Report Unstable Foundations: Impact of NGOs on Human Rights for Port-au-Prince's Internally...

8/8/2019 Report Unstable Foundations: Impact of NGOs on Human Rights for Port-au-Prince's Internally Displaced People

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UNSTABLE FOUNDATIONS:Impact of NGOs on Human Rights for Port-au-

Princes Internally Displaced People

October 4, 2010

Prof. Mark SchullerYork College (CUNY) / Facult dEthnologie (UEH)


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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report follows six weeks of research during the summer of 2010. With a team of eight stu-dents and a colleague at the Facult dEthnologie, Universit dtat dHati, this study coversover 100 camps for internally displaced persons (IDPs), a random sample of one in eight of the861 in the metropolitan area. Students conducted quantitative and qualitative surveys in threeinter-related areas: conditions and services within the camps, residents level of understandingand involvement in the camp committees, and interviews with committee representatives. Theauthor followed up with a visit to 31 camps.

The results show that despite the billions in aid pledged to Haiti, most of the estimated 1.5 mil-lion IDPs are living in substandard conditions. For example, seven months following the earth-quake, 40 percent of IDP camps do not have access to water, and 30 percent do not have toiletsof any kind. An estimated 10 percent of families have a tent; the rest sleep under tarps or evenbed sheets. In the midst of the hurricane season with torrential rains and heavy winds a regularoccurrence, many tents are ripped beyond repair. Only a fifth of camps have education, healthcare, or psycho-social facilities on site.

The services provided in the camps vary quite significantly according to a range of factors.Camps in Cit Soleil have almost no services, while those in Ption-Ville are better managed.Camps that are not on major roads or far from the city center in Croix-des-Bouquets or Carre-four have little to no services. Smaller camps, with 100 or fewer families, have demonstrablyfewer services. Camps situated on private land 71 percent of the sample are significantlyworse off than those on public land.

Despite the fact that many NGOs empower camp committees to select recipients and distributeaid most notably food, until the government stopped general distribution in April most offi-cial committees do not involve the population. Less than a third of people living in camps are

aware of the strategy or even the name of the committees. Two-thirds of members are men,despite well-documented concerns about gender based violence. While to most NGOs managingcamps or offering services these camps represent their local participation, it is clear that thepresent structure leaves much to be desired.

While many committees sprang up organically immediately following the earthquake as an ex-pression of solidarity and unity in an effort for survival, NGOs relationships with them have sev-eral negative intended or unintended consequences. First of all, most NGOs did not inquireabout local participation, leadership, needs deliberation, or legitimacy. As a result, in severalcases, the NGOs and self-named committees excluded pre-existing grassroots organizations.Some NGOs, the government, and even the land owners themselves created these committees.This is a root of several conflicts. In the majority of cases, the camp committees who were ac-tive in the immediate aftermath of the earthquake report not doing anything because of lackof funds, testifying to an increasing dependency on foreign aid.

Security including theft, gender-based violence, and forced evictions from private landowners remains urgent. The issue of forced eviction is greater than generally acknowledged; of the ini-tial sample, 19 of 106 or 17 percent of camps had been closed. Research assistants found anadditional fourteen camps that were either closed or under threat of closure. This is a violationof residents rights as granted by international conventions (the U.N. Guidelines for IDPs). This


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issue is likely only to heat up given the election season and the government-imposed deadline ofDecember to close the camps.

These failures are not isolated incidents but symptoms of larger structural problems that requireimmediate, sustained, profound reflection and attention. Solutions include involving IDP popula-tions in large community meetings, assessing levels democracy and participation within commit-tees, greater NGO accountability, coordination, and submission to a fully-funded local and na-tional government. Housing needs to be recognized as a human right (guaranteed by Article 22of Haitis constitution), with concrete, immediate steps to empower people to return to a safehome and basic services (e.g. water, sanitation, health care, and education) made available toall, regardless of residency status. All of these require the immediate release of pledged aid, thevast majority of which has failed to materialize.

Specific policy recommendations include:

1. Donors such as the U.S. and U.N. should focus more funds and rebuilding efforts atrebuilding the capacity of the elected Haitian government, and not simply NGOs.

2. AllNGOs working in Haiti need to work with the Haitian government and respectthe local authorities.

3. AllNGOs working in Haiti need to have an active and robust participation of im-

in the camps and other impacted communities.

4. NGOs should specifically encourage under-represented populations, particularlywomen, and pre-existing grassroots groups.

5. NGOs should assess the official committees and support those who are doing wellin transitioning toward greater autonomy, offer training to mid-range groups, andengage lower-functioning groups in dialogue with the general population.

6. Provide support for education at all levels, including popular education about IDPrights.

7. Provide more security, particularly for women, including an indefinite end toforced evictions until a sufficient amount of permanent housing is available.

8. Provide services in the neighborhoods as well as the camps.9. All parties: the Haitian government, NGOs, and donors, need to make the expe-

dient construction of high-quality permanent housing its first priority.

10.Fully fund Haitian relief efforts.

For correspondence regarding this report, please contact:

Mark Schuller, Assistant ProfessorAfrican American Studies and AnthropologyDepartment of Social SciencesYork College, the City University of New York94-20 Guy R. Brewer BoulevardJamaica, NY 11451(718) [email protected]


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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

I. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2II. Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5III. Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8IV. Living Conditions in the Camps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10V. Patterns in the Gaps in Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18VI. Security Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22VII. Camp Committees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26VIII. Foreign NGOs Role . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32IX. Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34X. Works Cited . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39XI. Appendices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41


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LIST OF ACRONYMS

BAI Bureaux des Avocats InternationauxCCCM Cluster for Camp Coordination and ManagementCIRH Interim Haiti Reconstruction CommissionDTM Displaced Tracking MatrixFRAKKA Reflection and Action Force on HousingHAP Humanitarian Accountability ProjectIDP Internally displaced personKOFAVIV Commission of Women Victims for VictimsMAST Ministry of Social Affairs and WorkMINUSTAH UN Mission for the Stabilization of HaitiMPCE Ministry of Planning and Foreign CooperationNGO Non-governmental organizationOIM International Organization of MigrationPNH Haitian National PoliceUSAID United States Agency for International Development

Cover photo: One of many ripped tents in Haiti s IDP camps, August 2010. Photos otherwise not attributed are from the author.Previous page and this page: Esaie Jules Gelin. photos of the Solino camp housing 6,820 people, April 2010.Following page and page 4: Corail, July 2010. Corail is very isolated and unprotected from the elements: wind, sun, and rain.
http://ijdh.org/about/baihttp://ijdh.org/about/bai


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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Research of this scope requires the active colla-boration of many people. Thanks first go to theUniversit dtat dHati, where the author has aformal affiliation, particularly the FacultdEthnologie, where he has taught since 2004.Chevalier Smail was instrumental in helping todesign the statistical database and SPSS, orga-nizing the data entry, and conducting the statis-tical analysis. Eight students spent long hoursgoing to the field, conducting the surveys, andwriting up the results: Jean Dider Deslorges,Mackenzy Dor, Jean Rony Emile, Junior JeanFrancois, Robenson Jean Julien, Rose MercieSaintilmont, Castelot Val, and Jude Wesh. CUNYcolleague Tania Levey gave some absolutely

essential assistance with SPSS. The authorwould also like to acknowledge the support ofmany individuals working for NGOs, the UnitedNations, and the Haitian government who pro-vided useful information.

Several institutions and individuals providedinvaluable guidance and support in the research

phase, including Fs Refleksyon ak Aksyon souKoze Kay (FRAKKA), Haiti Response Coalition,the Humanitarian Accountability Project, Inter-national Action Ties, and the Lambi Fund of Hai-ti. Thanks go to Sebastian Davis-VanGelder,Christophe, Etant Dupain, Daniel Junnot, Djalo-ki, Valerie Kaussen, Melinda Miles, Paul Chris-tian Namphy, Deepa Panchang, Reyneld Sanon,Mark Snyder, Troels Sorenson, and St. Cyr. Dee-pa Panchang, Nicole Phillips, and Jane Reganoffered very useful feedback.

This research was made possible by a FacultyResearch Grant from the Professional Staff Con-gress of the City University of New York (PSC-

CUNY). Additional support was provided by theChancellors CUNY Haiti Initiative.

Obviously the individuals living in the campswho took their time to answer the queries some of whom invited the author to follow upare the backbone of this research, to whom it isdedicated.


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I. INTRODUCTIONJanuary 12, 2010 will forever be remembered asone of the worlds deadliest disasters. For thir-ty-five seconds the earth shook and reduced anation already struggling with the weight ofslavery, underdevelopment, imperialism, andintense internal divisionsto rubble. A con-servative estimate of 1.5 million peopleone insix people in Haiti lost their homes, while anestimated 300,000 people lost their lives. TheNational Palace and the surrounding area housing most of Haitis government offices were almost completely destroyed. In additionto the physical damage suffered, the govern-ment lost an estimated 17 percent of its work-

force in the temblor.

The world responded with one of the most ge-nerous outpourings of aid in recent history. ByMarch 1st, private citizens in the U.S. alone one in two people donated $1 billion for therelief effort, of a total of $2.2 billion in the firsttwo months (Katz 2010a). At a donors confe-rence on March 31 in New York, internationalagencies pledged $5.3 billion over the nexteighteen months. This donors conference also

ratified an Interim Haiti Reconstruction Com-mission (CIRH, in the French acronym), withU.N. Special Envoy Bill Clinton and Prime Minis-ter Max Bellerive as co-chairs.

Despite this effort, surprisingly little hasreached Haitis most vulnerable living in theinternally displaced persons (IDP) camps. In Ju-ly, six months following the earthquake, theCNN reported that only 2 percent of thepledged aid had arrived (CNN 2010). Otheragencies including Clinton have placed thefigure at ten percent, but the only funds ac-counted for are those going through the HaitiReconstruction Fund, run by the foreign-dominated CIRH.1 Even with this, very little ofthe aid is going to the Haitian government. Ac-

1

For disbursement figures, consult:http://www.haitireconstructionfund.org/hrf/members

cording to the AP, 33 percent of aid went to theU.S. military, while less than 1 percent went tothe Haitian government (Edmonds 2010). As ofthe beginning of April, the U.S. Red Cross col-lected $255 million but only allocated $106 mil-lion to Haiti, reserving the majority for adminis-trative and overhead costs (Edmonds 2010).

More than mere embarrassments, these fail-ures constitute violations of the human rights ofthe 1.5 million people living in the camps (thelatest tracking mechanism on September 14from the International Organization of Migra-tion, OIM in French, actually lists 1.3 million

people and an additional 200,000 using the ser-vices). The U.N.s Office for Coordination forHumanitarian Affairs (OCHA) presented GuidingPrinciples for Internally Displacement in 1998,ratified in 2005 by U.N. member states. It pro-vides some legal framework for IDP rights, in-cluding:

Principle 7: (2) rights to satisfactoryconditions of safety, nutrition, healthand hygiene

Principle 11: (2)(a) protection from-specific violence, forcedprostitution and any form of indecentassault

Principle 18: right to an adequate stan-dard of living, including; (a) Essentialfood and potable water; (b) Basic shel-ter and housing; (c) Appropriate cloth-ing; and (d) Essential medical servicesand sanitation

In addition to these Guiding Principles, theSpheres Project (www.spheres.org) coordinateda series of humanitarian actors and establishedthe Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Stan-dards. While self-governed and policed, theseare supposedly minimum standards by which allhumanitarian agencies are to adhere to follow-ing a natural disaster. The first, Common Stan-dard, mandates community participation: The


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disaster-affected population actively partici-pates in the assessment, design, implementa-tion, monitoring and evaluation of the assis-tance program. (For a summary of some perti-nent Minimum Standards consult the Appendix page 41). Other relevant standards are thatall people have safe and equitable access to asufficient quantity of water for drinking, cook-ing, and personal and domestic hygiene. Publicwater points are sufficiently close to householdsto enable use of the minimum water require-ment, noting the average water use is 15 litersper person per day. Another minimum standardthe humanitarian community set for itself is amaximum of 20 people use each toilet.

The legal enforceability of the above remains

tenuous, which is why they are referred to asguidelines or minimum standards. Thereare, however, more specifically delineatedrights, such as the Haitian Constitution 22 thatthe State recognizes the right of every citizento decent housing, education, food, and socialsecurity.2 In addition to this, the progenitor ofall Haitian law, there are numerous internation-al conventions, most of which Haiti has signedonto, such as:

1.

International Convention Relating to theStatus of Refugees (1951),Article 21;

2. Universal Declaration of Human Rights(1948), Article 25;

3. The Convention on the Rights of theChildstates that all children have theright to survival; to develop to the ful-lest; to protection from harmful influ-ences, abuse and exploitation;

4. Charter of the Organization of AmericanStates, Article 31, especially sections (i),(k), and (l);

5. American Convention on Human Rights,Articles 22 and 26;

6. the Right to Adequate Housing (Article11 (1) of the International Covenant on

2dcent, o-ciale

Economic, Social and Cultural Rights),CECSR3 General Comment 4, 12 Decem-ber 1991;

7. the Right to Water(article 11 and 12 ofthe International Covenant on Econom-ic, Social and Cultural Rights), CESCRGeneral Comment 15, 26 November2002, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2002/11, Com-mittee on Economic, Social and CulturalRights:http://www.who.int/water_sanitation_health/Documents/righttowater/righttowater.htm

Unfortunately, crowding out this discourse onhuman rights is another, reactionary refrainused to justify inaction. It is true that, as a resultof the uncoordinated, top-down approach to

food distribution, cases were documentedwherein families sent members to differentcamps to maximize their chances to get food(INURED 2010). However, nearly all NGO andinternational agency staff argue that peopleprimarily stay in camps in order to receive ser-vices. This narrative has carried weight, cited bymembers of the U.S. Congress as justificationfor delay sending the 1.15 billion in pledged aid.

This discussion has lethal consequences, as vital

aid is not making its way to the ground. For ex-ample, seven months following the earthquake,40 percent of IDP camps do not have access towater, and 30 percent do not have toilets of anykind. An estimated 10 percent of families have atent; the rest sleep under tarps or even bedsheets. In the midst of hurricane season withtorrential rains and heavy winds a regular oc-currence, many of the tents are ripped beyondrepair. Only a fifth of camps have education,health care, or psycho-social facilities on site.

Teams of evaluators have completed physicalinspections of most of the housing stock in Port-au-Prince, tagging the house in different colors,according to their habitability. Green housesfit for human habitation have become veryvaluable; according to U.N. staff, rent for green

3 Haiti is not a signatory to this CECSR.


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houses have gone up 300 percent. This makesmoving back out of the camps out of reach ofmost residents, as an estimated 70 to 85 per-cent of Port-au-Prince residents did not owntheir home before the earthquake. Most peoplewho thus remain in the camps, enduring thetorrential rain and wind as they batter the tentsand the resulting pools of mud and standingwater that attract disease vectors, do so be-cause they have no option. They are stuck, lit-erally in the mud.

For many other residents still traumatized bylosing their families, their worldly possessions,and their homes, the issue is whether or how tomove back to homes that have sustained dam-age. Many are still afraid to sleep under con-

crete. The question is how to tell whether dam-aged homes are repairable or whether thefoundations are fundamentally unsound. ThePublic Works teams have color coded these

yellow or red houses. Also an open questionis whether or how homeowners will obtain theresources to rebuild, especially given the lack offunds.

Even a cursory visit to the majority of IDP campsyields the inescapable conclusion that despitethe promises and the best efforts of humanita-rian actors, much more must be done. Like thethousands who are contemplating moving backinto their damaged homes, we need to ask, arepeople just falling through the cracks, or is thefoundation itself unsound?

The evidence systematically collected and ana-lyzed in this report argues the latter. Followingthe analysis are recommendations to fix the

system before it is too late. Prudence not tomention justice demands that we not wait tilthe next disaster to act.


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II. BACKGROUNDDespite a persistent rumor in the immediateaftermath, the temblor can hardly be blamedon collective acts of mankind, unlike two morerecent disasters, the oil spill emanating fromBPs offshore drill and the monsoons that ren-dered 20 million Pakistanis homeless, both har-bingers of overconsumption of fossil fuels andits attendant increase in global sea tempera-tures. But the damage done during a more re-cent earthquake, over five hundred times morepowerful, pales in comparison to Haiti.

Vulnerability

On February 28, an earthquake measuring 8.8

on the Richter scale ripped through Chile, caus-ing hundreds of deaths. While random chanceintervened, placing Haitis earthquake along anewly-discovered fault (Israel 2010) right byHaitis population center, most of the differencelies in Haitis heightened vulnerability to disas-ters.

While it is absolutely true that Chile, like theU.S., has its share of poverty and inequality,Haitis development indicators are and were

much worse than Chiles. For example, HaitisGross Domestic Product (GDP, total value ofgoods and services) per person was $428 in2005, while Chiles per capita GDP was $8,350in 2007. Half of Haitis people earn $1 per dayor less, whereas only 2 percent of Chiles citi-zens live under the international poverty lineof $1.25 per day. The latest figures for childmortality are instructive: 74 children out of1,000 die in Haiti whereas only 9 do in Chile. Forall these reasons, Haiti ranked 149th out of 182countries on the U.N.s Human Development

Index (HDI), whereas Chile ranked 44th. Haiti isthe least developed country in the Americas,while Chile shares a ranking with central Eu-rope. See Oliver-Smith (2010) for further discus-sion of the construction of Haitis vulnerability.

For an even clearer example, on September 4, aquake of similar magnitude (7.1) flattened

buildings in Canterbury, New Zealand, with noearthquake-related deaths (Dykstra 2010).

In addition to Haitis poverty, the earthquakewas rendered more deadly because of the rapidand anarchic urbanization since the 1980s. Ac-cording to Alex Dupuy (2010), Port-au-Princegrew from 150,000 in 1950, to 732,000 in theearly 1980s, to approximately 3 million peoplein 2008. Why did the population of Port-au-Prince increase fivefold since 1980? First, theUnited States Agency for International Devel-opment (USAID) demanded that Haitian dicta-tor Jean-Claude Duvalier kill off the entire indi-genous pig population following a 1978 out-

break of swine fever (now after recent eventsknown as H1N1). Haitian pigs required relativelylittle maintenance but could be sold to pay forschooling, medical expenses, and a range ofeconomic goods. They were de-facto bank ac-counts for the rural population (Diederich1985), so their genocide represented Haitisgreat stock market crash (Smith 2001:29).Their livelihood annihilated,4 many peasantsmigrated to the cities. Haitian economist anddirector of research for Haitis State University

(UEH) Fritz Deshommes estimated that neoli-beral policies destroyed 800,000 agricultural jobs (Bergan and Schuller 2009). In addition toneoliberalisms push factors, it provided sev-eral pull factors, most notably the siren songof low-wage factory jobs in Haitis offshore ap-parel industry. Duvalier boasted that with hiscollaboration with the World Bank, USAID, andother donors, Haiti would become the Taiwanof the Caribbean.

So where were newly landless peasants going tolive, including those lucky enough to find a jobfor about $2 per day in the factories? Port-au-

4

There were others, including attempts at reoriented Hai-power in large-holding peasants and requiring foreign-produced fertilizers that were maladapted to the Haitiansoil and other high inputs like labor and water (DeWindand Kinley 1988).


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Princes bidonvil, its shantytowns, were born.Since neoliberal policies, particularly lendinginstitutions Structural Adjustment Programs,cut what little public spending there was foreducation and health care, people particularlywomen heads of households had to use theirmeager earnings to fulfill these basic needs. Sopeople saved money where they could, manyliving on a seven-by-seven foot patch of land intomblike structures in neighborhoods wherethere no government investment in water,street maintenance and cleaning, or electricity.All of these factors direct outcomes of neoli-beral policies exacerbated Haitis vulnerabilityand added to the death toll.

All development indicators have seen a steady

decline from 1980 to 2007 except for two.These two indicators the incidence ofHIV/AIDS and literacy are exceptions preciselybecause they were mutual priorities of theelected governments of Haiti and donor groups.Since the 1995 Dole Amendment, USAID wasprevented from funding the government of Hai-ti, a manifestation of a divided U.S. governmentand the U.S. governments mistrust of Haitiselected governments of Aristide and Prval.However, because it was a priority, USAID was

allowed to work with Haitis government onHIV/AIDS. Haitis success in combating the dis-ease is a ray of hope: in just over a decade since1993, the seroprevalence went from 6.2 per-cent to about 3.2 percent (Cohen 2006).

In short, Haitis earthquake was rendered moredeadly by the implantation and continual appli-cation of neoliberalism, the so-called Washing-ton Consensus that donor groups like theWorld Bank, the Inter-American DevelopmentBank, and USAID imposed on countries in the

Global South like Haiti. The earthquake couldhave provided an opportunity for rethinking theeconomic model, with Bill Clinton famously apo-logizing for the promotion of subsidized Arkan-sas rice to the Senate Foreign Relations Com-mittee on March 10: It may have been goodfor some of my farmers in Arkansas, but it hasnot worked. It was a mistake. I had to live eve-

ryday with the consequences of the loss of ca-pacity to produce a rice crop in Haiti to feedthose people because of what I did; nobodyelse.

NGO-ization of the Country

One major plank in neoliberalism is a distrust ofstates and a preference for private-sector initia-tives and the elusive concept ofcivil society.Since the 1980s, NGOs have proliferated in Haitiand elsewhere. The 1990s saw a tenfold in-crease in their numbers, from 6,000 worldwidein 1990 to an estimated 60,000 by 1998(Economist, cited in Regan 2003:3). Currently,there are so many NGOs that we cant evenguess at their number (Riddell 2007:53). This

rise in the number of NGOs is matched with anincrease in funding through them. Globally, in2005, it is estimated that NGOs channeled any-where from 3.7 to 7.8 billion U.S. dollars ofhumanitarian assistance (DevelopmentInitiatives 2006:47), and 24 billion in overall de-velopment funding (Riddell 2007:259).

The pattern is true in Haiti, with only 74 NGOsout of an official count of 343 in 2006 beingpresent before the dechoukaj, before the ouster

of foreign-supported dictator Jean-Claude Du-valier (Schuller 2007). Since the Dole Amend-ment in 1995, all of USAID funds go throughNGOs. A senior U.N. official recently estimatedthat for all donors 98 percent of aid goes direct-ly to NGOs. Haitian researcher Sauveur Pierretienne called this situation an Invasion(1997). All this is to say, whereas NGOs may nothave created this neoliberal framework, theyaccepted an infusion of official government aid known in the field as Overseas DevelopmentAssistance. Like it or not, the fact that NGOs

accepted and continue to seek out more of thisaid and benefit by receiving it in ever-greateramounts to preside over the developmentsystem makes NGOs accountable for its clearfailure in Haiti.

Bill Clinton has repeatedly said that there are10,000 NGOs working in Haiti, which would


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Photo: Turgeau, August, 2010. There is much competitionbetween countries and NGOs with little coordination.

make the most NGOs per capita, one for every900 people. While it is unclear how he arrivedat this number, it is likely that he added up theassociations and local groups registered withthe various ministries. For example 6,000groups were registered with the Ministry of So-cial Affairs and Work (MAST). Student assistantsin the summer of 2009 received a copy of thislist for a Port-au-Prince neighborhood. Of the65 groups listed, only 2 still existed. Looking atthe timing of the founding of the agencies, anddiscussing with neighborhood leaders, suggeststhat they were created to carry out NGOprojects. Once the project ended, so did theassociation.

Whether one adopts the official statistic put outby the Minister of Planning and Foreign Coop-eration (MPCE) or Clintons estimate of 10,000

NGOs, a central issue within the NGO system iscoordination. According to MPCE staff, on anygiven year, only 10-20% of NGOs submit theirannual report to the government, despite it be-ing a requirement to function in the country.Since the 1980s through 2009, almost everyreport commissioned by donors, government ofHaiti, NGOs, or independent researchers, on

NGOs concludes with a rec-ommendation that NGOsneed to do a better jobcoordinating with oneanother, and the govern-ment needs to set a frame-work that NGOs will workunder, to avoid duplicationof services and gaps and toensure that local develop-ment priorities are beingimplemented.

The fact that for almost 30years researchers fromacross the political spectrummake the same recommen-

dations suggests that NGOscontinue to act on their own.

Many in Haiti call NGOs parallel states orstates within the state or simply fiefdomsbecause of their tendency toward isolation andnear total control over geographical regions.Further, NGOs directly drain the capacity of thestate by paying much higher salaries manypeople estimate three times what World Bankresearcher Alice Morton termed raiding(1997:25). The social and economic distance

that NGOs the backbone of Haitis middleclass are expressed in popular distrust ofNGOs as a structure. Some, playing on the self-named political class are beginning to discussHaitis NGO class that move from one job toanother, driving the newest and biggest cars,etc. (Schuller 2009).

Again, like with the case for neoliberalism andits destruction of the local economy, the earth-quake presented an opportunity to rethink theapproach to working with NGOs (Kristoff 2010).

Clinton even said that it was a mistake to workoutside of the Haitian government, creatingparallel structures that are unaccountable.Every time we spend a dollar in Haiti from nowon we have to ask ourselves, Does this have along-term return? Are we helping them becomemore self-sufficient? ... Are we serious aboutworking ourselves out of a job?
http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5gKIwJdtwwiDTwRfEMQ_Mm602cm8wD9ELVTQ80http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5gKIwJdtwwiDTwRfEMQ_Mm602cm8wD9ELVTQ80http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5gKIwJdtwwiDTwRfEMQ_Mm602cm8wD9ELVTQ80http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5gKIwJdtwwiDTwRfEMQ_Mm602cm8wD9ELVTQ80


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III. METHODOLOGYThe methodical approach began with selectinga team of qualified researchers. The author hastaught at the Facult dEthnologie since 2004,having a formal affiliation since 2003. Given theeconomic crisis in the country there are farmore qualified applicants than jobs. Over 70people applied. To minimize political influenceor bias the following criteria were selected andapplied: having finished with coursework; highoverall GPA; not having failed more than onecourse in the last year or two in the past two;having taken classes in development, NGOs,and methods; and during interviews candidateswere asked about candidates research andwork experience, their references, and their

strengths and weaknesses. After interviews theauthor verified with colleagues, including refer-ences students listed. Finally, assistants weresent to the field to conduct a practice surveyand write up the results, as the ultimate test oftheir capacity and initiative. This process wascomplicated by nearly daily protests at the Fa-cult dEthnologie.

Assistants were trained or had experience con-ducting research in the field. There were two

orientation meetings, and the author met witheach individual one-on-one to have a practiceand to discuss the issues encountered duringpractice field research.

Sampling

To begin the selection of camps to analyze, thelatest OIMs Displaced Tracking Matrix (DTM)spreadsheet was used. On the Cluster for CampCoordination and Management (CCCM) web-site, run by OIM, the latest database 5was dated

May 3, with 1282 sites overall and 841 withinthe Port-au-Prince metropolitan area. Everyeighth camp was selected for inclusion into thisresearch.

5This May 3 database was the first listing on the website,

As a purely random sample, it bears significantresemblance to the overall list. Of the overalldatabase, 138 camps were in Port-au-Prince(16%), 206 in Delmas (24%), 148 in Carrefour(18%), 98 in Petionville (12%), 55 in Cit Soleil(6.5%), 97 in Tabarre (12%), and 99 in Croix desBouquets (12%). Of the sample, 18 were in Port-au-Prince (17%), 25 in Delmas (24%), 18 in Car-refour (17%), 12 in Petionville (11%), 7 in CitSoleil (6.7%), 12 in Tabarre (11%), and 13 inCroix-des-Bouquets (12%).

In addition to the percentage of communeswhich would have obviously been similar giventhat the DTM was organized by commune, the

sample is similar in many other aspects to theoverall DTM. In terms of the type of camp, 85are collective, 17 are planned, 731 arespontaneous, and 4 are transitional. As ofMay 3, when the DTM was written, 183 had acamp management agency (22 percent). Thelargest camp had 16,732 families and the smal-lest had 10 families, with a mean of 391. Nearlyall the camps, 787 (97%) had a committee; 24did not and 30 camps did not have this informa-tion.

Within the sample of 105 camps, 12 are collec-tive center, 1 planned, 90 spontaneous, 1transitional, and 1 did not include this infor-mation. 26 have a camp management agency(25 percent). The largest camp had 8500 fami-lies and the smallest 15, with a mean of 395families. 96 of the camps had a committee(96%), 4 did not, and 5 camps did not includethis information.

Significantly, several camps were closed by May3, and many more by July 7, when the DTM wasupdated. 42 camps were noted as closed onthe May 3rd DTM, with 8 on the random sample.Disturbingly, an additional 19 camps (18%) wereclosed in the following two months. In order tomaintain the scientific verifiability, to make upfor the loss of the 27 closed camps, a randomsample of the July 7th DTM (861) was employed,


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one out of every 32 camps. In case of duplica-tion the following camp was used.

Methods

Assistants went to the field with a three-partsurvey in their hand, the first investigating theconditions and services, the second asking asample of four people their level of knowledgeand involvement in the committees, and thethird interviewing committees (see appendix).Especially during surveys of small camps it wasdifficult if not impossible to interview fourpeople by themselves, which would have influ-enced the data. In these cases only two peoplewere selected.6 In several cases, representativesof the camp committees directed contact be-

tween assistants and residents, in some case-sanswering for the resident. Regarding ques-tions about the camp conditions if the assistantcould not physically count the number of tents,for example, (s)he was instructed to obtain thisfigure from the committee representative. If agood estimate was not possible assistants wereinstructed to leave this blank.

For quality control purposes, the author hadthree camps analyzed by two different assis-

tants. In addition, the author followed up withat least one site visit per assistant. In severalinstances residents themselves invited the au-thor a foreign researcher to discuss the situ-ation and document conditions. The author vi-sited 31 IDP camps.

In several cases, the information about locationlisted on the DTM or on the Yellow Pages list-ing the committee representative and her/hisphone number was inaccurate, rendering it dif-ficult and in some cases impossible to find the

camp. A total of 113 camps were visited by as-sistants. Assistants wrote up reports, answering

6 In one camp, according to the researcher, responsesthere was never any follow up. Nothing improved in thecamp.

both the quantitative and qualitative, open-ended questions.

Analysis

Collaboratively, Chevalier Smail and the authordesigned an Excel database and trained assis-tants to enter information. Smail also super-vised other individuals to assist in the data en-try process, cross-verifying the information as-sistants entered with the database of the ran-dom selection. Because some camps could notbe found, their information was not enteredinto the Excel spreadsheet, so a total of 99camps were entered. Once the spreadsheet wascompleted, minor errors were identified andcorrected, variables redefined to be able to be

used within SPSS. Smail converted the Excelspreadsheet into SPSS. Given the coding anddata entry errors, the author corrected the Ex-cel spreadsheet and colleague Tania Levey atYork College re-programmed an SPSS file andconducted the simple regression and correla-tion analyses.

In the data analysis, to explore patterns in thegaps within services and to verify several hypo-theses several variables were designated as in-

dependent. In addition to the simple frequency,data were cross-tabulated with the followingindependent variables: land ownership, size ofthe camp, commune (city), the presence of anNGO camp management agency, and majorityof women committee members.


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IV. PHYSICAL CONDITIONS IN THE CAMPSOne is immediately struck by the physical condi-tions inside the camps, particularly following arainstorm (unfortunately quite a common oc-currence in the summer months). Without ex-ception (n = 31) sanitation and drainage forrainwater was a serious issue. On the morningfollowing a rainstorm it is common to find largepools of standing, muddy water often stret-ching 20 yards over which mosquitoes, flies,and other potential disease vectors circle over-head. While miraculously there has not yet been a serious outbreak of malaria or cholera,the state of sanitation is manifested in numer-ous cases of serious skin problems. In at leastone camp, Noailles, the researcher estimated

that almost all the children had a rash on theirbodies because of the heat that is trapped in-side the tents combined with the other diseasevectors. The author himself contracted a rashfollowing repeated exposure to these unsanita-ry conditions.

Photo: Coq Michelet Stael. St. Louis de Gonzague, July.

Bracketing the health consequences, this lack ofproper drainage and sanitation still representsserious environmental hazards, most notably

the smell. Even in camps with latrines, thestanding rainwater and mud is pungent, remi-niscent of pig farms. Often, documented by re-search assistants and the author, the mud seepsunderneath peoples tents or tarps, rendering itimpossible to sleep or keep personal effects such as voter ID cards, birth certificates, mar-riage licenses and memorabilia such as photosdry and intact. It is also impossible to sleepwhen the mud seeps in. Imagine; everythingaround you moves, said one resident.

Those whose houses were destroyed or serious-ly damaged who nonetheless have their lakouthe yard intact, and more than the average

economic resources or other means stay intents elevated from the ground by cinder blocksrecovered from the houses. But these sleepingberths are the distinct minority.

Sanitation

People staying at or neartheir houses and not insideone of the eight hundredcamps within the capital do

not have to contend with theproblems associated withsharing a bathroom withneighbors. At even the bestmanaged camps, this is awidespread concern. TheSphere minimum standardsrecently translated into Hai-tian Creole7 outline twoways to address this sharing:facilities are either sex-segregated or shared by

household. The author onlyencountered two camps withsex-segregated toilets, and

these were both very large camps, planned re-settlements. The lack of gender-segregated fa-

7

http://www.sphereproject.org/component/option,com_doman/task,doc_details/Itemid,203/gid,406/lang,english/


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cilities poses serious problems, particularly forwomen.

Carine Exantus, a FASCH (Social Sciences) col-lege student and author of a blog reportingfrom the camp in Champs-de-Mars across theNational Palace,8 recalled in an interview,

In my camp, there are 12 toilets in thefront, 12 toilets in the back for 4,200people. When I wake up very early, Ihave a friend who lives right near here,and in the early mornings I can go toher house and she lets me use hershower. But in the camp, the shower veryone at their tent has a littleplastic basin, where they throw water

over themselves, or they just shower inpublic. They put water in their basinand they bathe like that, there aremany young men and women who do itthat way. In my journal I wrote aboutthis; young women suffer sexual ag-gression because they have to takeshowers in public.9

The Minimum Standards are also clear abouthow many people should share a toilet: no

more than 20. It is clear from Carines testimonythat these conditions are not even being metright in front of the National Palace, where for-eign NGOs, dignitaries such as former U.S. pres-idents, and journalists visit. The toilets line theoutside of the camp, presenting the appearanceof plenty. Hidden from passersbys view arerows and rows of tarps and tents.

And this is in a camp that is relatively well takencare of. Away from the glaring gaze of foreign-ers there are camps that are far worse off. In

Place de la Paix (Peace Plaza), in the Delmas 2neighborhood, also lining the perimeter, therewas a row of toilets next to the trash recep-

8

http://www.conversationsforabetterworld.com/author/Carine%20Exantus/9

Interview with author and Beverly Bell, July 2010. Tran-scribed and translated by Laura Wagner.

tacles, which was next to the water distributionand the site for the mobile clinic. Strikingly,there were only 30 toilets for 30,400 people. Ina small camp in Carrefour, to go to the bath-room people have to ask a neighbor whosehouse is still standing. Camp leader Carline ex-plains, Its embarrassing. And even thoughthey are neighbors, its starting to strain ourrelationship. They have to buy water and carryit back into the camp.

According to the latest DTM, 6,820 people livein the soccer field outside of the rectory in Soli-no. Despite this density, residents had to waitfor almost five months for the first toilets toarrive. When asked how people defecate, a res-ident held up a small plastic bag usually used to

sell half cups of sugar, or penny candy. Wethrow it in the ravine across the street. In theCAJIT camp, housing almost 2500 people in afar-off neighborhood in Carrefour, there wereno toilets either portable or latrines at leastas of August 12, seven months following theearthquake.

These cases are unfortunately not isolated. Ac-cording to even the most conservative esti-mates, with some large camps in which assis-

tants had to estimate taken out of the sample,the average number of people sharing a toilet inthe Port-au-Prince metropolitan area is 273people. Thirty percent (27 out of 89) of campswith verified information did not have any toi-lets at all. Another investigation from LAMP,IJDH, LERN, and the University of San FranciscoLaw School found similar results, that 27 per-cent of families had to defecate in a plastic con-tainer or an open area (The LAMP for HaitiFoundation, et al. 2010). This data was sevenmonths following the earthquake, despite the

persistent narrative that people are swelling thecamps or faking it, just using the camps dur-ing the daytime primarily in search of services.

For the camps with services, the most commonare latrines, pit toilets with a hole dug in theground (35, or 62.5 percent), followed by plasticportable toilets (19, or 34.0%). In a small minor-


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ity of camps (2, or 3.6%), residentshad access to flush toilets. Installingtoilets is one of the most importantservice provided by NGOs. Unfortu-nately residents needs dont stopwith their installation, and many arenot cleaned on a regular basis. While25 camps report that their toilets arecleaned every day (37 percent mostly those with portable toilets),10 camps (15%) report that they arecleaned less often than once permonth, and 17 (25%) report not hav-ing the toilets cleaned at all. Theytreat us like animals! said an exaspe-rated resident. She was interruptedby a neighbor: worse! Animals live

better than us. Some members of the WASH(Water and Sanitation) cluster are frustrated atwhat they see as the irresponsibility of NGOs:We call and call and write report after report.Some just flatly ignore us.

Water

In addition to sanitation, arguably even moreimportant, is the provision of safe, clean, water.In several reports the UN highlights the distribu-

tion of water to 1.2 million people (Ban 2010) asa success of the ensemble of agencies andNGOs. Like sanitation, there are still as of sev-en months following the earthquake largegaps in water distribution to IDP camps.

Take for example the case of Bobin, in a ravineoutside of Ption-ville, in a popular neighbor-hood off of Route des Frres. As of sevenmonths following the earthquake, the 2775 res-idents (according to the DTM, there were 1591people) still had no water. A single PVC pipe

that had cracked offers some people a couple ofbuckets whenever the government turns on thetap for paying clients. Many people use therainwater in the trash-filled ravine. Some indi-viduals had the opportunity to fetch water froma nearby tap, either privately owned or at anearby camp. Residents mentioned that NGOshad talked about installing a water system but

Photo: unnamed camp, Delmas, August, 2010. Fortunately

this camp has water, unlike 40 percent that do not.

seven months after the earthquake, it still hadyet to materialize. According to Valerie Kaussenwho investigated the situation, most of theproblem lies in the fact that two NGOs, Solida-rit and World Vision International, had begunto work in the camp at the same time, so eachassumed the other would finish the project.World Vision got out. Despite this, the OIMCamp Management Officer (CMO, the official

representative and responsible party for thecity) in Ption-Ville, referred Dr. Kaussen toWorld Vision as the Camp Management Agency.Months later, at the end of September, follow-ing advocacy from Kaussen and the report au-thor, progress was finally made in Bobin.

Several other camps, particularly in Cit Soleiland CAJIT in the hills above Carrefour notedabove, were without water as the researchteam investigated. Said Olga Ulysse, CAJIT lead-er, Carrefour is blessed with many little

springs. But the problem is that they are run-ning under the destroyed houses and the de-composing bodies. Its very unhealthy, yes. Butwe dont have any choice at all. The otherchoice is to walk downhill to the adjacent camp,pay for a bucket of water, and carry it back upthe hill.


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Of the camps wherein assistants could obtainreliable information, 30 out of 71, or 40.5 per-cent, of camps did not have a water supply, and3 others (4.1 percent) had a nearby PVC pipethat was tapped outside the camp. The humanrights investigation cited above (LAMP et. al.2010) noted similar results, that 44 percent offamilies drank untreated water. With the nota-ble exception of the WASH cluster who distin-guishes themselves by being the only one led bythe Haitian government, accountable to thepeople and not the NGOs and characterized byan activist, hands-on approach to filling thegaps in services, people from all levels of the aidindustry repeated the refrain that providing life-saving necessities encourages dependency. Saidone NGO worker, people are only living in the

camps in order to get the free services. Thisdiscourse has wide currency in aid circles andforeign parliaments, including U.S. Congress. Inaddition to this issue, several commentatorspointed to the issue of profit-making. Accordingto a person who works at a foreign develop-ment agency, private water company ownerspersuaded Prval to stop free water distributionbecause it was cutting into their profits (per-sonal communication withforeign development evalua-

tor, July 2010).

Several other minimumstandards are not being metregarding water provision.According to the SphereProject, the average per-sons water intake is 15 litersper day. Even given the pub-licly available information(NGOs self reporting), moreneeds to be done to attain

this goal (interview withWASH cluster, August 2010).Given the constraints on themethodology of this re-search, relying on residentsknowledge of the quantity ofwater, and quality (maximum levels of bacteriaand other toxins in the water) more specific

information is not possible. According to resi-dents reporting, two thirds of the water distri-buted is treated. A minimum standard that ap-pears to be attained is that the nearest sourceneeds to be no farther than 500 meters away.There are only a few camps wherein this dis-tance is even possible, and those that are largeenough are planned resettlement sites whereinNGOs and the OIM followed protocol.

Health Care

Given the very poor state of the health care sec-tor before the earthquake, this sector overallhas improved following the efforts of donorsand NGOs coordinating with the Haitian gov-ernment. Ground was recently broken on a

new, large capacity teaching hospital in Mireba-lais in partnership with Partners in Health /Zanmi Lasante and the Haitian government,approved by the Haiti Reconstruction Fund intheir second meeting in August (Charles2010).Within the flurry of news coverage mark-ing the six month point, Clinton and othersclaimed success because of the lack of out-breaks of public health catastrophes which oth-

Photo: Caradeux camp, July 2010. Despite the initial in-vestment and appearance of health care facillites, theyhave been neglected according to residents.


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erwise would be expected given the state ofsanitation within the camps, notably malariaand cholera. Clinton and others pointed to theexistence of mobile clinics and other vaccina-tion programs to explain this success, withoutciting epidemiological research.

Indeed, there are several gaps within the cover-age of health care facilities inside the IDPcamps. Only one camp in five has any sort ofclinic facility on-site. This number does not ac-count for quality. For example, in one camp,Carradeux, a tent was provided by UNICEF thatresembles a clinic, but it was completely empty:no medicines, no first aid supplies, and no nursepractitioners were present on researchers fivevisits to this camp. Im a nurse, executive

committee member Elvire Constant began. Butwe dont have the means to serve the popula-tion. I spoke on TV and radio, telling the minis-ter of public health that there are nurses availa-ble, and the population is vast [24,161, accord-the tent is here, but they have never come by,not even one day, to negotiate with us, to tellus whether it could be a mobile clinic or ahealth center. Inside the camp a couple hun-dred meters, a tent from Save the Children

whose purpose eluded everyone I asked wasempty and ripped past the point of providingany shelter. Carradeux is an officially-managed,planned relocation site, and supposed to there-fore be an example for others. Indeed, the re-searcher who visited the camp gave this camp a3 out of 10 as far as overall quality, with 1 beingacceptable and 10 being the worst imaginable.Most other camps were given higher scores,meaning the conditions were worse.

According to residents, the median walking dis-

tance to the nearest clinic was 20 minutes, withthe mean being 27 minutes. Five camps are soisolated that residents told researchers that ittakes 90 minutes to reach the nearest clinic.The same can be said of pharmacies. While inthe earthquakes immediate aftermath medica-tions were given to residents free of charge, thispractice stopped early on in most camps and

Photo: Caradeux, July. Flooding often occurs when it rains,also causing standing water.

neighborhoods. Nine out of 85 responses, tenpercent, of camps had some form of a pharma-cy on-site. The mean time to walk to the near-est pharmacy was 25 minutes, with the farthest

being two hours.

Education

Education under duress even before January12 remains in crisis, particularly for peopleliving within the camps. Students were withoutschools for three months, as the governmentgave a deadline of April 5, the day after Easter,for schools to reopen. Despite this, up to 40% ofschools could not re-open because of the extentof the damage to physical buildings and the

deaths of school personnel (interview with gov-ernment official, July 2010).10

10outlines 80 percent of schools had re-opened in Port-au-Prince.


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Photos: Esaie Jules Gelin. Solino, April 2010. Children ex-posed to hazardous conditions in the camps because theydo not have access to school.

Even for schools that re-opened, many children

do not have access to attend. In Haiti, even be-fore the earthquake, schools were among fami-lies highest expense. Career popular educatorand activist Reyneld Sanon estimated that, in agood school, you can pay up to 20,000-25,000Haitian gourdes ($500-625) per year per child.For schools of questionable quality, known aslekl blt (literally, lottery school, in otherwords, take your chances), tuition and fees forone child amounted to a third of Haitis mini-mum wage of 70 gourdes ($1.75) per day.11 Forthose living in camps this problem was exacer-bated. On top of this issue of funds in a devas-tated economy, people living in camps have theadditional concern of the farther transport. One

11

summer of 2009, President Prval suggested 125 gourdes($3.12).

resident, a mother of three school-aged child-ren, told that she didnt send her children toschools because of the time and the expense insending them to school: It is three kous(routes) to get to school 25 goud per personand an hour and a half each way if there is traf-fic. In the Corail camp, in the desert difficultiesof transport are even worse. Corail is four kousto town, and at least an hour and a half withgood traffic on public transport.

For all these reasons, building schools withinthe camps is a necessity if the 600,000 childrenliving in camps are to have an education. It is acrisis. We are setting ourselves up to lose ageneration, said a camp committee leader inCarrefour. Despite this, according to UN staff,

the government issued a decree forbiddingschools from being built within the camps (in-terview with author, August 2010). In additionto the very powerful refrain that providing ser-vices within camps would encourage people tostay in the camps indefinitely and hinderprogress in rebuilding peoples houses, this per-sons analysis was quite blunt: In Haiti, schoolsare the most profitable industry. While statis-tics are not available to verify the claim, thepoint is clear.

Photo: Public school, Routes des Frres, August 2010. Offi-cial statistics say 80% of schools have been reopened. OIMofficials pressured residents from leaving the grounds.

As is the effect. Only 21 camps (21 percent) hada school as part of its services. Said Samuel R-my, one of 6,000 people displaced from the


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Saint Louis de Gonzague school around the April5th deadline, There are 3,000 children here.Dont we pp la (the people, poor majority)have a right to school as well? Education is aright guaranteed by Article 32.1 in Haitis consti-tution. As the new school year approaches, IDPshave made education for their children a focusof mobilization, for example on Monday, Sep-tember 13.

Condition of the Tents

While many foreign policymakers suggest thatHaitis poor majority are living better than theyhave before the earthquake, they are forgettingthe simple reality that living under tents ortarps do not provide adequate shelter against

the harsh Caribbean conditions of extremelyhot sun, winds, and tropical rains. In somecamps, half of the tents were ripped beyondrepair because of the winds. Elvire Constantrecalled, the wind is crazy. Last night [earlyAugust] the wind blew for more than threehours straight. I woke up, got up on my kneesand held the tent up, left and right so that thetent wouldnt blow away with me. Whats moreserious is the afternoon sun. Elvire had toleave her tent because it was destroyed. She

pointed to another, where we were standing

Photo: Caradeux, July 2010. This tent that the wind rippedwas only installed ten days prior, the persons second.

right by the entrance to the camp, just recentlyshredded by that nights winds. The tent was onthe ground not more than ten days. In all thecamps visited, at least the bottom portion ofthe tents were covered in mud. In at least onecamp, Obama3, the majority of tents wereripped as of early August.

These are the people who have tents. Mostpeople in the camps dont even have a tent.Assistants estimated that only ten percent offamilies living in the camps have a tent. Humanrights investigators noted that of the 58 familiesstudied in six camps, 78 percent did not live inan enclosed area (LAMP et al., 2010). For exam-ple, in Delmas 2, in Place de la Paix (Peace Pla-za), the vast majority slept under tarps, that

were set up in a patchwork fashion to cover theplaza. Rare was an individual tent underneaththis roof that still leaked when it rained.Berthe Israel, president of a twenty-year oldassociation called Men Nan Men (Hand inHand), said, The tents we have are minimal.Theres probably 10 tents inside [for 6901 fami-lies per the DTM]. I dont believe there are 50,at most. You can see for yourself. [The authordid.] The vast majority is under tarps. I wonder,what if theres a fire? The entire camp would go

up in flames. How can these people save the 2-3things they have?

This is not merely an academic con-cern. The hurricane season is uponus; two years ago this month 793people lost their lives following fourtropical storms. The conditions areripe for an even greater catastrophegiven peoples housing situation. Luckand hope is not good social policy foravoiding disaster.

Case in point: a storm on Friday, Sep-tember 24 that was not connected toa tropical storm killed five and injured50 (Delva 2010).

On the six-month anniversary, when the gov-ernment was handing out medals to foreigners,


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Photo: July 2010. Tents destroyed at Corail, a week beforerains destroyed hundreds of tents.

hundreds of tents were ripped in Corail follow-ing a light rain.

The core emergency disaster preparedness planpromoted by the UN and touted as a success by

several media stories involves textingmessages to community leaders cellphones. Unfortunately without access toelectricity many peoples cell phones arehabitually not working. In 50 out of 94valid responses, camps have a place tocharge cell phones, but this service is notfree. That this service is even available atall is an outcome of peoples initiative toinstall a wire to an existing one. Somerandom individuals have their own plug.Often as a result, peoples cell phonesare no longer in service. According toresearch assistants who attempted tocontact camp committee representa-tives listed on the OIMs Yellow Pages,

around 80 percent of the residents phones

were invalid. The likely reason is this issue ofmoney to charge the phone.

Added up together, the camp conditions are farinadequate, subhuman, and violations of hu-man rights. We must do better.

Photo: Place de la Paix, Delmas 2, July 2010. There isonly a patchwork of tarps covering the camp. Notethe sunlight coming through, where rain seeps in.

Photo: Soeurs Salessiens, August 2010. In several camps, the majorityof tents are ripped beyond repair seven months following the earth-quake.


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V. PATTERNS IN THE GAPS IN SERVICESSeen from above, in terms of abstracted statis-tics of numbers of people served 4.3 millionpeople were given food, 2.1 million people non-food items, and 1.2 million receive water onregular basis (UN Security Generals Report,September 1) it appears that progress is beingmade.

Seen from below, from the residents, the situa-tion looks quite different. For example, 173people said that aid arrived out of 324 people(53.4%), with 7 people reporting that they didnot know. Put another way, four out of ninepeople (44.4%) said that no aid arrived what-soever, in any form. The LERN / IJDH / LAMP / U

of San Francisco human rights investigation re-ported that 75 percent of families had a personwho did not eat an entire day in the previousweek. This was in July (LERN et al., 2010).

Of the aid that arrived, almost half (46.5%)stopped distribution in or before April 3-4months since the interviews and more than athird (35.1%) stopped in or before March 4-5months in the past. That said, 31.7 percent ofthe aid which includes water, food, first aid

kits, tents, etc.12

was last distributed in July.

However if we are to improve the situation forthe 1.3 million residents of the camps, we needto ask, are there patterns in terms of who is notbeing served, and why? Some camps are farbetter managed and served than others. Thereare patterns within the gaps in service thatneed to be addressed. In addition to the simplestatistics listed above, correlations in the datawere explored with a range of variables. Analy-sis of the data using SPSS yielded four statisti-cally significant differences in services: thepresence of NGO camp management agencies,the municipality, the size of the camp, andownership of the land on which the camps sit.

12For example, some consider water to be aid while some donot, reserving the term for food distribution only.

NGO Camp Managers

This is the most obvious difference, and thank-fully so. Data shows that camps with NGO man-agers are far better serviced than camps with-out managers. This is as it should be; the prima-ry role of camp managers is to assure and su-pervise service delivery. That said, as of the July7 DTM database, only 20.8 percent of camps(171 of 822 listed in the metropolitan area) hadan NGO management agency. NGO-managedcamps are more represented in the randomsample in this study, 33 percent.

For example, while the overall percentage of

camps with water provided was 57.7%, the per-centage is much higher (88.5%) in camps withan NGO management agency than those with-out (40%). The same is true of health care; whe-reas one in five camps overall had an onsiteclinic, NGO-managed camps had twice thatnumber (37.5%) while non-managed camps hadhalf (11.1%). In overall conditions, on a scalefrom 1 to 10, with one being best, assistantsassigned a mean of 5.1 for NGO managedcamps and 6.4 for non-NGO managed camps.

This isnt perfect, as one of the worst (10) ma-naged camps, Place de la Paix in Delmas 2 notedabove, has an NGO camp management agency.

While there is indeed some hope in this finding that NGO management agencies appear tomake a difference in services provided to theresidents the question must be asked as towhy the vast majority of camps four in five do not have a management agency. OIM staffsaid that despite the information diligently col-lected about services or lack thereof, they have

no mechanism to force NGOs to become campmanagement agencies. Its a thankless job,said one. That said, there is clearly much morework to be done, particularly in areas typicallyunderserved by NGOs. An NGO that is amongthe most visible and hard-working in Cit Soleilbristled at being listed as camp manager forfear of the communication of public responsibil-


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ity that this designation connoted. Others arejust plain lazy, said a development agency offi-cial on condition of anonymity.

Municipality

Maybe its because were hidden away inside

that the NGOs have forgotten us, but were the

area that is most affected! This area, Fort-

National and Pivoine, doesnt have a big road so

the NGO trucks just dont see us. Maybe they

just dont see us. Ti Georges, camp com-mittee leader in Pivoine

There are definitely geographical differences inthe services offered. For example, the percen-tage of camps with water is greater in the cen-

tral cities of Delmas, Port-au-Prince, and Ption-Ville, where the NGOs and the UN are head-quartered. 83 percent of the camps in Delmashad water, whereas only 29 percent of camps inCroix-des-Bouquets and 25 percent in Carrefourhad water.13 It is possible that Carrefour resi-dents have better access to CAMEP, the publicwater facilities or the sources. But it is consis-tent with the other findings. Simply put, Carre-four is farther away, with many camps off themain highway. Camps in Carrefour are also less

likely (10.5%) to have a childrens play spacethan average (18.8%), to say the least aboutPtion-Ville (33.3%).

The first words from Olga Ulysse, leader withinthe CAJIT camp in Carrefour and Madanm Sara(international commercial importer) whosebusiness was totally destroyed with her house,were gratitude that we even showed up:People make appointments and they dontcome. I dont know if its too far or if people areafraid of the mountain. Her colleague Madame

Odrigue, who is an elected member of thecommunity council, the official local govern-ment, had another theory: Its because the

13 Regrettably the assistant who primarily worked in CitSoleil was not present when each camp was discussed(given the questionnaire there was an issue of coding),there were only two valid responses. But consistently CitSoleil is far below average on every other indicator.

donors dont get credit for giving us water, un-like down the hill next to the Route National.

This geographical difference in services is mostnoticeable in Cit Soleil, Port-au-Princes largestand poorest shantytown. None of the camps inCit Soleil had a school, a canteen, a childrensrecreational center, or a space that adults canuse for committee meetings or other program-ming. Cit Soleil is far underserved becauseNGOs are afraid to, or dont want to, workthere. WASH and the IOM have a close collabo-ration in Cit Soleil, but we cant do more thanpush. The NGOs would rather work in the lessbadly hit, wealthier suburb of Petion-Ville (alsoclose to their offices) rather than where thegreatest need is, decried the Cit Soleil IOM

officer, who correctly predicted that this datawould show a much lower rate of coverage inhis area. Cit Soleil and other shantytowns sub-sumed under larger communes such as Carre-four Feuilles and Delmas 2 were declared RedZones in the violent period following Aristidesforced ouster in 2004.14

The situation of duplication in Bobin, which inthe end meant that both NGOs dropped it,would never have occurred in Cit Soleil. I can

barely get the NGOs to come visit Cit Soleil,Delmas 2, Bel-Air, etc. Some say that they cant.Some say that their car rental insurance wontcover it. Some say they are legally prevented. Inany case, these are the areas of greatest need.Feast or famine, the problem is the same: lackof NGO coordination and the Haitian govern-ments inability to mandate coverage.

As, of course, is the result.

14 While it is true that many of these areas have been sitesfo violence, they are not more so than others not so desig-nated. They were, however, the focus of clashes betweenU.N. troops and local armed groups. According to many ,this designation is a reflection of the distrust of the poorpoor in these areas, known as hotbeds of Aristide support.


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Size of the Camps

Size matters in the camps, a combination of thisissue of NGO visibility and the refrain thatpeople are only staying in camps to get services,and therefore cutting services will spur peopleon to rebuild their homes. Smaller camps those with 100 or fewer families receive farless services than larger ones. OIM and otherhumanitarian agencies began talking about aphenomenon of ghost (shrinking and disap-pearing) camps, particularly since April, afterthe general food distribution stopped. One hu-manitarian was quite direct: places with fewerthan 200 families arent camps. We need tostop calling them camps and treating them likecamps. Another was even more direct, accord-

ing to International Action Ties, saying that, ifthe camp doesnt have more than 150 people, itdoesnt exist according to IOM.

Photo: Carrefour, Route des Rails, July 2010. Most campslike this right on the street are not officially recognized.

For example, camps with more than 1,000 fami-lies were more likely to have water (67%) thanthe overall average, whereas camps with 100 orfewer families were far less likely to have water only 30%. The percentage of small (100 orfewer families) camps that had a clinic onsitewas far smaller (6.3%) than average (19%), and

certainly than large (more than 1,000 families)camps (58%). In addition, small-to-mediumcamps (up to 200 families) were also under-serviced: none in the sample had a clinic. Smallcamps were also less likely to have a childrensplay space (6.3, compared to 18% average), andlarge camps were also much more likely to havepsycho-social centers (58 percent, compared toan average of 16%).

Peoples top priority especially people havingto keep all their belongings in a tent that can ripor be ripped, offering only the most minimalprotection from the hot Caribbean sun and thetropical rain storms that have been batteringthe island is to be moved into their old house,or a permanent house. Thats why people

choose to stay in a small, spontaneous shelterclose by their old home, where their social ties,friends, families, churches, school, business,

street commerce, etc. remain. Onedonor representative was quiteblunt: if we keep giving them ser-vices people will never move backinto their homes. So these verypeople in the small camps tryingdesperately to do just that are in asecond tier of camps that dont

offer any services. One committeeleader, Carline Cherline, decriedthat the only time they got helpwas from a private citizen, whohappened to have two tents togive. After that, nothing at all. Noone has come to offer aid. Theother ten shelters crowding thelakou (yard) of a private home,people had to buy. As if predicting

a concern from visiting officials, they shouldcome by at night and see how many people are

sleeping here. During the day, people are out inthe market, out at school, out trying to make aliving. This policy of shutting down smallercamps is also impractical, as many large camps,particularly official re-settlement sites like Co-rail or Tabarre Issa, wont accept new residents.As many people asked, where are we going togo?


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Land Owner

Among other things, the earthquake destroyedwalls that protected private property, such asthe Ption-ville Club a private golf club thatbecame home to 30,100 people as of July. Des-perately seeking shelter, this poses a funda-mental conflict of interest: landowners right totheir property and residents rights to decenttemporary shelter and living conditions. Againon the belief that people are living in the campsbecause of the services provided, some privateowners have cut off life-saving services, to getpeople to willingly leave the camps. NGOs andthe UN cannot interfere when the owner doesnot want us there, said an official.

The result is that camps on public land havemore services than those on private land.Camps that are on government land are morelikely to have water (75%) than those on privateland (51.8%).15 The differences in health provi-sion are more dramatic; 39 percent of camps onstate land had a clinic, whereas only 12 percentof camps on private land did. Camps on publicland were almost twice as likely to have aschool (32%, compared to 17%). Among otherissues there is also a significant difference re-

garding spaces for children to play (12 percenton private land, 27 percent on state land).

For example, the administration of the Saint-Louis de Gonzague school refused NGOs accessto provide services. They stopped food distribu-tion after the first time, and refused water. InMarch, there was only group of four toilets inthe camp, for almost 12,000 people. Campleader Elvire Constant who lived there at thetime recalled, Doctors Without Borders wassupposed to return to build more toilets, but

thats been suspended. They even stopped amobile clinic! I was forced to go uphill look forthe Americans to build a mobile clinic here. Butthe priest told the Americans to not pile up thegrounds! He said there were too many tents in

15The data set was too small to be statistically significant

for camps on schools or churches for analysis.

the compound, that the space was saturated.Because Saint-Louis is in the centrally located,densely-NGO-populated Delmas, residents didhave the opportunity to walk to a nearby campfor some but not all of the necessary servic-es.

Samuel Rmy, with a group called ComitdAction pour le camp de St. Louis (CAS), arguedthat this withholding was an attempt to starvepeople out. They know that we need food,clean water, latrines, and other materials. Butwe here have no choice but to stay here so wefind what we need outside. According to sev-eral neighborhood leaders, including Jean-Manno Paul with Regroupment des Victims de12 Janvier (Network of Victims of January 12),

the school director kept the Red Cross and Me-decins Sans Frontires from providing services.One day we visited, a group of Cuban doctorssat sheepishly in the entrance, waiting for au-thorization.

Eventually half of the residents of Saint-Louis deGonzague were moved to Carradeux, includingElvire, in April. But this situation of starvingpeople out of services is far from unique: Inter-national Action Ties has documented at least

five other locations where this same situationoccurred (2010a).

This forced eviction is also one of several securi-ty issues faced by people living in the camps.


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VI. SECURITY ISSUESGiven the persistence of the discourse of peopleliving better than they had before the earth-quake given the increased foreign presence andprovision of services, one might easily forgetthat tents offer no protection against insecurity.Said a 23-year old woman who preferred to re-main anonymous for security reasons, A nailfile or a razor can rip my tent. Thats why I cantleave, or if I do, I have to carry my money and[legal] papers with me.

Gender-Based Violence

As Carines testimony about having to bathe inpublic powerfully demonstrates, women living

in the camps are at risk of unwanted advances,rape, and sexual violence. Womens organiza-tion KOFAVIV (Commission of Women Victimsfor Victims) reported 230 incidences of rape in15 camps (Bell 2010b). Mdecins Sans Fron-tires reported 68 cases of rape in one of theirclinics in April (Institute for Justice andDemocracy in Haiti, et al. 2010). A study au-thored by five agencies based on two delega-tions including lawyers and womens health ex-perts concluded that the reasons for this rise in

rape are many: overcrowding, lack of privacy,lack of preventative measures, and inadequateresponse from government and the UN.

Grassroots womens organizations like FAVILEKand KOFAVIV have been courageously respond-ing to this rise in violence, documenting, ac-companying survivors to assure adequate policeand medical response, organizing night vigils,and organizing women to denounce the limitedresponse. Unfortunately many of these activistsare becoming targets themselves. Said KOFA-

VIVs Malya Villard:

I decided to leave the camp because Iwas a victim of violence, where a prisonescapee pulled a gun on me, pressuringme. He told me that the police is behindhim, he uses the polices firearms, thathe killed a lot of people, raped a lot of

women, and kidnapped many people.That camp has a lot of people who escapedfrom prison living inside [according toofficial statistics, 5,409 had escaped].He said that he wasnt alone; he had ateam of some 50 people. So, I wasforced to leave the camp because ofthis.

This followed the attempted rape of a child ofEramithe Delva, another leader within KOFAVIV:A young man tried to rape a child of ours here.When we went to the police station right here,they didnt even come and they never even

conducted an investigation. I explained that theguy returned under the tent and had a weaponin his hand. A police officer said, I cant say any-thing. Thats Prvals problem. Prval has to getinvolved.

When asked if the police conduct patrols, sev-eral camp residents said the same thing; thatwhile it may be true that police patrol the peri-meter of the largest and highest visibility campssuch as the one in Champs-de-Mars, they rarely,

if ever, go inside the camps. According to anAugust study by the U.S. Institute for Peace, 75percent of IDPs report not having ever seen anypolice either PNH (Haitian National Police) orMINUSTAH (UN Mission for the Stabilization ofHaiti). According to KOFAVIV, only 6 camps outof the 1300 have regular police patrols.

One Solution: Permanent Housing

While it is not a panacea, permanent housing isone clear solution to stemming the tide of rape.

As Eramithe Delva, one of KOFAVIVs leaders,argues, I think that if someone had a house tostay in, she is in more security. Now, people aresleeping under plastic. All it takes is someone tocome by with a razor and rip the tent, and hecan come inside and do what he wants. Its likeyoure sleeping in the street if youre in a tent.Even the so-called T-shelters (temporary shel-


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ters) are made of the same materialthat is easy to rip. Despite this, verylittle progress has been made in clear-ing the rubble and rebuilding perma-nent housing to date. A September 11AP article cited that 2 percent of therubble has been cleared.

Of the Minister of Public Works surveyof 230,000 buildings, half (50.2%) weredeclared green, or structurally sound,27.3% declared yellow, in need re-pair, and 22.4 % were red or recom-mended for demolition (Ban 2010).Funds have not been allocated tohomeowners to clear and repair theirhousing. According to neighbors, it costs up to

20,000 U.S. dollars to demolish and clear ahouse. Neither the Haitian government nor do-nors and NGOs are offering assistance or subsi-dies to homeowners. Given that the earthquakedestroyed many peoples livelihoods, only theprivileged few are able to invest in home repair.Even solidly middle-class people such as all buttwo families in the neighborhood of Christ-Roihave abandoned their homes.

Another roadblock cited by government and

international agencies is the issue of land te-nure. An estimated 70-85 percent of Port-au-Prince residents did not own their home beforethe earthquake.16 While the country has emi-nent domain laws (8th of July 1921 Decree onthe Recognition of Public Interest)17 the Prvalgovernment is loathe to use it. Haitis first coupdtat against liberator Jean-Jacques Dessalineswas triggered by his decision to appropriatelands of the ancien libre people who ownedland before the Haitian Revolution. The issue ofland tenure is also behind another security crisis

for Haitis 1.3 million IDPs (Padgett andDesvarieux 2010).

16Became Ga

17 At a July 2010 Bureaux des Avocats Internationaux (BAI,o-the state has the right to declare privateproperty for social and housing purposes under the 8th of

Photo: Soeurs Salessiens, August, 2010. School officialspressured residents to leave. Those who remained havenowhere else to go.

Forced Eviction

Most IDPs face another form of insecurity, thethreat of forced eviction or expulsion. Ofthe sample, 71.9 percent of the camps are onprivate land, with the bulk of the remainder onstate land (24.0%). This compares to an officialstatistic from the OIMs June 25 RegistrationUpdate, cited in an IAT report, that 60 percent

of camps are situated on private land(2010b:3).18 The July human rights investigationreported that 48% of the 58 families that theywere able to contact (many had moved toanother camp already) had been threatenedwith forced eviction (LAMP et al., 2010). Awomans organization leader at a public schoolin Route Frres also said that OIM came to tellresidents that the camp was closing, in Augustwhen school was not in session.

Again because of the belief that people are liv-ing in camps because of the services provided,there is a pattern of landowners attempting toforce people off by stopping the delivery of life-giving services like water, food, healthcare, andsanitation. In too many cases, when this doesnot work, violence is used as a last recourse.

18 Schools and churches comprise the rest.
http://ijdh.org/about/baihttp://ijdh.org/about/bai


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Advocacy group InternationalAction Ties has followed sev-eral such cases, the subject ofa report (2010a), as have Hai-tian advocacy groups FRAKKAand BAI, the subject of severalcampaigns.

According to UN SecretaryGeneral Ban Ki Moons Sep-tember 1 report (2010), 29percent of the 1268 campshad been closed because offorced evictions or negotiateddepartures. Advocates andothers following the situationon the ground have been no-

ticing this issue for quite some time. For exam-ple, 27 percent of the sample was closed by July7. Researchers identified an additional sevencamps that had been closed and an additionaleight that were in immediate threat of closure.

This figure is not counting instances like at St.Louis de Gonzague, noted above, or the Ption-Ville Club where some (or most) residents wereforced out but the camp itself remains. Elvireand 6,000 others were forced out in early April.

One case of forced eviction occurred at theSoeurs Salessiens school in Carrefour. Agentsacting as security for the school have beenpressuring people out. According to the OIMdatabase 5169 families lived in the camp. Butschool officials have designs to close the camp.Said community leader Mura St. Badette, fromtime to time you hear some pressure thattheyre going to force us out. And recently theyjust said, tomorrow, you have to leave. By thetime of our first visit on August 2, over 2,000

people had already been moved. Several of thetents were ripped. Others were still standing inplace, emptied of the people. But several of ushave had our tents ripped up, recalled Badette.And we have nowhere to go. Were forced tostay here. Some people just left their things be-cause they have nowhere to go with them.

Photo: Valerie Kaussen, Soeurs Salessiens, August 2010.Resident leaders tent was ripped as intimidation / retalia-tion for organizing residents.

School officials had taken fingerprints and askedfor copies of all official documents, askingpeople what amount of loan they would needto move. People became afraid that with all theofficial documentation they would be held le-gally to the loan, despite the fact that peopledidnt get that amount. According to Badette,the IOM was surprised to find out that people

only got 2500 gourdes, about $63, becauseschool and NGO officials told them residentswere getting much, much more. Badette sum-moned people who had been moved to offerproof.

Not only were Badettes efforts in vain, theymet with retaliation. On Thursday, August 5, anindividual known to be working with the officialsecurity guards came to Badettes tent with aknife. Badette said that he received deaththreats, and presumed this was an assassinationattempt. Not finding Badette, the assailantripped all the surrounding tents.

The following day, Badette went to the munici-pal court to offer a deposition, where the au-thor and colleague met him. Hopefully not be-cause of the presence of foreigners, the judge,Franz Guillou saw Badette right away, and we


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Photo: Aviation, August 2010. This camp had been closed.

drove with him back to Soeurs Salessiens,where Judge Guillou assessed damage to thetent and took three peoples testimony. Duringthe 15 minutes we were there, this same assai-lant locked the gate, keeping us from our sche-duled 11:00 appointment with Mayor Yvon Je-rome and his two assistant mayors in City Hall.

There have been similar ca

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