Róbert Tardos

Embeddedness, trust, polarization in a crisis context

– the Greek and Hungarian cases in a comparative

light –

Annual Conference of the Hungarian Sociological Association on Progression–Regression November 9-10 2012 Central European University Budapest

Initial questions regarding a comparative objective

Greece and Hungary as two cases of failed convergence in a European perspective

Comparative findings on trust, participation and mechanisms of (dis)embedment, (des)integration

An inner core of EU(-15) and outer sets of ‘newcomers’ (EU12) and the deficit-stricken Southern Europe; How the two countries are situated among these blocks with regard to these aspects? Are they just like their “peers”, or maybe similar to each other, or possibly cases of exception (exceptional configurations)? What features stand out as elements of similarity and what are the ones most separating them?

Theoretical frameworks and empirical means

(Social network based) approaches of social capital and cohesion, political homophily, ideological polarization and deficits of social integration (such as by van Deth et al 1999, Huckfeldt et al 2004, Baldassarri-Bearman 2007, Angelusz-Tardos 2005)

An application of Margaret Archer’s morphogenetic model of a cultural-structural processes for the interplay of trust, participation and network (social capital) components

Distinctions with regard to various levels of trust (generalized trust and confidence in institutions) and the typology of trust, distrust and ‘blind trust’ (Giddens 1990)

Distinctions between civic and political participation and, on the other hand, formal (electoral) and direct (informal, protest etc) sorts (Verba et al 1995, Sampson-McAdam 2005, Baldassari 2006, Ekman-Amna 2009)

I-V. waves of the European Social Survey, complex analyses on the structural and ideological embeddedness of the voters of various countries (Schmitt-Scheuer 2011)

The questionable relationship of trust and participation depending on context, findings by WVS comparative data (Rossteutcher 2008)

Studies and comparative data-base of the Hungarian Election Studies Program; secondary analyses based on the ESS-waves between 2002 and 2010

An application of Margaret Archer’s morphogenetic model of a cultural-structural

processes for the interplay of trust, participation and network (social capital)

components (with tendencies of ‘virtuous’ and ‘vicious’ circles)

The basic scheme (by Archer) Cultural

Socio-cultural Cultural components

Virtuous circles of a, generalized trust b, trust in institutions and participation a, generalized trust participation (bridging ties through associations) confidence in institutions b, trust in institutions participation (linking ties reaching up-/downwards) integration/cohesion

Vicious circles of deriving of distrust or blind trust and network closure components c, network density, closure and blocked inter-group integration a., generalized distrust withdrawal, absentism distrust in institutions

b, blind trust non-reciprocated activity, bonding (homophilious) ties in-group closure, cultural (ideological) polarization

Comparative findings by Rossteutscher 2008 on the ambivalent relationship of trust and participation depending on socio-political context may relate to both types of schemes

Social structure influences on electoral decisions by Schmitt-Scheuer 2011

(Z-coefficients [exp (B)/SE] based on a multivariate logistic regression model, with indicator sets of social structure, party identification and

ideological distance as independent variables, ranked by size of four-wave averages) Spain 23 27 29 36 29

Great Britain 26 27 31 31 29 Ireland 30 31 25 – 29 – Belgium 23 21 20 30 24 – Finland 24 21 24 25 24 Netherlands 23 24 24 26 24 Slovenia 29 21 23 23 24 – Country 2002 200420062008Ø Trend Sweden 20 25 23 25 23 – Poland 10 24 28 30 23 West Germany 21 23 19 18 21 France 14 15 22 24 21 Denmark 20 20 18 23 20 – Portugal 14 19 24 23 20

Hungary 1917 20 25 20 Estonia 20 18 20 19 – Austria 18 18 18 – 18 – East Germany 19 14 15 14 16 –

Greece 2016 – 12 16 Slovakia – 16 16 18 16 –

All coefficients significant p = ,001. Data source European Social Survey 2002-2008

As regards an overall analysis, based on (socio-demographic etc) structural factors in the first place, both Hungary and Greece are situated at the bottom of the European rank political (electoral) embeddedness (as is the case in general with Eastern, and some Southern countries with a short and thin pluralist tradition). In a temporal respect, this tendency has even become more conspicuous for Greece

during the last decade.

Influences of ideological distance on electoral decisions

(Z-coefficients [exp (B)/SE] based on a multivariate logistic regression model, with indicator sets of ideological distance as independent variables, ranked by size of four-wave averages,

source: Schmitt-Scheuer 2011) Country 2002200420062008Ø Trend

Sweden –16 –17 –17 –16 –17 –

Netherlands –12 –12 –14 –12 –13 –

Denmark –11 –10 –12 –15 –12 ↗

Greece –12 –12 – –13 –12 – Finland –11 –12 –10 –10 –11 –

West Germ. –10 –9 –9 –11 –10 –

Austria –9 –7 –14 – –10 –

Spain –7 –7 –9 –14 –10 ↗

France –9 –7 –11 –12 –10 ↗

Portugal –8 –9 –11 –11 –10 ↗

Hung. –7 –10 –9 –9 –9 – Great Brit. –7 –7 –9 –8 –8 –

Poland –6 –9 –7 –6 –7 –

East Germ. –8 –6 –7 –7 –7 –

Belgium –9 –5 –6 –6 –6 –

Ireland –6 –7 –4 – –6 –

Slovakia – –5 –3 –7 –5 –

Slovenia –4 –4 –4 –5 –4 –

Estonia – –3 –1 –4 –3 –

All coefficients significant p = ,001. Data source European Social Survey 2002-2008

With cultural features (the degree of ideological contrasts) coming to the fore, the picture somewhat changes, particularly for Greece. Contrary to the structural moment, the strength of ideological distances separating various camps (as it affects electoral decisions) is quite considerable related to the European countries under study.

A fine-grained set of comparative findings by Rossteutscher 2008 on the ambivalent

relationship of trust and participation depending on the context of democratic institutions

based on World Values Studies (wave IV, 2000) comparative data

A general contrast between West and East/South, West and East European countries, mature democracies and other regions, with a positive sign between trust and (various types of) participation as regards the former set (pointing to some “virtuous circle” in the above sense), and a negative sign among those of the other regions (suggesting the existence of “vicious circles” of various sorts). This difference stands both for the individual- and the aggregate-level analyses.

A snapshot at Greece and Hungary in a wider comparative context:

stocks of social capital in different world regions and both countries,

based on World Values Studies (wave IV, 2000) comparative data

Source: Rossteutscher 2008

Both at the low end with generalized trust, and Hungary also with (both types of) civic participation, the Greeks are (or, maybe, were in an earlier period) somewhat more inclined toward (associational and, especially, volunteering) civic activities.

Basic data from a closer Europe setting: trust in institutions, direct political and formal/electoral

participation for (pre- and post-crisis) Greece, Hungary and comparative countries

(source: European Social Survey I-V. waves, indices by the Hungarian Election Studies data-base; means)2002-

11Trust in institutions index (1-5)

Direct (informal) polit. particip. (0-7)

Electoral (formal) participation - party voting (1-3)

EU15 3,22 ,97 2,28

EU12 2,53 ,41 1,94

South Eur.

2,66 ,47 2,02

Greece 2,91 ,43 2,12

Hungary

2,71 ,32 1,97

EU15 -,05 ,00 ,00

EU12 -,06 -,02 ,01

South Eur.

-,34 -,08 -,06

Greece -,68 ,04 ,01

Hungary -,39 ,02 -,02

2002-06

Trust in institutions index (1-5)

Direct (informal) polit. participation (0-7)

Electoral (formal) participation (parties, voting 1-3)

EU15 3,22 ,97 2,28

EU12 2,57 ,42 1,93

South Eur.

2,84 ,51 2,05

Greece

3,13 ,42 2,12

Hungary

2,87 ,31 1,98

2008-11

Trust in institutions index (1-5)

Direct (informal) polit. particip. (0-7)

Electoral (formal) participation (parties, voting 1-3)

EU15 3,17 .97 2,28

EU12 2,51 ,40 1,94

South Eur.

2,50 ,43 1.99

Greece

2,45 ,46 2,13

Hungary

2,48 ,33 1,96

Change 2008-11/2002-6

Core European (EU15) countries standing out in all these aspects of (group-level) social capital

No significant changes related to the recent crisis period in the core EU15 and, in general, the new members’ EU12 bloc, while a conspicuous drop of trust in institutions in the Southern region, especially Greece, and Hungary, too.

A look at the underlying mechanisms of trust in institutions among various settings – sets of variables of an

explanatory model Socio-cultural resources (level of education as proxy) Age/cohort (also symbolizing generational groupings with

different background of socialization and historical experiences)

Level of political participation (covering both formal-electoral and direct modes)

Polar (or moderate, middle, or non-existent) ideological (left/right) position, as an approach to the role of ideological contrasts and political polarization (based on an eleven-point left-right scale, with 0-2 and 8-10 grades as polar categories)

The period factor of financial/debt crisis (with the fourth wave 2008 as the turning point introducing the crisis period)

Country-blocs EU15, EU12 and South Europe (with some overlaps) applied as regional contextual factors by some filter models for revealing specific mechanisms of generating trust

Trust/distrust toward institutions and contextual aspects

(Optimal Scaling categorical regression; ESS pooled data 2002-2010, DKMKA HES index-base)Whole ESS-sample (n=179160)

Beta Importance EU 15 (n=105113) Beta

Importance

education (4 categories)

,063 ,061 ,123 ,353

age (4 categories) -,037 ,006 -,038 ,020

political activity-index (nominal)

,156 ,283 ,111 ,301

Polar political pref. (nominal)

,147 ,268 ,117 ,314

Crisis years (1=--2007, 2=2007-)

-,070 ,137 -,031 ,012

R2 ,070 ,057

Greece (n=5994) South Europe (n=43689)

education (4 categories)

,014 -,018 -,036 ,027

age (4 categories) ,119 ,240 -,031 ,007

political activity-index (nominal)

,042 ,036 ,118 ,371

Polar political pref. (nominal)

,062 ,045 ,099 ,279

Crisis years (1=--2007, 2=2007-)

-,212 ,697 -,111 ,316

R2 ,067 ,043

Hungary (n=5778) EU12 (n=36986)

education (4 categories)

,103 ,205 ,064 ,119

age (4 categories) ,020 ,003 -,065 ,063

political activity-index (nominal)

,065 ,105 ,137 ,461

Polar political pref. (nominal)

,135 ,369 ,112 ,330

Crisis years (1=--2007, 2=2007-)

-,133 ,317 -,037 ,028

R2 ,059 .048

A cluster position of the Greek and Hungarian cases among regional and

core/periphery country blocs hierarchical cluster-analysis, based on CATREG beta-values of

the above filtered models

EU15

EU12

HU

S-EU

GR

The standard model by the core (EU15) bloc built on the salience of the (positive) role of political participation and, in turn, of moderate ideological position, more or less followed with its general pattern by the new EU12 grouping.

The southern bloc mostly follows this “normal” pattern, with the increased role of the (crisis) period effect as a difference.

Hungary and Greece, particularly the latter, also stand out by this temporal aspect, however, they exhibit an even more distinguishing feature of the negative relationship between political activity and trust in institutions (with various possible sources in the background). For Hungary, the relationship of polar ideological attitudes with trust in institutions is a further specialty. Greece (in addition to the crisis effect) is distinguished by another temporal moment, the cohort-effect (with confidence in institutions by elder people, in sharp contrast with the critical attitudes of the younger age-groups).

On this basis, on the whole, Hungary is situated between the Eastern and Southern country blocs, Greece neighbors the letter, most remote from the core EU15 one.

A scrutiny into the role of (crisis) period effect for Greece and Hungary:

Filtered period analyses and residual scores for relationships of trust/distrust (or “blind trust”)

and a, formal/informal (protest) participation b, polarity of political preferences

(Optimal Scaling CATREG residual scores, control variables: education and age; ESS I-V pooled data, DKMKA HES index-base) Greece Hungary

2002-7 2008 2002-7 2008-11

completely passive

-,766 -3,176 -1,929 -1,846

somewhat active

,633 -,341 ,688 ,698

very active -1,738 ,237 -,565 -,582

no political preference

-1,529 -,968 -2,136 -2,199

middle ,820 1,257 -,329 -,275

moderate ,850 ,036 1,122 ,623

polar (left/right)

-,855 -1,265 ,063 ,821The lack of a fifth wave for the Greek case somewhat limits the range of possible inferences with regard to a possible turn of its perverted trust/participation connection. For Hungary, however, the latter waves display an even stronger presence of a “perverse” linkage of another type: that of the positive relationship of polar preferences and trust.

A closer glimpse into a special feature of the Hungarian case –

growing political-ideological polarization and related network homophily through two decades(surveys by RGCS of ELTE-HAS, Ipsos, DKMKA HES, n=1000, 3000, 1500, 2000) Left-right scale, 10 points 1994

1998 2003

2009

Left pole(1+2) 9 9 17 13 3+4 26 23 16 15 Centre(5+6) 47 45 33 23 7+8 13 16 19 26 Jobb pole (9+10) 5 8 13 24 Total 100 100 100 100 Poles, together 14 17 31 37 No self-identification 15 27 20 16 Index of polarization (poles/centre)

.31 .39 .93 1.61

Cases weighted by WEIGHT_2

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In an international comparison, an exceptionally high polarization index score over 1.0

The growth of political homophily through the last decade (by the wider circle of acquaintanceship)

year

right-wing voters left-wing voters total

Ho-mo-phi--ly

The concentration of political homophily on the poles, 2009(Panel study of the project Participation, representation of DKMKA HES, n=2000)

left pole centre right pole (left-right scale)

Ho-mo-phi-ly

Some concluding remarks

The need of further investigations into the sources of the unusual participation/trust relationship for both the Greek and Hungarian cases, with special regard to various types of “vicious” (or, maybe, “virtuous” circles)

The need of application of a more differentiated typology of participation and the inclusion of generalized trust aspects as well

The possible inclusion of network approaches for the Greek case, too, with possible implications to political homophily, furthermore, patron-client or familism tendencies

(Also referring to the plennary talk by S. Ó Riain at this conference) a possible inclusion of “social compact” characteristics to the set of context variables (based on typologies by either Esping-Andersen, or, maybe, some other versions, applicable for both cases).