Right to privacy-Freedom of Speech

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OPLE VS. TORRES, July 23, 1998

Puno, J.

Facts:

On December 12, 1996, then President FIDEL V. RAMOS issued Administrative

Order No. 308 entitled “ADOPTION OF A NATIONAL COMPUTERIZED

IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE SYSTEM”.

The AO seeks to have all Filipino citizens and foreign residents to have a Population

Reference Number (PRN) generated by the National Statistics Office (NSO) through the

use of BIOMETRICS TECHNOLOGY .

The AO was questioned by Senator Ople on the following grounds:

1. The establishment of the PRN without any law is an unconstitutional

usurpation of the legislative powers of the Congress of the Philippines;

2. The appropriation of public funds for the implementation of the said AO is

unconstitutional since Congress has the exclusive authority to appropriate funds for

such expenditure; and

3. The AO violates the citizen‟s right to privacy protected by the Bill of Rights of

the Constitution.

Held:

1. The AO establishes a system of identification that is all-encompassing inscope, affects the life and liberty of every Filipino citizens and foreign residents and

therefore, it is supposed to be a law passed by Congress that implements it, not by an

Administrative Order issued by the President. Administrative Power, which is supposed

to be exercised by the President, is concerned with the work of applying policies and

enforcing orders as determined by proper governmental organs. It enables the

President to fix a uniform standard of administrative efficiency and check the official

conduct of his agents. Prescinding from the foregoing precepts, AO 308 involves a

subject that is not appropriate to be covered by an Administrative Order. An

administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President which relates to specific

aspects in the administrative operation of the government. It must be in harmony with

the law and should be for the sole purpose of implementing the law and carrying out the

legislative policy. The subject of AO 308 therefore is beyond the power of the President

to issue and it is a usurpation of legislative power.

2. The AO likewise violates the right to privacy since its main purpose is to

provide a “common reference number to establish a linkage among concerned agenc ies



through the use of BIOMETRICS TECHNOLOGY. Biometry is the science of the

application of statistical methods to biological facts; a mathematical analysis of a

biological data. It is the confirmation of an individual‟s identity through a fingerprint,

retinal scan, hand geometry or facial features. Through the PRN, the government

offices has the chance of building a huge and formidable information base through the

electronic linkage of the files of every citizen. The data, however, may be gathered for

gainful and useful government purposes; but the existence of this vast reservoir of

personal information constitutes a covert invitation to misuse, a temptation that may be

too great for some of our authorities to resist.

Further, the AO does not even tells us in clear and unequivocal terms how these

informations gathered shall be handled. It does not provide who shall control and

access the data and under what circumstances and for what purpose. These factors are

essential to safeguard the privacy and guaranty the integrity of the information. The

computer linkage gives other government agencies access to the information. YET,

THERE ARE NO CONTROLS TO GUARD AGAINST LEAKAGE OF INFORMATIONS.

WHEN THE ACCESS CODE OF THE CONTROL PROGRAMS OF THE PARTICULAR

COMPUTER SYSTEM IS BROKEN, AN INTRUDER, WITHOUT FEAR OF SANCTION

OR PENALTY, CAN MAKE USE OF THE DATA FOR WHATEVER PURPOSE, OR

WORSE, MANIPULATE THE DATA STORED WITHIN THE SYSTEM.

AO No. 308 is unconstitutional since it falls short of assuring that personal information

gathered about our people will be used only for specified purposes thereby violating the

citizen‟s right to privacy.

Zulueta vs. Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA 699 (1996)Zulueta vs. Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA 699 (1996)

The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable, except uponlawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise as prescrbiedby law. Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceeding section, shallinadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

FACTS: Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. On

March 26, 1962, petitioner entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and

in the presence of her mother, a driver and private respondent's secretary, forciblyopened the drawers and cabinet of her husband's clinic and took 157 documentsconsisting of private respondents between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours,greeting cards, cancelled check, diaries, Dr. Martin's passport, and photographs. Thedocuments and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal separationand for disqualification from the practice of medicine which petitioner had filed againsther husband.

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ISSUE: Whether or not the papers and other materials obtained from forcible entrusionand from unlawful means are admissible as evidence in court regarding maritalseparation and disqualification from medical practice.

HELD:

Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. Theconstitutional injuction declaring "the privacy of communication and correspondence tobe inviolable" is no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herselfaggrieved by her husband's infedility) who is the party against whom the constitutionalprovision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the constitution is ifthere is a "lawful order from the court or which public safety or order require otherwise,as prescribed by law." Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtainedinadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding."

The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify anyone of them in breakingthe drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence

of marital infedility. A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed her/his integrity orher/his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever availableto him or to her.

The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses bymaking it privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the otherwithout the consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither may beexamined without the consent of the other as to any communication received inconfidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for specified exceptions.But one thing is freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion for each oneto share what one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty offidelity that each owes to the other.

Kilusang Mayo Uno vs Ermita

on November 3, 2011

**Consolidated with Bayan Muna vs Ermita

Political Law – Control Power of the President

In 2005, EO 420 was passed. This law sought to harmonize and streamline the

country‟s id system. KMU, BM et al sought to have the said EO be declared asunconstitutional for it infringes upon the right to privacy of the people and that the same

is a usurpation of legislative power by the president.

ISSUE: Whether or not the said EO is unconstitutional.



HELD: Sec 1 of EO 420 directs these government entities to “adopt a unified multi -

purpose ID system.” Thus, all government entities that issue IDs as part of their

functions under existing laws are required to adopt a uniform data collection and format

for their IDs. Section 1 of EO 420 enumerates the purposes of the uniform data

collection and format. The President may by executive or administrative order direct the

government entities under the Executive department to adopt a uniform ID data

collection and format. Sec 17, Article 7 of the 1987 Constitution provides that the

“President shall have control of all executive departments, bureaus and offices.” The

same Section also mandates the President to “ensure that the laws be faithfully

executed.” Certainly, under this constitutional power of control the President can direct

all government entities, in the exercise of their functions under existing laws, to adopt a

uniform ID data collection and ID format to achieve savings, efficiency, reliability,

compatibility, and convenience to the public. The President‟s constitutional power of

control is self-executing and does not need any implementing legislation. Of course,

the President‟s power of control is limited to the Executive branch of government and

does not extend to the Judiciary or to the independent constitutional

commissions. Thus, EO 420 does not apply to the Judiciary, or to the COMELEC

which under existing laws is also authorized to issue voter‟s ID cards. This only shows

that EO 420 does not establish a national ID system because legislation is needed to

establish a single ID system that is compulsory for all branches of government.

BAYAN MUNA VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, ET AL., April 19,

2006 & June 20, 2006

Carpio, J.

President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Presidential Proclamation No. 420 that

mandates the Adoption of a Unified, Multi-purpose Identification System by all

Government Agencies in the Executive Department. This is so despite the fact that the

Supreme Court held in an En Banc decision in 1998 OPLE VS. EXECUTIVE

SECRETARY RUBEN TORRES Administrative Order No. 308[National computerizedIdentification Reference System] issued by then President Fidel V. Ramos that the

same is unconstitutional because “a national ID card system requires legislation

because it creates a new national data collection and card issuance system, where

none existed before”. The Supreme Court likewise held that EO 308 as unconstitutional

for it violates the citizen‟s right to privacy.



Based on the Ople ruling, the petitioners claimed that Proclamation No. 420 is

unconstitutional on two (2) grounds:

a. usurpation of legislative powers; and

b. it infringes on the citizen‟s right to privacy

Held:

The said Executive Order No. 420 does not violate the citizen‟s right to privacy since it

does not require all the citizens to be issued a national ID as what happened in AO 308.

Only those dealing or employed with the said government entities who are required to

provide the required information for the issuance of the said ID.

SAB IO V. GORDON Case Digest

GR No. 174340, Oct. 17, 2006

Facts:

On February 20, 2006, Senator Santiago introduced Senate Res. No. 455 “directing aninquiry in aid of legislation on the anomalous losses incurred by the PhilippinesOverseas Telecommunications Corporation (POTC), Philippine Communications

Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT), and PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation (PHC)due to the alleged improprieties in their operations by their respective Board ofDirectors.” Pursuant to this, on May 8, 2006, Senator Gordon, wrote Chairman Sabio ofthe PCGG inviting him to be one of the resource persons in the public meeting jointlyconducted by the Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises andCommittee on Public Services. Chairman Sabio declined the invitation because of priorcommitment. At the same time, he invoked Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 “No member orstaff of the Commission shall be required to testify or produce evidence in any judicial,legislative or administrative proceeding concerning matters within its officialcognizance.” Apparently, the purpose is to ensure PCGG‟s unhampered performance ofits task. Gordon‟s Subpoenae Ad Testificandum was repeatedly ignored by Sabio hence

he threatened Sabio to be cited with contempt.

Issue:

Whether or not Section 4 (b) of E.O. No. 1 be invoked by Chairman Sabio to justify non-appearance on legislative investigations?

Ruling:



No. Section 4 (b) of E.O. No. 1 is declared repealed by the 1987 Constitution. TheCongress‟ power of inquiry, being broad, encompasses everything that concerns theadministration of existing laws as well as proposed or possibly needed statutes. It evenextends “to government agencies created by Congress and officers whose positions are

within the power of Congress to regulate or even abolish.” Note that Article VI, Section21 of the Constitution grants the power of inquiry not only to the Senate and the Houseof Representatives, but also to any of their respective committees.

OSCAR ESPUELAS Y MENDOZA vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Facts:

On June 9 and June 24, 1947, both dates inclusive, in the town of Tagbilaran, Bohol,

Oscar Espuelas y Mendoza had his picture taken, making it to appear as if he were

hanging lifeless at the end of a piece of rope suspended form the limb of the tree, when

in truth and in fact, he was merely standing on a barrel. After securing copies of his

photograph, Espuelas sent copies of same to Free Press, the Evening News, the

Bisayas, Lamdang of general circulation and other local periodicals in the Province of

Bohol but also throughout the Philippines and abroad, for their publication with a suicide

note or letter, wherein he made to appear that it was written by a fictitious suicide,

Alberto Reveniera and addressed to the latter's supposed wife translation of which letter

or note, stating his dismay and administration of President Roxas, pointing out the

situation in Central Luzon and Leyte, and directing his wife his dear wife to write toPresident Truman and Churchill of US and tell them that in the Philippines the

government is infested with many Hitlers and Mussolinis.

Issue:

Whether the accused is liable of seditious libel under Art. 142 of the RPC against the

Government of the Philippines?

Held:

Yes. The accused must therefore be found guilty as charged. And there being no

question as to the legality of the penalty imposed on him, the decision will be affirmed

with costs.

Analyzed for meaning and weighed in its consequences, the article written bybthe

accused, cannot fail to impress thinking persons that it seeks to sow the seeds of



sedition and strife. The infuriating language is not a sincere effort to persuade, what with

the writer's simulated suicide and false claim to martyrdom and what with is failure to

particularize. When the use irritating language centers not on persuading the readers

but on creating disturbances, the rationable of free speech cannot apply and the

speaker or writer is removed from the protection of the constitutional guaranty.

If it be argued that the article does not discredit the entire governmental structure but

only President Roxas and his men, the reply is that article 142 punishes not only all

libels against the Government but also "libels against any of the duly constituted

authorities thereof." The "Roxas people" in the Government obviously refer of least to

the President, his Cabinet and the majority of legislators to whom the adjectives dirty,

Hitlers and Mussolinis were naturally directed. On this score alone the conviction could

be upheld.

Regarding the publication, it suggests or incites rebellious conspiracies or riots andtends to stir up people against the constituted authorities, or to provoke violence from

opposition who may seek to silence the writer. Which is the sum and substance of the

offense under consideration.

US VS. BUSTOS [37 PHIL. 731; G.R. L-12592; 8 MAR 1918]Sunday, February 08, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic WritesLabels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: In the latter part of 1915, numerous citizens of the Province of Pampanga

assembled, and prepared and signed a petition to the Executive Secretary(privileged

communication) through the law office of Crossfield and O'Brien, and five individuals

signed affidavits, charging Roman Punsalan, justice of the peace of Macabebe and

Masantol, Pampanga, with malfeasance in office and asking for his removal. The

specific charges against the justice of the peace include the solicitation of money from

persons who have pending cases beforethe judge. Now, Punsalan alleged that accused

published a writing which was false, scandalous, malicious, defamatory, and libelous

against him.

Issue: Whether or Not accused is entitled to constitutional protection by virtue of hisright to free speech and free press.

Held: Yes. The guaranties of a free speech and a free press include the right to criticize

judicial conduct. The administration of the law is a matter of vital public concern.

Whether the law is wisely or badly enforced is, therefore, a fit subject for proper

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comment. If the people cannot criticize a justice of the peace or a judge the same as

any other public officer, public opinion will be effectively suppressed. It is a duty which

every one owes to society or to the State to assist in the investigation of any alleged

misconduct. It is further the duty of all who know of any official dereliction on the part of

a magistrate or the wrongful act of any public officer to bring the facts to the notice of

those whose duty it is to inquire into and punish them.

The right to assemble and petition is the necessary consequence of republican

institutions and the complement of the part of free speech.Assembly means a right on

the part of citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public

affairs. Petition means that any person or group of persons can apply, without fear of

penalty, to the appropriate branch or office of the government for a redress of

grievances. The persons assembling and petitioning must, of course, assume

responsibility for the charges made. All persons have an interest in the pure and

efficient administration of justice and of public affairs.

Public policy, the welfare of society, and the orderly administration of government have

demanded protection for public opinion. The inevitable and incontestable result has

been the development andadoption of the doctrine of privilege. All persons have an

interest in the pure and efficient administration of justice and of public affairs. The duty

under which a party is privileged is sufficient if it is social or moral in its nature and this

person in good faith believes he is acting in pursuance thereof although in fact he is

mistaken. Although the charges are probably not true as to the justice of the peace, they

were believed to be true by the petitioners. Good faith surrounded their action. Probable

cause for them to think that malfeasance or misfeasance in office existed is apparent.The ends and the motives of these citizens— to secure the removal from office of a

person thought to be venal — were justifiable. In no way did they abuse the privilege.

In the usual case malice can be presumed from defamatory words. Privilege destroys

that presumption. A privileged communication should not be subjected to microscopic

examination to discover grounds of malice or falsity.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

ISAAC PEREZ, defendant-appellant.

Mario Guariña for appellant.

Attorney-General Villa Real for appellee.

Malcolm, J .:

Isaac Perez, the municipal secretary of Pilar, Sorsogon, and Fortunato Lodovice, a

citizen of that municipality, happening to meet on the morning of April 1, 1992, in the



presidencia of Pilar, they became engaged in a discussion regarding the administration

of Governor-General Wood, which resulted in Perez shouting a number of times: “The

Filipinos, like myself, must use bolos for cutting off Wood‟s head for having

recommended a bad thing for the Filipinos, for he has killed our independence.”

Charged in the Court of First Instance of Sorsogon with a violation of article 256 of the

Penal Code having to do with contempt of ministers of the Crown or other persons in

authority, and convicted thereof, Perez has appealed the case to this court. The

question presented for decision is, What crime, if any, did the accused commit?

A logical point of departure is the information presented in this case. It reads in

translation as follows:

That on or about April 1, 1922, in the municipality of Pilar, Province of Sorsogon,

Philippine Islands, the said accused, Isaac Perez, while holding a discussion with

several persons on political matters, did criminally, unlawfully and wilfully and with

knowledge that Honorable Leonard Wood was the Governor-General of the Philippine

Islands and in the discharge of his functions as such authority, insult by word, without

his presence, said Governor-General, uttering in a loud voice and in the presence of

many persons, and in a public place, the following phrases: “Asin an mangña filipinos

na caparejo co, maninigong gumamit nin sundang asin haleon an payo ni Wood huli

can saiyang recomendacion sa pag raot con Filipinas,” which in English, is as follows:

“And the Filipinos, like myself, must use bolos for cutting off Wood‟s head for having

recommended a bad thing for the Philippines.

Contrary to article 256 of the Penal Code.

At the trial of the case, two witnesses were called on behalf of the prosecution and three

witnesses on behalf of the defense. According to the first witness for the Government,Juan Lumbao, the municipal president of Pilar, what Perez said on the occasion in

question was this:

“The Filipinos, like myself, should get a bolo and cut off the head of Governor -General

Wood, because he has recommended a bad administration in these Islands and has not

made a good recommendation; on the contrary, he has assassinated the independence

of the Philippines and for this reason, we have not obtained independence and the head

of that Governor-General must be cut off.” Higinio J. Angustia, justice of the peace of

Pilar, in a written statement, and Gregorio Cresencio, another witness for the

prosecution, corroborated the testimony of the first witness. Cresencio understood thatPerez invited the Filipinos including himself to get their bolos and cut off the head of

Governor-General Wood and throw it into the sea.

The witnesses for the defense did not deny that an altercation took place on the

morning of April 1, 1922, in which the accused participated. But they endeavored to

explain that the discussion was between Perez and one Severo Madrid, the latter

maintaining that the fault was due to the Nacionalista Party, while Perez argued that the



Governor-General was to blame. The accused testified that the discussion was held in a

peaceful manner, and that what he wished to say was that the Governor-General should

be removed and substituted by another. On the witness stand, he stated that his words

were the following: “We are but blaming the Nacionalista Party which is in power but do

not take into account that above the representatives there is Governor-General Wood

who controls everything, and I told him that the day on which the Democrats may kill

that Governor-General, then we, the Filipinos will install the government we like whether

you Democratas want to pay or not to pay taxes.”

The trial judge found as a fact, and we think with abundant reason, that it had been

proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused made use of the language stated in

the beginning of this decision and set out in the information. The question of fact thus

settled, the question of law recurs as to the crime of which the accused should be

convicted.

It should be recalled that the fiscal named, in the information, article 256 of the PenalCode as having been infringed and the trial judge so found in his decision. The first

error assigned by counsel for the appellant is addressed to this conclusion of the lower

court and is to the effect that article 256 of the Penal Code is no longer in force.

In the case of United States vs. Helbig ([1920], R. G. No. 14705 1), the accused was

charged with having uttered the following language: “To hell with the President of the

United States and his proclamation!” Mr. Helbig was prosecuted under article 256, and

though the case was eventually sent back to the court of origin for a new trial, the

appellate court by majority vote held as a question of law that article 256 is still in force.

In the case of People vs. Perfecto ([1922], 43 Phil., 887), the accused was charged with

having published an article reflecting on the Philippine Senate and its members in

violation of article 256 of the Penal Code. In this court, Mr. Perfecto was acquitted by

unanimous vote, with three members of the court holding that article 256 was abrogated

completely by the change from Spanish to American sovereignty over the Philippines,

and with six members holding that the Libel Law had the effect of repealing so much of

article 256 as relates to written defamation, abuse, or insult, and that under the

information and the facts, the defendant was neither guilty of a violation of article 256 of

the Penal Code nor of the libel Law. In the course of the main opinion in the Perfecto

case, is found this significant sentence: “Act No. 292 of the Philippine Commission, the

Treason and Sedition Law, may also have affected article 256, but as to this point, it is

not necessary to make a pronouncement.”

It may therefore be taken as settled doctrine, to which those of us who retain a contrary

opinion must bow with as good grace as we can muster, that until otherwise decided by

higher authority, so much of article 256 of the Penal Code as does not relate to

ministers of the Crown or to writings coming under the Libel Law, exist and must be



enforced. To which proposition, can properly be appended a corollary, namely:

Seditious words, speeches, or libels, constitute a violation of Act No. 292, the Treason

and Sedition Law, and to this extent, both the Penal Code and the Libel Law are

modified.

Accepting the above statements relative to the continuance and status of article 256 of

the Penal Code, it is our opinion that the law infringed in this instance is not this article

but rather a portion of the Treason and Sedition Law. In other words, as will later

appear, we think that the words of the accused did not so much tend to defame, abuse,

or insult, a person in authority, as they did to raise a disturbance in the community.

In criminal law, there are a variety of offenses which are not directed primarily against

individuals, but rather against the existence of the State, the authority of the

Government, or the general public peace. The offenses created and defined in Act No.

292 are distinctly of this character. Among them is sedition, which is the raising of

commotions or disturbances in the State. It is a revolt against legitimate authority.

Though the ultimate object of sedition is a violation of the public peace or at least such a

course of measures as evidently engenders it, yet it does not aim at direct and open

violence against the laws, or the subversion of the Constitution. (2 Bouvier‟s Law

Dictionary, 974; U.S. vs. Abad [1902], 1 Phil., 437; People vs. Cabrera [1922], 43 Phil.,

64.)

It is of course fundamentally true that the provisions of Act No. 292 must not be

interpreted so as to abridge the freedom of speech and the right of the people

peaceably to assemble and petition the Government for redress of grievances. Criticism

is permitted to penetrate even to the foundations of Government. Criticism, no matter

how severe, on the Executive, the Legislature, and the Judiciary, is within the range ofliberty of speech, unless the intention and effect be seditious. But when the intention

and effect of the act is seditious, the constitutional guaranties of freedom of speech and

press and of assembly and petition must yield to punitive measures designed to

maintain the prestige of constituted authority, the supremacy of the constitution and the

laws, and the existence of the State. (III Wharton‟s Criminal Law, pp. 2127 et seq.; U.S.

vs. Apurado [1907], 7 Phil., 422; People vs. Perfecto, supra.)

Here, the person maligned by the accused is the Chief Executive of the Philippine

Islands. His official position, like the Presidency of the United States and other high

offices, under a democratic form of government, instead, of affording immunity frompromiscuous comment, seems rather to invite abusive attacks. But in this instance, the

attack on the Governor-General passes the furthest bounds of free speech was

intended. There is a seditious tendency in the words used, which could easily produce

disaffection among the people and a state of feeling incompatible with a disposition to

remain loyal to the Government and obedient to the laws.



The Governor-General is an executive official appointed by the President of the United

States by and with the advice and consent of the Senate of the United States, and holds

in his office at the pleasure of the President. The Organic Act vests supreme executive

power in the Governor-General to be exercised in accordance with law. The Governor-

General is the representative of executive civil authority in the Philippines and of the

sovereign power. A seditious attack on the Governor-General is an attack on the rights

of the Filipino people and on American sovereignty. (Concepcion vs. Paredes [1921], 42

Phil., 599; U.S. vs. Dorr [1903], 2 Phil., 332.)

Section 8 of Act No. 292 of the Philippine Commission, as amended by Act No. 1692,

appears to have been placed on the statute books exactly to meet such a situation. This

section reads as follows:

Every person who shall utter seditious words or speeches, or who shall write, publish or

circulate scurrilous libels against the Government of the United States or against the

Government of the Philippine Islands, or who shall print, write, publish utter or make anystatement, or speech, or do any act which tends to disturb or obstruct any lawful officer

in executing his office or in performing his duty, or which tends to instigate others to

cabal or meet together for unlawful purposes, or which suggests or incites rebellious

conspiracies or which tends to stir up the people against the lawful authorities, or which

tends to disturb the peace of the community or the safety or order of the Government, or

who shall knowingly conceal such evil practices from the constituted authorities, shall be

punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand dollars United States currency or by

imprisonment not exceeding two years, or both, in the discretion of the court.

In the words of the law, Perez has uttered seditious words. He has made a statementand done an act which tended to instigate others to cabal or meet together for unlawful

purposes. He has made a statement and done an act which suggested and incited

rebellious conspiracies. He has made a statement and done an act which tended to stir

up the people against the lawful authorities. He has made a statement and done an act

which tended to disturb the peace of the community and the safety or order of the

Government. All of these various tendencies can be ascribed to the action of Perez and

may be characterized as penalized by section 8 of Act No. 292 as amended.

A judgment and sentence convicting the accused of a violation of section 8 of Act No.

292 as amended, is, in effect, responsive to, and based upon, the offense with which

the defendant is charged. The designation of the crime by the fiscal is not conclusive.

The crime of which the defendant stands charged is that described by the facts stated in

the information. In accordance with our settled rule, an accused may be found guilty and

convicted of a graver offense than that designated in the information, if such graver

offense is included or described in the body of the information, and is afterwards

justified by the proof presented during the trial. (Guevarra‟s Code of Criminal Procedure,

p. 9; De Joya‟s Code of Criminal Procedure, p. 9.)



The penalty meted out by the trial court falls within the limits provided by the Treason

and Sedition Law, and will, we think, sufficiently punish the accused.

That we have given more attention to this case than it deserves, may be possible. Our

course is justified when it is recalled that only last year, Mr. Chief Justice Taft of the

United States Supreme Court, in speaking of an outrageous libel on the Governor of thePorto Rico, observed: “A reading of the two articles removes the slightest doubt that

they go far beyond the “exuberant expressions of meridional speech,” to use the

expression of this court in a similar case in Gandia vs. Pettingill (222 U.S. , 452, 456).

Indeed they are so excessive and outrageous in their character that they suggest the

query whether their superlative vilification has not overleapt itself and become

unconsciously humorous.” (Balzac vs. Porto Rico [1922], 258 U.S., 298.) While our own

sense of humor is not entirely blunted, we nevertheless entertain the conviction that the

courts should be the first to stamp out the embers of insurrection. The fugitive flame of

disloyalty, lighted by an irresponsible individual, must be dealt with firmly before it

endangers the general public peace.

The result is to agree with the trial Judge in his findings of fact, and on these facts to

convict the accused of a violation of section 8 of Act No. 292 as amended. With the

modification thus indicated, judgment is affirmed, it being understood that, in

accordance with the sentence of the lower court, the defendant and appellant shall

suffer 2 months and 1 day‟s imprisonment and pay the costs. So ordered.

RAFAEL S. MERCADO, petitioner,vs.COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL, BRANCH V, CITY FISCAL OF QUEZONCITY and VIRGINIA M. MERCADO, respondents.

Francisco R. Sotto for petitioner.

Clemente M. Soriano for respondents.

&

FERNANDO, C.J.: 1äwphï1.ñët

The relevant question in this suit is whether or not the landmark case of United States v.Bustos, 1 enunciating the doctrine that the free speech and free press guarantees of theConstitution constitute a bar to prosecutions for libel arising from a communicationaddressed to a superior complaining against the conduct of a subordinate, is impressedwith significance. The information in this certiorari, mandamus and prohibitionproceeding to quash an information for libel quoted in full the alleged offensivetelegram. Thus: "[Secretary David Consunji Department of Public Works and[Communications] Manila In line with President Marcos appeal to give information on



undesirable employees in the government service to achieve the objectives of the NewSociety request that investigation image of the activities of Mrs. Virginia Mercado ofPublic Service Commission as we have reason to believe that she has enriched herselfthru corrupt practices considering that she has properties and spending above what hersalary can afford with the husband jobless stop If investigation confirms this we trust

you take necessary action stop In case you need further details wire me at 101 MarianoCuenco Quezon City and I will give further details stop Expecting prompt action on thismatter. Rafael Mercado]" 2 It closed with the assertion that Virginia Mercado, privaterespondent, "never enriched herself in office." There was first a motion to dismiss filedby petitioner Ramon Mercado on the ground of the telegram being a privilegedcommunication. It was denied by the lower court.ït¢@lFº Thereafter, through anothercounsel, came a motion to quash, alleging that the facts charged do not "constitute anoffense." Again, it met with a denial. A motion for reconsideration having proved futile,the present proceeding was instituted.

This Court required comment from respondents. In the comment submitted, the stress

was on the absence of any privilege, there being malice and bad faith. As statedtherein: "The communication in issue was made by the petitioner with evident maliceand bad faith, a matter explicitly stated in the information filed with the respondentCourt, and the pretense that it was made allegedly in line with the President's appeal togive information on undesirable employees in the government service, cannot cover upsuch fact. Malice in fact and bad faith on the part of the petitioner, and/or that he wasmotivated by vengeance and ill-will in making the said communication, is shown by, andcan be established by the prosecution thru the testimony of the private respondent andthe following documentary evidence: a) On October 14, 1972, petitioner filed a letter-complaint with the Chairman of the Board of Transportation, against the privaterespondent, for alleged grave violations of the Rep. Act No. 2260 and civil service rules[with a true copy of the said complaint attached]; b) Fourteen (14) days after the filing ofthe aforementioned administrative complaint by petitioner against the privaterespondent, the said petitioner sent the subject libelous telegram or communication tothe Secretary of Public Works and Communication, which was indorsed for investigationto the said Board of Transportation on October 31, 1972, by first endorsement of thesaid Department Secretary, dated Oct. 31, 1972 to the Chairman of the Board ofTransportation [with a true copy of the said first indorsement attached]; c) On November23, 1972, the petitioner filed an amended administrative complaint against the privaterespondent with the same Board of Transportation docketed therein as Adm. Case No.72-1, charging the private respondent with dishonesty, pursuit of private business orcorrupt practices, and misconduct or discourtesy [with a true copy of the said amendedcompliant attached]; d) The private respondent, submitted her answer to the saidadministrative charges, and after due hearing, the Board of Transportation rendered adecision on June 26, 1973, finding the herein private respondent as innocent of thecharges, and dismissing the complaint filed against her [with a true copy of the saiddecision attached]; e) On July 17, 1973 petitioner, as complainant therein, filed a motionfor reconsideration of the decision of the Board of Transportation, but the said Board, inan order issued on August 29, 1973, denied said motion for reconsideration for lack ofmerit [with a copy of said order attached]; f) While the Administrative Case No. 72-1 was



pending determination before the Board of Transportation, petitioner, to further harassand malign the good character and reputation of the private respondent, filed with theConstabulary Highway Patrol Group (CHPG), a complaint against the privaterespondent and her husband Lorenzo M. Mercado accusing them of selling a FordWillys engine, which was carnapped. The said office, however, after due hearing,

issued a resolution on February 9, 1973, recommending that the said case be closed forlack of evidence [with a copy of the said resolution attached]; g) Also during thependency of the administrative complaint filed by petitioner against the privaterespondent in the Board of Transportation, petitioner filed with the Criminal InvestigationService (CIS), PC, Camp Crame, Quezon City, a complaint for corrupt practices againstthe private respondent; and after due investigation the CIS, in answer to the letter ofprivate respondent's counsel, dated March 24, 1973 [with a true copy attached].requesting information about the result of the said investigation, sent a letter to saidcounsel, dated March 27, 1973, advising him that the said case is considered closed forinsufficiency of evidence [with a copy of the said letter attached]." 3

The comment was considered as answer and the case was set for hearing. Prior tosuch hearing, there was a motion by petitioner to file memorandum in lieu of oralargument. As the motion was not acted upon before the date set for hearing, the partiesappeared. Preliminary questions were asked. They were then required to filesimultaneously their memoranda. Instead of just filing a memorandum, petitioner had amotion to admit amended petition enclosing with such motion the amended petition. Thememorandum filed by him was on the basis thereof. The amendments, however, did notaffect the fundamental question raised as to whether or not the telegram beingqualifiedly privileged should be the basis for the special civil action for certiorari,mandamus and prohibition. Respondents in due time, after seeking an extension, filedtheir memorandum. Thereafter, petitioner even submitted a manifestation, in effectreiterating contentions previously made.

In the light of the above pleadings, this Court after a careful study, holds that certiorarito annul the order denying the motion to quash as well as the motion for reconsiderationdoes not lie. Neither should respondent court be ordered to dismiss Criminal Case No.Q-2936, the criminal complaint for libel against petitioner. Nor should the court beprohibited from hearing the aforesaid criminal action. This petition lacks merit.

1. United States v. Bustos, 4 as mentioned at the outset, is a landmark decision. It is tothe credit of the Supreme Court of the Philippines that such a ruling antedated by thirty-six years, a similar doctrine announced by the United States Supreme Court, 5 to theeffect that a libel prosecution must likewise survive the test of whether or not theoffending publication is within the guarantees of free speech and free press. To keepsuch guarantees, if not inviolate, at the very least truly meaningful, certainly calls forsuch an approach.ït¢@lFº The judiciary lives up to its mission by vitalizing and notdenigrating constitutional rights. So it has been before. It should continue to be so.

2. Justice Malcolm, however, is careful to point out that qualified privilege, and this isone such instance, may be "lost by proof of malice." 6 His opinion continues: " 'A



communication made bona fide upon any subject matter in which the partycommunicating has an interest, or in reference to which he has a duty, is privileged, ifmade to a person having a corresponding interest or duty, although it containedcriminatory matter which without this privilege would be slanderous and actionable.'(Harrison vs. Bush, 5 E. & B., 344; 1 Jur. [N.S.], 846; 25 L. J. Q. B. 25; 3 W.R., 474; 85

E.C.L., 344.)"

7

He then gave what was referred to by him as a "pertinent illustration ofthe application of qualified privilege, " namely, "a complaint made in good faith andwithout malice in regard to the character or conduct of a public official when addressedto an officer or a board having some interest or duty in the matter. Even when thestatements are found to be false, if there is probable cause for belief in their truthfulnessand the charge is made in good faith, the mantle of privilege may still cover the mistakeof the individual. But the statements must be made under an honest sense of duty; aself-seeking motive is destructive. Personal injury is not necessary. All persons have aninterest in the pure and efficient administration of justice and of public affairs. The dutyunder which a party is privileged is sufficient if it is social or moral in its nature and thisperson in good faith believes he is acting in pursuance thereof although in fact he is

mistaken. The privilege is not defeated by the mere fact that the communication is madein intemperate terms. A further element of the law of privilege concerns the person towhom the complaint should be made. The rule is that if a party applies to the wrongperson through some natural and honest mistake as to the respective functions ofvarious officials such unintentional error will not take the case out of theprivilege." 8 What casts doubt on the good faith of petitioner is a summary of hisconduct, viz a viz private respondent: a letter complaint for grave violation of Republic

Act No. 2260 and civil service rules was filed by him with the Chairman of the Board ofTransportation on October 14, 1972. Fourteen days later, on October 28, 1972, thetelegram subject of this litigation, was sent to the Secretary of Public Works andCommunications. Then on November 23, 1972, there was an amended complaint withthe Board of Transportation to include such charges as dishonesty, pursuit of privatebusiness or corrupt practices and misconduct. The Board of Transportation foundprivate respondent innocent, in an order of June 26, 1973. There was a motion forreconsideration on July 17, 1973 filed by petitioner. It was denied on August 29, 1973and during the pendency of such administrative case, petitioner not content, filed withthe Constabulary Highway Patrol Group a complaint against private respondent and herhusband, a relation, accusing them of selling a Ford Willys engine, which wascarnapped. After due hearing, a resolution was issued recommending that said case beclosed for lack of evidence. Again, during the pendency of such administrativecomplaint, petitioner filed with the Criminal Investigation Service, a complaint for corruptpractices against private respondent, likewise found without support in the evidencesubmitted. The tenacity with which petitioner had pursued a course of conduct on itsface would seem to indicate that a doubt could reasonably be entertained as tothe bona fides of petitioner.ït¢@lFº The prosecution should be given the opportunitythen of proving malice.

3. Respondents have in their favor a decision of this Court supporting their stand.In People v. Monton, 9 the question of whether or not a motion to quash based on aqualified privilege should be upheld was decided adversely against the claim of those



accused of libel, This Court made clear that malice can be shown. It "simply puts theburden of doing so on the prosecution." 10 The ponencia of then Justice, later ChiefJustice, Makalintal distinguished the Bustos decision, thus: "That case is not hereapplicable, because the acquittal of the accused therein on the ground that thedefamatory imputation was qualifiedly privileged was adjudged only after trial, wherein

the prosecution tried to establish, although unsuccessfully, the element ofmalice." 11 Further, the opinion stated: " It need only be added that in the instant casethe information alleges that the defendants, appellees here, wrote and sent the subjectletter to the President 'with malicious intent and evil motive of attacking, injuring andimpeaching the character, honesty, integrity, virtue and reputation of one Jose J.Monteclaro ... and with malicious intent of exposing (him) to public hatred, contempt,ridicule, discredit and dishonor, without any justifiable motive.' Under the foregoingallegation, the prosecution is entitled to go to trial and present the necessary evidenceto prove malice; and the denial, to it of the opportunity to do so, upon the defendants'motion to quash, constitutes reversible error." 12

WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed.

BAGUIO MIDLAND COURIER & CECILLE AFABLE VS. COURT OF APPEALS &

RAMON LABO, JR., 444 SCRA 28 [November 25, 2004]

Freedom of Expression; the public has the right to be informed on the mental,

moral and physical fitness of candidates for public office.

FACTS:

1. In the January 3, 1988 issue of the Baguio Midland Courier (BMC), Cecille

Afable, the Editor-in-Chief, in her column “In and Out of Baguio” made the following

comments:

“Of all the candidates for Mayor of Baguio City), Labo has the most imponderables

about him. People would ask: “can he read and write”? Why is he always talking about

his Japanese father-in-law? Is he really a Japanes Senator or a barrio Kapitan? Is it true

that he will send P18M aid to Baguio? Somebody wanted to put an advertisement of

Labo in the Midland Courier but was refused because he has not yet paid his account of

the last time he was a candidate for Congress. We will accept all advertisements for him

if he pays his old account first.”

2. In the same column, Cecille Afable wrote the following comments in

her January 10, 1988 column at the Courier:

“I heard that the „Dumpty in the Egg‟ is campaigning for Cortes. Not fair. Some real

doctors are also busy campaigning against Labo because he has not also paid their

medical services with them. Since he is donating millions he should also settle his small

debts like the reportedly insignificant amount of P27,000 only. If he wins, several



teachers were signifying to resign and leave Baguio forever, and Pangasinan will be the

franca-liqua of Baguio.”

3. As a result of the above articles, Ramon Labor, Jr. filed a complaint for

Damages before the regional trial Court of Baguio City as he claimed said articles were

libelous. He likewise filed a separate criminal complaint before the Office of the City

Prosecutor of Baguio but was dismissed;

4. Labo claimed that the said articles were tainted with malice because he was

allegedly described as “Dumpty in the Egg” or one “who is a failure in his business”

which is false because he is a very successful businessman or to mean “zero or a big

lie”; that he is a “balasubas” due to his alleged failure to pay his medical expenses;

The petitioners, however, were able to prove that Labo has an unpaid obligation to the

Courier in the amount of P27,415.00 for the ads placed by his campaigners for the

1984 Batasang Pambansa elections;

The Regional Trial Court, Branch 6, Baguio City, in its Decision dated June 14, 1990

dismissed Labo‟s complaint for damages on the ground that the article of petitioner

Afable was privileged and constituted fair comment on matters of public interest as it

dealt with the integrity, reputation and honesty of private respondent Labo who was a

candidate for Mayor of Baguio City;

On January 7, 1992, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC Decision and ordered the

petitioners to pay Ramon Labo, Jr. damages in the total amount of P350,000.00 after

concluding that the “Dumpty in the Egg” refers to no one but Labo himself.

Hence, the Petition to the Supreme Court.

ISSUES:

1. Was Labo the “Dumpty in the Egg” described in the questioned article/

2. Were the articles subject of the case libelous or privileged/

HELD:

1. The Court of Appeals is wrong when it held that Labo is the “Dumpty in theEgg” in the questioned article. This is so because the article stated that “The Dumpty in

the Egg is campaigning for Cortes”, another candidate for mayor and opponent of Labo

himself. It is unbelievable that Labo campaigned for his opponent and against himself.

Although such gracious attitude on the part of Labo would have been commendable, it

is contrary to common human experience. As pointed out by the petitioners, had he

done that, it is doubtful whether he could have won as City Mayor of Baguio in the 1988



elections, which he actually did. In line with the doctrine in BORJAL VS. CA, 310 SCRA

1, that „it is also not sufficient that the offended party recognized himself as the person

attacked or defamed, but it must be shown that at least a 3rd

person could identify him

as the object of the libelous publication‟, the case should be dismissed since Labo

utterly failed to dispose of this responsibility.

2. Labo claims that the petitioners could not invoke “public interest” to justify the

publication since he was not yet a public official at that time. This argument is without

merit since he was already a candidate for City mayor of Baguio. As such, the article is

still within the mantle of protection guaranteed by the freedom of expression provided in

the Constitution since it is the public‟s right to be informed of the mental, moral and

physical fitness of candidates for public office. This was recognized as early as the

case of US VS. SEDANO, 14 Phil. 338 [1909] and the case of NEW YORK TIMES VS.

SULLIVAN, 376 U.S. 254 where the US Supreme Court held:

“…it is of the utmost consequence that the people should discuss the character and

qualifications of candidates for their suffrages. The importance to the State and to

society of such discussions is so vast, and the advantages derived so great, that they

more than counterbalance the inconvenience of private persons whose conduct may be

involved, and occasional injury to the reputations of individuals must yield to the public

welfare, although at times such injury may be great. The public benefit from publicity is

so great and the chance of injury to private character so small, that such discussion

must be privileged. “

Clearly, the questioned articles constitute fair comment on a matter of public interest as

it dealt with the character of the private respondent who was running for the top elective

post in Baguio City at that time.

LOPEZ VS PEOPLE

FACTS: pon arraignment on May 8, 2003, petitioner, as accused, entered a plea of “not guilty.”

During the pre-trial, the parties stipulated, among others, on the identity of the accused, that the

private complainant is the incumbent City Mayor of Cadiz City and is popularly known by the

nickname “Bading” and that the petitioner calls the private complainant “Bading.” Thenceforth,

trial on the merits commenced in due course.

Evidence introduced for the prosecution reveals that in the early part of November

2002, while exercising his official duties as Mayor of Cadiz City, private respondent saw

billboards with the printed phrase “CADIZ FOREVER” with a blank space before the word

“NEVER” directly under said phrase. Those billboards were posted on the corner of Gustilo



and Villena streets, in front of Cadiz Hotel and beside the old Coca-Cola warehouse

in Cadiz City. He became intrigued and wondered on what the message conveyed since it

was incomplete.

Some days later, on November 15, 2002, private respondent received a phone call

relating that the blank space preceding the word “NEVER” was filled up with the added words

“BADING AND SAGAY.” The next day, he saw the billboards with the phrase “CADIZ

FOREVER BADING AND SAGAY NEVER” printed in full. Reacting and feeling that he was

being maligned and dishonored with the printed phrase and of being a “tuta” of Sagay, private

respondent, after consultation with the City Legal Officer, caused the filing of a complaint for

libel against petitioner. He claimed that the incident resulted in mental anguish and sleepless

nights for him and his family. He thus prayed for damages.

Jude Martin Jaropillo (Jude) is a licensing officer of the Permit and License Division of

Cadiz City. While on a licensing campaign, he was able to read the message on the

billboards. He wondered what fault the person alluded therein has done as the message is so

negative. He felt that the message is an insult to the mayor since it creates a negative

impression, as if he was being rejected by the people of Cadiz City. He claimed that he was

giving his testimony voluntarily and he was not being rewarded, coerced or forced by anybody.

Nenita Bermeo (Nenita), a retired government employee of Cadiz City, was at Delilah‟s

Coffee [Shop] in the morning of November 19, 2002 when she heard the petitioner shouting

“Bading, Bading, Never, Never.” She and the tricycle drivers drinking coffee were told by

petitioner “You watch out I will add larger billboards.” When she went around Cadiz City, she

saw larger billboards with the phrase “CADIZ FOREVER BADING AND SAGAY NEVER,” thus

confirming what petitioner had said. With the message, she felt as if the people were trying to

disown the private respondent. According to her, petitioner has an ax to grind against the

mayor. Like Jude, she was not also forced or rewarded in giving her testimony.

Bernardita Villaceran (Bernardita) also found the message unpleasant because MayorEscalante is an honorable and dignified resident of Cadiz City. According to her, the message

is an insult not only to the person of the mayor but also to the people of Cadiz City.

Petitioner admitted having placed all the billboards because he is aware of all the things

happening around Cadiz City. He mentioned “BADING” because he was not in conformity with

the many things the mayor had done in Cadiz City. He insisted that he has no intention



whatsoever of referring to “Bading” as the “Tuta” of Sagay. He contended that it was private

respondent who referred to Bading as “Tuta” of Sagay. He further maintained that his personal

belief and expression was that he will never love Bading and Sagay. He concluded that the

message in the billboards is just a wake-up call for Cadiz City.

RULING: the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals

dated August 31, 2005 in CA-G.R. CR No. 28175 isREVERSED and SET ASIDE and

the petitioner is ACQUITTED of the crime charged. In criminal prosecutions,

fundamental is the requirement that the elemental acts constituting the offense be

established with moral certainty as this is the critical and only requisite to a finding of

guilt.”[23] In this case, contrary to the conclusion of the trial court as affirmed by the

appellate court, the prosecution failed to prove that the controversial phrase “CADIZ

FOREVER, BADING AND SAGAY NEVER” imputes derogatory remarks on private

respondent‟s character, reputation and integrity. In this light, any discussion on the

issue of malice is rendered moot.

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/february2011/172203.htm#_ftn23




Right to privacy-Freedom of Speech

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