1

Revolutions as a Cause of War Initiation and

Becoming a Target

Michał Kuź, Ph. D. (Lazarski University)

Abstract

The mainstream literature on revolutions points to the conclusion that within about five years from the onset of

a revolution the probability that a given country will be involved in a military interstate dispute rises

dramatically. However, there are no clear conclusions regarding the probability of becoming an instigator or a

target of a conflict. The aim of my project is to examine which variables determine the exact type of military

actions that the post-revolutionary state becomes involved in. My working hypothesis is that the geopolitical

and economic factors, which shape a given states influence within its immediate international surrounding,

play a pivotal role. Thus I arrive at a twofold typology of revolutions. The “hegemonic revolutions” (China,

Russia, France) are generally more rare, however, when they do occur they create a powerful incentive on the

part of the local hegemon to reshape its whole regional environment and thus become an instigator of military

conflicts. The “peripheral revolutions”, on the other hand, are seen by local hegemons as a threat to their

influence and thus make the post-revolutionary regimes a likely target of aggression. Interestingly, the same set

of variables that contribute to a revolutionary overflow in the international environment create strategic

incentives for both spreading revolutions and trying to quenching them depending on the geopolitical situation.

In my work I draw both from the recent quantitative databases on revolutions and present case studies

ncluding recent conflicts in Ukraine.

Introduction

Revolutions represent dramatic domestic changes and these can have similarly dramatic

effects in the international system. Maoz (1996, 120) aptly noted that “since the French

Revolution, virtually every state that has undergone a major political revolution leading to

regime change found itself in an international war within five years of that change.” This

finding, however, is more than an artifact of the French Revolution as there was the Cromwellian

wars with Scotland and Ireland following the Revolution of 1642-1649, the continent shaking

revolutions of 1848 in Europe, the struggle for territory in Eastern Europe between the Soviet

Union and Poland in 1920, and the outbreak of World War II following the Fascist and National

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Socialist revolutions in Italy and Germany (Kenyon 2000, Weyland 2009, Davies, 2003,

DeFronzo, 2011).

One can even see a hint of this process with the Russian Federation’s interference in

Ukrainian politics and annexation of Crimea or in the recent ISIS revolutions. Especially the

Russian actions were triggered by Ukraine’s efforts to break with the regional status quo and

align the state with the West rather than continuing to fall under the influence of Russia.

Revolutions create fundamental changes, which lead to new equilibria in both domestic and

international politics. The question addressed in this paper is how precisely do these radical

changes at the state level impact interstate conflict?

At their core, revolutions are different from other forms of regime change, which do not

seek to radically alter the status quo. In addition to changing which elites control the state,

revolutions serve as a broader break impacting how states view themselves and are viewed by

others. Revolutions include dramatic change in the political, economic, and social dynamics and

orientation of a state. Maoz (1996:92) highlights this point noting that one finds a “drastic shift

both in the foreign policy orientation of the state and in the attitude of the international

environment to the new polity.”

The dramatic change central to a revolution is frequently paired with a domestic impetus to

spread the new ideology, as well as a reactionary concern in neighboring sates that the spread of

this new ideology will involve violence or threaten the longevity of established political and

social institutions. In addition, revolutionary states often appear to be more capable than their

predecessors. Goldstone (1982, 201) noted that:

“it is widely agreed that full-scale revolutions, whether liberal or

socialist, from the American colonies to the Chinese republic, have

led to more centralized, more powerful governments than had

existed under the old regime.”

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In general, then, revolutions produce new states possessing an ideology that they want to spread

and are considered more capable in terms of organizing the populace for the promotion of the

cause both at home and abroad.

While post-revolutionary states are more capable than their predecessor regime, they are not

all equal in terms of power in the international system. Revolutions can occur in states both

major and minor and this plays an important role in the type of conflict one would expect to see

following a revolutionary movement. Clearly the stronger the state is the more capable it is to

forcibly alter the international environment, i.e France following the overthrow of the monarchy.

When a revolutionary state is a minor power, however, it would be less likely to be perceived as

a military threat to its neighbors. In such cases, a weaker revolutionary state is more likely to be

the target of more powerful non-revolutionary states seeking to maintain the status quo, i.e. the

United States support for Bay of Pigs Invasion following the Cuban Revolution or the Soviet

Union’s intervention during the Prague Spring of 1968.

This framework expects post-revolutionary states to become involved in interstate conflict

but whether the revolutionary state is the instigator or the target will vary based on the

capabilities of the revolutionary state. The more powerful revolutionary states will initiate

conflicts in an attempt to alter the political environment and spread their new ideology. Weaker

revolutionary states will be targeted by larger states in an attempt to minimize the threat they

pose to the interstate system, or restore the pre-revolutionary order. The following sections of

this paper will analyze the theoretical explanations of the process following a (preliminary)

analysis based on the data set proposed by Jeff Colgan (2012).

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Spreading the word

According to Katzenstein (1996) and Wendt (1994, 1995) states choose to engage in conflict

based on their rational interests as well as acknowledging similar or dissimilar collective

identities and political ideologies. A revolution is marked by a drastic shift in such identities and

thus can lead to war. Part of this change is related to regime type, which is a robust predictor of

conflict behavior but perhaps more important is the liberal nature of these regimes.

When compared to non-liberal states, liberal states are both dyadically and monadically

peaceful, i.e. they are less likely to engage in an armed conflict even with states that possess a

completely different type of ideology and regime (Danilovic and Clare, 2007). Therefore,

iIrrespective of procedural democracy, the liberal ideology of the regime is a stronger predictor

of dyadic peace. Interestingly, however, a number of scholars and thinkers such as Tocqueville

(2008/1856), Pincus (2008), Zimmerman (1990) and Goldstone (1982) point out that a majority

of revolutionary states initially reduce the amount of freedom present in the society by applying

violence to legitimize the dramatic political, economic, and social break that came with their

regime change, thus making the revolutionary state less liberal. This implies that these regimes

may be more prone to engage in interstate conflict.

Based on the democratic peace literature, see Chan (2010) for an overview, one can also

expect an increased likelihood of interstate conflict when a non-democratic revolutionary state

emerges. Moreover, a democratic, or aspiring democratic state that has been recently formed and

is still in the process of regime transition is more likely to participate in war (Danilovic and

Calare 2007). This disposition to interstate conflict can be stronger when the immediate states

neighboring a revolutionary state consist of non-revolutionary regime types (Sambanis 2001).

Such a claim is not tantamount to acknowledging that ideology on its own causes the post-

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revolutionary war; rather, it is more likely that along with other variables ideology significantly

contributes to the decision to start, or become the target of, an interstate military dispute.

An additional impact of revolutionary change in a state is a greater likelihood of

rekindling previous conflicts, especially those that in the past had resulted in a defeat. Firstly, a

lost war increases dissatisfaction with the predecessor regime and weakens the state through a

loss of resources and prestige. This dissatisfaction creates a favorable environment for a

revolutionary movement seeking radical change to succeed (Skocpol 1976). Secondly, a

revolutionary political agenda often contains a political message promising to restore the power

lost by the pre-revolutionary regime, as well as settling the score with its previous adversary. A

successful revolution creates a push to assert the dissatisfaction of the population more openly.

Revolution and types of military involvement

The term, revolution, while generally discussed, as a radical change still requires a clear

definition for this project. For the sake of this study we shall use a fairly broad understanding of

this term proposed by Charles Tilly (1973). As Tilly writes:

“A revolution begins when a government previously under the

control of a single, sovereign polity becomes the object of

effective, competing, mutually exclusive claims from two or more

separate polities. A revolution ends when a single polity – by no

means, necessarily, the same one-regains control over the

government” (1973, 439).

The advantage of this definition is that it encompasses a wide variety of possible sudden

developments in internal politics and avoids an ideological bias. For instance, since the

nineteenth century research done by Tocqueville (2008/1856, 2010/1840, 2005/1893) the word

“revolution” has become associated with a change in regime followed by democratization.

Nevertheless, a forceful and violent revolutionary change can yield many different results, which

the recent event in the Middle East and North Africa made palpably visible.

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Classical political thought saw a revolution as a change occurring along a spectrum of

democratic and non-democratic outcomes (Aristotle 1962; Arendt 2006). Such a change can

move a given regime in various directions both democratic and authoritarian. For instance,

changing a democracy into an oligarchy, or transforming a monarchy into a democracy. In

addition to other advantages, Tilly’s definition draws attention to the fact that revolutions are

intimately tied with international relations. For instance, unless a state is conquered and annexed

in its entirety, the victorious party will need to establish a new government favorable to the

interests of the conqueror.

The conclusion that revolutions and sudden regime changes can increase the likelihood of

becoming involved in an interstate conflict is well established. Two critical bodies of research on

this are Maoz’s Domestic Sources of Global Change (1996) and Stephen M. Walt’s Revolution

and War (1996). Both authors observe an increased likelihood of interstate conflict following a

revolution, as well as a significant increase in initiating an expansionist revolutionary war if the

state has a high level military capacity.1 They also describe the struggle between established

status-quo powers and new revolutionary regimes which seek to disturb the “balance of threat” in

their vicinity (Walt 1996, 19). What those research lacks is examining the relationship between a

revolutionary state instigating a war or becoming the target.

Therefore, my principal research question in this paper is: Why do some revolutions lead

to the state becoming a target of war and others to initiate a war? As noted, one hypothesiss is

that a previously lost war increases the chance of instigating a post-revolutionary rematch.

Nevertheless, I theorize that even a possible return to an old conflict is contingent on a different

variable – relative state power. Moreover, most post-revolutionary wars exceed in their

magnitude the conflicts that immediately preceded them. Relatively powerful revolutionary

1 This is also a prediction made by Huntington 1982.

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states such as France and Russia instigated conflict in order to spread their ideology and remodel

the international system following a revolution. The objective of these conflicts was to establish

a vast sphere of influence that will provide the revolutionary state with a guarantee that both

domestically and internationally no actors will seek to challenger their claim to power.

Conversely, revolutions in smaller states tend to make them targets. The stronger neighbors or

the former colonial masters of revolutionary states frequently view dramatic political change as a

threat to their own legitimacy and foreign policy interests in the smaller state. An additional

impact of revolutionary change is that a wrenching political transition effectively erases previous

diplomatic agreements. This creates an opportunity for a hegemonic state to subjugate or

incorporate a post-revolutionary state under the pretext of restoring order.

This prediction also draws on power transition theory (Kim and Morrow 1992, Lemke

and Werner 1996). Power-shift theories typically claim that one of the main factors leading to a

dyadic war is the dissatisfaction with the regional or global status quo. It also appears plausible

that in many cases revolutions increase this dissatisfaction. The political messages of restoring

lost prestige and power have been applied by numerous revolutionary movements to mobilize a

dissatisfied populace. This corresponds with Tilly’s (1975) concept of revolution as a victory of

one vision of how a society, economic system, and political structure should be ordered over a

competing vision of the polity. Furthermore, Lipset’s (1959) observation that every polity

requires a robust ideological legitimization suggests that revolutionary states which succeeds in

establishing their new vision of society and remains a major player in the interstate system

creates something that can defined as an ideological spillover.

This phenomenon occurs mainly because revolutions are political developments that

often cause the states to undergo substantive changes at the domestic level and toss aside

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political and social institutions that are otherwise common in the existing international or

regional environment. In other words, post-revolutionary states need to prove that they were

right in decisively breaking with the established norms found in the pre-revolutionary state as

well as in neighboring states. To achieve this end, revolutionary powers possessing a sizable

coercive capacity assert themselves by changing not just their own politics but also the politics in

their region and – ideally – the whole globe.

The weaker revolutionary governments, in the long run also have high revolutionary

ambitions but more often than not they find themselves on the defensive. I, however, assume that

irrespective of the actual intensions of weaker revolutionary states the dominant regional powers

will assume that they are a potential source of contagion that threatens their interests. Moreover

is line with Charles Tilly’s (1973, 1975) concept of revolution as state formation process, a

revolution can result in creating a hostile neighbor that existing powerful would have to deal

with. This is one of the reasons why the Hungarian uprising of 1848 was quenched by the

Russian empire (Evans 2000, 181-2007), even though, Russian at the time had no direct

territorial interests in Habsburgian Hungary and clearly acted a gendarme of Europe. More

recently this reasoning provides some explanation for Iran’s support for the Bashar al-Assad

regime in Syria and the Islamic republic reluctance to embrace a Sunni led revolution in its

vicinity. Similarly, the recently growing Kurdish autonomy and the activities of Kurdish

People’s Party in northern Iraq led to Turkey’s incursion into the territory of Iraq in 2008

(Tavernise and Asru 2008). The event intimated that following a revolution in Iraqi Kurdistan

and full autonomy of the region a larger Turkish invasion can be expected.

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Balance of powers and power shift theories do not explain the unprecedented scope and

rapid spread of major post-revolutionary wars. Evaluating the conditions present during a major

revolutionary war, such as the one embarked upon by Napoleonic France is difficult given

limited information and the unique collective psychology generated under revolutionary

conditions. Kurt Weyland’s (2009) study is an interesting research project investigating the

impact of group psychology and political revolutions. Weyland examines the unprecedented

expansion of major revolutionary wars, post-revolutionary wars, and civil wars, which are linked

to the Revolutions of 1848. Based on historical data Weyland concludes that the rapid spread of

revolutionary conflicts can be fully explained neither by theories of relative deprivation, nor by

theories of liberalization or neo-realism. Relative deprivation theory is based on the ancient

Platonic and Aristotelian assumption that revolutions are sparked by poverty (Aristotle 1962;

Plato 1951). Theories of relative liberalization draw from the work of Tocqueville (2008/1856)

and expect that rapidly reforming and economically developing states run a risk of revolution

due to rising political expectations which almost exceed at a certain point exceed the abilities of

the state to meet them.

While criticizing theories of liberalization Weyland acknowledges the existence of other

factors influencing increasing levels of revolutionary restlessness. Drawing on small world

models employed by Granovetter (1973) Weyland proposes that the rapid change in technology,

specifically in communication, created a whole new political situation. In addition to weighing

the impact of technological change, he also claims that limited information impacts the ability of

a populace to make fully informed rational choices. As a result a population in a pre- or near-

revolutionary state must select a course of action with limited information. The combination of

limited information, with an ability to communicate quickly across vast distances creates an

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environment where a population tends to make faster and more radical choices than a rational-

actor model would predict.

This observation of is consistent with the limited-rationality framework of Kahneman

and Tversky’s (1979). The researchers assume that humans are consistently risk-seeking in low-

stakes games, and inherently risk-averse in high-stake games. However, this risk-averse position

can change under certain psychological conditions. Weyland (2009) hypothesized that not only

revolutions themselves, but also the news of revolutions can drastically influence a given

person’s political choices. This effect is particularly strong as humans have a tendency to

exaggerate negative, dramatic, and sudden political news. The three emotions which are

described as associated with such news include fear, enthusiasm, and anger (Weyland 2009).

Psychological research suggests that all those emotions are triggers leading to risk

acceptant behavior (Druckman and McDermott 2008; Kim 2002). The link between emotions

and a propensity for risk acceptant behavior can explain how an agitated grocery vendor from

Tunisia could become the epicenter of the Arab Spring. News was capable of being quickly

spread via mobile phone and social media and encourage a wave of emotionally fueled risk

acceptant behavior throughout the region. This phenomenon also serves as a variable explaining

why divergent protest movements often cluster in time (Fahim 2011). Moreover, as a populace

engaged in a revolutionary uprising becomes more risk acceptant it also becomes more

optimistic about the chances of success (Kim and Morrow, 1992). This increase in risk acceptant

behavior and belief in the inevitable victory of ‘the cause’ are conditions that increase the

probability that a new revolutionary state will engage in an interstate conflict. Moreover, the fact

that in the modern world revolutionary movements can quickly disseminate information and

encourage similar revolts elsewhere makes them, potentially, more contagious than their

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historical predecessors. This risk increases the likelihood that local or global status quo powers

will seek to suppress revolutionary movements in weaker states soon after they appear.

As for the impetus of a revolutionary state to engage in interstate war, the grievances

encouraging the conflict may have been in place for years. However, the decision to fight comes

after the preferences of the populace and new ruling elite have become increasingly risk

acceptant, confident in victory, and both groups share a new self-image which has broken with

established norms. Following the massive social upheaval of a revolution instigating an interstate

conflict can serve as a way to channel social unrest by locating external enemies which can serve

as scapegoats for the injustices of the preceding regime or the social difficulties of imposing a

new revolutionary order on society. In addition to alleviating social unrest at home these

revolutionary interstate conflicts serve as a diversionary device preventing the same unrest that

brought revolutionary forces to power from being swiftly removed by a counterrevolutionary

force.

Russet (1990) finds that, leaders are more likely to instigate a war following a protest or

revolt irrespective of whether the objectives of the revolt are met and a violent regime change

was realized. However, while arguing that leaders opt for self- preservation rather than self-

destruction even if they become more risk acceptant, we still expect that observing the effect of

diversionary war is far more likely in the case of very powerful states that had undergone a

revolution. Only such political entities can afford to fight an external war in close succession to a

violent internal conflict. I assume that such states are likely to be major regional or global

powers with an established leadership position in the international system. As these powers must

possess the capability of surviving a violent internal transition, and still have the capability of

engaging in an interstate conflict I expect that a state’s score in Global Firepower Index (2016) to

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emerge to be robust variable explaining the post-revolutionary decision and capacity to go to

war.

Table 1. Hypotheses

high relative state power

(hegemonic revolution)

low relative state power

(peripheral revolution)

Revolution H1: High probability of

initiating a military conflict

H2: High probability of

becoming a target of a military

aggression

Unsuccessful/partial

revolution

H3: Lower probability of

initiating a military conflict

H4: Lower probability of

becoming a target of military

aggression

Analysis (preliminary)

The research still requires more quantitative input and more rigorous hypothesis testing. I also

need to examine the unsuccessful/partial revolutions since one of the recurring criticism of the

revolution literature is that it only examines the cases when the revolution was successful as well

as a narrow five year period spanning from the beginning of the protests which led to a

revolutionary change in the regime (King et al. 1994). However, in the second case study I

present towards the end of this paper I include some events that can be considered partial

peripheral revolutions.

The problem with data is that while we have many quantitative databases pertaining to

wars there is precious little databases pertaining to revolutions and the process of compiling such

databases requires a lot time and considerable funds. One of the few available databases is the

list compiled by Jeff Colgan for the revolutionary events in the period 1945-2004. Colgan in his

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data codes for a revolution if a major change occurs in at least three out the seven practices or

institutions he describes:

On page 454 he gives the following operationalization.

Table 2. Colgan’s coding for revolutions.

Practice Example

Executive power and selection. - Major change of a formal constitution.

- De facto change to leader selection

(e.g.abolishment of monarchy).

Political ideology. - Adoption (or abandonment) of communism or

fascism as official ideology of the state or its

single-party leadership.

Official state name. - Change from USSR to Russian Federation.

Property ownership. - Major changes in property ownership, such as

land reform or nationalization of key industries.

- Changes in economy type (market vs.

collectivized ownership).

Gender and ethnic Status. - Implementation or removal of major

restrictions on women’s dress, employment,

inheritance and/ or property ownership.

- Changing the institutionalized status or political

rights of major ethnic groups.

- Granting women the right to vote.

State–religion relationship - Constitutional adoption of a single religion as

the official state religion, to the detriment of

other religions.

- Adoption of a religion in the official state name

(e.g. ‘‘Islamic Republic’’.

Leadership of revolutionary council.

- Leader creates and chairs a National

Revolutionary Council while in power.”

Another perennial problem is operationalizing the “major power” factor as a variable.

Prior to the unprecedented development of technology in the XX century one could safely

assume that a major power is a state that possesses the military capabilities that surpass those of

all its neighbors. However, modern technology enables to project military power over long

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distances without the need to pass through the territories of the neighboring states. Further

research needs to be conducted to provide a better operationalization of this variable, however,

one can safely classify the states that have the technical abilities to project considerable military

force on a continental or transcontinental scale as major powers. Given this, apart from the

Chinese revolution and the change of Government in Russia in 1991 there were so far no major

hegemonic revolutions after 1945. This might be judged as fortuitous since one can hypothesize

that hegemonic revolution in a state like the USA in the modern globalized world could lead to a

conflict of unprecedented proportions.

One further issue is what period following a revolution makes for a revolutionary war?

Maoz (1996) explicitly cites the five years, nevertheless, given the importance of revolutionary

leaders and status quo leaders and assuming that major generational changes in politics occur

every two decades a longer (two decade) period seems to be a better choice.

As for the instigation of conflict it is assumed that if a state tries to overcome a revolution

that does not involve a large group of its citizens it is treated as being an instigator of a conflict.

Based on Colgan’s 1945-2004 database and the generally available historical records (e.g.

Scaruffi 2009) I propose the following list of revolutions/revolutionary periods and the resulting

wars.

Table 3. Revolutions and post-revolutionary wars 1945-2004

Revolutions and years. For

prolonged periods of

revolutionary unrest more

than one date can be cited.

However, revolutions

separated by more than a

decade are treated as

separate events.

Major Power Target within the next two

decades

Instigator

within the next decade

Afghanistan, 1978 No Yes, 1979, Soviet Union No

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Algeria, 19542 No Yes, 1954, France. No

Argentina, 1946 No No No

Bangladesh, 19713 No Yes, 1971, Pakistan No

Benin, 1972 No No No

Bolivia, 1970 No No No

Brazil, 1967 No No No

Bulgaria,1989 No No No

Burkina Faso, 1983, 1987 No No No

Burundi, 1966, 1976, No No No

Burundi, 1987 No No No

Cambodia, 1975 No Yes, 1978, Viet Nam No

Chile, 1973 No No No

China,1946 No No Yes, Korean War, 1950-

1953

Comoros,1975, 1978 No Yes, 1995, France No

Congo, 1969 No No No

Costa Rica, 1948, 1953 No No No

Cuba, 1959 No Yes, 1961, USA

Czechoslovakia, 1948 No No No

Czechoslovakia,

1989

No No No

DR Congo, 19604 No Yes, 1964, Belgium No

Egypt, 1952 No Yes, 1956, UK, France No

El Salvador, 1979 No No No

Ethiopia, 1974 No No No

Ethiopia, 1991 No No No

Fiji, 1987 No No No

Ghana, 1981 No No No

Greece, 1967 No No No

Guatemala, 1954 No No Yes, 1958 Mexico-

Guatemala conflict.

Guinea, 1984 No No No

Guinea-Bissau, 1980 No No No

Hungary, 1989 No No No

Iran, 1979 No Yes, 1980, Iraq. No

Iraq, 1958, 1963, 1968 Yes Yes Yes, 1980 war with Iran

Laos, 1975 Yes No No

Liberia, 1980 No No No

Libya Qaddafi, 1969 No No Yes, 1977, war with Egypt

Madagascar, 1975 No No No

Madagascar, 1993 No No No

Mali, 1968 No No Yes, 1985 war with

Burkina Faso

Mauritania,1980 No No Yes, 1989 war with Senegal

Myanmar ,1962 No No No

Myanmar ,1988 No No No

Nicaragua, 1979 No No Yes, 1988 invasion of

Honduras with USA

involvement

Pakistan, 1958 No No Yes, Indo-Pakistani War

2 Colgan uses the date 1965, but the changes were already visible at the onset of the war of independence.

3 Colgan uses the date 1977, but I look at the moment when the independence was declared.

4 I use the date of gaining independence

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Pakistan, 1977 No Yes, the 1984 war with

India

No

Panama, 1968 No No No

Peru, 1968 No Yes, the 1981 war with

Equator

No

Poland, 1990 No No No

Romania, 1989 No No No

Russia, 1991 No No Yes, 1991War in

Transnistria with Moldova,

1994 Chechen War, 1999

Chechen War, 2008 War

with Georgia

Somalia, 1969 No Yes, 1982 war with

Ethiopia

Yes, 1977 war with

Ethiopia

South Korea, 1961 No Yes, 1966 conflict with

North Korean

No

Sudan, 1969 No No No

Sudan, 1989 No No Yes, 2008 invasion of

Anjouan

Syria, 1958, 1963 Yes, 1967 with Israel Yes, 1971 war with Jordan,

1973 war with Isarael

Thailand, 1946 No No No

Thailand, 1958 No No Yes, 1987 with Laos

Uganda, 1971 No No No

Uganda, 1986 No No Yes, 1996 operation in Zair

(second Congo War)

Venezuela, 1999 No No No

Yemen, 1962, 1969 No No Yes, Saudi Arabia’s

involvement in the Civil

war (1962-1970)

Yugoslavia, 1989 No No Yes, 1991 war with

Slovenia

Zimbabwe, 1980 No Undecided, 1998

involvement in Second

Congo War.

No

Of course it is often very difficult to determine the exact instigation of military operations.

Moreover, the status-quo powers often start involvement in revolutionary wars relatively early in

the process, which often make it difficult to classify the nature of their involvement. Finally, a lot

of the involvement and support is very tacit and hard to classify as open military action.

Nevertheless even a very general (at this point) analysis yields some interesting results. In the

1945-2004 period out of the 68 cases of revolutions and revolutionary periods studied the

countries involved became targets of military operations in 15 cases and instigators in 16 cases.

This seems to suggest considerable belligerence following a revolutionary period.

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Both of major powers that underwent revolutionary changes (hegemonic revolutions) in

the studies period, i.e. Russia and China, were instigators of military conflicts. Russia was

especially belligerent, and instigated at least three wars following the two decades after the

regime change in 1991. Such a level of military activity indeed can be compared only with the

twenty years immediately following the previous revolution in Russia in 1917. However, what

the study shows is that even the states that are not major powers are very likely to instigate post-

revolutionary conflicts (14 cases).

As for the anti-revelatory wars, the states that undergo peripheral revolutions are indeed

quite likely to become a target for major powers. Out 15 cases of targeting 9 were done by states

that can be classified as major powers (they have the ability to project considerable forces on a

continental or global scale or are more powerful than all their neighbors). To further illustrate the

matter I provide three case studies, one modern and one historical. The Georgian and Chechen

case are not listed in Colgan’s dabase, which suggests that even partial or unsuccessful

revolutions can lead to a status-quo power intervention. The French case study is more of a

historical example and the events in Ukraine happened well before the compilation of Colgan’s

database.

Case studies

1) France and Europe

Revolutionary France while motivated by the laudable goals of liberty, equality, and

fraternity, ended as a failed imperial project. At the outbreak of the French Revolutionary Wars,

France had a legitimate chance of victory, as well as an opportunity to emerge as the hegemonic

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force in Europe, as France was Europe’s most populous nation and had access to raw materials

which could be applied to outfitting a sizable military force Moreover, France possessed a long

history of military innovation and experience in training and equipping well-disciplined

infantrymen (Bell 2008). In short, it not only had a very modern army, it was one the first

European states to devise one. As stated by John Childs, “after 1648 France was the dominant

political, military and cultural force in Europe” (Childs 2005, 34).

Prior to revolutionary unrest at home, French elites were supporting revolutionary

movements in the Americas, the Netherlands, and Hungary (Doyle 1989). These choices were

not an intentional attempt at sabotaging the existing monarchist status quo. They can be viewed

as rather opportunistic foreign policy decisions intended to undermine the competing powers of

the United Kingdom and Austria. While a great revolt had been anticipated in Europe as early as

the 1680s, the multiethnic and ill-governed Austria was considered the most likely to suffer from

it. Tocqueville’s (2008) insight stating that revolutions follow rapid technological and economic

development rather than periods of economic malaise was still a foreigh concept.

Despite the social and political unrest in Europe prior to the French Revolution of 1789,

the suddenness and violence of the revolt was shocking for all the neighboring states. The

publication of Burkes’ (1989) Reflections on the Revolution of France turned public sentiment in

Europe against the French Revolution. The work argued that the revolutionary movement would

inevitably collapse due to its inherently weak and abstract foundations centered on rationality.

Burke claimed that the revolutionary ideology simply ignored the wider complexities of human

nature. By 1791 this point of view had become widespread throughout the continent. Rulers

spanning from Scandinavia to the Italian states and Russia actively censored reports on the latest

developments in France, mobilized their armies, and actively spreading anti-revolutionary

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propaganda. All of Europe feared what would happen when the leading military power of the

continent began to turn its back on the standing international norms of the day.

Rather than assuaging old grievances the French Revolution exacerbated the perceived

threat posed by Austria and the potential that it could pose a counter-revolutionary threat. These

fears encouraged the National Assembly to attempt to drag Louis XVI into a preemptive conflict

and attack Austria before it could fully mobilize for war (Doyle, 1989). Despite the history of

Austro-French antagonism throughout the 18th

century this rivalry became colored with a new

ideological flame. In 1791 the National Assembly instructed Louis XVI to contact the electors of

Trier and Mainz and deliver a novel ultimatum. Louis XVI was told to:

“Say to them…that if German princes continue to favor

preparations directed against the French. We shall carry to them,

not fire and the sword, but freedom. It is for them to estimate what

would follow from the awakening of nations” (Doyle 1989, pg.

177).

In addition to a newly found desire to export France’s revolutionary ideology, the

National Assembly realized that neighboring states were hesitant to engage in a full-scale war

with France. Despite the turmoil of the revolt, France remained a formidable military power,

hence, the National Assembly’s decision, and ability, to declare war against Austria and its allies

on April 20th

1792 (Bell 2008). Following victories over the Prussian and Austrian armies, the

National Assembly reiterated its new foreign policy goals of continuing the French Revolution

abroad stating that it would “grant fraternity and aid to all peoples, who wish to recover their

liberty” (Bell 2008, 144). This declaration is considered declaring a war against non-

revolutionary Europe for the sake of expanding the “revolutionary cause” (Doyle 1989; Bell

2008).

20

In order to raise the sizable army required for tackling the challenge of expanding the

revolution abroad, the French government released what Townsend (2005) referred to as a

“volcanic natural force of patriotic citizenship”. Rather than conscripting feudal tenants

revolutionary France was able to enlist free men, who were fighting to prevent returning to a

state of subjugation, and who sought to liberate neighboring nations from the same form of

feudal subjugation. In doing, so Revolutionary France became a more formidable foe than its

predecessor. This increased ability to mobilize force conforms to Goldstone’s (1982) expectation

that revolutionary states are frequently more capable at altering the political status quo than their

preceding states.

Even though later Napoleon named himself Emperor of France his empire was a new

political entity which had little to do with the status quo monarchies of Europe which continued

to rely on feudal hierarchy and patrimonialism (Bell 2008). The revolutionary desire to expand

the “cause” and alter the international system in a way favoring a potential revolutionary

hegemon was strongly advocated by Napoleon. “I must make all the peoples of Europe one

people and Paris the capital of the world,” declared the emperor (Bell 2008, pg. 243)

Even after Waterloo and Versailles the old states of Europe never really managed to

contain the forces that the revolution had put into motion. Of course, they tried to return to

business as usual, reduce the size of the armies and again maintain the upper-class-only officer

corps. For some time, between 1815 and 1848 such politics worked, but the Jinn was already out

of the bottle. The modern army and modern nation-state formation was well on its way (See

French 2005). One might thus conclude that although France ultimately lost, the revolution won,

and it did so largely thanks to being fed with the prodigious military and economic potential of

the Ancien Régime

21

As a major power which under went a hegemonic revolutionary change in government

both the populace and the leadership France became increasing risk acceptant and expansionistic

in order to create a favorable international environment for a new revolutionary state and direct

popular sentiments away from a counter-revolution (Druckman and McDermott 2008; Kim

2002; Kim and Morrow 1992; Russett 1990). Daniel Bell (2008) observed that Napoleon took

huge risks on a near daily basis, hardly the decision making process of a risk averse rational

actor. While the non-revolutionary state system was initially wary of challenging France, once

the real threat of the French Revolution began to forcibly expand from the historic boundaries of

France the non-revolutionary states acted vigorously to attempt to contain and defeat both the

French state as well as their new ideology.

2) Russia, the Caucasus and Ukraine

Following the collapse of the Eastern Bloc and the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation

and former Soviet satellites of East Germany, Czechoslovakia and Hungary proceeded down

divergent paths. Rather than experiencing closer ties with the West and full-scale

democratization the former leaders of the Soviet Union were succeeded by their younger

protégés, many of whom were tied to the special services of the Soviet state. In Eastern Europe

many former Soviet satellites embarked on a path leading towards democratization and closer

ties with the West (Levitsky and Way 2010). Following the loss of Eastern Europe and the

collapse of the Soviet system, Moscow was determined to maintain some form of political

influence in Belarus, Ukraine, Central Asia, and the Caucasus.

In Competitive Authoritarianism (2010) Levitsky and Way propose a model explaining

why certain post-Soviet states democratized and others former Soviet states have either failed to

do so, or experienced a volatile and uncertain transition. In addition to variables such as: the

22

power of government, the structure of the government's resources, the organizational power of

the opposition; the researchers focus on Western linkage and leverage as key variables.

According to their analysis when strong levels of linkage and leverage with the West are present

they create an effect so strong that it can overcome domestic factors. They note that, "In states

with extensive ties to the West, post-Cold war international influences were so intense that they

contributed to democratization even where domestic traditions were unfavorable" (Levitsky and

Way 2010, pg. 38). Linkage is operationalized into four distinct forms including economic

linkage, intergovernmental linkage, technocratic linkage and social linkage. Leverage consists of

the strength of the linkage when utilized by the West to exert pressure for democratic change

(Levitsky and Way 2010).

In addition to explaining why certain states have been more likely to democratize, this

work also suggests that, powerful states in the international system or a powerful alliance of

states which share common values, have an inherent interest in encouraging smaller states to

adopt a friendly ideology and suppress unwanted potentially revolutionary movements in said

smaller states. The counterweight to encouraging democratization is described as the “black

knight” effect. The mechanism of this effect relies on the fact that some states support and

promote authoritarian systems in neighboring states and as a result try to counter democratizing

peripheral revolutions (Hufbauer et al. 1990; Levitsky and Way 2010).

Russia is a typical “black knight” in the former-Soviet republics in Central Asia and the

Caucasus. The idea of “near abroad”, encompassing these regions, is a concept deeply embedded

in Russian society and foreign policy. In the past, when high levels of Western linkage and

leverage and its democratizing effects on Eastern Europe proved too strong for Russia to

counteract it effectively gave up on some of its foreign policy interests. However, in the

23

Caucuses where ties to the West were notably weaker, Russia actively asserted itself in an

attempt to undermine Georgian and Ukrainian independence, the Rose Revolution, and

Chechnya’s struggle for independence. However, one needs to note a slightly different nature of

the Chechen conflict, since Chechenia was, according to all accounts, less inclined to follow

Western-liberal model and more willing to create a Islamic or semi-Islamic republic.

In the early 1990’s Chechnya was a semi-autonomous republic of the Russian Federation.

As Kristin M. Bakke notes:

“the immediate backdrop to the first Chechen war in 1994 was the

Chechen Revolution of 1990-91, which brought the nationalists to

power. Initially, the nationalist movement…sought to revive

Chechen culture and traditions, but its demands quickly came to

encompass political sovereignty” (Bakke 2011, 534).

After the collapse of negotiations in December of 1994, Boris Yeltsin, President of the Russian

Federation, opted for a military solution to the diplomatic stalemate. Following two succeeding

years of conflict, Russian troops withdrew and Chechnya effectively gained de facto

independence. The First Chechen War originated as a culturally based secessionist movement

which supported drastic changes in the style of government and wider Chechen society in terms

of cultural and religions self-identification. What followed these drastic changes, and their efforts

to break with the regional status quo, is a clear case of a non-revolutionary major power opting to

intervene in order to suppress a potentially contagious revolutionary ideology and reestablish the

pre-revolutionary status quo.

The casus belli for a second war between Russia and Chechnya arrived after Aslan

Maskhadov defeated a pro-Russian politician in a presidential race in 1997. Soon it became

clear that Maskhadov is unable to demilitarize the Islamist militias that were active in the

region (Schaefer 2011). As these groups began to carry out attacks in neighboring Daghestan,

24

effectively trying to spread the idea an independent Caucasian Emirate, Russia again intervened

militarily in 1999 hoping to at least contain this regional revolutionary movement, and at most

reassert hegemony over the Chechens (Ware 2005). This conflict reached its conclusion in 2004

when an authoritarian pro-Russian government was in place that disavowed the revolutionary

change favored by the preceding government and Chechen militias.

The events that lead to war with Georgia are an even clearer case of a major non-

revolutionary power opting to suppress revolutionary changes in a small neighboring state.

Georgia had long fallen under either the direct rule of Russia or had existed in its sphere of

influence. Given Russia’s historical role in the region it comes as little surprise that Georgian

independence followed by clear and decisive moves to align with the West was viewed by

Moscow as an unwelcomed development.

Following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Georgian leaders who favored

distancing themselves from Moscow and cementing Georgian independence supported separatist

movements within the Russian Federation. Zviad Gamsakhurdi, the first democratically elected

President of Georgia was the first head of state to recognize Chechnya as an independent state in

1991. Thomas de Waal goes as far as to call to Gamsakhurdi’s rise to power and its clear attempt

to radically reshape the Georgian political identity and disrupt the historical status quo found in

the Caucasus a “revolution” (de Waal, 2010, 131). Although this view is not shared by Jeff

Colgan. Nevethless, I have decided to include the Georgian case as a “partial revolution” that

nevertheless led to a military conflict.

Following the removal of Gamsakhurdi, Eduard Shevardnadze, a former Soviet Minister

of External Relations, emerged as the new President of Georgia advocating a return to the pre-

revolutionary status quo. As an additional precaution Russian army also apparently began to

25

militarily support the independence of two break-away regions of Georgia –Abkhazia, and South

Ossetia. Initially this was of course denied by Boris Yeltsin and his predecessors but consistently

emerged in the reports of Western journalists already in the early nineties (Almond and Stone,

2011).

Encouraging these separatist regions created a constant justification for war, which could

be employed at the convenience of Russia as the major status quo power in the region if Georgia

again chose to embark along a revolutionary or near- revolutionary path threatening the status

quo of the Caucasus. Following the removal from power of Eduard Shevardnadze during the

Rose Revolution in 2003, and the rise of pro-Western Mikheil Saakashvili Russian fears

regarding a Georgian attempt to break with Russia and align with the West increased. As noted

by Ronald Asmus (2010) Saakashvili was quite public in his desire to remove Georgia from

Russian control and align it with the West by joining NATO and later the European Union. In

these aspirations Russia saw the potential for a dramatic political realignment in the Caucasus

that could potentially undermine their positions in Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Central Asia. In an

attempt to halt Saakashvili’s efforts Russian support for the independence of Abkhazia and South

Ossetia served as justifications for a war intended to reassert Russian hegemony over a

rebellious, arguably revolutionary state. Again, in the words of Ronald Asmus (2010, pg. 54),

“They [South Ossetia and Abkhazia] became the flash point that would spark this war.”

Russia’s tactics in Caucasus clearly underline its status as a major status-quo power

within its nearest neighborhood. The Kremlin seems to be determined to counter any radical

power-shift that occurs close to its borders. The developments in Ukraine provides the latest

example of this tactic. The “Orange Revolution” of 2004 (Willson 2007) did not incite an

intervention only because it was unsuccessful and did not end in a radical political change. In

26

2006 the leaders of the “revolution” were forced to accept the post-soviet leader of the pro-

Russian status-quo block – Victor Yanukovych as the prime minister. And in 2010 Yanukovych

became the president effectively ending the “Orange revolution” and marking its failure. The

Russian Federation decided to intervene only when a new revolutionary outburst – the Maidan

Revolution forcibly ousted Yakovych. Following this Russia annexed the Crimean Peninsula

and started to actively support counterrevolutionary movement in the Eastern Ukraine (Foxall

and Cichowlas 2014). In spite of, a number of incidents the Russian and Ukrainians armies still

did not clash in open field. Nevertheless, at this point the two countries are now in a de facto

state of war.

3) Cuba and the Bay of Pigs Invasion

In line with the democratic and liberal peace propositions the initial USA’s policy towards

revolutionary Cuba was marked by conflict avoidance. The USA, for instance, imposed an

embargo on weapon trade with the Batista government during the revolution of 1959 (Leonard

1999, 19) and after Castro’s victory promptly recognized the new government. Still, the available

sources (Konrbluh 1998) make it clear that the USA fairly early on saw Fidel Castro as a grave

danger to its interests in Southern and Central America and a potential source of revolutionary

contagion. This paper argues that eventually, in spite of the USA’s administration’s reluctance to

enter into the armed conflict, the fears of revolutionary contagion proved too great to avoid

attempting a military intervention (Walt 2001).

In doing so the paper argues against the hypothesis of Robert S. Snyder (1999), who

claims that the conflict resulted from Fidel Castro’s attempts to “externalize” (1999, 266)

internal tensions. Snyder’s position is that Castro provoked the conflict with the USA in spite of

27

President Eisenhower’s administration attempts at normalizing the USA - Cuban relations and

that he did so in order to be able to rally the revenant political forces around his leadership and

fight the growing opposition. As Snyder puts it, even “before U.S. responded to Cuba’s hostility,

Castro had used American provocation to remove political rivals” (1999, 276). He also adds that

the provoked onset of tension with the USA preceded Castro’s communist “coming out” and his

alliance with the Soviet block or any inkling of such an alignment. In short, nothing intimated a

possible conflict before May of 1959 and the land reform that led to the confiscation of U.S.

citizen’s property.

What Snyder fails to acknowledge is that the USA’s intelligence and policy makers were

extremely weary of Castro’s regime very early on and saw it as a clear threat to U.S. interests in

the Latin America. Already during Castro’s visit to the USA in April 1959 Vice President Nixon

on meeting him wrote a 12 page confidential memorandum for the Department of State and the

CIA. In the document he clearly states that the new leader of Cuban is “either incredibly naïve

about Comunism or under Communist discipline” (quoted in Haynes 1964, 25) and urged that

the CIA and the Department of State should act on his suspicions. Moreover, Peter Wyden in his

books confirms that, although, Castro did not immediately disclose his communist sympathies it

was clear that many of the communist-leaning anti-Batista fighters found their way to his

government (Wyden 1979). Based on those facts as early as in December 1959 the CIA chief of

Western hemisphere division colonel J.C. King predicted a “real problem in Cuba” (1979, 19).

Another famous CIA executive and the main planner of the Bay of Pigs Invasion Jacob Esterline

later during an interview reflected on his early fears of revolutionary contagion that threatened

the USA geopolitical interests using the following words, “It seemed to me that something like a

chain reaction was occurring all over Latin America after Castro came to power. I saw – hell,

28

anybody with eyes could see – that a new and powerful force was at work in the hemisphere. It

had to be dealt with” (quotes in Konrbluh 1998, 7).

We still do not have full access to Cuban archives that would confirm Castro’s policy

plans. Indeed, however, we can assume the land reforms and signals of alignment with Moscow

were the events that ultimately prompted president Eisenhower to authorize CIA to “train and

equip Cuban refugees as guerrilla force to overthrow Castro” (Johnson 1964, 28). Members of

Brigade 2506 were trained on Useppa Island and in government facilities in South Florida. The

training of aircrews was carried out by Air National Guard in Alabama (Feranandez 2001, 103-

112). The CIA also recruited a group of American civilians, to fly some of the B-26 bombers

that the expeditionary forces were equipped with (Fineman and Mascarenas 1998). The final

briefing and the go order was given by President Kennedy on April 12th

1961 (Wyden 1979,

169) the invasion stated on April 17th.

Although, in Accordance with President Kennedy’s wishes (Wyden 1979, 308) there was

no direct involvement of the Unites States Military forces in the face of the later reveled

documents (Konrbluh 1998) the Bay of Pigs invasion was clearly an act of a governmental

military intervention. The USA not only equipped and financed the expedition but also send its

own citizens to combat, four American airmen were killed and two CIA operatives later

imprisoned and executed (Wyden 1979, 288-300). The operation failed mainly because the

popular support Castro enjoyed precluded a mass insurrection or defection of army units

(Schlesinger 2002, 264). Moreover the Cuban army was prepared. The officers were well aware

of the possibility of invasion and the Soviet intelligence, in fact, seemed to have been able to

provide Castro with exact date of the landing almost a week before it took place (Loeb 2000).

As Wyden notes, based on records of the conversations that took place in the oval office,

29

president Kennedy had many doubts concerning the outcome of the operation, he, however,

chose not to cancel the operation since this would be tantamount to “admission that Castro ruled

with popular support” and “it would guarantee that Castro would long be around to harass all of

Latin America” (Wyden 1979, 308).

Stephen M. Walt describes the Bay of Pigs intervention as “brief, inclusive clash” (Walt

2001, 55) and points out that this conflict resulted from an unwinding of a spiral of fear.

According to him, in general, in post-revolutionary conflicts on one hand the dominant powers

exaggerate the possible contagion and on the other had revolutionary regimes exaggerate every

hostile signal because of their insecurity and history of previous grievances. Walt at the same

time abitrarily downplays the actual scope and effects of contagion which is an erroneous

account. History of revolutions, suggests that, although, not necessarily long lived they are,

indeed, all fairly contagious and costly from the point of view regional power holders (Weyland

2009, 2012). Thus in spite of the difficulties, the domestic public opinion costs and often low

chances of success the temptation (Wyden 1978, 289-313) to try to suppress a revolution in a

smaller state often proves too great even for policy-makers of established democracies such as

the USA.

Conclusions

My research projects is far from being complete. However, the major case studies as well as the

preliminary analysis of the available data show some support for the two hypotheses that I have

proposed (see Table 1.). The research suggest that revolutions can severely alter the international

system and lead to violent post-revolutionary wars. Those wars, however, tend to be more

violent in the case of more powerful states (hegemonic revolutions) as they are more likely to

target other states almost indiscriminately. Less powerful states (peripheral revolutions), on the

other hand, are more likely to become targets of intervention following a major revolutionary

30

event. This conclusion may provide valuable guidelines for maintaining global peace and

reacting to possible conflicts before they lead to major global disturbance.

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