RETURNING FOREIGNTERRORIST FIGHTERS IN

EUROPE

A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

The following report does not necessarily reflect the positions

of the CODEXTER, the Council of Europe or its Member States

1

Summary

Thefollowingreportpresentsacomparativeanalysisoftheimplementedpoliciestowardsthe

returningForeignTerroristFightersineightMemberStatesoftheCouncilofEurope.Theaimis

to highlight the differences and similarities in the understanding of this phenomenon in the

most affected countries. First, the report exposes an inventory of the criminal law and

administrative measures taken by the States in order to tackle this issue and analyses the

positiveandnegativeeffectsofthesemeasures.Second,thereportpresentsthenon-repressive

measurestakenbytheStatesandanalysestheresultsofsuchmeasures.Then,thereport lists

all attempts of international cooperation in this field. Finally, the report suggests some

recommendation to the Council of Europe and its Member States in order to improve the

managementofthereturningForeignTerroristFighters’issueinEurope

Foreword

ThisreportwasproducedbytheworkinggroupReturningforeignterroristfighterscomposedof

twelveEuropeanstudents from the IEP (Institutd’EtudesPolitiques)of Strasbourgunder the

supervisionofPr.AlexisVAHLAS,andincollaborationwithmembersoftheCouncilofEurope,

especially Kristian BARTHOLIN, Giulia LUCCHESE and Albert FLORES-HERRERA. The twelve

authorsare:

HectorDERIVOIRE

CharlesGALLAND

LauraGENTILHOMME

CarolineGOERLICH

YiJunHUANG

MarilouJEANDEL

NicolasJOLIVALD

AgnieszkaLALIK

CyprienLEROY

AnastasiiaMELNIKOVA

SéverinSCHNEPP

AdrianZACHARIA

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Listofabbreviations

ACF: ActiveChangeFoundation

CAT: CentrefortheAnalysisofTerrorism

CoE: CouncilofEurope

CODEXTER: CouncilofEurope’sCommitteeofExpertsonTerrorism

CPT: CouncilofEurope’sCommitteeforthePreventionofTorture

CSS: CenterforSecurityStudies

DGSE: DirectionGénéraledelaSécuritéExtérieure(France)

DNE: Diagnostisch-TherapeutischesNetzwerk(diagnostic-therapeuticNetwork)

EU: EuropeanUnion

FTF: Foreignterroristfighters

FSB: FederalSecurityServiceoftheRussianFederation(ФСБ)

ICCT: InternationalCentreforCounter-Terrorism

ISIL/IS: IslamicStateinIraqandtheLevant

MS: MemberStates

PTSD: Posttraumaticstressdisorder

PLAT: PlandeLutteAnti-Terrorisme

UPRA: Unitédepréventiondelaradicalisation

UK: UnitedKingdomofGreatBritainandNorthernIreland

UN: UnitedNations

USA: UnitedStatesofAmerica

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TableofContents

INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................................................6

METHODOLOGYANDDIFFICULTIESOFTHESTUDY...........................................11

PART1:PRESENTATIONANDANALYSISOFREPRESSIVEMEASURES...........15

A. Overviewofcriminallawandadministrativemeasures..........................16

1)KingdomofBelgium..............................................................................................................................16a)Belgiancriminallawmeasures.............................................................................................17b)Belgianadministrativemeasures.........................................................................................17

2)KingdomofDenmark............................................................................................................................18a)Danishcriminallawmeasures...............................................................................................18b)Danishadministrativemeasures..........................................................................................19

3)FrenchRepublic.......................................................................................................................................20a)Frenchcriminallawmeasures...............................................................................................20b)Frenchadministrativemeasures..........................................................................................22

4)FederalRepublicofGermany............................................................................................................23a)Germancriminallawmeasures.............................................................................................23b)Germanadministrativemeasures........................................................................................24

5)KingdomoftheNetherlands..............................................................................................................25a)Dutchcriminallawmeasures.................................................................................................25b)Dutchadministrativemeasures............................................................................................26

6)RussianFederation................................................................................................................................27a)Russiancriminallawmeasures.............................................................................................28b)Russianadministrativemeasures........................................................................................28

7)RepublicofTurkey.................................................................................................................................29a)Turkishcriminallawmeasures.............................................................................................29b)Turkishadministrativemeasures........................................................................................30

8)UnitedKingdom.......................................................................................................................................31a)Britishcriminallawmeasures...............................................................................................31b)Britishadministrativemeasures..........................................................................................32

B. Theoreticalanalysis..............................................................................................35

1)Prosecutionofreturningforeignfighters....................................................................................35

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a)Challengesfacedbytheprosecutors...................................................................................35b)Consequencesoftheprosecution.........................................................................................36

2)Prisonandprobation............................................................................................................................36a)Challenges.....................................................................................................................................37b)Impacts..........................................................................................................................................37

3)Otheradministrativemeasures........................................................................................................38a)Revokingnationality.................................................................................................................38b)Travelrestrictionsandhousearrest...................................................................................40

PART2:PRESENTATIONANDANALYSISOFNON-REPRESSIVEMEASURES.43

A.OverviewofthesituationinEuropeancountriesconcerningnon-

repressivemeasures......................................................................................................43

Theforerunnersofrehabilitation:theDanishandGermanmodels...........................44TheGermanmodel..........................................................................................................................44TheDanishmodel............................................................................................................................46

Fromcounter-radicalisationtorehabilitation:TheNetherlands,Belgiumand

Russia...............................................................................................................................................................46TheDutchapproach.......................................................................................................................46TheBelgianapproach....................................................................................................................48TheRussianapproach...................................................................................................................49

TimidStepstowardsnon-repressivemeasures:BritishandFrenchpolicies........50TheBritishcase................................................................................................................................51TheFrenchcase...............................................................................................................................53

TheevolutionofTurkishcounter-terrorismstrategy:aparadoxicalcase..............55

B.Analysisofnon-repressivemeasures..................................................................56

1)Deradicalisation/disengagement:Theoriesforasuccessfulprocess..............................57

2)Apsychosocialapproachtothereturneephenomenon........................................................59a)TheAarhusmodel:betweenderadicalisationandrehabilitation?...........................59b)DNEandtheimportanceofthefamily................................................................................62

3)Cognitiveandideologicalapproaches...........................................................................................63a)TheCognitiveapproach...........................................................................................................63b)Theideologicalapproach........................................................................................................66

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PART3:INTERNATIONALCOOPERATIONFRAMEWORKSAND

RECOMMENDATIONSREGARDINGTHEFTFISSUE...............................................68

A. Cooperationframeworks....................................................................................68

B. Recommendations.................................................................................................72

GENERALCONCLUSION..................................................................................................78

BIBILIOGRAPHY...............................................................................................................79

APPENDICES......................................................................................................................91

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Introduction

Theforeign(terrorist)fighters:oldphenomenon,newscale

The foreign fighters phenomenon is now a top priority in the agenda of the international

community and, as assessed by the adviser to Belgium’s Ministry of Justice Daniel Flore,

“challengesbothinternationalandnationallaw,byitsnoveltyandspecificity”1.However,itdid

notemergewiththeSyrianconflict.Duringthelasttwocenturies,morethan70insurrections

have had a transnational dimension: the Spanish Civil War in 1936, the Afghanistan war

followingthe1989Soviet invasion, theBosnianconflicts in the1990sor theChechenwars to

namea few.Thatbeing said, the influxof foreign fighters into theSyrianand Iraqi conflict is

unprecedented. Even though the scale of the trend leaves no doubt, an accurate and

comprehensiveaccount isdifficult. Indeed,theestimatesof foreignindividuals involvedinthe

conflictinSyriaandIraqvaryfromonesourcetoanotherandtheStatesareoftenreluctantto

shareinformationconcerningthissensitiveissue.Itishoweverpossibletogivesomenumbers,

aslongasthereaderdoesnottakethemasgrantedandtakeintoconsiderationthedefinition

giventothe“terroristfighter”inthecounting.

DefiningFTF

There is no unanimous definition of the “foreign terrorist fighters”. In fact, the concept is

similarlyusedwiththeterm“foreignfighters”inthepublicdebateandwithintheinstitutional

sphere.

TheUnitedNations’“WorkingGroupontheuseofMercenariesasameansofviolatinghuman

rights2” hasdefined the concept of foreign fighters as “individualswho leave their countryof

originorhabitualresidenceandbecomeinvolvedinviolenceaspartofan insurgencyornon-

Statearmedgroupinanarmedconflict”3.

1D. FLORE, “Les combattants terroristes étrangers : vers un déplacement des frontières en droitinternationalpénal?”in Les combattants européens en Syrie,A. JACOBS&D. FLORE,Paris, L’Harmattan,2015,p.225.2WorkinggroupattachedtotheOfficeoftheHighCommissionerforHumanRights(OHCHR).3 Report of theWorking Group on the Use ofMercenaries as aMeans of Violating Human Rights andImpedingtheExerciseoftheRightofPeopletoSelf-determination,U.N.Doc.A/70/330,19August2015).

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According to the academic David Malet, foreign fighters can be defined as “non citizens of

conflictStateswhojoininsurgenciesduringcivilconflicts”4.Nevertheless,henotesthatthereis

noestablishedterminthepoliticalscienceliterature.ThomasHegghammer,academicspecialist

on violent Islamism, considers that it is due to the fact that “foreign fighters constitute an

intermediate actor category lost between local rebels, on the one hand, and international

terrorists, on the other”5. It can be observed that the researcher integrates the notion of

terrorisminhisdefinitionofforeignfighter:“anagentwho(1)hasjoined,andoperates,within

the confines of an insurgency, (2) lacks citizenship of the conflict state of kinship links to its

warringfactions,(3)lacksaffiliationtoanofficialmilitaryorganisation,and(4)isunpaid”6.

AdoptedinSeptember2014,theUNSecurityCouncilResolution2178definesforeignterrorist

fightersas“individualswhotraveltoastateotherthantheirstatesofresidenceornationality

forthepurposeoftheperpetration,planning,orpreparationof,orparticipationin,terroristacts

ortheprovidingorreceivingofterroristtraining,includinginconnectionwitharmedconflict”7.

ButasthereisnosingleauthoritativeStatedefinitionofterrorism,thereisnosingledefinition

of a foreign terrorist fighter.One canonly observe that bothof these concepts are left to the

discretionofStates’authoritiesandsuchsituationcansometimesleadtoexcesses.

AfterthisdifferentiationbetweenforeignfightersandFTF,itmustbekeptinmindthatsucha

distinction is fairly blurred as both terms are often used as synonyms either in the political

discourseorinthepress.

Onthedifficultytogiveaccuratedataonthephenomenon

Exact numbers are impossible to provide, but researchers and States have drawn up some

figures.Inanarticlepublishedin2010-2011,ThomasHegghammerassessesthenumberofFTF,

allmodernwarstakentogethersincetheAfghan-Sovietone,between10000and30000(not

necessarilyEuropeancitizens)8.Thisfirstinformationissufficienttounderstandhowdifficultit

is to untangle the reality, as there is awide range between the lowest and highest estimate.

Now, what can we say about the Syrian and Iraqi wars? It is once again obvious that it is

extremely difficult, if not impossible, to give precise figures on howmany European citizens

4D.MALET,ForeignFighters,OxfordUniversityPress,23May2013,p.9.5 T. HEGGHAMMER, “The rise of Muslim Foreign Fighters. Islam and the Globalization of Jihad”,InternationalSecurity,volume35,issue3,pages53-94,Winter2010-2011,p.55.6Ibid.,p.57.7SecurityCounciloftheUnitedNations,Resolution2178onthreatstopeaceandinternationalsecurityresultingfromactsofterrorism,S/RES/2178,24September2014,8T.HEGGHAMMER,op.cit.,p.53.

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joinedthesetheatresofwarsincethebeginningoftheconflict,andhowmanyarestillinthese

regions.Severalreasonsmayexplainthedifficultiestocalculateandestablishclearfigures.

Firstly,isconsideredasaforeignfighteranypersonfromadifferentnationalityofthecountry

where the fight takes place. Thismeans that some could die on the ground, somemaynever

come back in their home country, and some could or have already returned. In fact, when

discussingtheissueofforeignfighters,threedifferentcategorieshavetobedistinguished.

Secondly, it is not always possible to detect people leaving their country for Syria and Iraq,

particularlybecausesomeofthemhavevoluntarilychosenindirectitineraries,whichcannotbe

easilyidentified.Thus,amemberoftheFrenchintelligenceserviceexplainedtothenewspaper

LeMonde that “somepass through Italy, theMaghreborCyprus.This iswhatwecall "broken

flights": for example, a family stayed for severalmonths in Egypt before joining Turkey. It is

undetectable”9.Onecanreasonablyarguethatthereistimespanbetweenthedepartureofan

Europeancitizento joinawar,andthemomentwhere intelligenceagencies learnthathe/she

left.Thisfactmakesitevenmoredifficulttohaveupdateddataonthetopic.

Thirdly, researchers are trying to assess an unsettled issue. Indeed, they observe daily new

individualsgoingorattempting togo toSyria,whileon thesameday, several foreign fighters

arekilledontheSyrianandIraqisoil,oreveninanothercountry.

Taking into account these methodological and practical biases, the best estimate is now

between3.000and4.000EuropeanFTF,asassessed inrecentanalyses. Indeed, inSeptember

2014,BBCNewsreportedthattheEU’santi-terrorismcoordinator,GillesdeKerchove,gavethe

number of 3.000 European jihadists in Syrian and Iraqis wars10. In an article published in

December2014byLorenzoVidinofromtheCenterofSecurityStudiesofMunich, it iswritten

“larger countries such as France, Great Britain and Germany have provided the lion’s share

(respectively,roughly700,500and300)”11.However,smallercountrieshavealsobeenaffected

by thephenomenon, as forexampleBelgium(300),Netherlands (120),Denmark (100)12.The

number of FTF coming from Russia was estimated at around 2.700 at the end of 201513.

9S.SEELOW,“Leretourdesdjihadistes,unlourddéfipourlaFrance”,LeMonde,1December2016.10“IslamicStatecrisis:3,000Europeanjihadistsjointhefight”,BBCNews,26September2014,http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29372494.11 L. VIDINO, “European foreign fighters in Syria: dynamics and responses” inEuropean View n°13, 18December2014,p.218.12Ibid.,p.218.13 Security Council, Counter-terrorism Committee, S/2015/975 – Implementation of Security Councilresolution2178(2014)byStatesaffectedbyforeignterroristfighters–Thirdreport,2015.

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Regarding theestimatednumberofTurkishFTF, thediscrepancybetween figuresofdifferent

sources isverysignificant, inarangeofestimates from130014 to220015 for thesameperiod.

Lastbutnotleast,arelativelyrecentreportpublishedbytheInternationalCentreforCounter-

Terrorism (ICCT) inApril2016considers that thenumberofEU citizenswhohave left their

countrytofightinIraqandSyria“liesbetween3.922and4.294(...)amajorityof2.838foreign

fighterscomefromjustfourcountries:Belgium,France,GermanyandtheUnitedKingdom”16.

FTFasathreatfornationalsecurities

The FTF issue addresses an immense security challenge to national security authorities.

Member States of the CoE, especially the most affected by the phenomenon, are mainly

concernedaboutthepotentialthreatthattheforeignterroristfighterscouldrepresentfortheir

countryoforigin.Indeed,theFTFareperceivedasaconstantthreatfornationalpopulationand

institutions,astheycanusetheir“newlyacquiredcombatexperience,networkofcontactsand

ideological outlook”,which can drive or them or be utilized “to carry out attacks”17. In other

words, they can return to their home country hardened by the experience and possibly

perpetrateterroristattacks.Hence,therearemanyrisksandconsequencesbehindthenotionof

“blowback”,orwhattheacademicThomasHegghammercallsthe“veteraneffect”18.Inhisstudy

from 2013, Hegghammer has showed that among 945 Western jihadists (America, Western

Europe and Australia) between 1990 and 2010, 107 of them has been involved in terrorist

attacksorattemptsofterroristattacks,whichrepresentslittlemorethan11%19.

InBrussels,thisriskofblowbackwassadlyillustratedwiththeattackontheJewishmuseumin

May 2014 byMehdi Nemmouche, a returning FTF whowas still related to the Islamic State

organisation.Afterthis firstsuccessfulattackof ISILontheEuropeansoil, theattacksofParis

and Brussels finally convinced the European authorities of the scale of the threat. Thus, the

securitychallenge is immense. Indeed, thediversityandthenumberof individuals leaving for

SyriaandIraqincreasethisrisk,evenifnotallreturningforeignfightersembraceviolence.

14Ibid.,p.10.15TheSoufanGroup,ForeignFighters,AnUpdatedAssessmentof theFlowofForeignFighters intoSyriaandIraq,December2015.p.10.16ICCT,TheforeignfightersphenomenonintheEuropeanUnion,Profiles,ThreatsandPolicies,April2016.17L.VIDINO,op.cit.,p.219.18 T. HEGGHAMMER, “Should I Stay or Should I Go? Explaining Variation inWestern Jihadists’ ChoicebetweenDomesticandForeignFighting”inAmericanPoliticalScienceofReview,February2013,p.10.19Ibid.

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ReturningFTF:anintensificationofarrivalsinEurope

WiththeincreaseofbombingsfromtheinternationalcoalitionandtheprogressionoftheIraqi

armyandKurdishtroops,theIslamicstatehasconstantlylostbothterritoryandattractiveness

during the past sixmonths. The deterioration of themilitary situation of ISIL encourages an

increasingnumberofjihadiststoleavethewartheatre.Consequently,theMemberStatesofthe

CoEhavetobepreparedtothereturnofagrowingnumberofFTF20.

20Overthelastmonths,itseemsthatEuropeanStateshavestartedtobecomeawareoftheissue,asthenumber of publications (for example, twomajors books on the subject have recently been published,respectively A. DE GUTTRY, F. CAPONE& C. PAULUSSEN,Foreign fighters under international law andbeyond,February2016;D.THOMSON,Lesrevenants,December2016)andTVreportsonthesubjecthasmultiplied.

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Methodologyanddifficultiesofthestudy

Methodologicalissuesanddifficulties

Before examining in detail the foreign terrorist fighters phenomenon and political actions

implementedbyseveralEuropeancountries,itseemsnecessarytoclarifysomemethodological

points.

ThisreportfocusesonsomeEuropeancountries,allmembersoftheCoE.Becausethesituation

regarding the FTF is quite different from one country to another, we decided to compare

countriessignificantlyaffectedbythisphenomenon.Thus,areonlyconsideredtheoneswitha

largenumberoftheircitizensgonetoSyriaorIraqtojoinISILranks,namely:

*France

*Belgium

*Germany

*Russia

*TheUnitedKingdom

*Denmark

*Turkey

*TheNetherlands

• Foreignterroristfighters:acontemporaryissue...

Second,becauseitisarecentconcern,CoEMemberStatesarecurrentlydeliberatingaboutthe

typeofmeasureswhichwouldbethemostappropriatetoanswerproperlythisphenomenon.

As a consequence, political, criminal and non-repressivemeasures are still in a development

phase in most examined States, which inevitably leads to little academic analysis. We also

noticedthatmostgovernmentsfocusonderadicalisationprogrammesforcitizenswhodidnot

lefttojoinISISinIraqorSyria.

For some European States, such as France, FTF are not differentiated by national authorities

fromradicalisedcitizenswhodidnot left thecountry.This lackofdifferentiationreveals that

returnees are not considered as a special category but are rather incorporated in thewhole

“radicalisationcategory”.Moreover,asitisonlythebeginningofCoEMemberStates’responses,

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some measures are constantly evolving, making it difficult to build up definitive and stable

comparisonsonaEuropean level.As an illustration, Francehas turnedback inOctober2016

fromthe“Unitédepréventiondelaradicalisation”programme(UPRAprogramme),initiatedin

FrenchprisonsinJanuary2015.Consideredasinefficient,itisnowsupposedtobereplacedby

anotherone21.

• …leadingtofewavailableinformation

Thisnewphenomenonleadstoanotherdifficulty,directlylinkedtothelackofhindsight,which

istheshortageofinformation.ReliableelementsonFTFfightersarenoteasytofindbecauseof

the sensitivity of the issue, from both a security and a political point of view. Thus, national

authoritiesareverycautiouswhencommunicatingaboutthissubject,whichdoesnotfacilitate

comparisonsbetweenEuropeanStates.InthecaseofTurkey,currentlyexperiencingaperiodof

political turmoil, the situation is even worse and Turkish information is under considerable

restriction.Thus,veryfewstudiesareproduced,withthenotableexceptionoftheICCTresearch

paper,publishedinApril201622.

Last but not least, one cannot compare apples with pears. Once information is found,

comparisons areneeded tounderstandwhat are themaindifferences and similarities among

the countries. In order to establish relevant comparisons, it is necessary to find common

reference points, which appears to be also quite difficult. There is a great variation in the

situation among countries in which political, historical or cultural characteristics lead to

differentvisionsandwaystodealwiththe issueof foreignterrorist fighters.For instance, the

Danish vision of favouring terrorists’ deradicalisation and their reintegration into the society

seemsveryfarawayfromtheRussianortheBritishones.ThefocusfromMoscoworLondonis

clearlyonrepressivemeasuresinordertotakeawayreturneesfromthesocietyandmakethem

harmless.

Furthermore,countriesarenotfacingthesameintensityofreturnsoftheircitizensandiftheir

punitive measures may be, at first sight, similar, it does not necessarily mean that they are

identicalandthuscomparable.Therefore,whensomecountrieshavetobedistinguishedfrom

each other in order to build different group of countries, it appears that none of them have

21Speech of Jean-Jacques Urvoas, French Ministry of Justice about the fight against radicalisation, 25October2016.22B.VANGINKELandE.ENTENMANN(Eds.),“TheForeignFightersPhenomenonintheEuropeanUnion.Profiles,ThreatsandPolicies”,TheInternationalCentreforCounter-Terrorism-TheHague7,no.2,2016.

13

exactlythesamelegislativearsenalorthesameapproachtorespondtothephenomenon.For

thisreason,ourcomparisonsandourchoicesarenecessarilysubjective.

Because of these limits, directly linked to the recent awareness in most of the European

countriesconsidered,ithasbeenimportantfortheworkinggrouptocontactexperts,scientists,

journalistsorpoliticians.TheyareworkingonFTF(sometimestheyevenworkwiththem)and

we thereby assume that they are better placed to explain with great precision the current

situation.

Generalsourcesusedinthereport

• Textualsources

Asalreadysaid,veryfewscientificliteraturewaspublishedonthissubject.Ourresearchesare

mostlybasedonofficialcriminal legislationsdocuments.Asthestudycoversthe international

cooperation between European countries and their legislative convergence,we also analysed

directives,protocolsandconventionsdraftedbyinternationalorganisationssuchastheUnited

Nations, theEuropeanUnionortheCouncilofEurope.Furthermore,webeneficiatedfromthe

ICCTreportofApril2016,whichinitiatedcomparisonsofcountries’situationintheEuropean

Union. As a consequence, we had to update any legislative changes that occurring in the

countriesafterthispublication.

• Meetings,conferencesandinterviews

This study also benefited from representatives’ and associations’ reports23 as well as direct

assessments from politicians and experts working on the subject. The authors of this report

officially thank all the persons who shared their views and experiences, especially

DouniaBouzar,consideredasoneoftheFrenchspecialistsofradicalisation,AhmetInselforthe

Turkish policy toward FTFs, as well as advisors of the European Union Counter-Terrorism

Coordinator, Gilles de Kerchove, who were helpful on the coordination between European

countries. We also benefited from the 11thRendez-vousEuropéens de Strasbourg to meet

specialists of terrorism, such as Farouk Atig, international reporter who has written and

reportedaboutjihadistsinSyria,ClaudeMoniquet,formerDGSEagent,orJean-CharlesBrisard,

PresidentoftheCentrefortheAnalysisofTerrorism(CAT).

23Forinstancethereportofthe“Contrôleurgénéraldeslieuxdeprivationdeliberté”,publishedon7June2016abouttheUPRAProgrammefortheFrenchcase.

14

Meetingalotofspecialistswasimportantforusinordertohavedifferentpointsofviewandto

guarantee the greatest accuracy and objectivity in our report. Their opinion also provided

addedvaluetounderstandwhichmeasuresareeffectiveandwhichonesarenot.Theirdifferent

viewsandperceptionsguidedustoformulateourrecommendationsthatmayimprovethecare

ofFTFsbytheirhomecountry.

15

PART1:PRESENTATIONANDANALYSISOF

REPRESSIVEMEASURES

WhencopingwiththeproblemofreturningFTF,CoEMemberStatesdonotlacklegalmeansof

action.Admittedly, inmostcountries it isnot in itselfanoffencetogoabroadinordertotake

part in an armed conflict. Generally, a distinction should be made between two periods

regardingthephenomenonofforeignfightersinSyriaandIraq:thefirst“wave”ofFTF(2012-

2014)didnotgenerallyfacelegalaction.Itwasonlyattheendof2014thatthefirstconvictions

werepronouncedagainstreturneesintheircountryoforigin.Nevertheless,CoEMemberStates

havetodayintheirjudicialsystemsawiderangeoflegislativemeasuresthatcanbeappliedto

thereturnees.Thesetoolsarenotalwayselaboratedwiththespecificpurposeofrespondingto

thephenomenonofFTF,butareoftenmainlyrelatedtothefightagainstterrorismasawhole.

Indeed,statesoftenprosecuteFTFunderterrorismcharges,adaptingtheexistinglegislationto

the returnees cases. One can distinguish two types of legislations to apprehend the

phenomenon:respectivelycriminallawandadministrativemeasures.

Criminal lawmeasures canbedefinedas a “bodyof rules and statutes thatdefines conduct

prohibited by the government because it threatens and harms public safety andwelfare and

thatestablishespunishment tobe imposed for thecommissionofsuchacts”24.Inotherwords,

several criminal law provisions can be used to launch criminal prosecutions against the

returnees.Themainonesaretheperpetrationofaterroristact,receivingorprovidingterrorist

training, participation to a terrorist undertaking or even travelling for the purposes of

terrorism. That being said, the challenge of returnees led to several evolutions in certain

countries’ legislations:manyCoEmemberstateshaveadoptednewlawprovisionsinorderto

especially address the danger posed by FTF in democracies. The decision to prosecute takes

many factors into account, such as the availability of sufficient evidence and public interest.

Thus, returnees should be divided into several categories of risk. The general trend is to

strengthen criminal legislation and can bemainly explained by the terrorist attacks faced by

CoEmembersoverthelastyears.

Defining administrative measures is not an easy task, as they differ from one country to

another.Theyalsotakeseveralforms,buttheyallfollowthesamegoal:eradicatingthethreat

24"CriminalLaw."West'sEncyclopediaofAmericanLaw,edition2,2008.TheGaleGroup,consultedon10December2016.

16

FTF pose to national security. One can at minimum say they are all taken by national

governmentstopreventradicalisedindividualtoleaveorenterthenationalterritory,butalso

to put them under surveillance and be sure they will not commit any attacks. Contrarily to

criminal law measures, administrative measures are repressive but not in a sense of

punishment. In fact, European States mainly use administrative measures when they cannot

applycriminalmeasure;theycompletecriminalprosecution.

Tosumup,thistypeofmeasuresisasafeguardforthesecurityofthecountry,asortofspider

webthatspansontheentirenationalterritoryandinwhichitishopedthatoneoftheFTFwill

getcaught.Thereaderwillquicklyunderstandthat thesemeasuresare limitedtorevokingof

thecitizenship,confiscationoftraveldocuments,no-entrylistonnationalterritory,riskanalysis

unit,andstrongbordercontrolofpeopleleavingtheirhomecountry.

AstheobjectiveofthisreportisacomparativeanalysisofhowthemostaffectedCoEmember

states address the issue of FTFs, it is necessary to set the scene by explaining the legal

framework related to terrorism in the different countries(A). In a second section, the reader

willbeprovidedwithanattempttoevaluatetheefficiencyandcriticismofthemeasures(B).

A. Overviewofcriminallawandadministrativemeasures

The aim of this section is first to provide a comprehensive overview of the criminal law and

administrativemeasuresthatcanbeused.

Asalreadystated,mostofthelegislationaimedatfightingterrorismhavenotbeencreatedfor

theFTFcase.Ingeneral,judgesuseexistinglawsandadaptthemtotheFTFphenomenon.Asit

isoftendifficult,ifnotimpossible,toisolatespecificlawprovisionsrelatedtotheFTFissuefrom

the rest of antiterrorism legislation, it is therefore also necessary to briefly present national

contextswithregardtoterrorism.

1) KingdomofBelgium

BelgiumistheEUMemberthathasthehighestnumberofforeignfighterspercapita25.Themost

recentestimateshowsthatmorethan500BelgiancitizenshaveleftforSyriasince201126.

25C.KROET,“Belgiumhasmostforeignfightersperhead”,Politico,4January2016.26B.VANGINKELandE.ENTENMANN,op.cit.,p.25.

17

a) Belgiancriminallawmeasures

TherelevantterrorismprovisionsinBelgiumarethearticles137to141oftheBelgianCriminal

Code.Thearticle137definesterroristoffences27.Article140definesprisonsentencesfrom5to

10yearsandfinesuptofivethousandeurosforanyonewhoparticipates intheactivitiesofa

terroristgroup,“includingbyprovidinginformationormaterialmeanstotheterroristgroup,or

byanyformoffinancinganactivityoftheterroristgroup”28.Article140anditsparagraphsb,c,

danderespectivelycriminalisepublicincitement,recruitment,providingandreceivingtraining

tocommitterroristcrimes. Introducedbythe lawof July20th201529,article140fappearsto

specifically respond to the phenomenon of FTF since it creates a new offence: from now on,

thosewhotravelabroadfromBelgiumortoBelgiumfromabroad,withaviewtocommittinga

terroristoffense,maybeconvicted.

Morerecently,BelgianlegislatorsamendedtheCriminalCodewiththeLawof3August201630

toensurethatappropriatesanctionscanbeimposedagainstanyterroristbehaviour,sincethe

previous legislation lacked clarity on many procedures. This legal development particularly

addressestheissueofreturnees:indeed,thescopeofapplicationof“theincitementtocommita

terrorist offence” (article140bis) is extended to incriminate “the incitement to travel abroad

for terrorist purposes”. Furthermore, the incrimination of recruitment for a terrorist act

(article140ter)nowincludes“travellingabroad”sothatprosecutionisalsoadvocatedagainst

thosewho recruit another person in order to go abroad and return toBelgium for terrorism

purposes.Inbothcases,theperpetratorsoftheseoffencesriskanimprisonmentfromfivetoten

yearsandafineof100to5000euros.Finally,thecompetencesofthejurisdictionalpowerare

extended in such a way that anyone who is guilty of a terrorist offence outside the Belgian

territorycanbeprosecutedinBelgium.

b) Belgianadministrativemeasures

PublicauthoritiesdevelopedasetofmeasuresagainstFTF,includingadministrativedecisions.

AsexplainedbytheCenterforSecurityStudies,“theintensityofthemonitoringofeachreturnee

isbasedonthelevelofthreathe/sheisassessedtopose”31.

27Article137oftheBelgianCriminalCode.28Article140oftheBelgianCriminalCode.29Lawof20July2015tostrengthenthefightagainstterrorism,n°2015009385.30Lawcontainingvariousprovisionsrelatedtothefightagainstterrorism,n°2016009405,publishedon11August2016.31L.VIDINO,“ForeignFighters:anoverviewofresponsesinelevencountries”,CenterforSecurityStudies,ZurichETH,March2014,p.8.

18

• AsintheNetherlands,UnitedKingdomandFrance,deprivationofBelgiannationalityon

groundofterrorismifpossibleaslongastheindividualdoesnotbecomestateless.Thus,

thedeprivationcanonlybeappliedtoabinationalperson32;

• CreationofadatabasededicatedtoFTFssuppliedbytheOCAM(OrganedeCoordination

pour l’Analyse la Menace) to inform local authorities and implement a personal

monitoring. This implies a better cooperation between administration, police, and

judiciarystructures;

• IdentifiedFTFsreceiveastandardizedandindividualtargetedmonitoringfromBelgian

administrativeservices33.Apersonalanalysisforeachindividualisrealisedinorderto

determinehis/herlevelofdanger;

2) KingdomofDenmark

According to a statement from the Danish intelligence services dated December 2015, 125

individuals have left the country to fight in Syria or Iraq and among them 62 have returned

since 201134. Denmark is probably one of the most advanced and imaginative country with

NetherlandsinsolvingtheissueofFTF.Thesystemis“basedonaveryextensiveinfrastructure

created at the national and local level”35 and mixes as well criminal law and administrative

measures.

a) Danishcriminallawmeasures

In Denmark, the terror acts considered as crimes are the participation or leadership in a

terroristgroup,receivingaterroristtraining,financingterrorism,instructingotherstocommit

terrorist acts and recruitment for terrorism, covered by Sections 114a to 114e of theDanish

CriminalCode36.Morespecifically, thearticle114d,whichcanberelevant in thecaseofFTF,

specifies that “anypersonwho (...) participates in anunlawfulmilitaryorganisationor group

shallbeliabletoafineortoimprisonmentforanytermnotexceedingtwoyears”37.

3216July2016LawDOC541198/01.33BelgianMinistriesofJusticeandInterior,“CircularrelativetotheFTFapproach”,21stAugust2015.34B.VANGINKELandE.ENTENMANN,op.cit.,p.29.35L.VIDINO,op.cit,p.9.36 General Secretariat of the Council, Criminal justice response to the phenomenon of foreign fighters,CounciloftheEuropeanUnion,Brussels,16March2015.37Article114doftheDanishCriminalCode.

19

That being said, due to significant evidence requirements, prosecutions are complex, but not

impossible: indeed,asofMarch2013, twoDanish-Somalibrothers comingback fromSomalia

were convictedof terrorism training38. Itwas the first convictionof terrorist training for two

individuals coming back from a foreign training camp. The authorities were able to gather

evidencethankstoexplicittelephoneconversationsinterceptedbetweenthetwobrothers,one

of them affirming its willingness to “assemble a whole group [to] go to Europe andmurder

everything”39.Suchevidenceisnotalwaysavailable.Consequently,foralongtime,therehadnot

beenanyconvictionforFTFcomingbackfromSyria40.ItwasonlyinJune2016thatthefirstFTF

was convicted41. ThisDanish citizenwas charged for “"letting oneself be recruited to commit

actsof(terrorism)”42.

b) Danishadministrativemeasures

• AsinBelgium,DanishauthoritieshaveimplementedanindividualmonitoringforFTFs

in order to determine their level of danger. Local actors play a crucial role in the

welcomingandtreatmentofreturnees;

• TheDanishgovernmentproposedabill tobancitizensentering inaconflict zoneand

increaseprisontimeforpeoplebeingrecruitedbyterroristorganisations43;however,it

seemsthattheproposalhasnotyetreceivedanylegalsubstance

ForDanishnationals,amendmentstotheActonPassportsandtotheActonAlienshavebeen

adoptedwiththeMarch2015law:

• ThepolicecanrefusetoissueapassportforaDanishnational,ortheycanrevokeit, if

theindividualposesariskforthecountry.Inaddition,thepolicecansupplementsucha

decisionwithatravelbanforaspecifiedperiodoftime44

• Persons convicted of committing an act of terrorism under Chapter 13 of the Danish

Criminal Code may lose their Danish citizenship, unless this loss would make them

stateless45 38L.VIDINO,op.cit.,p.9.39Ibid.40Ibid.41“DenmarkconvictsfirstIsisforeignfighter”,TheLocal,22June2016.42Ibid.43N.SKYDSGAARD,“Denmarkmovestotoughenanti-terrorismlaws”,Reuters,8April2016.44B.VANGINKEL,E.ENTENMANN,op.cit.,p.30.

20

3) FrenchRepublic

AccordingtotheFrenchintelligenceservices,almost700FrenchFTFarestillinSyriaandIraq.

Furthermore, at the end of November 2016, the number of French citizens killed since the

beginning of the conflict reached22146. On 7November 2016, French PrimeMinisterManuel

Vallsdeclared that the issueof returneesrepresented“the firstpointofconcerns for thenext

fiveortenyears”intermsofsecurity47.Atthemoment,theFrenchgovernmentmainlyprovides

acriminalresponsetotheissue.

a) Frenchcriminallawmeasures

Francedoesnot condemn its citizens for the sole reasonof going toSyria. Indeed, itmustbe

shown that they were willing to join an organisation linked to terrorism, leading to an

indictment forcriminalassociation inrelationtoa terroristundertaking48.Thatbeingsaid, the

article421-2-6,addedintheCriminalCodeon13November2014,createsthenewoffenceof

“individualterroristundertaking”49.Itestablishesthatanactofterrorismisdefinedas“thefact

ofpreparingaterroristoffence,providedthatthispreparationis intentionallyconnectedwith

an individual undertaking which purpose is to seriously disturb public order through

intimidationorterror”50.Theprojectmustbecharacterizedontheonehandby“thepossession,

search, procurement or manufacture of articles or substances likely to create a danger to

others”51andontheotherhandbyasubstantiveelement.Thenewarticlegivesa listofthese

substantive elements and one of them is the fact of having stayed abroad into a theatre of

operationsforterroristgroups52,whichclearlyconcernstheFTF.Itispunishablewithtenyears

imprisonmentandafineof150,000euros.

Therefore,theFTFwhocurrentlyreturntoFranceareindictedandeitherheldinprecautionary

detentionorplacedunderjudicialsupervision.ThefirstsentenceagainstareturneefromSyria

45DanishCriminalCode,Ordern°909ofthe27thSeptember2005.46S.SEELOW,op.cit.47Ibid.48Article421-1ofFrenchCriminalCode.49Law n° 2014-1353 of 13 November 2014 strengthening the provisions relating to the fight againstterrorism.50Ibid.51Ibid.52Article421-2-6ofFrenchCriminalCode.

21

was passed in November 2014 with a term of imprisonment of seven years for “criminal

associationinrelationtoaterroristundertaking”53.

Accordingtothepublicprosecutor’sdepartmentofParis,268individualsarecurrentlyindicted

becausetheyleftforSyriaortriedto54.169ofthemhavebeeninpre-trialdetentionand99are

placed under judicial supervision. This proportion is unusual since provisional detention

concernsonly20%ofpeopleinordinarycriminalcases.

Besides,theCourtofCassationdeliveredanimportantjudgmenton30August2016following

thepublicprosecutor’srequest55.Thelatteraskedforanewlegalqualificationcriminalisingthe

traveltoSyriatojoinISISfortwoFrenchcitizens.Untilthisjudgment,themostcommonlyused

legal qualificationwas, as previously said, the offense of criminal association in relation to a

terroristundertaking.Itleadstoessentialconsequences:indeed,ifthereisalegalqualification

of terrorist crime, the period of pre-trial detention is of one renewable year, while it is six

months,renewableaswell,forterroristoffenses.Moreimportantly,thepenaltyisnowatermof

upto20or30years'imprisonment,insteadof10years56.

Regardingtheissueofwomenjoiningterroristorganisations,itshouldbeunderlinedthatfora

longtime,womenbenefitedfroma"genderbias":thatistosaytheyweremainlyseenasvictims

undergoingpressuresofmalerecruiters.However,thisisnotthecaseinFranceanymore:they

are now almost always indicted and increasingly held in detention. The Minister of Justice

announcedon22October2016that13womensectionswillbecreatedintheprisonfacilities

beforetheendof2017inordertoanticipatethereturnofwomenfromSyriaandIraq57.

53 E. FEFERBERG, “Le parcours chaotique du premier français accusé de jihad en Syrie”,France24,18November2014.54L.BOY,“Saint-Etienne-du-Rouvray:commentlaFrancegèrelesjihadistesrevenusdeSyrie,ouquionttentéd'ypartir”,FranceInfo,29July2016.55 P. ALONSO, “Terrorisme : les raisons derrière le durcissement de la politique pénale”, Libération,2September2016.56 “François Molins annonce un « durcissement considérable » de la politique pénale en matière deterrorisme”,LeMonde,2September2016.57S.SEELOW,op.cit.

22

b) Frenchadministrativemeasures

Aswe already said above, France is probably one of themore affected countries by the FTF

phenomenon.Itwasthusanecessityforthecountrytodevelopanefficientsystemtoprevent

any threat, mixing criminal law and administrative measures. The latter will be presented

underneath.

• French government and Parliament has already extended four times the state of

emergency, running now until January 2017. The French Senate also voted to amend

France’s1955“stateofemergency”lawinorderto:

� “Extend house arrest regime to any person suspected of constituting a threat to

securityandpublicorder;

� Use electronic bracelets in cases of house arrestwherein the person arrested has

beenpreviouslyconvictedforactsofterrorism;

� Dismantle groups that have been involved in, facilitated or incited acts that

constituteaseriousbreachofpublicorder;

� Enable France’s interior ministry to employ all measures to block websites that

glorifyorinciteterrorism”58

• Theindividualisprohibitedofleavingthenationalterritorythroughtheconfiscationof

traveldocumentsandIDcard59;

• He/shecanreceiveanobligationtoremaininadeterminedgeographicalzoneand/or,

sometimes completed with house arrest. In such situation, the individual has the

obligationtogotothepoliceservicesseveraltimesaday60;

• He/she canhaveanobligation to reporthis/herplaceof residenceandany changeof

residence61;

• He/shecanbeprohibitedtomeetpeoplewhoarenamelydesignated62;

58Counterextremismproject,Reporton“France:extremismandcounter-terrorism”,2016,p.7.59ArticleL.224-1fromtheFrenchInternalSecurityCode60Lawn°2016-731of3 June2016strengthening the fightagainstorganizedcrime, terrorismand theirfinancingandimprovingtheefficiencyandguaranteesofcriminalproceedings,Article52.61Ibid.62Ibid.

23

• He/shecanbedeprivedofhis/hernationality,onlyifhe/she:

� Hascommittedaterroristact;

� Ifthecriminalacthasbeencommittedinthe10yearsbeforetheprocurementofthe

Frenchnationalityorinthe15yearsaftertheprocurement;

� Heisbinational(nostatelesspeople)63

• Finally, French returnees can see their social allowances suspended, as Counter

extremism report: “on March 17, 2015, France’s interior minister announced that the

governmentcutwelfarebenefitsfor290Frenchcitizenswhohadleftthecountrytofight

withjihadistgroupsinIraqandSyria.”64

4) FederalRepublicofGermany

The issueofFTFhasbecomeaprimarysecuritychallenge forGermanyover the lastyears. In

October2015,theFederalProsecutorGeneralstatedthanmorethan750individualshadleftfor

SyriaorIraq65.

a) Germancriminallawmeasures

Thesections91(1)and111;sections30(1),129(a)and129(b);andsection89(a)oftheGerman

CriminalCoderespectivelycriminaliseincitement;offencesrelatedtorecruitment,supportand

membership in a terrorist organisation; preparing, encouraging or carrying out of a “serious

violentoffenceendangeringtheState”66.

TheGermanauthoritieshavealsochangedtheir legislationwithregardtothephenomenonof

FTFandinordertoimplementtheUNSecurityCouncilResolution2178.Precisely,anewanti-

terrorism legislationwas adopted in June 2015: it expanded preparatory offences bymaking

traveling outside the country with the intent to receive terrorist training a criminal offense,

punishableaccordingtosection89(a)67.

63Articles25and25-1fromtheFrenchCivilCode.64Counterextremismproject,France:extremismandcounter-terrorism,p.8.65B.VANGINKELandE.ENTENMANN,op.cit.,p.30.66Ibid.67 J.GESLEY, “Germany:NewAnti-TerrorismLegislationEntered IntoForce”,GlobalLegalMonitor,TheLawLibraryofCongress,10July2015.

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The first caseof a returneebeing sentencedoccurred at the endof 2014.The individualwas

convictedtothreeyearsandninemonthsof imprisonment for joiningaterroristorganisation

abroad68.

However,differentverdictshavebeencarriedoutinthefollowingyears,rangingfrom11years

of prison to acquittal. Thus, in July 2015, the Oberlandesgericht München (Munich Higher

RegionalCourt)sentencedareturneeto11yearsofprisonduetohismembershipinaterrorist

organisation,attempttomurderandaccessorytoattemptedmurder.69

Incontrast, theBundesgerichtshof (FederalCourtof Justice)hasdecided inOctober2015 that

civilpersonswhosympathizewithaterroristorganisationandaretrainedtotheuseoffirearms

inorder todefend themselves abroadare generallynotpreparing a serious state-threatening

act of violence (StGB § 89a Paragraph 1 Sentence 2)70. This principle especially applies to

foreignwomentravellingtoSyriaorIraqinordertostaytherewiththeirhusbandsbutwhoare

notactivelyinvolvedincombatoperations.

b) Germanadministrativemeasures

ThenumberofGermancitizensinvolvedintheSyrianandIraqiwarsisunprecedented.Various

administrativemeasureshavebeensetuptoconfronttheFTFphenomenon:

• Borderpoliceisextremelycarefulandsensitizedtothedetectionofreturnees;

• ThenamesofindividualssuspectedofterrorismwholeaveGermanyareinscribedinthe

Schengeninformationsystem(SIS)inordertobedetectedwhentheycomehome;

• Visarevocationfornon-Germancitizens;

• In addition to a sentence of imprisonment of no less than sixmonths, the courtmay

order the loss of the ability to hold public office, to vote and to be elected in public

elections(§§45,92a,101,102,108c,108e,109iStGB)71;

68S.BEHR,“IS-KämpferzumehrjährigerHaftverurteilt”,FrankfurterRundschau,4December2014.69W.KLUWER,“OberlandesgerichtMünchen,Urt.v.15.07.2015,Az.:7St7/14”,Jurion.70W.KLUWER,“Bundesgerichtshof,Urt.v.27.10.2015,Az.:3StR218/15”,Jurion.71M.FEHNDRICH,EntzugdesWahrlrechts,September2002.

25

• Authoritiesmaydepriveindividualsofpassportsandnationalidentificationdocuments

and theymay issueexitbans, impose reportingobligations, considermeasures to end

residence and prevent a person from entering the country (§§ 7 Paragraph 1, 8, 10

PassG);

• Regulationsregardingthebanningoftravelwereexpandedin2015topreventFTFsto

travel(§10Paragraph1PassG).

5) KingdomoftheNetherlands

TheNetherlands is probablynot themost affected countryby theFTFphenomenon, but it is

probablyoneofthemostactiveinthefight.ThenumberofDutchdeparturesforSyriaisindeed

unprecedented,andtheseindividualsareclearlyidentifiedasthreatstonationalsecurity.

a) Dutchcriminallawmeasures

Articles83a,46,140a,134a,421,205and131oftheDutchCriminalCodeaddresscriminalacts

conductedwithaterroristpurpose, thepreparationtocommitaseriousoffence,participation

to a terrorist organisation, providing or receiving terrorist training, terrorist financing,

recruitment for a terrorist purpose, and incitement to terrorism. Article 83 defines what a

terroristoffenseis.

In2014,theDutchauthoritieslaunchedthe“NetherlandsComprehensiveActionProgrammeto

Combat Jihadism”. It notably details that “verified departees who join terrorist militias are

subjecttocriminal investigation”72,since“participationinterroristarmedstruggle interrorist

trainingisapunishableoffenceundersections134aand140aoftheDutchPenalCode”73.

Theactionprogrammealsodescribesthedifferentexistinglegaloptionstosupervisereturnees:

asuspendedsentenceimposedbythecourtwiththeconvictedpersonhavingtomeetspecific

conditions during the probation period, conditions imposed in the context of a conditional

releaseaftermorethanoneyearinprison:“suspectedjihadistsandknownforeignfighterswho

havereturnedtotheNetherlandsarerequiredtocheckindailywiththepolice”74.

72DutchMinistryofSecurityandJustice,“TheNetherlandscomprehensiveactionprogrammetocombatjihadism-Overviewofmeasuresandactions”,28August2014.73Ibid.74“Jihadiskeptoutofpolicestationsbecauseofsafetyfears”,DutchNews,19February2015.

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b) Dutchadministrativemeasures

When prosecution is not possible (for instance when evidence is not sufficient), target

individualsaresubjectedtoseveralmeasures.

When an individual researched or identified for terrorism activities in a zone of conflict is

discoveredontheDutchterritory:

• He/shecanbeundersurveillancefromnationalintelligenceagencies;

• If he/she does not possess the Dutch nationality, the Ministry of justice may cancel

his/herresidencypermit.Suchadministrativeactcanbefollowedbyanexpulsionorder

andtheindividual’sidentitymaybedeposedonanationalterrorismlist(individualisat

thismomentlabelledas“undesirableforeignnational”);

• On the same level, if there is sufficient evidence that the individual hasbeen in touch

withterroristorganisationsoractivities,his/hertraveldocumentswillbeconfiscatedor

declaredinvalidandhewillbeplacedontheno-entrylist;

• Dutchauthoritiesmayblockbankaccountsofindividualssuspectedofterrorism;

• Verified departees are immediately removed from the Persons Database (PDB): they

will not be eligible to tuitions or financial allowances. Local administrations are

informed by the Dutch police of verified departees, which lose automatically their

allowanceseligibilityinordertostruggleagainstterrorismfinancing;

• Aproposal foraTemporaryAct foradministrativepowers isbeingpreparedtoreduce

the risks and prevent serious crimes from being committed by terrorist fighterswho

returntotheNetherlands.Thiscouldincludetemporarymeasuressuchas,interalia,a

periodicduty to report, contactbans, cooperationwith relocation, inorder toprevent

recruitment, further radicalisation of the returnees and the spread of radical ideas.

27

WhilethetextisstillindiscussionintheDutchParliament,ithasalreadybeencriticized

bytheCouncilofEurope,whohasconsideredthistypeofmeasureasgoing“toofar”75.

Revoking nationality is probably one of the recurrent debates regarding the fight against

terrorism.Dutchauthoritieshavedecidedtoadoptthismeasure.

• Individuals perceived as a threat and with dual nationality can have their Dutch

nationalitystripped,regardingarticle23ofthecountry’spassportlaw.Threeconditions

areenouncedinthelaw:

� Itconcernspeoplebeingatleast16yearsold;

� Itconcernspeoplewhoareoutsidethekingdom;

� Itconcernspeopleforwhomterroristactsorrelationshavebeendulyestablished.

Once the Dutch nationality is stripped, the individual will be considered as an “undesirable

foreignnational”(section67oftheDutchAliensAct)andmaybeexpelled.

6) RussianFederation

ThehistoryofRussiaregardingthecaseofforeignfightersisveryspecificbecausemanyofits

citizenswent to fight abroad before the Syrianwar, notably in several republics of Northern

Caucasus,suchasChechnya,IngushetiaorDagestan.TheNorthCaucasushasa longhistoryof

Islamist extremism. Moreover, the first anti-terror legislation entered into force in 1998

followingtheviolentconfrontationsinChechnyaandonwardterroristattacks76.Consequently,

RussiaismoreusedthanotherEuropeancountriestodealwithsuchaphenomenon.FTFwith

Russianpassportsarecurrentlyestimatedtobe250077.

75 J. PIETERS, “Dutch approach to jihadism violates Human Rights: Council of Europe”, NL Time, 29November2016..76RussianFederationFederalLawNo.130-FZ,signedbyRussianFederationPresidentB.Yeltsin,25July1998.77P.PAWLAK, J.GÖPFFÄRTH,“CounteringextremismandterrorisminRussia”,EuropeanParliamentaryResearchService,May2016.

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a) Russiancriminallawmeasures

TheRussianLawonCounteractiontoTerrorismof2006definesterrorismandterroristactivity

initsarticle378.

Overall, the Russian authorities have adopted a punitive response toward the returnees. The

359LawonMercenariesisarelevantpieceoflegislationregardingFTFasitprohibitsRussian

citizens fromparticipating in foreignarmed forces.Furthermore, the2013amendment to the

Anti-terrorism Law of 2006 incriminates the participation in an armed group outside the

Russianterritory“whoseaimsarecontrarytotheRussianinterests”79.Moreover,thelawsetsa

punishmentoftenyearsinjailfor“trainingwiththeaimofcarryingoutterroristactivities80”.

Forthosewhohaveparticipatedinterroristactivities,theimprisonmentgoesingeneralfrom5

years to perpetual imprisonment81. The same punishment concerns the complicity of other

individualswhohavebeenimplicatedintheorganisationoftheterroristact82.Publicincentives

forterrorism,aswellasjustifyingterrorism,canleadtoimprisonmentfor5years83.Attheend

of2014,Russia'sSupremeCourtissuedarulingrecognizingISILasaterroristorganisation84.As

aconsequence,participationinISILactivitiesisnowacriminaloffense.

b) Russianadministrativemeasures

Russian authorities clearly favour criminal lawmeasures and punishment, but there are few

administrativemeasuresthatcanbedeveloped:

• Afterseveraldiscussions inDuma,revokingofRussiannationalityproposalhas finally

been removed as it would block Russian authorities to judge and put in jail FTF85.

Moreover,itcancreateissuesforspecialservicesastheFederalSecurityServiceofthe

Russian Federation (FSB), because in case of nationality revoking the possibilities to

findterroristsbysecretservicesaredecreasing;

78FederalLawn°35-FZofMarch6,2006onCounteractionofTerrorism.79L.VIDINO,op.cit.,p.14.80Ibid.81PenalcodeoftheRussianFederation,partIX/24.,article205.82Ibid.,205.1.83Ibid.,205.2.84CountryReportsonTerrorism2015-Russia,UnitedStatesDepartmentofStates,2June2016.85N.SELIVERSTOVA,“RussianDoumawillnotdeprivetheterroristsandFTFofRussiannationality”,RIA-novosti,23June2016.

29

• People implicated in terrorist activities or having a linkwith any organisation cannot

leaveRussiaforatleast5years86.

7) RepublicofTurkey

SeveralauthorsstressthefactthatTurkeyhasarealexperienceincounter-terrorism,becauseit

hasbeen fighting for30years against theKurdish terrorists of thePKK.Due to itsparticular

geographicallocation,theRepublicofTurkeyisdirectlyconcernedbytheFTFissue,asitshares

aborderwithSyriaanditisatransitpointforallfighterscomingbacktotheirhomecountry.

a) Turkishcriminallawmeasures

Regardingthefightagainstterrorism,TurkeyhasadoptedtheCounter-TerrorismLawNo.3713

of12April199187.Itgivesadefinitionofterrorisminitsarticle1and2andhasbeenthesubject

ofnumerousamendments(in1995,1999,2003,2006and2010)tomakeitmoreeffectiveand

toadaptittonewthreats.Thedetentionconditionsandpenaltiesaredefinedinthearticles59,

63,68:

• Article59-4 enounces that the terrorist lawyer’sdocuments and files are subjected to

examination in order to check if he is not acting as an intermediary for a terrorist

organisation88;

• Article63expressesthatpeopleaccusedofterrorismcannotgettogetherinjailorhave

anycontactwitheachother89;

• Article 68 states that messages such as “letters and fax serving for communication

betweenmembersofterroristorganisationsshallnotbedeliveredtothesentenced,or

shallnotbesentiftheyarewrittenbythesentenced”90

86F.RUSTAMOVAandV.KOZLOV,“Russianauthoritiesaboutnewmeasuresofcounter-terrorism”,RBK,7April2016.87 Committee of experts on terrorism (CODEXTER), Profiles on Counter-Terrorism Capacity-Turkey,CouncilofEurope,May2013.88Ibid.89Ibid.90Ibid.

30

Theamendmentofthe2ndofJuly2012tothe1991counter-terrorismlawstatesthatterrorists

arejudgedin“heavypenalcourts”operatingunderarticle10ofthelaw,thislatterdisposition

explaining the investigation and trial process. We can observe that individuals accused of

terrorismactivitiesareheldlongerincustodythanforothercrime(48hours);

Othermain legalprovisionsconcerningterrorismaredeveloped in theTurkishCriminalCode

no.5237of200591.

b) Turkishadministrativemeasures

Turkish authorities have developed several administrative measures to address the

phenomenon:

• The establishment of a no entry-name-list on the Turkish territory (from 9.000 to

19.000between2011and2015butothernewspapersgiveahighernumber)92;

• Riskanalysisunits(RAU)areusedasacomplementtothenoentry-listduringpassport

controls at strategic crossing-border points (especially in airports and train stations).

RAUwork in close cooperationwith intelligence services andenter intoactionduring

passport control. Since spring 2014, those RAU have prevented the entry of 3.200

dangerouspeopleontheTurkishterritory93;

• Foreignersaccusedofterrorismareexpulsedtotheirhomecountry.Accordingtoalocal

newspaper,DailySabah,Turkeyhasdeportedmorethan3,700FTFssince201194;

• Turkish authorities have begun the building of a wall at the border with Syria (191

km)95;

• Ina speechgivenon5April2016,PresidentErdoğanannounced thathisgovernment

wouldconsiderstrippingTurkishterroristsoftheircitizenship96.However,nothinghas

91Ibid.92H.YACINKA,“ForeignterroristfightersandTurkey:anassessmentatthefirstyearoftheUNSecurityCouncilResolution2178”,OrsamReviewofRegionalAffairs,n°31,October2015.93“Turkeyhasdeported3,700FTFssince2011”,DailySabah,30October2016.94Ibid.95O. COSKUN and D. BUTLER, ”Turkey to complete Syria border wall within 5 months officials said”,Reuters,28September2016.96Counterextremismproject,Reporton“Turkey:extremismandcounter-terrorism”,2016,p.12.

31

beendoneyet.

8) UnitedKingdom

As for the Netherlands, the number of British citizens involved in the Syrian conflict is

unprecedented. In terms of counter-terrorism, many tools have been developed to prevent

radicalisationinorderto“makethemresilientagainstextremistmessages”97.

a) Britishcriminallawmeasures

Antiterrorism legislation in the United Kingdom provides for a large number of criminal

offensesconnectedwithterrorism.Thethreemainpiecesoflegislationregardingterrorismthat

can be used vis-à-vis FTF are the TerrorismAct of 2000, the TerrorismAct of 2006 and the

Counter-TerrorismandSecurityActof2015.AccordingtotheTerrorismActof2000,aperson

guiltyofanoffenseunderanysections15to18shallbeliableonconvictiontoimprisonmentfor

amaximumof14years98.Thepreparationofterroristactsiscriminalisedbythesection5ofthe

Terrorism Act of 2006, while providing or receiving a terrorist training is made a criminal

offencebyitssection6.Moreover,thesection8incriminatesthe“attendanceataplaceusedfor

terroristtraining”.

InMarch2015,theSeriousCrimeActwasadoptedanditssection81increasestheskillsofthe

UKterritorialjurisdictionrelatedtosection5and6oftheactreferredtoabove.Henceforth,UK-

linkedindividualsandthosewhoseektoharmtheUKandhavetrainedorpreparedforterrorist

actsoverseascanbeprosecuted.

Besides, the police have the authority to stop and question individuals suspected of being

terroristsatportsandborders.

97L.VIDINO,op.cit.,p.15.98TerrorismAct2000,C11,PartIII,Offences,Section22.

32

Travelling to Syria isnot a crime in itself. In fact, theBritishpolice try todeterminewhy the

individual went to Syria, what he did there andwhether his/her action violates the Counter

TerrorismAct,withregardthateven“passiveparticipation”iscriminalised99.

b) Britishadministrativemeasures

Britishauthoritieshavetakenseveraladministrativemeasures:

• Seizureortemporaryretentionoftraveldocuments100;

• TemporaryExclusionOrder(TEO)canbepronouncedforBritishcitizensthathaveleft

theKingdom,allowingauthoritiesto“manage”thereturnofBritishcitizenssuspectedof

involvementinterrorism-relatedactivitiesabroad.Duringthetimeofavailabilityofthe

TEO,“Britishpassportheldbytheexcludedindividualisinvalidated”101;

“A“temporaryexclusionorder”isanorderwhichrequiresanindividualnottoreturntotheUnited

Kingdom(...)ConditionAisthattheSecretaryofStatereasonablysuspectsthattheindividualis,or

hasbeen,involvedinterrorism-relatedactivityoutsidetheUnitedKingdom”102;

• TohavearighttoreturntotheUK,anyBritishcitizenwhowassubjecttotheTEOmust

receiveaPermittoreturnspecifyingwhenhe/shecanentertheUK,themannerandthe

placewherehe/sheispermittedtoarrive103;

• AfterreturningtotheUK,citizensthatweresubjecttoTEOmightbeobligedto,under

provisionoftheSchedule&totheTerrorismPreventionandInvestigationMeasuresAct

2011,

� Reporttothepolicestation(paragraph10)

� Attendatappointments(paragraph10A)

Policemayalsorequireinformationabout:

� Theindividual’splace(orplaces)ofresidence 99L.VIDINO,op.cit,p.16.100Counter-TerrorismandSecurityAct2015,Chapter1,Section1,“Seizureofpassportsetcfrompersonssuspectedofinvolvementinterrorism”.101 Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015, Chapter 2, Section 3, “Temporary exclusion orders:supplementaryprovision”.102Counter-TerrorismandSecurityAct2015,Chapter2,Section9,“Temporaryexclusionorders”.103Counter-TerrorismandSecurityAct2015,Chapter2,Section5,“Permittoreturn”.

33

� Anychangeintheindividual’splace(orplaces)ofresidence104

• Like in the Netherlands, individuals with dual citizenship can see their British one

stripped if theyare identifiedas a threat for the state. “Thedecisiondoesnot require

judicial approval and has immediate effect”105. Similarly to the Dutch legislation,

individualswithdualcitizenshipcanseetheirBritishnationalitystripped.However,the

UKhasbeenfurtherbypassingalawinMay2014“enablingtheHomeSecretarytostrip

citizensoftheirnationalityevenwhentheydonothavedualcitizenship”106.

• IndividualswhohaveacquiredtheBritishnationalitythroughthenaturalisationprocess

can be deprived of it, if there are enough elements to prove that they have done

“anythingseriouslyprejudicialtothevitalinterestsoftheUnitedKingdom,oraBritish

overseas territory”107and forbelieving that theperson isable tobecomeanationalof

anothercountryorterritory.

To conclude soberly this first section, the reader will find in the appendices two tables that

resumethemainpointsdevelopedabove.

Onthecomparisonbetweenrepressivemeasures:whyisitdifficulttoproducea

relevantcomparison?

Onacriminalandadministrativelevel,theissueofreturningFTFhasbecomecentralforthe

CoEMemberStates.Thereadermustbeawarethatonecanonlycomparewhatiscomparable.

Eventhoughtheoverall trend is thecriminalisationof theFTF issueand ifnotpossible, the

useof administrativemeasures, there are also toomanydifferences toproduce apertinent

comparison. Therefore, it has not been possible to create relevant comparison schemes or

groups.

In fact, the prosecution of returning FTF is a common aim among the studied countries.

Prosecutions are engaged for the commitment of a terrorist act, receiving or providing

104Counter-TerrorismandSecurityAct2015,Chapter2,Section2,“ObligationsafterreturntotheUnitedKingdom”.105L.VIDNO,op.cit.,p.16.106A. REED, J. DE ROY VAN ZUIJDEWIJN, E. BAKKER, “Pathways of foreign fighters: policy options andtheir(un)intendedconsequences”,ICCT-TheHague,April2015,pp.9-10.107Nationality,ImmigrationandAsylumAct2002,Section40(2).

34

terrorist training, participation to a terrorist undertaking or even travelling for terrorism

purposes. Furthermore, these countries are also using administrative measures, the most

commonbeing thedeprivationofnationalityandtravelrestrictions(includinghousearrest,

confiscationoftraveldocuments,travelban,no-entrylist,electronictrackingbracelet).Fewof

themarealsousing the suspensionof social allowances,deprivationof civil rights (right to

voteandbeelectedandholdpublicofficeforinstance)inthisregard.

However,therearealsotoomanydifferencestoproduceapertinentcomparison.Indeed,itis

hard to compare judicial and administrative systems due to the varying legal cultures

between each country. It is therefore difficult to appreciate how criminal law and

administrativemeasures are concretely applied. Two additional features add complexity to

the comparison process: first,when a lawproposal is announced and not inserted into the

legislativeprocess.Second,whenvoted-lawsarenot implemented,executedandappliedby

the national judges. Thus, due to the court’s discretion principle, judges are free and

independentinthewaytheyinterpretandapplythelawinrelationtopersonalfactors(social

situation,familybackground)propertotheaccused.Forinstance,andasitwillbeexplained

above, individuals committed with terrorist offence have been sentenced differently in

Germany.

Another relevant example to illustrate difficulties of comparison is the deprivation of

citizenship. This administrative measure has been implemented in most of the countries

studied in the report except in Germany, Turkey and Russia, even if it has been discussed.

Starting from this distinction, countries implementing citizenship deprivation are therefore

notcomparableastheydonotapplythismeasurewiththesamescope.Forexample,France,

Belgium,theNetherlandsandDenmarkonlydeprivecitizenswithdualnationalityfromtheir

citizenship.TheUnitedKingdomhashoweverdecidedtogo further,byrevokingtheBritish

nationalityofnaturalisedindividualshavinganylinkwithterroristactivitiesororganizations

and if there is “reasonablegrounds forbelieving that theperson is able,under the lawof a

country or territory outside the United Kingdom, to become national of such country or

territory”108.Thus,theUKtakestherisktocreatestatelesspersons,althoughthisdisposition

doesnotseemtohavebeenuseduntilnow109.

108BritishNationalityAct1981,PartV“MiscellaneousandSupplementarity”,Section40“Deprivationofcitizenship,4A.109A.REED,J.DEROYVANZUIJDEWIJN,E.BAKKER,op.cit.

35

B. Theoreticalanalysis

This section focuses on the criminal law and administrativemeasures outlined in the section

aboveandanalysestheirchallengesandconsequences.

1) Prosecutionofreturningforeignfighters

Duringthelastyears,anincreasingnumberofcourtcaseshavebeenopenedintheEUinwhich

returningFTFareconvicted.Theywereprosecutedforoffensessuchastravellingtoaconflict

zone,beinginvolvedinaterroristgroupandreceivingtrainingforthepurposeofcommittingor

preparing a terrorist attack110. Taking into consideration that until 2013, the act of joining a

terroristorganisationwasnotinitselfconsideredasacrimeinthecriminalcodesoftheMS111,

the recent situation showsan increasingdevelopment in theprosecutionof returning foreign

fighters. However, the practical implementation of the criminal law measures has revealed

challengesandnegativeconsequencesthatmightexplainwhythenumberofcourtcasesagainst

returningforeignfightersisstillverylowcomparedtotherelativehighnumberofreturnees112.

a) Challengesfacedbytheprosecutors

Apossiblepremise forprosecuting apotential foreign terrorist fighter is the committingof a

criminal offense. Therefore, it is necessary for the prosecutors to provide evidence of this

commitment.DuetothefragilesituationinSyriaandIraq,establishingalegalcooperationwith

local law enforcement authorities andundertaking criminal investigations abroad in order to

collectevidenceorarrestsuspectscanbecomplicated.Indeed,itposesaseriouschallengefor

theforeignprosecutors113.AlthoughtheemergingroleofsocialmediaandInternetpublications

of pertinent materials such as photos or video of suspected individuals enables new

opportunities, the gathering of Internet based evidence is likewise challenging when the

providersarelocatedabroad114.

However,ifprovingthecommitmentofacriminalactisimpossibleorverydifficult,prosecutors

oftenchooseaprosecutorialapproach.Inthiscase,itissufficienttoprove“thecriminalactsof

110A.REED,J.DEROYVANZUIJDEWIJN,E.BAKKER,op.cit,p.9.111Ibid.112B.VANGINKEL,“ProsecutingForeignTerroristFighters:WhatRolefortheMilitary?”TheInternationalCentreforCounter-Terrorism–TheHague7,no.1(2016),p.9.113Ibid.114Ibid.

36

recruitment,incitementorglorificationofterroristacts,financingofterrorism,membershipofa

terroristorganisation,andpreparatoryorsupportiveactivitiesforterroristacts”115.Hence,this

strategylargelyavoidstheneedforcollectingevidenceabroadandthusoffersahigherchance

of success for the prosecution of returnees. Yet, it is important to consider the choice of the

criminalqualificationasitdirectlyinfluencesthecourtjudgement.

b) Consequencesoftheprosecution

TheprosecutionofaFTFismainlyusedasameasuretodiscouragepotentialFTFfromleaving

theirhome countries for Syriaor Iraq. In contrast, thedeterrent effect of thismeasuremight

haveunintendedimpacts:

• Familymembersandfriendsmightbediscouragedtoinformthelocalauthoritiesabout

thedepartureorreturnofapotential foreign fighter fromSyria.Thiswill significantly

reduce the security authorities’ capabilities to gather information and consequently

limitthechancestodetectreturneestotheirhomecountries.Intheworstcasescenario,

theymightcontinuetheirengagementinterroristactivities116;

• Foreign fightersmight bedeterred from returning to their home countries due to the

prosecutionandconsequentlystay inSyriaor Iraqormove toanothercountry.While

thisresultmaybeconsideredaspositivefromaEuropeanperspectiveintheshortterm,

itwillprovokeanongoingdestabilisationinSyriaandIraqandmightevenleadtoaspill

overeffectonawiderregioninthelongterm117.

2) Prisonandprobation

The purpose of prisons is to “confine offenders in secure and humane conditions”118 and

thereby also includes the “retribution, rehabilitation and protection of society”119. However,

afteritwasknownthatsomeofthemajorperpetratorsofterroristattacksinEuropehadpassed

throughthecriminaljusticesystem,suspicionswerestrengthenedthatprisonsmaybeusedasa

115Ibid,p.8.116A.REED,J.DEROYVANZUIJDEWIJN,E.BAKKER,op.cit,p.12.117Ibid.118Council of Europe, Draft Council of Europe Handbook for Prison and Probation Services regardingRadicalisationandViolentExtremism,2016,p.5.119Ibid.

37

“breeding ground for radicalised violent extremists”120. In order to counter the risk of

radicalisation in prisons and during probation, it is crucial to identify and address the

challengesandunintendedconsequencesofthecurrentprisonandprobationsystem.

a) Challenges

Understanding the process of radicalisation and identifying radicalised individuals are one of

the key factors and at the same time one of themain challenges to counter radicalisation of

offendersinprisonandonprobation.Thisisduetothefactthatthereisnoconsistentprofilefor

violent extremists regarding their personal, political and ideological motivation. However,

distinctive characteristicsofviolentextremistoffenders compared tootheroffendersdoexist

andneedtobetakenintoaccountastheywillinfluencetheprocessofradicalisationinprison

andreintegrationintosocietyduringprobation.Inordertopreventradicalisation,itistherefore

necessary to undertake individualised risk assessments and to specialise intervention

programmes. Consequently, it is also important to provide adequate resources and qualified

prisonandprobationstaffmemberstoensurethesuccessful implementationoftheindividual

procedures.

b) Impacts

Eventhoughacorrelationbetweenovercrowdedprisonsandincreasedradicalisationinprisons

hasnotyetbeenproved,itseemsobviousthata“hostileandovercrowdedenvironment”121will

facilitate the recruitment and radicalisation process of frustrated individuals that suffer from

inhumane treatment in prisons.Given this possible risk of radicalisation, prisons thus should

givepositiveincentivestoavoidovercrowding,byprovidingforexamplemoretimeforprison

visitsorout-of-cell activities122.On theotherhand,anexpansionof theseprescriptionsmight

increase the risk that extremist activities are continued or even intensified through contacts

outside prison123. Furthermore, concern has also been expressed over the negative effects of

regular transfersofprisoners.AccordingtotheCPT,“successivetransferscouldundercertain

circumstances amount to inhuman and degrading treatment”124that “can have very harmful

effectson[theprisoner's]psychologicalandphysicalwell-being.”125

120Ibid.,p.4.121Ibid.,p.6.122Ibid.,p.5.123Ibid.,p.35.124Ibid.125Ibid.

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3) Otheradministrativemeasures

Criminallawmeasuresarewidelyusedinmostofthecountriesastheyhavetheadvantageof

separatingtheFTFfromtherestofthesociety.However,thisisnottheonlysolution.Indeed,as

observed,manycountriesareusingadministrativemeasuresasalternativesorsupplementsto

criminalprosecutions126.Adistinctioncouldthusbemadebetweentwoperiods:thefirstwave

of returningFTF (before2014)didnotgenerally face legalmeasures,butonlyadministrative

measures.Sincetheendof2014,MemberStatesratherchoosecriminalprosecutionswhenthey

can.

Among administrative measures we can distinguish: revoking nationality, travel restriction

(including house arrest, confiscation of travel documents, electronic tracking bracelet), the

suspensionofsocialallowance,thelossoftheabilitytoholdpublicoffice,tovoteandbeelected

in public elections. This section focuses on the most common procedures dealing with the

problemoftheFTFs:revokingnationalityandtravelrestriction.

a) Revokingnationality

Asthe firstpartof thereportshows it,somecountriesrevokenationality fordual-nationals if

“serious prejudicial” activities have been proven (for example in France or in the

Netherlands)127. In the United Kingdom, revoking nationality is also legally possible for

naturalisedpeoplewithonlyonenationality,evenifthiswouldleavetheindividualstateless128.

Revoking nationality could be a solution for the FTFphenomenon. Indeed, thewithdrawal of

nationality prevents them from re-entering the country. Thus, two positive aspects on the

challengeregardingFTFcanbedemonstrated.Firstly,thislackofpassportmightlimitchances

of seeinga returningFTF involved in terroristplotting in itshomecountrybecausehewould

notbeallowedtocomeback129.Secondly,revokingnationalitywouldhaveadissuasiveeffecton

prospectiveFTFas theywouldnotbeable to travel freely130. Inaddition,revokingnationality

for FTF already back to the national territorywould, in some cases, allow the State to expel

themtotheircountryofsecondnationality.Evenifsuchproceduresseemtogiveashort-term 126L.VIDNO,,op.cit,p.6127TeamITALY, “Foreign fighters:anewchallenge for theEUcounterterrorismstrategy”,Themis2016Competition,XIEdition,April2016.128BritishNationalityAct1981,PartV“MiscellaneousandSupplementarity”,Section40“Deprivationofcitizenship,4A129A.REED,J.DEROYVANZUIJDEWIJN,E.BAKKER,op.cit,p.9130Ibid.

39

solutionto theFTFphenomenon, ithasnopositiveeffectsonthe longtermandcan in fact in

somecasescausehumanrightsinfringements.

However, the deprivation of nationality causes real human rights’ infringements when it is

appliedtoindividualswithonlyonenationality.Indeed,themostbasicpoliticalandcivilrights

are related to the citizenship. Being stateless means “to lose all rights others that those

generallyrecognizedasbasichumanrights”131.Variousinternationaltextsexpresstherightto

nationality and call States to refrain depriving individuals from it. The most well-known

exampleistheUniversalDeclarationofHumanRights,adoptedon10December1948.Article15

specifiesontheonehandthat“Everyonehastherighttoanationality”,andontheotherhand

that “Nooneshallbearbitrarilydeprivedofhisnationalitynordeniedtheright tochangehis

nationality”132.IndeedthisUNGeneralAssemblyResolutionisnotaconventionandhasnolegal

authority per se. But the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, signed in 1961, is a

bindinginternationaltreatyand,today,amajorsourceof international lawoncitizenshipand

rightsofstatelesspeople.Itstatesthatonecannotloosenationalityuntilonehasnotacquired

nationality of another State (article 7)133. It also specifies exceptions according which an

individual can lose its nationality: fraud, disloyalty or prejudicial conduct toward the State

where he holds his nationality (article 8)134. Thus, revoking nationality when it results in

creating stateless people is against international law and breaks basic human rights.

Furthermore,evenwhenitisappliedtodual-nationals,revokingcitizenshipalsohavenegative

effectsontheproblemofreturningFTF.

Moreover, revoking citizenship also leads to negative effects when apply to dual-nationals

FTF135.Firstly, ifthenationalityisrevokedwhentheyreturn,itmakesitmoredifficultforthe

returneestoreintegratepeacefullyintosociety136.SomereturningFTFarenotviolentandwish

toderadicaliseordisengage.Butiftheirnationalityisrevoked,theStatecanlegallyexpelthem

totheirsecondnationalitycountry,eveniftheymayhavenoreallinkwiththisnation137.This

131 S. JAYARAMAN, “International terrorismand statelessness:Revoking theCitizenshipof ISILForeignFighters”,ChicagoJournalofInternationalLaw,Summer2016,p.190.132UniversalDeclarationofHumanRights,1948133ConventionontheReductionofStatelessness,UnitedNations,1961.Untilnow,55stateshaveratifiedtheConventionamongwhichDenmark,France,Germany,theNetherlandsandtheUK.134Ibid.135A.REED,J.DEROYVANZUIJDEWIJN,E.BAKKER,op.cit.,p.13.136Ibid,p.12.137B.BOUTIN, “AdministrativeMeasuresagainstForeignFighters: InSearchofLimitsandSafeguards”,ICCT-TheHague7,no12,2016,p.21.

40

could be used only if they do not risk “torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or

punishment”(EuropeanConventionofHumanRights,Article2)intheircountry.

Secondly, if thenationality is revokedduring fighting, it isasignal that there isnowayback.

Individualsmight prefer or be obliged to stay in the conflict zone or leave for another non-

western country that they can enter or that they will enter illegally.138 They will move into

illegalityanditwillmakeithardertomonitoranddetectthem.Nevertheless, theycanstayin

touch with potential returnees in their home country, support terrorist activity or become

involvedinterroristplotsinotherstates.

Thirdly, it creates an unequal treatment between citizens of a country139. Deprivation of

nationalitycontributestoincreasetheperceiveddiscriminationinthehomesociety,whichisa

factorofradicalisationandcanbeanobstacleforFTF’sderadicalisation.Indeed,deprivationof

nationality for dual-nationals only is perceived as the creation of “second-class citizens”140

resultinginanincreaseofanimosityagainsttheState141.

Finally, revoking nationality will not prevent from radicalisation142. This procedure simply

“shiftstheproblemandpossiblethreattoanotherlocation”143.It isawaytoexporttheriskto

another State, without solving the real deep-seated problem. Alternatives to revocation of

citizenshipcouldbetravelrestrictions.

b) Travelrestrictionsandhousearrest

Anotherwidelyusedadministrativemeasureistherestrictionoftravelling.Whennationalsand

EUcitizensaresuspectedofinterestinjihadistactivity,insteadofbeingimprisoned,theycould

beplacedunderhousearrestandhavetheirtraveldocuments(identitycard,passport,andvisa)

withheld144.Housearrest is, bydefinition, theobligation to stayhomeanumberofhoursper

day combined with the obligation to frequently make a report to a police station.145These

measures couldbe controlledby theuseof anelectronic trackingbracelet. Foreigners canbe

138A.REED,J.DEROYVANZUIJDEWIJN,E.BAKKER,op.cit.,p.13.139B.BOUTIN,op.cit.,p.21.140Ibid.,p.13.141A.REED,J.DEROYVANZUIJDEWIJN,E.BAKKER,op.cit.,p.13.142S.JAYARAMAN,Op.cit.,p.210.143A.REED,J.DEROYVANZUIJDEWIJN,E.BAKKER,op.cit.,p.13.144TeamITALY,op.cit.145B.BOUTIN,op.cit.,p.13.

41

subjecttoexpulsion,residencepermitwithdrawal,entrybanorprohibitiontoleavethecountry

forsecurityreasons146.

ThesedifferentformsoftravelrestrictionscouldhavepositiveeffectsontheFTFphenomenon

intheshortterm.Indeed,thoseindividualsdonothavetherighttoleavetheirhomes,citiesor

countries,dependingonthejudge'schoice.Theirtraveldocumentscanbeconfiscatedandtheir

movementscanbecontrolledbyelectronic trackingbracelet.Thus, theirchance togoback to

SyriaandIraqareverylimited,asaretheirattemptstoorganiseattacksintheirhomecountries.

However, it cannot completely avoid them to commit attacks on the national territory or to

recruit people, especially through the Internet and social Medias. If an individual want to

commitanattack,hecansimplyignorehishousearrestortravelrestriction.Furthermore,such

practices increase the risk of marginalisation of returnees who want to disengage or

deradicalise. Confiscation of travel documents and house arrest are in fact very stigmatizing

measuresbecausewithout an identity cardor apassport, it is verydifficult to find a job. For

instance, inFrancewhentraveldocumentsofanindividualarewithdrawn,he/shereceives in

exchange apaper explaining the reasonof the confiscation, highlighting at the same time the

terrorist past of the person. As a consequence, the potential employer will likely be very

reluctant to hire this person147. Moreover, measures like house arrest can have a significant

impact on the right to “private and family life”, which is yet guaranteed by article 8 of the

EuropeanConventiononHumanRights148.Itisclearlyhardtohaveajob,topursuestudiesorto

care for children when the individual have to stay home or to report regularly to a police

station149.

To conclude, administrative measures like revoking nationality, travel ban or house arrest

seemstohave limitedeffectsontheFTFphenomenon,especially inthe longterm.Thosewho

are inadisengagementoraderadicalisationprocesswill still comeback to theircountryand

thosewhowant to commit an attack on the national territorywill not be deterred by these

measures.Thus,itseemstobemoreanannouncementeffectusedbythepoliticianstoshowto

thepublicopinionthattheyareactingagainsttheFTFphenomenon.Forinstance,revocationof

citizenshipisrarelyapply,whichshowsthatthismeasureisfirstlysymbolic.150However,those

146TeamITALY,op.cit.147D.THOMSON,Lesrevenants,Seuil,2016.148 Council of Europe, European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and FundamentalFreedoms,4November1950,ETS5.149B.BOUTIN,op.cit.,p.13.150B.BOUTIN,op.cit.,p.15.

42

measures create “significant restrictions tobasic liberties”151, especially regarding freedomof

movementandrighttoprivateandfamilylife.Asaconclusion,nationaljudgesshouldusethem

withsenseofproportiontoprotectbasichumanrights.

CONCLUSIONOFPARTI

A general observation is that all studied CoE members have adopted and implemented

measures punishing terrorism activities. Evaluating their effects is always a complex task, as

repressionandpunishmentdonotalwaysfavourawarenessandrepentance.Asrealityshows,

these measures might achieve the opposite effect, i.e.further radicalisation of the individual

extremistandthusrisktobecounterproductive.Furthermore,therepressiveapproachignores

theissueofthereturnees’reintegrationintosociety.Imprisoningormonitoringthemovements

of a FTF is not enough to tackle the roots of his/her engagement alongside a terrorist

organisation.Thus,onecanqualifysuchmeasuresasashort-termanswer to theFTF issue; it

willrequiremoretimeforStatestoelaborateacompletestrategy.Thisiswhyanon-repressive

approachhasbeenprogressivelycontemplated.

151B.BOUTIN,op.cit.,p.20.

43

PART2:PRESENTATIONANDANALYSISOFNON-

REPRESSIVEMEASURES

Considering that the repressiveapproach containsawide rangeof restrictionsand thusdoes

not tackle the roots of a FTF’s involvement alongside a terrorist organisation, non-repressive

measures have been progressively developed by several States. These measures focus on

counter-radicalisation, deradicalisation and rehabilitation of returnees, in order to facilitate

theirreintegrationintosociety.Furthermore,theymainlyconsistofpropositionswhichaimat

reducing the risk of violence from returnees and radicalised individuals against their home

society. In this part, comparative overview of the different initiatives and policies and a

theoreticalanalysisofthesemeasureswillbepresented.

A.OverviewofthesituationinEuropeancountriesconcerningnon-

repressivemeasures

ThispartofthereportaimstoprovideanoverviewofthesituationintheselectedCoEMember

States concerning non-repressive measures implemented by governments and civil society

organisations to counter-radicalisation attempts. Such measures aim to go further than

repression and punishment in proposing to the returnee an exit door to its radicalised

behaviouranddangerousnessforcivilsociety.Inthisdisengagementprocess,thereaderhasto

beawareof the importanceofnationaland localprogrammesas it requiresan individualised

monitoring. In each country, different kinds of preventive measures and deradicalisation

programmesareimplemented.Inthisway,fourdifferentgroupsofStateshavebeenchosenin

ordertoidentifycommonpointsanddifferences:

• Countrieswherefullrehabilitationprogrammesarealreadyimplemented,notablyvis-à-

visreturnees:GermanyandDenmark.

• Countries where deradicalisation measures are already implemented, but FTF full

rehabilitationprogrammesarestillbeingdeveloped:TheNetherlands,Belgium,Russia.

• Countries where few attempts towards deradicalisation are in active process of

elaboration:TheUnitedKingdomandFrance.

• TheparticularcaseoftheTurkishrehabilitationinitiativestepbackwards.

44

Figure1:Classificationofcountriesregardingnon-repressivemeasures

ThisdivisionofCoEmembersallowsus todistinguishbetween the levelsof involvementand

readinessandtobetteranalysethemeasuresundertakenforthetreatmentofreturnees.

Theforerunnersofrehabilitation:theDanishandGermanmodels

DenmarkandGermanyaredeemedtobeleadingcountriesinEuroperegardingtheadoptionof

non-repressivemeasuresinordertofacetheproblemofreturningFTF.Severalinitiativeshave

beentakenbypublicauthoritiesinclosecooperationwithlocalactors,religiousauthoritiesand

families of FTFs. In addition, the tradition of open prisons that exists in Denmark and in

Germanyisdefinitelyinlinewithbothcountries’strategies.

TheGermanmodel

Germany is activelyworking on developing deradicalisationmeasureswhich could provide a

possibility for former combatants to reintegrate into society. The first German initiative is

relatedtoprisons.Itiscalledthe“ViolencePreventionNetwork”(VNP)andismonitoredbythe

45

CounterExtremismCentreofInformation(HKE)oftheRegionofHessen152.Thecentreisunder

theauthorityoftheMinistryofInternalAffairsandisspecificallyinchargeofderadicalisation

programmesinprisons153.Thus,morethan20prisonersaredividedintwogroups:

• Thosewhoareintheprocessofradicalisation,

• Thosewhoarealreadyradicalised.

Amongthoseprisoners,thereareindividualsimprisonedfortheirparticipationinactivitiesof

terrorist groups such as ISIL or Al-Qaida and also individuals who are imprisoned for their

involvementintheterroristattacksattemptsinGermany.

The second approach of the deradicalisation is the use of special governmental projects. For

instance, the Hayat programmewas one of the first projects implemented by the Centre for

DemocraticCulture(ZDK)inBerlin,aNGOspecializedinfightagainstextremism.SinceJanuary

2012,theMinistryofInternalAffairshasbeenparticipatinginthisinitiative154.Hayat’sactivities

targetspecificallytheemotional,ideologicalandpragmaticaspectsofradicalisation.TheHayat

programmedividesindividualsintodifferentgroups:

• Thosewhoareintheprocessofradicalisation;

• Thosewhoarealreadyradicalised;

• AndthosewhoarestillinSyriaandwishtocomeback,asreturningFTF

Professionalsinchargeofimplementingthisprogrammeworkbothonpragmaticaspects, like

administrativeproceduresandprofessionalreintegration,andonthe ideologicalside inorder

to deconstruct speeches, notions, terms and interpretations of the Islamist extremist

literature155.According to the reportof theFederalCriminalPolice (BVK), approximately274

former combatantshavealready comeback toGermany.Among them,onlyonequarterhave

acceptedtocooperatewiththeGermanauthorities,andmostoftheothersarestilldevotedto

theIslamicState156.

152M.ULHMANNandA.ELDIFRAOUI,“Preventionofradicalizationandderadicalization:British,GermanandDanishmodels”,Politiqueétrangère2015/4(Winter),pp.171-182.153Ibid.154M.ULHMANNandA.ELDIFRAOUI,op.cit.155Ibid.156“Allemagne:lamoitiédesdjihadistesderetouraupaystoujoursloyauxenversleurcause”,LeParisien,28November2016.

46

TheDanishmodel

Since9/11,Denmarkhasbeenoneofthemosthighlypro-activecountriesinimplementingthe

counter-terrorismmeasuresoftheUnitedNationsandtheEU.Accordingtothestatistics,nearly

125DanishcitizensleftDenmarkforSyria157.AftertheterroristattacksinMadridin2004and

inLondonin2005,theDanishgovernmentconductedthefirststudyconcerningradicalisation

process158. Since the two terrorist attacks attempts that followed the 2005 Danish cartoons

controversy159,thegovernmenthasinitiatedaplanagainstradicalisationandextremismwitha

widerangeofparticipantsincludinginstitutes,civilsocietygroupsandDanishsecurityservices.

However,since2012,theDanishgovernmenthasbeentryingtofocusonradicalisationthrough

an alarm system named “early warnings” which consists of preventive interviews for

individualsenrolledintheprocessofradicalisation.Sinceearly2014,Aarhuspoliceandwelfare

serviceshave runa rehabilitationprogrammenamed the “ExitProgram” for returningFTF. It

was initially a programme launched in 2007 to rehabilitate right-wing extremists. The

supervision of this programme belongs to a team of social workers and aims to protect the

youthfromradicalisation.However,thepoliceremainthemainparticipantoftheprojectofthe

reintegration of FTF, as they share the criminal record of radicalised individuals with social

workers. Inaddition toAarhusandCopenhagen, severalother citieshavenowreplicated this

model.Furthermore, inMay2011, theDanishPrisonandProbationService launcheda three-

yearprojectonderadicalisationinprisons,called“BackonTrack”.Finally,itisalsorelevantto

underlinethatbefore2016DenmarkdidnothaveanyFTFfacingthetrialsfortheircrimes.

Fromcounter-radicalisationtorehabilitation:TheNetherlands,BelgiumandRussia

The authorities of theNetherlands,Belgiumand theRussianFederationhaveunderstood the

threatthatradicalisedjihadists,andinparticularreturnees,representfortheirsociety.Hence,

they have developed counter-radicalisation initiatives, but are still elaborating the

rehabilitationdimension,withnoprogrammeimplementedyet.

TheDutchapproach

The Netherlands is the most advanced country in the elaboration of the FTF reintegration

projects. The Dutch government implemented a counter-radicalisation plan in 2004. This 157B.VANGINKELandE.ENTENMANN,op.cit.,p.29.158L. LINDELKILDE and M. SEDGEWICK, “Impact of Counter-Terrorism on Communities”, DenmarkBackgroundReport,London,InstituteforStrategicDialogue,September2012,p.25.159“ProphetMohammedcartoonscontroversy:timeline”,TheTelegraph,4May2015.

47

project is characterised on the one hand by a local dimension and on the other hand by the

numerousparticipantsinvolved160.Thenationallevelprovidesaframeworkaswellasapartof

the funding and training to the local levels in charge of the practical implementation in full

autonomy.161.Therefore,thelargeDutchcitiesdesignedtheirownprogrammes,oftenbasedon

Amsterdam’smodelcalledWijAmsterdammers.“Alltheaspectsoftheplan,fromitsconceptup

toitspracticalimplementation,arecharacterizedbythecooperationofanintricatecooperation

between ministries, governmental agencies, local authorities, social services, educational

facilities,think-tanks,religiousinstitutionsandfreelanceconsultants162”.Thisflexibleandmulti-

stakeholders’ organisation allows the counter-radicalisation operators to adopt an approach

tailoredtothesituation.Inthesameway,in2012,apilotprojectwasinitiatedbytheNational

Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism and the Dutch Probation Service aimed to

disengageandderadicalisevoluntaryjihadistextremistsandterrorists.Thisprojectintervened

in thephaseofprobationperiod toensurebetterreintegration intosocietyand toreduce the

riskofarepeatoffense.Thisinitiativecanbeseenasafirstattempttodevelopaprogrammeof

deradicalisationwhichcouldsuitthespecificsituationofdangerousreturnees163.Asaresponse

totheincreasingnumberofDutchcitizensandresidentsleavingtogotoSyria,thegovernment

designedin2014acomprehensivestrategytofightagainstjihadistradicalisation.Itintendsto

developand implementanexit facility toassistDutchcitizens involved in jihadistmovements

and who are ready to leave them. The Dutch authorities wanted to design it based on the

German model of Hayat programme164. Furthermore, the Netherlands provided a consular

assistance fromDutch embassies in bordering countries. This assistance’s objective is the re-

establishmentofcontactwith familyandregularconsularassistance for fighterswhowant to

leavethejihadistmovement165,whichisanapplicableapproachforthereturneesissue.

Consequently, the Netherlands have indeed taken certain measures in the domain of

deradicalisation,butthefullcompleteprogrammeofthetreatmentoftheFTFisstillcurrently

inaphaseofelaboration.

160L.VIDINO,“Apreliminaryassessmentofcounter-radicalizationinNetherlands”,CombatingTerrorismCenter,15August2008.161Ibid.162Ibid.163B.SCHURMANNandE.BAKKER,“Reintegratingjihadistextremists:evaluatingaDutchinitiative,2013-2014”,BehavioralSciencesofTerrorismandPoliticalAggression,2015.164DutchMinistryofSecurityandJustice,TheNetherlandscomprehensiveactionprogrammetocombatjihadism.Overviewmeasuresandactions,2014.165Ibid.

48

TheBelgianapproach

TheKingdomofBelgiumisthemostaffectedcountrybytheFTFphenomenonproportionallyto

itspopulation.Moreover,ithasalreadysufferedfromitthroughseveralterroristattacks.After

theNewYorkattacksin2001,Belgianauthoritieshavedevelopedanationalstrategytostruggle

against radicalism (Plan R 2005) with a multilevel approach based on the division of

competencesbetweenthedifferentpoliticallevels166.

Regarding thepreventionof radicalisation, actionplanshavebeenelaboratedatnational and

locallevels:

• TheadoptionoftheProgrammeforPreventionofviolentradicalisation(2013)focusing

notablyontheeradicationoffactorsoffrustrationfordiscriminatedpopulationandon

preventionandderadicalisationinprison167.

• The reviewofPlanR in2015organisedaround the cooperationbetween thenational

monitoring task force and the Local Task Forces in charge of the adaptation and

implementation of the Action Plan168.These Task Forces gather different police and

securityservices,aswellaspoliticalauthorities.

• TheadoptionofActionPlansandmeasuresbyregionalandcommunities’authoritiesin

thefieldofeducation,youthassistance,vocationaltraininginparticular169.

Regarding the specific case of FTF, theBelgian government has developed a specificworking

groupinsidetheNationalTaskForcededicatedtofindmeanstotacklethis issue.Onthelocal

level,theLocalTaskForcesareinchargeoftheFTFmonitoring.However, itdoesnotprovide

deradicalisationsolutions.

An initiative in the field of deradicalisation is currently developed by the Wallonia-Brussels

Federation,with thecreation in January2017ofa support centre forderadicalisation,named

166RadicalismActionPlan,federalpublicserviceHomeaffairs,2016.167Belgianfederalstrategyagainstviolentradicalisation,2014.168RadicalismActionPlan,federalpublicserviceHomeaffairs,2016.169Action Plan for the prevention of radicalisation processes that can lead to extremism and terrorism,Vlaamse Regering, 9 April 2015, / Circular on the improvement of living together and the radicalismpreventionintheframeworkofthesocialcohesionplan2014-2019,Walloniaregion,29October2015.

49

CAPRAV170.Thiscentreshallprovidea tailoredassistance tovoluntaryradicalised individuals

and their family for deradicalisation. It can however not be considered as a deradicalisation

structure, because it is not a closed reception centre demanding to remove supported

individualsfromtheirsocialandfamilialenvironment.Althoughthereisnopreciseinformation

whetherthiscentrewoulddealwithFTF,thisinitiativecouldrepresentafirststepforamore

advancedprogrammeforderadicalisationandrehabilitationdealingwithFTF.

TheRussianapproach

ItisalsorelevanttoincludetheRussianFederationinthisgroupofcountries.Accordingtothe

JointCentreof counter-terrorismofCommonwealthof IndependentStates (CIS)organisation,

therearenearly5.000Russiancitizensof inSyria.Fromthese5.000citizens,nearly2.000do

notusetheirpassports171.InRussia,thetreatmentofreturneesisveryspecific.

Firstofall, thearticle208oftheRussianCriminalcodesupposesthatthereleaseof persons

whohaveagreedvoluntarily to cease theirparticipation in the illegal armedgroupsandwho

have turned in their arms, depends on condition that the concerned individual has not

committedanycrimesorterroristacts172.Inpractice,thisarticleworksalittledifferentlyandis

only rarely used. Thus, a recent case from 2016 shows that a citizen of the Republic of

Daghestanreceivedacustodialsentenceofonly2monthsashehadparticipated inthe illegal

armedgroup173.Accordingtoexperts,thisarticleshouldbeactivatedmoreoftenbytheRussian

government. In exchange for a normal life, sentenced terrorists must cooperate in counter-

terroristactivitiesandpropaganda174.

Secondly,accordingtotheinformationoftheFederalSecurityService,specialsecurechannels

have been created for the returning FTF in order to differentiate the returneeswho had not

committedanycrimesduringtheirresidenceinSyriafromthosewhowereinvolvedinterrorist

acts175.Thesingleofficialmeasurethathasbeenimplementedintheprocessofderadicalisation

in Russia is the creation of Commissions for reintegration of the former jihadist combatants.

TheseCommissionswerecreatedin2010inordertosecuretheregionfortheOlympicGames

in 2014176. Nowadays, they are fully implemented in the deradicalisation process and have

170PressReleasefromtheWallonia-Brusselsregiongovernment,20January,2016.171A.NOVIKOV,“Nearly5000RussiancitizensaretodayinSyria”,interview,Interfax,17June2016.172Jihadismforexport?NorthernCaucasusandSyria.ThereportofICG,2016.173Thejudicialreview,art.208,CriminalCodeofRussianFederation,2016.174Ibid.175Ibid.176Ibid.

50

started their operations in Dagestan and Ingushetia177. They are all located in the Northern

Caucasus region – in Kabardino-Balkaria178, in Ingushetia179, in Dagestan and in Karachay-

Cherkessia Republics180. The returnees can address these Commissions if they wish to come

backtoanormallife,buttheprocedureisrealisedunderonecondition.Beforetheapprobation,

special servicessuchasFederalSecurityServiceand theMinistryof InternalAffairsofRussia

mustcheckthattheindividualhasnotcommittedacrime.Iftheperson’scriminalcharacteris

provedbytheinvestigation,theformercombatantwillbedirectlysenttoprison181.However,if

thereisnoproof,theindividualhastherighttoparticipateinthederadicalisationprogrammes

forreintegrationandreadaptation.Thesebodiesareconsultativeintergovernmentalorgansof

thefederallevel.Theyensurecooperationofthefederalorganswiththoseofexecutivepower,

police, local authorities, special services, aswell aswith different religious organisations and

associationsthatareinvolvedintheissueofreturningFTF182.Moreover,theseCommissionsare

participatingactivelyinthecreationandpracticalrealizationofmeasureswhichaimtoensure

ex-combatants return to a normal life. Such procedures include: juridical support for former

terrorist fighters, aid in the issue of professional reintegration, medical, psychological and

financial assistance for the returnees and other types of help that former fighters and their

families may need183. Commissions have a right to invite experts, psychologists, sociologists,

membersof religiousorganisations, forcesof special services andothernecessary specialists.

Oncetheprocessofderadicalisationhasbeenestablished,theCommissionsmonitortheformer

FTFs for a certain period of time in order to ensure that the deradicalisation has been

achieved184.

TimidStepstowardsnon-repressivemeasures:BritishandFrenchpolicies

This group is focusing on UK and France that did not implement specific public policies

targetingtheFTFphenomenonbutsawseveralinitiativestakenbycivilsocietyfoundationsand

organisationsoffirstlineworkers,withthesupportofthegovernments.

177 E. SOZAEV-GURIYEV, “In Dagestan the Commission for the reintegration of FTF continue towork”,Izvestia,26September2016.178 “Commission for the reintegration of foreign terrorist fighters in Kabardino-Balkaria”, Memorial,February19,2016.179“CommissionforreintegrationofFTFinIngushetiacontinueitswork”,Memorial,14March2014.180EgorSOZAEV-GURIYEV,op.cit.181TheofficialsiteofthelocalDepartmentoftheCouncilofSecurityinRepublicofIngushetia.182Ibid.183Ibid.184Ibid.

51

TheBritishcase

In the case of the United Kingdom, the government implemented an official programme of

counter-terrorism,whichiscalledthe“FourP:Prepare,Pursue,Protect,Prevent”185.Concerning

the numbers of British FTFs, nearly 750 British citizens left UK for Syria186. According to

Professor Anthony Glees, head of the University of Buckingham’s Centre for Security and

Intelligence Studies, the “hundreds of British citizens who have gone to Syria are highly

dangerous.Thefactsofewarebeingprosecutedwhentheyreturnisclearlyveryunsatisfactory

andwillbeveryalarmingtomanypeople.”187Themainobjectiveofthisgovernmentalactionis

therefore to target individuals facing a radicalisation process, to evaluate the risk of

radicalisationandtobringadministrativesupporttothosepersons.Anattempttoresolvethe

problemof FTFs is for instance thederadicalisationprogrammecalledChannel thathasbeen

introduced by the British government. The programme is currently running in England and

Wales and shall be extended. It focuses on deradicalisation of UK citizens and attempts to

dissuade them from travelling to Syria and Iraq. While this programme mostly focuses on

prevention and reintegration, FTF could also benefit from this programme. Furthermore, this

programmealso leadstotheactiveparticipationof theMuslimcommunity inderadicalisation

andreintegrationofFTFs.

A lot of work has been done and continues to be done on the question of how people are

triggered into radicalisation and terrorist activity by the members of this programme. The

number of individuals targeted by Channel has significantly raised since 2007, from 3.964

individualswhoidentifiedin2007to1.281in2013-2014188.Thereisanotherprogrammecalled

Prevent, specifically designed for Scotland. It focuses on training teachers to detect

“radicalisation”ofstudents.ThisprogrammeisapartoftheUKGovernment’sContestCounter-

Terrorism strategy since 2007. The different Muslim communities were solicited to put this

programme in place. The last existing programme in the UK is Ibaana Program, which was

planned for the deradicalisation of British prisoners189. According to the UK government

Counter-Extremism Strategy, published on the 19 October 2015, the Ibaana Program “will

185A. JOHNSON,TheUnitedKingdom’sStrategy forcountering international terrorismAnnualReport,HMGovernment,March2010.186B.VANGINKELandE.ENTENMANN,op.cit.,p.40.187R.MENDICKandR.VERKAIK,“OnlyoneineightjihadistsreturningtoUKiscaughtandconvicted”,TheTelegrah,21May2016.188M.ULHMANNandA.elDIFRAOUI,op.cit.,p.177.189C.LISTER,“ReturningFTF:CriminalizationorReintegration?”,BrookingsForeignPolicy,August2015,p.14.

52

actively support mainstream voices, especially in our faith communities and in civil society.

Thatmeanssupportingallthosewhowanttofightextremism,butaretoooftendisempowered

or drowned out in the debate”190. This program aims to force the administrative institutions

suchasschoolsanduniversitiestotakeallmeasurespossibletostoptheradicalisationprocess.

However,themeasurestakendoesnotinclude,asisthecaseinFranceorGermany,a“toll-free

number”, and theMuslim community have the task of identifying the dangerous individuals.

Another programme, the “Healthy Identity Interventions” aims to provide speeches and

languageselementswhichcompletes“Prevent”.Allthevolunteerstothisprogrammecanhave

an interviewwith two consultants in order to discuss the identity of the FTF.191 Finally, the

programme “Pathfinder” aims to coordinate all the initiatives of various actors concerning

radicalisation in prison at the national level. In order to achieve this objective, a national

database allowing the profiling of each terrorist or potential terrorist in prison has been

created192.

Therearealsosignificantmeasurestakenbytheassociationsandcivilsocietygroupswithout

the official support of the British administration, but in line with the Big Society strategy of

DavidCameron’sgovernment.Indeed,theGovernment’smajoritypresentedina“FreedomBill”

and promoted the creation of a “Big Society” of active citizens and non-governmental

organisationswho protect civil liberties193. According to some experts, fighting radical views

throughopennessandacomprehensivedialogueratherthanwithrepressivemeasurescouldbe

anefficientwaytoaddresstherootcausesofextremism194.Forinstance,MaajidNawazandEd

Hussain, two formermembersofHizbut-Tahrir, a Jordanianpan-Islamicorganisation, created

theQuiliamfoundationin2008.Itsmembersarestrugglingtoputinplaceoutreachdiscussions

promotingreligiousfreedom,humanrightsandliberaldemocracy,anddenounceextremismin

Muslims communities195. They also organised conferences about terrorism in order to

distinguishIslamicconceptsfromterroristactions,andareconsideredasquiteefficientbecause

of the involvementof former jihadists in the foundation’s programme.TheUnity Initiatives is

alsooneofthesegroups,createdbytheprofessorofmartialartsUsmanRakain2009inorder

toorganisefightsandmartialartslessonsforyoungpeople.Indoingthis,theprofessorintends

to teach them how to control their internal violence, and to see Islam as a peaceful religion.

190Counter-ExtremismStrategyoftheUK,2015.191 S. PIETRASANTA, “La déradicalisation, outil de lutte contre le terrorisme”, June 2015, LaDocumentationfrançaise,p.19.192Ibid.,p.19.193J. BARLETT and J. BIRWELL,From suspects to citizens: preventing violent extremism in a Big Society,Demos,July2010.194Ibid.,p.25.195M.ULHMANNandA.ELDIFRAOUI,op.cit.,p.20.

53

Finally, theActive Change Foundation (ACF)was created by formers Islamists in London and

establishedayouthcentre196.Thisprogrammewaslaunchedin2003byHanifQuadirafterhis

return from Afghanistan, where he had travelled to in 2002 with the aim of providing

humanitarian help but found himself working with Al-Qaeda. ACF actively dissuades young

peoplefromjoiningextremistgroupsincludingfromtravellingtosuchconcernedstates.They

arestillorganisingworkingsessionsforyoungpeopleinaradicalisedprocess.However,evenif

the British society is pretty inventive, the government’s programme remains large and

sometimesinefficientforanexceptionallyhighcost.

TheFrenchcase

In France, there are approximately 700 French jihadists currently fighting in Syria, among

which 275 are women, who could potentially come back with the progressive recoil of the

IslamicState’sarmiesinSyria.Weidentifiedaparticularapproachinthiscountry.Ontheone

hand,thereisasocalledrepressionpolicy,basedonopeningnewprisonswithparticularunits

for radicalised individuals, and on the other hand there is an implementation of different

centres of deradicalisation for people who did not left for Syria. The draft “Plan to fight

terrorism”(PLAT)wasimplementedonthe21stofJanuary2015.Inordertohandletheissues

linked to radicalisation in prison, a wide range of dedicated units has been implemented

betweenJanuaryandMarch2016197.Themajorityofindividualsplacedinthosededicatedunits

wereradicalisedpersonsalreadycondemnedforterrorists’acts,orradicalisedpeoplewhodid

notgoasfarascommittingaterroristact.Thegovernmentfundedthisproject,foranamountof

60,7millionEuros,whileawiderangeofquestionsremainsconcerningtheindividualsofthose

dedicatedunits.

First of all, it considers men as hopeless cases even if they did not commit any terrorist

attempts.Furthermore,manytheologicalMuslimcounsellorshavewarnedtheauthoritiesabout

thepossibilitythattheindividuals incarceratedcouldbeseenasheroesbyothers.Asaresult,

Jean-Jacques Urvoas, the newly appointed minister of Justice, wants to separate radicalised

fightersandpeoplewhodidnotproperlyjoinISIL,andtoendtheFrench“Guantanamo”policy

inprisons198.Asaresult,theadministrationistryingtofindanewwayofcreatingaseparation

betweenthe“normal”prisonersandtheterrorists,withoutputtingalltheterroristsinthesame

department. The Minister of Justice has also announced that he wants to replace the five 196Ibid.197Pland’actioncontrelaradicalisationetleterrorisme,PressFilefromFrenchPrimeMinister’sservices,9May2016,p.21.198“Détenusradicalisés:legouvernementchangedecap”,LePoint,25October2016.

54

dedicatedunits,withsixspecial“districtsofradicalisation’sevaluation”,withastrictdetention

regime. He has also stressed that he wants to recruit 90 more experts of insertions and 40

supportingpartners inorder to frametheprogramme199.Ontheotherside, the firstcentreof

deradicalisationopened in Indre-et-Loire, near the townofBeaymont-en-Vérone200, the13of

September2016.Thegovernment isalsoplanningtoopen12otherscentres,with individuals

from18to30withnocriminalrecord.

Furthermore,theFrenchGovernmentisleadinganactivecampaignofderadicalisationonthe

Internet.For instance, thegovernmenthadrecentlycreatedshort filmswhichaimtodescribe

theprocessofradicalisationandthebestwaystorefusetherecruiters’offerstoleaveinSyria.

Concerningcivilsociety,DouniaBouzar,aFrenchanthropologist,createdacentreofprevention

(CPDSI)thatwaspubliclyfunded.ItsaimwastofollowupyoungpeopleattractedbyISISand

radicalIslam201.Sheorganisedafollowupofmorethan1.000peoplewhowereconsideredas

potentialterrorists.Inthis,shehasbeenassistedbytheformerleaderoftheButtes-Chaumont’s

group Farid Benyettou, who now presents himself as reformed. However, she ended her

contract with the French Government in February 2016 because of the deprivation of

nationalityprojectandthepoliticalcontext202.Evenifshedidnotworkdirectlywithreturning

FTFs, she has developed a wide range of deradicalisation programmes with controversial

results. Indeed, several actors, journalists and legislators have underlined the lack of

transparencyaroundtheuseofpublicsubsidies.TheCentreofactionandoftheradicalisationof

individuals (CAPRI) in Bordeaux is another initiative aiming to prevent radicalisation. It is

interesting because of its multi-stakeholder approach combining both lawyers, imams and

administrationssuchasthemunicipalityofBordeauxandthelocalPréfecture203.Comparingthe

Frenchmethodwith the Danish approach, one can clearly see a difference:while prison is a

mandatory step before deradicalisation in France, the focus in Denmark is rather on

cooperationbetweenthepolice,thefamilyandthesocialservicesinordertoassessthedanger

posedbyareturnee.

199SpeechofJ.-J.URVOAS,Sécuriserlesprisonsetluttercontreladéradicalisation,25October2016.200C.BAUDUIN, “Lepremier centrededéradicalisation, tâtonnements soushaute surveillance”,RTL, 19September2016.201“DouniaBouzar renonceà samissionsur ladéradicalisationpourprotester contre ladéchéance”,LeMonde,11February2016.202Ibid.203 S. LACAZE, “Un discret centre anti-radicalisation islamiste lancé à Bordeaux”, Libération, 9 January2015.

55

TheevolutionofTurkishcounter-terrorismstrategy:aparadoxicalcase

TheTurkishsituationrepresentsaspecificcaseinourstudyfortworeasons.Firstofall,Turkey

shares a common border with Syria and Iraq which is crossed in both ways by FTFs. The

country is therefore on the front line of the fight against FTF. Furthermore, it is the only

observed country whose population is in majority Muslim. This element is primordial

consideringthefightagainstjihadistextremismandterrorismbecausethenumberofpotential

recruitsforjihadistmovementsishigherduetotheallegedlyreligiousprojectofthosegroups.

ThisisalsoconfirmedbytheestimationofTurkishrecruitedFTFsmentionedabove204.

In 2009, the Republic of Turkey experimented a pilot programme in the framework of its

counter-terrorism strategy, aiming at dealing with the issue of radicalised individuals and

terrorists.ThisprogrammewasdesignedbytheAdanaPoliceDepartmentwiththeobjectiveto

disengage, deradicalise and reintegrate in society radicalised individuals involved in political,

religious or separatist extremist groups’ activities. It was a singular initiative in Turkish

counter-terrorism tradition which is primarily focusing on repressive measures, notably

concerningKurdishseparatist terrorism205.Thispilotprogrammewas implementedbyAdana

police intelligence and counter-terrorismunitswith local authorities and community leaders’

support. The specificity of this programme was the counter-terrorism units intervention on

threedifferentlevels:

• Topreventfurtherindoctrinationbyextremistgroupattheearlystageofradicalisation;

• Uponarrestofaradicalisedindividualinvolvedinterroristorcriminalactivities;

• Duringtheradicalisedindividual’sincarcerationperiod,notablybeforeitsrelease.

Atany time, counter-terrorismofficersoffered radicalised individuals theopportunity to take

partintherehabilitationprogramme.Theywerefreeintheirdecision,evenifsomejudicialand

financial incentives were planned in order to convince them206. The family members of the

individual were early involved to encourage the individual’s participation and increase the

chancesofsuccess.Incaseofrecurrentrefusalsandthecontinuationofterroristactivities,the

repressiveapproachwasadopted.

204H.GULBEYAZ,Türkei-DrehkreuzdesTerrors?,Documentaryfilm,2016,Arte.205M.BASTUGandU.K.EVLEK,“IndividualDisengagementandDeradicalizationPilotPrograminTurkey:MethodsandOutcomes”,JournalforDeradicalization,Fall2016.206Ibid.,pp.36-38.

56

The second and third levels of intervention could represent a good template for the issue of

Turkish returnees, with the possibility to tailor the approach adopted for the proceeded

individual.Thedisengagement-deradicalisationprocessisconductedforaperiodofsixmonths,

duringwhichparticipants“acquirevocationaltraining,employment,housing,healthcare,social

and financial aids, counselling, and psychological support and treatment207”. In case of jail

conviction,theparticipationinrehabilitationbeginsafterhavingservedthesentence.

Because of its positive results, the initiative was duplicated in other regions. However, this

programme was ended in 2015 by the Turkish government in the aftermath of the Syrian

conflict and the interrupted Kurdish peace-process. At that moment, the Turkish counter-

terrorismstrategypassedfromacomprehensiveapproachcombiningrepressiveresponsewith

rehabilitationresponsetoamainlyrepressiveone.Therefore,Turkeyrepresents theopposite

case of a country that decided to develop before the Syrian civil war a quite efficient

rehabilitationprogramme,anddecidedtoabandonit,despitethefairlylargenumberofTurkish

citizensinvolvedinjihadistgroupsinSyria.

Thus, one can observe that regarding non-repressive measures, it is possible to distinguish

severalapproaches.Even if the firstgroup(composedofDenmarkandGermany)seemstobe

more advanced, the reader has to be aware that determining efficiency and solidity of such

measures requires time to put things into perspective. The ongoing high level of threat in

Europeancountries,addedtothecontinuousterroristattacks,easilyprovesthatrepressiveand

non-repressivemeasuresarestillneeded.

B.Analysisofnon-repressivemeasures

Inthissection,thetheoreticalfoundationsofthecomprehensivemeasuressetuptorespondto

theFTFissuewillbeanalysed.Thosemeasures,whicharemainlydesignedbyNGOsandpublic

sub-stateactors,oftenoriginatefromcounter-radicalisationandde-radicalisationprogrammes,

before possibly being implemented to FTF. Those theoretical foundations are then translated

into practical measures formulated to address the social, psychological and ideological

componentsofradicalisation.Eventhoughmostof the foreign fightershad theexplicitaimto

jointerroristorganisationslikeAl-QaedaorISIS,somealsohavebeenmotivatedbytheideato

207Ibid.,p.38.

57

provide humanitarian help or to protect the civil population from foreign military

interventions208.ThisexamplegivesanideaofthediversityoftheFTFs’profiles.

According to these different aims of getting involved in terrorist actions, their psychological

perception of their involvement is not the same. This means that an optimal rehabilitation

procedure also may differ from case to case and that an individual approach should be

preferred. Specialists share the concept of tailoring the de-radicalisation programmes on the

needs of the different extremist group profiles209 in order to go back to their radicalisation

roots. Forexample, Islamicextremists couldneeda religiousoriented treatmentdealingwith

theirreligiousconviction.Inthiscase,theywouldneedinteractionswithscholarsteachingthem

apeacefulwayofIslam.Therefore,onecanobservedifferentapproachesbyState’sdealingwith

thede-radicalisationofreturnees.

Thispartof the report shall givedeeperexplanationsabout theanalysisof radicalisationand

de-radicalisation, which constitute the core of some of the most developed comprehensive

programmes in Europe. Therefore, will be considered the functioning and the structure of

special programmes linked to the fields and presented different perspectives fromwhich the

phenomenoncanbeapproached.

1) Deradicalisation/disengagement:Theoriesforasuccessfulprocess

According to several scientists such as Peter Neumann or John Horgan, one can distinguish

betweencognitivederadicalisationandsocialdisengagementprocesses.

Cognitive deradicalisation210 consists in combating the radicalism with targeted conviction

withoutusingtoodirectoraggressivemeasures.AccordingtoNeumann,thechallengeconsists

inbeingascarefulaspossibleinordernottoprovokeadeeperstuckofthereturnees’ideology.

208 C. LISTER, “Returning Foreign Fighters. Criminalization or reintegration ?”Brookings Doha Center,ForeignPolicyatBrookings,2015,p.8.209 D. DELLA PORTA, G. LA FREE, “Processes of Radicalization and De-Radicalization”, InternationalJournalofConflictandViolence,GuestEditorial2012;quotedin:MehmetBastuk,UgurEvlek.“IndividualDisengagement and Deradicalization Pilot Program in Turkey: Methods and Outcomes” Journal forDeradicalization,vol.8,2016,p.30.210 P. NEUMANN, “Radikalisierung, Deradikalisierung und Extremismus”,AusPolitik und Zeitgeschichte,vol.632013,quotedin:S.Lenhart,“IslamistischerExtremismus:BetrachtungvonHandlungsmotivenundzivilgesellschaftlicherGegenmaßnahmen”,GlobaleZivilgesellschaftIFSAnalyse,2014,p.5

58

Being too harsh could provoke a harder resistance, with even a deeper conviction on the

ideologythanbefore211.

Disengagementconsistsinworkinginpriorityonthenonfeasanceofextremistattitudessuch

as violence. The extremist, if he wishes, can still stay in his radical environment but as a

“dropout”whochoosestonotparticipateinillegalorviolentactivitiesanymore212.Thisconcept

canbe applied to the individual but also to a groupby spreading the ideaof a lyingdownof

one’sarmsbutwithoutdemandingtogiveupthefundamentalideology.Horganpointsoutthat

psychologicalfactorssuchasdisillusionorphysicalfactorssuchasimprisonmentcanoftenlead

to disengagement213. Besides these psychological or physical reasons of disengagement, one

must also consider the strategic perspective for such a change. For example, the efficiency of

punitive measures as hard prison sentences could be a pressure whereas the material

components offered by de-radicalisation or disengagement such as jobs or trainings in some

statescanbecomepositiveincentives214.

The differentiation of these concepts brings along doubts about the necessity and even the

realityofderadicalisation.Whygoingsofarinderadicalisationifdisengagementissufficientto

guarantytheState’sprotection?Furthermore,thesuccessofderadicalisationisdifficulttoprove

withoutknowingtherealmotivationsbehindtheindividual’schoiceforthetreatment.

For Bjorgo and Horgan, disengagement should be a first step before deradicalisation for a

successful approach215. They argue that a change of behaviours at the end ismore important

first thanthechangeofmentality.Thispositionstands intotaloppositionwithRabasa216who

defendstheideathatapersonwhochangesone’spersonalbeliefs(deradicalisation)inpriority

toone’sbehaviour(disengagement)hasfewerchancestofallbacktoradicalismthanvice-versa.

However, it appears that both deradicalisation and rehabilitation should strongly be linked

togetherinordertoallowthereturneeasuccessfulcome-backinsociety.

211Ibid.212Ibid.213T.BJORGO,J.HORGAN,LeavingterrorismBehind:IndividualandCollectiveDisengagement,MiltonPark,New York 2009; quoted in: M.Bastug, U. Evlek, “Individual Disengagement and Deradicalization PilotPrograminTurkey:MethodsandOutcomes”,JournalforDeradicalization,vol.8,2016,p.30.214Ibid.215Ibid.216A.RABASA,S.Pettyjohn,J.Ghez,C.Boucek,DeradicalisingIslamistextremists,RAND,SantaMonica2010;quotedin:M.BASTUG,U.EVLEK,op.cit.,p.30.

59

A similar concept would be the Kruglanski approach that defines two types of

deradicalisation217: theexplicitmethod,whichmeans a targeted treatment of the causeof the

radicalisation,andtheimplicitone,whichcouldbeappliedforallkindofextremists.

By taking the example of Islamists, the explicitmethodwould address precisely the religious

convictionsand focusona correct interpretationof theQuran.On theother side, the implicit

methodwouldaimtheradicalisationinalargerapproachandfocusmoreonthereintegration

into society. These two types of methods are applicable to a broad spectrum of extremist

individual profiles. Their personal needs are taken into account and they are provided

continued counselling afterwards. Indeed, helping and encouraging the participants all along

duringtheprocessiscrucialforaneffectivederadicalisationandrehabilitation.Theeffortsand

the psychological struggling they face during their treatment have to be taken into

considerationwithregardtotheriskofarelapse.Therefore,aconstantsupportiscrucialforthe

cognitiveawakeningaswellasfortherehabilitation.

2) Apsychosocialapproachtothereturneephenomenon

In the following, further attention will be paid to the analysis of practical conceptions of

deradicalisation.TheDanishandtheGermanmodelsshouldbeusedasanexampleaccordingto

the place both state’s occupy in the searching for deradicalisation strategies.

Inordertoavoidanoverallanalysisofbothmodelslackingadeeperinsight,theDanishmodel

will be first presented by focussing on its theoretical concept. Then a specific factor in

deradicalisation, the role of the family will be analysed by taking the German model as an

example.

a) TheAarhusmodel:betweenderadicalisationandrehabilitation?

TheAarhusmodel, launched in2007 inDenmark inorder tocounter right-extremism, stands

forthemostcomprehensiveapproachtowardsreturningjihadistsinEurope.Ittargets“criminal

conduct and activismoutside the law” and relies on inclusion218,which is the real aimof the

217 A.W. KRUGLANSKI, M. J. GELFAND, J. J. BELANGER, A. SHEVELAND, D. HETTARIACHCHI, R.GUARATNA, “The psychology of radicalization and deradicalization: How significance quest impactsviolent extremism,PoliticalPsychology,vol.35,2014,pp.69-93quoted in:M.BASTUG,U.EVLEK,op. cit.,p.30.218 P. BERTELSEN, “Danish Preventive Measures and De-radicalization Strategies: The Aarhus Model”,Panorama,January2015,p.24.

60

programme. This notion can be understood as transforming personal motivations into legal

modesofparticipationandcitizenship219.

Besidesthederadicalisationwork,thisprogrammefocusesontherehabilitationintosociety.It

isnottheradicalisationitselfwhichiscriticizedbythecounsellors,butrathertheviolentoutput

whichcanresultfromradicalisation220.ProfessorPrebenBertelsen,whoplayedaleadingrolein

thecreationofthisprogrammeforIslamicextremists,underlinesthenecessityoftheinclusion

of thereturneesasananswerof theirenduredexclusion: theirexperienceof “daily, low-level

racism”andtheirtornidentitybetweentwocultures221:Ontheonehandfullyintegrated,onthe

other one not feelingwelcomed because of their religion or culture. Indeed, this programme

usesavery liberalphilosophyinproposinghelptothereturnees indifferentdomainssuchas

education, providing a job, accommodation, practical assignments like homework, job

application,etc.and inprovidingforeachreturneeamentor inchargeofhelp.“Jihadistshave

chosenapaththat'snotOK,butthekeyintheAarhusmodelisrecognizingthatthesepeopleare

notthatdifferentfromtherestofus,"saysBertelsen222inlinewiththeAarhuscounsellorswho

sharetheacceptanceofradicalisationinpoliticsorreligionbutwhodonotacceptanykindof

violence223.

Thisliberalconsiderationofderadicalisationfocussingonthebehaviourandtherehabilitation

ofreturneesstronglymatchesthedisengagementconcept.AccordingtoJorgenIlum,thechiefof

police in theregion, theprogrammeworks.Actually,uptonow,noneof theFTFhasrelapsed

backinmilitantactivities.224.

Itisabout“criminalconductandactivismoutsidethelaw”andaboutinclusion225.Thenotionof

inclusion stands for the real aim of the programme. This can be understood as transforming

personalmotivationsintolegalmodesofparticipationandcitizenship226.

TheAarhusmodelisnotspecialisedinaparticularformofextremismandprovidesthereforea

large cooperation of actors, called the SSP organisation (the interdisciplinary cooperation

219Ibid.220E.BRAW,“InsideDenmark’sradicaljihadistrehabilitationprogramme”,Newsweek,17October2014.221J.HENLEY,“HowdoyouderadicalisereturningISISfighters?”,TheGuardian.222E.BRAW,op.cit.223J.HENLEY,op.cit.224A.HIGGINS,“ForJihadists,DenmarktriesRehabilitation”,TheNewYorkTimes,13December2014.225 P. BERTELSEN, „Danish Preventive Measures and De-radicalization Strategies: The Aarhus Model”,Panorama,January2015,p.24.226Ibid.

61

betweenSchools, Social services andPolice)227.Thus,manyother stateorprivate institutions

are connected closely to the project, such as the Department of Psychology and Behavioral

Sciences228.

This department developed the discipline of Life Psychology, which is an approach of

integrating personality psychology, social psychology and societal psychology with social

sciences and humanities in the understanding of radicalisation processes, risk factors and

resilience229.LifePsychology relieson threepresumptions230.The firstone is that “everybody

aspirestoagood-enoughlife”.Thesecondonedemandsthenecessitytodevelopskillstofront

with the tasks of the good-enough life. The third one sets the fact that everybody, without

exceptions, is confronted to the same tasks. This implies that in life, the development of

capacitiesinhandlingone’sownlife,oneneedsskillswhichonlycanbeadoptedifwillingness

andabilitiesareadoptedinadditionwith“externalpossibilitiesandconditions”suchas“being

metbyothers”231.Theultimateresearchedactionof“doing”can justhappenwhenontheone

handmotivationalandcognitivecapacitiesareadoptedandontheotherhandrealityconditions

andsocialconditionmatchtogether232.

Life Psychology resilience programme towards violent radicalisation targets “triggering

threats”, risks thatwouldconduct to “non-flow” (nogoodgripon its life) in the realisationof

one’sfundamentalhumanlifeskillssuchasparticipation,realisticattunement,andperspective

taking233. Furthermorethe“moderateriskfactors”(thevariationofsocialcognitionandsocial

relationship)shouldalsobetakeninconsideration234.Fortheidentificationofthoseriskfactors,

individualmentors are trained in order to give the best response for one’s problems235. The

recruitment of those mentors by the municipality of Aarhus relies on criterion such as age,

gender,ethnicbackground,formaleducationandexperience,firsthand-knowledgeofdifferent

culturalandsocialenvironmentsaswellasontheirpoliticalandreligiousknowledge.Besides

theidentificationoftheseriskfactors,thecurrenttenmentorspointouttheillegalpasttothe

menteestheymayhavebeencaughtinorstillareendangeredtomeet,aswellasthepersonal

and societal dangers they represented or the failure of their experienced activism236. The

227Ibid.228Ibid.229Ibid.,p.243.230Ibid.,p.246.231Ibid.,p.247.232Ibid.233Ibid.,p.248.234Ibid.,p.249.235Ibid.,p.243.236Ibid.,p.244.

62

mentorisalsoresponsiblefortheinclusionofthereturnee.Thismeansasupervisionorahelp

for social activities of daily-life such as family-relations, seeking and applying for a job,

educationorforstructuringtheirfreetimeandhobbies.Finally,thementorhastobeuptohis

taskinstayingwellinformed,showingatrustfulandsympatheticattitudetowardshismentee.

Itisimportanttobeapartnerindialogue,especiallyforthementeesdaily-lifechallengesaswell

asforhisconcernsaboutexistential,politicalorreligiousmatters.

b) DNEandtheimportanceofthefamily

The DNE - Diagnostisch-Therapeutisches Netzwerk (diagnostic-therapeutic Network) is an

initiativeledbyZDKGesellschaftDemokratischeKulturinGermany.Asbeingalsotheinitiator

of HAYAT programme or EXIT programme, ZDK is one of the most important player in the

deradicalisation field in Germany. DNE has as principal function the responsibility to give

assistanceinapsychologicalwaytotheconstellationsofrelationsbetweenfamilymembersand

extremists.

Theideaistobuildaprofileestablishednotonlyonthecurrentstatusoftheradicalisedperson

buttoconsideralso,accordingtoascientificapproach, itspersonalpast inordertowithdraw

theindividual/personfromitsradicalisedenvironment.ThemainpointsonwhichDNEtriesto

work are the individual’s changes of identification, the reflection on its past and the

reorientationfornewperspectives,whichcanbedifficultiftheclientisalreadyexperiencingan

identitytransformation.Itseemslikewithdrawaldecisionsarestronglyconnectedtocriticallife

experiences and therefore get in touch with existential thematic which brings psychological

conflictswiththem237.

DNEunderlines the importance of the family in the deradicalisation process. A cognitive and

emotional “opening” should be the first condition before going forward to an “ideological

deradicalisation”238. The input has to come from outside to establish a sort of “distancing

stimulus”239.According toWagner, Wichmann and Borstel, family members still have a “high

emotional and social value”240. The implementation of self-doubts regarding the extremist

attitude should come “through a human proximity with simultaneous ideological distance.

237 K. SISZKA, “Auf dem Weg zu einem diagnostisch-therapeutischen Netzwerk Extremismus (DNE).Grundlagen für und Einblicke in einModellprojekt des Zentrums Demokratische Kultur“, Journal Exit-Deutschland,2015,p.106.238 B. WAGNER, F. WISCHMANN, D. BORSTEL, “Familienberatung und Deradikalisierung: AusstiegsorientierungimfamiliärenundsozialräumlichenBeratungskontext“;K.SISHKA,op.cit.,p.107.239Ibid.240Ibid.

63

Familymembers,inasocialmeaning,arereallysuitableforthattask”241.Aproblemissetwhen

theclientdoesnotaccept the“distancingstimulus”becauseofpriorconflictingrelationswith

theirfamilymembers.Theseconflictscanhappenduringtheradicalisationprocesswithhurting

or estrangement towards family members242.Therefore, most of consultancies specialised in

radicalisation, like for example HAYAT, work with family members on argumentation skills,

conflict management or discussion ability. Family members are often the last connection

betweentheradicalisedpersonandthesociety,whichiswhythefactofstayingincontactwith

them is crucial inorder to look forward forapossiblederadicalisation.Thisapproachshould

evenbepursuedwhenthepersonhasalreadyleftthestateasaforeignfighter243.

3) Cognitiveandideologicalapproaches

a) TheCognitiveapproach

Thenotionofthecognitiveapproachtowardsderadicalisationforreturneesreferstoareflexive

mechanism.Thesementalmechanismsareconsideredbymanyscholarsasresponsibletoboth

radicalisationandderadicalisation.Forthelatter,theycouldbeseenasa"rewindingprocess"of

radicalisation.Islamicreligiousradicalisationisnotalwayswellapprehendedbytherelativesof

the individual going through this process, as well as by the society in general, especially in

westernnon-Muslimor secular states.But thisdoesnot imply that the radicalised individual,

whomaygoasfarasjoiningaterroristgroup,haslostallrationality.

ItwouldbeamisconceptiontoconsiderthateveryindividualwhoengagesintoradicalIslamist

activitiesandeventually takespart into theactivitiesofextremistgroupsabroadsuffers from

psychiatric condition. A significant number of them, however, present characteristics of

behaviouraldisorders.Thatistheresultofa2014studyfromAntonWeeninkonDutchforeign

fighters in Syria,who foundout that on a sample of 140 individuals, 60%presented signs of

psychosocialproblems,46%displayedevidencesofproblembehaviours(childabuse,tantrums

orcompulsivedisorder)and20%showedsignsofseriousproblembehaviourorseriousmental

illness(suchaspsychosis,schizophrenia,autism,orPTSD)244.Itisinterestingtonotethat47%

oftheindividualsfromthatsamplewerefoundtohavecriminalrecordsfromtheDutchpolice

services.Indeed,itispossibletoregardthisanalyseasapartofatendencythatiscomparable

241Ibid.242K.SISZKA,op.cit.,p.107.243Ibid.244 A.WEENINK, “Behavioral Problems and Disorders among Radicals in Police Files”, Perspectives onterrorism,vol.9,no.2,2015.

64

with the psychological and behavioural profiles of the returnees ofother European countries.

Similarly, Horgan found out that people who are most likely to be recruited into terrorist

activitiescommonlyshowsignsofanger,disenchantment,identificationwiththevictimsofthe

perceived injustices they want to fight and impression that those injustices can not be

addressed outside radical and violent militant engagement245. This engagement is seen as

providing rewards in the form of a belonging feeling or as a fulfilment of one individual's

personality.Rallyingaterroristgroupcanthusbeexplained,foralotofradicalisedindividuals,

by a quest for personal meaning and comfort that they think they will find in a terrorist

group246.

MattVenhaus,whoanalysedtheprofilesofmorethan2.000FTFinAfghanistan,describedfour

different typical profiles of jihadist recruits: the “revenge seeker”, diffusely frustrated and

lookingtodischargehisfrustrationtowardsapersonoragroupheconsidersresponsibleofa

fault,the“statusseeker”;whichseeksrecognitionfromtheothers,the“identityseeker”,which

aims to define his personality through the affiliation to a group, and the thrill seeker whose

quest for glory, adventure and excitement drives the radical affiliation247. Similarly, Dounia

Bouzar inassociationwithChristopheCaupenneandandSulaymanValsanidentifieddifferent

rolemodelsthatpotentialjihadirecruitsidentifywithaccordingtotheirpersonality,inorderto

lurethemintojoininggroupssuchasISIS248:

• “MèreTheresa”(MotherTheresa):ahumanitarianrole,designedtofittheaspirationsof

minorgirlswhorepresentthemselvesasfuturedoctors,nursesorsocialworkers.

• “Lancelot”:thechivalrousfighter,readytosacrificehimselfforagreatercausethanthe

defenceofitsowninterests,suchasthedefenceoftheIslamiccommunity.

• “Leporteurd’eau”(thewatercarrier):referstothequestofpersonalidentitytobelong

to a group in order to exist, even if the individual is side-lined and affected to non-

combatantorinferiorlogistictasks.

• “TheCallofDutymodel”:amodeloftenpresentedtoyoungmalesseekingcomradeship

and brotherhood of arms, who previously wanted without success to apply to their

country’smilitaryorpoliceforce.

245DEANGELISTori,“UnderstandingTerrorism”,MonitoronPsychology,vol40,no.10,2009.246Ibid.247R.BORUMandR.FEIN,“ThePsychologyofForeignFighters”,StudiesinConflictandTerrorism,vol.31,no.12,2016,p.12.248D.BOUZAR,C.CAUPENNEandS.VALSAN,“Laméthamorphoseopéréechezlejeuneparlesnouveauxdiscoursterroristes”,BouzarExpertise,November2014.

65

• “Zeus”: amodel designed to address thewill of power and domination of individuals

who often present risky behaviour (drug addiction, dangerous driving, unprotected

sex…)priortotheirradicalisation.

Those categories are not exclusive and can be merged into an individual’s cognitive matrix,

driving him to travel abroad to fight for the jihad. Furthermore, among the FTFs who have

returned,threedifferentgroupscanbedistinguished249.

• “Thedisillusioned”whoseideologicaloradventurousaspirationshaveclashedwiththe

realityofbrutalityandcynicismof the fighting theatresor from thezoneoccupiedby

radicalgroups;

• The“traumatised”,whomayreturnwithrecentlydevelopedmentalhealthdamagesora

worsenedpsychiatricpre-existingconditionduetotheexposuretocombatexperience

aswellasfromexactionscommitteduponcivilians.Thesetraumasoftentaketheform

of post-traumatic stress disorder and may even lead to a dangerous general

disenchantment leaving to the questioning of the capacity of humanbeings to behave

morally;

• The“individualswhoarefurtherradicalised”,whichseemtoconstituteasmallminority

ofallreturnees,butaminoritythatnonethelessrepresentsthebiggestthreattosociety.

The careoffered toupon their return ina comprehensive frameworkmustbeadapted to the

profileofthereturnee,aswellastothereasonsmotivatinghisdepartureandhispsychological

condition at the moment of his return. As mentioned, comprehensive deradicalisation and

rehabilitationprogrammes,suchasEXIT inAarhus,Hayat inGermanyoreventheabandoned

pilotprogrammefromthemunicipalityofAdanainTurkey,attempttoaddresscommonissues

linkedtothereturnees.These latterare inparticulardisenchantment,self-depreciationorthe

lackofperspective,encompassingpracticalsocialmeasures.Theyalsorelyontheexpertiseof

professionalsinthefieldsofpsychology,psychiatryandsocialcounsellingtohelptheindividual

acquire the cognitive mechanism allowing its renouncement to violent engagement and its

reintegrationintothesociety.

The social and psychological care givers of the Aarhus EXIT initiative distinct two key

components of radical engagement: the “motivational process” that encompasses the wishes

anddesiresoftheindividualandthe“cognitiveprocessthatconsistsinknowing,thinkingand 249L.LINDEKILDE,P.BERTELSENandM.STOHL,“WhoGoes,Why,andWithWhatEffects:TheProblemofForeignFightersfromEurope”,SmallWars&Insurgencies,vol.27,no.5,2016,p.870.

66

reflecting.ThepsychologicalassistanceofferedbyEXITexpertsaimstoallowtheindividualto

projecthimself ina lifepaththatfosterstheconductofhis lifechoices inaccordancewiththe

externalconditionsforsocialrecognition250.Hayatalsoprovidesspecialmedicalcaresadapted

totheexperienceoftraumatisedreturneestopreventanyharmtheycouldinflicttothemselves

ortheirsurroundings.

b) Theideologicalapproach

Theimportanceoftheideologylyingunderradicalengagementshouldnotbeforgottenwhenit

comes todesigningandadaptingcomprehensivemethodsofderadicalisation for returneesas

well as for radical Islamists in general. If the influence of radical Islam, such as Salafism, is

commonly found at the core of terrorist group rhetoric, experts do not always agree on the

importanceofthereligiousfactorintheconstructionofradicalideology.RadicalIslamistsoften

consider their cultural and religious values, those of Sunni Islam, to be threatened. Extreme

formsof belonging and identificationwith those values is then conceived as away to defend

them, as they fear cultural globalisation could lead to an ethno-cultural stand-off thatwould

harm their system of religious beliefs. Yet, some psychologists suggest that the cultural and

religiousconceptionsofanindividualconstituteamentalshieldthatpreservesone’smindfrom

theuniversalandmostlyunconsciousfearofdeaththathumanbeingsexperienceeveninnon-

threateningsituations251.

Thisideologicalcommitmenttoaradicalgroupisnottheonlymotivationforjoiningaterrorist

group,astwootherformsofcommitmentcanbefound:theaffectivecommitmentrespondingto

theneedofpersonalbelongingandlifemeaning,andthepragmaticcommitment252.Considering

the variety of national approaches in addressing the religious aspect of radicalisation is an

interestingexercise,asitunderlinesthedifferencesintraditionalinteractionsbetweenthestate

and the religious sphere as well as with its cultural minorities. In this context, religious

deradicalisation is not the core of the EXIT strategy. Religious beliefs, even violent, are not

addressed as long as theydonot contravene theDanish law.As rehabilitator SteffenNielsen,

whoworksfortheEXITprogramme,states:“Wedon'tspenda lotofenergyfighting ideology.

250 J. BERCZYK, Returning from the ‘IS’ – Experiences from the counseling service HAYAT-Germany ,Sicherheitspolitik-blog,2015.251 T. A PYSZCZYNSKI, S. SOLOMON and J. GREENBERG, In theWake of 911: The Psychology of Terror.Washington DC: American Psychology Association, 2003, quoted in T. Deangelis, “UnderstandingTerrorism”,MonitoronPsychology,vol40,no.10,2009.252 A. RABASA, S. PETTYJOHN, J. J. GEHZ and C. BOUCEK, Deradicalizing Islamist Extremist, NationalSecurityResearchDivision.California,UnitedStatesofAmerica:RANDCorporation,2010,quotedin: L.BELTRAM,“Howaterroristcouldbederadicalized?”,JournalforDeradicalization,no5,2015.

67

Wedon'ttrytotakeawayyourjihadistbeliefs.YouarewelcometodreamoftheCaliphate”253.

This approach may not be we very surprising considering the Danish conception of non

interventioninthereligioussphere,butithasdrawnsomescepticism.MeanwhileinGermany,

the counsellors of Hayat, trained to possess a profound knowledge of Islamic and Islamist

concepts and rhetoric, can engage into a process of “delegitimization and invalidation” of

jihadistnarratives254.The importanceof the ideology in theradicalisationprocess, sometimes

contested, is acknowledged in theEXIT-Germanyprogramme.The latter assumes causeof an

individual falling into violence results more often from an ideological process than from a

personalbackground255.

Inopposition,Dutchderadicalisationprogrammesdonotmakeacleardifferencebetweenthe

extremistgroupsfromtheperspectiveofthereligion.Thehistoricalandculturalheritageofthe

Netherlands makes it really difficult for the deep secularized society to identify with the

religious background of theMuslim community and the religious fundamental identity of the

radicals. The phenomenon of radicalisation is not seen as a religious issue but more as a

negativesideeffectoftheinabilitytomanageamulticulturalsociety.However,religiousactors

areinvolvedinprogrammes,butnotwiththeimportancetheywouldmeetinotherstates256.In

any state built upon the rule of law principles, criminal and administrativemeasures can be

seenasatime-limitedsolutiontodealwiththeissueofreturningforeignterroristfighters.As

discussedabove,asignificantproportionofthereturneesfrompreviousconflictshavenotbeen

representingasecuritythreatfortheircountry.However,currentSyrianandIraqiconflictscan

hardlybecomparedwiththeprecedentcrisis,intermsofquantityofforeignfightersinvolved.

AsthenumberofreturneesinEuropeancountrieswillcontinuetoincrease,theneedtopropose

coherentresponsesoutsideofplainandsimpleincarcerationwillhavetobeaddressedonthe

longterm.

253CounterExtremismProject,Denmark,extremismandcounter-extremism,2016,p.6.254A.ELDIFRAOUIandM.UHLMANN,op.cit.,p.173.255EXITGermany,“WeprovidetheWayout:de-radicalizationanddisengagement”,2012,p.4.256A.RABASA,S.L.PETTYJOHN,J.J.GHEZ,C.BOUCEK,DeradicalizingIslamistExtremist,NationalSecurityResearchDivision.RANDCorporation:2010.

68

PART3:INTERNATIONALCOOPERATION

FRAMEWORKSANDRECOMMENDATIONS

REGARDINGTHEFTFISSUE

AfterareviewoftheselectedStates’repressiveandnon-repressiveresponsestothereturning

FTFs,severalattemptstohighlightsimilaritiesanddifferencesbetweenthem,andananalysisof

thedifferentapproaches,thethirdpartwilldevelopinternationalcooperationframeworksand

presentanon-exhaustivelistofrecommendationsthathavearisenallalongthepreparationof

thereport.These latterare theproductofacollectivereflectionandare inspiredbyreadings

anddiscussionswithprofessionals.

A. Cooperationframeworks

Despite noticeable differences among CoE Member States regarding responses to the

phenomenon of FTF, many similarities exist and can be partly explained by the role of

international and European organisations. Indeed, the United Nations, the CoE and the

EuropeanUnionhaveaddressedtheissueinadifferentmanner.

Resolution 2178 was adopted in September 2014 by the Security Council257. It calls UN

members to prevent the travel of FTF from their territories. Above all, it requires them to

considerasacriminaloffencethetravelorattemptedtravelofindividualstoanotherStatethan

theoneofresidenceornationality“forthepurposeoftheperpetration,planning,orpreparation

of,orparticipationin,terroristacts,ortheprovidingorreceivingofterroristtraining”258.

Therefore, Resolution 2178 has a legal dimension because of its binding character. Indeed, it

raises travel for joininga terrorist groupat the same level as financing terrorism, as a global

threatneedingspecificlawsandstronginternationalcooperation259.Therefore,thisresolution

constitutes anessential encouragement for governments to adapt their legislation inorder to

comply with international obligations. The third UN report on the implementation by its

members of Security Council resolution 2178 emphasised that, as observed above, several 257SecurityCounciloftheUnitedNations,Resolution2178onthreatstopeaceandinternationalsecurityresultingfromactsofterrorism,S/RES/2178,24September2014.258Ibid.259S.DAVIS,“RespondingtoForeignTerroristFighters.ARisk-BasedPlaybookforStatesandtheInternationalCommunity”,GlobalCenteronCooperativeSecurity,November2014,p.2.

69

European countries have supplemented existing laws with new amendments to criminalize

preparatoryactstojoinIraqorSyria.

TheSecurityCouncil resolutionnotonlyhashadan impactonstates’ legislations,butalsoon

twootherconcernedregionalorganisations:theCoEandtheEU.Indeed,theAdditionalprotocol

to the Convention on the prevention of terrorismwritten by the CoEwas signed in October

2015inordertoaddressthesecuritythreatcausedbytheFTF,whiletheEuropeanCommission

initiatedinDecember2015arevisionoftheFrameworkdecisiononcombatingterrorism.

Torespondtothegrowingthreatofterrorism,theCoEdecidedtocreatein2005alegal

framework for its Member States. It aimed to enhance their efforts in the fight against

terrorism. It underlines the importance of information exchange, improving civil protection,

“enhancing training and coordination plans for civil emergencies”260 and lastly international

cooperationincombatingthisthreat261.Moreover,itcriminalizespublicprovocationtocommit

a terrorist offence (article 5), recruitment for terrorism (article 6) and training for terrorism

(article7)referringtothosethatprovidesuchatraining.Inotherwords,the2005Convention

“reinforces cooperation on prevention both internally (national prevention policies), and

internationally”262andcriminalizesactsrelatedtoterroristactivities.Theescalationofconflict

in Syria and the emergingproblemof FTFhas forced the international community to expand

existingregulationto thisphenomenon.Thus, theresolution2178wasthe firstmeasure/step

takenby theUNSC, and it hasbeen followedby anotherdocument formulatedby theCoE. In

May 2015 CoE’s Committee of Experts on Terrorism (CODEXTER) completed theAdditional

Protocol to the CoE Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism263. This document was

designedasaresponsetotheneedofamorecoherentanddetaileddefinitionofterrorismand

terrorist activities compared to the one proposed in 2005 by the CoE Convention on the

PreventionofTerrorism.

Asmentionedabove,theProtocolwascreatedspecificallytorespondtotheincreasingthreatof

FTF264. In its articles 2 to 6 it gives several definitions of offences such as participating in an

associationorgroupforthepurposeofterrorism(article2-1),receivingtrainingforterrorism

(article 3-1), travelling abroad for the purpose of terrorism (article 4-1), funding travelling

260CouncilofEurope,ConventiononthePreventionofTerrorism,Warsaw,16.May2005,art.3.2.261Ibid.,art.4.262Ibid.263CouncilofEurope,AdditionalProtocoltotheCouncilofEuropeConventiononthePreventionofTerrorism,Riga,22October2015.264Ibid.

70

abroadforthepurposeofterrorism(article5-1),organisingorotherwisefacilitatingtravelling

abroad for the purpose of terrorism (article 6-1). Countries which ratify this Protocol are

obligedtoimplementmeasuresrecognizingsuchactsascriminaloffences.265Furthermore,this

legalactcreatesa“pointofcontactavailableona24-hour,seven-days-a-weekbasis”266inorder

toprovideefficientexchangeofinformationrelatedtopotentialFTFs.Moreover,initsarticle8,

the Protocol requires that all changes in legal acts and procedures designed to match these

obligationsmustbemadewithrespecttohumanrights.

Withoutanydoubt,thisprotocolwillcontributetotheconvergenceofthelegalframeworksto

combattheFTFthreatinEurope.However,themainaimofthecreationofsuchanactwasthe

criminalisation of themost common activities that are perpetrated by individualswanting to

joinISILinSyriaortoorganiseattacksinEuropeancountries.

At the EU level, the Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA of the European Union calls on

MemberStatestoharmonizetheirlegislationandtointroduceminimumsentencerequirements

regarding terrorist acts267. It therefore lays the foundations for the approximation of the

criminal law provisions relating to terrorist offences. Given the evolutions in the operating

mode of terrorist activists and sympathizers, this legal instrument was amended in 2008,

creatingthreenewoffencesinlinewiththeCoEConventiononthePreventionofTerrorism268.

ThenewthreatoftheFTFsalsoconstitutesanevolutiontowhichtheEUlegislationmustadapt.

For this reason, on 2 December 2015, the European Commission submitted a proposal for a

directiveon combating terrorism to strengthenandupdate theEU’s legal framework269. FTFs

wouldbedefinedaccordingtoUNlegislation.TheEUCounter-Terrorismcoordinator,Gillesde

Kerchove,considersthataEuropeandefinitionofFTFwouldhaveasymbolicdimension,which

couldinspireothercountries,aswellasapracticaldimension,regardingcooperationbetween

Europol and national counter-terrorism bodies270. On 30November 2016, an agreementwas

265CouncilofEurope,AdditionalProtocoltotheCouncilofEuropeConventiononthePreventionofTerrorism,Riga,22October2015.266Ibid.,art.7.267CounciloftheEuropeanUnion,CouncilFrameworkDecisionof13June2002oncombatingterrorism,OfficialJournalL164,22June2002.268CounciloftheEuropeanUnion,CouncilFrameworkDecision2008/919/JHAof28November2008amendingFrameworkDecision2002/475/JHAoncombatingterrorism,OfficialJournalL330/2,9December2008.269EuropeanCommission,ProposalforadirectiveoftheEuropeanParliamentandoftheCounciloncombatingterrorismandreplacingCouncilFrameworkDecision2002/475/JHAoncombatingterrorism,COM(2015)625final,2December2015.270N.GROS-VERHEYDE,"LaCommissionproposeunedéfinitioneuropéennepourlescombattantsétrangers",Bruxelles2Pro,1December2015.

71

found between the Council and the European Parliament, meaning that the adoption of this

legislationshouldbepossible in the followingmonths271.Thisadoptionwill leadtoadditional

convergence regarding the FTF related legislation of the EU Member States. It criminalises

travelling for terrorist purposes, funding, organisation and facilitation of such travels and

receiving training for terrorist purposes272. Lucia Žitňanská, minister for Justice of Slovakia

considered that this directive constitutes a “right balance between the need to effectively

combat new forms of terrorism - in particular foreign fighters - while at the same time

safeguardingindividualrights”273.

Furthermore,thelegislationisnottheonlyreasonthatcanexplaintheconvergencesamongthe

States. Indeed, at the EU level, the Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) was officially

launched on 9 September 2011274. It is a “network of networks”, gathering practitioners in

counteringradicalisationleadingtoviolentextremism.TheRANisorganisedineightthematic

groups: one of them, RAN-INT/EXT, focuses on the internal and external dimensions of

radicalisationand includes the issueofFTF.Thepurposehere is to gather governmental and

non-governmentalexpertstobetterunderstandtheissueofFTF.

All international initiativesmentioned inthispart focusonpunitivemeasuresdespitethe fact

that they also provide for non-repressive measures. It largely explains the prevalence of

punitivemeasuresinCoEMemberStates’responsestotheFTFissue.

That being said, some initiatives are conducted to circulate best practices for non-repressive

approach.TheEU financially supportspilotprojects thanks to theEuropean Internal Security

Fund275,with theobjective todiffusepositive results. Furthermore, it takespart alongside29

StatesintheGlobalCounter-TerrorismForum,whichaimstoimproveexchangeofexperiences

and technical expertise, notably for the specific case of the FTF. A “Memorandum on good

practices for a more effective response to the FTF phenomenon”276 has been drafted on the

initiativeoftheNetherlandsandMoroccoin2013-2014inordertopresentrecommendations

toguidegovernmentsinthepolicy-making. 271CounciloftheEuropeanUnion,“Directiveoncombatingterrorism:CouncilconfirmsagreementwithParliament”,Pressrelease,5December2016.272Ibid.273Ibid.274ICCT,“RadicalisationAwarenessNetwork”.275EuropeanCommission,Callforproposals"Preventingradicalisationtoterrorismandviolentextremism",(HOME/2014/ISF/AG/RADX).276TheHague–MarrakechMemorandumonGoodPracticesforaMoreEffectiveResponsetotheFTFPhenomenon,“ForeignTerroristFighters”(FTF)Initiative,TheGlobalCounterterrorismForum,2014

72

Concerning the European cooperation, the exchange of information and best practices is a

crucial step to embrace the degree of international cooperation. Indeed, the signature of the

Prüm Convention in 2005277, sometimes known as Schengen III or Schengen Plus, was an

essentialsteptoenabledataexchange.ThisagreementwasadoptedbytheKingdomofBelgium,

theFederalRepublicofGermany,theKingdomofSpain,theFrenchRepublic,theGrandDuchy

ofLuxembourg,theKingdomoftheNetherlandsandtheRepublicofAustria,inordertoextend

crossbordercooperationincombatingterrorism.

InadditiontotheexistentmeasuresofwhichwereimplementedintotheEuropeanUnionLaw

by the EU Council Decision 2008/615/JHA278, among which the exchange of Fingerprints,

DNAandvehicleownerregistrations, itcouldberelevant toaddaspecificprogrammeto this

add a dedicated programme for the FTF, in order to enhance the existing police and judicial

cooperation. To achieve this objective, the member states of the Council should pass an

agreementonthecreationofaspecificdataexchangeprogrammeprovidinganaccuraterange

of information concerning each foreign fighter, including their age, presumed hierarchical

positionwithinISIL,andtheirpsychologicalmindsetforthereturnees.Suchacooperationcould

havesignificantoutcomesinreducingtheriskofterroristattacks.

B. Recommendations

Asdemonstrated in thepreviouspart, internationalorganisations takepart inpromotingand

spreading best practices to tackle a common issue. This section presents several

recommendations made by this working group in order to improve the response given by

MemberStatesoftheCoEconcerningtheissueandchallengeoftheFTF.Therecommendations

should be considered as proposals without any normative character. Based on the working

group’s observations, understandings and reflections on the FTF question, as well as on

recommendationsmadebyspecialisedinternationalfora,theyarethereforesubjectiveandonly

engagetheworkinggroup.

277Euro-Lex,PrumDecision2008/615/JAIofthe23thofJune2008relatedtosteppingupcrossbordercooperation,2008278Ibid.

73

Recommendation1:DevelopaspecificFTFpolicy inthecomprehensivecounter-terrorism

framework:

TheMember States of the CoE should design a specific policy dedicated to the FTF, separate

from existing programmes for radicalisation prevention. This distinction may contribute to

better deal with the returned FTF’s case specificities, thanks to a tailored approach drawing

several available paths for the different returnee’s cases. It would be relevant that this FTF

policy includes actions for disengagement and social rehabilitation. Furthermore, returnees’

socialreintegrationshouldbetheclearmainobjectiveofthispolicy, inordertoavoidtotreat

returnees as everlasting criminals,whichwould limit disengagement endeavours. Finally, the

integrationofthisFTFpolicyintoacomprehensivebalancedcounter-terrorismstrategy-onthe

Dutchmodel279-seemsnecessarytoreduceincompatibilitiesbetweenitsdifferentcomponents.

For instance, as mentioned above, the deprivation of nationality adversely affects the

prevention of radicalisation and the disengagement as well as the cooperation with third

countries receiving expelled nationality deprived individuals. For this reason, this working

grouprecommendstheremovalofnationalitydeprivation.TheMemberStatesoftheCoEwitha

mainlypunitivecounter-terrorismpolicyshoulddevelopandstrengthenpoliciesinthefieldof

theradicalisationprevention,disengagementandrehabilitationnotablyfortheFTF,asalready

mentionedabove.

Recommendation2:DesignariskassessmentofreturnedFTFandsupportresearchinthe

fieldofderadicalisation:

AdangerousnessassessmentofFTFshouldbeconductedupontheirreturninordertomeasure

the risk they represent for their home society, as suggestedby theGlobal Counter-Terrorism

Forum (GCTF)280. Given the impossibility to provide individually tailored measures to each

suspectedFTF,theauthoritiesshouldat leastmakeadifferencebetweenlargergroupsofFTF

accordingtoassessmentcriteria.Theaimofsuchadifferentiationisabetterappropriatenessof

sentences,abettermanagementofthedetentionfacilities,betterperspectivesofdisengagement

andeffectivemedicaltreatmentsifrequired.

279MinistryofSecurityandJustice,TheNetherlandscomprehensiveactionprogrammetocombatjihadism.Overviewmeasuresandactions,2014.280TheHague–MarrakechMemorandumonGoodPracticesforaMoreEffectiveResponsetotheFTFPhenomenon,“ForeignTerroristFighters”(FTF)Initiative,TheGlobalCounterterrorismForum,2014.

74

The realisationof these analyses shouldbe subject to thedevelopment of commonEuropean

standards.Todoso,aEuropeancenter,withinthestructuresoftheCoE,couldbeestablished

as an institution for cooperation and best practice-sharing in the particular field of

psychologicalevaluationoftheFTF.

As such, it could gather experts and academics fromall overEurope,whosepublications and

methodological advices in assessing the dangerousness of each returnee could be used by

nationaljudgestodetermineifjudicialoradministrativemeasuresshouldbeadoptedornot.

Thefollowingcouldbeseenasexamplesofsuchcriteria:

- Psychologicalcriteria:

ThepsychologicalstatusofreturneesregardingtheirexperienceasFTFshouldbeanalysedin

order tocategorise them into threedifferentgroups: the traumatised, thedisengagedand the

radicalised. This would help to create more homogeneous groups in prevention detention

facilities.

Later in the post-judicial process, each group specialists should provide the best targeted

rehabilitationapproach.Forexample,anindividualclassifiedasaviolentreligiouslyradicalised

FTFgroupshouldmeetregularlyspecialistsorscholarsofthereligionfield.

- Medicalcriteria:

MedicalconditionmustbeapointofattentioninthedeterminationoftheFTF’sdangerousness,

especially for FTF suffering from PTSD (posttraumatic stress disorder) and other forms of

traumatisms.

- “Willingnesstocooperate”criteria:

ThecooperationcriteriawouldconsidertheFTFs’willingnesstocooperatewithauthoritiesbut

alsotocopewithafuturedisengagementprocess.Itcouldevenstartbeforetheirprosecution:

if,forexample,awantedFTFsurrenderstothepolice,heshouldnotbeconsideredinthesame

wayassomeonewhoishiding.

Individuals considered as low-risks profiles because of their limited radicalisation and their

absence of participation in criminal actions could be host in FTF deradicalisation center,

75

although authorized to receive supervised visits from their familymembers. The stay in this

centershouldbeconsideredasatransitionbetweenwarzoneandhomesociety,duringwhich

deradicalisationprocessandrehabilitationsupportcouldbeconducted.

Considereddangerousindividualsmustbeheldinacloseddetentionfacilitybeforetrial.Inthat

case,theyshouldbeseparatedfromotherdetainees,particularlythosewhoalreadyshowsigns

of radicalisation, as long as a real isolation between these two categories can be guaranteed.

Thus,theimportanceofcommonstandardsaspreciseaspossibletoevaluatethelevelofthreat

isapparent.There isaneedtoensure thatnopotentiallydangerousreturneestaysbelowthe

radars of anti-terrorist because of a shallow evaluation of its hazard profile by its European

stateoforigin.

Recommendation 3: Adapt the detention response to the FTF challenge and promote

necessaryalternativestoprison:

Outcomes of the risk assessment for a returnee are either preventive detention or restricted

freedomofmovementviaprohibitiontoleavethecountryorhousearrest.Thensomereturnees

maybeprosecutedandfaceprisonterms.Thus,numerousreturnedFTFmightbeincarcerated,

despite the fact that jail is a fertile soil for radicalisation. It is therefore important to adapt

prison to FTF specific case to prevent radicalisation and to foster disengagement. For this

purpose, it is necessary to separate FTF detainees from other detainees in order to avoid

radicalisationspreadingandformationofcriminalnetworks.Themoredangerousprofiles-as

wellasunstabletraumatiseddetainees-shouldbeplacedinsolitaryconfinementwhenpossible

tobreakthegroupstrength.Atthesametime,aspecialattentionwillbepaidtotheriskofFTF

“heroisation”byotherdetaineesbecauseoftheirspecialstatusinprison.Returneesshouldbe

able to receive special medical and social aftercare brought by trained specialists, such as

psychologists in preparation of their disengagement and release. Round of meetings with

radicalisation experts and/or imams for still radicalised FTF in order to proceed to

disengagementhavetobeorganisedinsideprison.

Solutionsoutsidepenitentiarieshave aswell tobedesigned tooffer alternativeswhich could

fosterdisengagement and social reintegration.Those solutions concernonly returneeswitha

low risk assessment as well as traumatised individuals who should be held in psychiatric

hospitalwhennecessaryandpossible.Forthedisengagedreturnees,thesolutionofprobation

andtheuseofelectronicbraceletmayfacilitatetheirsocialreintegration.

76

Recommendation4:Provideanappropriatemedicalassistancetotraumatisedreturnees:

The psychomedical aspect of the returning FTF issue should be more than ever taken into

account. As the fights on the ground intensified in both Syria (sincemid-2015 and the heavy

involvementof theRussianarmy)andIraq(withthecaptureofvast territoriesunder jihadist

groupcontrolandthebesiegingofMosul), it is likelythana largenumberofrecentreturnees

andofthosewhowillreturninthenextmonthshavebeencaughtintoviolentcombats.Those

who have been involved in fighting as well as those who have witnessed shelling or been

exposed and/or involved into gruesome criminal acts towards civilians or fighters, went

through traumaticexperiences.Theyare thus likely to suffer fromPTSD,a condition that can

emergewhenoneexperiencesadisillusionaboutitspreexistingperceptionofhimselfandthe

world. This disillusion is the result of a trauma harming “the perception of the world as

meaningful”, the “positive view of self” and highlights one’s “personal vulnerability”281. The

manifestationsofthesesyndromes,whichcantaketheformofanumbingofinterestandaffect,

ahypervigilanceorirritability282,canmaketheindividualapotentialdangerforhimselfandits

surrounding.Itwouldbenecessarytoevaluate,ineachreturnee’scase,beyondthelikelinessof

a relapse into violent activism, its propensity todevelop andmaintain such syndrome,which

canalsoaffectitspotentialsocialreintegration.

Recommendation5:Givecloseattentiontotheissueofreturnedchildren:

Thecaseoftraumatisedchildrenshouldalsobeamainpointofattentionandbeaddressedwith

adequatemethods.Numerouschildrenaccompanyingrelativeswhotookpartintotheactivities

ofradicalIslamicgroupsabroadorwenttoliveontheterritoriesundertheircontrolmayhave

witnessed brutal violations of human rights. They may also have been indoctrinated with

radicalsocialandreligiousconceptsandtrainedforthepurposeofcommittingterrorattacksor

to become child soldiers. Special deradicalisation and reintegration programmes, relying on

educationandbehavioraltherapiesmustbedesignedandappliedtothem283.

281S.SALOMON,“PsychosocialtreatmentofPosttraumaticstressdisorder”,PsychotherapyinPractice,vol.3,n°4,1997,p.4.282Ibid.283Suchmethodscanbeinspiredfromtheinternationalorganisationsprogrammesofrehabilitatingchildsoldiersorfromrehabilitationprogramofcriminaladolescents,suchasthe“JustCommunityApproach”,designedbyLawrenceKohlberg.Thismethodaimstofosterthereintegrationofyoungoffendersbybuildingamoralcapacitythroughprinciplesofdemocracyandjustice.J.DIONNE,«L’interventioncognitive-développementaleauprèsdesadolescentsdélinquants»,Criminologie,vol.29,n°1,1996,p.14.

77

Recommendation6:Developactionsinthefieldofdisengagementandsocialreintegration:

In each situation, theopportunityofderadicalisation and/or rehabilitation support shouldbe

offered to individuals, aswell as psychological care and religious counselling. Socialworkers,

psychologistandreligiouscounsellors,aswellastrainedpersonnelofspecialisedNGOscouldbe

involved.Theparticipationofassociationsofterrorismvictims,as intheFrenchpreventionof

radicalisationinitiative,couldbeanexampleofsuchNGOs.Returnees’familiesshouldbepartof

reintegration programmes as well. Along with the NGOs, they should represent a bridge

between the individual and the home society he/she tries to reintegrate. TheNGOs involved

musthelpthereturneesbuildaprofessionalprojectinlinewiththeirinitialambitionandcould

offertodisengagedreturneespossibilitiesofsocialengagement.

Reintegration programmes relying on a comprehensive approach, such as those proposed by

themunicipality of Aarhus or in Germany by theHayat initiative, are particularly interesting

models. Rehabilitating those individuals into society through professional and social

reintegrationshouldbeatthecoreofanyprogrammeseekingtoaddresstheFTFissue,outside

or in an association with a framework of administrative measures or reduced criminal

measures. It can be useful, for political and administrative executives of the countries

implementing or seeking to implement such comprehensives methods, to stress out to their

citizens that social reinsertion does not necessarily imply a greater vulnerability to terrorist

attacks,neitheranabsolutionforthecriminalactivitiesofforeignterroristfighters.

Preparingthesocietyforthereintegrationofreturneesmaybeanimportantfactorofefficiency,

as a better consideration from the society is likely to enhance the moral capacity of former

criminal and radicalised individuals284. On the other hand, racial, cultural social or religious

reject,whichinalotofcaseshavebeenafactorofradicalisation,shouldbepreventedasmuch

aspossibletoavoidthejeopardizingofthewholereinsertionprocess.

284J.DIONNE,op.cit.,p.2.

78

GeneralConclusion

Finally, this report presented several relevant findings of the working group on the

implementationofpoliciesinthestudiedcountriesconcerningFTF.Thiswasmadedespitethe

difficultiesinobtaininginformationonthisemergingissueandcomparingimplementedpolicies

indifferentculturalenvironments.

Firstofall,theresponsetothephenomenonofreturneeshasbeenaboveallrepressiveinevery

studiedcountry,mainlyrelyingoncriminallawsandadministrativemeasures.Indeed,theuse

of thesemeasures allows authorities to provide a short term solution to the assumed threat

representedbyareturningterroristfighterforhis/herhomesociety.Thus,thewidespreaduse

ofrepressivemeasuresisthemaincommonpointofthestudiedstates’policies.

However, the limits associated to the implementation of these short-termmeasures and the

various cases gathered behind the returnees’ notion require the design of non-repressive

measures.Itisinthisfieldthatadifferentiationcanbemadebetweenthepoliciesimplemented

by the studied states. Indeed, only two countries (Denmark and Germany) have developed

programmes dealing with returning terrorist fighters. Some countries intend to design such

programmes from their experiences in the prevention of violent radicalisation. Nevertheless,

others favour a mainly repressive response, excluding the use of deradicalisation and

rehabilitationmeasuresforreturnees.Thisdiversityofcasesisabovealltheresultofhistorical

andculturaldifferencesbetweencountries,notablyinthejudicialfield.Thelackofknowledge

on the efficiency of disengagement, deradicalisation and rehabilitation measures is another

reasonofthesedifferences.

Inthelightoftheseobservations,itisdifficulttopresentthebestandworstcasesandtherefore

todrawuprecommendationsapplicabletoeachMemberStateoftheCouncilofEurope.Indeed,

cultural differences are very important among its 47 Member States. However, by taking

inspiration of the existing international cooperation engaged in this field, thisworking group

draftedsomegeneralrecommendationsthatmayguideCoEmemberstatesintheirattemptsto

addresstheFTFchallenge.

79

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EuropeanUnion,Profiles,ThreatsandPolicies”,ICCT-TheHague,April2016,https://www.icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/ICCT-Report_Foreign-Fighters-

Phenomenon-in-the-EU_1-April-2016_including-AnnexesLinks.pdf

VIDINOLorenzo,“ForeignFighters:anoverviewofresponsesinelevencountries”,Centerfor

SecurityStudies,ZurichETH,March2014,http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-

studies/pdfs/Foreign_Fighters_2014.pdf

Academicarticles:

BORUMRandyandFEINRobert,“ThePsychologyofForeignFighters”,StudiesinConflictand

Terrorism,vol.31,no.12,2016

HEGGHAMMERThomas,“TheriseofMuslimForeignFighters.IslamandtheGlobalizationof

Jihad”,inInternationalSecurity,volume35,issue3,pages53-94,Winter2010-2011,http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/ISEC_a_00023

HEGGHAMMERThomas,“ShouldIStayorShouldIGo?ExplainingVariationinWestern

Jihadists’ChoicebetweenDomesticandForeignFighting”inAmericanPoliticalScienceof

Review,February2013.

86

DEANGELISTori,“UnderstandingTerrorism”,MonitoronPsychology,vol40,no.10,2009,http://www.apa.org/monitor/2009/11/terrorism.aspx.

JAYARAMANShiva,“Internationalterrorismandstatelessness:RevokingtheCitizenshipofISIL

ForeignFighters”,ChicagoJournalofInternationalLaw,Summer2016

RABASAAngelandal.,“DeradicalizingIslamistExtremist”,NationalSecurityResearchDivision.

RANDCorporation:2010.

SALOMON,“PsychosocialtreatmentofPosttraumaticstressdisorder”,PsychotherapyinPractice,

vol.3,n°4,1997

ULHMANNMilenaandELDIFRAOUIAsiem,“Preventionofradicalizationandderadicalization:

British,GermanandDanishmodels”,Politiqueétrangère2015/4(Hiver),pp.171-182,https://www.ifri.org/en/publications/politique-etrangere/articles-de-politique-etrangere/de-

radicalization-and-prevention-1

VIDINOLorenzo,“EuropeanforeignfightersinSyria:dynamicsandresponses”inEuropean

Viewn°13,18December2014,

http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12290-014-0316-4

WEENINKAnton,“BehavioralProblemsandDisordersamongRadicalsinPoliceFiles”,

Perspectivesonterrorism,vol.9,no.2,2015,

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/275642945_Behavioral_Problems_and_Disorders_a

mong_Radicals_in_Police_Files.

Newspapersarticles:

• French

ALONSOPierre,“Terrorisme:lesraisonsderrièreledurcissementdelapolitiquepénale”,

Libération,2September2016,

http://www.liberation.fr/france/2016/09/02/terrorisme-les-raisons-derriere-le-

durcissement-de-la-politique-penale_1478859

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BAUDUINClémence,“Lepremiercentrededéradicalisation,tâtonnementssoushaute

surveillance”,RTL,19September2016,

http://www.rtl.fr/actu/societe-faits-divers/le-premier-centre-de-deradicalisation-

tatonnements-sous-haute-surveillance-7784705435

BOYLouis,“Saint-Etienne-du-Rouvray:commentlaFrancegèrelesjihadistesrevenusdeSyrie,

ouquionttentéd'ypartir”,FranceInfo,29July2016,

http://www.francetvinfo.fr/faits-divers/terrorisme/saint-etienne-du-rouvray/saint-etienne-

du-rouvray-comment-la-france-gere-les-jihadistes-revenus-de-syrie-ou-qui-ont-tente-d-y-

partir_1565147.html

FEFERBERGEric,“LeparcourschaotiquedupremierfrançaisaccusédejihadenSyrie”,

France24,18November2014

“FrançoisMolinsannonceun«durcissementconsidérable»delapolitiquepénaleenmatièrede

terrorisme”,LeMonde,2septembre2016,

http://www.lemonde.fr/police-justice/article/2016/09/02/francois-molins-annonce-un-

durcissement-considerable-de-la-politique-penale-en-matiere-de-

terrorisme_4991487_1653578.html

LACAZEStéphanie,“Undiscretcentreanti-radicalisationislamistelancéàBordeaux”,

Libération,9January2015.

“Allemagne: lamoitiédesdjihadistesderetouraupaystoujours loyauxenvers leurcause”,Le

Parisien,28novembre2016

SEELOWSoren,“Leretourdesdjihadistes,unlourddéfipourlaFrance”,LeMonde,1st

December2016,

http://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2016/11/30/le-retour-des-djihadistes-un-lourd-defi-

pour-la-france_5040608_3224.html

88

• Belgian

GROS-VERHEYDENicolas,"LaCommissionproposeunedéfinitioneuropéennepourles

combattantsétrangers",Bruxelles2Pro,1stDecember2015

• Danish

“DenmarkconvictsfirstIsisforeignfighter”,THELOCAL,22June2016,

http://www.thelocal.dk/20160622/denmark-convicts-first-isis-foreign-fighter

• Dutch

“Jihadiskeptoutofpolicestationsbecauseofsafetyfears”,DutchNews,19thFebruary2015,

http://www.dutchnews.nl/news/archives/2015/02/jihadis-kept-out-of-police-stations-

because-of-safety-fears/

PIETERSJanene,“DutchapproachtojihadismviolatesHumanRights:CouncilofEurope”,NL

Time,29thofNovember2016,

http://nltimes.nl/2016/11/29/dutch-approach-jihadism-violates-human-rights-council-

europe

• English

“IslamicStatecrisis:3,000Europeanjihadistsjointhefight”,BBCNews,26thSeptember2014

HENLEYJon,“HowdoyouderadicalisereturningISISfighters?”,TheGuardian,12November

2014,

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/nov/12/deradicalise-isis-fighters-jihadists-

denmark-syria

HIGGINS Andrew, “For Jihadists, Denmark tries Rehabilitation”, The New York Times, 13

December2014,

https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/14/world/for-jihadists-denmark-tries-rehabilitation

89

MENDICKRobert andVERKAIKRobert, “Onlyone in eight jihadists returning toUK is caught

andconvicted”,TheTelegrah,21May2016

“ProphetMohammedcartoonscontroversy:timeline”,TheTelegraph,4May2015.

• German

BEHRStefan,“IS-KämpferzumehrjährigerHaftverurteilt”,FrankfurterRundschau,4December

2014http://www.fr-online.de/gericht/syrien-heimkehrer-is-kaempfer-zu-mehrjaehriger-haft-

verurteilt,1472814,29237378.html

• American

COSKUNOrhanandBUTLERDaren,”TurkeytocompleteSyriaborderwallwithin5months

officialssaid”,Reuters,28thSeptember2016http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-

crisis-syria-turkey-idUSKCN11Y1MB

KROETCynthia,“Belgiumhasmostforeignfightersperhead”,Politico,4January2016.

SKYDSGAARDNikolaj,“Denmarkmovestotoughenanti-terrorismlaws”,Reuters,8April

2016,http://www.reuters.com/article/us-denmark-security-idUSKCN0X50YQ

GESLEYJenny,“Germany:NewAnti-TerrorismLegislationEnteredIntoForce”,GlobalLegal

Monitor,TheLawLibraryofCongress,10July2015https://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/germany-new-anti-terrorism-legislation-

entered-into-force/

• Russian

RUSTAMOVAFandKOZLOVV,“Russianauthoritiesaboutnewmeasuresofcounter-terrorism”,

RBK,April7,2016

SELIVERSTOVANicole,“RussianDoumawillnotdeprivetheterroristsandFTFofRussian

nationality”,RIA-novosti,June23,2016

90

• Turkish

“Turkeyhasdeported3,700FTFssince2011”,DailySabah,30October2016

http://www.dailysabah.com/war-on-terror/2016/10/31/turkey-deported-3700-foreign-

fighters-since-2011

Websites:

BERCZYKJ,“Returningfromthe‘IS’–ExperiencesfromthecounselingserviceHAYAT-

Germany”,Sicherheitspolitic-blog,2015,http://www.sicherheitspolitik-

blog.de/2015/03/20/returning-from-the-is-experiences-from-the-counseling-service-hayat-

germany/.

SAFAKYeni,ForeignterroristfightersandTurkey,2016.

http://www.yenisafak.com/en/world/foreign-terrorist-fighters-and-turkey-2451879

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APPENDICES

Table1:Legalframeworkandrelevantcriminallawprovisionsforeachstudied

country

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Table2:Mainchargesforterroristactivitiesinstudiedcountries