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    A Report and Recommendations

    Prepared by the Aerospace Industries Association

    April 2008

    U.S. DefenseModernizationReadiness Now and for the Future

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    An AIA Report andRecommendations:

    U.S. DefenseModernizationReadiness Now and for the Future

    This study was produced under the directionand leadership of the Aerospace Industries

    Associations National Security Council and theDefense Policy and Budget Committee.

    Introduction: Defense BudgetChallenges AheadThe Aerospace Industries Association is deeplyconcerned that three ongoing developmentswithin the deense budget will give U.S.decisionmakers ar less latitude and exibility respond to long-deerred deense modernizatiand recapitalization needs and requirements.They are:

    Inexorable growth in operations and

    maintenance costs.Rising personnel expenditures, includinguture costs o recent increases in activeduty end strength.

    Simultaneous needs or reset andrecapitalization.

    These three developments, working incombination, will require the next U.S.administration to careully ormulate a

    national strategy or sustained, adequateand balanced resourcing or nationaldeense capabilities.

    We present here an AIA Report on U.S.Deense Modernization, a study andrecommendations based on our analysiso this important national security matt

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    Modernization of

    key national defense

    capabilities willrequire a generation-

    long national security

    investment strategy

    providing sufcient

    and stable resourcing

    to recapitalize all

    defense sectors,

    including aerospace.

    U.S. Defense ModernizationThe preamble to the U.S. Constitution declares thaone o the undamental purposes or which our oo government was adopted is to provide or thcommon deense. The world o the 21st century is

    increasingly dangerous no nation can isolate itsrom the expansive set o threats emanating romaround the globe. Consequently, our national deemust be an abiding concern and unding priority inthe years ahead.

    For several generations Americas national securityhas depended on sustained military superiority.Whether monitoring suspected terrorist camps,moving relie supplies to disaster areas or enorcinno-y zones, the United States has long relied onpossessing the worlds most advanced aerospacesystems. Manned ight was invented here, and airpower is now an enduring national asset.

    That asset, however, is now in serious danger. Acrothe eet, aircrat are aging as never beore. All o omilitary services are in need o modernization andrecapitalization as a result o deerred procuremenollowing the all o the Soviet Union. But the needis particularly acute or the air arms o our militaryorces. Emerging national security challenges othe 21st century require renewed national ocus

    on the relevance o air power and attention toaccomplishing long-delayed deense modernizatioUpgrading key national deense capabilities andmaintaining readiness will require a generation-lonational security investment strategy that providesufcient and stable levels o resources to enable trecapitalization o all our deense sectors, especialaerospace.

    At the same time, the political inheritance o thenext administration will be the Global War onTerrorism (GWOT) and the need to continue devotsufcient resources to prevail in that conict.Given the likelihood o a growing competition ornational security resources, it is critical that deendecisionmakers understand the nature o the crisiand accept the implications that uture resourcedecisions will have on the totality o the U.S. deen

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    stablishment and the deense industrial basehat supports it.

    The orthcoming resource competition will poseritical deense policy and planning choices or thenext administration. The United States has a longhistory o demonstrated ability to und deense atmuch higher levels than its current 4 percent share

    Gross Domestic Product (GDP). However, ederaldefcits, growing entitlement programs, pent-updemand or other domestic spending and the cost

    the GWOT will place increased pressure on uturedeense spending.

    ndeed, there could be domestic political pressures

    o level o, i not pull back, deense spending asU.S. involvement in Iraq is reduced. In a largerense, national budgetary orces are presenthat, i not addressed, will structurally inhibitur ability to eectively supply the modernized

    military equipment essential or maintaining ourechnological advantage over the long term.

    AIA is deeply concerned that three ongoingdevelopments within the deense budget will giveU.S. decisionmakers ar less latitude and exibility to

    espond to long-deerred aerospace modernizationnd recapitalization needs and requirements. Thehree are:

    Inexorable growth in operations andmaintenance costs.

    Rising personnel expenditures, includinguture costs o recent increases in activeduty end strength.

    Simultaneous needs or reset and

    recapitalization.

    These three developments, working in combination,will require the next administration to careullyormulate a national strategy or sustained,dequate and balanced resourcing or national

    deense capabilities.

    AIA believes that while the investment resources

    proposed in the fscal 2008-2013 Future Years DeenseProgram (FYDP) represent a modest start towardsassuring uture national security needs, the FYDPitsel doesnt eectively address growing structuralchallenges within the U.S. deense budget or themounting modernization and recapitalization billscoming due as a result o years o deerred investment.

    During the past 45 years, investment spending hasgone through peaks and valleys exhibiting a cyclicalpattern largely consistent with that o overall deense

    spending. Twice during this period investment spendinhas dipped signifcantly with the end o the VietnamWar and the end o the Cold War. These were periodsin which deense spending also ell in real terms.Investment spending rose during the late Cold Waryears o the 1980s and post-9/11 period as deensespending itsel was increased and sustained politically.

    Despite recent increases, base budget procurement isstill running well below the historic averages shownprior to the end o the Cold War (see Figure 1 andTable 1).

    The procurement account dropped in real terms ora 12-year period between fscal 1986 and fscal 1997,only to slowly rise again beginning in fscal 1998.Since then, there have been moderate increases ininvestment spending, heavily inuenced recently bygrowth in RDT&E and transormational programs.

    These increases while welcome have comeagainst a smaller investment spending base that hasnot kept up with long-term recapitalization demands.

    Congressional Budget Ofce analysis indicates the needor steady procurement unding o $120150 billion peryear, in constant dollars, to modernize the current orce

    While the investment accounts have been increasing,procurement is still well below the required level andcomprises only about 20 percent o the deense budgetThere still is much catching up to do that will requireadditional resources well above the current level.

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    This brie analysis underscores that the health oinvestment spending is highly dependent on theoverall level o deense spending. It is our viewthat the next administration must be much moreaggressive in bolstering out-year deense undingprojections, which have been constrained to meet

    policy and defcit reduction objectives at the expeno deense modernization requirements.

    Now is the time to stabilize deense spending andthe investment portolio and ocus on modernizatand recapitalization or the uture. The nextadministration should ocus priority attention on tissue and also show increased diligence in addressthe resource challenges within the deense budgetthat could negatively impact orce modernization.

    Funding Challenges forDefense ModernizationEven i the country were to increase deense spendithe next administration will have to address emergiresource challenges internal to the DoD budget. Sevongoing trends portend an historic and critical shitin DoDs spending priorities and, ultimately, the sizeand composition o the deense investment portoliThey must not be permitted to cascade uncontrollabto the point that they inhibit our ability to sustain a

    robust deense acquisition program and a responsivindustrial base.

    The act is, however, that these trends are alreadyobservable. Funding or investment is graduallybeing squeezed rom the baseline deense budget military personnel and operations and maintenancosts take an increasing share o deense resource

    By 2013, over a 25-year period, the operations andsupport element o the budget will have more thandoubled aster than the growth in the deense

    budget itsel. In contrast, investment will increaseslightly more than 50 percent, well below the growpath o the general budget.

    These growth trends translate into a structural shiin which investment will decline to only 35 percen

    DoD requires steady

    procurement funding

    of $10150 billionper year, in constant

    dollars, to accomplish

    modernization of the

    current force.

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    5

    the deense budget by 2013, well below the 41ercent level o fscal 1988 (see Table 2).

    This isnt a mere percentage shit. It translatesnto tens o billions o dollars migrating rom thenvestment portolio into operations and supportO&S) costs. These trends suggest an ongoing,ermanent change in composition o the deenseudget, one in which operations and supportonsumes an ever-increasing share o the deenseudget. Continuing this trend beyond currentrojections will make it even more difcult or

    deense planners to adequately resource thenvestment spending upon which our militaryuperiority and technological edge depends. The

    next administration should address this seriousuture resource challenge in developing long-range

    deense plans and in budget guidance to the nextQuadrennial Deense Review (QDR).

    The United States cannot aord to pull backinvestment spending as it has done during past post-war deense drawdowns the nature o the securityenvironment strongly mitigates against takingsuch a risk during what may be a generation-longwar on terrorism. Instead, the next administrationshould seek to reorm DoD business managementpractices and processes to ensure that they support,rather than compete with, long-range deensemodernization and recapitalization requirements.

    Inexorable Growth Trends in Operations andMaintenance (O&M) Costs. For more than 40 years wehave seen steady growth in deense O&M costs abovethe rate o ination, despite continued eorts oseveral administrations to constrain that growth (seeFigure 2). Future sources o urther O&M cost growth

    0

    50

    100

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    FY45

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    FY51

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    93

    FY96

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    Procurement RDT & E

    F

    Y

    0

    8

    $

    B

    Vietnam

    Reagan EraBuildup

    9/11

    Post-Cold WarDeferred

    Procurement

    WWII

    Korean War

    Figure 1. DoD Investment Funding in Constant FY2008 Dollars, Excluding GWOT Supplementals

    Source: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), National Defense Budget Estimates for FY2008, March

    2007, Table 6-8, pp. 113-115. GWOT Supplementals are excluded.

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    include rapid escalation in health care costs, growthnon-capital purchases (supplies and material, energacilities and equipment repairs), installation O&Mbacklogs, improved pay or DoD civilians, O&M costsassociated with growth in active duty end strength unding or equipment reset. Let unchecked, these

    inexorable O&M growth trends will generate moreunding demands than the current FYDP can suppoThereore, unless the deense top line rises accordinunding will likely have to migrate rom materielinvestment to O&M to cover the cost growth.

    AIA believes that the next administration, in order tominimize pressures on the investment portolio, mumake a dedicated eort to contain O&M costs andeliminate the root causes o O&M cost growth aboverate o ination. A concerted eort should be made t

    develop a long-term plan to reduce O&M costs by a percent annually by promoting DoD-wide managemefciencies (including expansion o competitivesourcing, perormance-based logistics, perormancebased agreements, service contracting, more energy-efcient systems, etc.) and adopting more integratedsupply chain management. For example, DoD studieindicate that sustainment accounts or up to 75 perco a weapon systems lie cycle cost and that broadlyapplying government/industry partnerships integratcost containment principles across all phases oweapon system lie cycles could reduce O&M costs bat least 20 percent.

    Rising Personnel Expenditures. The recent decisionincrease the active duty end strength o the Army aMarine Corps through fscal 2012 (65,000 and 27,00respectively) was largely related to the increasedoperating tempo in the wars in Iraq and AghanistaThe number o Army Brigade Combat Teams (BCTswill increase rom 42 to 48 and Marine ExpeditionaForces (MEF) will grow rom 2.5 to 3.0 balanced MEF

    The Congressional Budget Ofce (CBO) estimates thtotal incremental cost o the end-strength increasebetween fscal 2007 and fscal 2013 as being $108 billabove previously planned levels (see Table 3). CBO alidentifed the overwhelming majority more than percent o the costs as unrelated to the investme

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    ortolio (military personnel, O&M,military construction and amilyhousing). For this reason, the

    fscal 08-13 FYDP was increased toccommodate these end-strengthosts. Without such an increase,he modest investment growthath that was laid out could not

    have been sustained.

    nd-strength increases bringwith them the added costs oraining, health care and orce

    modernization associated with thexpansion o the orce. These costsre must pay bills and, unlikerocurement and RDT&E, are nots amenable to annual undingdjustments. Consequently, the

    decision to increase active dutynd strength carries with it addedong-term cost burdens i the

    DoD top line is not sustained orncreased additional end strength ultimatelyranslates into an increase in fxed personnel costsn the orm o pay and benefts. These increased

    osts must be accommodated via an increasing topne in order to preclude erosion o investment and,

    hence, creation o a hollow orce.

    n a volunteer military system, raising and sustainingarger military orces is more expensive than inhe past. Even ater recent increases, however, weurrently have a much smaller military than thosehat ought in WWI, WWII, the Korean War, the

    Vietnam War, the Cold War and even the Gul War.

    To counter the dangers o the 21st century withhighly capable but historically smaller orces,he U.S. military must be equipped with modern

    hardware that multiplies their orce eectivenessnd provides greater reliability and survivability.

    Our emphasis should continue to be on leveraginghe application o advanced military technologies to

    maintain our superiority. The investment portoliohould not be viewed as a discretionary bill

    payer. Rather, modernization programs should beresourced and managed in a manner that continuesto oster technological innovation and sustainsmilitary lead-time advantages over our adversaries.At the same time, U.S. deense planners must

    Table 1. FY19652010 Investment Spending, in Billions of Constant FY08 Dollars

    FY1965

    FY1970

    FY1975

    FY1980

    FY1985

    FY1990

    FY1995

    FY2000

    FY2005

    FY2010

    Procure-ment

    87.5 89.8 56.5 77.7 162.5 114.9 55.4 65.4 103.7 110.0

    Proc as% DoD

    23.2% 20.4% 16.6% 21.0% 30.2% 24.2% 15.1% 17.7% 19.6% 22.1%

    RDT&E 37.9 36.0 29.0 29.8 54.0 52.8 44.6 46.3 74.1 73.8

    RDT&Eas %DoD

    10.0% 8.2% 8.5% 8.0% 10.0% 11.1% 12.2% 12.6% 14.0% 14.8%

    Invest-

    ment $B

    125.4 125.8 85.5 107.5 216.5 167.7 100.0 111.7 177.8 183.8

    DoDTotal $B

    377.3 440.0 339.8 369.4 538.1 474.5 366.1 368.7 528.8 498.0

    Invest-ment %DoD

    33.2% 28.6% 25.2% 29.1% 40.2% 35.3% 27.3% 30.3% 33.6% 36.9%

    Source: Ofce o the Under Secretary o Deense (Comptroller), National Deense Budget Estimates orFY2008, March 2007, Table 6-8.

    Table 2. Operations and Support Versus Investment as Percent ofDoD Budget

    Budget Category FY1988 FY2008Request FY2013Projection

    DoD Budget Total $283.8B $483.2B $548.5B

    Military Personnel 76.6 118.9 145.2

    Operations &Maintenance

    81.6 165.3 196.0

    Operations &Support (O&S) Total

    158.2 284.2 341.2

    O&S Percent o DoDTotal

    55.7% 58.8% 62.2%

    Procurement 80.0 101.7 125.2

    RDT&E 36.5 75.1 68.1

    Investment Total 116.5 176.8 193.3

    Investment Percento DoD Total

    41.1% 36.6% 35.2%

    Source: Ofce o the Under Secretary o Deense (Comptroller), NationalDeense Budget Estimates or FY2008, March 2007, Table 6-8.

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    provide or a balanced deense posture across allservices, capabilities and portolios.

    Simultaneous needs for both reset and recapitalizatThe DoD base budget is a peacetime budget.Base budget expenditures must ft withinannual discretionary spending limits set by theadministration and Congress. Combat operationsin Iraq and Aghanistan, however, are treated asemergency spending and are not subject to annuadiscretionary spending ceilings. These combatoperations currently cost on the order o $170190billion per year. Within that total fgure, procuremor war-related replacement o materiel consumeddestroyed or prematurely worn out by the war inthe fscal 07 and fscal 08 supplementals amountsto $5070 billion per year. Thus ar, supplemental

    appropriations to separately und replacement owar-related losses have protected the recapitalizatprogram in the baseline deense budget.

    Absent a signifcant top line increase, any attemptto und reset requirements out o the baselinebudget (i.e., without supplementals) would placetremendous stress on other service investmentneeds by orcing absorption o wartime reset andrecapitalization within the normal budgeting proceSuch an approach could ultimately break essential

    modernization programs. Thus, reset must be undeas an increment above baseline deense needs throsupplemental deense appropriations. As ormer ArChie o Sta Peter Schoomaker noted in testimonybeore the House Armed Services Committee in Jun2006, Reset is a cost o war that must not be borat the expense o our modernization eorts. We munot mortgage the uture readiness o the orce byocusing our resources solely on current challenges

    Supplementals should continue as long as necessato reconstitute wartime losses o all the services,

    especially the Army and Marine Corps. Thecurrent operational tempo in Iraq and Aghanistanwill require continued supplementals or resetand recapitalization or several years ater theredeployment o U.S. orces.

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    The Role of Air Power in the 010

    QDR and Defense PlanningAIA believes that the United States needs toonduct within the context o the 2010 QDR a ulleassessment o the proper role o air power as the

    most versatile component o national security. The006 QDR, with its primary emphasis on irregular

    warare, deeating terrorist networks and weapons mass destruction, tilted toward the kinds operations currently experienced in Iraq and

    Aghanistan. Consideration o needs or the rest ohe broad spectrum o conict has been minimized,

    with procurement planning discussed largely in theontext o a hedge against any potential near-peerompetitor.

    The 2010 QDR should assess the appropriatealance among security challenges, such as

    planning or near-peer regional conicts whilealso engaging in the Global War on Terrorism. Theenduring role o air power needs to be thoroughlyre-examined as a part o this assessment. Inparticular, the 2010 QDR should re-evaluate the roleo air power in all potential conict regions.

    Modernization o military aerospace should bedone in a manner that eliminates the decades-long phenomenon in which entire sectors areout o production and not being modernized.

    All military services ace substantial aerospacerecapitalization unding challenges in the decadeahead. Thus, the next administrations plan shouldaddress modernization requirements across allkey aerospace sectors o all the military services airlit, unmanned air vehicles, rotary wingaircrat, missiles, space launch, precision-guidedmunitions and command, control, communicationscomputers, intelligence, surveillance andreconnaissance (C4ISR) systems.

    Figure 2. O&M Costs Per Service Member, in Constant FY2008 Dollars

    Source: AIA Analysis of data in Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), National Defense BudgetEstimates for FY2008, March 2007, Tables 6-8 and 7-5.

    0

    20,000

    40,000

    60,000

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    FY45

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    FY

    93

    FY95

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    FY01

    FY03

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    FY07

    1975: Fallof Vietnam

    1991Gulf WarReagan

    EraBuildup

    GWCT

    $

    1973: Beginningof All Volunteer

    Force

    1967: Buildup to463,000 US troops

    in Vietnam

    March 8, 1965:First US combat

    troops (3500Marines) land in

    Vietnam

    Demobilizationspike

    After WW II

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    10

    Resource Planning for Aerospace

    ModernizationMaintaining U.S. technological superiority andindustrial pre-eminence in military aerospacerequires sustained investment. Air Force SecretaryMichael W. Wynne captured the problem succinctlWell take delivery this coming year o about 60aircrat. With a eet o about 6,000 aircrat, thismakes a 100-year recapitalization rate.

    Our countrys current path or military aerospacemodernization is not viable. It wont be possible tothe situation without additional, sustained resourinvestment over the long term. The investmentrequirements or major aircrat procurements,their support equipment and sustainment are larg

    oten exceeding several billion dollars annuallyor a single major aircrat program and hundredso millions or missiles, munitions and spaceprograms. In particular, the Air Force has a seriousunderunded aircrat recapitalization programwhen gauged against age parameters and missionrequirements (a eet averaging 24 years old with 1percent grounded or ying with mission-limitingrestrictions).

    Aerospace recapitalization is a national securityissue that deserves the attention o the 2008presidential candidates and the next administratioIn developing a long-range strategy to modernizethe military, AIA recommends the ollowing resouplanning approach:

    Sustain a national consensus to adequately unational deense capability and readiness as ahigh and enduring priority. We live in dangerotimes, and without robust national security thcan be no economic, social or cultural securityThe next administration should support growt

    in the DoD top line to adequately und militarypersonnel, operations and maintenance, andmodernization o systems and equipment toprovide required capabilities, credible deterrenand orce eectiveness across the ull spectrumo conict. Investment must not become the b

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    11

    payer or a top line too low oror operations and support coststhat are insufciently unded.

    Acknowledge that deensemodernization is alreadylong overdue. We must notall into the trap o thinkingthat our military need becapable in only that portiono the spectrum o potentialconict in which it fnds itselcurrently engaged. To meet21st century challenges andsustain our military superiorityin all areas o potential conict,modernization must be a priority across theboard. As part o adequately unding nationaldeense, DoD needs to increase annualprocurement spending to a steady state rangeo $120150 billion, in constant dollars, simplyto modernize an aging, increasingly obsoleteand potentially vulnerable orce. Deensemodernization is the predicate or militaryaerospace modernization.

    Realistically address the growing bow waveo modernization requirements in militaryaerospace. This should be done by providinggrowth and stability in not only aerospaceprocurement but also in RDT&E. Aerospacetechnologies are integral to the electronicsrevolution occurring in military capabilitieswhether they are in aircrat, missiles, precisionmunitions or the command and control,communications, computers, intelligence,surveillance and reconnaissance systems

    essential or uture combat operations. Thenext administration should develop a coherentmodernization plan to realistically addressaerospace requirements that can last ordecades to come.

    Foster innovation and stability in DoDinvestment planning. This can be bestaccomplished by establishing or the fscal2010 budget submission a Stable ProgramFunding Account, similar to that proposedby the Deense Acquisition PerormanceAssessment Panel, or all Acquisition CategoryI programs rom Milestone B through initialoperating capability. A pilot program orcapital budgeting is currently underway inDoD. The time is right to apply this proposal

    on a broader scale in order to bring enhancedbudget and program stability to the DoDacquisition process.

    Support the concept o a oor or deensespending. Incorporate into broad nationalbudget planning the goal o deense being noless than 4 percent o GDP in order to preventthe budget being drawn down to increaseunding or non-deense programs ollowingthe eventual withdrawal o orces rom Iraq

    and Aghanistan the precise time whenmodernization and recapitalization o ourorces will be most critical to our nationalsecurity.

    AIA will provide extended discussion and supportor these positions or consideration by the nextadministration. Also, the association is prepared toassist the Deense Department by providing dataconcerning industrial capacity and industrys abilityto respond to increased resource investment.

    Table 3. Incremental Costs of Army and USMC End Strength: IncreaseAbove QDR 2006 Force Level

    2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Total

    Army - $ ES Level $4.5B36K

    9.543K

    12.150K

    12.957K

    11.264K

    10.065K

    9.465K

    $69.6B

    USAR & ANG/ES $0.0B_

    0.81.3K

    1.02.6K

    1.13.9K

    1.35.3K

    1.56.8K

    0.99.2K

    $6.7B

    USMC -$ES Level

    $2.2B9K

    4.114K

    5.319K

    5.724K

    5.927K

    5.027K

    3.527K

    $31.7B

    Total/Yr $6.7B 14.4 18.4 19.7 18.5 16.5 13.9 $107.9B

    Source: CBO, Estimated Cost o the Administrations Proposal to Increase the Armys and the MarinCorps Personnel Levels, April 16, 2007, p.2

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    Blenheim Capitol Services

    Brogdon Tool & Die, Inc.

    Brookfeld Atlantic

    Brush Wellman Inc.

    BTC Electronic Components

    Burton Industries AerospaceHeat Treating, Inc.

    Caliornia ManuacturingTechnology Consulting

    Capo Industries Inc.

    Celltron Inc.

    Chandler/May, Inc.

    Cherokee Nation Distributors

    Cincinnati Machine, A UNOVACompany

    CMC Electronics

    Coalition Solutions Integrated,Inc.

    Co-Operative IndustriesDeense, LLC

    Consolidated PrecisionProducts

    CPI Aero, Inc.

    Crestwood Technology Group

    Cytec Engineered Materials

    Dassault Systems o AmericaData Conversion Laboratory,Inc.

    Dayton T. Brown Inc.

    Delphi Corporation

    Designed Metal Connections

    Doyle Center orManuacturing Technology

    DynaBil Industries, Inc.

    East West Associates

    EDAG Inc.

    Electronic/Fasteners, Inc.

    Emhart Teknologies, A Black &Decker Company

    Endicott InterconnectTechnologies, Inc.

    ENSCO, Inc.

    Exotic Metals FormingCompany LLC

    Fenn Technologies

    The Ferco Group

    Ferguson Perorating and WireCompany

    Forrest Machining, Inc.

    Frontier Electronic SystemsCorporation

    GEAR Sotware

    Greene, Tweed & Company

    G.S. Precision, Inc.

    GuardianEdge Technologies

    H&S Swansons Tool Company

    Harvard CustomManuacturing

    HDL Research Lab, Inc.

    Heartland Precision FastenersAerospace Plating Company

    Heizer Aerospace

    Hitachi Consulting

    Hi-Temp Insulation Inc.

    Hobart Machined Products, Inc.

    Hughes Bros. Aircraters, Inc.

    IDD Aerospace Corp.

    Industrial Metals InternationalLTD

    Inotech Enterprises America

    Inmedius

    Integrated Sourcing

    ION Corporation

    JRH Electronics, LLC.

    KPMG LLP-Risk AdvisoryServices

    Kreisler ManuacturingCorporation

    Kulite Semiconductor Products,Inc.

    M/A-COM, Inc.

    McCann Aerospace MachiningCorporation

    Meyer Tool Inc.

    Microsemi Corporation

    Mid-State Aerospace Inc.

    Millitech, Inc.

    Mil Spec Sales Co.

    Morris Machine Company, Inc.

    MPC Products Corporation

    Navigant Consulting, Inc.

    New Breed Corporation

    NMC Group, Inc.

    Nor-Ral Plastics Inc.

    Norfl Manuacturing, Inc.

    ONeil & Associates, Inc.

    Ohio Aerospace Institute

    Orion Industries

    P3-North America, Inc.

    Parkway Products, Inc.

    PCA Aerostructures

    PCC Airoils, LLC

    Perormance SotwareCorporation

    Perillo Industries, Inc.

    PGM o New England, LLC

    Plexus Corporation

    Plymouth Extruded ShapesPlymouth Tube Company

    Powerway, Inc.

    Precision Gear

    Precision Aircrat MachiningCompany

    Precision Machine &Manuacturing Co.

    Precision Tube Bending

    PRTM ManagementConsultants, LLC

    PTC

    QuEST

    Radant Technologies, Inc.

    Ranal

    REMEC Deense & Space,Inc.

    Renaissance Services

    Rodelco ElectronicsCorporation

    Rubbercrat

    Sanmina-SCI Corporation

    Sample Machining, Inc. dBitec

    Sea Air Space Machining Molding

    SEAKR Engineering

    Sechan Electronics, Inc.

    SELEX Sensors and AirboSystems US Inc.

    Senior Aerospace

    Service Steel Aerospace

    Servotronics, Inc.

    Sigma Metals, Inc.

    Signal International

    Southern Caliornia Braid

    CompanySpectralux Corporation

    Spincrat

    Spirit Electronics, Inc.

    Starwin Industries

    Tedopres International, In

    TEK Precision Co. Ltd

    Telephonics Corporation

    Therm, Inc.

    Thermal Solutions, Inc.

    TIGHITCO, Inc.

    Tiodize Co., Inc.

    TMX Aerospace

    Tri Polus Inc.

    TTI, Inc.TTM Technologies

    TW Metals

    UGS

    UMA, Inc.

    Unicircuit Inc.

    United Perormance Meta

    Universal ID Systems, Divo Commerce OverseasCorporation

    University o Tennessee Aerospace Deense ClearHouse

    Unlimited Innovations

    Vishay

    Vulcanium Metals

    Incorporated

    Waer Systems

    Welding Metallurgy, Inc.

    West Cobb Engineering &Co. Inc.

    The Wharton School Executive Education

    Wind River Systems

    Windings, Inc.

    World Graphics, Inc.

    Xerox Corporation

    X-Ray Industries

    XyEnterprise

    Yarde Metals

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    Civil, military, and business aircratHelicoptersUnmanned aerial vehiclesSpace systemsAircrat enginesMissiles

    Materiel and related componentsEquipmentServicesInormation technology

    The Aerospace Industries Association of America

    The Aerospace Industries Association o America(AIA) was ounded in 1919, only a ew years aterthe birth o ight.

    Today, some 270 major aerospace and deensecompanies and suppliers are members othe association, embodying every high-technology manuacturing segment o theU.S. aerospace and deense industry romcommercial aviation and avionics, to manned

    and unmanned deense systems, to spacetechnologies and satellite communications.

    AIA represents the nations leadingdesigners, manuacturers and providers o:

    The ollowing is a list o images used in this report:

    Cover: top row (l. to r.) Next-Generation bomber (Boeing artists rendition) UH-60 Black Hawk helicopter (U.S. Army photo) Predator B unmanned aircrat (Courtesy o General Atomics

    Aeronautical Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.)

    center row (l. to r.) Arleigh Burke-class guided missile destroyer (U.S. Navy photo) F-22 Raptor fghter (U.S. Air Force photo) C-17 Globemaster III transport (U.S. Air Force photo)

    bottom row (l. to r.) Stryker armored vehicle (U.S. Army photo) F-35 Lightning II fghter (Lockheed Martin photo) Global Positioning System 11R-M satellite (Lockheed Martin

    artists rendition)

    Pg. 2: F-35 Lightning II fghter (Lockheed Martin photo)

    Pg. 4: B-2 Spirit bomber (U.S. Air Force photo)

    Pg. 6: top to bottom Seawol-class nuclear-powered attack submarine (General Dynamics

    Electric Boat photo) Atlas V rocket (United Launch Alliance photo)

    Pg. 8: top to bottom U.S. Navy F/A-18C fghter (U.S. Navy photo) CV-22 Osprey tiltrotor (Bell Boeing photo) USS Enterprise nuclear-powered aircrat carrier (U.S. Navy photo)

    Pg. 10: top to bottom C-130J transport (Lockheed Martin photo) Shipboard Combat Direction Center (U.S. Navy photo) Patriot missile launcher (U.S. Army photo)

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    Aerospace Industries Association

    1000 Wilson Boulevard, Suite 1700

    Arlington, VA 22209-3928

    703-358-1000

    www.aia-aerospace.org