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Comparative Analysis of Modern EU Accession Law

Law 6004 European Union

William H. Rice, Jr.

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Introduction

The European Union (EU) currently consists of twenty-eight Member States, and

is “founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality,

the rule of law and respect for human rights.”1 Although the EU originally included just

six Member States, the end of the Cold War and increased economic integration

brought many potential accession candidates.2

This document seeks to clarify the EU accession process by examining two

cases. After highlighting relevant background information and legal aspects of EU

accession, we will examine the successful 2013 accession of Croatia. We will next

examine Turkey, a current candidate country for EU accession. Finally, we will provide

forward guidance for current and potential accession candidates, highlighting factors

which may help or hinder a country’s EU accession prospects.

Part I — History of EU enlargement

Following two devastating world wars, European leaders sought to promote

organizations which would unify Europe and reduce nationalist sentiment. The

Schuman Declaration of 1950 was one of the first steps toward European integration, as

it sought to prevent weapons proliferation throughout Europe.3 The Schuman

Declaration placed French and German steel production “under a common High

Authority, within the framework of an organization open to the participation of the other

1 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, Article 2, EUROPA (December 13, 2007), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A12012M%2FTXT. 2 EU Enlargement in the 21st Century: New Stage and Challenges, CHINA INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES (September 23, 2014), http://www.ciis.org.cn/english/2014-09/23/con tent_7254504.htm. 3 The Schuman Declaration, EUROPA (May 9, 1950), http://europa.eu/about-eu/basic-information/symbols/europe-day/schuman-declaration/index_en.htm.

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countries of Europe.”4 Robert Schuman, a French foreign minister, contended that the

pooling of coal and steel production would “immediately provide for the setting up of

common foundations for economic development as a first step in the federation of

Europe.”5 Schuman believed this would allow oversight of the armaments of war, keep

the historic Franco-German rivalry in check, lay the groundwork for integration of other

industries, and prove a symbolically peaceful gesture.6

The Schuman Declaration culminated in the 1951 Treaty of Paris, which

established the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC).7 This treaty was signed

by the “Inner Six”8 nations, who were the founding members of what became the

modern European Union.9 The ECSC was the height of European supranationalism, as

the ECSC “was accompanied by the establishment of strong institutions to manage the

operation of the common market.”10 The “Inner Six” nations also signed the 1957

Treaties of Rome, which established the European Economic Community (EEC) and

the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom). The EEC’s main objective was to

establish “a common market with broad economic policies.”11 The 1967 Merger Treaty

fused the previously disparate institutions of ECSC, EEC, and Euratom into “a single

4 Id. 5 Id. 6 Id. 7 Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, ECSC Treaty, EUROPA, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/txt/?uri=uriserv:xy0022. 8 Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and West Germany. 9 The EU Member States, EURO-SCEPTIC, http://www.euro-sceptic.org/the-eu-member-states.html. 10 Brigid Laffan, Integration and Co-operation in Europe 31 (1992). 11 Id. at 32.

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Commission and a single Council.”12

In contrast to the supranational disposition of the ECSC, 1960 saw the

establishment of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), signed by the “Outer

Seven” nations that were not members of the EEC.13 EFTA allowed the “Outer Seven”

nations to access to the EEC’s internal market.14 In contrast to the supranational ECSC,

EFTA was a “purely intergovernmental approach to inter-state relations,” containing “no

underlying political ambition to go beyond a free trade area.”15

The 1986 Single European Act (SEA) laid the groundwork for creating a single

European market.16 The SEA was the first “major amendment of the Treaty”

establishing the EEC and was meant to “add new momentum to European

integration.”17 The SEA came to fruition through the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, also known

as the Treaty on European Union (TEU), which remains a formative treaty in the EU at

the time of writing.18 Responding to “external and internal events,” such as the fall of the

Soviet Union, the TEU furthered the SEA’s goals.19

The TEU established five objectives to which the EU should aspire: “promote

economic and social progress which is balanced and sustainable,” “assert its identity on

12 The history of the European Union - 1967, EUROPA, http://europa.eu/about-eu/eu-history/1960-1969/1967/index_en.htm. 13 These “Outer Seven” nations consisted of Austria, Britain, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, and Switzerland. 14 The European Free Trade Association, EUROPEAN FREE TRADE ASSOCIATION, http://www.efta.int/about-efta/european-free-trade-association. 15 Laffan, supra note 10, at 33. 16 The Single European Act, EUROPA (February 17, 1986), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/txt/?uri=uriserv:xy0027. 17 Id. 18 Treaty of Maastricht on European Union, EUROPA (February 7, 1992), http://eur-lex.europa. eu/legal-content/en/txt/?uri=uriserv:xy0026. 19 Id.

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the international scene,” introduce “a citizenship of the Union,” “develop close

cooperation on justice and home affairs,” and “maintain in full the acquis

communautaire.”20 The TEU created the modern European Union, “which consists of

three pillars: the European Communities, common foreign and security policy and police

and judicial cooperation in criminal matters.”21 The TEU also provided a three-stage

process by which the EU would establish a single currency, and ensured “this

currency's stability thanks to price stability and respect for the market economy.”22

Another transformative doctrine of the TEU was “the creation of European citizenship

over and above national citizenship.”23

Several subsequent treaties made significant changes to the TEU. The Treaty of

Amsterdam amending the Treaty of the European Union was signed in 1997, four years

after the original TEU entered into force.24 This was followed by the 2001 Treaty of Nice,

which addressed “the institutional problems linked to enlargement which were not

resolved” in Amsterdam.25 The 2007 Treaty of Lisbon made further reforms, ending the

European Community, abolishing “the former EU architecture,” and making “a new

allocation of competencies between the EU and the Member States.”26 The Treaty of

Lisbon also abolished the three pillar system which was a product of the 1993 TEU.27

20 Id. 21 Id. 22 Id. 23 Id. 24 Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, EUROPA (October 2, 1997), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/topics/treaty/pdf/amst-en.pdf. 25 Treaty of Maastricht on European Union, supra note 18. 26 Id. 27 Id.

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The Treaty of Lisbon replaced the three pillar system with a single “legal personality,”28

allowing the EU to become a single body with increased solidarity in a globalized

market.29

These treaties and amendments confer competences upon which the EU may

act, and competences which remain with the Member States.30 The 2007 Treaty of

Lisbon clarified the division of competences, establishing the principles of exclusive

competences, shared competences, and supporting competences.31 Exclusive

competences are “areas in which the EU alone is able to legislate and adopt binding

acts.”32 Shared competences are when “EU countries exercise their own competence

where the EU does not exercise, or has decided not to exercise, its own competence.”33

Supporting competences are those in which “the EU can only intervene to support,

coordinate or complement the action of EU countries.”34

The TEU was also amended by three accession treaties in 1994,35 2003,36 and

2005,37 which benefited the Union in both economic and social aspects.38 In economic

terms, EU enlargement “has benefited all EU Member States as it has broken down

28 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, Article 47, EUROPA (December 13, 2007), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A12012M%2FTXT. 29 Legal personality, EUABC, http://en.euabc.com/word/622. 30 Division of competences within the European Union, EUROPA, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=URISERV:ai0020&from=RO. 31 Id. 32 Id. 33 Id. 34 Id. 35 Treaty of Accession of Austria, Finland, and Sweden. 36 Treaty of Accession of Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Slovenia. 37 Treaty of Accession of Bulgaria and Romania. 38 The European Union Explained: Enlargement, EUROPA (2013), http://europa.eu/pol/pdf/flipbo ok/en/enlargement_en.pdf.

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trade barriers in Europe and created a bigger and more prosperous internal market.”39

The economic benefits of accession are directly quantifiable, as the GDP of countries

which joined between 2004 and 2007 grew by 77%.40 Additionally, trade between the

“old” EU countries and “new” members grew by 185%.41

Part II — Analysis of modern EU accession law Though it began as a club of six Member States, the European Union now

encompasses some 500 million European citizens spread amongst 28 Member

States.42 Additionally, the EU holds the position as the largest economy in the world,

reporting a GDP of approximately $18.5 trillion in 2014.43 Many countries wish to join

the EU to enjoy the benefits of such economic potential. Therefore, the EU has a “pre-

accession” strategy which aids countries in preparation for future EU membership.

Countries which meet certain criteria are then deemed official candidate countries for

EU accession. As of May 2016, the current candidate countries are Albania, Macedonia,

Montenegro, Serbia, and Turkey. Additionally, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo are

potential candidate countries.

We will now examine various EU treaty provisions which control accession. First,

Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union defines a broad set of values to which which

all EU member states must adhere.44 Article 2 states:

The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights,

39 Id. 40 Id. 41 Id. 42 Living in the EU, EUROPA, http://europa.eu/about-eu/facts-figures/living/index_en.htm. 43 European Union GDP, TRADING ECONOMICS, http://www.tradingeconomics.com/european-union/gdp. 44 Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union, supra note 1.

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including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail.

Additionally, Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union states that any nation which

adheres to the Article 2 values may accede to the EU.45 Article 49 then illustrates the

application mechanics for potential candidate countries. Article 49 states:

Any European State which respects the values referred to in Article 2 and is committed to promoting them may apply to become a member of the Union. The European Parliament and national Parliaments shall be notified of this application. The applicant State shall address its application to the Council, which shall act unanimously after consulting the Commission and after receiving the assent of the European Parliament, which shall act by an absolute majority of its component members. The conditions of admission and the adjustments to the Treaties on which the Union is founded, which such admission entails, shall be the subject of an agreement between the Member States and the applicant State. This agreement shall be submitted for ratification by all the contracting States in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements. The conditions of eligibility agreed upon by the European Council shall be taken into account.

In addition to the above provisions found within the Treaty on European Union,

candidate countries must adhere to “criteria and conditions for accession as defined by

the EU leaders at their summit in Copenhagen in 1993, and by a number of subsequent

EU decisions.”46 This “Copenhagen Criteria” contains three provisions to which a

country must adhere in order to be considered for EU membership:

1. “Stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities.”

2. “A functioning market economy and the ability to cope with competitive pressure are market forces within the EU.”

3. “Ability to take on the obligations of membership, including the capacity

45 Id. 46 Id.

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to effectively implement the rules, standards and policies that make up the body of EU law (the ‘acquis’), and adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union.”47

Next, a candidate country must implement existing EU laws and regulations,

known as Acquis Communautaire (acquis).48 Numbering approximately 100,000 pages,

these laws are divided into 35 chapters, “each corresponding to a policy area” such as

transport policy, taxation, environment, social policy, et al.49 Each chapter is negotiated

separately, as “the Commission makes a recommendation on whether to open

negotiations” on a particular chapter.50 The candidate country then agrees on how and

when to implement changes in respective policy areas.51

Negotiations between the EU and candidate countries Croatia and Turkey began

in 2005.52 Croatia successfully joined the EU on July 1, 2013.53 As of May 2016,

Turkey’s accession prospects remain uncertain. We will first examine Croatia’s

accession process.

Part III — Examining Croatian accession Croatia’s 2013 accession to the European Union was unique in a number of

ways. Most significantly, Croatia was the first country to negotiate through “a very

47 Accession criteria (Copenhagen criteria), EUROPA, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/summary/glossa ry/accession_criteria_copenhague.html. 48 Cristina Dallara, Democracy and Judicial Reforms in South-East Europe: Between the EU and the Legacies of the Past 14 (2014). 49 Id. 50 Conditions for membership: Chapters of the acquis, EUROPA, http://ec.europa.eu/enlarge ment/policy/conditions-membership/chapters-of-the-acquis/index_en.htm. 51 The European Union Explained: Enlargement, supra note 38. 52 From 6 to 28 members, EUROPA, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/policy/from-6-to-28-members/index_en.htm. 53 Id.

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elaborate scheme of opening and closing benchmarks.”54 Additionally, previous

candidate countries negotiated 31 chapters during their accession processes.55 Croatia

was the first country to negotiate the EU’s 35 chapter system, which remains in place at

the time of writing.56 Thus, Croatia is an intriguing case study to illuminate the current

EU accession process. While we will further explore the benchmark and chapter

systems below, we must first overview Croatian history and economics before

examining its EU accession in detail.

Croatia implemented a democratic constitution in 1990 and has followed a

parliamentary system of governance since 2000.57 According to the World Bank, which

provides loans for developing countries, Croatia’s private sector economy is less

competitive than its EU peers, and “actions are needed to liberalize the labor market.”58

Further, the 2016 Index of Economic Freedom reports “pervasive corruption still erodes

public trust in government.”59

Formerly a republic of Yugoslavia, relations between the EU and Croatia began

after Croatia gained internationally-recognized independence in 1992.60 On November

24, 2000 the European Commission met Croatian leaders at Zagreb, the Croatian

54 Vladimir Drobnjak on Croatia: 28th Member of the EU, THE INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN AFFAIRS (Nov 25, 2011), http://www.iiea.com/events/croatia-28th-member-of-the-eu. 55 Id. 56 Id. 57 Croatian Parliament - Sabor, HRVATSKI SABOR, http://www.sabor.hr/default.aspx?sec=713. 58 Croatia Overview, THE WORLD BANK, http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/croatia/overview. 59 Croatia Economy: Population, GDP, Inflation, Business, Trade, FDI, Corruption, 2016 INDEX OF ECONOMIC FREEDOM, http://www.heritage.org/index/country/croatia. 60 David Binder, U.S. Recognizes 3 Yugoslav Republics as Independent, THE NEW YORK TIMES (April 8, 1992), http://www.nytimes.com/1992/04/08/world/us-recognizes-3-yugoslav-republics-as-independent.html.

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capital, to discuss the prospects for increased regional cooperation.61 This “Zagreb

Summit”62 launched the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP) between the EU

and Croatia.63 The SAP is “the European Union's policy towards the Western Balkans,

established with the aim of eventual EU membership.”64 According to EU leadership, the

Western Balkans include the following nations: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina,

Croatia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and

Kosovo.65 This SAP policy provided Croatia, and other Western Balkan nations, with

considerable financial assistance to stimulate reform efforts.66 The EU’s pre-accession

financial assistance for Croatia focused on building institutions such as “an efficient

justice system and a modern, transparent, citizen-oriented public service.”67 This pre-

accession assistance was also meant to assist Croatia in aligning the country’s laws

with the EU acquis, and to promote economic and social development.68

In October 2001, this Stabilization and Association Process culminated in Croatia

signing a Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) with the EU, which created a

61 The Declaration of the Zagreb Summit, EUROPEAN STABILITY INITIATIVE (November 24, 2000), http://www.esiweb.org/pdf/bridges/bosnia/zagrebsummit24nov2000.pdf. 62 The main accomplishments of the Zagreb Summit were: “Further strengthening the regional cooperation, including the establishment of a free trade area building on [the Central European Free Trade Agreement], improving people to people contacts through visa facilitation and scholarships, as well as continuing financial assistance.” 63 European Commission - Enlargement - Stabilisation and Association Process, EUROPA, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/policy/glossary/terms/sap_en.htm. 64 Id. 65 Western Balkans: Enhancing the European perspective, EUROPA (May 3, 2008), http://trade.ec.europ a.eu/doclib/docs/2008/november/tradoc_141300.pdf. 66 European Commission - Enlargement - Stabilisation and Association Process, supra. 67 Croatia - financial assistance, European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, EUROPA, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/instruments/funding-by-country/croatia/ index_en.htm. 68 Id.

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framework for cooperation between the two entities in the pre-accession period.69 The

objective of this SAA was to “establish a close and lasting relationship based on

reciprocity and mutual interest, which should allow Croatia to formalise and strengthen

the existing relationship” with the EU.70 This SAA covered areas such as human rights,

market economy principles, the four freedoms, and the creation of a free trade area.71

As “the first comprehensive agreement between the EU and Croatia,” this SAA was

comparable to agreements signed by previous candidate countries.72 This SAA entered

into force in February 2005.73

Croatia formally applied for EU membership in 2003, and the Thessaloniki

Summit confirmed Croatia’s accession prospects.74 At this summit the EU provided

“concrete ways in which it [was] willing to support the countries of the Western Balkans

as they move[d] towards European Integration.”75 The EU declared that the Western

Balkans’ accession chances depended upon “the performance of the countries

themselves in a wide range of reforms of their economies, standards of democracy,

human rights, good governance and respect for rule of law.”76 Ten Eastern European

69 Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Croatia, of the other part, EUROPA (February 2, 2005), http://ec.europa.eu/world/agreements/preparecreatetreatiesworks pace/treatiesgeneraldata.do?step=0. 70 Id. 71 Id. 72 Id. 73 Croatia's Path to the EU, CROATIAN PARLIAMENT, http://www.sabor.hr/croatias-path-to-the-eu0001. 74 The EU and the Western Balkans, EUROPEAN COMMISSION AND GENERAL SECRETARIAT OF THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (June 25, 2003), http://www.consilium.europa.e u/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/er/76323.pdf. 75 Id. 76 Press release - The Thessaloniki Summit: a milestone in the European Union's relations with the Western Balkans, EUROPA (June 18, 2003), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_ip-03-860_en.htm.

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nations77 successfully acceded to the EU on May 1, 2004, and the Thessaloniki Summit

was meant to encourage Croatia “to follow the same successful path.”78 However, the

Thessaloniki Summit recognized organized crime and corruption as barriers to Croatia’s

accession to the EU.79 Therefore, the EU encouraged Croatia to implement “major

reforms in areas such as the strengthening of the rule of law, combating organized

crime, corruption and illegal migration, and strengthening administrative capacity in

border control and security of documents.”80

In 2004, the Commission analyzed Croatia’s 2003 application to accede to the

EU, examining Croatia’s ability to comply with the Copenhagen Criteria and conditions

of the Stabilization and Association Process.81 The Commission recommended that

“negotiations for accession to the European Union should be opened with Croatia.”82 In

July 2004 the European Council followed the Commission’s positive opinion on potential

Croatian accession and deemed Croatia “a candidate country for membership and that

the accession process should be launched.”83

The European Council intended to commence accession negotiations with

Croatia in March 2005.84 However, negotiations were postponed because the

77 Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia. 78 European Commission - Press release - Eu-Western Balkans Summit Thessaloniki, 21 June 2003, EUROPA, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_pres-03-163_en.htm. 79 Id. 80 Id. 81 Communication from the Commission - Opinion on Croatia's Application for Membership of the European Union, EUROPA (April 20, 2004), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/lexuriserv/lexur iserv.do?uri=com:2004:0257:fin:en:pdf. 82 Id. 83 Presidency Conclusions of the Brussels European Council, EUROPA (June 17 - 18, 2004), http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/81035.pdf. 84 Id.

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International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) found Croatia was not

making sufficient efforts to capture General Gotovina, who was a fugitive wanted for war

crimes.85 Viewed as a war hero by some Croatians, General Gotovina was indicted in

2001 for murdering hundreds of Serbian civilians and prisoners of war.86 The General

went into hiding, and many nations issued warrants and bounties for his arrest.87

Several EU Member States refused to begin Croatia’s accession process until General

Gotovina was captured, as they suspected Croatia was secretly harboring the fugitive.88

However, in October 2005 the ICTY found Croatia to be in full compliance with the

ICTY, and formal EU accession negotiations were launched the same day.89 The

General was captured a few months later.90

Croatia’s accession process and criteria were different from previous accessions

because the acquis was divided into 35 chapters, instead of the previous 31 chapters.91

The accession processes for countries like Bulgaria and Romania, which successfully

acceded to the EU in 2007, “revealed that shortcomings in key areas such as reform of

the judiciary and the fight against organised crime and corruption had not been fully

85 About the ICTY, ABOUT THE UNITED NATIONS INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, http://www.icty.org/en/about. 86 Croatia Closes Two Chapters in EU Accession Talks, BALKAN INSIGHT (April 20, 2011), http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/croatia-closes-two-chapters-in-eu-accession-talks. 87 EU warns Croatia to help in arrest, PARTITO RADICALE NONVIOLENTO (March 10, 2005), http://www.radicalparty.org/en/content/eu-warns-croatia-help-arrest. 88 Id. 89 Prosecutor's assessment of the co-operation provided by Croatia to the ICTY, UNITED NATIONS INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, http://www.icty.org/en/press/assess ment-prosecutor-co-operation-provided-croatia. 90 Croatian hero Ante Gotovina acquitted of war crimes, THE TELEGRAPH (November 16, 2012), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/croatia/9682855/croatian-hero-ante-gotovina-acquitted-of-war-crimes.html. 91 Vladimir Drobnjak on Croatia: 28th Member of the EU, supra note 55.

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overcome.”92 Therefore, EU policy makers reformed the accession criteria to emphasize

the importance of the “rule of law and the respect for fundamental rights.”93 Specifically,

Chapter 23 was created to mandate reforms in the “judiciary and fundamental rights,”

and the issues presented by this chapter proved difficult for Croatia to address.94

Chapter 23 promotes the EU as “an area of freedom, security and justice.”95 This

chapter states that “an independent and efficient judiciary is of paramount importance,”

as “impartiality, integrity and a high standard of adjudication by the courts are essential

for safeguarding the rule of law.”96 Chapter 23 also addresses corruption, which

“represents a threat to the stability of democratic institutions and the rule of law.”97

Finally, this chapter highlights the importance of ensuring “respect for fundamental

rights and EU citizens’ rights, as guaranteed by the acquis and by the Fundamental

Rights Charter.”98

The June 2007 Croatia Screening Report revealed specific issues which the

country had to remedy to be granted EU membership. This screening report addressed

a variety of Croatia’s Chapter 23 problem areas.99 One area of concern was Croatia’s

“Judicial Impartiality.”100 The report expressed concern regarding “corruption within the

92 The 100% Union: The rise of Chapters 23 and 24, CLINGENDAEL - NETHERLANDS INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (August 2012), http://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/the1 00%union.theriseofchapters23and24.pdf. 93 Id. 94 23 - Judiciary and Fundamental Rights, EUROPEAN POLICY CENTRE, http://www.european policy.org/en/european-policies/23-judiciary-and-fundamental-rights.html. 95 Conditions for membership: Chapters of the acquis, supra note 49. 96 Id. 97 Id. 98 Id. 99 Screening report Croatia - Chapter 23 – Judiciary and fundamental rights, EUROPA (June 27, 2007), http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/croatia/screening_reports/screening_report_23_ hr_internet_en.pdf. 100 Id.

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judiciary,” and “ethnic bias against the Serb minority” within Croatia.101 Additionally, the

report was concerned with the “excessive length of court proceedings in Croatia” and

suggested “alternative mechanisms should be considered that would take the

enforcement process out of the hands of the overloaded courts.”102 Corruption was

another issue which the report labeled “a serious problem in Croatia that affects various

aspects of society” as “general tolerance” of corruption appeared to be “widespread.”103

The June 2007 Croatia Screening Report also revealed outstanding human rights

issues within Croatia, particularly with minority and cultural rights.104 The report stated

that problems persisted in terms of “under-representation of minorities in state

administration, the judiciary and the police.”105 This minority repression particularly

impacted Serb and Roma minority groups.106

In addition to reforming the accession chapters themselves, EU policy makers

also implemented a system of ‘benchmarks’ within those chapters.107 Croatia was the

first country to navigate this new accession system.108 These benchmarks provide

candidate countries with sets of criteria they must meet in order to close accession

chapters.109 Croatia’s accession contained 137 total benchmarks spread throughout the

35 chapters.110 Many of these benchmarks are composed of several sub-benchmark

101 Id. 102 Id. 103 Id. 104 Id. 105 Id. 106 Id. 107 Steps towards joining, European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, EUROPA, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/policy/steps-towards-joining/index_en.htm. 108 Vladimir Drobnjak on Croatia: 28th Member of the EU, supra note 55. 109 Steps towards joining, supra. 110 Vladimir Drobnjak on Croatia: 28th Member of the EU, supra note 55.

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requirements, which meant that Croatia was required to meet in excess of 400 precise

sub-benchmark requirements.111

Various benchmarks contain different requirements a candidate country must

meet.112 Some contain specific action plans, some require legislative reform, and some

require implementation of a new institutional framework.113 Further, the assessment

criteria for benchmark success is not uniform among the 35 chapters. Some

benchmarks contain precise and concrete requirements based upon specific acquis,

where progress is measured by precise legal requirements.114 However, some

benchmarks contain less acquis, and lack precise measurements to determine if a

candidate meets the requisite requirements.115 In the latter case, the EU provides

judges who decide if the candidate country has met that chapter’s requirements.116

From the perspective of a candidate country, the benchmark system provides

advantages as they enhance a candidate country’s credibility regarding their

membership preparedness.117 However, a candidate country may also recognize the

vastly-increased compliance work as a disadvantage of this new system. For example,

Croatia required a negotiating team in excess of 3,000 people in order to successfully

navigate this extensive benchmark system.118

111 Id. 112 Id. 113 Id. 114 Id. 115 Id. 116 Id. 117 Id. 118 Id.

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Croatia’s acquis screening process began in October 2005.119 This screening

process “is a preparatory phase of accession negotiations.”120 Executed by the

Commission and Croatia, the screening process allowed Croatia “to familiarise

themselves with the acquis and, subsequently, to indicate their level of alignment with

EU legislation and outline plans for further alignment.”121 The screening process

indicated on which chapters Croatia was aligned with the acquis, and which chapters

required further reform efforts. The screening process was closed in October 2006.122

In February 2008 the Council of the European Union executed an Accession

Partnership with Croatia.123 This agreement detailed “the principles and priorities for the

country’s accession preparations, with particular reference to implementation of the

acquis.”124 This agreement emphasized Croatia’s compliance with the Copenhagen

Criteria, the Stabilization and Association Process, the Zagreb Declaration, the

Thessaloniki agenda, and the negotiation framework adopted in October 2005.125

Though authorities believed Croatia might enjoy a rapid accession to the EU, a

Croatia-Slovenia border dispute disrupted the negotiation process for approximately ten

months.126 Slovenia and Croatia have a “long-running border dispute over a tiny bay

119 Principles governing the negotiations, EUROPA (October 3, 2005), http://ec.europa.eu/enlarg ement/pdf/croatia/st20004_05_hr_framedoc_en.pdf. 120 European Commission - Enlargement - Screening of the acquis, EUROPA, http://ec.europa .eu/enlargement/policy/glossary/terms/screening_en.htm. 121 Id. 122 EU-Croatia relations, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/candidate-countries/croatia/eu_croatia_relations_en.htm. 123 Accession Partnership with Croatia, EUROPA (February 12, 2008), http://eur-lex.europa. eu/legal-content/en/txt/html/?uri=uriserv:e50024. 124 Id. 125 Id. 126 Slovenia to block Croatia EU accession talks, EU OBSERVER (December 18, 2008), https://euobserver.com/enlargement/27314.

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named Piran,”127 and have fought “over their common border since they broke away

from the former Yugoslavia in 1991.”128 Having acceded to the EU in 2004, Slovenia

effectively blocked Croatia’s accession negotiation process, as a chapter may not be

opened or closed without the approval of each existing EU Member State.129 In 2009

Slovenia blocked the opening of three accession chapters,130 claiming maps that

Croatia had provided as part of its accession documents were inaccurate.131 Both

countries eventually agreed to arbitration, and Slovenia removed its blockade of

Croatia’s accession in November 2009.132 This successful blockade illustrates how a

single EU Member State may stall a candidate country’s accession process.

In June 2011, the Council of the European Union closed Croatia’s final four

negotiating chapters, marking “the successful completion of a negotiating process that

lasted more than five years.”133 Croatia signed the Accession Treaty with the European

Union on December 9, 2011.134 However, the Croatian constitution requires a

referendum to be held when Croatia considers executing a political union which will

reduce Croatian sovereignty, like acceding to the EU.135 A referendum is defined as “a

127 Id. 128 A Balkan state in balk, THE ECONOMIST (April 16, 2009), http://www.economist.com/node /13497022. 129 Slovenia, EUROPA, http://europa.eu/about-eu/countries/member-countries/slovenia/index _en.htm. 130 On the environment, on fisheries, and on foreign, security and defence policy. 131 Slovenia-Croatia border row heats up, BBC NEWS (February 18, 2009), http://news.bbc.co. uk/2/hi/europe/7896040.stm. 132 Slovenia Fears Croatia's Bidding Round Launch Would Jeopardize Maritime Dispute, NATURAL GAS EUROPE, http://www.naturalgaseurope.com/croatia-slovenia-maritime-dispute. 133 Accession Conference at Ministerial level closes negotiations with Croatia, EUROPA (June 30, 2011), http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/genaff/123336 .pdf. 134 Id. 135 Constitution of the Republic of Croatia (consolidated text), CROATIAN PARLIAMENT (July 6, 2010), www.sabor.hr/fgs.axd?id=17074.

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public vote on a particular issue.”136 This particular referendum ballot asked: “Do you

support the Republic of Croatia's membership of the European Union?”137 The Croatian

Constitution declares that if a simple majority of voting Croatian citizens responded

“yes,” then this decision would bind the Croatian Parliament.138 The referendum was

held on January 22, 2012, and 66.27% of voting Croatian citizens supported Croatia’s

accession to the EU.139 For a candidate country to accede to the EU, their “accession

must be approved unanimously by the Council and must receive the consent of the

European Parliament. The treaty is then signed and ratified by each of the EU countries

and by the acceding country, each according to its own constitutional procedures.”140

Croatia officially acceded to the EU on July 1, 2013.141

Part IV — Examining Turkey’s attempted accession In contrast to Croatia’s relatively seamless accession process, Turkey’s hopeful

accession to the EU has lingered for decades. Some commentators doubt Turkey will

ever meet the requisite criteria for accession, and “the EU is divided over whether

Turkey should join at all.”142 We will briefly overview relevant Turkish history and

economics before detailing the country’s accession issues.

136 Simple Definition of 'referendum', MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com /dictionary/referendum. 137 Croatia EU referendum: Voters back membership, BBC NEWS (January 22, 2012), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-16670298. 138 Constitution of the Republic of Croatia (consolidated text), supra note 135. 139 Croatia's Path to the EU, supra note 74. 140 Joining the EU — the accession process, EUROPA, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/txt/?uri=uriserv:l14536. 141 Detailed Country Information - Croatia, EUROPA, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/countri es/detailed-country-information/croatia/index_en.htm. 142 EU enlargement: The next seven, BBC NEWS (September 2, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/ news/world-europe-11283616.

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Turkey’s modern government is a republican parliamentary democracy

containing Executive, Legislative, and Judicial branches.143 The current President is

Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and the current Prime Minister is Ahmet Davutoğlu.144 Turkey’s

“largely free-market economy is increasingly driven” by industrial and service sectors,

though “its traditional agriculture sector still accounts for about 25% of employment.”145

The Turkish economy has slowed in recent years, as demand has weakened in Europe,

“Turkey’s most important export market.”146 Turkey’s 2015 GDP per capita was

$20,500, considerably lower than most EU Member States.147 Located at the

crossroads between eastern Europe and western Asia, Turkey is a nation of great

geopolitical importance. With Syria and Iraq to the south, Iran and the Caucuses to the

east, and Greece to the west, Turkey’s neighborhood contains a great amount of

instability.

With the 1922 fall of the Ottoman Empire, Mustafa Kemal led Turkey’s drive

towards modernity.148 Kemal “introduced a broad range of reforms in the political, social,

legal, economic, and cultural spheres.”149 The 1923 Treaty of Lausanne established

borders and created the modern Republic of Turkey, the “successor state to the

143 Government & Politics in Turkey - The Turkish Republic established by Ataturk, TURIZM.NET, http://www.turizm.net/turkey/info/government.html. 144 Erdogan Loyalist Is Nominated to Be Turkey’s Prime Minister, THE NEW YORK TIMES (May 19, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/20/world/europe/binali-yildirim-turkey-prime-minister.html. 145 The World Factbook: Turkey, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (May 10, 2016), https ://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/tu.html. 146 Id. 147 Id. 148 M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, Atatürk: An Intellectual Biography (2011). 149 A Brief Outline of Turkish History, A BRIEF OUTLINE OF TURKISH HISTORY, http://www.turki shculture.org/general-1067.htm.

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Ottoman Empire.”150 The Ottoman Empire colonized “vast territories in North Africa, the

Balkans, and the Middle East” over a period of five centuries.151 Under the Treaty of

Lausanne, modern Turkey relinquished any claims to former Ottoman colonies such as

Cyprus.152 However, Turkey invaded Cyprus in 1974, and Cyprus remains divided in

2016.153 This paper will further examine the contentious Cyprus issue below.

In 1959, Turkey applied for an Association Agreement (AA) with the EEC.154

Such association agreements often “prepare [a nation] for future membership in the

European Union.”155 For example, Croatia signed an Association Agreement with the

EU in 2005, which led to Croatia’s eventual accession to the EU.156 Turkey’s AA

negotiations culminated in the 1963 Ankara Agreement, which set standards that

Turkey must fulfill in order to eventually become an EU Member State.157

The Ankara Agreement sought to strengthen “trade and economic relations”

between Turkey and the European Economic Community, while ensuring “an

accelerated development of the Turkish economy” and improvement in “the level of

employment and the living conditions of the Turkish people.”158 Article 5 of the Ankara

150 The World Factbook: Turkey, supra note 145. 151 Ottoman Empire, NEW WORLD ENCYCLOPEDIA (March 5, 2015), http://www.newworld encyclopedia.org/entry/ottoman_empire. 152 Treaties of Sèvres and Lausanne, ALL ABOUT TURKEY, http://www.allaboutturkey .com/antlasma.htm. 153 Cyprus peace deal could come this year, confirm Turkey and US, THE GUARDIAN (March 28, 2016), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/29/cyprus-peace-deal-could-come-this-year-confirm-turkey-and-us. 154 EU-Croatia relations, supra note 123. 155 Association Agreements, EUROPEAN EXTERNAL ACTION SERVICE, http://eeas.europa.eu/a ssociation/. 156 EU-Croatia relations, supra note 123. 157 EU-Turkey relations, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/candidate-countries/turkey/eu_turkey_relations_en.htm. 158 Agreement Establishing an Association Between the EEC and Turkey, EUROPA (September 12, 1963), http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/turkey/association_agreement_1964_en.pdf.

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Agreement declared that a “customs union between Turkey and the Community” should

eventually be established. This agreement was meant to “align the economic policies of

Turkey and the Community more closely,” with the ultimate goal of Turkish accession

into the European Economic Community.159 The Ankara Agreement was supplemented

by a 1970 Additional Protocol, which established reciprocal “conditions, arrangements

and timetables for implementing” the customs union.160 This customs union would

abolish “tariffs and quotas on goods circulating between Turkey and the EEC.”161 It also

called for the elimination of “quantitative restrictions on imports and all measures having

equivalent effect.”162

In 1987 Turkey formally applied to join the EEC.163 However, the Commission

rejected Turkey’s application at that time, stating that

“Turkey's economic and political situation, as far as the Commission can

evaluate it in the last quarter of 1989, does not convince it that the

adjustment problems which would confront Turkey if it were to accede to

the Community could be overcome in the medium term, despite the

positive features of the recent developments in Turkey.”164

The Commission cited a “substantial development gap between the Community and

159 Id. 160 Additional Protocol and Financial Protocol signed on 23 November 1970, EUROPA (December 29, 1972), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/txt/html/?uri=celex:21970a11 23(01). 161 Candidate and Potential Candidate Countries, EUROMED, http://www.euromed.be/sit e/index.php?id=72. 162 Additional Protocol and Financial Protocol signed on 23 November 1970, supra. 163 EU-Turkey relations, supra note 157. 164 Making Sense of the Anomalies in Turkish-European Union Relations, JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RESEARCH, http://www.fatih.edu.tr/~jesr/jesr.aral..pdf.

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Turkey” and Turkey’s “low level of productivity” as reasons the country was not

prepared for accession to the EEC.165 However, this rejection “did not preclude the

possibility of Turkish accession at a future date.”166

The Commission also rejected Turkey’s 1987 application due to political

concerns.167 The Commission took issue with Turkey’s human rights, social rights, and

minority rights, stating that the country “fell short of EEC norms” in those categories.168

Amnesty International, a non-governmental organization, published a 1991 report

documenting these issues.169 The report highlighted widespread systematic torture,

protracted police custody in contravention of international law, and “extrajudicial

executions and ‘disappearances’ in Southeast Turkey.”170 The Southeast Turkey killings

were directed towards the Kurdish minority, which has an adversarial and violent

relationship with the majority Turkish population.171

In January 1996 the long-contemplated EEC-Turkish Customs Union came into

force, and Turkey abolished “all duties and equivalent charges on imports of industrial

goods and processed agricultural products” imported from EU Member States into

Turkey.172 For the customs union to take effect, Turkey accepted a large amount of

acquis in “aspects relating to customs, trade policy, competition and the protection of

165 Id. 166 Id. 167 Id. 168 Commission of the European Communities - Commission opinion on Turkey's request for accession to the Community, CVEE (December 20, 1989), http://www.cvce.eu/content/ publication/2005/2/4/4cc1acf8-06b2-40c5-bb1e-bb3d4860e7c1/publishable_en.pdf. 169 Turkey: Torture, Extrajudicial Executions, "Disapearances", AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL (April 30, 1992), https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/eur44/039/1992/en/. 170 Id. 171 Id. 172 Making Sense of the Anomalies in Turkish-European Union Relations, supra note 164.

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intellectual, industrial and commercial property.”173 This was an historic step which

“extended the scope and depth of Turkey-EU relations,”174 and “opened the Turkish

market of 65 million consumers to EU companies.”175 However, at the 1997

Luxembourg summit EU leaders enunciated several reforms which Turkey had to

implement before Turkey would be considered for EU accession.176 These included

political and economic reforms, improved treatment of its Kurdish minority, and

improved relations with Cyprus, including “support for United Nations mediation efforts

in Cyprus.”177

In December 1999, the Helsinki summit of the European Council officially

declared that Turkey was “a candidate State destined to join the Union on the basis of

the same criteria as applied to the other candidate States.”178 In the same meeting, that

European Council stated that Turkey would “benefit from a pre-accession strategy to

stimulate and support its reforms,” including “enhanced political dialogue . . . with

particular reference to the issue of human rights.”179 In the Presidency Conclusion from

the Helsinki Summit, the European Council reaffirmed “the importance of human rights,”

directing special attention should be paid “to the improvement of the situation of those

groups which do not form a majority in any State.”180

173 Turkey's pre-accession strategy, EUROPA, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/txt/? uri=uriserv:e40113. 174 Making Sense of the Anomalies in Turkish-European Union Relations, supra note 164. 175 Birol A Yesilada, Turkey's Candidacy for EU Membership, MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL 56.1 (2002), http://www.jstor.org/stable/4329722. 176 Id. 177 Id. 178 Helsinki European Council 10 and 11 December 1999: Conclusions of the Presidency, EUROPA (December 10 - 11, 1999), http://www.europarl.europa .eu/summits/hel1_ en.htm. 179 Id. 180 Id.

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In 2001 the Turkish government adopted “Turkey’s National Programme, which

set out her priorities and objectives for the necessary transformation of the country in

order to prepare” for EU membership.181 The purpose of the National Programme was

for Turkey to monitor “the work underway for harmonization” with the acquis.182 In

another step forward for Turkey, the 2002 Copenhagen European Council conclusions

stated that the EU would open accession negotiations with Turkey should the 2004

Commission find “Turkey fulfills the Copenhagen political criteria.”183 At this point, the

EU significantly increased its “pre-accession financial assistance for Turkey.”184 The

Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA) is the vehicle by which “the EU supports

reforms in the 'enlargement countries' with financial and technical help.”185 IPA provides

financial assistance through five channels: “transition assistance and institution building,

cross-border cooperation (CBC), regional development, human resource development

and rural development.”186

However, in December 2006 tensions arose between Turkey and Cyprus, which

further delayed Turkey’s potential accession.187 These two countries have experienced

discord for decades, as Turkey “does not recognize the Cypriot government, which

181 Turkey - EU Relations in the Aftermath of the Helsinki Summit, ANKARA REVIEW OF EUROPEAN STUDIES (Fall 2002), http://dergiler.ankara.edu.tr/dergiler/16/8/404.pdf. 182 Id. 183 Copenhagen European Council - 12 and 13 December 2002 - Presidency Conclusions, EUROPA (January 29, 2003) http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressda ta/en/ec/73842.pdf. 184 Id. 185 Overview - Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance, EUROPA, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargem ent/instruments/overview/index_en.htm. 186 Id. 187 Detailed Country Information - Turkey, European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, EUROPA, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/countries/detailed-country-information/turkey/index_en.htm.

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joined the EU in 2004.”188 The EU stated that Turkey must accept and implement an

Additional Protocol to the Ankara Agreement, which would apply the decades-old

agreement to new EU members.189 However, Turkey refused to apply this Additional

Protocol to Cyprus, which had recently acceded to the EU.190 Turkey denied port and

airport access to traffic from Cyprus.191 In response, the EU froze “accession talks in

eight policy areas” to punish Turkey, stating that until Turkey applies the Additional

Protocol to Cyrus “eight negotiation chapters will not be opened and no chapter will be

provisionally closed.”192

As a consequence of these unresolved tensions, in 2009 Cyprus blocked the EU

from opening several chapters in Turkey’s accession negotiations.193 In particular,

Cyprus blocked “the opening of the energy chapter in response to threats and efforts of

the Turkish government to prohibit Cyprus from engaging in exploration of oil reserves

in the southern coastal area of Cyprus.”194 The tensions with Cyprus continue to plague

Turkey’s accession efforts, and provides another example of a single Member State

blocking a candidate country’s accession hopes.

Despite the Cyprus setbacks, in May 2012 the EU and Turkey launched a

188 Cyprus threatens EU-Turkey refugee deal, POLITICO (March 11, 2016), http://www.polit ico.eu/article/cyprus-turkey-refugees-referendum-greece-migrants-accession-chapters/. 189 Detailed Country Information - Turkey, supra note 187. 190 Id. 191 Turkey 'will open up to Cyprus', BBC NEWS (December 7, 2006), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/ europe/6216498.stm. 192 Detailed Country Information - Turkey, supra note 187. 193 Fule urges Turkey to implement Additional Protocol, FAMAGUSTA GAZETTE (February 27, 2013), http://famagusta-gazette.com/fule-urges-turkey-to-implement-additional-protocol-p18332-69.htm. 194 Cyprus Sets Stumbling Blocks to Turkey’s Accession Negotiations, THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS (July 27, 2009), http://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/cyprus-european-union-turkey-cyprus-sets-stumbling-blocks-to-turkeys-accession-negotiations/.

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“positive agenda” aimed to “keep the accession process alive and put it properly back

on track after a period of stagnation.”195 The two sides focused this positive reset on

“political reforms, alignment with EU law, dialogue on foreign policy, visa, mobility and

migration, trade, energy, and counter terrorism.”196 However, progress again stalled in

July 2012, when Cyprus took the position of the Presidency of the Council of the

European Union, which is a six-month rotating position.197 At that time, “Turkey refused

to talk to the Cyprus authorities” who held the position.198 At the time of writing, only 14

chapters199 are open for Turkey to negotiate, and one chapter200 has been provisionally

closed.201

While Turkey officially remains a candidate country for EU accession,

controversial topics plague Turkey’s accession opportunities.202 One such topic is that

of refugee migration. At the time of writing, millions of refugees are displaced by the

Syrian civil war and larger regional instability.203 Many refugees migrate north through

Turkey and into Europe. The Syrian refugee crisis began in 2011, and it is estimated

195 Positive EU-Turkey agenda launched in Ankara, European Commission - Press release, EUROPA (May 17, 2012), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_memo-12-359_en.htm. 196 Key findings of the 2012 progress report on Turkey, European Commission, EUROPA (October 10, 2012), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_memo-12-771_en.htm?locale=en. 197 Turkey talks tough on Cyprus EU presidency, DW.COM (July 1, 2012), http://www.dw.com/en/turkey-talks-tough-on-cyprus-eu-presidency/a-16060297. 198 EU enlargement: The next seven, supra note 142. 199 Free Movement of Capital, Company Law, Intellectual Property Law, Information Society and Media, Food Safety - Veterinary & Phytosanitary Policy, Taxation, Statistics, Enterprise & Industrial Policy, Trans-European Networks, Environment, Consumer & Health Protection, Financial Control, Regional policy & coordination of structural instruments, Economic and Monetary Policy. 200 Science and Research. 201 Detailed Country Information - Turkey, supra note 187. 202 EU enlargement: The next seven, supra note 142. 203 Migrant crisis: Migration to Europe explained in seven charts, BBC NEWS (March 4, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34131911.

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that Turkey now shelters “almost three million refugees.”204 Additionally, 2014 saw an

“unprecedented increase in asylum applications from Afghans, Iraqis and Iranians.”205

Many refugees travel by boat from Turkey to Greece, and more than 143,000 refugees

made that dangerous journey in the first three months of 2016.206 In the EU itself,

Germany alone accepted more than one million migrants in 2015.207

Turkey and the EU are coordinating to address the migrant crisis, and in March

2016 the two sides reached a deal to stem the flow of migrants.208 On March 18, 2016

the European Council met with Turkish Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu, and the two

sides agreed to critical action points to combat the illegal smuggling of refugees across

the Aegean Sea.209 First, the agreement established a protocol for the return of

migrants, stating “all new irregular migrants crossing from Turkey into Greek islands as

from 20 March 2016 will be returned to Turkey.”210 Second, the agreement provides a

“one-for-one” resettlement mechanism, whereby “for every Syrian being returned to

Turkey from Greek islands, another Syrian will be resettled from Turkey to the EU taking

into account the UN Vulnerability Criteria.”211 This vulnerability criteria gives priority to

204 Turkey and EU agree outline of 'one in, one out' deal over Syria refugee crisis, THE GUARDIAN (March 8, 2016), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/08/european-leaders-agree-outlines-of-refugee-deal-with-turkey. 205 2015 UNHCR country operations profile - Turkey, THE UN REFUGEE AGENCY, http://www. unhcr.org/pages/49e48e0fa7f.html. 206 Migrant crisis: EU-Turkey deal comes into effect, BBC NEWS (March 20, 2016), http://www .bbc.com/news/world-europe-35854413. 207 Migrant crisis: Majority would welcome refugees, BBC NEWS (May 19, 2016), http://www .bbc.com/news/world-europe-36328566. 208 European Council Conclusions March 2016, DELEGATION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION TO THE UNITED STATES (March 17-18, 2016), http://www.euintheus.org/press-media/main-results-of-the-european-council-3/. 209 Id. 210 EU-Turkey statement, European Council, EUROPA (March 18, 2016), http://www.consilium. eur opa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/03/18-eu-turkey-statement/. 211 Id.

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refugees with medical needs, as well as “elderly asylum-seekers and women, girls and

children at risk.”212 The third action point states that Turkey will take measures to

prevent the establishment of “new sea or land routes for illegal migration.”213 Fourth, the

agreement states that a Voluntary Humanitarian Admission Scheme will be activated

“once irregular crossings between Turkey and the EU are ending or at least have been

substantially and sustainably reduced.”214 European Commission President Jean-

Claude Juncker stated that, pursuant to this Voluntary Humanitarian Admission

Scheme, EU Member States would offer temporary protection to vulnerable people

fleeing violent conflict in Syria, in line with each Member State’s individual capacity.215

Fifth, the agreement provides a visa liberalization roadmap whereby Turkish nationals

gain “access to the Schengen passport-free zone” by June 2016.216 The seventh action

point states the EU and Turkey will “re-energise the accession process,” opening

Chapter 33 “during the Netherlands presidency.”217 The Presidency of the Council of the

European Union is a six-month rotating position, which the Netherlands holds “in the

first half of 2016.”218 Additionally, the agreement calls for an acceleration of the opening

of additional chapters.219 Finally, the agreement calls for EU-Turkish cooperation “to

212 Implementation of Turkey-EU Agreement of 18 March 2016, REPUBLIC OF TURKEY MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/implementation-of-turkey_eu-agreement-of-18-march-2016.en.mfa. 213 EU-Turkey statement, supra note 210. 214 Id. 215 Commission presents Recommendation for a Voluntary Humanitarian Admission Scheme with Turkey for refugees from Syria, EUROPEAN COMMISSION (December 15, 2015), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_ip-15-6330_en.htm. 216 Migrant crisis: EU-Turkey deal comes into effect, supra note 206. 217 EU-Turkey statement, supra note 210. 218 The Netherlands and the EU Presidency, THE NETHERLANDS EU PRESIDENCY 2016, http://english.eu2016.nl/eu-presidency. 219 EU-Turkey statement, supra note 210.

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improve humanitarian conditions inside Syria,” particularly in providing safe havens near

the Turkish border.220

After examining the long history between Turkey and the EU, your correspondent

believes the current Syrian migrant crisis provides a unique opportunity for Turkey to

improve the nation’s case for EU accession. Increased Turkish-EU collaboration, which

is a necessity to properly address the crisis, could lead to reduction in tensions and

improved understanding between the parties. Turkey must seize this opportunity to

demonstrate their willingness and capacity to work with EU policymakers.

Part V — Forward guidance for current and potential accession candidates

After examining Croatia and Turkey’s respective accession processes, several

themes emerged which will provide value for current and potential candidate countries

for EU accession. Before highlighting said themes, we will briefly overview the current

and potential candidate countries.

As of May 2016, the current candidate countries are Albania, Macedonia,

Montenegro, Serbia, and Turkey.221 Additionally, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo

are potential candidate countries for EU accession.222 Except for Turkey, these

candidate and potential candidate countries are all Western Balkan states, and

therefore enjoy a supportive disposition from the EU.223 The European Council

confirmed this notion at the 2003 Thessaloniki Summit, stating that the “future of the

220 Id. 221 On the road to EU membership, EUROPA, http://europa.eu/about-eu/countries/index_en.htm. 222 Id. 223 European Commission - Press release - Eu-Western Balkans Summit Thessaloniki, 21 June 2003, supra note 79.

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Balkans is within the European Union.”224 However, “accession criteria are identical for

all countries and remain those defined by the 1993 Copenhagen European Council.”225

In June 1999 the European Council established the Stabilisation and Association

Process for the Western Balkans, a “common strategy for South-Eastern Europe”226

which provides the “framework for the European course of the Western Balkan

countries, all the way to their future accession.”227

We will now highlight relevant themes that emerged from examining Croatia and

Turkey’s respective accession processes. First, many EU Member States are suffering

from “enlargement fatigue,” as the EU added thirteen new Member States between

2004 and 2013.228 Jean-Claude Juncker, President of the European Commission from

2014 to 2019, declared that although “ongoing negotiations will continue, and notably

the Western Balkans will need to keep a European perspective,” “no further

enlargement will take place over the next five years.”229 Juncker stated that the EU must

pause its enlargement process so they may “digest the addition of 13 member states in

the past 10 years.”230

The second theme is that candidate countries must resolve corruption issues

224 Id. 225 Acceding and candidate countries, European Commission, EUROPA, http://ec.europa.eu /economy_fin ance/international/non_eu/candidate/index_en.htm. 226 The stabilisation and association process, EUROPA, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/txt/?uri=uriserv:r18003. 227 European Commission - Press release - Eu-Western Balkans Summit Thessaloniki, 21 June 2003, supra note 79. 228 Juncker's enlargement standstill threatens the EU's credibility, EUROPE'S WORLD (November 12, 2015), http://europesworld.org/2015/11/12/junckers-enlargement-standstill-threatens-eus-credibility/#.vz9pczmrje4. 229 Id. 230 My priorities, JEAN-CLAUDE JUNCKER, http://juncker.epp.eu/my-priorities.

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before the EU will allow them to accede. Vladimir Drobnjak, Croatia’s Chief Negotiator

for Accession Negotiations with the European Union, stated that Chapter 23 proved the

most difficult for Croatia to address.231 Chapter 23 names corruption and organized

crime as threats “to the stability of democratic institutions and the rule of law.”232

Transparency International, a non-governmental organization “leading the fight against

corruption,”233 publishes an annual Corruption Perceptions Index which indicates a

country’s “perceived level of public sector corruption on a scale of 0 (highly corrupt) to

100 (very clean).”234 According to Transparency International,” the average corruption

score for current EU candidate countries235 is 40.8 out of 100.236 Additionally, the

average corruption score for potential candidate countries237 is 35.5 out of 100.238

These scores are in stark contrast to EU Member States such as Denmark, which has a

world-best corruption score of 91.239 Therefore it is evident that current candidate

countries and potential candidate countries must enact substantial reforms to combat

corruption.

A third theme is the importance of timing in opening negotiations on Chapters 23

and 24. The current and potential candidate countries have corruption issues which

must be addressed prior to their accession, as evidenced by the Corruption Perceptions

231 Vladimir Drobnjak on Croatia: 28th Member of the EU, supra note 55. 232 Id. 233 About - Transparency International - The Global Anti-Corruption Coalition, TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, http://www.transparency.org/about/. 234 Corruption by Country / Territory, TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, http://www.transp arency.org/country/. 235 Albania, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Turkey. 236 Corruption by Country / Territory, supra. 237 Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo. 238 Corruption by Country / Territory, supra. 239 Id.

34

Index.240 Given the long term nature of corruption reforms, there are strong arguments

in favor “of opening these chapters earlier in the negotiations process.”241

In conclusion, after examining Croatia and Turkey’s respective accession

processes, it is clear that current and potential candidate countries for EU accession

must enact substantial reforms in regards to corruption and human rights. Additionally,

each country must take steps to begin Chapter 23 and 24 negotiations early in their

accession process, as these chapters will require significant reform efforts and

potentially protracted negotiations with EU leadership.

240 Id. 241 The 100% Union: The rise of Chapters 23 and 24, supra note 93.