Response to Portion of NRC Request for Additional ... · Reference: 1. MFN 06-197, Letter from U....

134
GE Energy Security Notice This letter forwards Security-Related information in accordance with JOCFR2.390. The balance of this letter may be considered non- Security-Related upon the removal of Enclosure 1. David H. Hinds Manager, ESBWR PO Box 780 M/C L60 Wilmington, NC 28402-0780 USA T 910 675 6363 F 910 362 6363 [email protected] MFN 06-407 Docket No. 52-010 November 8, 2006 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555-0001 Subject: Response to Portion of NRC Request for Additional Information Letter No. 38 Related to ESBWR Design Certification Application - Structural Analysis - RAI Numbers 3.8-17, 3.8-24, 3.8-28, 3.8-32, 3.8-33 through 3.8- 38, 3.8-44, 3.8-59, 3.8-62, 3.8-65, 3.8-69, 3.8-73, 3.8-76, 3.8-77, 3.8-79, 3.8- 80, 3.8-81, 3.8-84, 3.8-85, 3.8-86, 3.8-88, 3.8-89, 3.8-92, 3.8-93 through 3.8- 97, 3.8-99, 3.8-101, 3.8-102 and 3.8-103 Enclosure 1 contains GE's response to the subject NRC RAIs transmitted via the Reference 1 letter. Enclosure 1 contains Security-Related information identified by the designation "{ { {Security-Related Information - Withhold Under 10 CFR 2.390} } }." GE hereby requests this information be withheld from public disclosure in accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR 2.390. A public version is contained in Enclosure 2 If you have any questions about the information provided here, please let me know. Sincerely, David H. Hinds Manager, ESBWR General Electric Company

Transcript of Response to Portion of NRC Request for Additional ... · Reference: 1. MFN 06-197, Letter from U....

Page 1: Response to Portion of NRC Request for Additional ... · Reference: 1. MFN 06-197, Letter from U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission to Mr. David H. Hinds, Request for Additional Information

GE Energy

Security NoticeThis letter forwards Security-Relatedinformation in accordance withJOCFR2.390. The balance of thisletter may be considered non-Security-Related upon the removal ofEnclosure 1.

David H. HindsManager, ESBWR

PO Box 780 M/C L60Wilmington, NC 28402-0780USA

T 910 675 6363F 910 362 [email protected]

MFN 06-407 Docket No. 52-010

November 8, 2006

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory CommissionDocument Control DeskWashington, D.C. 20555-0001

Subject: Response to Portion of NRC Request for Additional Information LetterNo. 38 Related to ESBWR Design Certification Application - StructuralAnalysis - RAI Numbers 3.8-17, 3.8-24, 3.8-28, 3.8-32, 3.8-33 through 3.8-38, 3.8-44, 3.8-59, 3.8-62, 3.8-65, 3.8-69, 3.8-73, 3.8-76, 3.8-77, 3.8-79, 3.8-80, 3.8-81, 3.8-84, 3.8-85, 3.8-86, 3.8-88, 3.8-89, 3.8-92, 3.8-93 through 3.8-97, 3.8-99, 3.8-101, 3.8-102 and 3.8-103

Enclosure 1 contains GE's response to the subject NRC RAIs transmitted via theReference 1 letter.

Enclosure 1 contains Security-Related information identified by the designation"{ { {Security-Related Information - Withhold Under 10 CFR 2.390} } }." GE herebyrequests this information be withheld from public disclosure in accordance with theprovisions of 10 CFR 2.390. A public version is contained in Enclosure 2

If you have any questions about the information provided here, please let me know.

Sincerely,

David H. HindsManager, ESBWR

General Electric Company

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MFN 06-407Page 2 of 2

Reference:1. MFN 06-197, Letter from U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission to Mr. David H.

Hinds, Request for Additional Information Letter No. 38 Related to ESBWRDesign Certification Application, June 23, 2006

Enclosures:1. MFN 06-407 - Response to Portion of NRC Request for Additional Information

Letter No. 38 Related to ESBWR Design Certification Application - StructuralAnalysis - RAI Numbers 3.8-17, 3.8-24, 3.8-28, 3.8-32, 3.8-33 through 3.8-38,3.8-44, 3.8-59, 3.8-62, 3.8-65, 3.8-69, 3.8-73, 3.8-76, 3.8-77, 3.8-79, 3.8-80, 3.8-81, 3.8-84, 3.8-85, 3.8-86, 3.8-88, 3.8-89, 3.8-92, 3.8-93 through 3.8-97, 3.8-99,3.8-101, 3.8-102 and 3.8-103 - Security-Related Information

2. MFN 06-407 - Response to Portion of NRC Request for Additional InformationLetter No. 38 Related to ESBWR Design Certification Application - StructuralAnalysis - RAI Numbers 3.8-17, 3.8-24, 3.8-28, 3.8-32, 3.8-33 through 3.8-38,3.8-44, 3.8-59, 3.8-62, 3.8-65, 3.8-69, 3.8-73, 3.8-76, 3.8-77, 3.8-79, 3.8-80, 3.8-81, 3.8-84, 3.8-85, 3.8-86, 3.8-88, 3.8-89, 3.8-92, 3.8-93 through 3.8-97, 3.8-99,3.8-101, 3.8-102 and 3.8-103 -Public Version

cc: AE Cubbage USNRC (with enclosures)GB StrambackGE/San Jose (with enclosures)eDRF 0000-0058-8392

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ENCLOSURE 2

MFN 06-407

Response to Portion of NRC Request for

Additional Information Letter No. 38

Related to ESBWR Design Certification Application

Structural Analysis

RAI Numbers 3.8-17, 3.8-24, 3.8-28, 3.8-32, 3.8-33 through 3.8-38, 3.8-44, 3.8-59, 3.8-62, 3.8-65, 3.8-69, 3.8-73, 3.8-76, 3.8-77, 3.8-79, 3.8-80, 3.8-

81, 3.8-84, 3.8-85, 3.8-86, 3.8-88, 3.8-89, 3.8-92, 3.8-93 through 3.8-97,3.8-99, 3.8-101, 3.8-102 and 3.8-103

Public Version

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MFN 06-407Enclosure 2Page 2 of 95

NRC RAI 3.8-17

DCD Section 3.8.1.4.1.1.3 states that numerical analytical techniques were used to

determine the state of stress and behavior of the containment around the openings at major

penetrations. DCD Section 3.8.2.1.3 also states this, and adds, "The analysis of the area

around the penetrations consists of a three-dimensional finite element analysis with

boundaries extending to a region where the discontinuity effects of the opening are

negligible. "

Please provide a description of these analyses, including pictures of the finite element

models, identification of the loading conditions, the types of analyses conducted, a

summary of the results of the analyses, and comparison to Code acceptance criteria.

Include this information in DCD Section 3.8 and/or Appendix 3G.

In addition, (1) identify the applicable detailed report/calculation (number, title, revision

and date, and brief description of content) that will be available for audit by the staff, and

(2) reference this report/calculation in the DCD.

GE Response

Figure 3.8-17(1) is a flow chart for the design of RCCV wall penetrations. This flow chart

is the same as DCD Tier 2 Figure 3G.1-39, Flow Chart for Structural Analysis and Design,

with the following exceptions:

* Stress analyses are performed using a local Finite Element (FE) analysis model which

includes the local area around the opening.

* In the local model FE analyses, displacements which are obtained from the RB/FB

global model stress analyses are prescribed to the boundary nodes in order to consider

the constraints of items not included in the model.

" Local loads which are not considered in the analysis of the global model are considered,

if necessary.

Figure 3.8-17(2) is a sketch showing reinforcements in the RCCV wall around a large

opening. The area around the opening is reinforced by main hoop and vertical reinforcing

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MFN 06-407Enclosure 2Page 3 of 95

bars and additional bars, which are required to resist concentrated stresses around the

opening. Additional diagonal bars are installed to add reinforcement in the areas where

hoop and vertical bars are terminated.

(1) The applicable detailed report/calculation that will be available for the NRC

audit is SER-ESB-045 Design Report for RCCV Wall around UD Personnel

Airlock Opening, Rev.0, which contains the calculations of the containment

around an opening.

(2) Since this information exists as part of GE's internal tracking system, it is not

necessary to add it to the DCD.

No DCD change will be made in response to this RAI.

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MFN 06-407Enclosure 2Page 4 of 95

Design Loads" Dead Load" Live Load" Pressure Load" Thermal Load" Seismic Load" Hydrodynamic Load" Pipe Reaction

------------ -------------------------- F

RB/FB GlobalFE Analysis Model

-- ------------I------------i

Structural ConfigurationI Material I

P11

Local FE Analysis Modelfor Opening H-Enforced Displacements

To Boundary NodesI I

F ILinear Stress Analyses

(NASTRAN)

Section Forcesfor Thermal Loads

Reduction due toConcrete Cracking

Section Forcesfor Other Loads

JP11 Combination ofSection Forces

LI"q

I f

Section Design Calculations forDesign Load Combinations

Confirmation to Satisfy

Code Requirements

End

Figure 3.8-17(1) Flow Chart for the Design of RCCV Wall Penetrations

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MFN 06-407Enclosure 2Page 5 of 95

Diaonal Additional Bar Vertical Bar M Tty 0' 0- -Vertical Bar

I I I DiagonalAdditonal Bar of I o o

iI Addtonal Ba''4 ''- of Iooo,,

I .- I-- I I f • o[6, r 7 I piers

-II

T

I-I ---- Opening- I- .Opening- -

Note: Amount of required reinforcements 'around opening will be determinedin the final design calculations. A-A SECTION B-B SECTION

I I

Figure 3.8-17(2) RCCV Wall Penetration Reinforcement Details

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MFN 06-407Enclosure 2Page 6 of 95

NRC RAI 3.8-24

With regard to DCD Section 3.8.1.4.1.2:

a) DCD Section 3.8.1.4.1.2 states that the liner plate analysis considers deviations in

geometry due to fabrication and erection tolerances. Describe the treatment of

fabrication/erection tolerances in the evaluation of the liner plate. Was the

potential for buckling of the liner pate considered (convex curvature due to

fabrication tolerances/concrete shrinkage)? Include this information in DCD

Section 3.8.1 and/or Appendix 3G.

b) DCD Section 3.8.1.4.1.2 also states that liner strains are within allowable limits

defined by ASME Code Subarticle CC-3720. Describe the analysis that verified

this, and discuss how fabrication/erection tolerances are considered in this

analysis. Include this information in DCD Section 3.8.1 and/or Appendix 3G.

In addition, (1) identify the applicable detailed report/calculation (number, title, revision

and date, and brief description of content) that will be available for audit by the staff, and

(2) reference this report/calculation in the DCD.

GE Response

a) Liner strains are evaluated based on the analysis results of the NASTRAN model

described in DCD Tier 2 Section 3G.1.4.1. In this model, the liner plate is modeled with

nominal dimensions. The liner plate modeling method is discussed in the response to

NRC RAI 3.8-25. Strains associated with construction-related liner deformations may

be excluded when calculating liner strains for the service and factored load

combinations according to ASME B&PV Code Section III, Division 2, Subarticle CC-

3720.

b) The consideration of fabrication/erection tolerances for the evaluation of liner strains is

described in a) above. The analysis results of the liner strains are summarized in DCD

Tier 2 Table 3G.1-35. The details of the analysis results are described in DC-OG-0052,

Structural Design Report for Containment Metal Components, Revision 1, September

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MFN 06-407Enclosure 2Page 7 of 95

2005, which contains the evaluation method and results for structural integrity of the

containment liner and drywell head.

Fabrication/erection tolerances are considered for liner anchor design with the following

conditions:

1) Liner thickness

a) Carbon steel liner plate - Nominal thickness: 6.4 mm, Maximum thickness: 7.416

mm, Minimum thickness: 6.146 mm

b) Stainless steel liner plate - Nominal thickness: 6.4 mm, Maximum thickness: 7.67

mm, Minimum thickness: 6.146 mm

2) Liner anchor spacing

a) Nominal 508 mm, maximum 518 mm, minimum 498 mm

b) Nominal 270 mm, maximum 280 mm, minimum 260 mm

3) Anchor stiffness

Nominal value: 1603.1 (N/mm/mm)

Lower value: 800 (N/mm/mm)

Upper value: 2400 (N/mm/mm)

The worst-case evaluation results are summarized in Tables 3.8-24(1) through 3.8-24(3).

(1) The applicable detailed report/calculation that will be available for the NRC audit is

DE-ES-0017, Liner Anchorage Evaluation, Revision 0, October 2006, which contains

the evaluation method and results for RCCV liner anchor displacement/pullout.

(2) Since this information exists as part of GE's internal tracking system, it is not necessary

to add it to the DCD.

DCD Tier 2 Figures 3G.1-48 and 3G.1-49 will be revised in the next update as noted in the

attached markups.

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MFN 06-407Enclosure 2Page 8 of 95

Table 3.8-24(1) Summary of Liner Anchor Displacement Evaluation

Liner Anchor Category 1*1 Category 11*2Thickness Spacing Anchor

Location (mm) (mm) Stiffness Displacement Allowable Displacement Allowable(N/rmmram)_______ (mm) (mm) (mm) (mm)

Wetwell 7.67 518 800Wetwell0.416Cylinder (Max.) (Max.) (Lower)

Pedestal 7.416 518 800 - 1.27 2.34 2.54Cylinder (Max.) (Max.) (Lower)

Wetwell 7.67 280 800Wwel0.398 1.82Bottom (Max.) (Max.) (Lower)

Note * 1: Category I includes test, normal, severe environmental and extreme environmental

*2: Category II includes abnormal, abnormal/severe environmental and

abnormal/extreme environmental

Table 3.8-24(2) Summary of Liner Anchor Pullout Evaluation (Concrete)

Anchor Category I Category IISpacing

Failure Mode (mm) Load Allowable Load Allowable

(N/mm) (N/mm) (N/mm) (N/mm)

Cone Failure 58.1 167 68.4 167518

Bearing on (Max.) 58.1 1964 68.4 1964Flange

Table 3.8-24(3) Summary of Liner Anchor Pullout Evaluation (Steel)

Anchor Category I Category IIStress Spacing

Location Type (mm) Stress Allowable Load Allowable(MPa) (MPa) (MPa) (MPa)

Flange Bending 518 65 77131 199Web Tension (Max.) 10 11

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MFN 06-407Enclosure 2Page 9 of 95

NRC RAI 3.8-28

Provide additional details for the containment mechanical and electrical penetrations

(other than Main Steam and Feedwater), including the number, types, geometry, analytical

models used, loading, summary of results, comparison to Code allowables, and the current

status of the design. Is the design final for all penetrations, or is this a COL applicant

responsibility? If a COL applicant responsibility, where is this identified in the DCD?

Include this information in DCD Section 3.8.2 and/or Appendix 3G.

In addition, (1) identify the applicable detailed report/calculation (number, title, revision

and date, and brief description of content) that will be available for audit by the staff, and

(2) reference this report/calculation in the DCD.

GE Response

Details for the containment mechanical and electrical penetrations (other than Main Steam

and Feedwater) are not currently available and will be developed after the routing of piping

and commodities, such as cable trays, ducts, etc., is laid out during detailed design. These

containment penetrations will be designed to meet the ASME code.

DCD Tier 2 Section 3.8.2.4.1.3 will be revised in the next update as noted in the attached

markup.

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MFN 06-407Enclosure 2Page 10 of 95

NRC RAI 3.8-32

The DCD does not address fatigue failure. What is the Service Level A and B cyclic

loading design basis for the drywell head? Were any fatigue calculations performed? If

not, identify the Code basis for waiving the fatigue evaluation. If so, describe the method

used to predict peak stresses and to calculate the cumulative usage factor. Provide the

results and the comparison to the Code acceptance criteria. Include this information in

DCD Section 3.8.2 and/or Appendix 3G.

In addition, (1) identify the applicable detailed report/calculation (number, title, revision

and date, and brief description of content) that will be available for audit by the staff, and

(2) reference this report/calculation in the DCD.

GE Response

Fatigue evaluation is performed for the metal components of the RCCV including the

drywell head in accordance with ASME B&PV Code Section III, Subsection NE-3221.5(d)

in which the limits on peak stress intensities as governed by fatigue are considered and

satisfied when the Service Loading meets the stipulated condition.

(1) The applicable detailed report/calculation that will be available for the NRC audit is

DE-ES-0022, Fatigue Evaluation for Metal Parts of RCCV, Revision 0, October 2006,

which contains the evaluation method and results for the fatigue analysis of the

containment metal components.

(2) Since this information exists as part of GE's internal tracking system, it is not necessary

to add it to the DCD.

No DCD change will be made in response to this RAI.

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MFN 06-407Enclosure 2Page 11 of 95

NRC RAI 3.8-33

The DCD does not address fatigue failure. What is the Service Level A and B cyclic

loading design basis for the main steam, feedwater, and other hot penetrations? Were any

fatigue calculations performed? If not, identify the Code basis for waiving the fatigue

evaluation. If so, describe the method used to predict peak stresses and to calculate the

cumulative usage factor. Provide the results and the comparison to the Code acceptance

criteria. Include this information in DCD Section 3.8.2 and/or Appendix 3G.

In addition, (1) identify the applicable detailed report/calculation (number, title, revision

and date, and brief description of content) that will be available for audit by the staff, and

(2) reference this report/calculation in the DCD.

GE Response

Fatigue evaluation has been performed for the main steam penetrations using the same 3D-

finite element model that was developed for the stress analysis (see response to NRC RAI

3.8-35). In addition to pressure and temperature loads, the cyclic dynamic loads were taken

into account when calculating the total stress intensity (including peak stress) for each

event. The maximum cumulative usage factor was found to be 0.0036. This small

cumulative usage factor indicates that fatigue is not a controlling parameter for the design

of main steam penetrations. Since cyclic loading conditions are similar, detailed fatigue

evaluation for the feedwater and other hot penetrations is not considered necessary at this

stage and will be performed during detailed design in accordance with the acceptance

criteria stated in the DCD.

(1) The applicable detailed report/calculation that will be available for the NRC audit is

092-134-F-M-03812, Main Steam and Feedwater RCCV Penetrations Design Report,

Revision 1, which contains the fatigue evaluation of the main steam penetrations.

(2) Since this information exists as part of GE's internal tracking system, it is not necessary

to add it to the DCD.

DCD Tier 2 Section 3.8.2.4.1.3 will be revised in the next update as noted in the attached

markup.

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MFN 06-407Enclosure 2Page 12 of 95

NRC RAI 3.8-34

The DCD does not address fatigue failure. What is the Service Level A and B cyclic

loading design basis for the cold penetrations, equipment hatches, and personnel airlocks?

Were any fatigue calculations performed? If not, identify the Code basis for waiving the

fatigue evaluation. If so, describe the method used to predict peak stresses and to calculate

the cumulative usage factor. Provide the results and the comparison to the Code

acceptance criteria. Include this information in DCD Section 3.8.2 and/or Appendix 3G.

In addition, (1) identify the applicable detailed report/calculation (number, title, revision

and date, and brief description of content) that will be available for audit by the staff, and

(2) reference this report/calculation in the DCD.

GE Response

Fatigue evaluation for cold penetrations will be performed in the detailed design in

accordance with the acceptance criteria stated in the DCD.

Fatigue evaluation is performed for the metal components of the RCCV including

equipment hatches and personnel airlocks in accordance with ASME B&PV Code Section

III, Subsection NE-3221.5(d) in which the limits on peak stress intensities as governed by

fatigue are considered and satisfied when the Service Loading meets the stipulated

condition.

(1) The applicable detailed report/calculation that will be available for the NRC audit is

DE-ES-0022, Fatigue Evaluation for Metal Parts of RCCV, Revision 0, October 2006,

which contains the evaluation method and results for the fatigue analysis of the

containment metal components.

(2) Since this information exists as part of GE's internal tracking system, it is not necessary

to add it to the DCD.

DCD Tier 2 Section 3.8.2.4.1.3 will be revised in the next update as noted in the attached

markup.

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MFN 06-407Enclosure 2Page 13 of 95

NRC RAI 3.8-35

Provide details of the main steam and feedwater penetration analyses for both stress and

buckling (if applicable). Describe all pressure and thermal conditions applicable to the

main steam and feedwater penetrations, and compare the response for each applicable

load case to both stress and buckling (if applicable) acceptance criteria. Include this

information in DCD Section 3.8.2 and/or Appendix 3G.

In addition, (1) identify the applicable detailed report/calculation (number, title, revision

and date, and brief description of content) that will be available for audit by the staff, and

(2) reference this report/calculation in the DCD.

GE Response

3D Finite Element Models have been developed to analyze main steam and feedwater

penetrations. Pressure and temperature for the process piping inside and outside of the

RCCV are considered in calculations. The reaction loads obtained from the pipe stress

analysis of the main steam lines are used in the design of main steam penetrations. For

feedwater penetrations, a set of enveloping mechanical loads is developed to obtain a

preliminary design. The head fitting sections meet the stress intensity limits prescribed in

ASME NB-3220. The sleeves, flange plates and gusset plates meet the stress intensity

limits prescribed in ASME NE-3220. Hand calculations are used to demonstrate that

buckling stress values are much higher than the values obtained in the finite element

analyses. Therefore, buckling is not a controlling case, and the penetrations meet the

stability stress limits.

(1) The applicable detailed report/calculation that will be available for the NRC audit is

092-134-F-M-03812, Main Steam and Feedwater RCCV Penetrations Design Report,

Revision 1, which contains the stress evaluation of the main steam penetrations and

feedwater penetrations.

(2) Since this information exists as part of GE's internal tracking system, it is not necessary

to add it to the DCD.

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MFN 06-407Enclosure 2Page 14 of 95

DCD Tier 2 Section 3.8.2.4.1.3 will be revised in the next update as noted in the attachedmarkup.

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MFN 06-407Enclosure 2Page 15 of 95

NRC RAI 3.8-36

Provide details of the two (2) personnel air lock analyses for both stress and buckling (if

applicable). Describe all pressure and thermal conditions applicable to the personnel air

locks, and compare the response for each applicable load case to both stress and buckling

(if applicable) acceptance criteria. Include this information in DCD Section 3.8.2 and/or

Appendix 3G.

In addition, (1) identify the applicable detailed report/calculation (number, title, revision

and date, and brief description of content) that will be available for audit by the staff, and

(2) reference this report/calculation in the DCD.

GE Response

Stress and buckling analyses for the upper and lower personnel airlocks are performed for

all applicable loads and load combinations. The results confirm that the stresses are within

the allowables specified in ASME B&PV Code Section III, Division 1, Subarticle NE-

3220, Division 2, Subarticle CC-3400, and Code Case N-284-1 of ASME B&PV Code

Section III with corrections in RG 1.193 Rev. 1. Buckling stresses calculated in accordance

with Code Case N-284-1 for ASME MC components do not include thermal stress since it

acts in a direction opposite to the buckling effects.

Tables 3.8-36(1) through 3.8-36(6) summarize the stress analysis results for the stress

evaluation points shown in Figures 3.8-36(1) and 3.8-36(2). Tables 3.8-36(7) and 3.8-36(8)

summarize the buckling analysis results.

(1) The applicable detailed reports/calculations that will be available for the NRC audit are:

DE-ES-0010, Stress Analysis Report for Personnel Airlock, Revision 0, October 2006,

which contains the stress analyses method and results for personnel airlocks.

DE-ES-0023, Buckling Evaluation for Personnel Airlock, Revision 0, October 2006,

which contains the buckling evaluation method and results for personnel airlocks.

(2) Since this information exists as part of GE's internal tracking system, it is not necessary

to add them to the DCD.

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MFN 06-407Enclosure 2Page 16 of 95

DCD Tier 2 Figure 3G.1-54 will be revised in the next update as noted in the attached

markup.

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MFN 06-407Enclosure 2Page 17 of 95

Table 3.8-36(1) Summary of Stress Evaluation (P1 - P2, P19-P20 of Personnel Airlock)

unit: MVPa

Pm PL+Pb PL+Pb+QEvaluation Serice Level Result Result Result

Point Upper Lower Limit Upper Lower Limit Upper Lower LimitDrywell Drywell Drywell Drywell Drywell Drywell

Test Condition - - - 24 24 262 -

Inner Hatch Design Condition - - - 21 21 227 -- -

(P1, Pig) Level A, B - - - 21 21 227 21 21 456Level C - - - 21 21 342 -

Level D - 21 21 430Test Condition - - - 24 24 262 -

Outer Hatch Design Condition - - - 21 21 227(P2, P20) Level A, B - - 21 21 227 21 21 456

Level C - - - 21 21 342 _ - tLevel D - - - 21 21 430 - I

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MFN 06-407Enclosure 2Page 18 of 95

Table 3.8-36(2) Summary of Stress Evaluation (P3 - P6, P21-P24 of Personnel Airlock)

unit MPa

Pm PL+Pb PL+Pb+QEvaluation Service Level Result Result Result

Point Upper Lower Limit Upper Lower Limit Upper Lower Limit

DrDrywelel DDrywell rywell D__ rywell Drywell

Test Condition - 69 69 262 -

Inner Bulkhead Design Condition - 60 60 227 - -

(P3, P21) Level A, B - 60 60 227 60 60 456Level C - 60 60 342 - -

Level D - 60 60 430 -

Test Condition - 106 106 262 -

Ceiling Member Design Condition - 92 92 227 - -

of Inner Hatch Level A, B - 92 92 227 92 92 456

(P4, P22) Level C 92 92 342 - -

Level D 92 92 430 - -

Test Condition 15 15 262 - -

Flooring Member Design Condition - 13 13 227 - -

of Inner Hatch Level A, B - 13 13 227 13 13 456

(P5, P23) Level C - 13 13 342 - -

Level D - 13 13 430 - -

Test Condition - 13 13 262 _ -

Side Wall Member Design Condition 11 11 227 - - _

of Inner Hatch Level A, B 11 11 227 11 11 456

(P6, P24) Level C 1 11 342 - -

Level D 11 11 430 - - I

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NE1099511/15/2006 NE10995 Job: 20 2:52:39 PM

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MFN 06-407Enclosure 2Page 2 of 95

NRC RAI 3.8-17

DCD Section 3.8.1.4.1.1.3 states that numerical analytical techniques were used to

determine the state of stress and behavior of the containment around the openings at major

penetrations. DCD Section 3.8.2.1.3 also states this, and adds, "The analysis of the area

around the penetrations consists of a three-dimensional finite element analysis with

boundaries extending to a region where the discontinuity effects of the opening are

negligible."

Please provide a description of these analyses, including pictures of the finite element

models, identification of the loading conditions, the types of analyses conducted, a

summary of the results of the analyses, and comparison to Code acceptance criteria.

Include this information in DCD Section 3.8 and/or Appendix 3G.

In addition, (1) identify the applicable detailed report/calculation (number, title, revision

and date, and brief description of content) that will be available for audit by the staff, and

(2) reference this report/calculation in the DCD.

GE Response

Figure 3.8-17(1) is a flow chart for the design of RCCV wall penetrations. This flow chart

is the same as DCD Tier 2 Figure 3G. 1-39, Flow Chart for Structural Analysis and Design,

with the following exceptions:

* Stress analyses are performed using a local Finite Element (FE) analysis model which

includes the local area around the opening.

* In the local model FE analyses, displacements which are obtained from the RB/FB

global model stress analyses are prescribed to the boundary nodes in order to consider

the constraints of items not included in the model.

* Local loads which are not considered in the analysis of the global model are considered,

if necessary.

Figure 3.8-17(2) is a sketch showing reinforcements in the RCCV wall around a large

opening. The area around the opening is reinforced by main hoop and vertical reinforcing

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MEN 06-407Enclosure 2Page 3 of 95

bars and additional bars, which are required to resist concentrated stresses around theopening. Additional diagonal bars are installed to add reinforcement in the areas where

hoop and vertical bars are ,terminated.

(1) The applicable detailed report/calculation that will be available for the NRC

audit is SER-ESB-045 Design Report for RCCV Wall around UD Personnel

Airlock Opening, Rev.O, which contains the calculations of the containment

around an opening.

(2) Since this information exists as part of GE's internal tracking system, it is not

necessary to add it to the DCD.

No DCD change will be made in response to this RAI.

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MFN 06-407Enclosure 2Page 4 of 95

Design Loads" Dead Load" Live Load" Pressure Load" Thermal Load" Seismic Load" Hydrodynamic Load" Pipe Reaction

---- ---- ---- -------------- F-

RB/FB GlobalFE Analysis Model

I - - - - - - - - - - - - I-------I

Structural ConfigurationMaterial

P11

Local FE Analysis Modelfor Opening K]! Enforced DisplacementsTo Boundary Nodes

I I | I

F ILinear Stress Analyses

(NASTRAN)

Section Forcesfor Thermal Loads

Section Forcesfor Other Loads

Reduction due toConcrete Cracking

I

Combination ofSection Forces

L

FI I

Section Design Calculations forDesign Load Combinations

Confirmation to SatisfyCode Requirements

End

Figure 3.8-17(1) Flow Chart for the Design of RCCV Wall Penetrations

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MFN 06-407Enclosure 2Page 5 of 95

.Opening-

0 lolI lO 0

Boil 11SETO

00 000

B-B SECTIONNote: Amount of required reinforcements I 1 \'around opening wilt be determinedI

in the final design calculations. A-A SECTION

Figure 3.8-17(2) RCCV Wall Penetration Reinforcement Details

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MFN 06-407Enclosure 2Page 6 of 95

NRC RAI 3.8-24

With regard to DCD Section 3.8.1.4.1.2:

a) DCD Section 3.8.1.4.1.2 states that the liner plate analysis considers deviations in

geometry due to fabrication and erection tolerances. Describe the treatment of

fabrication/erection tolerances in the evaluation of the liner plate. Was the

potential for buckling of the liner pate considered (convex curvature due to

fabrication tolerances/concrete shrinkage)? Include this information in DCD

Section 3.8.1 and/or Appendix 3G.

b) DCD Section 3.8.1.4.1.2 also states that liner strains are within allowable limits

defined by ASME Code Subarticle CC-3720. Describe the analysis that verified

this, and discuss how fabrication/erection tolerances are considered in this

analysis. Include this information in DCD Section 3.8.1 and/or Appendix 3G.

In addition, (1) identify the applicable detailed report/calculation (number, title, revision

and date, and brief description of content) that will be available for audit by the staff, and

(2) reference this report/calculation in the DCD.

GE Response

a) Liner strains are evaluated based on the analysis results of the NASTRAN model

described in DCD Tier 2 Section 3G.1.4.1. In this model, the liner plate is modeled with

nominal dimensions. The liner plate modeling method is discussed in the response to

NRC RAI 3.8-25. Strains associated with construction-related liner deformations may

be excluded when calculating liner strains for the service and factored load

combinations according to ASME B&PV Code Section III, Division 2, Subarticle CC-

3720.

b) The consideration of fabrication/erection tolerances for the evaluation of liner strains is

described in a) above. The analysis results of the liner strains are summarized in DCD

Tier 2 Table 3G.1-35. The details of the analysis results are described in DC-OG-0052,

Structural Design Report for Containment Metal Components, Revision 1, September

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MFN 06-407Enclosure 2Page 7 of 95

2005, which contains the evaluation method and results for structural integrity of thecontainment liner and drywell head.

Fabrication/erection tolerances are considered for liner anchor design with the following

conditions:

1) Liner thickness

a) Carbon steel liner plate - Nominal thickness: 6.4 mm, Maximum thickness: 7.416

mm, Minimum thickness: 6.146 mm

b) Stainless steel liner plate - Nominal thickness: 6.4 mm, Maximum thickness: 7.67

mm, Minimum thickness: 6.146 mm

2) Liner anchor spacing

a) Nominal 508 mm, maximum 518 mm, minimum 498 mm

b) Nominal 270 mm, maximum 280 mm, minimum 260 mm

3) Anchor stiffness

Nominal value: 1603.1 (N/mm/mm)

Lower value: 800 (N/mm/mm)

Upper value: 2400 (N/mm/mm)

The worst-case evaluation results are summarized in Tables 3.8-24(1) through 3.8-24(3).

(1) The applicable detailed report/calculation that will be available for the NRC audit is

DE-ES-0017, Liner Anchorage Evaluation, Revision 0, October 2006, which contains

the evaluation method and results for RCCV liner anchor displacement/pullout.

(2) Since this information exists as part of GE's internal tracking system, it is not necessary

to add it to the DCD.

DCD Tier 2 Figures 3G.1-48 and 3G.1-49 will be revised in the next update as noted in the

attached markups.

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MFN 06-407Enclosure 2Page 8 of 95

Table 3.8-24(1) Summary of Liner Anchor Displacement Evaluation

Liner Anchor Category I* Category I112

Thickness Spacing AnchorLocation (mm) (mm) Stiffness Displacement Allowable Displacement Allowable

(N/mm/mm)(mm) (mm) (mm) (mm)

Wetwell 7.67 518 800Wetwell0.416

Cylinder (Max.) (Max.) (Lower)

Pedestal 7.416 518 800 - 1.27 2.34 2.54Cylinder (Max.) (Max.) (Lower)

Wetwell 7.67 280 800Wtel0.398 1.82Bottom (Max.) (Max.) (Lower)

Note * 1: Category I includes test, normal, severe environmental and extreme environmental

*2: Category II includes abnormal, abnormal/severe environmental and

abnormal/extreme environmental

Table 3.8-24(2) Summary of Liner Anchor Pullout Evaluation (Concrete)

Anchor Category I Category IISpacing

Failure Mode (mm) Load Allowable Load Allowable

(N/mm) (N/mm) (N/mm) (N/mm)

Cone Failure 58.1 167 68.4 167518Bearing on (Max.) 58.1 1964 68.4 1964

Flange

Table 3.8-24(3) Summary of Liner Anchor Pullout Evaluation (Steel)

Anchor Category I Category IILoaton Stress Spacing

Location Type (mm) Stress Allowable Load Allowable(MPa) (MPa) (MPa) (MPa)

Flange Bending 518 65 77131 199Web Tension (Max.) 10 11

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MFN 06-407Enclosure 2Page 9 of 95

NRC RAI 3.8-28

Provide additional details for the containment mechanical and electrical penetrations

(other than Main Steam and Feedwater), including the number, types, geometry, analytical

models used, loading, summary of results, comparison to Code allowables, and the current

status of the design. Is the design final for all penetrations, or is this a COL applicant

responsibility? If a COL applicant responsibility, where is this identified in the DCD?

Include this information in DCD Section 3.8.2 and/or Appendix 3G.

In addition, (1) identify the applicable detailed report/calculation (number, title, revision

and date, and brief description of content) that will be available for audit by the staff, and

(2) reference this report/calculation in the DCD.

GE Response

Details for the containment mechanical and electrical penetrations (other than Main Steam

and Feedwater) are not currently available and will be developed after the routing of piping

and commodities, such as cable trays, ducts, etc., is laid out during detailed design. These

containment penetrations will be designed to meet the ASME code.

DCD Tier 2 Section 3.8.2.4.1.3 will be revised in the next update as noted in the attached

markup.

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MFN 06-407Enclosure 2Page 10 of 95

NRC RAI 3.8-32

The DCD does not address fatigue failure. What is the Service Level A and B cyclic

loading design basis for the drywell head? Were any fatigue calculations performed? If

not, identify the Code basis for waiving the fatigue evaluation. If so, describe the method

used to predict peak stresses and to calculate the cumulative usage factor. Provide the

results and the comparison to the Code acceptance criteria. Include this information in

DCD Section 3.8.2 and/or Appendix 3G.

In addition, (1) identify the applicable detailed report/calculation (number, title, revision

and date, and brief description of content) that will be available for audit by the staff, and

(2) reference this report/calculation in the DCD.

GE Response

Fatigue evaluation is performed for the metal components of the RCCV including the

drywell head in accordance with ASME B&PV Code Section III, Subsection NE-3221.5(d)

in which the limits on peak stress intensities as governed by fatigue are considered and

satisfied when the Service Loading meets the stipulated condition.

(1) The applicable detailed report/calculation that will be available for the NRC audit is

DE-ES-0022, Fatigue Evaluation for Metal Parts of RCCV, Revision 0, October 2006,

which contains the evaluation method and results for the fatigue analysis of the

containment metal components.

(2) Since this information exists as part of GE's internal tracking system, it is not necessary

to add it to the DCD.

No DCD change will be made in response to this RAI.

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MFN 06-407Enclosure 2Page 11 of 95

NRC RAI 3.8-33

The DCD does not address fatigue failure. What is the Service Level A and B cyclic

loading design basis for the main steam, feedwater, and other hot penetrations? Were any

fatigue calculations performed? If not, identify the Code basis for waiving the fatigue

evaluation. If so, describe the method used to predict peak stresses and to calculate the

cumulative usage factor. Provide the results and the comparison to the Code acceptance

criteria. Include this information in DCD Section 3.8.2 and/or Appendix 3G.

In addition, (1) identify the applicable detailed report/calculation (number, title, revision

and date, and brief description of content) that will be available for audit by the staff, and

(2) reference this report/calculation in the DCD.

GE Response

Fatigue evaluation has been performed for the main steam penetrations using the same 3D-

finite element model that was developed for the stress analysis (see response to NRC RAI

3.8-35). In addition to pressure and temperature loads, the cyclic dynamic loads were taken

into account when calculating the total stress intensity (including peak stress) for each

event. The maximum cumulative usage factor was found to be 0.0036. This small

cumulative usage factor indicates that fatigue is not a controlling parameter for the design

of main steam penetrations. Since cyclic loading conditions are similar, detailed fatigue

evaluation for the feedwater and other hot penetrations is not considered necessary at this

stage and will be performed during detailed design in accordance with the acceptance

criteria stated in the DCD.

(1) The applicable detailed report/calculation that will be available for the NRC audit is

092-134-F-M-03812, Main Steam and Feedwater RCCV Penetrations Design Report,

Revision 1, which contains the fatigue evaluation of the main steam penetrations.

(2) Since this information exists as part of GE's internal tracking system, it is not necessary

to add it to the DCD.

DCD Tier 2 Section 3.8.2.4.1.3 will be revised in the next update as noted in the attached

markup.

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MFN 06-407Enclosure 2Page 12 of 95

NRC RAI 3.8-34

The DCD does not address fatigue failure. What is the Service Level A and B cyclic

loading design basis for the cold penetrations, equipment hatches, and personnel airlocks?

Were any fatigue calculations performed? If not, identify the Code basis for waiving the

fatigue evaluation. If so, describe the method used to predict peak stresses and to calculate

the cumulative usage factor. Provide the results and the comparison to the Code

acceptance criteria. Include this information in DCD Section 3.8.2 and/or Appendix 3G.

In addition, (1) identify the applicable detailed report/calculation (number, title, revision

and date, and brief description of content) that will be available for audit by the staff, and

(2) reference this report/calculation in the DCD.

GE Response

Fatigue evaluation for cold penetrations will be performed in the detailed design in

accordance with the acceptance criteria stated in the DCD.

Fatigue evaluation is performed for the metal components of the RCCV including

equipment hatches and personnel airlocks in accordance with ASME B&PV Code Section

III, Subsection NE-3221.5(d) in which the limits on peak stress intensities as governed by

fatigue are considered and satisfied when the Service Loading meets the stipulated

condition.

(1) The applicable detailed report/calculation that will be available for the NRC audit is

DE-ES-0022, Fatigue Evaluation for Metal Parts of RCCV, Revision 0, October 2006,

which contains the evaluation method and results for the fatigue analysis of the

containment metal components.

(2) Since this information exists as part of GE's internal tracking system, it is not necessary

to add it to the DCD.

DCD Tier 2 Section 3.8.2.4.1.3 will be revised in the next update as noted in the attached

markup.

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MFN 06-407Enclosure 2Page 13 of 95

NRC RAI 3.8-35

Provide details of the main steam and feedwater penetration analyses for both stress and

buckling (if applicable). Describe all pressure and thermal conditions applicable to the

main steam and feedwater penetrations, and compare the response for each applicable

load case to both stress and buckling (if applicable) acceptance criteria. Include this

information in DCD Section 3.8.2 and/or Appendix 3G.

In addition, (1) identify the applicable detailed report/calculation (number, title, revision

and date, and brief description of content) that will be available for audit by the staff, and

(2) reference this report/calculation in the DCD.

GE Response

3D Finite Element Models have been developed to analyze main steam and feedwater

penetrations. Pressure and temperature for the process piping inside and outside of the

RCCV are considered in calculations. The reaction loads obtained from the pipe stress

analysis of the main steam lines are used in the design of main steam penetrations. For

feedwater penetrations, a set of enveloping mechanical loads is developed to obtain a

preliminary design. The head fitting sections meet the stress intensity limits prescribed in

ASME NB-3220. The sleeves, flange plates and gusset plates meet the stress intensity

limits prescribed in ASME NE-3220. Hand calculations are used to demonstrate that

buckling stress values are much higher than the values obtained in the finite element

analyses. Therefore, buckling is not a controlling case, and the penetrations meet the

stability stress limits.

(1) The applicable detailed report/calculation that will be available for the NRC audit is

092-134-F-M-03812, Main Steam and Feedwater RCCV Penetrations Design Report,

Revision 1, which contains the stress evaluation of the main steam penetrations and

feedwater penetrations.

(2) Since this information exists as part of GE's internal tracking system, it is not necessary

to add it to the DCD.

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MFN 06-407Enclosure 2Page 14 of 95

DCD Tier 2 Section 3.8.2.4.1.3 will be revised in the next update as noted in the attached

markup.

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MFN 06-407Enclosure 2Page 15 of 95

NRC RAI 3.8-36

Provide details of the two (2) personnel air lock analyses for both stress and buckling (if

applicable). Describe all pressure and thermal conditions applicable to the personnel air

locks, and compare the response for each applicable load case to both stress and buckling

(if applicable) acceptance criteria. Include this information in DCD Section 3.8.2 and/or

Appendix 3G.

In addition, (1) identify the applicable detailed report/calculation (number, title, revision

and date, and brief description of content) that will be available for audit by the staff, and

(2) reference this report/calculation in the DCD.

GE Response

Stress and buckling analyses for the upper and lower personnel airlocks are performed for

all applicable loads and load combinations. The results confirm that the stresses are within

the allowables specified in ASME B&PV Code Section III, Division 1, Subarticle NE-

3220, Division 2, Subarticle CC-3400, and Code Case N-284-1 of ASME B&PV Code

Section III with corrections in RG 1.193 Rev. 1. Buckling stresses calculated in accordance

with Code Case N-284-1 for ASME MC components do not include thermal stress since it

acts in a direction opposite to the buckling effects.

Tables 3.8-36(1) through 3.8-36(6) summarize the stress analysis results for the stress

evaluation points shown in Figures 3.8-36(1) and 3.8-36(2). Tables 3.8-36(7) and 3.8-36(8)

summarize the buckling analysis results.

(1) The applicable detailed reports/calculations that will be available for the NRC audit are:

DE-ES-0010, Stress Analysis Report for Personnel Airlock, Revision 0, October 2006,

which contains the stress analyses method and results for personnel airlocks.

DE-ES-0023, Buckling Evaluation for Personnel Airlock, Revision 0, October 2006,

which contains the buckling evaluation method and results for personnel airlocks.

(2) Since this information exists as part of GE's internal tracking system, it is not necessary

to add them to the DCD.

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MFN 06-407Enclosure 2Page 16 of 95

DCD Tier 2 Figure 3G.1-54 will be revised in the next update as noted in the attached

markup.

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MFN 06-407Enclosure 2Page 17 of 95

Table 3.8-36(1) Summary of Stress Evaluation (P1 - P2, P19-P20 of Personnel Airlock)

unit: MPa

Pm PL+Pb PL+Pb+QEvaluation Service Level Result Result Result

Point Upper [ Lower Limit Upper Lower Limit Upper Lower LimitDrywell Drywell Drywell Drywell Drywell Drywell

Test Condition - 24 24 262 -

Inner Hatch Design Condition - - 21 21 227 - -

Level A, B - 21 21 227 21 21 456(P1,Pig) Level C - - 21 21 342 -

Level D - - 21 21 430 -

Test Condition - 24 24 262 -

Outer Hatch Design Condition - 21 21 227 - --

Level A, B - 21 21 227 21 21 456Level C ] 21 21 342 - - -

Level D -21 21 430 -

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MFN 06-407Enclosure 2Page 18 of 95

Table 3.8-36(2) Summary of Stress Evaluation (P3 - P6, P21-P24 of Personnel Airlock)

unit: MPa

Pm PL+Pb PL+Pb+QEvaluation Service Level Result Result Result

Point Upper Lower Limit Upper Lower Limit Upper Lower LimitDrywellDrywel Dry jll Drywell Drrwell Drywell Drywell

Test Condition - - - 69 69 262 - IInner Bulkhead Design Condition - - - 60 60 227 - - I

Level A, B - - - 60 227 60 60 456(P3, P21) Level C - - - 60 60 342 - -

Level D - 60 60 430 -

Test Condition - 106 106 262 -

Ceiling Member Design Condition - 92 92 227 -

of Inner Hatch Level A, B - 92 92 227 92 92 456(P4, P22) Level C - - 92 92 342 - --

Level D - 92 92 430 -

Test Condition - - 15 15 262 - -

Flooring Member Design Condition - - 13 13 227 - --

of Inner Hatch Level A, B - - 13 13 227 13 13 456(P5, P23) Level C - - 13 13 342 - -

Level D - 13 13 430 -

Test Condition - - 13 13 262 -

Side Wall Member Design Condition - - 11 11 227 - _

of Inner Hatch Level A, B - 11 11 227 11 11 456(P6, P24) Level - - 11 I 1 342 - -

Level D 11 11 430 -

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MFN 06-407Enclosure 2Page 19 of 95

Table 3.8-36(3) Summary of Stress Evaluation (P7 - P10, P25-P28 of Personnel Airlock)

unit: MPa

Pm PL+Pb PL+Pb+QEvaluation SrieLvl - Result Result Result

Point Upper Lower Limit Upper Lower Limit Upper Lower Limit

Drywell Drywell Drywell Drywell Drywell DrywellTest Condition - - 155 .155 262 - -

Outer Bulkhead Design Condition - - 134 134 227 - -(P7, P25) Level A, B - - 134 134 227 134 134 456Level C - - 134 134 342 -

Level D - 134 134 430 -Test Condition - - 130 130 262 -

Ceiling Member Design Condition - - - 113 113 227of Outer Hatch Level A, B - - - 113 113 227 113 113 456

(P8, P26) Level C - - - 113 113 342 - -

Level D - - - 113 113 430 - -

Test Condition - - - 17 17 262 - -

Flooring Member Design Condition - - - 15 15 227 - -

of Outer Hatch Level A, B - - - 15 15 227 15 15 456(P9, P27) Level C - - - 15 15 342 - -

Level D - - - 15 15 430Test Condition - - - 16 16 262 -

Side Wall Member Design Condition - - - 14 14 227 - - -

of Outer Hatch Level A, B - - - 14 14 227 14 14 456(P10, P28) Level C - - - 14 14 342 - - -

Level D - - - 14 14 430

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MFN 06-407Enclosure 2Page 20 of 95

Table 3.8-36(4) Summary of Stress Evaluation (P11-P14, P29-P32 of Personnel Airlock)

unit MPa

Pm PL+Pb PL+Pb+QEvlainResult Result Result

Evaluation Service Level U e L Limit Upper Drywell Lower Drywell Limit Upper Drywell R Lower Drywell Limit

PonInsrLwe iitt i de 1usd ii Outsid I FOutsid LitDrywell Drywell Inside Outsid nside Outsid Inside e Insidee e e e

Test Condition 28 28 171 28 28 28 28 262 - -

Inside Sleeve Design Condition 24 24 151 24 24 24 24 227 - - - -

(P11, P29) Level A, B 27 34 151 27 27 34 34 227 27 27 34 34 456Level C 34 39 228 34 39 34 39 342 - - - - -

Level D 34 39 287 34 39 34 39 430 -- -

Test Condition - - - 15 15 15 15 262Joint between Inside Sleeve Design Condition - 14 14 14 14 227 -

and Flange Plate Level A, B - 21 21 30 30 227 830(*) 6651*) 839(*) 673(*) 456(P12, P30) Level C - 30 30 36 36 342 -

Level D - - - 30 30 36 36 430

Test Condition 27 27 171 27 27 27 27 262 -

Outside Sleeve Design Condition 24 24 151 24 24 24 24 227 -

(P13, P31) Level A, B 27 34 151 27 27 34 34 227 27 27 34 34 456Level C 32 39 228 32 32 39 39 342 - - - - -

Level D 32 39 287 32 32 39 39 430 -

Test Condition - - 15 15 15 15 262 - - -

Joint between Inside Sleeve Design Condition - - 14 14 14 14 227 - -

and Flange Plate Level A, B - - 20 20 30 30 227 9051*) 727T)- 9141*) 735() 456(P14, P32) Level C - - 28 28 36 36 342 -

I Level D - - 28 28 36 36 430 -

Note * Acceptable by meeting all requirements for simplified elastic-plastic analysis stipulated in NE-3228.3 of ASME B&PV Code Section IM.

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MFN 06-407Enclosure 2Page 21 of 95

Table 3.8-36(5) Summary of Stress Evaluation (P15 - P17, P33-P35 of Personnel Airlock)

unit: MPa

Pm PL+Pb PL+Pb+QEvaluation SrieLvlResult Result Result

Point Upper Lower Limit Upper Lower Limit Upper Lower Limit

D__rwellDrywell Drywell _______ Drywell Drywell Drywell

Test Condition - 9 9 262 -

Outside Flange Plate Design Condition - 9 9 227 -

[Level A, B - 52 107 227 52 107 456(P15,P33) Level C - 107 140 342 - -

Level D - 107 140 430 -

Test Condition - 71 71 262 -

Inside Flange Plate Design Condition - 63 63 227 -

Level A, B - 89 118 227 89 118 456Level C - 121 137 342 -

Level D - 121 137 430 -

Test Condition - 81 81 262 -

Gusset Plate Design Condition - 71 71 227 -

Level A, B - 103 141 227 103 141 456Level C - 142 164 342 -

Level D - 142 164 430 -

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MFN 06-407Enclosure 2Page 22 of 95

Table 3.8-36(6) Summary of Stress Evaluation (P18 of Personnel Airlock)

unit: MPa

Compressive StressEvaluation Service Level Upper Drywell Lower Drywell Limit

Point Near Outside Near Inside Near Outside Near Inside_ Flange Plate Flange Plate Flange Plate Flange Plate

Service

Test 0.1 1.9 0.1 1.9 13.8

Construction 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1Normal 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.4

Concrete Portion Factored(P18, P36) Severe Environmental 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.4

Extreme Environmental 1.1 1.3 0.8 1.0

Abnormal 1.2 3.5 2.3 4.8 20.71.1 3.0 2.0 4.1

Abnormal / Severe Environmental 1.1 3.0 2.0 4.1

Abnormal/Extreme Environmental 1.7 3.3 2.1 3.9

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MFN 06-407Enclosure 2Page 23 of 95

Table 3.8-36(7) Summary of Buckling Evaluation

Absolute Stress Value Allowables

Service Limit Part (ao: hoop, u,: meridional, Elastic Inelastic

aoý: shear)aY((MPa) 30 axa 247 , 92

Test, Design Cylindricaland Shell ao(MPa) 28 aha 171 0 hc 97

Lo,(MPa) 9 O-a 334 (Y, 68a (MPa) 35 ,xa 295 axc 110

Level C&D *1 Shell ao(MPa) 24 Gha 205 Ghc 116

_o69(MPa) 11 a 400 GTC 82

* 1 Level C allowables are applied to Level D conservatively.

Table 3.8-36(8) Summary of Buckling Evaluation for Interaction Check

Service Limit Part Stress (MPa)* 1 Interaction Elastic*2 Inelastic*2 Allowables

Test, Design GO = 0o and aY - 1and Cylindrical Shell a0= o and aG 0.165 0.307 1

Level A&B L0e= C and aeo 0.123 0.344 1

CO = ao anda 9 - - 1Level C&D Cylindrical Shell 09 =15 ae and (YO 0.118 0.225 1

cO=10 aand ao 0.120 0.337 1

* 1 These values are absolute.

*2 Means interaction check is not required.

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MFN 06-407Enclosure 2Page 24 of 95

A- P13 P14 PW18 P 12 nP11 F

Figure 3.8-36(1) Stress Evaluation Points of Upper Drywell Personnel Airlock

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MFN 06-407Enclosure 2Page 25 of 95

A P31 P 32 P 36 P 30 P2 9F

C

Figure 3.8-36(2) Stress Evaluation Points of Lower Drywell Personnel Airlock

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MFN 06-407Enclosure 2Page 26 of 95

NRC RAI 3.8-37

Provide details of the three (3) containment equipment hatch analyses for both stress and

buckling (if applicable). Describe all pressure and thermal conditions applicable to the

equipment hatches, and compare the response for each applicable load case to both stress and

buckling (if applicable) acceptance criteria. Include this information in DCD Section 3.8.2

and/or Appendix 3G.

In addition, (1) identify the applicable detailed report/calculation (number, title, revision and

date, and brief description of content) that will be available for audit by the staff, and (2)

reference this report/calculation in the DCD.

GE Response

Stress and buckling analyses for the wetwell hatch and upper/lower equipment hatches are

performed for all applicable loads and load combinations. The results confirm that the stresses

are within the allowables specified in ASME B&PV Code Section III, Division 1, Subarticle

NE-3220, Division 2, Subarticle CC-3400, and Code Case N-284-1 of ASME B&PV Code

Section III with corrections in RG 1.193 Rev. 1. Buckling stresses calculated in accordance

with Code Case N-284-1 for ASME MC components do not include thermal stress since it acts

in a direction opposite to the buckling effects.

Tables 3.8-37(1) through 3.8-37(8) summarize the stress analysis results for the stress

evaluation points shown in Figures 3.8-37(1) through 3.8-37(3). Tables 3.8-37(9) and 3.8-

37(10) summarize the buckling analysis results.

(1) The applicable detailed reports/calculations that will be available for the NRC audit are:

DE-ES-0006, Stress Analysis Report for Equipment Hatch, Revision 0, October 2006,

which contains the stress analyses method and results for equipment hatches.

DE-ES-0009, Stress Analysis Report for Wetwell Hatch, Revision 0, October 2006, which

contains the stress analyses method and results for wetwell hatches.

DE-ES-0020, Buckling Evaluation for Equipment Hatch, Revision 0, October 2006, which

contains the buckling evaluation method and results for equipment hatches.

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MFN 06-407Enclosure 2Page 27 of 95

DE-ES-00 19, Buckling Evaluation for Wetwell Hatch, Revision 0, October 2006, which

contains the buckling evaluation method and results for wetwell hatches.

(2) Since this information exists as part of GE's internal tracking system, it is not necessary to

add them to the DCD.

DCD Tier 2 Figures 3G.1-52 and 3G.1-53 will be revised in the next update as noted in the

attached markups.

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MFN 06-407Enclosure 2Page 28 of 95

Table 3.8-37(1) Summary of Stress Evaluation (P1 - P5, P12-P16 of Equipment Hatch)

unit: MPaPrn PL+Pb PL+Pb+Q

Evaluation Service Level Result Result ResultPoint Upper Lower Limit Upper Lower Limit Upper Lower Limit

I Drywell Drywell D__ well Drywell Drywell Drwell

Test Condition 22 22 171 22 22 262 -

Center of Hatch Head Design Condition 19 19 151 19 19 227 - -

Level A, B 19 19 151 19 19 227 19 19 456Level C 19 19 228 19 19 342 -

Level D 19 19 287 19 19 430 -

Test Condition - - - 143 143 262 -

Flange Design Condition - - - 139 139 227(P2, P13) Level A, B - - - 139 139 227 139 139 456

Level C - - - 139 139 342 - -

Level D - - - 139 139 430 - --

Test Condition - - - 109 109 262 - --

Joint between Bracket Design Condition - - - 106 106 227 - -

and Flange Level A, B - - 106 106 227 106 106 456(P3, P14) Level C - - 106 106 342 - --

Level D - - 106 106 430 -

Test Condition - - 109 109 262 -Joint between Bracket and Design Condition - 106 106 227 -

Wetwell Hatch Sleeve Level A, B - 106 106 227 106 106 456(P4, P15) Level C - - 106 106 342 - -

Level D - - 106 106 430 -

Test Condition - - -

Bolt Design Condition 137 137 219 - - -Bolt Level A, B 137 137 439 - - -

Level C 137 137 439 - - -

Level D 137 137 439 - - -- I

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MFN 06-407Enclosure 2Page 29 of 95

Table 3.8-37(2) Summary of Stress Evaluation (P6-P7, P17-P18 of Equipment Hatch)

unit: MPa

Pm PL+Pb PL+Pb+QEvaluation Result Result Result

Pon Service Level Result Upper Drywell 1 Lower Drywell Upper Drywell R lt LimitDrywell Drywell Inside Inside Inside Inside

e e e eTest Condition 27 27 171 27 27 27 27 262 -

Wetwell Hatch Sleeve Design Condition 24 24 151 24 24 24 24 227 - - - - -We 6, Hatc Level A, B 27 33 151 27 27 33 33 227 27 27 33 33 456

Level C 33 36 228 33 33 36 36 342 - - - - -

Level D 33 36 287 33 33 36 36 430 -- -Test Condition - - - 13 13 13 13 262 -- -

Joint between Wetwell Design Condition - - - 11 11 11 11 227 -- -

Hatch Sleeve and Flange Level A, B - - - 2 21 7 27 27 95 27 10 31 456Plate Leve A, 21 21 27 27 227 905*_ 727_* 910* 731*) 4

(P7, P18) Level C - - - 27 27 32 32 342 - -Level D - - = 27 27 32 32 430 - -

Note * Acceptable by meeting all requirements for simplified elastic-plastic analysis stipulated in NE-3228.3 of ASME B&PV Code Section IlI.

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MFN 06-407Enclosure 2Page 30 of 95

Table 3.8-37(3) Summary of Stress Evaluation (P8-P10, P19-P21 of Equipment Hatch)

unit :MPa

Pm PL+Pb PL+Pb+Q

Evaluation Service Level Result Result ResultPoint Upper Lower Limit Upper Lower Limit Upper Lower Limit

D___wel__Drwelwellel_ Drywell D Drywell j Drywell

Test Condition - 11 11 262 - -Outside Flange Plate Design Condition - 11 11 227 j 4 -

(P8, P19) Level A, B 46 19 227 46 19 456Level C -91 126 342 -

Level D 91 126 430

Test Condition - 71 72 262

Inside Flange Plate Design Condition - 63 64 227 -(P9, P20) Level A, B - 84 113 227 84 113 456

Level C - 110 129 342 --

Level D - 110 129 430 -

Test Condition 121 121 262

Gusset Plate Design Condition 107 107 227Level A, B - 151 216 227 151 216 456Level C - 208 255 342 -

Level D - 208 255 430 -

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MFN 06-407Enclosure 2Page 31 of 95

Table 3.8-37(4) Summary of Stress Evaluation (P11 of Equipment Hatch)

unit: MPa

Compressive StressEvaluation Service Level Upper Drywell Lower Drywell Limit

Point Near Outside Near Inside Near Outside Near InsideFlange Plate Flange Plate Flange Plate Flange Plate

Service

Test 0.1 1.9 0.1 2.0 13.8

Construction 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 10.3Normal 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.5

Concrete Portion Factored(P 11, P22) Severe Environmental 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.5

Extreme Environmental 0.8 1.0 0.7 0.9

Abnormal 0.8 3.2 1.5 4.2 20.70.8 2.8 1.4 3.6

Abnormal / Severe Environmental 0.7 2.7 1.3 3.6

Abnormal / Extreme Environmental 1.1 2.8 1.5 3.3

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MFN 06-407Enclosure 2Page 32 of 95

Table 3.8-37(5) Summary of Stress Evaluation (P1 - P5 of Wetwell Hatch)

unit: MPaEvaluation Service Level P_ PL+Pb PL+Pb+Q

Point Result Limit Result Limit Result I LimitTest Condition 18 175 18 269 I -

Center of Hatch Head Design Condition 16 151 16 227 -

(P) Level A, B 16 151 16 227 16 468Level C 16 234 16 351 1 -

Level D 16 287 16 430

Test Condition - 1 139 269

Flange Design Condition - 1 134 227 _ -

(P2) Level A, B - 1 134 227 134 468Level C _ 1 134 351 { -

Level D 134 430

Test Condition 143 269Joint between Bracket Design Condition 139 227 - -

and Flange Level A, B 139 227 139 468(P3) Level C 139 351 - -

Level D 139 430

Test Condition 143 269Joint between Bracket and Design Condition - - 139 227 - -

Wetwell Hatch Sleeve Level A, B - - 139 227 139 468(P4) Level C _ _ 139 351 - -

Level D _ _ 139 430Test Condition - -_

Bolt Design Condition 134 219 1(P5) Level A, B 134 438

Level C 134 438 - -

Level D 134 438

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MFN 06-407Enclosure 2Page 33 of 95

Table 3.8-37(6) Summary of Stress Evaluation (P6 and P7 of Wetwell Hatch)

unit: MPaEvaluationPm______PL+Pb _ ____PL+Pb+Q _____

Evaluation Service Level P Result J Result I LiiPoint Result Limit Limit u - LimitInside Outside Inside Outside

Test Condition 24 175 24 24 269

Wetwell Hatch Sleeve Design Condition 21 151 21 21 227 - - -

(P6) Level A, B 25 151 25 25 227 25 25 468Level C 31 234 31 31 351 - - -

Level D 31 287 31 31 430 -

Joint between Wetwell Test Condition 14 175 14 14 269 - -

Hatch Sleeve and Flange Design Condition 13 151 13 13 227Plate Level A, B 21 151 21 21 227 668(*) 537(*) 468

(P7) Level C 28 234 28 28 351 - -

Level D 28 287 28 28 430

Note * Acceptable by meeting all requirements for simplified elastic-plastic analysis stipulated in NE-3228.3 of ASME B&PV Code Section HI.

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MFN 06-407Enclosure 2Page 34 of 95

Table 3.8-37(7) Summary of Stress Evaluation (P8-P10 of Wetwell Hatch)

unit: MPa

Evaluation Service Level Pm PL+Pb PL+Pb+QPoint Result Limit Result Limit Result Limit

Test Condition - - 12 269

Outside Flange Plate Design Condition - - 12 227 - -

(P8) Level A, B - - 72 227 72 468Level C - - 115 351 1 -

Level D - - 115 430

Test Condition - - 61 269

Inside Flange Plate Design Condition - - 53 227 - -

(P9) Level A, B - 88 227 88 468Level C - 111 351 - -

Level D - 111 430 -

Test Condition - 85 269 -

Gusset Plate Design Condition - 75 257(P10) Level A, B -133 257 133 468

Level C - 179 351 - -

Level D - 179 430

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MFN 06-407Enclosure 2Page 35 of 95

Table 3.8-37(8) Summary of Stress Evaluation (Pll of Wetwell Hatch)

unit: MPa

Evaluation Se Level Compressive Stress Limit

Point Near Outside Flange Plate Near Inside Flanae Plate

Service

Test 0.1 1.7 13.8

Construction 0.1 0.2 10.3

Normal 0.3 0.5

Concrete Portion Factored .

(P11) Severe Environmental 0.3 0.5Extreme Environmental 0.8 1.0

Abnormal 1.1 3.4 20.71.0 3.0

Abnormal / Severe Environmental 1.0 2.9Abnormal / Extreme Environmental 1.3 2.9

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MFN 06-407Enclosure 2Page 36 of 95

Table 3.8-37(9) Summary of Buckling Evaluation for Equipment Hatch

Service Limit PartAbsolute Stress Value

(a.: meridional,ao0: shear)

AllowablesI

a(,(MPa) 4

Test, Designand

Level A&B

0o9(MPa) 9Cylindrical

Shell ElasticInteraction 0.0169*1

InelasticInteraction 0.0610*2

o (MPa) 6

co09(MPa) J 11Level C&D *3 Cylindrical

Shell ElasticInteraction 0.0210*1

4-Inelastic

Interaction 0.0730*2

* 1 Elastic interaction check is performed by the equation of a(l/(xa +(9(0q /aa)2 .

*2 Inelastic interaction check is performed by the equation of a/oxc +(aeG/o(P) 2.

*3 Level C allowables are applied to Level D conservatively.

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MFN 06-407Enclosure 2Page 37 of 95

Table 3.8-37(10) Summary of Buckling Evaluation for Wetwell Hatch

Absolute Stress Value AllowablesService Limit Part (a.: meridional, Elastic Inelastic

000: shear)o9 (MPa) 4 Yxa 303 Oxc 99

Test, Design Cylindrical aoe(MPa) 6 Ota 442 (YC 70and CyidiaLevel A&B Shell Elastic

Interaction 0.0134*1

Inelastic 0.047812Interaction

a9(MPa) 6 Oxa 363 Oxc 119

Level C&D *3 Cylindrical o,(MPa) 10 (,:a 529 Y, 84Shell Elastic 0.0169,1

Interaction 0Inelastic 0.0646*2Interaction

* 1 Elastic interaction check is performed by the equation of Gg/Oxa +(Y0,/pIa) 2.

*2 Inelastic interaction check is performed by the equation of 0 1/0xc +(oe9/oYc) 2 .

*3 Level C allowables are applied to Level D conservatively.

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MFN 06-407Enclosure 2Page 38 of 95

(BB

A-A

Figure 3.8-37(1) Stress Evaluation Points of Upper Drywell Equipment Hatch

A-A

Figure 3.8-37(2) Stress Evaluation Points of Lower Drywell Equipment Hatch

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MFN 06-407Enclosure 2Page 39 of 95

(BB

A-AA-1

Figure 3.8-37(3) Stress Evaluation Points of Wetwell Hatch

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NRC RAI 3.8-38

Provide details of the drywell head analyses for both stress and buckling. Describe all pressure

and thermal conditions applicable to the drywell head, and compare the response for each

applicable load case to both stress and buckling acceptance criteria. Include this information in

DCD Section 3.8.2 and/or Appendix 3G.

In addition, (1) identify the applicable detailed report/calculation (number, title, revision and date,

and brief description of content) that will be available for audit by the staff, and (2) reference this

report/calculation in the DCD.

GE Response

Stress and buckling analyses for the drywell head are performed for all applicable loads and load

combinations. The results confirm that the stresses are within the allowables specified in ASME

B&PV Code Section III, Division 1, Subarticle NE-3220, Division 2, Subarticle CC-3400, and

Code Case N-284-1 of ASME B&PV Code Section III with corrections in RG 1.193 Rev. 1.

Buckling stresses calculated in accordance with Code Case N-284-1 for ASME MC components

do not include thermal stress since it acts in a direction opposite to the buckling effects.

Tables 3.8-38(1) through 3.8-38(5) summarize the stress analysis results. Tables 3.8-38(6) and

3.8-38(7) summarize the buckling analysis results.

(1) The applicable detailed reports/calculations that will be available for the NRC audit are:

DC-OG-0052, Structural Design Report for Containment Metal Components, Revision 2,

October 2006, which contains the evaluation method and results for structural integrity of the

drywell head other than stress analyses of the bolted flange and the sleeve anchorage and

buckling analysis.

DE-OG-0082, Local Analysis Model for Drywell Head, Revision 0, October 2006, which

contains the description of the analysis model, analysis condition and applied loads for the

drywell head.

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MFN 06-407Enclosure 2Page 41 of 95

DE-ES-0001, Stress Analysis Report for Drywell Head, Revision 0, October 2006, which

contains the stress analyses results for the bolted flange and the sleeve anchorage of the

drywell head.

DE-ES-0003, Buckling Evaluation for Drywell Head, Revision 0, October 2006, which

contains the buckling evaluation method and results for the drywell head.

(2) Since this information exists as part of GE's internal tracking system, it is not necessary to add

them to the DCD.

DCD Tier 2 Table 3G.1-36 and DCD Tier 2 Figure 3G.1-51 will be revised in the next update as

noted in the attached markups.

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MFN 06-407Enclosure 2Page 42 of 95

Table 3.8-38(1) Drywell Head Elements Stress Summary

Service Level PL PL+Pb PL+Pb+Q

Calculated Allowable Stress Calculated Allowable Calculated AllowableStress (MPa) (MPa) Stress (MPa) Stress (MPa) Stress (MPa) Stress (MPa)

Test Condition 77 262 77 262

Design 66 227 66 227 - -Condition

A, B 81 227 81 227 798 *1 456

C 108 342 108 342 -

D 108 430 108 430 -

* 1 Acceptable by meeting all requirements for simplified elastic-plastic analysis stipulated in NE-3228.3 of ASME B&PV

Code, Section III.

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Table 3.8-38(2) Summary of Stress Evaluation of Drywell Head Flange

Unit: MPa

Condition Stress Result LimitTest SH 4 1.15Sy 262

SR' 37 0.75Sy 171SR 2 0.75Sy 171ST -1 0.75Sy 171

(Sn+SR)/2 3 0.75Sy 171(SHIST)/2 2 0.75Sy 171

Design SH 3 1.5Smc 227SR' 32 1.OSmc 151

SR 2 1.OSmc 151

ST 1 1.OSmc 151(Sr+S.)/2 3 1.0Smc 151(SI-+ST)/2 1 1.OSmc 151

Table 3.8-38(3) Summary of Stress Evaluation of Drywell Head Flange Bolt

Unit: MPa

Condition Stress Result Limit

Test r B 219 2.OSmC 439

Design R B 219 1.OSmc 219

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MFN 06-407Enclosure 2Page 44 of 95

Table 3.8-38(4) Summary of Stress Evaluation for Metal Parts of

Drywell Head Sleeve Anchorage

Unit: MPa

Part Condition Pm PL+Pb ] PL+Pb+Q

Result Limit Result Limit Result LimitTest - - 17 262 - -

Design - - 17 227 - -

Upper Flange Plate Level A, B - - 62 227 62 456Level C - - 139 342 - -

Level D - - 139 430 - -

Test - - 117 262 - -

Design - - 102 227 - -

Lower Flange Plate Level A, B - - 147 227 147 456Level C - - 223 342 - -

Level D - - 223 430 - -

Test - - 16 262 - -

Gusset Plate of Design - - 16 227 - -

Upper Flange Plate Level A, B - - 64 227 64 456Level C - - 144 342 - -

Level D - - 144 430 - -

Test - - 102 262 - -

Gusset Plate of Design - - 88 227 - -

Lower Flange Plate Level A, B - - 133 227 133 456Level C - - 210 342 - -

Level D - - 210 430 -

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MFN 06-407Enclosure 2Page 45 of 95

Table 3.8-38(5) Summary of Stress Evaluation for Concrete Portion of

Drywell Head Sleeve Anchorage

Unit: MPa

Part Condition Bearing StressResult Limit

Test 0.7 13.8

Service Construction 0.710.3

Normal 1.1

Severe 1.1Concrete Portion Environmentalnear the Upper Extreme 4.2

Flange Plate Environmental

Factored Abnormal 3.2 20.7

Abnormal/Severe 3.0Environmental

Abnormal/Extreme 2.9Environmental

Test 5.0 13.8

Service Construction10.3

Normal 0.6

Severe 0.6Concrete Portion Environmentalnear the Lower Extreme

Flange Plate Environmental

Factored Abnormal 9.0 20.7

Abnormal/SevereEnvironmental

Abnormal/Extreme 7.6Environmental

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Table 3.8-38(6) Summary of Drywell Head Buckling Evaluation (Stress)

Allowables (MPa)Service Limit Part Evaluated Stress Value (MPa)*2 Elastic Ineat

Elastic Inelastic

CF 10 159 95Cylindrical 7 178 83

Test, Design Shell 26

and G09 4 290 68

Level A&B 0l 54 379 103

Knuckle 01 13 379 103

Y2 9 43 43

00 22 191 114Cylindrical

Shell oP 15 214 99

Level C&D *1 090 10 347 81

01 74 453 123

Knuckle 01 34 453 123

G2 17 51 51

* 1 Level C allowables are applied to Level D conservatively.

*2 These stresses are absolute values, (O: hoop, cr.: meridional,stress.

a(0: shear, ol and a2: principal

Table 3.8-38(7) Summary of Drywell Head Buckling Evaluation (Interaction Check)

Service Limit Part Stress (MPa)*I Interaction Elastic*2 Inelastic*2 Allowables

C0 =10 oe and aT - - 1

Test, Design Cylindrical Shell 09 =7 o0 and 090 0.0631 0.109 1and 090=4 oF and 090 0.0396 0.0878 1

Level A&BL Knuckle o13 o and 02 0.220 -

02 =9

o0 =22 o0 ando 9 - - 1Cylindrical Shell o--15 o0 and o9 0 0.116 0.209 1

Level C&D o0=010 o, and o9 0 0.0710 0.167 1

Knuckle or=34 oand o 2 0.371 - 1a2 =17

*1 These values are absolute.*2 Means interaction check is not required.

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MFN 06-407Enclosure 2Page 47 of 95

NRC RAI 3.8-44

DCD Section 3.8.3.2 indicates that the design of all containment internal structures conform toANSI/ASME NQA-1-1989 and Addenda ]a-1989, lb-1991, and ]c-1992 as indicated in DCDTable 3.8-6. A note in this table states that more recent revisions exist, however they are notused. DCD Section 17.1 indicates that the quality assurance for the ESBWR design complieswith ANSI/ASME NQA-1-1983, and with NQA-1a-1983 for certain aspects of quality assurance(quality assurance program, inspection, and audits). NRC RG 1.28, Rev. 3, August 1985,accepts NQA-1 and NQA-1a-1983 Addenda subject to additions and modifications as identifiedin the RG. Based on the above, the quality assurance program requirements in DCD Section3.8.3.2 are not consistent with the commitments presented in DCD Section 17.1. Please clarifywhich commitments apply and make the necessary revisions in the DCD, or justify the use ofdifferent QA requirements for the containment internal structures.

GE Response

The reviewer correctly identified the inconsistency between the NQA-1 references in DCD Tier2 Sections 3 and 17. DCD Tier 2 Table 3.8-6 Item 18 has been revised to cite NQA-1-1983 andalso references DCD Tier 2 Section 17.

DCD Tier 2 Table 3.8-6 will be revised in the next update as noted in the attached markup.

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NRC RAI 3.8-59

General Design Criterion 53, in part, requires that the reactor containment be designed topermit appropriate periodic inspection of all important areas. RAI 3.8-1 requests that theapplicant address this for the concrete and steel elements of the ESBWR containment structure.A stated industry design criterion for advanced reactors is to accommodate inservice inspection(ISI) of critical areas. The staff considers that monitoring and maintaining the condition ofcontainment internal structures is essential for plant safety. DCD Section 3.8.3 does not addressany special design provisions (e.g., providing sufficient physical access, providing alternativemeans for identification of conditions in inaccessible areas that can lead to degradation, remotevisual monitoring of high radiation areas) to accommodate inservice inspection of containmentinternal structures. Please include a description of any special design provisions forcontainment internal structures in DCD Section 3.8.3.7. If none have been incorporated in theESBWR design, please provide the technical basis for concluding that they are not necessary.

GE Response

(1) Areas of the containment are subject to periodic inspection in accordance with ASMESection XI, Subsections IWE and IWL as described in DCD Tier 2 Section 3.8.1.7.3.1.Specific provisions for access from IWE-1231 are incorporated by this reference. Further,those Subsections require inspection of the accessible areas, and areas that will be renderedinaccessible must meet the requirements of IWE-1232 for exemption of such areas asexplained in DCD Tier 2 Section 3.8.1.7.3.2.

Space Control is exercised in the ESBWR by means of a 3D model. It is the means by whichinterference checking and space control is accomplished. It includes all safety and non-safetyrelated SSC's. Items are added to the model as it is being developed by stages depending oncriticality to the plant and construction sequence of the item. Accessibility to equipment,valves, instrumentation, welds, supports, etc. for operation, inspection or removal ischaracterized by sufficient space to allow unobstructed access and reach of site personnel.Therefore, aisles, platforms, ladders, handrails, etc. are reviewed as the components are laidout. Interferences with access ways, doorways, walkways, truck ways, lifting wells, etc. areconstantly monitored.

(2) As indicated in item (1) above, accessibility is constantly monitored, maintained anddocumented during the plant layout process. ESBWR is committed to perform the requiredinspections per ASME Section XI and the supplemental requirements of 1OCFR50.55a.Remote tooling would only be included if for some layout reasons the required inspectioncould not be carried out otherwise.

No DCD change will be made in response to this RAI.

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NRC RAI 3.8-62

DCD Section 3.8.4 mentions several Seismic Category II structures (e.g., control building (CB)above grade and FB penthouse). Describe all Seismic Category II structures and explain eachstructure's physical relationship to Seismic Category I structures. Provide the structural designcriteria used for all Seismic Category II structures to assure that they do not affect theperformance of Seismic Category I structures, systems and components under all loadingconditions. Provide sufficient information for the staff to confirm that the approach satisfies thethree criteria presented in SRP 3.7.2 1, 8for all C-1 SSC.

Include this information DCD Section 3.8.4.

GE Response

DCD Tier 2 Table 3.2-1 provides the Seismic Categorization of Structures and DCD Tier 2Figures 1.2-1 through 1.2-20 provide the physical arrangement of Category I and Category IIstructures.

Since the methods of seismic analysis and design acceptance criteria for Seismic Category II (C-II) SSCs are the same as C-I SSCs, C-II SSCs meet the SRP3.7.2 11.8 criteria and are notpostulated to fail.

See also response to NRC RAI 3.8-42.

No DCD change will be made in response to this RAI.

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NRC RAI 3.8-65

DCD Section 3.8.4.1.4, which discusses the EBAS Building, does not reference a summary reportin Appendix 3G that contains a description of the EBAS Building, the loads and loadcombinations, reinforcement stresses, and concrete reinforcement details for the basemat,seismic walls and floors. Provide this information similar to that provided for the other SeismicCategory I structures. Also provide plan and section views showing the relationship of theEBAS, CB and RB/FB foundation mats and superstructures and confirm that these structures areindependent of each other.

Include this information in DCD Appendix 3G. In addition, (1) identify the applicable detailedreport/calculation (number, title, revision and date, and brief description of content) that will beavailable for audit by the staff and (2) reference this report/calculation in the DCD.

GE Response

See response to NRC RAI 3.8-64 Supplement 1.

Figures 3.8-65(1) and (2) show the plan and section views respectively of the RB/FB, CB andEBAS.

No DCD change will be made in response to this RAI.

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21 OM

RB FB

Figure 3.8-65(1) Plan View of RB/FB, CB and EBAS

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37000 5000 22900 6950

EL 52400

EL 34000

EL -70 0 0

m_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ID __ __ IEIE -11900

EL -9400

EL -10400

RB AT CB EBAS

Figure 3.8-65(2) Section View of RB/FB, CB and EBAS

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NRC RAI 3.8-69

DCD Section 3.8.4.2.3 discusses the applicable documents for the Fuel Building design, but doesnot specifically discuss the criteria for design of the spent fuel pool racks and associatedstructures. Provide a description of the criteria and the design of the spent fuel pool and racks.This description should include sufficient information so that the staff can determine if thecriteria and design of the spent fuel pool racks and associated structures meets the stafftechnical position described in Appendix D to SRP Section 3.8.4.

Include this information in DCD Section 3.8.4 and/or Appendix 3G. In addition, (1) identify theapplicable detailed report/calculation (number, title, revision and date, and brief description ofcontent) that will be available for audit by the staff and (2) reference this report/calculation inthe DCD.

GE Response

The design loading and acceptance criteria for the Spent Fuel Pool, Fuel Racks and associatedstructures are defined in DCD Tier 2 Section 9.1 under Auxiliary Systems.

(1) At this stage of the design process detailed report/calculation for the design of spent fuelracks and associated structures are not available. However, Specification 26A6552, ESBWRFuel Storage Functional Requirements, Revision 1, August 2006, is available for audit by theNRC staff. This specification contains the functional requirements for design, performance,configuration, testing, and documentation for Fuel Storage Racks. The criteria and design ofthe spent fuel racks and associated structures meet the staff technical position described inAppendix D to SRP Section 3.8.4.

(2) Since this information exists as part of GE's internal tracking system, it is not necessary toadd it to the DCD.

DCD Tier 2 Sections 3.8.4.2.3 and 9.1.2 will be revised in the next update as noted in theattached markup.

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NRC RAI 3.8-73

DCD Section 3.8.4.3.2 states that accident pressure loads (Pa) do not exist for the ControlBuilding. Section 3G.2.5.2.1.6 states that thermal loads (Ta) for the Control Building areevaluated for abnormal (LOCA) conditions. Explain how the Control Building is affected byLOCA thermal loads. Also provide the technical basis why the dynamic effects of LOCA, SRVdischarge, condensation oscillation, and chugging are not applicable to the design of theControl Building.

Include this information in DCD Section 3.8.4.3.2 and/or Appendix 3G.

GE Response

Ta is not a design basis accident LOCA load but is associated with the loss of HVAC function.

This postulated loss of HVAC function is caused by a loss of off-site power and delivers themaximum thermal load, Ta, to the CB due to concurrent LOCA.

The control building is a stand-alone structure isolated from the reactor building, which housesthe containment. As a result, the dynamic effects of LOCA, SRV discharge, condensationoscillation and chugging loads originating inside the containment are not applicable to the designof the control building.

DCD Tier 2 Section 3.8.4.3.2 and DCD Tier 2 Appendix 3G.2.5.2.1.6 will be revised in the nextupdate as noted in the attached markups.

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NRC RAI 3.8-76

Provide information on Materials, Quality Control, and Special Construction Techniques forOther Seismic Category I Structures. This information is normally included in Section 3.8.4.6,but has not been provided in the ESBWR DCD. SRP 3.8.4 provides guidance as to the type ofinformation that the staff expects to review.

Include this information in a new DCD Section 3.8.4.6.

GE Response

GE agrees to include the information on Materials, Quality Control, and Special Construction

Techniques for Other Seismic Category I Structures in the DCD.

DCD Tier 2 Section 3.8.4.6 will be added as noted in the attached markup.

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NRC RAI 3.8-77

DCD Section 3.9.2 presents the criteria, testing procedures, and dynamic analyses used toensure the structural and functional integrity of piping systems, mechanical equipment, reactorinternals, and their supports (including supports for conduits, cable trays, and ventilation ducts)under vibratory loadings. DCD Section 3.10.3.2 describes the design approach for cable trayand conduit supports. Although some limited information is provided in DCD Sections 3.9.2 and3.10.3 about the design of supports for conduits, cable trays, and ventilation ducts, noinformation could be located that covers design criteria for conduits, cable trays, and ventilationducts. Other Seismic Category I Structures have attached conduits, cable trays, and ventilationducts. However, DCD Section 3.8.4 does not describe the design criteria used for cable trays,conduits, ventilation ducts. Therefore, please provide a description of the analysis and designcriteria (i.e., description; applicable codes, standards, and specifications; loads and loadcombinations; acceptance criteria; and analysis and design procedures) used for cable trays,conduits, and ventilation ducts in Other Category I Structures.

Include this information in the DCD. In addition, (1) identify the applicable detailedreport/calculation (number, title, revision and date, and brief description of content) that will beavailable for audit by the staff and (2) reference this report/calculation in the DCD.

GE Response

See response to NRC RAI 3.8-52.

No DCD change will be made in response to this RAI.

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NRC RAI 3.8-79

Confirm that the Turbine Building (TB), Service Building (SB), and Radwaste (R W) Building,which are in close proximity to Category I structures, are designed to Seismic Category IIrequirements. If not, explain why not.

Include this information in DCD Section 3.8.4.

GE Response

The TB, SB and RW seismic category classifications are shown in DCD Tier 2 Table 3.2-1. TheTB is classified as Seismic Category II, and the SB is classified as Non-seismic. Since SB is inclose proximity to RB/FB, its classification will be changed to Seismic Category II in DCD Tier2 Table 3.2-1. The RW is remotely located from C-I structures and is classified as Non-SeismicCategory. It is, however, designed to the special prescriptive provisions of RG 1.143, CategoryRW-IIa.

DCD Tier 2 Table 3.2-1 will be revised in the next update as noted in the attached markup.

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NRC RAI 3.8-80

What buildings other than the RB, FB and CB have been designed and evaluated to applicableacceptance criteria? What is the status of the EBAS and RW Building designs? What are theCOL applicant responsibilities and what are the standard plant designrestrictions/limitations/requirements for the design of buildings not covered in the DCD?

Include this information in the DCD.

GE Response

The analytical design of the RB, CB and FB is done and documented in DCD Tier 2 Appendices

3A and 3G. The preliminary design of the EBAS is done. The RW design has not started.

The COL applicant responsibilities are addressed in DCD Tier 2 Section 3.8.6.

No DCD change will be made in response to this RAI.

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NRC RAI 3.8-81

The DCD does not discuss testing and inservice inspection requirements for Other SeismicCategory I Structures. This information is normally included in Section 3.8.4.7, but has not beenprovided in the ESBWR DCD. Describe any requirements for testing and inservice inspection ofOther Seismic Category I Structures. Explain whether Regulatory Guide 1.160 and 10 CFR50.65 requirements, related to structures monitoring and maintenance, are applicable to theESBWR Other Seismic Category I Structures. If not, explain why not.

Include this information in new DCD Section 3.8.4.7.

GE Response

Regulatory Guide 1.160 will be referenced in a new DCD Tier 2 Section 3.8.4.7 for monitoring

of the Seismic Category I structures of the ESBWR listed in DCD Tier 2 Table 19.2-4.

DCD Tier 2 Section 3.8.4.7 will be added in the next update as noted in the attached markup

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NRC RAI 3.8-84

DCD Section 3.8.4.2 indicates that the design of Other Category I Structures conform toANSI/ASME NQA-1-1989 and Addenda la-1989, lb-1991, and Jc-1992, as indicated in DCDTable 3.8-9. A note in this table states that more recent revisions exist, however they are notused. DCD Section 17.1 indicates that the quality assurance for the ESBWR design complieswith ANSI/ASME NQA-1-1983, and with NQA-la-1983 for certain aspects of quality assurance(quality assurance program, inspection, and audits). NRC RG 1.28, Rev. 3, August 1985,accepts NQA-1 and NQA-la-1983 Addenda subject to additions and modifications as identifiedin the RG. Based on the above, the quality assurance program requirements in DCD Section3.8.4.2 are not consistent with the commitments presented in DCD Section 17.1. Please clarifywhich commitments apply and make the necessary revisions in the DCD, or justify the use ofdifferent QA requirements for the Other Seismic Category I Structures.

GE Response

The reviewer correctly identified the inconsistency between the NQA-1 references in DCD Tier2 Sections 3 and 17. DCD Tier 2 Table 3.8-9 Item 5 has been revised to cite NQA-l-1983 andalso references DCD Tier 2 Section 17.

DCD Tier 2 Table 3.8-9 will be revised in the next update as noted in the attached markup

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NRC RAI 3.8-85

DCD Section 3.8.4.2 indicates that the design and construction of Other Seismic Category IStructures conform to ACI 349-01 and Regulatory Guide 1.142, November 2001, as indicated inTable 3.8-9. RG 1.142, states the staff's position on the use of ACI 349-97. Since the staff hasnot formally reviewed and endorsed ACI 349-01 at this time, identify all deviations between ACI349-97/RG 1.142 and AC1 349-01 that affect the ESBWR design. Also provide the technicalbasis for ensuring that a comparable level of safety is achieved for each such deviation.

GE Response

In the attached table, the differences between ACI 349-01 and ACI 349-97/RG 1.142 (withNRC-accepted supplemental requirements) that affect the ESBWR design are compared andsummarized. As shown in the table, the following items are the most important ones that affectthe design of ESBWR structures:

1. Design load combinations shown in DCD Tier 2 Table 3.8-15 satisfy requirements of ACI 349(including exceptions of RG 1.142) and SRP 3.8.4.

2. Two kinds of dynamic fluid effects are considered in the design of the containment andbuildings. One is hydrodynamic load in the suppression pool due to LOCA/SRV discharge,and the other is sloshing loads due to earthquakes.

3. DCD Tier 2 Section 3.8 does not postulate loads that are due to malevolent vehicle assault,aircraft impact, and accidental explosion.

No DCD change will be made in response to this RAI.

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MFN 06-407Enclosure 2Page 62 of 95

Table 3.8-85(1) Comparison of ACI 349-97/RG 1.142 and ACI 349-01

RG 1.142, Regulatory Positions on the use of ACI 349-97 ACI 349-01 ESBWRACT 349-97

1 Structures required to withstand pressures No equivalent provision is given in ACI No equivalent provision is given in ACI RG 1.142 is applicable.and to maintain a certain degree of 349. 349.leaktightness during operating andaccident conditions will be reviewed inaccordance with the provisions of Section3.8.3 of the Standard Review Plan,NUREG-0800. To include these structuresunder ACI 349-97, the followingadditional provisions should be added toACI 349-97.

a. Provision for crack control underservice loads, including test pressure load;

b. Provisions to deal with the transitionfrom the concrete portion of the drywell tothe steel portion of the drywell; and

c. Provisions for preoperational testingand inservice inspections.

2 When concrete structures are used to The provisions noted for radiation Same as ACI 349-97 adding: RG 1.142 is applicable.provide radiation shielding, provisions of shielding in ACI 349 are as follows. The Exception: Aggregates failing to meetANSI/ANS 6.4-1997 (Appendix A) are other description regarding shielding ASTM C 33 but which have been shownapplicable to the extent that they enhance function was not found. by special test or actual service tothe radiation shielding function of these 3.3.1 Concrete aggregates shall conform produce concrete of adequate strength andstructures. Reduction in shielding to one of the following specifications: durability shall be permitted to be usedeffectiveness from embedments, for normal-weight concrete wherepenetrations, and openings should be fully a) "Specification for Concrete authorized by the engineer.evaluated. Aggregates" (ASTM C 33).

b) "Specification for Aggregates forRadiation-Shielding Concrete" (ASTM C637).

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RG 1.142, Regulatory Positions on the use of ACI 349-97 ACI 349-01 ESBWRACI 349-97

3 Where structural components, normally Chapter 10-Flexure and Axial Loads CHAPTER R10--Flexure and Axial Basically, walls, slabs,defined as walls, slabs, and foundations, Chapter 10 is identical to that of ACI 318 Loads and foundations areactually exhibit a structural response designed using sectionconsistent with the response of structural except as described below for Sections Chapter 10 is identical to that of ACI 318 forces and momentsframes, such 1.142-7 components should 10.6. except as described below for Sections obtained from FEconform to the requirements of Chapters Chapter 1I-Shear and Torsion. analyses, and "Flexure10, 11, and 21 of ACI 349-97, in addition The commentary in ACI 318 is applicable CHAPTER RI1I- Shear and Torsion and Axial Loads" (ACIto Chapters 13, 14, and 15 as appropriate. The commentary in ACI 318 is applicable 349 Chapter 10) and

The response of structural components to this chapter except as noted herein. "Shear and Torsion"

should be considered as consistent with Chapter 21-Special Provisions for (Chapter 11) arethe response of structural frames when the Seismic Design Chapter 21-Special Provisions for considered in their design.flexural moment from seismic loads Seismic Design.exceeds two-thirds of the design flexuralcapacity of the section in the absence ofaxial forces.

4 In addition to meeting the standards of 1.3.1 The Owner is responsible for the 1.3.1 The Owner is responsible for the RG 1.142 is applicable.Section 1.3.1 of ACI 349-97, the concrete inspection of concrete construction inspection of concrete constructionQA inspectors should have sufficient throughout all work stages. The Owner throughout all work stages. The Ownerexperience in reinforced and prestressed shall require compliance with design shall require compliance with designconcrete practice as applied to the drawings and specifications and keep drawings and specifications. The Ownerconstruction of nuclear power plants. records required for quality assurance of shall also keep records required for

construction, fabrication, manufacture or quality assurance and traceability ofinstallation, and for traceability, construction, fabrication, material

procurement, manufacture, or installation.

5 In lieu of the frequency of compressive 5.6.1.1 Samples for strength tests of each Same as ACI 349-97. RG 1.142 is applicable.strength testing specified by Section class of concrete placed each day shall be5.6.1.1 of ACI 349-97 or that specified by taken not less than once a day, nor lessASME/NQA-2, the following is than once for each 150 yd3 of concrete,acceptable: nor less than once for each 5000 ft2 of

Samples for strength tests of concrete surface area for slabs or walls.

should be taken at least once per day foreach class of concrete placed or at least

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RG 1.142, Regulatory Positions on the use of ACI 349-97 ACI 349-01 ESBWRACI 349-97

once for each 100 cu yd of concreteplaced. When the standard deviation for30 consecutive tests of a given class is lessthan 600 psi, the amount of concreteplaced between tests may be increased by50 cu yd for each 100 psi the standarddeviation is below 600 psi, except that theminimum testing rate should not be lessthan one test for each shift when concreteis placed on more than one shift per day ornot less than one test for each 200 cu yd ofconcrete placed. The test frequency shouldrevert to once for each 100 cu yd placed ifthe data for any 30 consecutive testsindicate a higher standard deviation thanthe value controlling the decreased testfrequency.

6 The load factors used in Section 9.2.1 of 9.2.1 The required strength U shall be at Sama as ACI 349-97. Design load combinations

ACI 349-97 are acceptable to the staff least equal to the greatest of the shown in DCD Table 3.8-except for the following: following: 15 satisfy requirements of

RG 1.142 as follows:6.1 In load combinations 9, 10, and 11, 1.2 1. U = 1.4D + 1.4F + 1.3L + 1.7H +

To should be used in place of 1.05 To. 1.7Ro 2. 1.05D + 1.05F + 1.3L +1 .3H + 1 .3To + 1 .3Ro

6.2 In load combination 6, 1.4Pa should be 2. U = 1.4D + 1.4F + 1.7L + 1.7H + 11+_

used in place of 1.25Pa. 1.7Eo + 1.7Ro 4. 1.05D + 1.05F + 1.3L +1.3H + 1.3W + 1.3To +

3. U = 1.4D + 1.4F + 1.7L + 1.7H + 1.31o1 .3Rto1.7W + 1.7Ro

8. D+ F+ L + H+Ta +4. U =D + F +L +H+To +Ro +Ess Ra+ 1.5Pa

5. U = D + F + L + H + To + Ro + Wt

6. U = D + F + L + H + Ta + Ra + 1.25Pa

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RG 1.142, Regulatory Positions on the use of ACI 34997 ACI 349-01 ESBWRACI 349-97

7. U=D+F +L +H+Ta+Ra+ 1.15Pa+ 1.0(Yr + Yj + Ym) + 1.15Eo

8. U= D + F + L + H + Ta + Ra + 1.OPa+ 1.0(Yr + Yj + Ym) + 1.OEss

9. U = 1.05D + 1.05F + 1.3L + 1.3H +1.05To + 1.3Ro

10. U = 1.05D + 1.05F + 1.3L + 1.3H+1.3Eo + 1.05To + 1.3Ro

11. U = 1.05D + 1.05F + 1.3L + 1.3H +1.3W + 1.05To + 1.3Ro

7 Loads that are due to malevolent vehicle There is no provision about vehicle Same as ACI 349-97. DCD Section 3.8 does notassault, aircraft impact, and accidental assault, aircraft impact, and accidental postulate loads that areexplosion should be taken as Wt in load explosion in ACI 349-97. due to malevolent vehiclecombination 5. assault, aircraft impact,

and accidental explosion.

8 Hydrodynamic loads associated with There is no provision noted Same as ACI 349-97. Hydrodynamic loads ofseismic loads (i.e., the impulsive and hydrodynamic loads, pool water due tosloshing loads for fluids in tanks) are to be earthquakes are includedconsidered as Ess in load cases 4 and 8, in Seismic loads in theand EO in load cases 2, 7, and 10. All design of the RBFB andother hydrodynamic loads should be taken RCCV, refer to theas Yj, in load combinations 7 and 8. response to NRC RAI 3.8-

15 and 16.

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RG 1.142, Regulatory Positions on the use of ACT 34997 ACT 349-01 ESBWRACT 349-97

9 The consideration of loads that are due to R9.1--General Same as ACI 349-97. Loads that are due to poolpool dynamics for the concrete structures The discharge of safety relief valves into dynamics for the concretein pressure-suppression containments will structures are consideredbe evaluated on a case-by-case basis, a suppression pool generates loads which in the RCCV design.are unique to BWR power plant Refer to the response to

structures. Specific classification of these RC tA 381 and 16

loads is not given by the Code at this time NRC RAI 3.8-15 and 16.

due to ongoing efforts by the industry toquantify them.

10 The local exceedance of section strengths In ACI 349 following provisions are Same as ACI 349-97. Design based on ductilityin accordance with Appendix C of ACI provided, ratios is not included in349-97 is acceptable in analyses for 9.0-Notation DCD Section 3.8.impactive or impulsive effects of Yr, Yj, ESBWR complies withand Ym in load combinations 7 and 8, Yj = jet impingement load, or related AC1B349-01 and RGload combinations of tornado-generated internal moments and forces, on the 1.142.missiles, and loads described in structure generated by a postulated pipeRegulatory Position 7 in load combination break5 except for the following: Ym = missile impact load, or related

10.1 The deformation and degradation of internal moments and forces, on thethe structure resulting from such an structure generated by a postulated pipeanalysis must not cause loss of function of break, such as pipe whipany safety-related structures, systems, or Yr = loads, or related internal momentscomponents. and forces, on the structure generated by

10.2 The section strengths should be the reaction of the broken pipe during aadequate to satisfy these load postulated breakcombinations without the impactive orimpulsive effects.

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RG 1.142, Regulatory Positions on the use of ACI 34997 ACI 349-01 ESBWRACI 349-97

10.3 In Section C.3.5 of ACI 349-97, the C.3.5 The permissible ductility ratio in Same as ACI 349-97.maximum permissible ductility ratios ( ) flexure shall not exceed 3.0 for loadswhen a concrete structure is subjected to a such as blast and compartmentpressure pulse caused by compartment pressurization which could affect thepressurization or external explosion (blast) integrity of the structure as a whole.loading should be as follows.10.3.1 For the structure as a whole =1.0except as noted in 10.5.10.3.2 For a localized area in the structure= 3.0.

10.4 In Section C.3.7 of ACI 349-97, C.3.7 For beams, walls, and slabs where Same as ACI 349-97.where shear controls the design, the shear controls design, the permissiblemaximum permissible ductility ratios ductility ratio shall be taken as:should be as follows, a) For shear carried by concrete alone, the

10.4.1 When shear is carried by permissible ductility ratio shall be 1.3.concrete alone, = 1.0. b) For shear carried by concrete and10.4.2 When shear is carried by a stirrups or bent bars, the permissiblecombination of concrete and stirrups or ductility ratio shall be 1.6, orbent bars, = 1.3. c) For shear carried completely by

stirrups, the permissible ductility ratioshall be 3.0.

10.5 In Section C.3.8 of ACI 349-97, the C.3.8 For beam-columns, walls, and slabs Same as ACI 349-97.maximum permissible ductility ratio in carrying axial compression loads andflexure should be as follows: subject to impulsive or impactive loads

10.5.1 When the compressive load is producing flexure, the permissible

greater than 0.1 f'c Ag or one-third of that ductility ratio in flexure shall be as

which would produce balanced conditions, follows:

whichever is smaller, the maximum a) When compression controls the design,permissible ductility ratio should be 1.0. as defined by an interaction diagram, the

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MFN 06-407Enclosure 2Page 68 of 95

RG 1.142, Regulatory Positions on the use of ACI 349-97 ACI 349-01 ESBWRACI 349-97

10.5.2 When the compression load is less permissible ductility ratio shall be 1.3.than 0.1 f'c Ag or one-third of that which b) When the compression load does notwould produce balanced conditions, exceed 0.1 f cAg or one-third of thatwhichever is smaller, the permissible which would produce balancedductility ratio should be as given in C.3.3 conditions, whichever is smaller, theor C.3.4 of ACI 349-97. permissible ductility ratio shall be as

10.5.3 The permissible ductility ratio given in C.3.3 or C.3.4.should vary linearly from 1.0 to that given c) The permissible ductility ratio shallin C.3.3 or C.3.4 of ACI 349-97 for vary linearly from 1.3 to that given inconditions between those specified in C.3.3 or C.3.4 for conditions between10.5.1 and 10.5.2. those specified in (a) and (b).

10.6 In Section C.2.1 of ACI 349-97, the C.2.1 Dynamic increase factors (DIF) Same as ACI 349-97.dynamic increase factor is to be appropriate for the strain rates involvedconsidered as 1.0 for all materials when may be applied to static materialthe dynamic load factor associated with strengths of steel and concrete forthe impactive or impulsive loading is less purposes of determining section strengththan 1.2. but shall not exceed the following:

Material DIF

Reinforcing steel

fy = 40 ksi ................................ 1.20

fy = 50 ksi ................................ 1.15

fy = 60 ksi ................................ 1.10

Prestressing steel ...................... 1.00

Concrete

Axial and flexural compression.. 1.25

Shear ........................................... 1.10

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MFN 06-407Enclosure 2Page 69 of 95

RG 1.142, Regulatory Positions on the use of AC 349-01 ESBWRACI 349-97

11 The local exceedance of section strengthsin accordance with Appendix C of ACI349-97 is acceptable under the impactiveand impulsive loadings associated withmalevolent vehicle assault, aircraft impact,turbine missiles, and a localized pressuretransient during an explosion, subject tothe applicable exceptions of RegulatoryPosition 10.

ACI 349 provides following provisions: Same as ACI 349-97.

C. 1.4 Impactive loads are time-dependentloads due to collision of masses whichare associated with finite amounts ofkinetic energy. Impactive loading may bedefined in terms of time-dependent forceor pressure. Impactive loads to beconsidered shall include, but not belimited to, the following types of loading:

(a) tornado-generated missiles;

(b) whipping pipes;

(c) aircraft missiles;

(d) fuel cask drop; and

(e) other internal and external missiles.

C. 1.5 Impulsive loads are time-dependentloads which are not associated withcollision of solid masses. Impulsive loadsto be considered shall include, but not belimited to, the following types of loading:

(a) jet impingement;

(b) blast pressure;

(c) compartment pressurization; and

(d) pipe-whip restraint reactions.

DCD Section 3.8 does notpostulate loads that aredue to malevolent vehicleassault, aircraft impact,and accidental explosion.

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MFN 06-407Enclosure 2Page 70 of 95

RG 1.142, Regulatory Positions on the use of ACI 349-97 ACI 349-01 ESBWRACI 349-97

12 The generic criteria of Appendix A, A.1.1 Nuclear safety related reinforced Same as ACI 349-97 Analyses of structures"Thermal Consideration," of ACI 349-97 concrete structures shall conform to the under loads To and Ta areare acceptable for the analysis of minimum provisions of this Code and to performed in compliancestructures under loads To and Ta. the special provisions of this Appendix with Appendix A of ACI

for structural members subjected to time- 349.dependent and position-dependenttemperature variations.

A. 1.2 The provisions of this Appendixapply to concrete structures which aresubjected to normal operating conditionsas well as thermal accident conditionsand which have restraint such thatthermal strains would result in thermalstresses.

A.1.3 The design provisions of thisAppendix are based on the strengthdesign method. The assumptions,principles, and requirements specified in10.1 and 10.2 are applicable for bothnormal operating and accident conditions.

13 The design of composite members used in 10.14-Composite compression members Same as ACI 349-97 except following Same as ACI 349-01.modular construction should conform to Chapter 17-Composite Concrete descriptions and provision. RB floor slabs that arethe intent of Code provisions of Chapter Flexural Members 1.1.7.2 This Code does not govern the composite structures are10.14rules used in computing the strength design of structural concrete slabs cast on designed using the designsame rules rein co ngrte should stay-in-place, composite steel form deck. methods for regularof regular reinforced concrete should Concrete used in the construction of such reinforced concrete, i.e.,specific requirements for modular slabs shall be governed by Parts 1, 2, and steel plates are regarded asconstruction, future designs will be 3 of this Code, where applicable, equivalent reinforcingconsructonfutue deign wil bebars in designevaluated on a case-by-case basis. 10.16-Composite compression members calculations.

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MFN 06-407Enclosure 2Page 71 of 95

RG 1.142, Regulatory Positions on the use of ACI 349-97 ACI 349-01 ESBWRACI 349-97

14 Slabs and walls that frame into concrete No equivalent description in ACI 349. Same as ACI 349-97. As stated in DCD Sectioncontainments and will participate in 3.8.1.1.3, structural

resisting accident and seismic loads should components that aremeet the standards of ACI 349-97 or ACI integral with the359 as appropriate, containment structure are

treated the same as thecontainment as far asloads and loadingcombinations areconcerned in the design.See also response to NRCRAI 3.8-4.

15 Members that are subject to torsion and 11.6--Combined shear and torsion CHAPTER 11-SHEAR AND Section 11.6 of ACI 318-

combined shear and torsion should be strength for nonprestressed members with TORSION 99 has been included inevaluated to the standards of Section 11.6 rectangular or flanged sections 11.6.1 It shall be permitted to neglect Section 11.6 of ACI .of ACI 318-99 instead of the requirements 11.6.1 Torsion effects shall be included torsion effects when the factored torsional 01.of Section 11.6 of ACI 349-97. with shear and flexure where factored moment Tu is less than:

torsional moment Tu exceeds f(0.5Sx2y). Otherwise, torsion effects may be (a) for nonprestressed members:neglected. (12

(b) for prestressed members:

SP ) F4 ./-•c

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MFN 06-407Enclosure 2Page 72 of 95

NRC RAI 3.8-86

General Design Criterion 53, in part, requires that the reactor containment be designed topermit appropriate periodic inspection of all important areas. RAI 3.8-1 requests that theapplicant address this for the concrete and steel elements of the ESBWR containment structure.A stated industry design criterion for advanced reactors is to accommodate inservice inspectionof critical areas. The staff considers that monitoring and maintaining the condition of OtherCategory I Structures is essential for plant safety. DCD Section 3.8.4 does not address anyspecial design provisions (e.g., providing sufficient physical access, providing alternative meansfor identification of conditions in inaccessible areas that can lead to degradation, remote visualmonitoring of high radiation areas) to accommodate inservice inspection of Other Category IStructures. Please include a description of any special design provisions for other Category IStructures in new DCD Section 3.8.4.7. If none have been incorporated in the ESBWR design,please provide the technical basis for concluding that they are not necessary.

GE Response

(1) In support of the monitoring of the Seismic Category I structures of the ESBWR listed inDCD Tier 2 Table 19.2-4, as described in the new DCD Tier 2 Section 3.8.4.7 (added perNRC RAI 3.8-81), access will be considered in the detailed design process.

Space Control is exercised in the ESBWR by means of a 3D model. It is the means by whichinterference checking and space control is accomplished. It includes all safety and non-safetyrelated SSC's. Items are added to the model as it is being developed by stages depending oncriticality to the plant and construction sequence of the item. Accessibility to equipment,valves, instrumentation, welds, supports, etc. for operation, inspection or removal ischaracterized by sufficient space to allow unobstructed access and reach of site personnel.Therefore, aisles, platforms, ladders, handrails, etc. are reviewed as the components are laidout. Interferences with access ways, doorways, walkways, truck ways, lifting.wells, etc, areconstantly monitored.

(2) As indicated in item (1) above, accessibility is constantly monitored, maintained anddocumented during the plant layout process. Remote tooling would only be included if forsome layout reasons the required inspection could not be carried out otherwise.

No DCD change will be made in response to this RAI.

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MFN 06-407Enclosure 2Page 73 of 95

NRC RAI 3.8-88

DCD Sections 3.8.5.4 indicates that a main objective of the design of the foundation is to ensurethat there is adequate frictional and passive resistance to prevent sliding of the structure whensubjected to lateral loads. However, the DCD does not indicate how the analysis is to beperformed and how lift-off effects, if appropriate, are to be captured in this analysis. The DCDalso indicates that the capability of the foundation to transfer shear is evaluated whenwaterproofing is used beneath the basemat. The DCD needs to indicate the proceduresemployed to assess such effects for a potential range of site conditions varying from soil siteswith shear wave velocities of the order of 1, 000 fps to hard rock sites.

GE Response

See response to NRC RAI 3.8-96. This evaluation was done for the softest soil conditions in the

range examined.

No DCD change will be made in response to this RAI.

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MFN 06-407Enclosure 2Page 74 of 95

NRC RAI 3.8-89

DCD Section 3.8.5.4 states that the capability of the foundation to transfer shear withwaterproofing is a COL item, and refers to Section 3.8.6.1. DCD Section 3.8.6.1 states that theCOL applicant shall demonstrate the capability of foundations to transfer shear loads wherefoundation waterproofing is used. The staff needs additional information. Explain the technicalissue in detail. With respect to waterproofing, what is the ESBWR standard plant assumptionused in conducting the foundation sliding analyses? Why is the capability to transfer shear withwaterproofing a COL item? How does a COL applicant confirm that it is in compliance with thestandard plant foundation design assumptions for a selected, site-specific waterproofingmateriall

Include the information requested above in DCD Section 3.8.5.4. In addition, (1) identify theapplicable detailed report/calculation (number, title, revision and date, and brief description ofcontent) that will be available for audit by the staff and (2) reference this report/calculation inthe DCD.

GE Response

Foundation waterproofing will be deleted as a COL item. The selected waterproofing materialfor the bottom of the basemat is a chemical crystalline powder that is added to the mud matmixture. It forms a waterproof barrier. No membrane waterproofing is used under thefoundations in the ESBWR.

However, membrane waterproofing is applied to the outer walls. The friction at sidewalls is notevaluated as one of the forces resisting seismic loads; therefore, membrane waterproofing isappropriate for sidewalls.

(1) The applicable detailed reports/calculations that will be available for the NRC audit are:

26A6652, RB FB Stability Analysis Report, Revision 2, April 2006, which contains thestability calculations of the Reactor Building/Fuel Building.

26A6654, CB Stability Analysis Report, Revision 2, April 2006, which contains the stabilitycalculations of the Control Building.

(2) Since this information exists as part of GE's internal tracking system, it is not necessary toadd it to the DCD.

DCD Tier 2 Section 3.8.5.4 will be revised in the next update as noted in the attached markup.

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MFN 06-407Enclosure 2Page 75 of 95

NRC RAI 3.8-92

DCD Section 3.8.5.4 indicates that the standard design is developed using a range of soilconditions as detailed in Appendix 3A. Appendix 3A describes the range in shear wave velocitiesconsidered in SSI analyses, and only focuses on assumed uniform site conditions. Section 3.8.5.4also states that total and differential settlements of the foundations must be considered, butrefers to Section 3.8.6.2for COL information. Section 3.8.5.4 does not indicate if any potentialeffects of static or dynamic differential settlement effects have been incorporated into the designof the standard plant nor the magnitude of settlement that was considered. Also, the effect offsettlement on construction procedures is not addressed. DCD Section 3.8.5.4 needs to clarifyhow settlement issues are incorporated in to the generic design of the standard plant, andidentify limitations on the magnitude of settlements.

a) Explain how the potential for settlement was considered in the ESB WR standard plantdesign.

b) What is the allowable settlement that can be accommodated by the ESBWRfoundations/structures?

Include this information in DCD Section 3.8.5.4. In addition, (1) identify the applicable detailedreport/calculation (number, title, revision and date, and brief description of content) that will beavailable for audit by the staff, and (2) reference this report/calculation in the DCD.

GE Response

Three types of soil conditions are considered in the DCD, which are soft, medium and hard as

uniform subgrades. See response to NRC RAI 3.8-93 for clarification on settlement issues.

No DCD change will be made in response to this RAI.

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MFN 06-407Enclosure 2Page 76 of 95

NRC RAI 3.8-93

Section 3.8.5.4 states that total and differential settlements of the foundations must beconsidered, but refers to Section 3.8.6.2 for COL information. The DCD needs to clarify howsettlement issues are incorporated into the generic design of the standard plant, and identifylimitations on the magnitude of settlements, so that the COL applicant can ensure compliancewith the standard design. Define the COL applicant actions required to confirm that thepredicted site-specific settlement meets the standard plant design assumptions.

Include this information in the DCD. In addition, (1) identify the applicable detailedreport/calculation (number, title, revision and date, and brief description of content) that will beavailable for audit by the staff and (2) reference this report/calculation in the DCD.

GE Response

This response is similar to NRC RAI 3.8-92. The stipulated settlements will be incorporated intothe total plant design as a requirement. The following evaluation, Settlement Effect on BasematDesign, clarifies the settlement issues. The COL holder will have to demonstrate that differentialsettlements at the site do not exceed this value by instituting a settlement monitoring program orjustify in the COL why it would not be necessary.

The confirmation for settlement effect on basemat design is provided by parametric analysisconsidering a variety of soil conditions and construction sequences as shown in the followingevaluation, Settlement Effect on Basemat Design. As a result, the basemat stresses reported in theDCD are not affected by horizontal variations in spring stiffness. Also basemat stresses duringconstruction are much smaller than DCD design stresses.

No DCD change will be made in response to this RAI.

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Settlement Effect on Basemat Design

1. Scope

Additional topics discussed at audit have been stated in response to NRC RAIs 3.8-13 and 92regarding the ESBWR basemat design. Additionally NRC recommended that to refer DCD ofAP600 including the discussion during construction period. The main purpose of these requestsis to estimate the differential settlement effect on basemat design during Operation andConstruction Phase respectively. The discussion was stated in response to NRC RAI 3.8-93.

This section provides the result of the estimation concerning following items with the FEM

model.

" Non-uniform soil condition under basemat during normal operation* Settlement effect on basemat during construction period

2. Normal Operation Phase

Analyses are performed under the variety of soil condition (non-uniform condition), and thenthey are compared to the DCD design. Analytical conditions are as follows.

* FEM Model" Soil Condition

* Load

Global FEM Model (DCD Design Model):"Hard Spot", stiff spring under the Pedestal area.

Three types of soil conditions are considered as "Hard Spot" as shownin Figure 3.8-93(1).

Dead Load

Soil spring Modulus

Uniform (DCD)

Basemat

Soft

ab c Medium, Hard, Soflx3

Soil spring Modulus

Non-uniform (Hard Spot)

Figure 3.8-93(1) Soil conditions

Figure 3.8-93 (2) and (3) show the basemat deformation and bending moment of basematcomparing with those of DCD design (uniform soil condition). These indicate the bendingmoment of DCD design is larger or similar to Hard Spot condition since the soil springs are

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MFN 06-407Enclosure 2Page 78 of 95

stiffer than DCD condition (uniform soft soil). Therefore there is no concern about basematdesign if the building is settled on Hard Spot soil conditions.

3. Construction PhaseAfter the completion of basemat several part of building will be constructed based on plannedconstruction sequence. This analytical study is provided to confirm the stress of basemat inconstruction period. Assumed sequence is as follows, but this is imaginary since these portionsare constructed in short time periods.

Case A: sequentially outward construction

1. Pedestal poured up to 5m (below the floor EL-6400, approximately)2. Apply loads by RCCV and B3F structure3. Add exterior walls in RB4. Add walls in FB area

Case B: Sequentially inward construction

Constructed into inverse direction of Case A.1. FB area poured (below the floor EL-6400, approximately)2. Add exterior walls in RB3. Add RCCV and B3F structure4. Add pedestal

The analytical model has been extracted from global FEM model used for DCD design. Somemodification has been applied to this as shown in Figure 3.8-93(4). This model is similar to the"Modified Truncated Model" provided to the NRC for confirmatory analysis. The height ofstructural members is limited to 5m in every top portion of the model considering constructionplan. Figure 3.8-93(4) shows sequence of Case A.

The dead loads are considered per element thickness and density of concrete which in the model.The analytical conditions are as follows.

" FEM Model : Based on the "Modified Truncated Model (a part of Global FEMModel).

" Soil Condition : "Uniform", soft soil spring under the basemat* Load :Dead Load

Figures 3.8-93 (5) and (6) show deformation of basemat. The maximum settlement is 15 mm andthe maximum differential settlement is 8 mm. Figures 3.8-93 (7) and (8) show bending momentof basemat comparing with those of DCD design (normal operation). These indicate the bendingmoment of DCD design is larger than the bending moment during the construction period.

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MFN 06-407Enclosure 2Page 79 of 95

---- -- -

PN(ý

-8

-0YL,,×

I

B

ý-----oDCD

H-d

z 0.0 30.0 (m)

DEF. SCALE I J

0.0 5.00 (i)X MOD. SCALE [LJ

a) A-A Section

-. ODCD

-HHrd

-Modiom

• .+-----.----M-----

0.0 30.0 (-m)

DEF SCALE LI

0.0 5.00(.)

Y MOD. SCALE IL I

b) B-B Section

Figure 3.8-93(2) Comparison of Basemat Deformation

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MFN 06-407Enclosure 2Page 80 of 95

RB EW Sectin

I.OE+I

8.0E+O -. - -

-0.OE+0

d4.0E+O .

O.0OE+O ------------ !

-30 -20 -10 0

Coodinate (Y;* m) (a)

M in -B Sctio

20 30

(a) My in B-B Section

2.OE+O

O.OE+O

-2.0E+0

RBFBNS Section

Coordinate (X; m)

-30 .20 -10 0 20 30 40 50

(b) Mx in A-A Section

a . . , , .. .. . .. .• • , . . . . . .. -

0-

A

PN( a-

Y a-

-e

L, i-6

. -.. . . . . . . .. . . . . . .I . I I -0

Figure 3.8-93(3)-a Comparison of Basemat Sectional Moments (Hard)

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RB EW Section

i

-30 .20 -10

C(di)Mti (Y, m)

10 20 30

(a) My in B-B Section

RBFBNS Scw1ion

0

*0.OE+0L10+

-20 -10 0 10 20 30 40 50

Coordinate (X; m)

(b) Mx in A-A Section

8-

A

PN( 8-

Y 8-

Figure 3.8-93(3)-b Comparison of Basemat Sectional Moments (Medium)

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MFN 06-407Enclosure 2Page 82 of 95

RB EW Section

1.OE+I

8.0E+-0 - _------------------------------- --- --- -------------------------- -- -- DCDMy

_ - - - -"-- -- -- '- Inside RCCV: Softx3 My6.0E+O-

4OE+O -. --- - -

0.OE+0 I I2 I

• -2.0E+O

-4.0E+I0 ---- --- -I

-6.0E+O-- - --- - -- - - -- ----- •-I

-8.OEI0E+

-10OE+I

-30 -20 -10 0 10 20 30

Coodinate (Y; m)

(a) My in B-B Section

Figure 3.8-93(3)-c Comparison of Basemat Sectional Moments ( soft x3)

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iure 3.8-93(4)-a Case A (Sten 1) Figure 3.8-93(4)-b Case A (Sten 21

Figure 3.8-93(4)-c Case A (Step 3) Figure 3.8-93(4)-d Case A (Step 4)

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Figure 3.8-93(5) -a Deformation of basemat (CaseA - Step 1) Figure 3.8-93(5) -b Deformation of basemat (CaseA - Step 2)

Figure 3.8-93(5) -c Deformation of basemat (CaseA - Step 3) Figure 3.8-93(5) -d Deformation of basemat (CaseA - Step 4)

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6) -a Deformation of basemat (CaseB - Step 1) Figure 3.8-93(6) -b Deformation of basemat (CaseB - Step 2)

Figure 3.8-93(6) -c Deformation of basemat (CaseB - Step 3) Figure 3.8-93(6) -d Deformation of basemat (CaseB - Step 4)

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RB EW Secon

-30 -20 -10 0Coodinate (Y, m)

10 20 30

R3FB NS S.Wt.o

LO&8.0E+O

0DCD Mx

6.OE+0- i i ii-O Case I STEP IMx....... Case I STEPP2 Mx

4.OE- - Case-I STEP3 Mx

E 20OE.-

o .OE+0

S-2.0E+1

-6.OE+tl

-8,0E+0 -

-L.OE+I

-30 -20 -10 0 10 20 30 40 50

Coordinate MX i,,)

- --

.. . . . . . ... ..- .. .J . !. .

PNý#

-8

-eA

YL_×- ) ( 80

- i--w-

Figure 3.8-93(7) Comparison of Basemat Sectional Moments (Case A)

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RB EW Setion

LOE+I

8 -- e---DCD My80E+0--o- Case2 STEP IMy

-- " " Case2 STEP2 My6.0E+0 . .. . • • •.. /* - - | __. _Case2 STEP3 y

4 E0 .0 E

0.OE--0

S-2.0E+O-4 0E+D

-6ýOE+O

-8.0E+O

-30 -20 -10 0 10 20 30

Coordmc (Y; m)

RBFB NS Sootmn

-30 -20 -10 0 10

Coorduite (X; m)

20 30 40 50

6-

A--PN(ý

Y

Figure 3.8-93(8) Comparison of Basemat Sectional Moments (Case B)

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NRC RAI 3.8-94

DCD Section 3.8.5.4 indicates that the design incorporates an evaluation of the worstloads resulting from the superstructures and loads directly applied to the foundation mat,due to static and dynamic load combinations. However, the DCD does not identify themaximum allowable toe pressure that is acceptable for the basemat design, under theworst-case static and dynamic loads. This information is needed so that evaluations canbe made at the COL state for site-specific conditions. Include the maximum toe pressureused in the basemat design in DCD Table 3.8-13.

GE Response

Maximum soil bearing stresses involving SSE are summarized in DCD Tier 2 Table3G.1-58 for soft, medium and hard site conditions. Maximum soil bearing stress due todead plus live loads is 699 kPa as shown in DCD Tier 2 Appendix 3G.1.5.5. The site-specific allowable bearing capacities need to be larger than the maximum stressdepending on its site condition.

The values indicated in DCD Tier 2 Table 3G.1-58 are evaluated by using the EnergyBalance Method, which is described in the Reference cited in response to NRC RAI 3.7-48 Supplement 1. In the evaluations, the basemat is assumed to be rigid, and uplift of thebasemat is considered.

The soil pressures obtained from the RB/FB global FE model analyses used for thebasemat section design are summarized in Table 3.8-94(1). This table also includes theresults of the basemat uplift analyses, which were performed to respond NRC RAI 3.8-13. Seismic loads used for the FE analyses are worst-case loads, i.e., the envelopedvalues for all site conditions included in DCD Tier 2 Table 3G.1-58. In the FE analyses,the basemat is assumed to be flexible.

As shown in Table 3.8-94(1), the bearing pressures obtained by the FE analyses are lessthan the worst case maximum bearing pressure in DCD Tier 2 Table 3G.1-58, which is5.33 MPa for the hard site. Therefore, it can be concluded that the maximum bearingpressures in DCD Tier 2 Table 3G.1-58 are evaluated conservatively.

No DCD change will be made in response to this RAI.

Table 3.8-94(1) Maximum Bearing Pressure

Max. PressureSeismic Direction Case Location Combination

(MPa)

DCD 4.18 Northeast 1.0NS+0.4EW+0.4VUplift'" 4.56 Northeast 1.0NS+0.4EW+0.4V

DCD 4.16 Northeast 0.4NS+I.OEW+0.4V-Uplift" 4.49 Northeast 0.4NS+I.OEW+0.4V

Note *1: See response to NRC RAI 3.8-13 Supplement 1.

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MFN 06-407Enclosure 2Page 89 of 95

NRC RAI 3.8-95

DCD Section 3.8.5.4 indicates that site-specific allowable bearing capacities are no lessthan the calculated static and dynamic bearing pressures, and refers to Section 3.7.5.1for COL information. Section 3.7.5.1 states that the site allowable foundation bearingcapacities are no less than the values in Section 3G.1.5.5 for RB, Section 3G.2.5.5 for CBand Section 3G.3.5.5 for FB. Section 3G.1.5.5 refers to Table 3G. 1-58; Section 3G.2.5.5refers to Table 3G.2-24; and Section 3G.3.5.5 refers back to Section 3G.1.5.5. Thecircuitous referencing employed is confusing and unnecessary. Expand the discussion ofbearing capacities as a function of site conditions (soft, medium, hard) in DCD Section3.8.5.4, and directly reference the Appendix 3G tables that contain the pertinentinformation.

GE Response

To eliminate circuitous referencing, the statement, "The site-specific allowable bearingcapacities are no less than the calculated static and dynamic bearing pressures. SeeSubsection 3.7.5.1 for COL information", will be deleted from DCD Tier 2 Section3.8.5.4. DCD Tier 2 Section 3.7.5.1 is a more appropriate location to capture seismicdesign parameters.

DCD Tier 2 Section 3.8.5.4 will be revised in the next update as noted in the attachedmarkup.

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MFN 06-407Enclosure 2Page 90 of 95

NRC RAI 3.8-96

DCD Section 3.8.5.5 presents two specifications of appropriate safety factors (SF) forfoundation design. The SF against sliding indicates that sliding resistance is judged asthe sum of both shear friction along the basemat and passive pressures induced due toembedment effects. However, the DCD does not indicate (1) how these effects are toconsider consistent lateral displacement criteria (that is, the displacement effect onpassive pressure is not the same as on friction development) and (2) how the effect ofwaterproofing is to impact the development of basemat friction capacity. DCD Section3.8.5.5 needs to clearly indicate how these effects are incorporated into the standardplant design for the considered range of acceptable site conditions considered.

Include this information in DCD Section 3.8.5.5. In addition, (1) identify the applicabledetailed report/calculation (number, title, revision and date, and brief description ofcontent) that will be available for audit by the staff, and (2) reference thisreport/calculation in the DCD.

GE Response

a) As stated in the response to NRC RAI 3.7-35, SASSI analyses were performed toaddress the embedment effect. It was confirmed that the base shears calculated bythe SASSI analyses, which consider the embedment effect, are less than thoseobtained by design seismic analyses that neglect the embedment effect. The use ofhigher base shears calculated without the beneficial effect of embedment is deemedconservative for the sliding evaluation without explicit consideration of consistentlateral displacement criteria for passive pressure and friction resistance.

b) Please see NRC RAI 3.8-89 for the response to impact of waterproofing.

(1) The applicable detailed reports/calculations that will be available for the NRC auditare:

26A6652, RB FB Stability Analysis Report, Revision 2, April 2006, which containsthe stability calculations of the Reactor Building/Fuel Building.

26A6654, CB Stability Analysis Report, Revision 2, April 2006, which contains thestability calculations of the Control Building.

(2) Since this information exists as part of GE's internal tracking system, it is notnecessary to add it to the DCD.

No DCD change will be made in response to this RAI.

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MFN 06-407Enclosure 2Page 91 of 95

NRC RAI 3.8-97

DCD Section 3.8.5.5 presents two specifications of appropriate safety factors (SF) forfoundation design. The SF against uplift indicates that the full calculated dead load willbe used to counteract the potential effects of buoyancy. However, due to the uncertaintyin calculation ofplant dead loads, it is typical to limit the effective dead load to a fractionof the best estimate dead load, being typically limited to 0.90 of the full dead load. DCDSection 3.8.5.5 needs to clarify how the dead load will be defined for this upliftevaluation, including the treatment of the stored volume of water in the pools.

Include this information in DCD Section 3.8.5.5. In addition, (1) identify the applicabledetailed report/calculation (number, title, revision and date, and brief description ofcontent) that will be available for audit by the staff, and (2) reference thisreport/calculation in the DCD.

GE Response

The full dead load was considered in the buoyancy calculations. Since the FS aresufficiently large, it is not deemed necessary to use 0.90 of the DL for checking. Table3.8-97(1) compares the Factors of Safety for the flotation for the full dead load and 0.9 ofthe full dead load cases. Factors of safety are larger than the required value withsufficient margins even if the dead loads are reduced to 90% of the full value.

(1) The applicable detailed reports/calculations that will be available for the NRC auditare:

26A6652, RB FB Stability Analysis Report, Revision 2, April 2006, which containsthe stability calculations of the Reactor Building/Fuel Building.

26A6654, CB Stability Analysis Report, Revision 2, April 2006, which contains thestability calculations of the Control Building.

(2) Since this information exists as part of GE's internal tracking system, it is notnecessary to add it to the DCD.

No DCD change will be made in response to this RAI.

Table 3.8-97(1) Factors of Safety for Floatation

Building Load Combination Factors of Safety

Required ActualRB/FB 1.OD + 1.0F' 1.1 3.48

0.9D +1.OF' 3.13

CB 1.0D + 1.0F' 1.1 1.66

0.9D + 1 .OF' 1.49

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MFN 06-407Enclosure 2Page 92 of 95

NRC RAI 3.8-99

DCD Section 3.8.5.7 indicates that there are no testing or 1S1 requirements for thefoundations. Has the applicant committed to RG 1.160 for monitoring of structures tomeet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.65? If so, then modify DCD Section 3.8.5.7 toindicate this. If not, provide the technical basis in DCD Section 3.8.5.7.

GE Response

Regulatory Guide 1.160 will be referenced in a revised DCD Tier 2 Section 3.8.5.7 formonitoring of the Seismic Category I structures of the ESBWR listed in DCD Tier 2Table 19.2-4.

DCD Tier 2 Section 3.8.5.7 will be revised in the next update as noted in the attachedmarkup.

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MFN 06-407Enclosure 2Page 93 of 95

NRC RAI 3.8-101

DCD Section 3.8.5.2 implies that two separate sets of codes, standards, andspecifications were used for the common RCCV/RB/FB foundation. Was the commonfoundation supporting the RCCV, RB, and FB actually designed to two different sets ofcodes, standards and specifications, as indicated, or was a uniform design basisemployed? If two different design bases were employed, explain how this wasimplemented andjustify the jurisdictional boundary.

Include this information in DCD Section 3.8.5.2. In addition, (1) identify the applicabledetailed report/calculation (number, title, revision and date, and brief description ofcontent) that will be available for audit by the staff, and (2) reference thisreport/calculation in the DCD.

GE Response

Section designs of the portions, which are included in the RCCV, are performed inaccordance with the ASME code, and other portions outside of containment are designedin accordance with ACI 349.

The loads and load combinations that cover both codes are considered for the wholebasemat for conservatism.

See also response to NRC RAI 3.8-4.

No DCD change will be made in response to this RAI.

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MFN 06-407Enclosure 2Page 94 of 95

NRC RAI 3.8-102

DCD Section 3.8.5.3 implies that two different sets of loads and load combinations wereused for design of the common RCCV/RB/FB foundation. For the common foundationsupporting the RCCV, RB and FB, explain how two different sets of loads and loadcombinations were implemented and justify thejurisdictional boundary.

Include this information in DCD Section 3.8.5.3. In addition, (1) identify the applicabledetailed report/calculation (number, title, revision and date, and brief description ofcontent) that will be available for audit by the staff, and (2) reference thisreport/calculation in the DCD.

GE Response

Refer to the response to NRC RAI 3.8-101.

No DCD change will be made in response to this RAI.

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MFN 06-407Enclosure 2Page 95 of 95

NRC RAI 3.8-103

DCD Section 3.8.5.5 describes the structural acceptance criteria for foundations andstates that the containment portion follows DCD Section 3.8.1.5, and the rest of thefoundations follow DCD Section 3.8.4.5. Was the common foundation supporting theRCCV, RB, and FB actually designed to two different sets of structural acceptancecriteria, as indicated, or was uniform structural acceptance criteria employed? If twodifferent structural acceptance criteria were employed, explain how this wasimplemented and justify the jurisdictional boundary.

Include this information in DCD Section 3.8.5.5. In addition, (1) identify the applicabledetailed report/calculation (number, title, revision and date, and brief description ofcontent) that will be available for audit by the staff, and (2) reference thisreport/calculation in the DCD.

GE Response

Refer to the response to NRC RAI 3.8-101.

No DCD change will be made in response to this RAI.

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26A6642AJ Rev. 03ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 2

Table 3.2-1

Classification Summary

Safety Quality QA SeismicPrincipal Components' Class. 2 Location 3 Group 4 Req.5 Category6 Notes

U74 Radwaste Building Structure N RW - E NS Radwaste Management Systems - A qualityassurance program meeting the guidance of NRCRegulatory Guide 1.143, Category RW-IIa isapplied to radioactive waste management systemsduring design and construction.

U75 Service Building Structure N SB - E IIU77 Control Building HVAC1. Ducts, valves, and dampers (including 3 CB - B I

supports) supporting safety-related areas2. Other ducts, valves and dampers N CB - E NS

(including supports)3. Electrical modules and cable with safety- 3 CB - B I

related function4. Main control room bottled air system 3 CB, 00 - B I5. Other nonsafety-related equipment N CB - E NSU78 Cold Machine Shop N 00 E NSU80 Electrical Building Structure N EB - E NSU81 Seismic Monitoring System N ALL - E NSU84 Service Water Building Structure N SF - E NSU85 Service Water Building HVAC N SF - E NSU91 Administration Building Structure N OL - E NSU93 Training Center N OL - E NS

U95 Hot Machine Shop N 00 - E NSU97 Fuel Building Structure 3/N FB - B I/II Main building is SC I. HVAC penthouse, stair

towers and elevator shafts are SC II.U98 Fuel Building HVAC

3.2-31

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26A6642AJ Rev. 03ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 2

3.8.2.4.1.2 Equipment Hatches

An equipment hatch assembly consists of the equipment hatch cover and the equipment hatchbody ring, which is imbedded in the RCCV wall and connects to the RCCV liner.

A finite-element analysis model and/or manual calculation is used to determine the stresses in thebody ring and hatch cover of the equipment hatch. The equipment analysis and the stressintensity limits are in accordance with Subarticles NE-3130, NE-3200 and NE-3300 of ASMECode Section III. The hatch cover with the bolted flange is designed in accordance withSubarticle NE-3326 of ASME Code Section III.

3.8.2.4.1.3 Other Penetrations

Piping penetrations and electrical penetrations are subjected to various combinations of pipingreactions, mechanical, thermal and seismic loads transmitted through the RCCV wall structure.The resulting forces due to various load combinations are combined with the effects of externaland internal pressures. The required analysis and associated stress intensity limits are inaccordance with Subarticle NE-3200 of ASME Code Section III, Division 1, including fatigueevaluation as required.

Main Steam and Feedwater penetrations are analyzed using the finite element method of analysisfor applicable loads and load combinations. The resulting stresses meet the acceptance criteriastipulated in Subarticle NE-3200 of ASME Code Section III, Division 1, including fatigueevaluation as required.

3.8.2.4.1.4 Drywell Head

The drywell head, consisting of shell, flanged closure and drywell-head anchor system, isanalyzed using a finite-element stress analysis computer program or manual calculation. Thestresses, including discontinuity stresses induced by the combination of external pressure orinternal pressure, dead load, live load, thermal effects and seismic loads, are evaluated. Therequired analyses and limits for the resulting stress intensities are in accordance with SubarticlesNE-3130, NE-3200 and NE-3300 of ASME Code Section III, Division 1.

The compressive stress within the knuckle region caused by the internal pressure and thecompression in other regions caused by other loads are limited to the allowable compressivestress values in accordance with Subarticle NE-3222 of ASME Code Section III, Division 1, orCode Case N-284.

3.8.2.5 Structural Acceptance Criteria

The structural acceptance criteria for the steel components of the RCCV (i.e., the basis forestablishing allowable stress values, the deformation limits, and the factors of safety) areestablished by and in accordance with ASME Code Section III, Subsection NE.

In addition to the structural acceptance criteria, the RCCV is designed to meet minimum leakagerate requirements discussed in Section 6.2. Those leakage requirements also apply to the steelcomponents of the RCCV.

The combined loadings designated under "Normal", "Construction", "Severe Environmental","Extreme Environmental", "Abnormal", "Abnormal/Severe Environmental" and"Abnormal/Extreme Environmental" in Table 3.8-2 are categorized according to Level A, B, C

3.8-19

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26A6642AJ Rev. 03ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 2

3.8.4.1.6 Seismic Category I Cable Trays, Cable Tray Supports, Conduits, and Conduit Supports

Electrical cables are carried on continuous horizontal and vertical runs of steel trays or throughsteel conduits. The tray and conduit locations are based on the requirements of the electricalcable network. Trays or conduits are supported at intervals by supports made of hot or coldrolled steel sections. The supports are attached to walls, floor, and ceilings of structures asrequired by the arrangement. The type of support and spacing is determined by allowable tray orconduit spans which are governed by rigidity and stress. Bracing is provided where required.The loads, loading combinations, and allowable stresses are in accordance with applicable codes,standards, and regulations consistent with Tables 3.8-6 and 3.8-9.

3.8.4.1.7 Seismic Category I HVAC Ducts and HVAC Duct Supports

HVAC duct locations and elevations are based on the requirements of the HVAC system.HVAC ducts are made of steel sheet metal and are supported at intervals by supports made of hotor cold rolled steel sections. The supports are attached to walls, floor, and ceilings of structuresas required by the arrangement. The type of support and spacing is determined by allowableduct spans that are governed by rigidity and stress. Bracing is provided where required. Theloads, loading combinations, and allowable stresses are in accordance with applicable codes,standards, and regulations consistent with Tables 3.8-6 and 3.8-9.

3.8.4.2 Applicable Codes, Standards, and Specifications

3.8.4.2.1 Reactor Building

The major portion of the Reactor Building outside Containment structure is not subjected to theabnormal and severe accident conditions associated with a containment. Applicable documentsfor the RB design are shown in Table 3.8-9, except items 4, 11, 30 and 32.

3.8.4.2.2 Control Building

Applicable documents for the CB design are the same as the RB, which are listed in Table 3.8-9.

3.8.4.2.3 Fuel Building

Applicable documents for the FB design are same as the RB, which are listed in Table 3.8-9.Applicable documents for the spent fuel racks and associated structures are specified inSection 9.1.2.

3.8.4.2.4 Radwaste Building

Applicable codes, standards, specifications and regulations used in the design and construction ofRW are items 1, 2, and 32 listed in Table 3.8-9.

3.8.4.2.5 Welding of Pool Liners

Welding activities conform to the AWS Structural Welding Code, DI.1. All welds are visuallyinspected before to start any other NDE method. The visual weld acceptance criteria is definedin AWS DI. 1. In accordance with approved procedures the welded seams of the liner plate arespot radiographed where accessible, liquid penetrant and vacuum box (ASME Section V)examined after fabrication to ensure that the liner does not leak. Any evidence of leaking is

3.8-31

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26A6642AJ Rev. 03ESBWR Design Control DocumentfTier 2

In all these load combinations, both cases of L having its full value or being completely absentare checked.

3.8.4.3.2 Control Building

Refer to the loads, notations, and combinations established in Subsection 3.8.4.3.1, except thatfluid pressure F, accident pressure Pa, and pipe break loads Yr, Yj, Ym do not exist. The live

loads and temperature loads are as follows:

* All concrete floors except for HVAC room - 4.8 kPa

* Concrete floors in HVAC room - 2.9 kPa

* Concrete roof- 1.4 kPa

" Construction live load on floor framing in addition to dead weight of floor - 2.4 kPa

The temperatures during normal operating conditions are shown in Table 3.8-11. Thetemperatures during abnormal operating conditions are shown in Table 3H-10 and are associatedwith a postulated loss of HVAC function.

3.8.4.3.3 Fuel Building

Refer to the loads, notations, and combinations established in Subsection 3.8.4.3.1, except thatfluid pressure F, accident pressure Pa, and pipe break loads Yr, Yj, Ym do not exist. The live

loads and temperature loads are as follows:

" All concrete floors except for HVAC room - 4.8 kPa

* Concrete floors in HVAC room - 2.9 kPa

" Concrete roof- 1.4 kPa

* Construction live load on floor framing in addition to dead weight of floor - 2.4 kPa

The temperatures during normal operating conditions are shown in Table 3.8-12.

3.8.4.3.4 Radwaste Building

Loads and load combinations listed in Table 3.8-9 Item 32, Safety Class RW-IIa is used for thedesign of the RW.

3.8.4.3.5 EBAS Building

Refer to the loads, notations, and combinations established in Subsection 3.8.4.3.1, except thatfluid pressure F and pipe break loads Yr, Yj, Ym do not exist.

3.8.4.4 Design and Analysis Procedures

3.8.4.4.1 Reactor Building, Control Building, Fuel Building, and EBAS Building

The Reactor Building (RB), Control Building (CB), Fuel Building (FB), and EBAS Building areanalyzed using the linear elastic finite element (FE) computer program NASTRAN described inAppendix 3C.

3.8-34

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26A6642AJ Rev. 03ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 2

As described in Subsection 3.8.4.1.3, the RB and FB is integrated into one building. Therefore,the RB and FB structure is analyzed using a common FE model, which includes the RB and FBand also the concrete containment. The model is described in Appendix 3G Subsection 3G.1.4.1.

The FE analysis models of the CB and EBAS Building include the entire structure. The detailsof the FE model of the CB are described in Appendix 3G Subsection 3G.2.4.1.

The foundation soil is simulated by a set of horizontal and vertical springs in each model. Thesoil spring constraints are calculated based on the properties of the soil spring used in the Soil -Structure Interaction (SSI) analysis model, which is described in Appendix 3A. The constraintsby soil surrounding the buildings are conservatively neglected in the FE models.

3.8.4.4.2 Radwaste Building

The RW is described in Section 3.8.4.1.5. The design is in accordance with the criteria inTable 3.8-9 Item 32 for Safety Class RW-IIa.

3.8.4.5 Structural Acceptance Criteria

3.8.4.5.1 Reactor Building

The acceptance criteria for the design of the safety-related reinforced concrete structure areincluded in Table 3.8-15. "U" in Table 3.8-15 is the section strength required to resist designloads based on the strength design method described in Table 3.8-9 item 1 and in SRP 3.8.4Section 11.3.

The acceptance criteria for the design of the safety-related steel structure are included inTable 3.8-16. Allowable elastic working stress, S, is the allowable stress limit specified in Part 1of ANSI/AISC N-690.

The design criteria preclude excessive deformation of the Reactor Building.

3.8.4.5.2 Control Building

The acceptance criteria for the design of the Control Building are same as the Reactor Buildingin Section 3.8.4.5.1.

3.8.4.5.3 Fuel Building

Same as the RB in 3.8.4.5.1.

3.8.4.5.4 Radwaste Building

Structural acceptance criteria and materials criteria for the RW is in accordance with Item 32 inTable 3.8-9 for Safety Class RW-IIa.

3.8.4.5.5 EBAS Building

Same as the RB in 3.8.4.5.1.

3.8.4.6 Material, Quality Control and Special Construction Techniques

This subsection contains information related to the materials, quality control and specialconstruction techniques used in the construction of the other Seismic Category I structures.

3.8-35

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26A6642AJ Rev. 03ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 2

3.8.4.6.1 Concrete

Concrete material is the same as described in Section 3.8.1.6.1 with the following exception:The specified compressive strength is 34.5 MPa. Concrete is batched and placed according toACI-349-01.

3.8.4.6.2 Reinforcing Steel

Reinforcing steel is the same as in Section 3.8.1.6.2.

3.8.4.6.3 Splices of Reinforcing Steel

Splices of reinforcing steel are the same as in Section 3.8.1.6.3 except that placing and splicing isin accordance with ACI-349-01.

3.8.4.6.4 Quality Control

Quality control is the same as in Section 3.8.1.6.5 except that the Construction Specification willreference ACI-349-01 and applicable Regulatory Guides.

3.8.4.6.5 Special Construction Techniques

There is composite construction in the other Seismic Category I structures. Some of thecomponents, such as rebar cages, are pre-assembled and lifted into place. As described inSection 3.8.4.1.1, the RB floor slabs are composed of reinforcing bars, steel plates, and concrete.Floor slab steel plates, which are reinforced by welded shapes, are assembled in discretesegments that are lifted into place. The steel plates are also used as formwork for concrete fill.

3.8.4.7 Testing and In-Service Inspection Requirements

Seismic Category I structures listed in Table 19.2-4 are monitored in accordance with Section 1.5of RG 1.160.

3.8.5 Foundations

This section describes foundations for all Seismic Category I structures of the ESBWR StandardPlant.

3.8.5.1 Description of the Foundations

The Reactor Building (RB) including the containment and Fuel Building (FB) are built on acommon foundation mat as described in Subsection 3.8.4. The foundation of the ControlBuilding (CB) and EBAS are separated from the foundation of the RB and FB and each other.

The foundation of the RB and FB is a rectangular reinforced concrete mat. Its key dimensionsare shown in Table 3.8-13. The foundation mat is constructed of cast-in-place conventionallyreinforced concrete. It supports the RB, the FB, the containment structure, and other internalstructures. The containment structure foundation is defined as within the perimeter or theexterior surface of the containment structure. The containment foundation mat details arediscussed in Subsection 3.8.1.1.1.

The Control Building foundation is rectangular reinforced concrete mat. The key dimensions areincluded in Table 3.8-13.

3.8-36

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26A6642AJ Rev. 03ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 2

The worst case scenario for foundation base mat design is the soft soil since it is subject tolargest deformation. From the NASTRAN analysis the results are scanned for the worst loads inthe mat sections and are selected for checking the section. This enveloping of most severeloading is done for all loading considered in the analysis.

The selected waterproofing material for the bottom of the basemat is a chemical crystallinepowder that is added to the mud mat mixture forming a water proof barrier when cured. Nomembrane waterproofing is used under the foundations in the ESBWR.

The standard ESBWR design is developed using a range of soil conditions as detailed inAppendix 3A. The physical properties of the site-specific subgrade materials are furnishedwithin Subsection 2.5. Settlement of the foundations, and differential settlement betweenfoundations for the site-specific foundations medium, is calculated, and safety-related systems(i.e., piping, conduit, etc.) designed for the calculated settlement of the foundations. The effectof the site-specific subgrade stiffness and calculated settlement on the design of the SeismicCategory I structures and foundations is evaluated.

A detailed description of the analytical and design methods for the foundations of the RBincluding the containment, the CB and the FB is included in Appendix 3G.

3.8.5.5 Structural Acceptance Criteria

The main structural criteria for the containment portion of the foundation are to provide adequatestrength to resist loads and sufficient stiffness to protect the containment liner from excessivestrain. The acceptance criteria for the containment portion of the foundation mat are presented inSubsection 3.8.1.5. The structural acceptance criteria for the RB, CB and FB foundations aredescribed in Subsection 3.8.4.5.

The allowable factors of safety of the ESBWR structures for overturning, sliding, and flotationare included in Table 3.8-14. The calculated factors of safety are shown in Appendix 3G foreach foundation mat evaluated according to the following procedures.

The factor of safety against overturning due to earthquake loading is determined by the energyapproach described in Subsection 3.7.2.14.

The factor of safety against sliding is defined as:

FS = (F, + Fp)/(Fd + Fh)

where Fs and Fp are the shearing and sliding resistance, and passive soil pressure resistance,respectively. Fd is the maximum lateral seismic force including any dynamic active earthpressure, and Fh is the maximum lateral force due to loads other than seismic loads.

The factor of safety against flotation is defined as:

FS = FDL/FB

where FDL is the downward force due to dead load and FB is the upward force due to buoyancy.

3.8-38

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26A6642AJ Rev. 03ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 2

3.8.5.6 Materials, Quality Control, and Special Construction Techniques

The foundations of Seismic Category I structures are constructed of reinforced concrete usingproven methods common to heavy industrial construction. For further discussion, seeSubsection 3.8.1.6.

3.8.5.7 Testing and In-Service Inspection Requirements

Seismic Category I structures listed in Table 19.2-4 are monitored in accordance with Section 1.5of RG 1.160.

3.8.6 COL Information

3.8.6.1 Structural Integrity Pressure Result

The structural integrity test (SIT) of the ESBWR containment shall be performed in accordancewith Subsection 3.8.1.7.1. Additionally, the first ESBWR containment is considered as aprototype and its SIT performed accordingly. The details of the test and the instrumentation,required for a prototype SIT, is provided by the first ESBWR utility for NRC review andapproval.

3.8-39

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26A6642AJ Rev. 03ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 2

Table 3.8-6

Codes, Standards, Specifications, and Regulations Used in the Design and Construction of

Seismic Category I Internal Structures of the Containment

Specification SpecificationReference or Standard TitleNumber Designation

I ACI 301-99 Specifications for Structural Concrete for Builders

2 ACI 307-88 Recommended Practice for Concrete Formwork

3 ACI 305-99 Recommended Practice for Hot Weather Concreting

4 ACI 211.1-91 Recommended Practice for Selecting Proportions for NormalWeight Concrete

Manual of Standard Practice for Detailing Reinforced NormalWeight Concrete

6 ACI 306-88 Recommended Practice for Cold Weather Concreting

7 ACI 309-96 Recommended Practice for Consolidation of Concrete

8 ACI 308-98 Recommended Practice for Curing Concrete

9 ACI 212-86 Guide for use of Admixtures in Concrete

Recommended Practice for Evaluation of Compression Testresults of Field Concrete

11 ACI 311-88 Recommended Practice for Concrete Inspection

12 ACI 304-00 Recommended Practice for Measuring, Mixing, Transporting, andPlacing Concrete

13 ACI 349-01 Code Requirements for Nuclear Safety-Related ConcreteStructures

14 Not Used.

ANSI/AISCN690- Specification for the Design, Fabrication, and Erection of Steel1994s2 (2004) Safety-Related Structures for Nuclear Facilities(')

16 AWS D1.1-04 Structural Welding Code

Visual Weld Acceptance Criteria for Structural Welding at17 EPRI NP-5380, 1987 Nuclear Power Plants (Nuclear Construction Institute Group) Rev.

2, Sep. 1987.

ANSI/ASME Quality Assurance Program Requirements for Nuclear Facilities,NQA-1-1983 (Reference Section 17.0)

19 Regulatory Guide 1.54 Service Level I, II and III Protective Coatings Applied to NuclearPower Plants, Rev. 1, July 2000.

I

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26A6642AJ Rev. 03ESBWR Design Control DocumentfTier 2

Table 3.8-9

Codes, Standards, Specifications, and Regulatory Guides Used in the Design and

Construction of Seismic Category I Structures

Specification SpecificationReference or Standard TitleNumber Designation

1 AC1 349-01 Code Requirements for Nuclear Safety-Related Concrete Structures

Specification for the Design, Fabrication and Erection of Steel Safety-Related2 ANSI/AISC-N690-1994s2 (2004) Structures for Nuclear Facilities(l)

3 ASME-2004 Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code Section I11, Division 2, Subsection CC

Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code Section III, Subsection NE, Division 1, Class4 ASME-2004 MC

5 ANSI/ASME NQA-1-1983 Quality Assurance Program Requirements for Nuclear Facilities, (Reference

Section 17.0)

6 AWS D1.1 -04 Structural Welding Code - Steel

7 AWS D1.4 -98 Structural Welding Code - Reinforcing Steel

8 AWS D1.6-99 Structural Welding Code for Stainless Steel

9 ASCE 4-98 Seismic Analysis of Safety-Related Nuclear Structures

10 ASCE 7-02 Minimum Design Loads for Buildings and Other Structures

11 AISC360-05 2005 AISC Specification for Structural Steel Building12 SSPC-PA-1-00 Paint Application Specification No. 1, Shop, Field and Maintenance Painting of

Steel13 SSPC-PA-2-04 Paint Application Specification No. 2, Measurement of Dry Coating Thickness

with Magnetic Gages

14 SSPC-SP-1-82 Surface Preparation Specification No. 1, Solvent Cleaning

15 SSPC-SP-5-00 Surface Preparation Specification No. 5, White Metal Blast Cleaning

16 SSPC-SP-6-00 Surface Preparation Specification No. 6, Commercial Blast Cleaning

17 SSPC-SP-10-00 Surface Preparation Specification No. 10, Near-White Blast Cleaning

18 Not Used

19 Not Used

20 Regulatory Guide 1.28 Quality Assurance Program Requirements" (Design and Construction), Aug.1985

21 Regulatory Guide 1.29 Seismic Design Classification, Sep. 1978

22 Regulatory Guide 1.31 Control of Ferrite Content in Stainless Steel Weld Metal, Apr. 1978

23 Regulatory Guide 1.44 Control of the Use of Sensitized Stainless Steel, May 1973

Service Level 1, 11 and III Protective Coatings Applied to Nuclear Power Plants,24 Regulatory Guide 1 .54Re.1Juy20 Rev. 1, July 2000

25 Regulatory Guide 1.60 Design Response Spectra for Seismic Design of Nuclear Power Plants, Dec.1973

26 Regulatory Guide 1.61 Damping Values for Seismic Design of Nuclear Power Plants, Oct. 1973

27 Regulatory Guide 1.69 Concrete Radiation-Shields for Nuclear Power Plants, Dec. 1973

28 Regulatory Guide 1.76 Design Basis Tornado for Nuclear Power Plants, Apr. 1974

3.8-50

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26A6642AN Rev. 03ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 2

Table 3G.1-36

Drywell Head Elements Stress Summary

Service Level PL PL+Pb PL+Pb+Q

Calculated Allowable Stress Calculated Stress Allowable Calculated Stress Allowable StressStress (MPa) (MPa) (MPa) Stress (MPa) (MPa) (MPa)

Test Condition 77 262 77 262 -

Design Condition 66 227 66 227 - -

A, B 81 227 81 227 798*1 456

C 108 342 108 342 - -

D 108 430 108 430 -

* 1 Acceptable by meeting all requirements for simplified elastic-plastic analysis stipulated in NE-3228.3 of ASME B&PV Code,

Sec.IIL.

3G-81

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ESBWR26A6642AN Rev. 03

RCCV LINER ANCHOR DETAIL (TYP)( itoo)SECTION 0' -180'

D-D(i 20)

LINER PLATE (.) I

LINER PLATE (0.4)

PLATE (1 E)

C Is10)

LINERLA7 PLr (54

SA-240A- Ty . 3 4 EL. -10400

Figure 3G.1-48. Liner Anchor

3G-168

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26A6642AN Rev. 03ESBWR

DRYWELL TOP SLAB(UNDER SIDE)(i:0oo)PLAN EL. 24600 90* 9g0

WETWELL BOTTOM SLAB (i10oo)PLAN EL. 4650

180"

A-A(I : 10) TOP OF BASE MAT CAVITY(i1ioo)PLAN EL. -10400 B-B (I 10) O-C (I 10}

WT-41 5

tit IAý-S

SA-36

0* 180°

Figure 3G.1-49. Liner Plate Plans

3G-169

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26A6642AN Rev. 03ESBWR

'55.~~~~~ 0150053 !.

3"

1 2 0 -. 8t(B 0 sL.T H0 L E S Z E)

m /

F~cligu1 re 3.MP t-1.DwelHa

A4-A

Figure 3G.1-51. Drywell Head

BRACKET

3G-171

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ESBWR26A6642AN Rev. 03

A-A €,eo

Upper DrywellEquipment Hatch Top View

Aj o 27

B-B (1;30)

Lower DrywetlEquipment Hatch Too View

t-001

22 20a

rA-140 Ge. 224 1 *n 3

W

Figure 3G.1-52. Equipment Hatch

{{{Security-Related Information - Withheld Under 10 CFR 2.390}}}

3G-172

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26A6642AN Rev. 03ESBWR

Wetwell Hatch Top View5: 100)

-gO0

B C

,Foil

Figure 3G.1-53. Wetwell Hatch I

{{{Security-Related Information - Withheld Under 10 CFR 2.390}}}

3G-173

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26A6642AN Rev. 03ESBWR

Upper DrywellPersonnel Airlock Top View

ii, Mo)

Lower DrywellPersonnel Airlock Top View

11• 1M)B

150

A-A (1:20)0O

900

O L_180*

Figure 3G.1-54. Personnel Airlock

{{{Security-Related Information - Withheld Under 10 CFR 2.390}}}

3G-174

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26A6642AN Rev. 03ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 2

3G.2.5.2.1.2 Snow Load

The snow load is applied to the roof slab and is taken as shown in Table 3G.1-2. Snow load isreduced to 75% when snow load is combined with seismic loads.

3G.2.5.2.1.3 Lateral Soil Pressure at Rest

The lateral soil pressure at rest is applied to the external walls below grade and is based on soilproperties given in Table 3G.1-2. Pressures to be applied to the walls are provided inFigure 3G.2-10.

3G.2.5.2.1.4 Wind Load (W)

Wind load is applied to the roof slab and external walls above grade and is based on basic windspeed given in Table 3G.1-2.

3G.2.5.2.1.5 Tornado Load (W,)

The tornado load is applied to the roof slab and external walls above grade and its characteristicsare given in Table 3G.1-2. The tornado load, Wt, is further defined by the combinationsdescribed in Subsection 3G. 1.5.2.1.5.

3G.2.5.2.1.6 Thermal Load (T, and Ta)

Thermal loads for the CB are evaluated for the normal operating conditions and abnormal(LOCA in combination with a loss of external AC power) conditions. Figure 3G.2-11 shows thesection location for temperature distributions for various structural elements of the CB, andTable 3G.2-4 shows the magnitude of equivalent linear temperature distribution.

Stress-free temperature is 15.5°C.

3G.2.5.2.1.7 Design Seismic Loads

The design seismic loads are obtained by soil - structure interaction analyses, which aredescribed in Appendix 3A. The seismic loads used for design are as follows:

* Figure 3G.2-12: design seismic shears and moments

* Table 3G.2-5: maximum vertical acceleration

The seismic loads are composed of two perpendicular horizontal and one vertical components.The effects of the three components are combined based on the 100/40/40 method as describedin Subsection 3.8.1.3.6.

Seismic lateral soil pressure for wall design is provided in Figure 3G.2-13 using the elasticprocedure described in ASCE 4-98 Section 3.5.3.2.

3G.2.5.2.2 Load Combinations and Acceptance Criteria

Table 3.8-15 gives load combinations for the safety-related reinforced concrete structure. Basedon previous experience, critical load combinations are selected for the CB design. They aremainly combinations including LOCA loads and seismic loads as shown in Table 3G.2-6. Theacceptance criteria for the selected combinations are also included in Table 3G.2-6.

3G-182

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26A6642AY, Rev. 02ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 2

The applied loads to the rack are as follows:

" Dead loads, weight of rack and fuel assemblies plus the hydrostatic loads

* Live loads-effect of lifting an empty rack during installation

* Thermal loads-the uniform thermal expansion caused by pool temperature changes

* Seismic forces

* Accidental drop of fuel assembly from maximum possible height

* Postulated stuck fuel assembly causing an upward force

The load combinations considered in the rack design are as follows:

" Live loads

" Dead loads plus SSE

* Dead loads plus fuel drop

Stress analyses are performed by classical methods based upon shears and moments developedby the dynamic method. Using the given loads, load conditions and analytical methods, stressesare calculated at critical sections of the rack and compared to acceptance criteria referenced inASME Code Section III, Subsection NF. In addition, the design of the spent fuel storage racksand associated support structures meet the requirements of Appendix D to SRP 3.8.4.

9.1.2.5 Thermal-Hydraulic Design

The fuel storage racks are designed to provide sufficient natural convection coolant flow throughthe rack and fuel to remove decay heat without reaching excessive water temperatures (100°C;212°F).

In the spent fuel storage pool, the bundle decay heat is removed by FAPCS recirculation flow tomaintain the pool temperature below 48.91C (120°F) during normal conditions.

A thermal-hydraulic analysis to evaluate the rate of naturally circulated flow and the maximumrack exit temperature will be performed. See Subsection 9.1.6 for COL information.

9.1.2.6 Material Considerations

Structural material used in the fabrication of the fuel storage racks is in accordance with thelatest issue of the applicable ASTM specification at the time of equipment order. Materials arechosen for their corrosion resistance and their ability to be formed and welded with consistentquality.

The storage tube material is permanently marked with identification traceable to the materialcertifications. The fuel storage tube assembly is compatible with the environment of treatedwater and provides a design life of 60 years.

9.1.2. 7 Facilities Description (Spent Fuel Storage)

There are two separate areas for storage of spent fuel assemblies. These are in a separate deeppit area in the buffer pool in the Reactor Building and in the Spent Fuel Pool in the FuelBuilding.

9.1-5