilemma of organization and effectiveness via several key

operations components which would be revisited numerous times throughout the 50s.

First, transcripts of hearings regarding Public Law 920 and the FCDA indicate that to

further the quality and accuracy of any federal civil defense program outreach it was explicitly

understood and encouraged that there would need to be more research done in order to better

prepare civilian, and by extension military defense. Who undertook this research and which areas

of study would be investigated likewise came into question within the original bill and its

revisions. Second, the issue was raised repeatedly as to what should be the functions of different

agencies in the federal government in encouraging civilian preparation for an attack and

coordinating civilians in the event of an attack. Also the question was asked who had the

authority within the federal government to provide the agencies with the materials and

information they would need in either situation. For example, who could be relied upon to

20 Jordan, Nehemiah. “U.S. Civil Defense Before 1950: the Roots of Public Law 920”. http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=AD0637900. Institute for Defense Analysis. Economic and Political Studies Division. 1966. 127.

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http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=AD0637900

administer immediate medical assistance after a disaster, and what funds should be made

available to citizens in such a situation so that they could afford new shelter, clothing and food?

At a more fundamental level this hesitancy to become deeply involved in the civil defense

program of the bill came back to the issue of what tier of government – local, state or federal -

should be in charge of the aspects of mobilization on the home front concerned those in

attendance regarding the bill. Third, it was a matter of some debate concerning what could be

expected of the average citizen in terms of participation in civil defense. Following that, how

could the American identity be presented as one that was founded on the necessary personality

qualification for a successful civil defense program - self reliance, initiative and commitment to

the protection of United States boundaries. Most importantly, the fourth component of the

proposed FCDA’s program would be the means by which it disseminated the prescribed

American identity throughout the cities and towns of the nation. Education through seminars,

pamphlets, films and other publications would be in line with the approach of previous civil

defense agencies such as the Office of Civilian Defense, the NSRB, and the NSRB’s internal

agency the OCDP, but the question of what should citizens be told and who should tell it to them

remained a point of contention.

Tying together the data gathered through scientific research on civil defense methods, the

coordinated efforts of numerous federal departments and agencies, and the obligation of all

civilians to participate in national defense, educational programs of the FCDA sought to bring

the nation in line with the rising threat of attacks perpetrated on United States soil. It would

ultimately be this final component on which the legitimacy of the Civil Defense Act and its

civilian mobilization program and agency, the FCDA, would be judged. For if the bill could not

produce a program which could convince America to channel their fear for the future into

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productive self preparedness, then one half of the United State’s deterrence policy would have

failed.

The Science Behind Civil Defense

As Jussi Hanhimäki and Odd Westad point out in their book, The Cold War: A History

in Documents and Eyewitness Accounts, the majority of fighting during the Cold War was done

in the laboratory since, “Technological achievement was the yardstick in the competition

between the United States and the Soviet Union to represent the best model for future

societies”.21 Being able to judge the progress made by the Soviet Union and the People’s

Republic of China in the developing arms and technology race of the late 1940s was absolutely

paramount to safeguarding the United States’ tenuous position as a world power. Given the

aggressive invasion of the American sympathetic South Korea by the Soviet ally North Korea

earlier in June 1950, the willingness of other nations to take up arms for or against American

interests deeply resonated throughout the Federal Government.

In conjunction with the Soviet Union having deployed their first successful nuclear

weapon test in August 1949, the United States recognized the need to ready the civilian

population for an enemy nation which could be as well armed as their own country. To this end

section 2 of the bill deems it of paramount importance for the proposed FCDA to develop and

coordinate a strong program of research on civil defense methods to meet enemy attacks on the

civilian front and to disseminate this information amongst States and local communities. Various

forms of attack methods including atomic, radiological, chemical, bacteriological and biological

were to be studied under the FCDA’s guidance in order to research such topics as protection and

21 Hanhimäki, Jussi M. and Odd Arne Westad., ed. The Cold War: A History in Documents and Eyewitness Accounts. New York: Oxford University Press, 2004. 273.

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survival methods.22 Using this information the FCDA, working with other federal agencies,

would then proceed to develop civilian and State appropriate standards to be disseminated

throughout the United States. According to the bill it would also be the responsibility of the

FCDA to encourage further study of survival techniques within both government agencies and

private institutions, as well as follow the advancements and new theories of the scientific

community in the hopes that the United States could strengthen the ability of their civilian

population and in doing so further deter foreign attacks.

Whether given as verbal affirmation of plans for further research into atomic warfare, or

outright pledges of agency materials, the December hearings regarding the Federal Civil Defense

Act of 1950 universally condoned any research done under the FCDA. Oscar R. Ewing, Federal

Security Administrator and one of the most vocal supporters of civil defense research during the

December hearings for the bill, made his approval of the FCDA’s civil defense research clear not

only by pointing out the usefulness of agencies under the Federal Security Administration, but by

offering to go beyond the call of duty via networking inside and outside of his department. Case

in point, to show their support of the FCDA’s research agenda both the Federal Security

Administration’s Office and Education and Public Health Service offered their services and

resources in the statements given by their representatives at the December 8th hearing for the bill.

Touting the long standing support of civil defense agencies including the Office of Civilian

Defense, NSRB, and the early transition of the NSRB to the Federal Civil Defense

Administration, Surgeon General Dr. Leonard A. Scheele of the United States Public Health

Service pointed out on page 98 of the hearing transcript that the agency was ready and willing to

continue providing references for expert specialists and researchers. Federal Security

Administrator Ewing adds that the Public Health Services has amongst its resources the National

22 United States. Cong. Senate. Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950. 2.

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Institutes of Health, while the Office of Education can offer connections with university and

college facilities. In keeping with the directive of civil defense it was the hope that through war-

time preparation techniques and knowledge of current threats, an educated public could

hopefully avoid falling into the dreaded state of hysteria feared by civil defense theorists.

In accordance with the bill, the FCDA would be privy to any unclassified information

relevant to planning counter attack measures with the Department of Defense.23 However, as

Director of the United States Atomic Energy Commission’s Division of Biology and Medicine,

Dr. Shields Warren, points out, no agency including the proposed FCDA had carte blanche

access to the AEC’s findings. In accordance with the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, the Atomic

Energy Commission had the responsibility of protecting the nation’s security by holding sole

control as to when sensitive data on atomic energy could be accessed and published.24 Within the

final version of Public Law 920 there exists Section 410 to enforce this position. The

Commission would also need the FCDA to allow it to continue its research without much

interference. The reasoning being that the Commission was aware of the research being carried

out within the scientific community, and as such would be the most appropriate body to

supervise and consequently prevent the FCDA from funding or requesting research which was

already underway25. Regardless of these stipulations, it was recognized by the Senate Committee

on Armed Forces that the cooperation of the AEC was greatly valued as a resource for the FCDA

and thus should be appeased. Knowing this it was imperative to Dr. Warren that he make clear

not only his willingness to aid the FCDA in civil defense research, but the parameters under

which his agency and its people would work.

23 United States. Cong. Senate. Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950. 2. 24 United States. Cong. Senate. Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950. 110.25 United States. Cong. Senate. Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950. 110.

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Given their years of working with the NSRB, the AEC confidently presented itself as a

cooperative supporter of the FCDA who would willingly donate time and resources to further the

understanding of human and environmental reactions to atomic attack. It is stressed, however,

that while the Commission may aid the FCDA with information and guidance on how to apply

that knowledge to practical civil defense purposes, it was not, nor had it ever served as, an

organization in charge of administering civil defense functions.26 Aside from monitoring area

contamination from a nuclear blast, the AEC was simply not suited or willing to operate such

tasks as administering emergency first aid, fire fighting, or area evacuation. As in their prior role

to the NSRB, Dr. Warren points out on page 110 of the hearing transcript that the role of the

Commission, as discussed with the acting civil defense agency as recently as March 1950, was in

supplying information to those agencies who have primary responsibilities for civil defense

planning.

While this may seem peripheral to the mission and purpose of civil defense as understood

in the bill and in American policy, Dr. Warren does remain proactive by demonstrating that,

while the Commission may be more of a wealth of knowledge rather than a tool of

implementation, the newly founded FCDA is welcome to make use of the existing publications

and advisory committees on radiation monitoring and training which had already been

established to train local and State governments.27 Stockpiled instruments belonging to the

Commission were likewise available for use in civil defense training exercises performed by

authorized State civil defense organization. Although the purpose of the Commission’s

emergency radiation monitoring teams was to protect Commission facilities and installations, Dr.

Warren considered their training and organization to be applicable to the civil defense goals of

26 United States. Cong. Senate. Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950. 110.27 United States. Cong. Senate. Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950. 111.

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radiation containment and treatment. As such Dr. Warren states on page 111 that the

Commission would be willing to deploy their emergency radiation monitoring teams in the event

of a disaster, specifically if there were no ready civil defense teams available in the area.

Surprisingly, the interest in scientific achievement sparked during this era did not initially

translate well into any kind of heavily funded, well planned effort as is evident in the parameters

of the bill. Despite an open line of communication between the FCDA and the people and

resources of the Atomic Energy Commission as outlined in Section 4 of the bill and established

already through the FCDA’s predecessor, the legislation regarding the use of consultants and

experts is surprisingly limited. As it would be later realized in the Reorganization Plan No. 1 of

1956, the funds available to visiting experts were too small to encourage any kind of special

interest in government consultation. Barely fifty dollars a day was reserved within the original

Civil Defense Act for the payment of a visiting expert, and nowhere within the bill was there a

specific budget set aside for the funding of research into weapons testing or civil defense

techniques. Within the final version of Public Law 920 as approved by Congress in 1951, there

still remains no inclusion of a research budget or compensation for expert consultation. Despite

this initial rocky start it was evident by the testimony from various politicians at the December

1950 Senate hearing for the bill that the transparency of government actions and research done

for civil defense purposes would be a prerequisite for any forthcoming research. Consequently a

virtually universal agreement between visiting speakers at the December 1950 hearings was that

research into weapons and civil defense techniques was vital for the well being of America; yet

little was done about conducting this research within the first several iterations of the bill.

Despite an initial lack of funding going directly to organizations and expert consultants in

the private sector, the political climate of the early 1950s bolstered an unprecedented interest in

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atomic research. Of all agencies and institutions involved in this field, the United States Atomic

Energy Commission stood within the Federal Government as the authority on the scientific

community, and thus it was through them that federal officials were presented with information

regarding nuclear tests and intelligence. The actions of the Atomic Energy Commission during

the mid to late 1940s would come to represent the types of tests undertaken throughout the 1950s

and 60s to, in part, aid civil defense efforts.

The role that the Commission would come to play in league with the FCDA deviated

very little from the ground rules emphasized by Dr. Warren in the hearings for the Civil Defense

Act of 1950. With their knowledge of medical treatments for radiation exposure the Commission

and the NSRB had sponsored instructor training courses for people from 31 States, Alaska,

Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and the District of Columbia. 89 people, as well as 70 nurses, all with

added instructions to expand their numbers by passing along their knowledge to State and local

governments, represented the fruits of these efforts. Collaborative Atomic Energy Commission

publications under the NSRB included many works which would form the basic knowledge of

early civil defense used by the FCDA. Such works included the “United States Civil Defense”

manual, and the bibliography of 400 references on entitled “Civil Defense Against Atomic

Warfare – A Selected Reading List”. “The Effects of Atomic Weapons”, the first handbook for

public use disclosing the total effects of an atomic explosion, was published in August 12, 1950.

“Medical Aspects of Atomic Weapons” focused solely on medical information provided within

“The Effects of Atomic Weapons”. Even more recent was the pamphlet “Survival Under Atomic

Attack”. Published in October 1950, this literature offered estimated damages as a result of fire

started during and immediately after a bombing. The book which Dr. Warren personally felt to

be of great importance was the “NSRB Document No. 128”, an ongoing collaborative effort

19

between the Commission and the NSRB which, in the most recent volume as of December 1950,

included significant medical information on atomic energy.28

Moving forward following the official approval of Public Law 920 and the establishment

of the FCDA in the Office for Emergency Management under the Executive Office of the

President in 1951, the AEC continued its research in radiation detection instruments for civil

defense purposes, emergency radiation exposure limits for personnel, and tolerable levels of

radiation in food and drinking water. Since it was stated in Public Law 920, Section 201(d), that

the FCDA would be allowed to perform research into protection and survival method standards

and the effects of various attack types this research fit well within the parameters of the FCDA’s

information requirements. Research projects which the Commission oversaw during and after the

founding of the FCDA included those undertaken at Argonne National Laboratory, the

University of Rochester, and the University of California, all of which were involved in the study

of radiation injury therapy.29 However, with new understanding of the effect and factors of

nuclear weapons came a better understanding of the unique qualities of any given attack. In

addition to weather, the distance from ground zero of a bomb’s detonation, as well as the

material comprising the ground of the surrounding environment became contributing factors to

the likelihood of surviving a nearby nuclear detonation.

In order to assuage public fear and normalize the concept of effects of nuclear weapons,

not to mention test the function of equipment and all aspects of shelters from construction to

living conditions, the FCDA and the AEC immediately set about undertaking field tests. In 1951

the energy release of 20 kiloton weapons was used against shelters that were feasible for families

to build, constructed with commercially available materials, and required only common house


20

hold tools. That same year the FCDA tested 28 family shelters under similar circumstances in

order to bring compiling information for how-to shelter guides and pamphlets. Shelter designs

were again improved through the Buster-Jangle series of tests. By 1953 one begins to see the

effects of the FCDA’s limited budget, as they recycled shelters in order to witness cross-sections

of shelters that survived the 1951 tests.30 Regardless, the FCDA did manage to coordinate the

successful Upshot Knothole series that same year, in which vehicles, frame houses, radiation

protection methods and family shelters are all tested.

Funding proved to further limit the involvement of the FCDA with AEC tests as Dr. C. L.

Dunham, Director of the Division of Biology and Medicine within the AEC, makes mention of

the FCDA’s spending limit for the shelters used in Operation Teapot in 1955.31 The statement

regarding this particular test given by Edward Saunders, FCDA Director of Test Operations, is

naturally more optimistic since it was at the 1958 hearings Civil Defense: Part 1 – Atomic

Shelter Tests, Part 2 – Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1958 that the FCDA was in dire need of

defending its actions toward the objectives of research and education within the Civil Defense

Act. Within the statement of Director Saunders, the emphasis is put on the data gathered from the

tested residential, commercial and industrial structures and building materials, utilities and

services equipment, mobile houses, emergency vehicles, food, civilian shelters and radiation

protection methods.32 The 1957 Operation Plumbbob while massive, only peripherally involved

the FCDA. According to Robert L. Crosbie, AEC Director of the Civil Effects Test Group, there

were around 400 medical doctors, physicists, veterinarians, biologists, chemists, architects, and

engineers in addition to AEC and FCDA staff. 30 The first biological tests were held during this year to observe the effects of overpressure and underpressure.31 United States. Cong. House. Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations. Civil Defense: Part 1 – Atomic Shelter Tests, Part 2 – Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1958. 85th Cong., 2nd sess. Washington: GPO, 1958. 8.32 United States. Cong. House. Civil Defense: Part 1 – Atomic Shelter Tests, Part 2 – Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1958. 109.

21

Very quickly, the data collected by the Commission indicated more and more that the

fatalities incurred by the disastrous and numerous stages of a nuclear explosion would be greater

than anyone had anticipated, while the probability of surviving an atomic attack and the

conditions the population would have to face compiled an increasingly fatalistic impression of

post attack life. With a greater understanding of the effects of fallout came the greater

appreciation for issues related to contamination such as the longevity of radioactive isotopes in

the food chain and how they can eventually reach humans, thus resulting in a high number of

cases of bone cancer.33 By 1956 the Atomic Energy Commission presented the likelihood of

death within three miles of a ten megaton nuclear bomb detonation to be 100% should the

residents seek shelter within reinforced concrete buildings with standard ten inch walls and six

inch floors.34 It was also the conclusion of Dr. Willard F. Libby, Commissioner of the United

States Atomic Energy Commission, in Civil Defense for National Survival that, whether above-

ground or below-ground, common shelters being built in homes across America would not

provide sufficient thickness to prevent harmful radiation exposure. At one mile from the blast it

would not matter what self-preparation methods you had taken; death was virtually assured.

“You will have to protect against other effects [besides radiation exposure] which would have

gotten you anyway. That is, if you were within a mile of that fireball…something else would

probably get you”.35 However, Dr. Libby in his statement within Civil Defense for National

Survival is hesitant to disregard all civil preparedness methods. Shelters can still provide

sufficient protection in peripheral areas to a blast, and there is still the option of evacuation

before and after the detonation of a bomb. Dr. Libby goes on to assure the Senate that the FCDA,

33 United States. Cong. House. Part 1 Hearings Before the United States House Committee on Government Operations, Subcommittee on Military Operations. Civil Defense for National Survival. 84th Cong., 2nd sess. Washington: GPO, 1956. 24.34 United States. Cong. House. Civil Defense for National Survival. 8.35 United States. Cong. House. Civil Defense for National Survival. 13.

22

to the best of his knowledge, is working on both the tasks of shelters and evacuation “with the

wholehearted cooperation of other Government agencies”.36 Implying, at least, that the AEC is

doing its part. Nonetheless, as the 1950s progressed it became clear that there was a serious need

to reevaluate civil defense methods and determine whether or not they were a truly realistic

option.

Despite the new knowledge of atomic weapons’ effects and damages creating a grim and

daunting impression the FCDA was determined to make the best use of the information they

were supplied. Although most research conducted by the Commission was for the purpose of

testing the durability of everything from building materials to living tissue, the FCDA found this

information useful and applied it to everything from construction of fallout shelters to the

planning of evacuation routes. Unwilling to accept that nothing could be done for those at any

distance from the detonation of a bomb the FCDA continued to approach shelters as a viable

option for protection. Monteyne notes that the use and feasibility of fallout shelters was

challenged in a number of ways including the idea of communal living being representative of

communist ideology and the lack of funding being offered by Congress for a fallout shelter

program given their apprehension of the FCDA’s ability to plan, coordinate and implement such

a program.37 Educational material, courses and research data on nuclear weapons effects and

personal protection was therefore the extent of most FCDA civilian outreach. Progress continued

to be made regarding potential shelter designs as is evident by the continued participation of the

AEC and FCDA in weapons field tests, but by 1953 the majority of material published by the

FCDA was focused more on evacuation rather than shelters, as well as the necessity of taking

action to protect oneself and one’s family immediately following a bomb’s detonation such in the

36 United States. Cong. House. Civil Defense for National Survival. 29.37 David Monteyne. Fallout Shelters: Designing for Defense in the Cold War. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2011. 13.

23

film “Duck and Cover”. A demonstration of this new direction for the FCDA is present in

hearings such as the January and February 1956 hearings before the Military Operations

Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations, titled Civil Defense for National

Survival. In a statement by Dr. Libby, he not only enlightened the Congress as to the risks and

newfound data on nuclear blasts, but demonstrated the connections being made between tests in

the Pacific Proving Grounds and the Nevada Proving Grounds, and information supplied to the

FCDA. With greater understanding of the effects of nuclear blasts, combined with the

advancement of weapons’ capabilities, Dr. Libby was able to make new highly specific

suggestions about such topics as the minimal requirements of various building materials

including concrete and earth, which could be used in shelters to protect from radiation, neutron

and gamma rays. In an interesting conclusion citing the scientific community’s better

understanding of travel distance and the longevity of radioactive fallout, it was the conclusion of

Robert L. Crosbie that weather data for a given area should facilitate the formulation of multiple

evacuation routes.38 Unfortunately, despite combined efforts of the FCDA’s outreach, a more

prevalent issue began to arise – the management of information.

With such a large focus on the effects of nuclear weapons damage the data that the FCDA

was trying to manage was becoming unwieldy. Indeed, in the 1956 hearing Civil Defense for

National Survival it was the opinion of Dr. Lloyd Berkner39 (120), Chet Holifield40 (120), and Dr.

Libby (40), that the amount of information regarding bomb effects, shelter designs, etc. was not

organized and cohesive enough for any agency with civil defense intentions to use it effectively.

Dr. Berkner and Holifield conclude that, given the rapid pace of research, a new volume of

current theories, methods and techniques regarding self preparedness would greatly help civil

38 United States. Cong. House. Civil Defense for National Survival. 15.39 Dr. Lloyd Berkner was the president of Associated Universities Inc. and a member of Project East River.40 Chet Holifield was the Chairman of the Military Operations Subcommittee.

24

defense officials and civilians.41 Not to mention the fact that it would clarify relevant educational

material. What information the FCDA was given from the AEC or the Department of Defense

was admittedly not meant for immediate public consumption due to its classified nature. In order

for the data to be used in any form of educational outreach it had to be either reworded or

declassified which, according the Civil Defense Act section 403(a), required an investigation by

the FBI as to the intent of use and loyalty of the requester. A result of this change was the

noticeable use of outdated information in the FCDA’s program.

Within the hearings between 1950 and 1958 addressing the Civil Defense Act and/or the

FCDA there is surprisingly little mention of new data being internalized within the FCDA’s

functions. One exception was when FCDA Administrator J. J. Wadsworth provided a brief

mention of refresher courses to be offered to staff of the FCDA’s civil defense “staff college”

and training centers during the 1951 hearing Civil Defense Training School and Other

Amendments to the Civil Defense Act of 1950. These refresher courses expressed Wadsworth’s

intention to update the civil defense trainers, and consequently the students, with the newest

methods devised through research. However, aside from this brief statement, there is little other

indication of new self preparedness methods being incorporated into the FCDA’s educational

program. Consequently, the lack of public acknowledgement testifying to the fact that the FCDA

was incorporating new information into their public education efforts had the unfortunate effect

of leading to, and then supporting, the conclusion drawn from Part II – Reorganization Plan No.

1 of 1958.

In Part II – Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1958, part of the April and May 1958 hearings

titled Civil Defense, hearing it was stated that the FCDA’s, “organization for the planning,

coordination, and conduct of [the United States’] nonmilitary defense programs”, had resulted in

41 United States. Cong. House. Civil Defense for National Survival. 120.

25

persistent repetition of civil defense functions among other agencies and the use of out-of-date

data due to the agency’s inability to keep up with the rapid change of “technical advances of

military science”.42 Occasionally it was evident that the data was not being used at all, as in the

case of Dr. Libby’s testimony that the FCDA was not consulting the AEC at any point in their

planning for civilian evacuation.43 In one memorable exchange within Civil Defense for National

Survival, Commissioner of the United States Atomic Energy Commission Dr. Libby mentions

that the Commission’s book Effects of Atomic Weapons, which contains the same information

that the FCDA has been basing their contemporary shelter designs and survival techniques on, is

five years out of date!44 Dr. Libby proceeded to offer assurance that there was soon to be an

updated edition published, but Holifield still expressed undoubtedly shared frustration at this lag

in information. “[Effects of Atomic Weapons] is obsolete as far as the consideration of blast,

thermal and radiation damage is concerned. The principles are there, but... the results have to be

changed as a result of the new and bigger type bombs.”45 Despite testimony in 1958 from Robert

L. Crosbie, speaking as the Director of the Civil Effects Test Group (CETG), that all projects in

the AEC-FCDA test program are screened for non-duplication of prior experiments, the

necessity of undertaking the experiment as a field test, and the reasonable feasibility of said

experiment, it was the eventual conclusion of the Federal Government within the President’s

Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1958 that the functions within the Civil Defense Act would be best

suited to another organization – the Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization (ODCM). With

the AEC, the FCDA, the small Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM) all participating in a

research project among other civil defense functions, the chaotic nature of the FCDA’s approach

42 United States. Cong. House. Civil Defense: Part 1 – Atomic Shelter Tests, Part 2 – Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1958. 322. 43 United States. Cong. House. Civil Defense for National Survival. 34.44 United States. Cong. House. Civil Defense for National Survival. 7.45 United States. Cong. House. Civil Defense for National Survival. 7.

26

to scientific research eventually contributed to its merger with the ODM to form the ODCM.

Science, however, was not the only field in which the FCDA integrated itself to such a degree

that it lost the capacity to function effectively. As part of the Civil Defense Act the FCDA was

authorized to make use of other agencies within the Federal Government, and it was not only

working with the AEC that the FCDA found it had overlapping functions.

Power and Authority in the Civil Defense Act

Since the emphasis of civil defense was as an element of deterrence to foreign attack and

simultaneously a preparatory step in readying citizens for the eventuality of an attack, the

proposed FCDA of Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950 would need strong leadership and

extensive power to coordinate the agencies of the Federal Government in order to reach out to

local municipalities across America. The civil defense efforts of World War II proved to be a

bountiful resource on which to draw administrative and practical reference during the

deliberation before the Senate with regard to the administrative provisions of the bill. Federal

Security Administrator Oscar R Ewing considered the organizational structure and duties of

local, state and federal agencies during World War II to be a sensible model for the

interdepartmental cooperation that a civil defense administration would need to capitalize on. For

example, Ewing makes a point of highlighting the existing connections between the Public

Health Service and the Department of Defense and the National Security Resources Board. He

also mentions that the proposed FCDA would need to know which civil defense functions are

already being handled so as to avoid redundancy; such as the Public Health Services’ duty to

inform Federal Security Agency regional offices about civil defense planning, who will then pass

this information on to the State departments of health.46 Crediting the prior experience of


27

providing day-to-day necessities to citizens during World War II, Ewing extols the individual

usefulness of the Public Health Service, The Food and Drug Administration, and the Social

Security Administration in a civil defense capacity. However, despite the strongly advocated

networking which the proposed FCDA was encouraged to make use of, the efforts which would

be undertaken by the FCDA to commence citizen national security responsibilities were highly

decentralized. Civil defense planning and guidance would be provided at the top most level of

government, but it would be the states and local governments which would be mobilizing

citizens.

Not only would this model of civil defense administration be based upon the successful

home front mobilization of World War II, but, as Andrew Grossman points out on page 36 of

Neither Dead Nor Red, it would be a visible display for the world to see how a country could

plan for an attack and motivate its people to do so. It would be democracy at work as the people

gathered behind a commonly accepted goal and took actions seemingly of their own accord to

reach that goal. And with the Soviet Union and the United States competing to see whose society

would form the template for future societies, this kind of community effort would reflect well on

the nation who managed to achieve it.

As it was proposed to the United States Senate on December 6, 1950, the Federal Civil

Defense Act of 1950 would create a separate agency to expand upon the functions previously

held by the NSRB and the OCDP; that is, all responsibilities necessary to defend the U.S., its

provinces and its allies from sabotage, subversive acts, and direct attacks.47 While

acknowledging that the element of civilian preparedness was absolutely necessary to the

American international image, it had also become clear to representatives at the 1950 hearings

for the Civil Defense Act that a fully effective civil defense plan required as much information as


28

possible regarding enemy activities, not to mention access to current scientific advances. To

accommodate these needs the FCDA would require access to data and contacts within various

agencies in order to gather relevant material for civil defense application. Through civil defense

training, education, research, and outreach programs to supply a nation in peril with the tools

necessary to pick themselves up and carry on, it was the hope of the hearing representatives that

the directives of the Civil Defense Act of 1950 would nullify some of the fear that had

supposedly gripped the nation. This enormous effort would be difficult to coordinate and execute

however. It would require strong leadership and decisive action in order to reach out to local

municipalities across America. A national civil defense mobilization program designed to

educate and incorporate a population as large as that of the United States would require that the

head agency, the FCDA, be given power which had not been held by any preceding agencies

charged with civil defense responsibilities.

Given the rising apprehension of the public’s ability to react efficiently in a nuclear crisis

situation, compounded with the escalation of the Korean War during 1950 and into 1951, the

power of action granted to the Administrator of the FCDA was staggering. Heading the FCDA

was an individual known as the Administrator, an individual appointed by the President pending

Senate approval. Chosen personally by the President, the Administrator’s position required him

to oversee all functions of the FCDA, or simply “Administration” in the language of the bill,

including the organization of collaborative civil defense measures with “neighboring countries”

as well as the coordination of federal defense measure between different departments, and

between the aforementioned departments and the civilian population.48 In times of crisis Section

303(c) of Public Law 920 authorized the Administrator to coordinate relief activities of any

department or agency within the Federal Government. Sections (b), (d), and (e) allowed the


29

Administrator to move funds to the acquisition of land, equipment, transportation and people

independently of any federal power except for that of the President.

Murky language such as that outlining the Administrator’s authority to direct his staff to

work with “similar political subdivisions” located in neighboring countries would seem to

suggest the funding and cooperation of American sympathizers regardless of that country’s

political standpoint. The suggested subversion by which the Administration could act was made

all the more evident as the bill goes on to define “neighboring countries” as Canada, Cuba,

Mexico and, “the European possessions in the Western Hemisphere and their political

subdivisions”.49 This would be revised in Public Law 920 to merely include Mexico and Canada

according to Section 3(g), although it was permissible to employ personnel from the United

Kingdom provided in Section 401(b) that their position as temporary or part time advisors did

not exceed a combined total of 25 people of Canadian and United Kingdom citizenship.

For the most part, however, the FCDA did not take foreign involvement in the civil

defense program beyond the scope of cooperative research on shelter designs and the sharing of

program infrastructure. For example, during the July 1951 hearing for S. 1260, a bill which

presented plans for the construction of a permanent federal civil defense technical school, the

case of Great Britain’s permanent civil defense “staff college” was used as a successful example

of a government organized institution designed to furnish potential civil defense trainers with the

skills and knowledge they would need to teach the public. In the case of a “staff college” in the

United States, it would not only supply the nation with civil defense trainers for all levels of

government (federal, state and local), but would also serve as a vehicle to strengthen

international relations by educating visiting students from such places as Australia and Canada.50

49 United States. Cong. Senate. Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950. 6.50 United States. Cong. Senate. Hearing before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services. Civil Defense Training School and Other Amendments to the Civil Defense Act of 1950. 82nd Cong., 1st sess. Washington: GPO,

30

In terms of research for civil defense purposes, the section titled Part 1 – Atomic Shelter Tests

within the 1958 hearings before the subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations

denoted FCDA sponsorship of five French and nine West German shelter tests (paid for by the

respective governments) in order to, “obtain design criteria and make design improvements”.51

The participation of 31 observers from 10 different countries was also mentioned in Part 1 –

Atomic Shelter Tests regarding the undertaking of Operation Plumbbob in 1957.

As outlined in the bill, decisions made by the Administrator could not be overturned if

they were considered in good faith within the outlined requirements of the Act. Even the seizure

of land without payment no longer became subject to any previous legislature, more specifically

the Act of June 30, 1932 or any of its subsequent amendments according to Section 303(a). If it

was deemed a necessary step by the Administrator then it was legal. The reach of the

Administrator was immense in accordance with the numerous functions he and his staff were

required to perform. While at peace, Section 201(e) of the law stated that the Administration

staff was to be predominantly concerned with the well being of American citizens via training

programs, civil defense schools, public awareness campaigns to better educate people at to the

nature of atomic attacks, and the equipping of civilians with survival materials such as medicine

and “technical information of processes”. Assuming, naturally, that such release of information

did not violate any confidentiality clauses and that there would be a pending investigation by the

FBI into the information request.

In times of attack nearly all due process could be overturned save for any Presidential

decrees or orders. In this legal stature alone there were no other proposed forms of restraint put

on the Administration. The bill even supplies in section 7(a) of S. 4219 that other federal

1951. 4.51 United States. Cong. House. Civil Defense: Part 1 – Atomic Shelter Tests, Part 2 – Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1958. 142.

31

departments would be obligated to equip the FCDA with any materials or facilities requested.

Quite simply the FCDA was to be the last line of homeland defense while the Defense

Department coordinated the most appropriate counter defenses for any potential attack. In a dual

role the FCDA would serve both the public and the Defense Department. There were, however,

definitive lines which certain agencies insisted be drawn between the functions necessary for

civil defense and those which were related to a more military nature.

The investigation of suspected subversion, espionage or act of sabotage was the express

jurisdiction of the FBI to pursue any lines of inquiry. Fearful of the wording within Section 2 of

the original bill presented to the Armed Services’ Subcommittee on Civil Defense in December

1950, Allen Crozier of the Department of Justice wished it to be made clear that the rights of the

Administrator and Administration staff were not being extended to, “broad investigative

jurisdiction over these offenses to the myriad people – federal, state and local – who may be

engaged in the overall civil-defense program”.52 Possible security transgressions were best left to

those with the proper connections and training. It was also implied by Crozier as well as the

representative of the Immigration and Naturalization Service that the responsibility of the FCDA

should concern itself with educating and preparing the civilian population rather than policing it.

The latter, General Counsel L. Paul Winings, had similar concerns with the wording of the bill.

However, unlike Crozier, his apprehension of the authority seemingly granted to the

Administrator was not merely a matter of involvement in another department’s affairs, but an

overstepping of federal law. Section 5(b) of the bill stated that the Administrator, in forming a

compact with, “any state or province of a neighboring country for mutual aid into or out of the

United States”, could restrict the entry or exit of anyone traveling in the United States.53 Wining


32

brought up the point that the International Security Act, or Public Law 831, held the Attorney

General and the Immigration and Naturalization Service accountable for preventing the entry of,

“aliens seeking to enter the United States.. to engage in activities which would be prejudicial to the public interest or would endanger the welfare or safety of the United States,.. members of the Communist Party, Communist association, or other totalitarian parties or subsidiaries or such parties in this country or abroad, aliens who there is reason to believe seek to enter the United States to engage in activities which would be prohibited by laws of the United States relating to espionage and sabotage, or in other activities subversive to the national security”.

However, in creating a compact the Administrator could unknowingly allow such individuals to

enter the country under the guise of offering aid.54 Again, the reasoning of resources and inside

knowledge were used by the Immigration and Naturalization Service to support its unique

qualifications to handle any such persons. Civil defense was again relegated to the role of

instructor rather than active member of investigative security.

The civil defense responsibilities of the Federal Government as they were outlined in the

Civil Defense Act were a continuous point of contention throughout the existence of the FCDA,

particularly between the military establishment and the FCDA. With the close connection made

between civil defense and military strength in the United States’ policy of deterrence it is

understandable that, from the very conception of the post World War II civil defense program,

there would a fine line between military responsibilities and priorities, and likewise those of the

NSRB, OCDP, FCDA and subsequent successors. In his statement to the Senate, Federal

Security Administrator Ewing denounced the expenditure of military resources on functions

which were the responsibility of civilians, yet even he did not delineate a clear distinction

between civil defense and military purpose in terms of national security. His empowered speech,

“Total war knows no rear areas, and every civilian should feel as much a part of the fighting

machine as are men and women in uniform” demonstrates the apparent ambiguous distinction


33

between civilian contributions to security and those made by official members of the armed

service. In many ways the relationship between the two is centered around the idea of “equal but

different”. Unfortunately this does not lend itself well to any form of administrative distinction

between one group’s functions versus another’s.

The FCDA considered its service to national security not merely additive to the measures

undertaken by the military establishment, but of equal importance and necessity. Statements

given at the 1950 hearings for the enactment of the Civil Defense Act described civil defense and

the responsibilities of the proposed FCDA as military parallels on the civilian front, and

considering the power invested in the Administrator during an attack scenario it was considered

paramount by the FCDA staff that their Administration should be perceived as worthy of equal

funding and publicity as the Defense Department and all agencies within. In order to make their

case before the Senate and Congress the FCDA’s representatives drew parallels to the benefits of

the civil defense program and how they directly aided not only the nation, but more specifically

the operability of the military presence throughout the nation. Within the 1951 hearing to discuss

the exemption of Alaska from requirements pertaining to funding and the administering of oaths

as outlined within the Civil Defense Act, the argument given in favor of this change centered

around the benefits which could be afforded to the military presence. If civil defense measures

were not implemented which could accommodate the isolation of many of Alaska’s

municipalities, then the civilians would be inclined to move. As the military outposts within

Alaska relied upon the local population for laborers in the construction and maintenance on the

facilities, it would be in the best interest of the people and the military presence in Alaska for

there to be funding exceptions made on behalf of the State. Building upon this, Governor of

Alaska Ernest Gruening drew upon the common consideration of Alaska as being “on the front

34

line” and called upon the likelihood of loss of both lives and territory if the bill were not

modified to accommodate the state’s situation.55 A similar argument for the reliance of the

military on civil defense was presented in September 1951 at the Senate hearing Civil Defense

Program, whereupon the FCDA Administrator Millard Caldwell stated that the stability created

through civil defense efforts provides the Defense Department with a labor force that, in the

event of an attack, would be able to promptly regroup and continue manufacturing and producing

any and all essential supplies.56

During the hearings later that year in July titled Civil Defense Training School and Other

Amendments to the Civil Defense Act of 1950 it was the position of the current FCDA Deputy

Administrator, J. J. Wadsworth, that the importance of civil defense was irreversibly linked with

the need for well trained civil defense officials. Deputy Administrator Wadsworth goes on to

state that it is not merely a matter of equal contribution, but part of the nature of the threat that

the United States was sharing. As the threat was one that could affect all levels of society it had

to be dealt with using equal fervor and passion from both civilian and military agencies. Page 20

of the transcript for this hearing expresses Wadsworth’s conviction quite clearly, “The enemy of

the future is not only the enemy of the armies in the field, but also the enemy of the civilian

population”. Drawing this link between the perceived shared purpose of the military with that of

the civil defense program, Wadsworth thereby placed the civil defense program on an equal

standing with the nation’s military deterrence efforts. It would prove to be a position that the

FCDA would need to defend throughout the agency’s existence.

55 United States. Cong. House. Hearings before the United States House Committee on Armed Services. Subcommittee Hearings on S. 1244, To Amend the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950, Relating to the Territory of Alaska. 82nd Cong., 1st sess. Washington: GPO, 1951. 11.56 United States. Cong. House. Hearings before the Civil Defense Task Force of the Preparedness Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services. Civil Defense Program. 82nd Cong., 1st sess. Washington: GPO, 1951. 5.

35

As 1951 drew to a close the legitimacy of the FCDA and the continued enactment of the

Civil Defense Act came into question. The belief originally present during the hearings for the

enactment of the Civil Defense Act back in December of 1950 was again raised; that being that a

civil defense program run through a federal agency was not a realistic option and could not

possibly function over such a large region and with so large a population. It had also come to the

attention of the federal agencies that the relationship of civil defense with the defense department

was not clearly delineated as was evident by the stated position of the FCDA in prior Senate

hearings and in the actions of the agency. Indeed, the case was made by the FCDA that the

Department of Defense, as well Congress, were partially responsible for the unsatisfactory public

reaction to the civil defense program.57 Falling back on the irrefutable need of the nation for a

powerful military, the FCDA fought for its existence by bringing up what they argued was an

equal partnership of the civil defense program and the military. On page 2 of the September 1951

hearing to discern the future of both the bill and its agency, simply titled Civil Defense Program,

the FCDA is described as a, “civilian counterpart with the Military Establishment”. An argument

was even presented that Congress and the Defense Department were in violation of the law as

described in the Civil Defense Act via their seeming unwillingness to provide critical support for

the civil defense effort.58 That support being adequate funding for the FCDA’s operations,

funding for local shelter construction, the stockpiling of medical supplies and equipment, and an

outspoken acknowledgement of the need for the civil defense program and the operations

conducted by the FCDA.

Legally it was within the rights of the Administrator and his staff to ask these concessions

of the Defense Department as per Sections 201(a), 201(b), and 401(c) of the official version of

57 United States. Cong. House. Civil Defense Program. 4.58 United States. Cong. House. Civil Defense Program. 4.

36

Civil Defense Act, aka Public Law 920. Nonetheless, in asking for contributions of supplies and

other materials for civil defense purposes, as was demonstrated in the hearings Civil Defense

Program (1951) and To Amend Further The Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of

1949, As Amended (To Authorize the Disposal of Surplus Property for Civil Defense Purposes)

(1955), the FCDA further blurred the line between the role of the Administration and the

Department of Defense. Granted in the short term this would enable the Administration to

accomplish their goal of civilian self-preparedness, but it would eventually work against them as

it became increasingly obvious that the FCDA and the Defense Department were performing

many closely related functions and as such were redundant.

In the 1956 hearing Civil Defense for National Survival two proposals were presented.

One suggested that the FCDA be integrated into the Department of Defense and the other argued

that the FCDA be made into a cabinet department of the government. In the view of the Military

Operations Subcommittee this was compliant with their belief that the Civil Defense Act had

become obsolete given advent of the successful detonation of a hydrogen bomb by the Soviet

Union. In such a situation it was the consensus in the subcommittee that the principle protection

of civilians was what subcommittee chairman Chet Holifield personally described as “our

obligation”.59 Echoing what Robert Dallek describes as the conservative viewpoint that, “in order

to preserve personal liberties, Americans would all have to stand together against communism”60,

the increased militarization and conformity characteristic of Eisenhower’s presidency brought

the functions of the FCDA and the Civil Defense Act even further into the military field.

Essentially proposing an integrated program, the functions of the FCDA as the Civil Defense Act

59 United States. Cong. House. Part 1 Hearings before the United States House Committee on Government Operations, Subcommittee on Military Operations. Civil Defense for National Survival. 84th Cong., 2nd sess. Washington: GPO, 1956. 68.60 Robert Dalek. The American Style of Foreign Policy: Cultural Politics and Foreign Affairs. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1983. 190.

37

had described them would be altered so that rather than have civil defense responsibilities

primarily be comprised of relief efforts and the organization of protective measures such as

shelters, evacuation plans and survival techniques, the civilian mobilization effort would be one

of “nonmilitary defense”.

Within “nonmilitary defense” would be a more disciplined undertaking of alert behavior

such as the operation of early warning systems and the increased production of goods for

military consumption. Dr. Lloyd V. Berkner succinctly described the purpose of “nonmilitary

defense” as both a coordination of civilian and military units as well as a true form of security for

American power, thus showing a drastic move away from the need of civil defense as a

containment of public emotions to one of protecting the productivity of society and industry.

“The job of nonmilitary defense is to increase the number of bombs that an enemy must deliver

to damage us mortally, so that no enemy can imagine that any mass or surprise attack within his

capability can put us out of the running”.61

As of 1958, the realization of these proposals came to fruition with the Reorganization

Plan No. 1 of 1958. Serving two agencies at once, the Director would be in charge of both the

National Security Council and the ODCM. Most importantly, the Reorganization Plan

considered the program priorities of the ODCM to be first and foremost advising the President

on how to, “clarify and expand the roles of the federal departments and agencies in carrying out

nonmilitary defense preparedness functions”.62 Secondary was the actual coordination and

direction of said functions within their assigned departments or agencies. Unlike the

independence given to the Administrator of the FCDA in his coordination of civil defense

measures within other departments, it would be the position of the Director of the ODCM to

61 United States. Cong. House. Civil Defense for National Survival. 97.62 United States. Cong. House. Civil Defense: Part 1 – Atomic Shelter Tests, Part 2 – Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1958. 322.

38

advise the president on appropriate functions to be carried out by other agencies. The greater

involvement of the President was not only for supervisory purposes, but necessary to consolidate

the movements of all national defense activities within the executive branch. By 1958 the Civil

Defense Act was all but dismantled. What had originally started as a department that would

coordinate and assist State and local community initiatives had become a militarized

coordination of agencies acting for the civilians’ own good.

How Civil Defense Imagines America

Many historians maintain that the necessity of civil defense was tied to a steady

succession of propaganda campaigns propagated throughout the Cold War by Americans for

Americans in order to facilitate the creation of a common, unifying enemy who employed

despicable underhanded tactics including the spread of panic, the use of nuclear attack and

espionage, and the deconstruction at all levels and in all aspects of society. Guy Oakes wrote in

The Imaginary War: Civil Defense and American Cold War Culture that civil defense provided a

way to enforce the resolve of Americans against the Soviet Union during the early years of the

Cold War, as well as provide a means to fight back since their mere education about the risks

involved in a war with this nation was not enough. “Their hearts had to be moved as well. In

order to equip American people for this struggle, it was imperative to build up their courage and

steadfastness. Only then would they be prepared to assume the risks entailed by the strategy of

deterrence.”63 Andrew D. Grossman had a more succinct way of describing the formative civil

defense plans of the National Security Resources Board (NSRB), the short lived predecessor to

the Federal Civil Defense Administration (FCDA), by characterizing them as a “blueprint for

63 Oakes, Guy. The Imaginary War: Civil Defense and American Cold War Culture. 31

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social control”.64 In civil defense schools and community meetings, literature, movies, comic

books, and other material, the techniques taught were not meant simply as the survival of the

average citizen, they were his or her moral and national responsibility. Once learned and applied

it was then the citizen’s duty to see to the continued education of his community and the

adherence of all people to the program of his nation’s civil defense administration.

In his book on Cold War architecture and defense, David Monteyne outlines the civil

defense agenda as striving to address the short and long term consequences of an enemy attack

by proving that social, economic and political standards would remain unaffected following any

disaster be it natural or man-made. The means for doing this were, “to demonstrate that what

good citizens already did in everyday life was a model for the roles they should perform when

under attack”.65 The survival and response techniques which were researched and advocated

throughout the Cold War by the Federal Government’s civil defense offices offered the proactive

approach provided to the quintessential American; a way to contribute on the home front while

simultaneously serving ones own goals of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. This image of

the “good citizen” simultaneously gave a set of social roles which formed the basis for the ideal

American.

At its heart Cold War civil defense was meant to be integrated as a family affair. This

“family” did not necessarily include only the immediate members of the nuclear family, but

rather the entirety of a community be it a town, city, or organization such as a school or hospital.

Between 1950 and 1955 the language used with regard to the FCDA consistently referred to the

public as “local communities” or “State government”, thus distinguishing the divide between the

Federal Government and most specifically the Department of Defense, from the rest of the

64 Grossman, Andrew D. Neither Dead Nor Red: Civilian Defense and American Political Development During the Early Cold War. 37.65 Monteyne, David. Fallout Shelter: Designing For Civil Defense in the Cold War. XII.

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nation’s population. It is largely after 1955 that the language begins to change from

“community” to individuals whose efforts can be coordinated or integrated into nonmilitary

responsibilities.

If civil defense materials are to be taken at face value, the common American town is one

in which everyone will come to the aid of their neighbors. Having heard and taken to heart the

necessity of reliance on group efforts to stave off disasters, it would be the immediate response

of all patriotic citizens to efficiently prepare and respond in the event of a threat to the group.

One film produced in 1951 by Encyclopedia Britannica Films Inc. entitled Atomic Alert

(Elementary Version) urged civilians to seek shelter with strangers if they could provide the

nearest cover since, “Everyone is in on this. Strangers will understand”.66 During this time when

civil defense was still a community undertaking, the constant portrayals of families

simultaneously involving themselves in drills, rescue exercises and the construction and

occupation of shelters speaks for the desire of civil defense to be brought into the private

landscape of the home. Although the immediate and far reaching benefits of civil defense are

described as a community effort within Atomic Alert, the film does not draw a line between the

nuclear family and the community they live in. Before branching into the aspects of

neighborhood cooperation and contribution the film clearly distinguishes the family as a group

within a group. The following lines illustrate this,

We have the national defenses to help intercept an enemy, and we all form a team to help each other through emergencies. You are on that team. So is your family – each member of it. And in your community every doctor, fireman, every policeman and nurse, every lineman and operator, every civil defense worker – in fact, every community employee is ready to help you if you need him.67

66 Encyclopedia Britannica Films, Atomic Alert (Elementary Version) (1951), MPEG2 video, 10:13. http://archive.org/details/AtomicAl1951.67 Encyclopedia Britannica Films, Atomic Alert (Elementary Version) (1951), MPEG2 video, 10:13. http://archive.org/details/AtomicAl1951.

41

Likewise, the starring family unit of the National Archives and Records Administration’s 1950

dramatization Atomic Attack keep mostly to themselves, but when asked to are willing to help

out their neighbors by providing shelter, offering consolation for those in grief, keeping the

peace, and in one instance literally bringing a stranger into their family circle.

It was common for FCDA civil defense publications to frame the usefulness of disaster

response as knowledge that was applicable to common mishaps such as fires and floods. As such

the functions and procedures of self-preparedness were often contextualized as common sense,

and merely a rehearsal of information that should already be known. Both the educational comic

strip and film “Bert the Turtle Says Duck and Cover”, produced in 1951 by the FCDA, begin to

address the proper reaction to atomic attack by building upon the everyday safety routines which

are taught to people as common sense. “You have learned to take care of yourself in many ways

– to cross the street safely. And you know what to do in case of fire. But the atomic bomb is a

new danger.”68 Similarly, “Mr. Civil Defense Tells About Natural Disasters!” (1956) and

“Operation Survival!” (1957), both published by the FCDA and the Graphic Information Service,

began with a discussion about the safety tips civilians will have already learned, extending the

new safety precautions civil defense provided in order to face the “new danger”. According to

these civil defense publications, the sheer magnitude of disaster response functions required the

involvement of the entire neighborhood. Films like Atomic Alert depicted a group of young

adults learning about the purpose and use of a Geiger counter, which was then followed up with

a scene of a lineup of civilians with different jobs accompanied by a narrative statement stressing

the importance of their involvement in “helping you if you need it”.

68 Richard L. Graham. Government Issue: Comics for the People, 1940s – 2000s. New York: Abrams Comicarts, 2011. 145.

42

As the film progressed and the camera pulled back as series of connections is made

between the town we are first introduced to and then neighboring communities, until the image

merged into a map of the United States accompanied by a description of the State and National

headquarters of civil defense. In choosing to begin at the individual level with young men and

women learning how to use common civil defense equipment, and then pulling backwards to the

community, then the local surrounding area and finally the nation, the film was connecting all of

the smaller functions of civil defense to the grand picture of the United States security policy.

The 1956 comic strip “Mr. Civil Defense Tells About Natural Disasters!”, published for the

FCDA by the Graphic Information Service, brought out the seriousness of a community’s

preparedness for flood, and by implication an atomic attack, by detailing the extensive damage

which can be brought down instantly upon people, even going so far as to assure that lives will

be lost. However, hope is offered in the form of “well trained civil defense workers” who, while

they may not be able to prevent any loss of life from occurring, can prepare civilians and direct

them, through a system of previously constructed communication networks in an emergency.

Despite most claims that the portrayal of civil defense as a community effort was a

propaganda attempt, this viewpoint is essentially too narrow. To believe that civil defense

materials propagated the image of unity in small-town America merely as a reaffirmation of

nationalist ideology robs members of the FCDA and the Federal Government of any other

motivation besides that of manipulation. Granted, the purpose of civil defense as it was defined

in NSC-68 and repeatedly by representatives at the 1950 hearings for the Civil Defense Act of

1950 was the mobilization of citizens to take up arms and knowledge for the defense of a

particular America – one founded on “freedom, democracy, and the defense of the free world” –

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but the incentive for reaching out to towns and municipalities was not merely to connect them

with a larger, imagined national narrative.

As purely an administrative technique, the purpose of targeting local towns and cities in

civil defense films, pamphlets and comic books among other publications, was necessary for the

FCDA to filter down its knowledge and standards for civil defense techniques. The public

mobilization that could be achieved through local organizations, voluntary organizations,

professional societies, churches, and civic associations was openly acknowledged. Social groups

could not only influence public opinion of the war effort on a local scale, but on a national scale

as well assuming they were convinced of the need for their members to apply methods and

techniques of civil defense, as well as their patriotic responsibility to do so. As part of his

statement during the hearings for the Civil Defense Act of 1950, Federal Security Administrator

Oscar R. Ewing made sure to voice his hope that section 7(c) of the bill would take this into

consideration as it could greatly influence their generosity in providing, “public or private lands,

protective and other work essential for the preservation of life and property, for clearing debris

and wreckage, and for making emergency repairs to, and temporary replacement of,

communications, hospitals, utilities, transportation facilities, or public facilities of States or their

political subdivisions damaged or destroyed by enemy attacks”.69 While neither the bill S. 4219

to authorize a federal civil defense program, nor the December 1, 1950 executive order from

President Truman establishing the FCDA in the Office for Emergency Management of the

Executive Office of the President pay heed to the chain through which civil defense shall be

disseminated amongst the general populace, testimony before United States Senate committee on

Armed Services addresses this repeatedly.


44

In numerous instances the tiers of communication are described as starting with the

Federal Government, or more accurately its civil defense department the FCDA, which

communicates with the State government, who then passes any necessary information on to the

local municipalities. Thus, a strong divide between civilians and the federal civil defense

authorities, the purpose of which is to distribute the process of planning and enacting civil

defense across all tiers of government, is created.

The Acting Director of the Civil Defense Office, accompanied by Federal Civil Defense

Administrator Millard F. Caldwell Jr., drew upon the prior experience during World War II of

the Civil Defense Office to advocate this communication hierarchy on the basis of encouraging

interstate civil defense and disaster relief alliances.70 Other representatives at the hearing for the

bill, including Surgeon General of the United States Public Health Service Dr. Leonard A

Scheele and Federal Security Administrator Oscar R. Ewing, considered it a civic responsibility

of all citizens to contribute to civil defense effort by organizing and administering various

functions that would directly affect their everyday communities, especially immediately after an

attack. To some the shirking of this civic responsibility was not only reprehensible, but

detrimental to the well being of one’s neighbors. The statement on page 61 from James J.

Wadsworth, Acting Director of the Civil Defense Office, best exemplifies this sentiment. While

emphasizing the need for all civilians to cooperate and to do their share of civil defense

preparation, Wadsworth simultaneously denounces community leaders who don’t consider civil

defense to be an immediate necessity, despite the early stages of planning civil defense in the

context of atomic warfare. As it is from them that communities look for direction, it must be the

community leaders who push their friends and neighbors to take up the charge for a prepared and

fortified town. Quite simply, “Local officials who pass off this grave responsibility [of civil


45

defense] or say that they cannot or will not move until every “i” is dotted, and every “t” crossed

by the Federal Government are losing sight of their responsibility to their own people”.71

Federal Security Administrator Ewing, sharing the fear that the nature of civil defense

would be misinterpreted as a military responsibility, hastened to point out that the issues of war

which were outside of civilian expertise were the priority of the military. Civil defense, however,

was in practice and in the parameters of the bill, a civilian undertaking, comprised of functions

meant to serve the interests of citizens. And although the methods of self-preparedness

comprising the directive of the proposed FCDA’s program were important for “preserving the

maximum civilian morale and support for the war effort”, it was all ultimately done to restore

“normal community life” after an attack.72 This, Ewing pointed out on page 97 of the hearing

transcript, was the very premise of the United States Civil Defense manual as it was written by

the National Security Resources Board and the Atomic Energy Commission, and so it should

remain.

When asked on the December 8th 1950 hearing by future FCDA Assistant Administrator

for Plans and Policy, Justice M. Chambers, whom, under the provisions of the bill, should be

responsible for training “first aid people” and additional nurses within the medical profession of

small communities, Dr. Scheele firmly stated that it was a local responsibility.73 However, he

hastened to clarify that the educational programs at local levels would not have to be built from

scratch. By networking through the other agencies of the Federal Government it was expected

that the FCDA would request the aid of the Atomic Energy Commission (who could provide

information on medical treatments for radiation exposure), the Public Health Service, and other

appropriate government agencies to help train teachers to lead State-to-State educational

71 United States. Cong. Senate. Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950. 61.72 United States. Cong. Senate. Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950. 97.73 United States. Cong. Senate. Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950. 102.

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programs. “[The Federal Government] can do the top training, because it has the resources and

the available information across the broad range of subjects involved. On top of that it is

qualified to provide the best framework for this, but the real job at the grass roots level is the

local responsibility”.74 However, it was not merely a combination of administrative and the

availability of resources which entrenched the active role of local communities in 1950 civil

defense policy.

Personal belief in the ability of local governments to appreciate and prepare for Soviet

threats to United States security empowered people such as Senator Kefauver, Federal Security

Administrator Oscar R. Ewing, and Mayor William Devin to speak on behalf of municipality and

other local community’s responsibilities in civil defense preparedness. Senator Kefauver,

speaking on behalf of the Armed Services Subcommittee, stated on the December 1, 1950

hearing for S. 4219 that the role of the Federal Government in civil defense preparation should

be one of coordination. Assistance in the forms of funding, materials and facilities could be

distributed where needed, but it would be through the actions of individuals, local communities

and State governments that the country would persevere through any attack on American

territory.75 Administrator Ewing had a somewhat more skeptical view of civilian willingness to

help one another after an attack, but still maintained that people would come to the aid of their

neighbors. Seeing disaster response as more of a mutual necessity, Administrator Ewing stated

that, “Though they may not want to they will be required to furnish full support to their stricken

neighbors and perhaps receive evacuees and causalities and care for them”.76 Mayor of Seattle,

WA, Williams Devin, believed that in the event of an attack the municipal officials and

municipality had the potential, and responsibility, to prepare to deal with the immediate

74 United States. Cong. Senate. Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950. 102.75 United States. Cong. Senate. Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950. 8.76 United States. Cong. Senate. Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950. 94.

47

aftermath.77 He did, however, believe that areas with a high risk of being targeted for an attack

should be exempt from the unilateral hierarchy of civil defense communication and dealt with on

the same level as the State government i.e. direct contact with FCDA officials.

The reality of local governments and community individuals shouldering the burdens of

self-preparedness was rather far removed from the idealized conception. While a nice sentiment,

the portrayal of Americans taking those in need into the very center of their familial circle

ignored the pressing debate of fallout shelter morality whereby people questioned whether they

should accept an outsider into their home and shelter given the limited supplies and space

available. Jesuit priest and former Georgetown University professor of ethics L. C. McHugh

wrote in the Catholic magazine America that the only way to avoid having to turn away

neighbors, or worse shoot them, should they attempt to force entrance to your family’s shelter

was to help them build one of their own.78 The willingness of rural communities to shelter, feed

and clothe refugees fleeing from bombed cities was likewise a point of contention. Researchers

contracted by the FCDA found that not only were outlying communities against the idea, they

were in some instances hostile such as one Midwestern resident who told his interviewer that his

community would fire upon those attempting to enter their town in order to, “Keep those city

folk from using up our children’s food and water”.79 It was apparent that for the FCDA, issues in

attempting to reach and influence municipalities and State governments were going to be many

and frequent after the official start of the department.

Following the beginning of official operations for the FCDA in January of 1951, the

municipalities of Alaska, and by extension the State, found that they had a crippling inability to

generate the necessary funds for fallout shelter construction, the purchase of equipment and

77 United States. Cong. Senate. Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950. 15.78 Hine, Thomas. Populux. Woodstock, NY: The Overlook Press, 2007. 136.79 Monteyne, David. Fallout Shelters: Designing for Defense in the Cold War. 14.

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means of transportation, as well as any funding for the education of local officials and volunteer

civil defense workers. In answer to this problem it was proposed in the April 1951 hearings titled

Subcommittee Hearings on S. 1244, To Amend the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950, Relating to

the Territory of Alaska that the state in question should not be held to specific restriction

regarding the acceptance of federal funding for civil defense purposes. Specifically, it was

suggested that the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950, now known as Public Law 920, be revised

in order for the second sentence of subsection 201(i) be followed by the following lines,

“Provided further, that the limitations upon the making of federal contributions contained in the

second, third, and fourth provisos of this sentence shall not apply to the Territory of Alaska”.80 In

adopting this change within the Civil Defense Act the State would be free from having to match

any federal funds received for the purpose of purchasing civil defense “organizational

equipment”, land, buildings or shelters, nor would it be held to the same method of funding

distribution as other States in order to receive contributions for shelters and “other protective

facilities”. Given the State’s low population density of only 127,000 people spread out over a

large area, the local governments were only able to raise a combined $400,000 despite asking a

for a greater amount of money per citizens than observed in any other state. In order to facilitate

a shelter program in Alaska exceptions to Public Law 920 would need to be made. Thinking of

what the absence of the FCDA’s program in Alaska could signify, the delegate for Alaska, E. L.

Bartlet, formulated his argument for Alaska’s need of funding exception around several points

which, if the Senate failed to accommodate, would mean the hypothetical loss of civilian support

for civil defense in Alaska. Unlike other areas in the United States, it was pointed out by Bartlet

that the towns and cities of Alaska were not situated close to one another and as such the theory

80 United States. Cong. House. Subcommittee Hearings on S. 1244, To Amend the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950, Relating to the Territory of Alaska. 1.

49

of nearby communities taking in refugees would not be entirely practical.81 As mentioned on

page 24 of this paper, a loss of civilians due to their migration away from the dangers of the

“front line” would mean a loss of labor for the military outposts stationed at key cities

throughout Alaska. However, this could be avoided if expansive underground shelters were

funded and constructed in order to give the people a sense of security, but this could only be

done with additive funding and the changes put forth by the FCDA to exempt Alaska from

having to match contribution from the federal government.

In the case of Alaska in 1951 it was apparently not due to a lack of community interest

that resulted in the problematic adoption of advised civil defense preparations. Indeed, it is quite

clear from testimony from E. L. Bartlet, Hurbert R. Gallagher (Director of Field Administration

within the FCDA) and Colonel Joseph D. Alexander (the acting Adjutant General for Alaska and

Director of Civil Defense) that citizens were very much aware of their danger given their close

proximity to Russia, their vulnerable dispersal across the State, and their mutual association with

numerous military facilities. It was in their interest to adopt civil defense measures in order to

protect their livelihoods and their lives, and they were willing to do so provided they received

financial help. In this early stage of the FCDA it was the mere possibility of the citizens of

Alaska growing apathetic and discouraged that spurred Congress to take action before any true

discontent over the FCDA’s civil defense program could take root. Indeed, so great was the

desire to prevent disinterest in the civil defense program that compromises were made in order to

make it even slightly easier for civilians to become involved. At the same January 1951 hearing,

the possibility of modifying the means of taking the mandatory oath of allegiance required in

order to become a member of staff for a state or local civil defense organization was seriously

81 United States. Cong. House. Subcommittee Hearings on S. 1244, To Amend the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950, Relating to the Territory of Alaska. 5.

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considered. In an effort to make enrollment in local civil defense organizations more convenient,

since it was pointed out that having to visit a public notary or similar person authorized to

administer oaths of allegiance to the United States Constitution could be a “burden”, it would be

a prudent measure to simplify the process by editing the applicable section, 403(b), of the Civil

Defense Act. Although not in favor of Alaska being granted special consideration regarding

section 201(i) of the Civil Defense Act, the prepared statement of Secretary of the Army, Frank

Pace Jr., speaking on behalf of the Department of the Army stated that the modification of

section 403(b) was an applicable and reasonable request. FCDA General Counselor Samuel H.

Sabin, although disagreeing with the Department of the Army in respect to Alaska’s need for

special funding consideration, held similar feelings about making changes to section 403(b).

Although clarification was asked for on the part of Bartlet’s understanding of how the oath

would be administered should the motion to change section 403(b) be approved, no statements of

direct objection were raised.

As the FCDA’s program progressed it became apparent that hypothetical scenarios were

not sufficient for envisioning all possible deterrents for public participation in the FCDA’s

program. A few months after the April hearing to address the funding issues of Alaska, the July

1951 hearing Civil Defense Training School and other Amendments to the Civil Defense Act of

1950 presented not only new civilian apprehensions regarding civil defense, but compelling

evidence of public acceptance and support for the educational aspects of the FCDA’s program.

Specifically, Deputy Director of the FCDA, J. J. Wadsworth, pointed out that public land and

buildings are being volunteered to act as potential locations for the construction of training

centers for national, state, and local level officials of civil defense.82 However, Wadsworth

82 United States. Cong. House. Civil Defense Training School and Other Amendments to the Civil Defense Act of 1950. 6.

51

mentioned that it had been observed by the Eastern Conference of State Civil Defense Directors

in February 1951 that the fear of injury in service of civil defense functions was discouraging

people from volunteering for the nation’s Civil Defense Corps. To address this issue, Wadsworth

advised that incentives such as insurance protection would provide the proper kind of personal

protection needed to increase volunteer numbers. Still, despite ongoing attempts to placate the

public fear through education and incentives, the issue of civilian willingness to participate in

civil defense on the grounds of injury continued to resurface.

The situation grew worse following the detonation of the H-bomb, which not only

brought a new level of weapon destruction into the public imagination, but seemingly negated

any civilian preparations taken up to this point to defend themselves in an attack. Protest

movements against nuclear armament challenged the further advance of civil defense techniques

and despite threats of jail time and fines there continued to be scattered resistance. Repeating the

opinion of his predecessors FCDA Director Val Peterson likewise made it clear that, “Panic – not

the A bomb – may be the easiest way to win a battle, the cheapest way to win a war”.83 The

problem of societal breakdown through panic was again a serious consideration. The increased

militarization rhetoric of civil defense added to public discontent. One of pacifist Dorothy Day’s

pamphlet’s, distributed on the day Operation Alert (1954) was scheduled, reads, “We will not

obey this order to pretend, to evacuate, to hide… We know this drill to be a military act in a cold

war to instill fear, to prepare the collective mind for war”.84 In his statement to the Senate during

the 1956 hearing Civil Defense for National Survival Congressman Chet Holifield announced on

page 1 that the national opinion on civil defense had become one that envisioned civilian

83 Garrison, Dee. “Our Skirts Gave Them Courage: The Civil Defense Protest Movement in New York City, 1955-1961”. Not June Cleaver: Women and Gender in Postwar America, 1945 – 1960. Ed. Joanne Meyerowitz. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1994. 205.84 Garrison, Dee. “Our Skirts Gave Them Courage: The Civil Defense Protest Movement in New York City, 1955-1961”. Not June Cleaver: Women and Gender in Postwar America, 1945 – 1960. 207.

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preparedness as pointless. He went on to say that his own opinion on the possibility to defend

against modern weapons was suspect, but if there were techniques which would benefit the

public both morally and physically they should be known throughout the country and applied.

Public disconnect from the higher levels of civil defense leadership proved to be an

obstacle of public participation in civil defense from early on in the FCDA’s operation. Even

prior to the official approval of the Civil Defense Act and the beginning of FCDA operations,

statements given during the hearing on the bill likewise expressed concerns for the top – down

approach by which the Federal Government would handle civil defense. Richard Graves, the

Executive Director of the League of California Cities, raised the issue of local governments

receiving second hand information and contacts to the FCDA from their State Government.85 By

his reasoning this practice would result in the timely dissemination of information which would

ultimately mean that the lower levels of government would constantly be out of touch with new

data, research and civil defense policy updates. In actuality the gap between local communities

and the leadership of the civil defense program brought on a more immediate public concern for

the “actual” importance and necessity of civilian mobilization. It was less than a year after Civil

Defense Training School and other Amendments to the Civil Defense Act of 1950 when the

hearing titled Civil Defense Program was held to discuss whether or not a national civil defense

program was justifiable and by extension if the Public Law 920 should be repealed. To bolster

his argument regarding the lack of public pronouncements from Congress and the Department of

Defense in support of civil defense contributing to poor public acceptance of civil defense

responsibilities, FCDA Administrator Caldwell noted that the public felt that there was no

universal consent in the government regarding their need to act. Despite the statement of Deputy

Secretary of Defense Robert Lovett, speaking on behalf of the Department of Defense, in which


53

he noted the ways in which the Department was bringing civilians into activities which bridged

the gap between military and civil defense, such as the Civil Air Patrol and the operation of the

air raid warning system, Caldwell remained unconvinced of their effort. Citing an article from

the Memphis Commercial Appeal which wrote, “The people are told of their danger by second-

string officials and not by their highest and more responsible defense leadership… If Russia is as

well armed as is now claimed, the matter is one of such gravity as to call for a solemn

pronouncement of civil defense needs for preparatory action reaching from the highest levels of

government to those of even smaller cities and communities”, Caldwell argued that if the

government wanted civil defense to be effective it must demonstrate this effectiveness within

itself first and commit to the cause of the civil defense program.86 Otherwise, such views would

continue to dissolve the tenuous hold civil defense had on the American public.

Greatly shaken by the reported lack of public interest, the representatives at the

September 1951 hearing Civil Defense Program attempted to legitimize the continuation of the

program by explaining why there had not been a greater surge of public interest in civil defense.

It was the argument of Senator Estes Kefauver, Chairman of the Preparedness Task Force, that

the civil defense program was on par with the need for a strong military force but was not being

promoted to the same extent on the part of both Congress and the Department of Defense. As a

result of this contradiction, the public believed that there was a lack of leadership in the civil

defense program and no clear program objectives.87 The argument in favor of greater

congressional and federal support was used to great effect in the years leading up to the

Eisenhower’s 1958 Reorganization Plan. In the 1955 hearing To Amend Further The Federal

Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, As Amended (To Authorize the Disposal of

86 United States. Cong. House. Civil Defense Program. 12.87 United States. Cong. House. Civil Defense Program. 2.

54

Surplus Property for Civil Defense Purposes) Director of New York State Civil Defense,

Lieutenant General Clarence Huebner, was quoted as having been of the opinion that bills H. R.

4660 and H. R. 7227 should be approved since they would disprove any notion of the Federal

Government’s awareness for the needs of the people.88 Foreshadowing the 1958 hearings for the

Reorganization Plan the subject of direct communication between the higher levels of the

government and the State level government came into play as Civil Defense Director of Boston,

MA, Joseph Malone, made his statement in favor of the bills, thanking the Senate for giving him

an opportunity to speak. As the president of the United States Civil Defense Council, Malone

expounded that the organization had over 400 members, yet the standard procedure which allows

his agency to voice their concerns has handled through FCDA officials rather than through any

higher legislative body such as the Senate.89 Hinting at the desire to be heard by more powerful

leadership, Malone was inadvertently expressing the concern of many Americans – if civil

defense is of such importance why is it not more closely tied to more powerful bodies? With the

occurrence of Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1958 this question was answered. By investing in the

President the power to oversee, coordinate and delegate civil defense functions through the

ODCM, the need for centralized leadership was met for the purposes of, “providing unified

guidance and assistance to the State and local government”90, and improving relationships with

officials of State and local government91. From there it was the hope that the public would

88 United States. Cong. House. Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations. To Amend Further the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, As Amended (To Authorize the Disposal of Surplus Property for Civil Defense Purposes). 84th Cong., 1st sess. Washington: GPO, 1955. 21.89 United States. Cong. House. To Amend Further the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, As Amended (To Authorize the Disposal of Surplus Property for Civil Defense Purposes). 30.90 United States. Cong. House. Civil Defense: Part 1 – Atomic Shelter Tests, Part 2 – Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1958. 322.91 United States. Cong. House. Civil Defense: Part 1 – Atomic Shelter Tests, Part 2 – Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1958. 334.

55

recognize the strong leadership given to the civil defense program, and thus would reinvest in

mobilization efforts for national security.

The Civil Defense Education of America

Above all else education was considered the most important function of the civil defense

program, and it was on the success of this undertaking which would ultimately prove or discredit

the actions of the FCDA, as well as the effectiveness of the department’s infrastructure as

outlined within the Civil Defense Act. Regardless of the eventual overlap in operations resulting

in the merger of the FCDA and the Office of Defense Mobilization to form the OCDM, the

public acceptance and willingness to take action against an ever present threat would determine

whether there was a need for, or even an ability to continue, civil defense as a component of

American’s national deterrence policy.

From the hearings for the Civil Defense Act in 1950 through the creation of the OCDM

in 1958, the educational functions of the FCDA remained central components of the purpose.

The NSRB’s study of “the sociological problems of civil defense from the field of morale”,

submitted mere months prior to the beginning of FCDA operations, stressed the forthcoming

agency’s need to provide Americans with enough information that they would be able to

comprehend the danger but not be overwhelmed. It was the goal of any agency created to serve

the purpose of civil defense as outlined in all stages of the Civil Defense Act (including the

official Public Law 920 as well as the bill S. 4219) to prepare the civilian population for the

event of an attack. S. 4219 clearly stated in Section 2 that the FCDA would be responsible for

spreading methods for meetings enemy attacks developed via scientific research, with specific

mention in Section 4(e) that the proposed method for accomplishing this task is within the

56

authorization of the Administrator to, “conduct or arrange, by contract or otherwise, for training

programs for the instruction of civil defense officials and other persons in the organization,

operation, and techniques of civil defense; conduct or operate schools or classes,… and provide

instructors and training aids as deemed necessary.”92 Within Public Law 920 this authority is

written the same word-for-word, but with the added stipulation in Section 201(e) that there can

only ever exist one national civil defense college and three civil defense technical training

schools at a time. Section 201(e) clearly states that in times of peace the Administrator should

focus on training programs, public awareness campaigns to spread familiarity with the nature of

atomic attacks, and providing them with the materials and skills they would need to survive a

nuclear threat upon their lives. In comparison to S. 4219, Public Law 920 even goes one step

further by including as part of the very definition of “civil defense” within Section 3(b), the

necessity for the “establishment of appropriate organizations,… [and] the recruitment and

training of personnel”. Throughout its existence, the FCDA used its plans and accomplishments

in the area of public education regarding civilian preparedness to promote the value of the

Administration and the necessity of civil defense.

By July of 1951 the proposition for Congressional approval of civil defense schools came

before the Senate as the FCDA sought to relate its timelessness to that of the permanent nature of

the military establishment, the incorporation of new scientific data into its educational program,

and the public acceptance of the civil defense program despite lower than expected enrollment in

the United States Civil Defense Corps. In order to convey the scale of the FCDA’s educational

program and their desire to make use of their authority as allowed by Public Law 920, FCDA

Deputy Administrator Wadsworth sought to present the establishment of a permanent civil

defense college as a means to disseminate survival methods and techniques to not only civilians,


57

but to civil defense trainers, directors and even federal employees of other agencies. Quite

simply, the education of anyone remotely involved with civil defense activities could benefit

from such training facilities.

Dividing the two types of learning organizations by the students they would produce, the

FCDA sought to systematize their education agenda, thus presenting an effective and efficient

teaching agenda. The “staff college” would seek to teach those who would be leading civil

defense operations on a national level, as well as within State and local community governments.

Listed on page 3 of Civil Defense Training School and Other Amendments to the Civil Defense

Act of 1950, the groups who would be catered to by the college’s curriculum would be State

directors of civil defense, deputy State directors, mutual aid coordinators, mayors and city

managers, city engineers, police and fire chiefs, plant protection directors, religious and social

workers, liaison personnel with national social societies and associations, department store and

business building civil defense officers, as well as, “Others who carry significant administrative

and operational responsibilities in civil defense”.93 Training centers, on the other hand, were

meant to educate the local instructors and volunteer workers so that they would be capable of

going into their respective social groups and passing along their knowledge. Training centers

were to be the technical schools of the civil defense program, while the college would be the

center for teaching critical decision making and situational analysis simultaneously over large

areas and numerous communities.

In each case it was the hope of the FCDA that the students would take what knowledge

they had acquired and use it to organize civil defense efforts in their respective communities,

businesses, services or organizations. Given time it would hopefully come to pass that the natural

93 United States. Cong. House. Civil Defense Training School and Other Amendments to the Civil Defense Act of 1950. 3.

58

dissemination of information gained through research would prompt community minded

Americans to mobilize the nation through group mentality and participation in local government.

Thus, civil defense education would unify the country toward national security by catering to the

American image of patriotism and offering scientifically gained knowledge that could be applied

to the public and private life of all citizens. The execution of this goal would prove to be

problematic however.

Films, comics, pamphlets, radio announcements and other forms of popular media were

utilized to shape the public response to the possibility of an attack as well as to rehearse what

each member of society should do in an actual attack. As discussed in chapter 4 “How Civil

Defense Imagines America”, the message within these materials served to both enforce widely

held perceptions of American identity while building upon “common sense” and the desire to

live take preemptive actions against the anxiety of bomb threats and mass vulnerability.

However, the effectiveness and implementation of these publications is not well documented,

leading one to question the impact they had upon the population. If there was such a desire

within the public to be offered activities which would ease their bubbling panic and sense of

helplessness, the FCDA was clearly not offering them the right information or the means through

which they would learn about that information. After all, a book must be read, a radio

announcement or speech must be heard, and a film must be watched. If these senses were not

being saturated to the point that they were noticeably instigating public change, then there was

the possibility that the public was either not interested in what the FCDA had to offer or they

were not convinced in the message of protection within the civil defense agenda. In either

scenario, the FCDA had apparently not made the right decisions in enacting their public

outreach. Within the Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1958, the language on page 322 suggests that

59

the very design of the FCDA failed to properly lead the public to the conclusion that civil

defense was important, and that not all of the public civil defense responsibilities as envisioned

in Public Law 920 were realistic.

Within the transcripts of congressional hearings, evidence of conflicts regarding the

FCDA’s need of more funding, better equipment and stronger support pertaining to their mission

to shift American perception through reeducation surface frequently. The 1955 hearing To

Amend Further the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, as Amended

offers evidence on page 10 that the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare and the

FCDA did not have a smooth system balancing who would have supervisory roles with regard to

the distribution of surplus equipment for the purpose of educational programs. The FCDA’s

vocal opposition of congressional favoring for military expenditure over civil defense is evident

throughout 1951 in the Subcommittee Hearings on S. 1244, To Amend the Federal Civil Defense

Act of 1950, Relating to the Territory of Alaska, and in Civil Defense Training School and Other

Amendments to the Civil Defense Act of 1950, as well as the hearing Civil Defense Program. In

1955 the issue of military favoritism was again raised within To Amend Further the Federal

property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, as Amended (To Authorize the Disposal of

Surplus Property for Civil Defense Purposes) and in 1956 within the hearing titled Civil Defense

for National Survival.

In a similar vein, at the same time that the FCDA and the Department of Defense vied for

funding, they also raised the issue of outspoken support and the need of interdepartmental

contributions whether it was physical resources, information or services deemed necessary to the

civil defense agenda, or simply outspoken support. The latter was particularly sought after since

it was necessary to convince the public that civil defense was not merely the pursuit of one lone

60

federal agency, but was recognized as of paramount importance by the entirety of the

government. While the FCDA’s sense of alienation and abandonment was appeased to a great

degree following 1955, the greater involvement of the Department of Defense began to the

struggle of power over who would carry out the functions of the FCDA. Not merely interested in

offering public acknowledgement of the need for civil defense, representatives of the military

establishment at the hearings regarding the FCDA and Public Law 920 questioned the nature of

civil defense and whether it should be a military undertaking rather than a project by an

independent agency. As I have discussed on page 38, the replacement of the term “civil defense”

with “nonmilitary defense” in 1956 leant the belief in a more militarized approach to education

on national preparation for a nuclear attack. As Dr. Libby pointed out in the 1956 hearing, the

information and training program may exist within the FCDA, but it is his professional opinion

based on observation that there is little knowledge that has been so ingrained in people that they

will be able to carry out the FCDA recommended actions under the stressful and terrifying

experience of a nuclear attack.94 It is no coincidence that further down in the transcript on page

93 there is talk of “coordinating” civil defense efforts, by that the adoption of regimented

military-like training of civilians. At the same time the possibility of implementing martial law

also appears on page 96 as a way the public might be given the disciplined training they would

need in order to be properly prepared in survival techniques for the immense shock of an atomic

attack.

It was during this meeting that the idea of “nonmilitary defense” was also introduced, in

which education would still play a role, but the subject matter would be very different from that

offered by the FCDA. While the FCDA supplied the public with knowledge about the effects of

an atomic attack, their information was continually out of date and had no immediate purpose

94 United States. Cong. House. Civil Defense for National Survival. 47.

61

other than to serve as a justification for why civilians should prepare evacuation routes and build

shelters. Nonmilitary defense, on the other hand, would provide civilians with active roles which

they could perform on a daily basis. Examples given by Dr. Berkner included participating in

such jobs as working for the Civil Air Patrol or producing goods for military consumption.

Although the conclusion of the committee did not officially take a stance in favor or against

coordination of military and civil defense the ideas would remain, and eventually become

realized in Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1958. During the lifetime of the FCDA there would

never be a solution to address the need for internalizing nuclear attack response activities in any

other way besides the far removed and scattered city and town drills.

At the same time that the degree of military versus civilian involvement in national

defense in the latter half of the 1950s was coming to a head, the AEC remained highly active in

its role as researcher into the effects and counter measures against weapons of mass destruction.

Educational efforts of the FCDA also found their way into the AEC-FCDA test program. In

defense of the FCDA’s outreach efforts during the 7 years of its existence, FCDA Director of

Test Operations Edward Saunders claimed that all FCDA projects in conjunction with the AEC

had not only been undertaken with the intent of producing new data and results than previous

tests, as was the concern of the Senate with regard to overlapping civil defense functions

between agencies, but the tests had served as educational opportunities. According to Saunders

the tests served to offer practical defense experience for specialists, local officials, as well as

federal and state civil defense officials.95 There was even a “test information program” which the

FCDA established so that the AEC would be able to educate the public on the effects of nuclear

weapons.

95 United States. Cong. House. Civil Defense: Part 1 – Atomic Shelter Tests, Part 2 – Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1958. 100.

62

Here in lay the problem with the FCDA’s educational undertakings, and thereby all other

civil defense functions. Throughout its existence the FCDA conducted and sponsored many field

and laboratory tests in order to study the effects of nuclear blasts, but it lacked any form of

productive output for this information. Despite the many comics, films, manuals and pamphlets

that it produced, the speed of scientific developments outpaced the agency’s ability to acquire

information, reword or declassify it, and then disseminate any relevant defense methods

throughout the public. What information it had accumulated was so scattered that it was

incredibly difficult to discern any kind of relevant data by which to enlighten the public. Its

training centers and staff college were not heavily used as was evident from testimony given at

the hearings, and neither was there anything other than a scattering interest in making the major

investments necessary for shelter construction and equipment purchasing.

Despite the acknowledged necessity of civil defense by the Senate, Congress, President

Truman, President Eisenhower, and the many representatives present at the hearings regarding

the agency produced to enforce the mandates of Public Law 920, limitations in funding,

organizational structure and varying public interest were far to crippling for the FCDA to achieve

any significant form of public change. As William Finan, the Bureau of the Budget’s Assistant

Director for Management and Organization, put it in 1958, “The States and localities, which, in

the final analysis, must make a most important contribution to our preparedness effort,…

suffered from a lack of clear and uniform guidance from the Federal Government”.96 Overlap in

actions and responsibilities between the AEC, the Department of Defense, and various other

agencies, all for the purpose of teaching the public how to cope emotionally and physically in the

event of an atomic attack proved to be the downfall of the FCDA.

96 United States. Cong. House. Civil Defense: Part 1 – Atomic Shelter Tests, Part 2 – Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1958. 326.

63

As an early attempt at bringing public participation into the arena of national policy it

was an overly idealistic undertaking. The belief that, through education on threats and methods

of preparation, the general public would adapt and conform to their role as protectors of the

nation was not entirely unrealistic. The NSRB, the Office of Civil Defense Planning, and the

Civil Defense Board were all organization which had witnessed a great interest in civil defense

and nuclear deterrence, but the indefinite nature of the FCDA’s decentralized campaign to quell

public emotions and direct their attention to productive outlets of defense had lacked direction

from the beginning.

So it came to pass that the ODCM consolidated the FCDA and the Office of mobilization

in an attempt to salvage its deterrence policy. What remained of the Civil Defense Act pertained

now to the emergency abilities of the President who, like the Administrator of the FCDA, could

now enact any of the emergency procedures for meeting the aftermath of an attack. However, the

time for the push for a grass-roots civilian mobilization and emergency preparation as had been

outlined in Public Law 920 had passed. In its place would be the ODCM and its directives to

protect the productivity of the United States so that the people could feasibly “win” the war

instead of simply hide from it.

ConclusionAs an early attempt at molding the domestic response to what was perceived as a time of

national threat from external and internal forces, Public Law 920 sought to outline a program and

create an agency that could address this rapidly growing state of emergency. Although it was

based on the ideals of commonly held public willingness to protect values of freedom from being

extinguished and to preserve the country which allowed them these freedoms, it was clear by

1958 that the American public was not willing to position itself in a state of constant readiness.

64

Within the hearings regarding Public Law 920 and the FCDA this was attributed to a lack of

administrative organization, misuse of information for educational purposes not to mention the

sheer volume of scientific data that the FCDA was expected to incorporate. Lastly there was the

unfortunate failure of the government to convince the public that civil defense was best solution

to preparing for the “acceptable” sacrifices that could result before and after an atomic attack. In

short, the fear had been realized that civilian mobilization could not be carried out by the people

with guidance offered the government. Civil defense as an independent part of the nation’s

deterrence policy was not feasible. As such, the replacement agency of the FCDA would attempt

this again within the Executive Office of the President where the president himself overseeing

the responsibilities previously held by the FCDA Administrator. With such a powerful,

respected, symbolic and visible person touting the importance of civil defense, or as it would be

now referred to as “nonmilitary defense”, it was the hope that civilian participation in national

security would be more forthcoming.

Although representatives at the hearings regarding the Civil Defense Act and the FCDA

consistently vocalize their belief that the people not only want leadership through educational

programs in order to arm brace themselves for attacks, the response to these training efforts is

not discussed at length. The emphasis is always on new methods or ways to improve existing

training programs, such as the AEC offering more speeches on fallout or more funds being

allocated to the FCDA for the purpose of strengthening their training centers. This attitude of “if

we do more we will be more successful” did not work in the FCDA’s favor. Without ingrained

practice, civilians would be incapable of action when faced with an actual attack. The switch of

wording and alteration of function from “civil defense” to “nonmilitary defense” within the

Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1958 sought to offer a more militarized outlet for civilian

65

participation, thus offering them the training which would by necessity become second nature in

a crisis scenario. In theory, the public would not be abandoned as the deterrence policy moved

away from a dual approach of civilian mobilization and military defense. Rather the public

would become an even stronger source of support for the military aspects of national security.

While not on exactly equal footing on par with the Department of Defense, as the FCDA had

attempted, the new OCDM would “coordinate” with them in a way similar to the discussion of

“coordination” within the 1956 hearing Civil Defense for National Survival.

In trying to marry the scientific research of civil defense, use the materials and services of

other agencies, and mold American perception of duty to community and national security

through a massive educational campaign the FCDA attempted and ultimately failed to instigate

the civilian mobilization revolution they had hoped for. It did, however, pose as an interesting

experiment into the manipulation of public perception, and offered conclusive evidence that a

decentralized civil defense program would not garner satisfactory results over an extended period

of time. Had an actual attack occurred during the years between 1950 and 1958 it is impossible

to say whether or not the public would have been properly prepared to duck and cover, or if they

would have been able to experience the short period of reconstruction they were promised in

FCDA publications and announcements. However, through the limited public response, as well

as the many issues surrounding information use in educational outreach, the chaotic distribution

of civil defense functions throughout the levels of government, and the belief that the entire

undertaking lacked clear goals and leadership, nearly the entirety of the Civil Defense Act of

1950 had to be reexamined. As it stood, neither Public Law 920 nor the acting departments

carrying out its objectives were effective within the nation’s deterrence policy. The product of

the Reorganization Act of 1958, the OCDM, sought to address the need for a more centralized

66

civil defense program that would not rely so heavily upon civilians undertaking the initiative for

their own, and the nation’s, protection. The OCDM would in theory flourish in the ways the

FCDA had failed. It would give the American people high-profile leadership which would

inspire them to relearn what they believed they knew about their safety, and it would give them

the means to offer them preemptive activities for their own good. The OCDM would take away

the individual agency offered to the public under the FCDA and, while technically offering direct

contact with powerful supervisors, it would at the same time distance civilians from the

administration of the American security policy. But this was judged to be an acceptable public

sacrifice for national security, and it was one that the people were willing to make.

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United States. Cong. House. Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services. Civil Defense Training School and Other Amendments to the Civil Defense Act of 1950. 82nd Cong., 1st sess. Washington: GPO, 1951. Print.

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United States. Cong. House. Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations. Part 1 Civil Defense for National Survival. 84th Cong., 2nd sess. Washington: GPO, 1956. Microfilm.

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