REMOVAL OF PVVH LEL ANALYZERS FAULT TREE ANALYSIS
Transcript of REMOVAL OF PVVH LEL ANALYZERS FAULT TREE ANALYSIS
REMOVAL OF PVVH
LEL ANALYZERS
FAULT TREE ANALYSIS
BY
HOWARD E. LAMBERT FTA ASSOCIATES
3728 BRUNELL DRIVE OAKLAND, CA . 94602
AND
BOND CALLOWAY WESTINGHOUSE SAVANNAH RIVER COMPANY
DECEMBER 10, 1993
TABLE OF CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1
ACRONYM LIST 2
1.0 Introduction .. 4
2.0 Historical Perspective Regarding the SPC Process and Control Scheme • . . . . • • • • . • • • • . . • • • 8
2.1 Initial Study (1980 - 1986) ..• 2.2 HAN Process (1987 - 1991) 2.3 Late Wash Process (1991 - Present)
. . . . . . . 3.0 Operational Experience for the Precipitate Hydrolysis
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Process During Cold Chemical Runs . . . • • • . 22
4.0 FTA Protocol .
5.0 Removal of PVVH LEL Analyzers FTA
6.0 Acknowledgments
7.0 References . . .
APPENDIX A
APPENDIX B
APPENDIX C
TABLES
FIGURES
Interlock List for HAN Addition/Nitrite Destruction Fault Trees
Interlock List for Late Wash Fault Trees
Fault Trees
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
A probabilistic Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) was conducted for the Salt Process Cell (SPC) to determine the new frequency of fire and explosion and the new frequency of a formation of a flammable mixture in the DWPF Process Vessel Vent Header ( PWH) for the following case:
Assuming the PVVH Lower Explosive Limit (LEL) analyzers are permanently removed from service, two benzene analyzers are available to start a batch and at least one benzene analyzer is available at the end of the batch.
The new annual frequency of fire and explosion for all scenarios calculated in this FTA is 3. 3 x 10"5 yr· 1 which is less than the design goal of 1. o x 10·4 yr· 1 •
The basic conclusion of this study is that two benzene analyzers being available at the beginning of the run offers enough redundancy to insure an acceptable level of safety in the SPC operation without the existence of the Lower Explosive Limit (LEL) analyzers. Since the LEL analyzers provide the same level of process safety protection as the benzene analyzers, precipitate reactor feeding can be initiated with two LEL or two benzene analyzers or any combination of two PWH analyzers (LEL and benzene) .
Other topics discussed in this report are:
• Historical perspective regarding the SPC process and control scheme.
• Current SPC operating experience.
• FTA protocol to conduct the SPC FTA.
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ACRONYM
APP
CPC
DCS
DWPF
FTA
gpm
HAN
HAZOP
ITP
LEL
LPPP
MOC
MOV
NFBL
OE
OECD
OECT
P&ID
PHA
PHEF
PHP
PHR
POP
PR
PRBT
ACRONYM LIST
DESCRIPTION
Auxiliary Pump Pit
Chemical Processing Cell
Distributed Control System
Defense waste Processing Facility
Fault Tree Analysis
Gallon Per Minute
Hydroxylamine nitrate
Hazard and Operability studies
In-Tank Precipitation
Lower Explosive Limit
Low Point Pump Pit
Minimum oxidant for Combustion
Motor Operated Valve
Negative Feedback Loop
Organic Evaporator
Organic Evaporator Condenser Decanter
Organic Evaporator Condensate Tank
Piping and Instrument Diagram
Precipitate Hydrolysis Aqueous
Precipitate Hydrolysis Experimental Facility
Precipitate Hydrolysis Process
Process Hazards Review
Process Operating Procedure
Precipitate Reactor
Precipitate Reactor Bottoms Tank
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PRCD
PRFT
PVVH
PVVS
RPC
seve
SME
SOP
SPC
SRAT
SRS
SRTC
we
Precipitate Reactor Condenser Decanter
Precipitate Feeding Tank
Process Vessel Vent Header
Process Vessel Vent System
Remote Process Cell
Salt Cell Vent Condenser
Slurry Mix Evaporator
Standard Operating Procedure
Salt Process Cell
Sludge Receipt and Adjustment Tank
Savannah River Site
Savannah River Technical Center
Water Column
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1.0 Introduction
A probabilistic Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) was conducted for the Salt Process Cell (SPC) which is located at the Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) at the Savannah River Site (SRS). The DWPF will immobilize radioactive wastes in borosilicate glass. As part of the permanent high level waste disposal plan, virtually all of the cesium-137 and strontium-90, as well as most of the plutonium, will be removed from concentrated salt solutions and redissolved salt cakes by the In-Tank Precipitation process (ITP) in H-Area. Salt solution and salt cakes are composed of potassium, nitrates, nitrites, aluminates and hydroxides of sodium as well as the radioactive compounds discussed. Sodium Tetraphenylborate will be added to salts solutions in Tank 48H to precipitate cesium and potassium and insoluble sodium titanate will be added to adsorb strontium and plutonium. Potassium tetraphenylborate will be the major insoluble component of the resulting tetraphenylboratej titanate slurry (Precipitate slurry). The slurry is concentrated via a crossflow filter and washed to decrease the soluble salts. Decontaminated filtrate is sent to Z-Area for immobilization in concrete monoliths.
Contaminated precipitate slurry is sent to the Late Wash process located in the Auxiliary Pump Pit (APP) between S and H areas. A crossflow flow filtration system similar to the filter system in ITP is used to remove nitrites. Higher aromatic carbon removal with lower levels high boiling side products (i.e., diphenylamine, biphenyl, terphenyl, tars, etc.) can be achieved by acid hydrolysis in the SPC when nitrite concentrations are reduced to less than 0.011 M. The resulting precipitate slurry stream from the Late Wash process is fed to the Precipitate Hydrolysis Process (PHP) which is located in the DWPF 221-S Salt Process Cell, ref (4].
An acid hydrolysis process is used to remove radioactive strontium and cesium from the feed stream in the SPC. Figure 3 shows a simplified flow diagram for the SPC. The function of the precipitate processing facilities is to receive precipitate slurry and hydrolyze it into two phases, organic and aqueous. The organic phase will be low in radioactivity whereas the aqueous phase will contain the majority of the radioactive components. The organic stream is transferred outside the vitrification building and
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stored. The aqueous stream is fed to the Melter Feed Preparation System for feeding to the glass melter.
The major systems in the SPC are:
• Precipitate reactor feed system to receive/store/ sample the precipitate slurry from the Low Point Pit and feed the slurry to the Precipitate Reactor (PR) .
Precipitate reaction system where the precipitate slurry is hydrolyzed into an organic stream and an aqueous stream by reaction with formic acid. Aqueous stream is sampled and transferred to the Chemical Processing Cell (CPC) . The aqueous stream is mixed with sludge waste and eventually fed into the DWPF melter.
• Organic Evaporation system where the organic stream is decontaminated by water washing and evaporation.
• Organic evaporator condensate decontaminated organic stream prior to transfer outside of building.
system where the is stored/sampled the vitrification
• Salt process vent system to condense benzene in the off-gas stream and limit the release of benzene and mercury to the Process Vessel Vent Header (PVVH).
The SPC process vessels and Process Vessel Vent System ( PVVS) contain benzene and compounds of benzene which are flammable. The report entitled "Fault Tree Analysis for Fire and Explosion Within the Salt Process Cell (Late Wash)", ref (2] was completed in February of 1993. This study is referred to as the "Late Wash FTA" in this report. (See section 2.0 of this report for a description of Late Wash Process.) The Late Wash FTA attempted to consider all credible fire and explosion scenarios inside and outside of the process boundary of the SPC. Inside the process boundary includes SPC vessels and the PVVH. outside the boundary includes the air space within the cell where a benzene leak or a benzene vapor
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release can occur. The SPC FTA is a stand-alone document used for critical design decisions. This means that the FTA contains the following properties: (1) is scrutable and understandable, (2) is a complete risk model within the state of the art and (3) can be readily updated before design changes are made (the intent of this study) . Potential risks of proposed design changes can be analyzed before spending design and construction dollars. Therefore, this FTA can actually lower future capital and operating costs of the DWPF SPC. This FTA is a living design document and should be used to assess risks of proposed design modifications before design changes are submitted to the design agency. After design and construction are complete, the FTA should then be modified to reflect as-build configuration of the plant. The protocol used to conduct the FTA is described in section 4.0 of this report.
The ultimate goal of the SPC FTA is to evaluate control schemes for the SPC and determine an acceptable control scheme in which the sum of the frequencies of all risk significant events (i.e., large fires and explosions) is less than 1. 0 x 10"4 yr· 1 , the design goal for the study.
Both benzene and LEL analyzers are used to detect flammables within the PVVS and activate interlocks in the event that an unacceptable concentration of flammables is present. During the course of the cold chemical runs that were conducted for the SPC, problems resulted from the use of the LEL analyzers in the PVVS due to silicon poisoning and were removed from service for testing and evaluation. In this study, the Late Wash FTA is modified to determine the new frequency of fire and explosion and the new frequency of a formation a flammable mixture in the DWPF PVVH for the following case:
Assuming the PVVH LEL analyzers are permanently removed from service, two benzene analyzers are available to start a batch and at least one benzene analyzer is available at the end of the batch. The batch cycle time is assumed to be 44 hours.
The new annual frequency of fire and explosion for all scenarios calculated in this FTA is 3. 3 x 10"5 yr· 1 which is less than the design goal of 1. o x 10·4 yr· 1 •
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Section 2 gives an historical perspective regarding the evolution of the SPC chemical process, process safety, environmental considerations and the control scheme which is important in understanding the recommendations of the FTA with regards to the present control scheme in preventing fire and explosion within the SPC. Section 3 discusses current operating experience with the SPC. Section 4 describes the protocol used to conduct the SPC FTA. Section 5 discusses the FTA conducted for this report in which the LEL analyzers were removed from service.
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2.0 Historical Perspective Regarding the SPC Process and Control Scheme
Both a Process Hazards Review (PHR) and Fault Tree Analysis were conducted for the SPC for three time periods listed below:
1) 1980 - 1986 (Initial study)
2) 1987 - 1991 (HAN Process)
3) 1991- Present (Late Wash Process).
As listed below, three FTA reports were generated for each time period:
1) Fault Tree Analysis for Fire and Explosion and Explosion within the Salt Process Cell Savannah River Plant, 1986, ref [1], Referred to as the "1986 FTA," in this report.
2) Appendix A to PHR 32, Fault Tree Analysis for HAN Addition, 1991, ref [2], referred to as the "HAN FTA," in this report.
3) Fault Tree Analysis for Fire and Explosion Within the Salt Process Cell (Late Wash), 1993, ref (3], referred to as the "Late Wash FTA" in this report.
We discuss the evolution of the SPC process for each time period and the design changes that were recommended by the FTA.
2.1 Initial Study (1980 - 1986)
The SPC is part of the DWPF vitrification building as shown in figure lA. This building was built in the early 1980's and facility space and services were limited. The cell size is 22 1 x 54' and the vitrification building walls, general layout and embedded piping for process and services were already designed before the initial conceptual design and research and development for the PHP was completed. Since every additional horizontal foot of the 221-S building was estimated to cost $1 MM (million), enlarging the SPC beyond the 22 1 x 54' dimensions would not have been cost effective
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given the DWPF budget in the mid-eighties. In March of 1984, the precipitate hydrolysis process was designed to operate at 100 psi. In 1985, the process was changed to run at atmospheric pressure by the use of a copper formate catalyst.
Figure 2 shows the simplified flow diagram of the SPC analyzed in the 1986 FTA study.
In the 1986 design, the PR received the precipitate feed directly from the Low Point Pump Pit (LPPP). The Precipitate Reactor Bottoms Tank (PRBT) which receives the aqueous product from the PR is contained within the SPC (see figure 1A). The PR, Organic Evaporator (OE) and Organic Evaporator Condensate Tank (OECT) are inerted with nitrogen. The fire suppression system consisted of a Halon system and water spray system. The 1986 FTA study estimated that the frequency of all fire and explosion scenarios to be 1. 0 x 10"3 yr· 1 • The dominant accident scenarios listed in that study were:
• small fire within the SPC air space due to a line or gasket leak
• loss of nitrogen purge within process vessels
• explosion within the PRBT because the PRBT transfer valve from the PR fails open
• explosion within the PVVH because butterfly valve 2034 fails open.
2.2 HAN Process (1987 - 1991)
Since 1986, the precipitate hydrolysis process was modified to allow for addition of hydroxylamine nitrate (HAN). This addition allows for nitrite destruction with good organic removal and precludes high-boiler formation.
The nitrite/HAN reaction produces nitrous oxide gas which can serve as a benzene oxidant. This reaction is about 2. 7 times more energetic than the benzene/air reaction. The nitrous oxide
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flammability is controlled by dilution with inertant to below the Minimum oxidant for Combustion (MOC).
A process flow sheet used to conduct the FTA is shown in figure 4. This flow sheet uses zone indices and depicts the hardwired interlocks that were considered. Appendix A lists the control elements of control loops and interlocks that were considered in the HAN FTA study. The sequence of steps performed during the 44-hour batch cycle is shown in figure 5.
It is important to note that all the interlock actions described in the appendices are not included in the SPC FTA. For example,. the SPC FTA did not give credit to software interlocks listed in table A-4 of Appendix A.
Important safety and environmental control system design concerns are:
• Benzene/air explosive mixtures in the PVVH .
• BenzenejN2o explosive mixtures in the PR system •
• Benzene emissions .
• Benzene/air explosive mixtures in tank vapor spaces •
Concerns with regards to PR Operation are:
• N20 evolution versus PR temperature .
• Excess HAN decomposition .
• Accumulation of heavy organics in PR .
• Organic solids carryover .
Concerns with regards to Process Vessel Vent Operation are:
1) Dilute organics below LEL (feed step in high flow co2 is used)
• Limit inert flow from Salt Cell Vent Condenser (SCVC).
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Control SCVC exit temperature.
Minimum air flow in PVVH.
2) Dilute organics below LEL (Normal, base load C02 is used)
• Minimum flow in PVVH.
• seve temperature.
General operation
• Minimize air inleakage.
The SPC design process employed three levels of protection:
• Hardwired Interlocks safety generally these interlocks were actuated at a set point that is the highest or lowest value of process variable(s) -- in this case, both the operator and software interlocks are unsuccessful in ameliorating the effect of the upset condition or process deviation.
• Software Interlocks - Control Logic Diagrams, Distributed Control System (DCS) actuated generally these interlocks were actuated at a set point that is the second highest or second lowest value of process variable(s) -- in this case, the operator is unsuccessful in ameliorating the effect of the upset condition or deviation.
• standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) and Process Operating Procedures (POPs) -- operator responds to the first level of alarms and tries to ameliorate the effect of process upset or deviation. DCS automation program responds to first level of alarms and tries to correct the effect of process upset or deviation.
In most cases, the FTA gave credit to hardwired interlocks only with the exception of operator response to alarms as described next.
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We give credit to an operator responding to the following alarms:
• Increase system pressure by adjusting MOV 1041 or MOV 9278 in the event of insufficient baseload purge to SPC process vessels, i.e., the Precipitate Feeding Tank (PRFT), PR, OE and OECT (see sheets 3, 4, 9 and 11 of the SPC Fire/Explosion fault trees in Appendix C).
Increase system pressure by adjusting MOV 1041 or MOV 9278 in the event of high oxygen concentration (see sheet 44 of the SPC Fire/Explosion fault trees in Appendix C).
These alarms are generated by the DCS and hence require that the DCS works properly. It is important to note that the SPC FTA used a conservative failure rate for air inleakage as 1.1 x 10·6 yr· 1 per connector or 1.1 x 10-4 yr- 1 ("'1 month) for the whole system (assuming 100 connections in the system, connectors include Hanford connectors, gaskets, flanges, etc.). During one year of operation, one air inleakage event has been observed. Based upon this data, a more realistic estimate of air inleakage for the entire system is "'1. o x 10-5 yr- 1 • In addition, a conservative estimate of 1.0 x 10-2/demand was assigned to operator error in responding to an alarm in the SPC FTA. What these two statements imply regarding assignment of conservative probabilities are that the operator action responding to the alarms regarding low flow purge and high oxygen concentration may not be required to achieve an acceptable accident frequency. However, another FTA run is required to verify this statement.
As a result of the safety and environmental concerns stated above, the following design operation philosophy was adopted in the SPC control scheme:
1. Prevent N20jbenzene deflagration in the PR by insuring that N2o concentration is below 60% of the MOC.
2. Prevent air/benzene deflagration in process vessels by insuring that 02 concentration is below 60% of the MOC.
3. Prevent air/benzene deflagration in PVVH by insuring that benzene concentration is below 60% of the LEL.
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4. Prevent system overpressurization and benzene vapor release to the SPC.
5. Prevent leaks in transfer lines by shutting off pumps in the event of high sump level.
6. Shut off ignition sources when sump level is high or exhaust tunnel LEL is above noise level.
As result of conducting the PHR and FTA, the following changes were made to the HAN process:
•
•
High flow C02 is used during PR feeding and boilup periods during steps 10 and 12 listed in figure 5. During step 10, HAN reacts with nitrites to evolve N2o. During all other periods, baseload C02 purge is used.
Carbon dioxide is used for fire suppression in the SPC instead of Halon, see figure 6 which depicts the fire protection system.
Carbon dioxide is used for process inerting instead of nitrogen. The use of co2 reduces benzene emissions.
• The overflowjrelief valves on the PRFT and OECT were removed and the tank nozzles sealed with a blank connector. In the event of overfill of the PR or PRFT, liquid will be discharged through the mercury seal on the agitator shaft. There is no overflow protection for the PRFT and OECT. If the OECT is overfilled, liquid will backup through the condenser/decanter condensate drain and then through the aqueous overflow from the OE and eventually to the PR, which has an available capacity of 3,000 gallons (considering the PR has 6,000 gallons of aqueous waste leftover from the previous batch). Any pressure buildup in the system will be relieved at about 2 psig through the mercury seals on the agitators for the PR and PRFT to the limit of the relief capacity.
Liquid carbon dioxide cylinders are provided for backup of the primary supply. Cylinder weight, instead of
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pressure, was used to inhibit/stop operation of the precipitate feed pump before the C02 supply is too low to permit a safe shutdown during the PR feeding operation.
The PRFT takes the place of the PRBT in figs. 1 and 2. A new PRBT was located in the CPC (see figure lB).
• Close steam valves (HIS-1027A, HIS-9301) and open cooling water valves (HIS-1033, HIS-9307) to the PR and OE on any of the following hardwired interlocks:
SCVC Temperature HHH (TSHHB-9356)
seve Exhaust Flow HHH (FSHHB-9277)
PVVH Exhaust Flow LLL (FSLLB-5860)
PR Pressure HH (PSHH-1041)
OE Pressure HH (PSHH-9313)
Existing software switches and setpoints for the above interlocks will be used for alarms and shutdowns on both the PR and OE but credit will not be given in the FTA.
The FTA completed by June of 1989 showed that the frequency due to air inleakage was unacceptable. This is because there are over 100 connectors in the precipitate hydrolysis process system and since the system was under a slight vacuum, any one of these connectors leaking results in an air inleakage. Furthermore, the use of POPs to detect oxygen content in the process vessels was questionable because of the inherent inaccuracies in the flow measurements and the computation of air inleakage by difference. A new control scheme had to be devised to 1) detect leakage of air in the system and 2) perform mitigation to prevent the possibility of fire or explosion.
As a result, the following recommendations were made:
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The arrangement of the mercury seals on the PR and PRFT agitator shafts has been of concern because of the possible path for air inleakage into the vessels.
The total loss of mercury and subsequent air inleakage at pressure differentials in the range of 10-20 11 we is assumed to be highly unlikely. The reservoir is provided with a liquid level bubbler for continuous measurement of the mercury level with an alarm on low level. Assuming that the proper mercury level is maintained, the seal should be serviceable for pressures in the range of 20 11 we and vacuums up to 50" we in the process system. Because of the relative cross sections, the vacuum capability should be maintained after extensive periods of pressure relief.
However, during water run startup testing (8/92-11/92), pressure relief did indeed occur which forced some of the mercury from the agitator seals. Cups were installed to collect the mercury. After pressure relief, mercury will drain back into the seals and make the seals leak tight.
• Reduce the frequency of high oxygen from air inleakage as a result of process flange failure by a factor of 10 for fault tree calculations. The previous assumption has been that all leaks result in high oxygen concentration inside of process vessels. Because of the low pressure differential (~ 15 11 we) during operation, the probability of a leak or that a given leak will immediately result in high oxygen concentration is very low. The 221-Canyon data for Hanford flange leaks which are used for leakage frequency are based on operation in the 20-75 psig (600-2,00011 we) range.
· • Eliminate the use of POPs for calculation of oxygen concentration in the various vessel systems.
The use of POPs for calculating oxygen content in the process vessels were questionable because of the inherent inaccuracies in flow measurements and computation of air inleakage by difference. The use of carbon dioxide for
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the inert gas makes it virtually impossible to calculate oxygen content within an acceptable ± 20% range because of the large changes in average molecular weight with changes in carbon dioxide concentration.
• Use the seve exhaust oxygen analyzers to monitor oxygen content continuously. Interlock oxygen concentration HHH (ASHHB-3405, ASHHB-3409) or a rate-of-change HHH (a new oes software interlock) in oxygen concentration to automatically raise the control pressure setpoint to atmospheric to stop any air inleakage. Activate the SPe interlock on the same signals to minimize ignition sources if the oxygen content exceeds 9% (60% of MOe for oxygen in an airjeo2jbenzene mixture) . Rate-of-change software interlocks were later deleted due to the complexity of control and interlock scheme. The FTA did not consider rate-of-change interlock as a safety interlock.
• In order to obtain an acceptable frequency for a flammable condition inside of process equipment, the entire system is tested for air inleakage between batches. The leak test may be performed by 1) reducing the system pressure to -10" we and measuring rate-of-rise in pressure or 2) momentarily stopping inert purge to process vessels and determining the air inleakage by the change in vesseljsystem exhaust flow. See section 2.3 for final method to determine air inleakage.
• If necessary, in order to obtain an acceptable frequency for a flammable condition inside of process equipment, interlock baseline flow LLL (loss of inert purge) to the PR (FSLLB-1103), PRFT (FSLLB-1108), OE (FSLLB-9315), or OEeT (FSLLB-9328) to raise the control pressure setpoint to atmospheric to stop any air inleakage and activate the SPe interlock to stop pumps and agitators to minimize ignition sources (this change was not implemented since an acceptable frequency was computed without this change).
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The HAN FTA computed the frequency of the following top events which were hazard rating 3 events, except for the small fire described below. As described in table 3, hazard rating events can result in a downtime greater than six months.
1. Fire or explosion in the PR system (including PRCD and SCVC) for periods including:
i) feeding ii) boil up.
2. Fire and explosion in the PVVH during all periods.
3 • Fire and explosion in the OE system (including OECD).
4. Fire and explosion in the OECT.
5. Fire or explosion in the PRFT system. (The PRFT C02 purge system is identical to the PR baseload and transfer and the ignition sources are the same.)
6. Large explosion causing overpressurization and reverse flow out of the Remote Process Cell (RPC) .
7. Large fire in the SPC caused by organic and aqueous spill greater than 3~0 gallons.
8. Small fire in the SPC (a fire which is quickly extinguished and causes no backflow and is not a hazard rating 3 event).
The HAN FTA study computed the total sum of risk significant events listed above as 5. 7 x 10"5 yr· 1 • overpressurization events during organic evaporation in the PR and OE (steps 12 and 23 in figure 5) dominated probabilistically~ During overpressurization, benzene is released to the SPC air space and a large explosion occurs as described in event 6 listed above. The FTA suggested the following improvements which were incorporated in the design.
1. Suggest where redundancy should be incorporated, e.g., incorporate a block valve in series with a flow control valve to provide a redundant means of shutting off flow for the
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following streams (the zone index for the block valve is indicated in brackets, see figure 4):
i) PR feed (BV-1100, B-3]
ii) High flow C02 [BV-1109, D-2]
iii) Steam flow to PR [HCV-1038, E-3]
iv) steam flow to OE [G-6].
2. Install a doubly redundant interlock. There are approximately 100 connectors and flanges in the system. Leakage of any one of these connectors could lead to an explosive concentration. (The initiating event frequency of 100 connectors is 1. 3 x 10"4/hr, [ 1. 1 months].) Due to the high initiating event frequency of air inleakage, a doubly redundant interlock was installed to increase pressure, i.e., the inclusion of MOVs 1041 and 9278.
3. Specify inspection and calibration frequency for critical components, e.g., specify monthly inspection interval for the following components, OE and PR block valves for steam supply, PR and OE pressure sensors, 1041 and 9312 and the sump pump.
4. Install additional interlocks, e.g., two additional hardwired interlocks (interlocks 20 and 21 in Appendix A) were incorporated to shut off OE and PR steam in the event of high steam flow. In addition, interlocks 14 and 15 were modified so that high pressure in either the PR or OE will shut off steam to both vessels and provide redundancy in sensing pressure in the precipitate hydrolysis processing system.
5. Eliminate a master relay and incorporate a dedicated relay for each hardwired interlock.
6. In order to provide maximum dilution capability by the PVVS air flow, provide a tie-in for the seve exhaust to the PVVS that is downstream of all other exhaust streams. Provide a static mixer [C-8] to insure rapid dilution. It is important to note that the static mixer is the only location in the
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whole process where an explosive concentration normally exists most of the time.
It is important to note that the FTA demonstrated where changes were not required, i.e. , the design was adequate as is. For example, separate sensors/transmitters for Negative Feedback Loops (NFBLs) and interlocks were not required to sense flow for the PR feed and high flow C02 • Even though failures of these sensors were common cause initiating events, there were other interlocks whose sensors were not part of a NFBL, i.e., there were other redundant means to shut off flow to these streams which did not depend upon these sensors working properly. Therefore, the FTA can be used to save design and capital project costs by installing only those control schemes which have been rigorously analyzed as risk significant.
2.3 Late Wash Process (1991 - Present)
The HAN FTA was not a stand alone document and was an appendix to PHR 32. In addition, since the HAN FTA was conducted, additional changes were made to the SPC chemical processes and procedures. Changes which impacted the FTA were:
• Proposed addition of a late wash facility which would remove nitrite ions and eliminate the need for HAN addition in the PR feed step -- as a result, some hardwired interlocks and the N20 analyzers were removed. Nitrite ions cause formation of high molecular weight organics which can not be accepted by the melter. During research and development of the sludge process in the CPC, HAN was found to break down into ammonium. Ammonium would combine with nitrates in the PVVS to form ammonium nitrate which is a contact explosive.
• The Organic Evaporator (OE) steam block valve, which is functionally in series with the OE steam flow control valve, was removed. Calculations in the Late Wash FTA showed that other failures would have to occur in order that a stuck-open OE steam flow control valve would overpressurize the system.
• Interlocks were removed that automatically pumped spills in the sump back to the PR. This automatic action was
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replaced by a manual procedure in which the operator would wait for the PR to cool down to 5o•c before initiating the transfer. Pumping back to a hot PR can cause overpressurization and benzene release to the SPC.
• Air inleakage testing prior to batch processing was changed from the methods previously discussed in this report (see section 2. 2, HAN process) during initial testing of the system using the Late Wash process. The original design basis air inleakage rate was 1.5 lb/hr per vessel. Since the off gas flowmeters for each tank did not provide accurate readings, the procedure for calculating air inleakage was changed to calculate air inleakage based upon the combined total carbon dioxide purge for all vessels (nominally 2.5 scfm) and the oxygen concentration as measured using the seve 02 analyzers (higher value of the 2). The calculation provides the total air inleakage for the entire system. Since the oxygen concentration for each vessel is unknown, the acceptable operating air inleakage rate was changed to 1.5 lb/hr for the entire system. This rate is 4 times lower that the original design basis air inleakage rate. Nominal air inleakage rates during Cold Chemical run testing have been between 0.3 - 1.2 lb/hr (average 0.36 lbjhr for 5 batches). No credit for the new air inleakage test method was taken in the Late Wash FTA or in this FTA.
• The spraywater fire suppression system shown in figure 6 was deleted.
As the result of eliminating HAN addition during the PR feed step, hazards involving a benzenejN2o deflagration were eliminated. However, the use of high fiow co2 remained to dilute any unknown oxidants in feed stream. High flow of noncondensibles such as C02 in the PR feed step could result in high concentrations of benzene in the PVVH. This hazard was addressed in the Late Wash FTA as it was in the HAN FTA.
The process flow sheet used to conduct the Late Wash FTA is shown in figure 7. As in figure 4, this flow sheet uses zone indices and depicts the hardwired interlocks that were considered. Appendix B lists the control elements of control loops and interlocks that
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were considered in the Late Wash FTA. The sequence of steps performed during the 44-hour batch cycle is shown in figure 8.
The following scenarios dominated probabilistically in the Late Wash FTA:
Overpressurization during boilup and evaporation in the PR leading to a benzene release and large explosion in the SPC.
overpressurization in the PR because the operator erroneously pumps to a hot PR when a spill of organics in the sump occurs again leading to a benzene release and a large explosion in the SPC.
• Deflagration in the PR during feeding.
The Late Wash FTA produced an occurrence frequency of 5. 0 x 10"5 yr- 1
for fire and explosion which is very nearly the frequency computed for HAN FTA which is 5. 7 x 10·5 yr· 1 • The reason for this is that the frequency of the scenario involving overpressurization in the OE diminished because the OE steam valve failing fully open was not sufficient to cause overpressurization. However, a new scenario is introduced into this analysis that was not considered in the HAN FTA study, i.e., the operator pumping organics into a hot PR. The frequencies of these two scenarios offset.
21
3.0 Operational Experience for the Precipitate Hydrolysis Process (PHP) During Cold Chemical Runs
During the initial design and construction of the Salt Process Cell, several internal, ref [5], and external audit groups (DOE, Stone & Webster) raised questions concerning the process operability given the complex control scheme outlined in the design and mandated by the SPC FTA and design PHR 32. Several of the control devices in this process have multiple interlocks (>100) which can cause potential shutdowns. Operating experience with the small scale process at the pilot plant TNX (Precipitate Hydrolysis Experimental Facility, PHEF) has indicated that without proper maintenance and process control, this process can experience multiple shutdowns during a given batch. However, operating experience to date with the SPC PHP has been very good considering complex control scheme and experience levels of the operating and supporting engineering staff.
During Cold Chemical Run Batch 1, the PR feeding cycle was concluded without interruption. Approximately 2800 gallons of precipitate slurry was fed into the PR with an average feed rate of 24 gpm. Temperature control during feeding was poor while the controller was in automatic control. However, PR temperature remained within operating parameters during the entire feeding cycle, ref [6].
Batch 1 had two interruptions during the PR 5 hour hold cycle. The first was caused by an inoperable benzene analyzer. Process control design allows for the PHP operation to continue with only 1 of 2 analyzers on-line once the batch has started. The second interruption was caused by the process chiller cycling off. A high alarm was received on the seve chilled water inlet supply temperature indicator (software interlock). Two additional shutdowns during aqueous boiling of the PR were due to the Process Chiller cycling off. The chiller problems were corrected by changing the operating setpoint from 41•F to 43•F. The chiller temperature switches were eventually recalibrated to prevent this problem.
Batch 1 OE operation was completed without interruption.
22
The operating experience gained with Batch 1 was evident during Batch 2 as the run was completed with few interruptions. PR feeding was completed without interruption. One interruption occurred during the 5 hour hold period. The cause of this interruption is not known. Aqueous boiling was completed without interruption. The initial problems which occurred with the PVVH benzene analyzers were corrected. The benzene and oxygen analyzers continue to perform well during the last 4 batches.
Two interruptions occurred during the OE cycle. High oxygen concentration caused an interruption during organic boiling. The high oxygen concentrations are speculated to be the result of increased air inleakage at jumper connections caused by unequal thermal expansion. The second interruption occurred during OE aqueous boiling and was caused by a high Organic Evaporator Condenser-Decanter (OECD) exit gas temperature. This high exit gas temperature was apparently caused by inadequate cooling water flow. Standard operating procedures were changed to place the OECD cooling water return valve in manual at 65% open during the entire batch. This has corrected the problem. A similar change was made to the Precipitate Reactor Condenser-Decanter (PRCD) cooling water valve operation, ref [7].
Batch 3 PR feeding was completed without interruption with an average feed rate of 30 gpm. The five hour hold and aqueous boiling periods were also completed without interruption. The OE cycle was completed without interruption. It is important to note the PHP system was in a lay up condition for 14 weeks prior to starting Batch 3 due to the melter flooding incident, ref (8].
Batch 4 and 5 reports have not been issued to date. However, several interruptions occurred which are note worthy. During Batch 4, a feed interruption occurred involving the operation of the PVVS blowers. Feeding was started with the PVVH operating at 35" we vac. Feeding was interrupted due to a PR pressure spike of 1.0" we. It was noted the configuration of the PVVS had changed since Batch 3 due to both Canister Decon Chambers being connected to the PVVS. At 35" we vacuum and 1600 scfm, the blowers were not able to maintain the SPC vessels at -4" we when PRFT to PR feeding was initiated.
23
The vacuum in the PVVS was increased to -50 11 we with a header flow at 1900 scfm. Feeding was reinitiated at 18 gpm and manually increased to 30 gpm in one step change. This caused an instantaneous spike in benzene in the PVVH. The spike did not exceed 60% of the LEL. A high LEL alarm was received which caused feeding and steam to the PR to shutdown. Operating procedures have since been modified to gradually increase PRFT to PR feed flow.
Other interruptions during Batch 4 and 5 were due to the PRFT transfer pump losing prime after feeding was initiated. These interruptions were apparently caused by operating the pump at a very low level with the PRFT agitator running. The simulated precipitate slurry experiences some tendencies to foam, and with the agitator running at a low tank level, air can easily become entrained in the slurry. This can cause the pump to lose prime. The causes and solutions to the pumping problems experienced with all DWPF remote canyon pumps is being studied by the DWPF engineering staff, ref (9).
In general, precipitate hydrolysis aqueous (PHA) and the organic products from this process have been high in quality. Some initial problems with high benzene concentrations in the PHA were experienced. These problems were easily corrected by purging the PR with carbon dioxide (35 scfm) during the cool down cycle. Apparently, some benzene vapor was being trapped in process and service jumpers and condensing out into the PR during the cool down cycle. The carbon dioxide purge during cool down has corrected this problem, ref [6-8].
Process gas analyzer performance has been excellent with the exception of the PVVH LEL analyzers. During Batch 5, a high calibration drift was experienced on the LEL analyzer causing more frequent calibrations (daily, manufacturer recommends every 30 days) . Recent studies on these analyzers appear to indicate that silicone poisons the LEL sensor causing it to malfunction. The antifoam agent used in the Sludge Receipt and Adjustment Tank (SRAT) and Slurry Mix Evaporator (SME) process has silicone listed as a component. As a result, this FTA study was commissioned to determine if these analyzers could be permanently removed from service.
24
Before discussing what was done in this FTA with regards to removing the LEL Analyzers in the PVVS, we discuss the FTA protocol that was used to conduct the FTA for the HAN and Late Wash fault trees.
25
4.0 FTA Protocol
As described in the introduction, the FTA conducted for the SPC is a stand-alone document used for critical design decisions. This means that the FTA contains the following properties: ( 1) is scrutable and understandable, (2) is a complete risk model within the state of the art, (3) can be readily updated as design changes are made, and (4) can be used during initial design conception to calculate risk associated with new control schemes (as was done in this report) .
It must be emphasized that the SPC FTA was conducted by a highlyqualified team of professionals, familiar with the SPC process, who understood every step that was conducted in the FTA. The team was trained in FTA before the study started. The FTA was not conducted by a sole individual.
The steps to conduct the SPC FTA are listed below.
Step 1 -- Top Event Definition - identify hazards from HAZOP, experience or narrative description. For this study, hazards that required FTA were benzene deflagration both inside and outside the SPC process boundary.
Step 2
• •
•
•
• •
System Understanding
Examine P&IDs Generate simplified flow diagram with zone indices from P&IDs (e.g. figures 4 and 7) For batch systems, generate a bar chart that shows the sequence of operations and their duration (e.g., figures 5 and 8) Identify active control loops, e.g., negative feedback and negative fo~ward loops and associated control elements (e.g., Table A-2 of Appendix A and Table 3 of Appendix B) Describe interlock strategy (as described in section 2. 2) Identify important control elements that comprise these interlocks, identify control element failures that are common-cause initiating events, i.e, failures of elements
26
Step 3
Step 4
Step 5
Step 6
•
Step 7
•
comprising control loops which simultaneously fail one or more interlock actions (e.g., Appendices A and B) Describe important operator procedures
Fault Tree Construction
List assumptions Top level fault tree List control system failure modes that are dependent on Top Events -- explain the directed graph approach for generating fault trees from directed graphs for complex control systems (true for the SPC process) see figure 11 for PWH Generation of AND gates, e.g., a) conditions for firejexplosion b) redundancy c) mitigation by interlocks/operators d) common-cause initiating events
Qualitative Analysis, generate min cut sets
Reliability Data for the basic events
Identify initiating and enabling events Identify maintenance policies for components Failure rates, A Inspection intervals, 0 Data sources
Probabilistic Analysis
Establish acceptable frequencies ( 1. 0 x 10"4 yr" 1 for this study) compute instantaneous top event occurrence frequency Compute expected number of occurrences over a specified time interval (e.g. plant life) which is the integral of the instantaneous top event occurrence frequency
Importance Analysis
Weighting functions (frequency of a defined set of events divided by top event occurrence frequency)
27
step 8
Importance measures for 1} initiating events, 2} enabling events, 3} total importance and 4) min cut set importances Display component failure modes that dominate probabilistically Generate summary fault trees from min cut sets that dominate probabilistically, i.e., concept of cumulative and residual importance of min cut sets
Conclusions, recommendations and results
• Suggest where redundancy should be incorporated • Suggest additional interlocks • Specify inspection and calibration frequency of critical
components Iterate fault tree steps as necessary
• Describe important failure modes in terms of a summary fault tree description
step 9 -- Peer Review
28
5.0 Removal of PVVH LEL Analyzers FTA
The basic conclusion of this study is that two benzene analyzers being available at the beginning of the run offers enough redundancy to insure an acceptable level of safety in the SPC operation without the existence of the LEL analyzers. Below, we discuss the basis of this conclusion.
As described in the introduction, the Late Wash FTA is modified to determine the new frequency of fire and explosion and the new frequency of a formation a flammable mixture in the DWPF Process Vessel Vent Header (PVVH) for the following case:
Assuming the PVVH LEL analyzers are permanently removed from service, two benzene analyzers are available to start a batch and at least one benzene analyzer is available at the end of the batch. The batch cycle time is assumed to be 44 hours.
This means that interlock 12 in table 6 of Appendix B has been removed.
To conduct this FTA, the following three fault trees were modified:
1) Fire/explosion within the PVVS during PR feeding when high flow C02 is used
2) Firejexplosion within the PVVS during all other periods in which the high flow co2 is not used
3) Fire/explosion within the PR during the feeding period.
The complete set of modified fault trees for this study is contained in Appendix c.
The reason that the PR fault tree must be modified is that a spurious false signal indicating trouble in the PVVS can lead to an unsafe shutdown of the PR, i.e., a fault condition in which feeding in the PR occurs without high flow co2 being available.
29
Tables 12 and 13 in the Late Wash FTA were used as the reliability data for the basic events. It is assumed in the FTA that the benzene analyzer performs the same function as the LEL analyzer in detecting benzene and the compounds of benzene within the PVVS. It is further assumed that the benzene analyzers will not detect flammables such as hydrogen and ammonia.
Table 1 lists the new annual frequency of fire and explosion for all the top level events considered in the Late Wash FTA. Table 2 lists the same information except the frequency of an explosive concentration is listed. The table 2 frequencies are upper bound frequencies for table 1 since table 2 assumes that an ignition source exists all the time.
The new annual frequency of fire and explosion for all scenarios calculated in this FTA is 3. 3 x 10-5 yr· 1 which is less than the design goal of 1. 0 x 10-4 yr- 1 • The new frequency, 3. 3 x 10-5 yr- 1 , is actually less than the 5. 0 x 10-5 yr- 1 computed in the Late Wash FTA.
Below, we discuss this discrepancy.
There were two errors in the Late Wash fault trees that were corrected. The first error described below resulted in a non-conservatism but was not significant. The second error had the opposite affect and was significant in reducing the frequency.
When Savannah River Technical Center (SRTC) conducted a peer review of the fault trees in the Late Wash report, the review identified different basic event descriptions (i.e., failure modes) that were assigned to interlock relays whose contacts were both normally closed and opened. Assigning separate descriptions to these failure modes gave the appearance that these failure modes were independent when in fact the failure involved the same relay. This error actually increases the frequency but did not do so significantly. Figure 9 shows by an example how this error was corrected.
Another error made in the Late Wash FTA is the assumption that failure of PR high flow co2 flow transmitter, FI-1107, in the inactive mode was unannounced when in fact the failure is announced. For example, during feeding, if the DCS erroneously
30
generates a signal to close BV-1109, then high flow purge to the PR is stopped. If FI-1107 still indicates nominal flow, then FI-1107 fails in the inactive mode. However, this failure would be detected before the start of the next run. This means that the fault duration time for the transmitter failure is one operating cycle as opposed to six months assumed in the Late Wash FTA. The six month inspection interval corresponds to the assumed inspection frequency for flow transmitters. When correcting this error in the fault tree, a lower frequency for PR deflagration during the feeding period is computed.
Since the Late Wash FTA was conducted, interlock 16 on table 4 in Appendix B was deleted. In addition, the control actions in interlock 6 to close the PR steam flow control valve and block valve and opening the PR cooling valve were deleted. These deletions have no effect on the Late Wash FTA since these control actions were not included in the Late Wash FTA.
It is interesting to note that in the Late Wash FTA, some conservative assumptions were assumed regarding the availability of the PVVH analyzers during feeding. It was assumed that only one benzene and one LEL analyzer was available. However, during all other periods, it was assumed that two benzene analyzers and two LEL analyzers are available at the beginning of the run. Hence, during the feeding period, the assumption was made that two analyzers are available in the new study as well as in the Late Wash FTA, and hence the new frequency for PVVH fire or explosion during feeding did not increase significantly.
During all other periods (called the normal period in the study) reducing the number of PVVH analyzers did not significantly change the frequency of PVVH firejexplosion. The reason for this is that the scenario involving loss of dilution air during OE evaporation dominated probabilistically -- failure of the OE steam valve 9301 to close was a single event resulting in failure of the interlock action. See figure 9 which shows the summary fault tree for the PVVH during the normal period. The failure of the analyzers in this case would involve two separate failures and would not be as significant probabilistically as a single failure of the OE steam valve.
31
6.0 Acknowledgments
The authors wish to thank Eric Browne and Anthony Sarrack for their comments regarding the errors in the Late Wash FTA. These errors were corrected when the FTA was conducted for this study.
The authors also wish to thank those members of the BNI, DuPont Engineering, WSRC DWPF and WSRC SRTC design team who participated in the SPC FTA development.
32
7.0 References
Reference 1
Reference 2
Reference 3
Reference 4
Reference 5
Reference 6
Reference 7
Reference 8
Reference 9
"Fault Tree Analysis for Fire and Explosion Within the Salt Process Cell," Walter Chen and Howard Lambert, September 1986. Letter and Report, from K.G. Miller to R.J. Cunningham BD-8599, dated September 10, 1986.
Process Hazards Review, System No. 32, Precipitate Processing Facilities, Rev. 1, for the Defense Waste Processing Facility; Bechtel National, Inc., March 7, 1992.
"Fault Tree Analysis for Fire and Explosion Within the Salt Process Cell (Late Wash)", by H.E. Lambert for Westinghouse savannah River Company, Erin Engineering & Research, Inc., February 1993.
"Defense Waste Processing Facility: Technical Basis for HAN Precipitate Hydrolysis Process," WSRC-TM-90-11 Rev. o, by M.A. Baich, R.A. Jacobs, J .c. Marek, WSRC-SRTC, December 1990.
"Precipitate Process Operability," D.A. Orth to R.A. Harral, March 1989.
"Salt Process Cell Batch 1 Report (U)," D.P.Lambert, R.E. Edwards & Others, WSRC-RP-93-466, 4/29/93.
"Salt Process Cell Batch 2 Report (U)", S.R. Young, R.E. Edwards & Others, WSRC-PR-93-560, 4/13/93.
"Draft Salt Process Cell Batch 3 Report (U)", H.B. Shah, R.E. Edwards & Others, WSRC-93-1297, 7/21/93
"SPC Batch 4, PRFT to PR J.E. Occhipinti to W.R. 7/29/93.
33
Feed Interruption (U)," Davis, OPS-DTC-930018,
APPENDIX A
INTERLOCK liST FOR HAN ADDITION/NITRITE DESTRUCTION
FAULT TREES
TABLE A-2
TABLE A-3
TABLE A-4
TABLE A-5
TABLE A-6
LIST OF TABLES IN APPENDIX A
CONTROL ELEMENTS ON NEGATIVE FEEDBACK LOOPS
CONTROL ELEMENTS COMPRISING HARDWIRED INTERLOCKS THAT PREVENT BENZENE-N20 FIRE/EXPLOSION IN PR
CONTROL ELEMENTS COMPRISING HARDWIRED AND DCS DEPENDENT INTERLOCKS FOR PREVENTION OF BENZENE-AIR FIRE/EXPLOSION IN PRECIPITATE PROCESS SYSTEM
CONTROL ELEMENTS COMPRISING HARDWIRED INTERLOCKS FOR PREVENTION OF BENZENE-AIR FIRE/EXPLOSION IN PVVH SYSTEM
CONTROL ELEMENTS COMPRISING HARDWIRED INTERLOCKS FOR PREVENTION OR ORGANICS FIRE IN SPC
TABlE A-2 (HAN ADDITION)
CONTROl ElEMENTS ON NEGATIVE FEEDBACK lOOPS
~ ~-- - ---- - -------------------------
SENSOR CONTROLLER OTHER CONTROL ELEMENTS NFBL DESCRIPTION [LOCATION] [LOCATION] [LOCATION]
CONTROL PUMP SPEED DURING FEEDING Fl-1106 FC-1106 SPEED CONTROLLER 1173 [B-1] I
[B-2] [B-2] FEED PUMP [B-1]
CONTROL HIGH FLOW C02 DURING FT-1107 FC-1107 FCV-1107 [D-2] FEEDING [D-2] [C-2] CONTROL STEAM FLOW TO PR DURING FI-1027 FIC-1027 PR FLOW CONTROL VALVE 1027 [E-3] FEEDING/BOILUP/STEAM STRIPPING [E-3] [E-3] I/P TRANSDUCER FY 1027 [E-3]
CONTROL STEAM FLOW TO OE DURING FI-9301 FIC-9301 OE FLOW CONTROL VALVE 9301 [G-5] DISTILLATION/STEAM STRIPPING [G-5] [G-5] I/P TRANSDUCER 9301
CONTROL FLOW OF DILUTION AIR IN FT-5860 FIC-5860 FLOW CONTROL VALVE 2034 [D-7] PVVH [C-10] [D-10]
CONTROL SCVC EXHAUST TEMPERATURE Tl-9356 TIC-9356 PROCESS CHILLED WATER FLOW CONTROL [C-6] [C-6] VALVE 9356 [C-6]
E:\WSRC\REPTB93\APPEND\APPA\A-2 12/13/93 3:23pm
TABlE A-3 (HAN ADDITION)
CONTROl ElEMENTS COMPRISING HARDWIRED INTERlOCKS THAT PREVENT BENZENE-N20 FIRE/EXPlOSION IN PR ------
INTERLOCK TRIP CONDITION SENSOR/ (INTERLOCK NUMBER, ANALYlER SWITCH RELAY CONTROL ACTION [LOCATION]
L_ VESSEL OR SPC PROTECTION) [LOCATION]
PR HI-FLOW C02 PURGE FLOW LLL FI-1107* FSLL11078 HR5 PRFT TRANSFER PUMP (HIS-1173) STOPPED [B-1] (6, PR) [D-2] PRFT-PR BLOCK VALVE (MOV-1100) CLOSED [B-2]
PRFT-PR PPT FEED FLOW HHH FI-1106* FSHH1106B HR2 SAME AS INTERLOCK 6 ABOVE (7, PR) [B-2] SCVC EXHAUST N20 CONC HHH AI-3406 ASHH3406B CR3D PRFT TRANSFER PUMP (HIS-1173) STOPPED [B-1] (8, PR) [C-6] PRFT-PR BLOCK VALVE (MOV-1100) CLOSED [B-2]
AI-4798 ASHH4798B CR6D PR STEAM FLOW VALVE (FCV-1027) CLOSED [E-3] [C-6] PR STEAM BLOCK VALVE (HCV-1038) CLOSED [E-3]
PR COOLING WATER VALVE (HCV-1033) OPEN [E-4] SPC BACKUP C02 WEIGHT LLL WI-2779 WSLL2779B HR7 PRFT TRANSFER PUMP (HIS-1173) STOPPED [B-1] (9A, PR) [F-2] PRFT-PR BLOCK VALVE (MOV-1100) CLOSED [B-2]
PR STEAM FLOW VALVE (FCV-1027) CLOSED [E-3] PR STEAM BLOCK VALVE (HCV-1038) CLOSED [E-3] PR COOLING WATER VAlVE (HCV-1033) OPEN [E-4] PR HI-FlOW C02 VAlVE (FCV-1107) ClOSED
(5 MIN DElAY) [D-2] PR HI-FlOW BLOCK VAlVE (HCV-1109) CLOSED
(5 MIN DELAYl [D-2J
SPC BACKUP C02 PRESSURE LLL PI-2778 PSLL2778B HR7 SAME AS INTERLOCK 9A ABOVE (9B, PR) [F-3}
PR HI-FLOW C02 FLOW LLLLL FI-1107* FSLL1107D HR8 PR STEAM FLOW VALVE (FCV-1027) CLOSED [E-3] (16, PR) [D-2] PR STEAM BLOCK VALVE (HCV-1038) CLOSED [E-3]
PR COOLING WATER VALVE (HCV-1033) OPEN [E-4] I
* COMPONENT ON NFBL, FAIL HIGH OR LOW FAILURE MODE IS COMMON CAUSE INITIATING EVENT
- - ----- ------ ------ -~-
INTERLOCK TRIP CONDITION SENSOR/ (INTERLOCK NUMBER, MALYlER SWITCH RELAY CONTROL ACTION [LOCATION]
VESSEL OR SPC PROTECTION) [LOCATION]
SCVC EXHAUST FLOW HHHH FI-9277 FSHH9277C HR9 PRFT TRANSFER PUMP (HIS-1173) STOPPED [B-1] (4, PVVH, PR) [C-6] PRFT-PR BLOCK VALVE (MOV-1100 CLOSED [B-2]
PR STEAM FLOW VALVE (FCV-1027) CLOSED [E-3] PR STEAM BlOCK VALVE (HCV 1038) CLOSED [E-3] PR COOLING WATER VALVE (HCV-1033) OPEN [E-4] PR HI-FLOW C02 VALVE (FCV-1107) CLOSED
(5 MIN DELAY) [D-2] PR HI-FLOW C02 BLOCK VALVE (HCV-1109) CLOSED
(5 MIN DELAY) [D-2] OE STEAM FLOW VALVE (FCV-9301) CLOSED [G-6] OE STEAM BLOCK VALVE (HCV-XXXX) CLOSED [G-5]
TABLE A-4 (HAN ADDITION) CONTROL ELEMENTS COMPRISING HARDWIRED AND DCS DEPENDENT INTERLOCKS FOR PREVENTION OF BENZENE-AIR FIRE/EXPLOSION IN PRECIPITATE PROCESS SYSTEM
INTERLOCK TRIP CONDITION (INTERLOCK NUMBER,
VESSEL OR SPC PROTECTION)
SCVC OXYGEN CONCENTRATION HHH {10, All PROCESS VESSELS, All THE TIME)
** HARDWIRED INTERLOCK *** DCS INTERlOCK
-------
SENSOR/ MALYlER SWITCH RELAY
[LOCATION]
AI-3405 ASHH3405B CR3C AI-3409 ASHH3409C CR6C
- --------····------
CONTROL ACTION [LOCATION]
RAISE SPC VESSEl SYSTEM PRESSURE TO POSITIVE (PI-1041 & 9312) ** [D-3], [G-4]
AGITATORS STOPPED: PRFT (HIS-1140), PR (-1042), OE {-9317) *** [B-1], [E-3], [G-5]
CATALYST FEED TANK TRANSFER PUMP (HIS-1008) STOPPED ***
FORMIC ACID FEED TANK TO PR BlOCK VALVE (HIS-2056) CLOSED ***
HAN FEED TANK TO PR BlEED VALVE (HCV-8829) OPENED ***
HAN FEED TANK TO PR DOWN STREAM TRANSFER VALVE (HCV-8830) ClOSED ***
HAN FEED TANK TO PR UP STREAM TRANSFER VALVE (HCV-8828) CLOSED ***
lPPT TRANSFER PUMP (HIS-7162A) STOPPED *** OE COOLING WATER VAlVE {HCV-9307) OPENED ***
[G-6] OE TRANSFER PUMP (HIS-9316) STOPPED *** [G-5] OECT SAMPlE PUMP (HIS-9333) STOPPED *** [F-4] OECT TRANSFER PUMP (HIS-9337) STOPPED *** [F-4] PR SAMPLE PUMP (HIS-1044) STOPPED *** [E-3] PR TRANSFER PUMP (HIS-1057) STOPPED *** [E-3] PRFT TRANSFER PUMP (HIS-1173) STOPPED *** [B-1] PRFT SAMPlE PUMP (HIS-1172) STOPPED *** [B-1] PRFT-PR BLOCK VALVE (MOV-1100) CLOSED*** [B-3] PR STEAM flOW VAlVE (FCV-1027) CLOSED *** [E-3] PR STEAM BlOCK VAlVE (HCV-1038) CLOSED *** [E-3] PR COOLING WATER VALVE (HCV-1033) OPEN *** [E-4] PR HI-FLOW C02 VALVE (FCV-1107) CLOSED ***
(5 MIN DELAY) [D-2] PR HI-FLOW C02 BLOCK VALVE (HCV-1109) CLOSED ***
(5 MIN DELAY) [D-2] OE STEAM FLOW.VALVE (FCV-9301) CLOSED*** [G-6] OE STEAM BLOCK VAlVE {HCV-XXXX) CLOSED *** [G-5]
r
I
TABlE A-5 (HAN ADDITION)
CONTROl ElEMENTS COMPRISING HARDWIRED INTERlOCKS FOR PREVENTION OF BENZENE-AIR FIRE/EXPlOSION IN PVVH SYSTEM
INTERLOCK TRIP CONDITION SENSOR/ (INTERLOCK NUMBER, ANALYlER SWITCH RELAY CONTROL ACTION [LOCATION]
VESSEL OR SPC PROTECTION) [LOCATION]
PR HI-FLOW C02 PURGE FLOW HHH FI-1107* FSHH1107B HR4 PRFT TRANSFER PUMP (HIS-1173) STOPPED [B-1] (1, PVVH) [D-3] PRFT-PR BLOCK VALVE (MOV-1100) CLOSED [B-2]
PR STEAM FLOW VALVE (FCV-1027) CLOSED [E-3] PR STEAM BLOCK VALVE (HCV-1038) CLOSED [E-3] PR COOLING WATER VALVE (HCV-1033) OPEN [E-4] PR HI-FLOW C02 VALVE (FCV-1107) CLOSED
(5 MIN DELAY) [D-2] PR HI-FLOW C02 BLOCK VALVE (HCV-1109) CLOSED
(5 MIN DELAY) [D-2] OE STEAM FLOW VALVE (FCV-9301) ClOSED [G-6] OE STEAM BlOCK VALVE (HCV-XXXX) CLOSED [G-5]
PVVH FLOW LLL FI-5860* FSLL5860B HR3 SAME AS INTERLOCK 1 ABOVE (2, PVVH) [C-10]
PVVH TEMPERATURE HHH TI-6041 TSHH6041B HR1 SAME AS INTERLOCK 1 ABOVE (3, PVVH) [C-9]
SCVC EXHAUST FLOW HHHH FI-9277 FSHH9277C HR9 SAME AS INTERLOCK 1 ABOVE (4, PVVH) [C-6]
SCVC EXHAUST TEMPERATURE HHHH TI-9356* TSHH9356C HR6 SAME AS INTERLOCK 1 ABOVE '---(5, PVVH)
---_ [C-6]
* COMPONENT ON NFBL, FAIL HIGH OR LOW FAILURE MODE IS COMMON CAUSE INITIATING EVENT
I
INTERLOCK TRIP CONDITION SENSOR/ (INTERLOCK NUMBER, MALVZER SWITCH RELAY CONTROL ACTION [lOCATION]
VESSEL OR SPC PROTECTION) [LOCATION]
PVVH C6H6 CONCENTRATION HHHH AI3407 ASHH3407C CR3A PRFT TRANSFER PUMP (HIS-1173) STOPPED [B-1] (11, PVVH) [C-10] PRFT-PR BLOCK VALVE (MOV-1100) CLOSED [B-2]
AI-3408 ASHH3408C CR6A PR STEAM FLOW VALVE (FCV-1027) CLOSED [E-3] [C-10] PR STEAM BLOCK VALVE (HCV-1038) CLOSED [E-3]
PR COOLING WATER VALVE (HCV-1033) OPEN [E-4] PR HI-FLOW C02 VALVE (FCV-1107) CLOSED
(5 MIN DELAY) [D-2] PR HI-FLOW C02 BLOCK VALVE (HCV-1109) CLOSED
(5 MIN DELAY) [D-2] OE STEAM FLOW VALVE (FCV-9301) CLOSED [G-6] OE STEAM BLOCK VALVE (HCV-XXXX) CLOSED [G-5] SCVC MOV'S 1041 & 9278 CLOSED [C-7]
PVVH LEL HHHH AI-4713 ASHH4713C CR3B SAME AS INTERLOCK 11 ABOVE (12, PVVH) [C-10]
AI-4714 ASHH4714C CR6B [C-10]
* COMPONENT ON NFBL, FAIL HIGH OR LOW FAILURE MODE IS COMMON CAUSE INITIATING EVENT
TABLE A-6 (HAN ADDITION)
CONTROL ELEMENTS COMPRISING HARDWIRED INTERLOCKS FOR PREVENTION OF ORGANICS FIRE IN SPC
INTERLOCK TRIP CONDITION SENSOR/ ~ (INTERLOCK NUMBER, MALVZER SWITCH RELAY CONTROL ACTION [lOCATION]
ESSEL OR SPC PROTECTION) [LOCATION]
PR PRESSURE HH PI-1041 PSHH1041 PSHHX1041 PRFT TRANSFER PUMP (HIS-1173) STOPPED [B-1] (14, SPC) [D-3] PRFT-PR BLOCK VALVE (MOV-1100) CLOSED [B-2]
PR STEAM FLOW VAlVE (FCV-1027) ClOSED [E-3] PR STEAM BlOCK VAlVE (HCV-1038) CLOSED [E-3] PR COOLING WATER VALVE (HCV-1033) OPEN [E-4] PR HI-FLOW C02 VAlVE (FCV-1107) CLOSED
(5 MIN DElAY) [D-2] PR HI-FlOW C02 BLOCK VAlVE (HCV-1109) CLOSED
(5 MIN DElAY) [D-2] OE STEAM FLOW VAlVE (FCV-9301) ClOSED [G-6] OE STEAM BLOCK VALVE (HCV-XXXX) CLOSED [G-5] OE COOLING WATER VALVE (HCV-9307) OPENED [G-6]
OE PRESSURE HH PI-9313 PSHH9313 PSHHX9313 PR STEAM FLOW VALVE (FCV-1027) CLOSED [E-3] (15, SPC) [G-5] PR STEAM BLOCK VALVE (HCV-1038) CLOSED [E-3]
PR COOLING WATER VALVE (HCV-1033) OPEN [E-3] OE STEAM FLOW VALVE (FCV-9301) CLOSED [G-6] OE STEAM BLOCK VALVE (HCV-XXXX) CLOSED [G-5] OE COOLING WATER VALVE (HCV-9307) OPENED [G-6]
SPC C02 FIRE SUPPRESSANT XS-4030 X54030 X54030 OE TRANSFER PUMP (HIS-9316) STOPPED [G-5] RELEASED OECT TRANSFER PUMP (HIS-9337) STOPPED [F-4] {17, SPCJ OECT SAMPLE PUMP (HIS-9333) STOPPED F-4]
SUMP PUMP lEVEl HHH li-5925 LSHH59258 lSHHX5925B SPC SUMP PUMP (HIS-5925B) STARTED [D-2] (18, SPC) [E-2] LSHH5927B LSHHX5927B SUMP PUMP DISCHARGE VALVE (MOV-5928) OPENED [D-2]
U-5927 -----····--·-··-
[_E-2] --···- -- -~
* COMPONENT ON NFBL, FAIL HIGH OR LOW FAILURE MODE IS COMMON CAUSE INITIATING EVENT
INTERLOCK TRIP CONDITION SENSOR/ (INTERLOCK NUMBER, ANALVZER SWITCH RELAY CONTROL ACTION [LOCATION]
VESSEL OR SPC PROTECTION) [LOCATION]
SUMP PUMP LEVEL HHHH LI-5930 LSH5930 LSHX5930 SPC SPRAY WATER VALVE (SV-7276) CLOSED (19, SPC) [E-2] LSH5931 LSHX5931
LI-5931 [E-2]
tR STEAM FLOW HH FSH-1027* FSHH1027 FSHHX1027 PR STEAM FlOW VALVE (FCV-1027) CLOSED [E-3] (20, PR & PVV SYSTEMS) [E-3] PR STEAM BLOCK VALVE (HCV-1038) ClOSED [E-3]
OE STEAM FLOW HH FSH-9301* FSH9301 FSHX9301 OE STEAM FLOW VALVE (FCV-9301) CLOSED [G-6] (21, PR AND PVV SYSTEMS) [G-5] OE STEAM BLOCK VALVE (HCV-XXXX) ClOSED [G-5]
* COMPONENT ON NFBL, FAIL HIGH OR LOW FAILURE MODE IS COMMON CAUSE INITIATING EVENT
APPENDIX B
INTERLOCK LIST FOR LATE WASH
FAULT TREES
TABLE 3
TABLE 4
TABLE 5
TABLE 6
TABLE 7
LIST OF TABLES IN APPENDIX B
CONTROL ELEMENTS ON NEGATIVE FEEDBACK LOOPS
CONTROL ELEMENTS COMPRISING HARDWIRED INTERLOCKS THAT PREVENT BENZENE FIRE/EXPLOSION IN PR DURING FEEDING
CONTROL ELEMENTS COMPRISING HARDWIRED AND DCS DEPENDENT INTERLOCKS FOR PREVENTION OF BENZENE-AIR FIRE/EXPLOSION IN PRECIPITATE PROCESS SYSTEM
CONTROL ELEMENTS COMPRISING HARDWIRED INTERLOCKS FOR PREVENTION OF BENZENE-AIR FIRE/EXPLOSION IN PVVH SYSTEM
CONTROL ELEMENTS COMPRISING HARDWIRED INTERLOCKS FOR PREVENTION OF ORGANICS FIRE IN SPC
TABLE 3 (LATE WASH)
CONTROL ELEMENTS ON NEGATIVE FEEDBACK LOOPS
SENSOR CONTROLLER OTHER CONTROL ELEMENTS NFBL DESCRIPTION [LOCATION] [LOCATION] [LOCATION]
CONTROL PUMP SPEED DURING FEEDING FI -1106 FC-1106 SPEED CONTROLLER 1173 [8-1] [B-2] [B-2] FEED PUMP [B-1]
CONTROL HIGH FLOW C02 DURING FT-1107 FC-1107 FCV-1107 [D-2] FEEDING [D-2] [C-2] CONTROL STEAM FLOW TO PR DURING FI-1027 FIC-1027 PR FLOW CONTROL VALVE 1027 [E-3] FEEDING/BOILUP/STEAM STRIPPING [E-3] [E-3] 1/P TRANSDUCER FY 1027 [E-3] CONTROL STEAM FLOW TO OE DURING FI-9301 FIC-9301 OE FLOW CONTROL VALVE 9301 [G-5] DISTILLATION/STEAM STRIPPING [G-5] [G-5] 1/P TRANSDUCER 9301 CONTROL FLOW OF DILUTION AIR IN FT-5860 FIC-5860 FLOW CONTROL VALVE 2034 [D-7] PVVH [C-10] [D-10] CONTROL SCVC EXHAUST TEMPERATURE TI-9356 TIC-9356 PROCESS CHILLED WATER FLOW CONTROL
[C-6] [C-6] VALVE 9356 [C-6]
E:\WSRC\REPTB93\APPEND\APPB\TABLE3 12/13!93 3:52pm
II
TABlE 4 -- INTERlOCK TABlE (lATE WASH)
CONTROl ElEMENTS COMPRISING HARDWIRED INTERlOCKS THAT PREVENT BENZENE FIRE/EXPlOSION IN PR DURING FEEDING
- -
INTERLOCK TRIP CONDITION SENSOR/ (INTERLOCK NUMBER, ANALYZER SWITCH RELAY CONTROL ACTION [LOCATION]
VESSEL OR SPC PROTECTION) [LOCATION]
PR HI-FLOW C02 PURGE FLOW LLL FI-1107* FSLL1107B HR5 PRFT TRANSFER PUMP (HIS-1173) STOPPED [B-1] (6, PR) [D-2] PRFT-PR BLOCK VALVE (MOV-1100) CLOSED [B-2]
PR STEAM FLOW VALVE (FCV-1027) CLOSED [E-3]** PR STEAM BLOCK VALVE (HCV-1038) CLOSED [E-3]** PR COOLING WATER VALVE JHCV-1033J OPEN [E-4]**
PRFT-PR PPT FEED FLOW HHH FI-1106* FSHH1106B HR2 SAME AS INTERLOCK 6 ABOVE (7, PR) [B-2]
SPC BACKUP C02 WEIGHT LLL WI-2779 WSLL2779B HR7 PRFT TRANSFER PUMP (HIS-1173) STOPPED [B-1] (9A, PR) [F-2] PRFT-PR BLOCK VALVE {MOV-1100) CLOSED [B-2]
PR STEAM FLOW VALVE (FCV-1027) CLOSED [E-3] PR STEAM BLOCK VALVE (HCV-1038) CLOSED [E-3] PR COOLING WATER VALVE (HCV-1033) OPEN [E-4] PR HI-FLOW C02 VALVE (FCV-1107) CLOSED
(10 MIN DELAY) [D-2] PR HI-FLOW BLOCK VALVE (HCV-1109) CLOSED
(10 MIN DELAY) [D-2]
SPC BACKUP C02 PRESSURE LLL PI-2778 PSLL2778B HR7 SAME AS INTERLOCK 9A ABOVE (9B, PR) [F-3]
PR HI-FLOW C02 FLOW LLLLL FI -1107* FSLU107D HR8 PR STEAM FLOW VALVE (FCV-1027) CLOSED [E-3] (16, PR) *** [D-2] PR STEAM BLOCK VALVE (HCV-1038) CLOSED [E-3]
--- ~-- '~~-- -~
PR COOLING WATER VALVE (HCV-1033) OPEN [E-4]
* COMPONENT ON NFBL, FAIL HIGH OR LOW FAILURE MODE IS COMMON CAUSE INITIATING EVENT ** INTERLOCK ACTIONS ELIMINATED *** INTERLOCK 16 REMOVED FROM SERVICE
-----
INTERLOCK TRIP CONDITION SENSOR/ {INTERLOCK NUMBER, ANALYZER SWITCH RELAY CONTROL ACTION [LOCATION]
VESSEL OR SPC PROTECTION) [LOCATION]
SCVC EXHAUST FLOW HHHH FI-9277 FSHH9277C HR9 PRFT TRANSFER PUMP (HIS-1173) STOPPED [B-1] (4, PVVH, PR) [C-6] PRFT-PR BLOCK VALVE (MOV-1100 CLOSED [B-2]
PR STEAM FLOW VALVE (FCV-1027) CLOSED [E-3] PR STEAM BLOCK VALVE (HCV 1038) CLOSED [E-3] PR COOLING WATER VALVE (HCV-1033) OPEN [E-4] PR HI-FLOW C02 VALVE (FCV-1107) CLOSED
(10 MIN DELAY) [D-2] PR HI-FLOW C02 BLOCK VALVE (HCV-1109) CLOSED
(10 MIN DELAY) [D-2] OE STEAM FLOW VALVE (FCV-9301) CLOSED [G-6]
* COMPONENT ON NFBL, FAIL HIGH OR LOW FAILURE MODE IS COMMON CAUSE INITIATING EVENT ** INTERLOCK ACTIONS ELIMINATED *** INTERLOCK 16 REMOVED FROM SERVICE
TABLE 5 -- INTERLOCK TABLE {LATE WASH) CONTROL ELEMENTS COMPRISING HARDWIRED AND DCS DEPENDENT INTERLOCKS FOR PREVENTION OF BENZENE-AIR FIRE/EXPLOSION IN PRECIPITATE PROCESS SYSTEM
INTERLOCK TRIP CONDITION (INTERLOCK NUMBER,
VESSEL OR SPC PROTECTION)
SCVC OXYGEN CONCENTRATION HHH {10, ALL PROCESS VESSELS,
I ALL THE TIME)
** HARDWIRED INTERLOCK *** DCS INTERLOCK
SENSOR/ ANALYZER SWITCH RELAY
[LOCATION]
AI-3405 ASHH3405B CR3C AI-3409 ASHH3409C CR6C
CONTROL ACTION [LOCATION]
RAISE SPC VESSEL SYSTEM PRESSURE TO POSITIVE (PI-1041 & 9312) ** [D-3], [G-4]
AGITATORS STOPPED: PRFT (HIS-1140), PR (-1042), OE (-9317) *** [B-1], [E-3], [G-5]
CATALYST FEED TANK TRANSFER PUMP (HIS-1008) STOPPED ***
FORMIC ACID FEED TANK TO PR BLOCK VALVE (HIS-2056) CLOSED ***
HAN FEED TANK TO PR BLEED VALVE (HCV-8829) OPENED ***
HAN FEED TANK TO PR DOWN STREAM TRANSFER VALVE (HCV-8830) CLOSED ***
HAN FEED TANK TO PR UP STREAM TRANSFER VALVE (HCV-8828) CLOSED ***
LPPT TRANSFER PUMP (HIS-7162A) STOPPED *** OE COOLING WATER VALVE (HCV-9307) OPENED ***
[G-6] OE TRANSFER PUMP (HIS-9316) STOPPED *** [G-5] OECT SAMPLE PUMP (HIS-9333) STOPPED *** [F-4] OECT TRANSFER PUMP (HIS-9337) STOPPED *** [F-4] PR SAMPLE PUMP (HIS-1044) STOPPED *** [E-3] PR TRANSFER PUMP (HIS-1057) STOPPED *** [E-3] PRFT TRANSFER PUMP (HIS-1173) STOPPED *** [B-1] PRFT SAMPLE PUMP (HIS-1172) STOPPED *** [B-1] PRFT-PR BLOCK VALVE (MOV-1100) CLOSED *** [B-3] PR STEAM FLOW VALVE (FCV-1027) CLOSED *** [E-3] PR STEAM BLOCK VALVE (HCV-1038) CLOSED *** [E-3] PR COOLING WATER VALVE (HCV-1033) OPEN *** [E-4] PR HI-FLOW C02 VALVE (FCV-1107) CLOSED ***
(10 MIN DELAY) [D-2] PR HI-FLOW C02 BLOCK VALVE (HCV-1109) CLOSED ***
(10 MIN DELAY) [D-2] OE STEAM FLOW VALVE (FCV-9301) CLOSED *** [G-6]
!
I: 1TERLOCK TRIP CONDITION (INTERLOCK NUMBER, VESSEL OR SPC PROTECTION)
TABlE 6 -- INTERlOCK TABlE (lATE WASH)
CONTROl ElEMENTS COMPRISING HARDWIRED INTERlOCKS FOR PREVENTION OF BENZENE-AIR FIRE/EXPlOSION IN PVVH SYSTEM
SENSOR/ ANALYZER SWITCH RELAY CONTROL ACTION [LOCATION] [LOCATION]
PR HI-FLOW C02 PURGE FLOW HHH FI-1107* FSHH1107B HR4 PRFT TRANSFER PUMP (HIS-1173) STOPPED [B-1] (1, PVVH) [D-3] PRFT-PR BLOCK VALVE (MOV-1100) CLOSED [B-2]
PR STEAM FLOW VALVE (FCV-1027) CLOSED [E-3] PR STEAM BLOCK VALVE (HCV-1038) CLOSED [E-3] PR COOLING WATER VALVE (HCV-1033) OPEN [E-4] PR HI-FLOW C02 VALVE (FCV-1107) CLOSED
(10 MIN DELAY) [D-2] PR HI-FLOW C02 BLOCK VALVE (HCV-1109) CLOSED
(10 MIN DELAY) [D-2]
PVVH FLOW LLL FI-5860* FSLL5860B HR3 SAME AS INTERLOCK 1 ABOVE {2, PVVH) [C-10]
PVVH TEMPERATURE HHH TI-6041 TSHH6041B HR1 SAME AS INTERLOCK 1 ABOVE (3, PVVH) [C-9]
SCVC EXHAUST FLOW HHHH FI -9277 FSHH9277C HR9 SAME AS INTERLOCK 1 ABOVE (4, PVVH) [C-6] OE STEAM FLOW VALVE CLOSES (FCV-9301}
SCVC EXHAUST TEMPERATURE HHHH TI -9356* TSHH9356C HR6 SAME AS INTERLOCK 1 ABOVE (5, PVVH) [C-6] OE STEAM FLOW VALVE CLOSES (FCV-9301)
* COMPONENT ON NFBL, FAIL HIGH OR LOW FAILURE MODE IS COMMON CAUSE INITIATING EVENT ** SOFTWIRED INTERLOCK
INTERLOCK TRIP CONDITION SENSOR/ (INTERLOCK NUMBER, ANALYZER SWITCH RELAY CONTROL ACTION [LOCATION] VESSEL OR SPC PROTECTION) [LOCATION]
PVVH C6H6 CONCENTRATION HHHH AI3407 ASHH3407C CR3A PRFT TRANSFER PUMP (HIS-1173) STOPPED [B-1] (11, PVVH) [C-10] PRFT-PR BLOCK VALVE (MOV-1100) CLOSED [B-2]
AI-3408 ASHH3408C CR6A PR STEAM FLOW VALVE (FCV-1027) CLOSED [E-3] [C-10] PR STEAM BLOCK VALVE (HCV-1038) CLOSED [E-3]
' PR COOLING WATER VALVE (HCV-1033) OPEN [E-4] PR HI-FLOW C02 VALVE (FCV-1107) CLOSED
(10 MIN DELAY) [D-2] PR HI-FLOW C02 BLOCK VALVE (HCV-1109) CLOSED
(10 MIN DELAY) [D-2] OE STEAM FLOW VALVE (FCV-9301) CLOSED [G-6]** SCVC MOV'S 1041 & 9278 CLOSED [C-7]**
PVVH LEL HHHH AI-4713 ASHH4713C CR3B SAME AS INTERLOCK 11 ABOVE (12, PVVH) [C-10]
AI-4714 ASHH4714C CR6B [C-10]
* COMPONENT ON NFBL, FAIL HIGH OR LOW FAILURE MODE IS COMMON CAUSE INITIATING EVENT ** SOFTWIRED INTERLOCK
TABLE 7 ~- INTERLOCK TABLE (LATE WASH)
CONTROL ELEMENTS COMPRISING HARDWIRED INTERLOCKS FOR PREVENTION OF ORGANICS FIRE IN SPC
II INTERLOCK TRIP CONDITION I SENSOR/ I I I
I' (INTERLOCK NUMBER, ANALYlER 1 SWITCH RELAY CONTROL ACTION [LOCATION]
I VESSEL OR SPC PROTECTION) [LOCATION]
PR PRESSURE HH PI-1041 PSHH1041 PSHHX1041 PRFT TRANSFER PUMP (HIS-1173) STOPPED [8-1] (14, SPC) [D-3] PRFT-PR BLOCK VALVE (MOV-1100) CLOSED [B-2]
PR STEAM FLOW VALVE (FCV-1027) CLOSED [E-3] PR STEAM BLOCK VALVE (HCV-1038) CLOSED [E-3] PR COOLING WATER VALVE (HCV-1033) OPEN [E-4] PR HI-FlOW C02 VALVE (FCV-1107) CLOSED
(10 MIN DELAY) [D-2] PR HI-FLOW C02 BLOCK VALVE (HCV-1109) ClOSED
(10 MIN DELAY) [D-2] OE STEAM FlOW VALVE (FCV-9301) CLOSED [G-6] OE COOLING WATER VALVE (HCV-9307) OPENED [G-6]
OE PRESSURE HH PI-9313 PSHH9313 PSHHX9313 PR STEAM FlOW VAlVE (FCV-1027) ClOSED [E-3] (15, SPC) [G-5] PR STEAM BLOCK VALVE (HCV-1038) ClOSED [E-3]
PR COOLING WATER VALVE (HCV-1033) OPEN [E-3] OE STEAM FLOW VALVE (FCV-9301) CLOSED [G-6] OE COOLING WATER VALVE (HCV-9307) OPENED [G-6]
SPC C02 FIRE SUPPRESSANT XS-4030 X54030 X54030 OE TRANSFER PUMP (HIS-9316) STOPPED [G-5] RELEASED OECT TRANSFER PUMP (HIS-9337) STOPPED [F-4] (17, SPC) OECT SAMPLE PUMP JHIS-9333) STOPPED F-4] SUMP PUMP LEVEL HHHH U-5930 LSH5930 LSH5930 INITIATE SPC INTERLOCK, TURN OFF All SPC PUMPS, (18, SPC) [E-2] LSH5931 LSH5931 TURN OFF STEAM TO OE AND PR, TURN ON COOLING WATER
U-5931 TO OE AND PR [E-2]
PR STEAM FLOW HH FSH-1027* FSHH1027 FSHHX1027 PR STEAM FLOW VALVE (FCV-1027) CLOSED [E-3] (20, PR & PVV SYSTEMS) [E-3] PR STEAM BLOCK VALVE (HCV-1038) CLOSED [E-3]
* COMPONENT ON NFBL, FAIL HIGH OR LOW FAILURE MODE IS COMMON CAUSE INITIATING EVENT
TABLE 7 -- INTERLOCK TABLE (LATE WASH)
CONTROL ELEMENTS COMPRISING HARDWIRED INTERLOCKS FOR PREVENTION OF ORGANICS FIRE IN SPC
II I SENSOR/ I I
------·····-·-
INTERLOCK TRIP CONDITION ,. (INTERLOCK NUMBER, ANALYlER I SWITCH RELAY CONTROL ACTION [LOCATION]
VESSEL OR SPC PROTECTION) [LOCATION]
PR PRESSURE HH PI-1041 PSHH1041 PSHHX1041 PRFT TRANSFER PUMP (HIS-1173) STOPPED [B-1] (14, SPC) [D-3] PRFT-PR BLOCK VALVE (MOV-1100) CLOSED [B-2]
PR STEAM FLOW VALVE (FCV-1027) CLOSED [E-3] PR STEAM BLOCK VALVE (HCV-1038) CLOSED [E-3] PR COOLING WATER VALVE (HCV-1033) OPEN [E-4] PR HI-FLOW C02 VALVE (FCV-1107) CLOSED
(10 MIN DELAY) [D-2] PR HI-FLOW C02 BLOCK VALVE (HCV-1109) CLOSED
(10 MIN DELAY) [D-2] I OE STEAM FLOW VALVE (FCV-9301) CLOSED [G-6]
OE COOLING WATER VALVE (HCV-9307) OPENED [G-6] OE PRESSURE HH PI-9313 PSHH9313 PSHHX9313 PR STEAM FLOW VALVE (FCV-1027) CLOSED [E-3] (15, SPC) [G-5] PR STEAM BLOCK VALVE (HCV-1038) CLOSED [E-3]
PR COOLING WATER VALVE (HCV-1033) OPEN [E-3] OE STEAM FLOW VALVE (FCV-9301) CLOSED [G-6] OE COOLING WATER VALVE (HCV-9307) OPENED [G-6]
SPC C02 FIRE SUPPRESSANT XS-4030 X54030 X54030 OE TRANSFER PUMP (HIS-9316) STOPPED [G-5] RELEASED OECT TRANSFER PUMP (HIS-9337) STOPPED [F-4] (17, SPC) OECT SAMPLE PUMP (HIS-9333) STOPPED F-4]
SUMP PUMP LEVEL HHHH LI-5930 LSH5930 LSH5930 INITIATE SPC INTERLOCK, TURN OFF All SPC PUMPS, (18, SPC) [E-2] LSH5931 LSH5931 TURN OFF STEAM TO OE AND PR, TURN ON COOLING WATER I
LI-5931 TO OE AND PR [E-2]
PR STEAM FLOW HH FSH-1027* FSHH1027 FSHHX1027 PR STEAM FLOW VALVE (FCV-1027) CLOSED [E-3] (20, PR & PVV SYSTEMS) [E-3] PR STEAM BLOCK VALVE (HCV-1038) CLOSED [E-3]
* COMPONENT ON NFBL, FAIL HIGH OR LOW FAILURE MODE IS COMMON CAUSE INITIATING EVENT
SALT PROCESS CELL FIRE/EXPLOSION (PVVS LEL ANALYZERS REMOVED FROM SERVICE)
F1RE DR EXPLmmN RE OR EXPLOSION \JITH WITHIN PRECIPITATE PRECI ITA TE REACTOR <PRl S EM
FEED TANK <PRFTl (IN UDES PR. SCVC AND P CDl
CD-FE-01 + CD-fE-Q2 +
SHEET 2 SHEET 4
(TOP-PRFT) * (TOP-PR--) *
FIRE DR EXPL.mmN VITHIN PROCESS
SYSTEM
F"E-ot-ot ---.--DR
RE OR EXPLOSION \JITH DR ANIC EVAPORATOR SYS
NCLUDES DE AND OECD
CO-FE-03 +
SHEET 8
(TOP-OE--)
+ EVENTS TO BE ANALYlED SEPARATELY
* SEVERITY THREE EVENTS IN PHR
FIRE OR EXPLDSIDN M WI N ORGANIC EVAPDRA
DENSA TE TANK <DEC l
CO-FE-Q.4. +
SHEET 10
* (TOP-OECT)
C SUMP NOT :TINGUISHED
CD-F"E-08
+
SHEET 25
(TOPSFIRE)
R
T+ SHEET 12
* (TOP-PVVH)
SHEET 1
CELL <SPCl AIR SPACE <DUTSI PROCESS BOUNDAR'() USING BACKFI
FROM R£MDTE P IJCESS CELL <RPC) TD COJPIED AREA
T+ SHEET 23 SHEET 30
(TOPLFIRE) * (TOPLARGE) *
*
MASTER LOGIC DIAGRAM
10-25-93 13:21 F: \FIRE\FlRE1
SPC FIRE/EXPLOSION
AIR LEAK THRU PRrT FEED
PUMP FLANGE
9FU1lPPL ---.--
AlR LEAK THRU PRFT AGITATOR
FLANGE
SFLAGITL --,-
OXYGEN CONC IN PRFT
INCREASES
DR
PURGE SUPPLIER FAILURE - 02
INSTEAD OF" C02
1.3E-6/H 22-H t3E-6/H 22-H
* DENOTES ENABLING EVENT
OPERA TOR FAILS TO SHUT DOWN
PRDCESS
DPER!\TIJR ---.--
LOE-e 1.0 ,.
lO
CD-FE-IE --,-
SHEET 33
1.0 •
AIR LEAKAGE IN PRFT HIGHER THAN
DESJGN RATE
BFLSAPPL ---.--
:1.3E-6/H 22.H
PRFT TANK STATIC CHARGE
LOE-!7/H ee.H
AIR LEAK THRU ANY I OF' 15
HANFORD CONNECTORS
8DPPRFTL ---.--
!.3E-6/H .'Sf
3.4E-5H
PRFT lGNlTIDN SOURCES
DR
O,:SH
---!ZJ AND
± LPPT-PRFT VALVE FAILS
TO CLOSE
=r:= o6TKI
8.3E-6/H Z2.H><
PRFT SAMPLE PUMP IGNITION SOURCE V44
6.8E-!5/H O.:iH
AIR LEAK THRU PRFT THERMO 'WELL FLANGE
I SI'L±ERL I
I OTCSTCI
4.6E-4/H
SHEET
22.H
PRFT /PR FEED PUMP IGNITION SOURCE 2/44
SPP-TR-1 --.--
e.OE-4/H
2
LOH
02-02-9:3 12::38 F: \FI RE\FI RE2
SPC FIRE/EXPLOSION
<LD PRF'T PURGE DRAIN VALVES DPEN
<ANY 1 OF' 2)
'9VDIDF'2X ...........,..-
~.6E-6/H 22H
HCV 1017 TRANSFERS
CLOSED
1.2£-5/H
HCV 1017 CLIJSED
<ALL CAUSES)
22.H
F'E-63-()4 ---r-
DR
BASELDAD PURGE iD PRFT
INADEQUATE
n::-03-02 ---r-
DPERATDR
INADVERTANTLY CLOSES HCV 1017
DR
PRF'T PURGE F'IL.TER
PLUGGED
9F'R-IP ___,.-
LOE-6/H
I.OE-5/H 22-H
* DENOTES ENABLING EVENT
e<,H
!.OE-5/H
NEEDLE VALVE SV H CLOSED <ALL CAUSESl
FE-03-o5 ---,-
DR
22/H
CPERATDR FAll.S ID ADJUST
MDV 1041/"9278
UVMI041T ---r-
l.OE-2
PRF'T PURGE MANUAL VAL~ CL.DSED
<ANY 1 CF' 4l
9VTlDF"4X ~
LIE-6/.H 2C.H
LO "
NEEJlLE VALVE SV 74 FAILS
CLIJSED
PCV 1016 FAll.S CLOSED
9VTSV74C -.,..-
LSE-6/H 22H
9Vl1016C ---,--
LGE-6/H
DCS FAILS iD
ALARM
7CPDCS-F ...........,..-
Z.OE-4/H
PSV 716 RELIEF VALVE
OPEN
9VY-716D -r--
2.0E-9/H 22.H
22H>!
LOSS Dr NORMAL
PURGE SUPPLY
22.H
n::-03-67 --,---
DR
PRFT PURGE MANUAL VAL YES CLOSED
<ANY I CF 2l
INSUFFICIENT PURGE SUPPLY
8VTIDF2X ...........,..-
5.6E-71H 22.H
CC-FE-29 ~
SHEET 17
SHEET 3
DR
n 1018
INACTIVE
9SFI018F -,--
7.8E-5/H 3.0M><
LOSS CF PURGE
SUPPLY
F'E-03-Q6 ---,-
AND
LDSS OF' BACKUP
PURGE SUPPLY
CD-FE-72 ...........,..-
SHEET 45
PRrT PURGE CHECK VALVE
PLUGGED
9VX-10 -r--
3.0E-7/H 22.H
seve MDV 1041/n78
INACTIVE
UVMBCTHF ----.---
'9.00E-6/li LO ~
01-08-93 11:21 F: \FIRE\FIRE3
SPC FIRE/EXPLOSION
* DENOTES ENABLING EVENT (1} CONCENTRATION MAY EXIST WHEN PR
TIEMPERA TURE IS LESS lHAN 88"C
PR-EL-----r-
1.0 1.0 ..
INTERLOCK 10 FAILS TO INCREASE SYSTEM PRESSURE
CD-FE-70 --.-
SHEET 44
TD
Cll-fE-15
SHEET 5
RE
PR AGITATOR lGNlTION
SOURCE 275/44
PAG-1 --,.---
CD-F"E-Q2
SHEET 1
F1RE OR EXPLOSION \.fiTH~N PR SYSTEM \JHEN HIGH Hl FLll¥1 C02 IS USED
TDPPR----r-
0.0 0.0 •
PR TANK STATIC CHARGE
PTK--l --,.---
LS>E-4/H H.OH LOE-9/H
OXYGEN CDNCENTRA TJON lN
PR INCREASES
(1) DR
AIR LEAKAGE lN PR lS MIGHER THAN
DESIGN RATE
CD-fE-H
SHEET 6
PURGE SUPPLIER fAILURE - De
INSTEAD OF' C02
NTK--u
LOE-7/H 2e.H
lGNITI!JN SIJURCES PRESENT
INPR
DR
PR TRANSFER PUMP IGNITION SOURCE 2/44
ez.H
PPP-TR-1 -.--
L4E-+/H
SHEE 4
LOH
PR SAMPLE PUMP IGNrTIDN SOURCE 1/44
PPP-SA-1 ----r--
6.8E-5/H O.SH
10-19-93 15:20 F: \FJRE\FIRE4
SPC FIRE/EXP
<LCl PR PURGE DRAIN VALVES OPEN <ANY 1 OF 2)
QVD1DI'2X --r-
v 5.6E-7/H CZH
l2E-51H
HCV liOC CLOSED
<ALL CAUSES)
DR
22.H
* DENOTES ENABLING EVENT
OSION
D~ERATDR
INADVERT ANTLY CLOSES HCV-liOC
QVSU02U
BASELDA» PURGE TO PR INA»EQUA TE
F"E-o5-02 --,-
OR
PR PURGE FIL 1"ER ~LUGGED
QF'R--IP -r--
LOE:-6/H
l.OE-5/H 22.H
2Z.H
QVTSV74U
l.OE-5/H
FAILS
NEEDLE VALVE CLOSED
<ALL CAUSES)
22.H
OPERATOR FAILS TD AD.JUST
MOV-104V927S
UVH1041T ----.--
DCS FAILS
TO ALARM
7CPDCS-F --r-
DR
l.OE-e 1.02 2.0E-41H 22.H~
PR PURGE MANUAL VAL YES CLOSED
<ANY 1 OF -4-l
NEEDLE VALVE SV 74 FAILS
CLOSED
QVTSV74C --,--
QVTIDF4X ---r-
l.1E-61H
2.2E-6/H 22.H
22,H
PR PURGE MANUAL VALVES CLOSED
<ANY 1 OF 2)
QVTIDF2X ---r-
PSV 180 RV OPEN
QVY-1800 -r--
eoE-~IH
5.6E-7/H 22.H
FT 1103 INACTIVE
llSFU03F -.----
7.8E-5/H
~eH
3.0M2
LOSS OF NORMAL PURGE
SUPPLY
F"E-05-07 ---,.-
DR
INSUFFICIENT PURGE
SUPPLY
CD-FE-~9 ---r-
SHEET 17
AND
SHEET 5
seve MDV lO'Il./n7a INACTIVE
UVMBOTHF -,---
9.00E-61H LO "'
SHEET 59
LOSS OF BACKUP
PURGE SUPPLY
CD-F"E-72 ----.-
SHEET 45
PR PURGE CHECK VALVE
PLUGGED
QVX-10 ----.-
::l.OE-7/H 22.H
PCV 1101 FAILS
CLOSED
G>VIUOLC --,-
1.6E-5/H CZH
10-26-93 15:19 F: \FIRE\FlRE5
SPC FIRE/EXPLOSION
SHEET 7
PR PRESSURE RELlEf VALVE FAILS
Ol'EN
PVf--·
c.OE-6/H cz.H
OPERA TOR F" AILS TD SHUiDD\IN
PROCESS
DPERATIJR -,-
l.OE-2 1.0 ..
* DENOTES ENABLING EVENT
"'* REQUIRES SIMULTANEOUS FAILURE OF 4 VACUUM
REUEF VALVES AND FAILURE OF VESSEL VENT EXHAUSTERS
CD-F"E-12 --.--
SHEET 33
AIR fUN FROM
DR
SUMP PUMP
LIMIT S"w'IT CH AILURE CAUSES VAL'
TO REMAIN DPEN
!LSD= --.--
L2E--6/H cz.H
SHEET 4
PRBT DIP TUBE
LEAKS
JHCD!PTL -.---
L3E--6/H !S(
PRBT MOV 1056 fAILS
OPEN
JVM10560 --.--
LOE-7/H
DR
!S(
SHEET 6
0.0
PRBT PRESSURE HIGHER
THAN PR
CLD FAILS TD CLDSE ISDLATIDN
VALVE 1056
7CL1056f -.---
3.0E--6/H .5Y
JTKGTPR3 -,--
.01 1.0 1M
o.o ..
01-11-93 12:32 F: \FIRE\FIRE6
SPC FIRE/EXPLOSION
AIR LEAK THRU PR THERMO
'WELL fLANGE
PfLPR-L ---r--
l.3E-6/H 22.H
AIR LEAK THRU PR SAMPLE
PUMP FLANGE
PfLSAPPL ---,-
1.3E--6/H 22.H
AIR LEAK THRU PR TRANSFER PUMP FLANGE
PFLFDPPL ---,.-
1.3E--6/H 22.H
DR
AIR LEAK THRU PR AGITATOR
FLANGE
PFLAGffi ----.--
1.3E--6/H 22.H
CQ-fE-1~
SHEET 6
AIR LEAK THRU PRCD VAPOR UNE fLANGE
PFLPRCDL ---,-
l3E--6/H 22.H
AIR LEAK THRU PRESSURE REUEF
VALVE SEAT
PfLVTVLL ----.---
l3E-6/H 22.H
SHEET 7
AIR LEAK THRU ANY l OF 16
HANFORD CDNNECmRS
PHC-16L ----.--
2JE-5/H 22.H
01-08-93 11:50 F: \FI RE\FI RE7
SPC FIRE/EXPLOSION
LD
AIR LEAK THF<U DE AGITATOR
FLANGE
DFLAGffi --r---
1.3E-6/H
* DENOTES ENABLING EVENT
22.H
1.0 ..
INTERLOCK 10 FAILS TO INCREASE SYSTEM PRESSURE
AIR LEAK THRU DE THERMO
\YELL FLANGE
CFLFDPPL ----..,.-
l.::lE-6/H 22.H
(1} CONCENlRAllON MAY EXIST AT TEMPERATURES BELOW 70'C
AILS
IGNITIDN SOURCES
PRESENT IN DE
OE AGITATOR IGN!TION SOURCE:
12.5/«
OAG--·
L4E-~/H 6.3H 1.0E-UH
OXYGEN CIJNC IN DE
INCREASES
DR (3)
AIR LEAKAGE IN OE IS HIGHER THAN
DESIGN RATE
AIR LEAK THI<U DE THERMO
VELL FLANGE
OFLTHERL -,----
1.3E-6/H 22.H
AIR LEAK THRU OECD VAPOR LINE FLANGE
OFLOECDL -,----
L.:JE-6/H 22.H
PURGE SUPPUER F AlLURE -- OE
INSTEAD CF" C02
DFLVTVLL ----.---
1.3E-6/H 22.H
(2} OR
22.H
(2) AGITATOR AND lRANSFER PUMP SHUT OFF WHEN OXYGEN CONCENlRAllON EXCEEDS 60% OF MOC
(3) BASED ON THE CONSERVAllVE ASSUMPTION THAT THERE IS ENOUGH AIR LEAKAGE TO THE OE GIVEN PURGE FAILURE
SHEET 8
~lE-4/H
AIR LEAK THRU ANY 1 OF 12
HANFORD CONNECTORS
CHC-12l --r---
!.GE-5/H 22.H
3.0H
01-08-93 11:57 F: \FI RE\FI RE8
SPC FIRE/EXPLOSION
<LC> DE PURGE DRAIN VAL YES CPE:N <ANY 1 DF 2)
LVD1CF2X --.-
5.6E-7/H 22.H
HCV 9314 TRANSFERS
CLOSED
LV$931-4-C ----,-
HCV 9314 CLOSED
(ALL CAUSES)
BASELOAD PURGE TO DE INADEQUATE
f'E-09-02 -.---DR
0~ FILTER PLUGGED
OPERATOR !NADVERTANTL V
CLOSES HCV 931-4
LVS9314U ----,-
1.oE--6/H 22.H
OPERATOR JNADVERTANTL Y CLOSES SV 74
LVTSV74U --.--
l.OE-2
NEEDLE VALVE CLOSED <ALL CAUSES)
DR
DCS FAILS
"TO ALARM
7CPDCS-F
:1.02 e.OE-4/H e2.H2
DE PURGE MANUAL
NEEDLE VALVE SV 7-4- FAILS
CLOSED
LVTSV74C --.--
VAL YES CLOSED <ANY 1 OF 4)
LVT1DF4X
LlE-6/H e2.H
LOSS DF NORMAL PURGE
SUPPLY
I'E-o9-07 ---r-OR
1.2E-5/H 22.H LOE-5/H 22.H l.OE-5/H 22.H 2.2E-6/H 22.H
* DENOTES ENABLING EVENT
DE PURGE MANUAL VALVES CLOSED
<ANY 1 OF 2>
LVTlDFeX ----,-
5.6E-71H 22.H
JNSUI't!CIENT PURGE
SUPPLY
CD-FE-e9 -,--
SHEET 17
SHEET 9
tT 9315
INACTIVE
lSf9315F --..--
7.8E-5/H 3.0M2
SCVC MDV 104119276 INACTIVE
UVMBDTHF ---..--
9.00E-6/H
PSV 161 RV
OPEN
LVY-1810 ---,-----
2.0E-9 22.H
LOSS OF llACKUP
PURGE SUPPLY
CD-FE-72 ----,-
SHEET 45
DE PURGE CHECK VALVE
PLUGGED
LVX--10 ---r-
3.0E-7/H 22.H
LO "
PCV 9315 F'An.S
CLOSED
LVI9315C ---,-----
1.6E-5/H 2e.H
1o-26-93 13:25 F: \FIRE\FIRE9
SPC FIRE/EXPLOSION
AIR LEAK THRU ANY 1 OF' 18
HANFORD CONNECTORS
BHC1-18L -----;--
OECT-uE---,--
1.0
2.3E-5/H ez.H
(1)
1.0 ~
* DENOTES ENABLING EVENT
(1) CONCENTRATION EXISTS WHEN OECT
TEMPERATURE IS LESS 1HAN s2•c
AIR LEAK THRU THERHD WELL
fLANGE
BF'L THERL ---,----
L3E-61H ez.H
OXYGEN CDNC IN DECT
INCREASES
AIR LEAK THRU DECT SAMPLE PUHP fLANGE
BFLSAPPL ----,--
THRU 0\JST DIP TUBE
OR
1.3E-61H $'(
I
PURGE SUPPUER FAILURE -- 02 INSTEAD DF C02
I PURGE SUPPLY TO D\IST
u LOE-S/H
OPPPDRYU
!.OE-5/H 22.H
DECT TIINK STATIC
CHARGE:
BTK--1 -,....--
LOE-9/H
I I
22.H
HCV 9176 FAILS TD
CLOSE
1VS9176K
!.OE-3
22.11
LO•
SHEET 1 0
IGNmCN SOURCES PRESENT
IN DECT
DR
OECT TRANSFER PUMP IGNITIDN SOURCE: 1/44
BPP-TR-1 -----,-
DECT SAMPLE PUHP lGNITIDN SOURCE 1/44
BPP-SA-I ---,----
6.8E-5/H O.SH 6.8E-51H 0.5H
AIR LEAK THRU DECT TRANSFER
PUHP FLANGE
BFLTRPPL --.-
L3E-61H
DR
1:2.11
2.0E-4/H
AIR llACKF1JJ\I FROM 0\oiST YIASTE LINE AFTER HCV 9176
I AIR LEAK THRU DECT /D\IST TRANSFER >LANGE CONNECTION
=r= OFLDECTL
0
AIR LEAK THRU HCV 9176 SEAL
1.3E-6/H 22.H 2.SE-5/H 22.H
22.H><
01-08-93 12:02 F: \FIRE\FIRE1 0
SPC FIRE/EXPLOSION
DECT PURGE DRAIN V.._VES OPEN <ANY 1 or 2>
AVD1lJF2X ----y-
:5.6E-7/H &.H
HCV 9327 TRANSFERS
CLOSED
AVS9327C --,-
HCV 931:!7 CLOSED
(ALL CAUSES:>
OPERATOR INADVERTANTLY
CLOSES HCV 9327
AVS9327U -.-
BASELDI\ll PURGE TD CECT
INADEQUATE
FE-11-Il2 --,--
DECT PURGE F'D...TER
PWGGED
AF"R-lP -,..--
LOE-6/H
DR
22.H
OPERATIJR INADVERTANTLY CLOSES SV 74
AVTSV74U ----r--
NEEDLE Vl'd..VE CLDSED (ALL CAUSES)
OPERATIJR FAILS TD ADJUST
MDV 104V9278
UVH1041T --.-
l.OE-e
NEEDLE VALVE SV 74 fAILS CLDSED
AVTSV74C
l.02
PCV 9329 FAILS
CLDSED
ME-6/H
1.2E-5/H 22.H I.OE-5/H 22.H I.GE--5/H &.H 2.2E-6/H 22.H
* DENOTES ENABLING EVENT
DECT PURGE MANUAL VALVES CLOSED
(ANY 1 OF 2)
AVTIDF2X --r--
5.6E-7/H 22.H
DCS FAILS TD
ALARM
7CPDCS-f -.-
eoE-4/H ce.H•
LDSS Df
ec.H
FE-11-07
DR
INSUFFlCJENT PURGE SUPPLY
CD-FE-e9 --r--
SHEET 17
DR
FT 93C8
INACTIVE
ASf93CSF -.-
7.SE--5/H 3.0Ml<
I I OECT PURGE MANUAL VALVES CLOSED
<ANY 1 or 4)
~ LIE-6/H C2.H
LOSs or BACKUP
PURGE SUPPLY
T SHEET 45
DECT PURGE CHECK VALVE
PLUGGED =r= AVX-10
0 3.0E-71H ee.H
SHEET 11
SCVC MDV 1041/9e78 INACTIVE
UVMBOTHF --,-
~.OOE-6/H 1.0 ..
PSV 182 RV
DI'EN
AVY-1920 -.-
C.OE-9 &.H
10-26-93 13:29 F: \FI RE\FI RE11
SPC FIRE/EXPLOSION
HIGH C02 F'UlV DURING PR HEA TUP
AND STEAM Sl"RIPPING
C!l-F"E-73 ---,--
SHEET 46
HIGH C02 FLD\1 DURING DE HEATUP AND EVAPDRA TlDN
CIJ...FE-74 ---,--
SHEET 47
* DENOTES ENABLING EVENT
FIRE DR EXPLDSIDN IN VVH 'JHEN HIGH Fl[ ClJZ IS USED IN PR
illPPVVH~
FE-12-oG ---,-
C!J--FE-23 --.--
SHEET 13
DR
CD-FE-24 --.--
SHEET 13
DR
SHEET 1
LOSS OF DILUTION AIR IN PVVH DURING :BENZENE GENERATION
FE-12-07 --,--
DR
LOSS DF DILUTION AIR IN PVVH - BENZENE
GENERA TIDN IN PR
CD-FE-75 --,---
SHEET 48
PVVH STATIC CHARGE
:LOE-'9/H
LOSS OF DDLUTIDN AIR IN PVVH - BENZENE
GENERA TIDN IN DE
CD--FE-76 --,---
SHEET 49
22.H
SHEET
IGNITIDN SOURCE
PRESENT
LlE-6/H 22.H
12
PWH BLIJ\IER MECHANICAL
IGNITION SOURCE
TBL--I ---y--
l.lE-5/H 22.H
01-08-93 12:05 F: \FI RE\FI RE12
SPC FIRE/EXP
INTERLOCK 5 BYPASSED
7IT--5U -.--
LOE-3
INSUFFICIENT seve
CODLING
CO-FE:-27 --.--
SHEET 14
~ .07
LO•
NCE
!.0 "
33E-5/H
OSION
INTE:RUJCK LOOP 11 ACTIVE <PR> EXHAUS
C6H6 CONC HHH
CO--FE-92 --.--
SHEET 57
INTERLOCK LOOP 5 INACTIVE
SCVC TEMP HHH
F"E-!3-04
DR
I
ez.H• 3.0E--6/H
* DENOTES ENABLING EVENT
INSUFFICIENT seve
CDOUNG
CD-tE-27
SHEET 1+
3o0M"
PRCD COOLING
INSUfFICIENT
CIJ-FE-19 --.--
SHEET 19
6ZE-5/H
INTERLOCK 5 BYPASSED
m--:su --.--
DECD COOUNG
INSUFFICIENT
CIJ-FE-:58
SHEET 34
2Z.Ho
l.O~
SHEET 12
Tl 9356
INACTIVE
UST9356f --.--
INTERLOCK LOOP :S INACTIVE.
SCVC TEMP HHH
DR
RELAY HR6 FAILS
TO OPEN
7RYHR6-D --.--
3.3E-:S/H ez.H~ 3.0E--6/H
INTERLOCK LOOP ll INACTIVE <DD PVVH
AUST C6H6 CDNC HH
CIJ-FE-91
SHEET 55
3.0M•
PR STEAM BLOCK VALVE
!'"AILS TO CLOSE
6.2E-5/H 0.5MMI
SHEET
:BENZENE GENERATION DURING HEAT-UP AND
STEAM S1RIPPING 4/44
PRSTEAMO ..............-
.09 1.0 Mt
PR STEAM VALVE 1027
!'"AILS TO CLOSE
13
6.2E-5/H 22.H•
1()-26-93 13:33 F: \FIRE\FIRE13
SPC FIRE/EXPLOSION INSUFFICIENT COOLING SCVC
9356 VALVE
REVERSED
PRESSURE REGULATOR
FAILURE <Hl-HD
NVI-ZZ ---,---.
1.6£ -6/H CC.H
seve TEHP CONTROL UJDP
REVERSED
DR
9356 TIC
REVERSED
l.OE-5/H
* DENOTES ENABLING EVENT
22.H
9356 VALVE STUCK
UVL9356F -,--
6.2£-5/H
9356 TEHP SENSOR
REVERSED
2.2E-6/H 22.H
TII[+Il CHILLED ';/ ATER
TEMP HIGH
22.H><
9356 TC
STUCK
UCN9356F" ---,---.
2.1E-4/H
9356 TIC SET POINT
HIGH
USP9356U --,-
l,OE:-5/H
22.H<
FE-14-03 -,---DR
22.H
OR
9356 TEMP SENSOR
STUCK
UST9356F" ---,---.
3.3E-5/H 22.H•
SHEETS 13, 18
TI 9356 FAILS LD\1
CHILLED YATER FLD\1 LDV MIS [-!OJ
INSTRUMENT AIR HIGH 'RESSURE [+D CAUSES
rev 9356 TO PARTIALLY CLOSE
PRESSURE REGULATOR
FAILURE <HIGH)
NVI---z ----r-
l6E-6/H 22.H
9356 TC
STUCK
UCN9356F ---r--
2.1E-41H
SHEET 14
MODERATE D!Si\JRBANCES ENTER
INACTIVE LOOP
9356 CONTROLLER FAILS HIGH
FE-14-04 ---.-OR
lJ~ m::.,"V.L'-~ M'r<:.C. .LAM!::fiiVE
22.H><
I
AND
DE:VlCES ARE INACTIVE
OR
9356 TEMP SENSOR
STUCK
UST'9356F --.----
3.3E-5/H 22.H"
10-26-9.3 1.3:.36 F: \FI RE\FIRE14
SPC FIRE/EXPLOSION
936-4 TEMP SOISDR
REVERSED
CST9364U ----,-
l.OE--6/H
LDOP IS
REVERSED
DR
<ZH
~36-4
TIC REVERSED
CCN9364U ---.----
l.OE--6/H
* DENOTES ENABLING EVENT
<ZH
~364 nc F"AILS
HIGH
CCN9364-Z ----,-
Z.!E-5/H 2Z.H
CALlS
T11 [+1]
CHJUED VATER
"TEMP HIGH
DR
LARGE a.JNCIJNTRDLLABLE>
DISTURBANCES
HEATER S'WITCH !'"AILS
CLOSED
CSV9364-C -.-
::l.OE-5/H
DR
CZ.H
CD-FE-29
SHEET 14
936-4 TIC SETPOINT
HIGH
CSX9364U ----,-
:LOE-5/H CZ.H
9364 TEMP SENSOR
FAILS LD'W
=r::::= CST9364Y
0 3.3E-6/H 2Z.H
'9364 TIC
STUCK
=r= CCN93G4F
0 2.1E-4/H 22.H><
SHEET 15
MllllERA TE INPUT DISTURBANCES ENTER
INACTIV'E LDDP
LOOP IS
INACTIVE
FE-1S--o5 ---,--
OR
9364 TEMP SENSOR
STUCK
CST93G4F ----,-
3.3E-5/H 22.H•
AND
PROCESS CHJUED VATER SYSTEM fAILS
TO REMD'WE HEAT
CO-FE-61 --,--
SHEET 38
POYER
SWITCH SIUCK
CSVPD'WRF ---;-
3.0E-51H 22.H•
01-08-93 12:35 F: \FIRE\FIRE15
SPC FIRE/EXPLOSION
CHEH REACTION NOT COMPLETED IN PR DUE TO DPERA"TOR ERROR
LOE-3 1.0 •
BAD PR
SAMPLE
JTICBADST ---,--
I.OE-5/H
DR
22.H
BENZENE PRESENT AND YITHIN D<PLDSIYE
LIMITS
ABNDRMALL Y HIGH CONCENTRATION OF
NZENE F'RDM PR <TH FtDl UNE TD PRBD
BENZENE EXISTS IN THE PR AI'TER
HYDROLYSIS
BAD CHEMICAL ANALYSIS
JTI<llADCT ---,--
LOE-S/H
DR
2ZH
7CL1056F'
3.0E-61H
JPRllTMDC ---,--
1.0 1.0•
AGITATOR IGNITIDN
SOURCE 22/44
JAG--I -,--
1.5E-4/H
ORGANIC VAPOR PASSED THRU
TRANSI'I:R VALVE
PRBT TRANSFER VALVE OPEN <ALL CAUSES)
DR
:sf l.OE-7/H
PRBT DIP TUBE
LEAKS
L3E-61H
.SY
.5Y
ll.OH
TANK STATIC CHARGE
JPT--1 -.-
l.OE-'3/H
SHEET 16
IGNITION SOURCES PRESENT
IN PRBT
DR
TRANSFER PUMP IGNITION SOURCE 6/44
22.H
JPP-TR-1 -.-
4JE-4/H 3.0H
SAHPLE PUMP IGNITION
SOURCE 2/44
JPP-SA-I -.-
1.4E-4/H LOH
* DENOTES ENABLING EVENT
** TOP EVENT TO BE ANALYZED SEPARATELY
PRBT IN CHEMICAL PROCESS CELL
10-26-93 13:39 F: \FIRE\FIRE16
SPC FIRE/EXPLOSION
3.0E-7/H 2Z.H 1.~-6/H ez.H l8E-8/H Z2.H l.6E-51H
* DENOTES ENABLING EVENT
CD-FE-29
SHEETS 3,5,9,11
SOLENOID VALVE 7600X
F'AILS CLOSED
~
2Z.H I lZE -!5/H I I
2Z.H
I VAPORIZER FAn.S I I 1 NO
ELE:CTRIC PDIVER TO VAPORIZER
TD PROVIDE HEAT
NVPC02-F' ---r-
6.9E-6/H 22.H
LOSS DF' DFFSITE PO>JE:R
LDSP---,
0.33Y 22-H
2.2E-6/H
SHEET 17
2Z.H l.OE-7/H Z2.H
01-08-93 12:37 F: \FIRE\FIRE17
SPC FIRE/EXPLOSION
PR STEAM FUJ'w' VALVE FCV 1oe7 FAILS VIDE OPEN
RVA1027D -,-
2.2E-61H
** 22.H
INTERLOCK 20 FAILS TD SHUT Off PR STEAM
CD-f"E-59 ---,-
SHEET 61
IIP TRANSDUCER FT 10e7
FAILS LD'W
R!Pl027Y ----.---
PR STEAM SUPPLY
PROVIDES TlJil MUCH HEAT
6.4E-6/H 22.H
CIJ-FE-16
SHEET 33
FLD'W THRU FCVro27 TDO HIGH
rE-lS-Il3 ----.---DR
2.1E-5/H 22.H
** COMMON CAUSE INITIATING EVENT (SHEET 58)
*** COMMON CAUSE INITIATING EVENT (SHEET 37)
7.SE-6/H 22.H
SHEET 34
DE STEAM FLD'W VALVE FCV ~01 FAILS VIDE OPEN
GVA~O!D
*** 22E-6/H 22.H
FLD\1 THRU rev 9301 TOO HIGH
FE-19-Il4 ----.---OR
IIP TRANSDUCER FT nm
FAILS LIN
GlP9301Y
6.4£-6/H e2.H
INTERLOCK 21 FAILS TD SHUT OFF DE :sTEAM
CO--I'E-79 -,-
SHEET 61
FLD'W CONTROLLER 9301 FAILS
LDI>I
GCN~O!Y --,..-
2lE-5/H 22.H
SHEET 18
seve COOUNG
INSUFF!ClENT
CO--I'E-27 -,-
SHEET 14
FLOW' ELEMENT ~01 FAILS
LDV
GSF'930JY ----.---
7.9E-6/H 22.H
10-26-93 13:46 F: \FlRE\FIRE18
SPC FIRE/EXPLOSIO
SHEET 3~
* DENOTES ENABLING EVENT
TCV 1116 FAILS CLOSED
(RANDOM CAU=)
PRCD HEAT EXCHANGER
FOULED
KHX--H
L5E-:S/H
Z.2E-6/H ZZ.H
ee.H
liP 1116 TRANSDUCER FAILS l.IJ\{
MIPI116Y -.---
6.4E-6/H 22.H
CIJ-F"E-18
SHEETS 13, 33
MANUAL VALVE CLOSED
<ANY I OF 2)
HV•
INADEQUATE FLIJY/ ITHRU PROCESS COOLIN•
VATER SYSTEM
1-f!'C-'
5.6E-7/H reH SHEET 20
TEMP CONTRCLLER 1116 FAILS
LOll
2.1£-5/H 22.H
TEMP ELEMENT 1116A
tAILS LOll
3.3E-6/H 22.H
SHEET 19
1o-2S-93 13:50 F: \FIRE\FIRE19
SPC FIRE/EXPLOSION
PUMP 021 FAILS
TO RUN
XPP-o21F" -r--
5.7E-SIH
PUHP oe1 FAILS
<ALL CAUSES)
DR
~eH
lNSUFnCIENT POWER CN BUS 702
INSUFnCIENT PIJ'WER CN
BUS BlO
CD-FE-38 --.,-
SHEET 40
PUMP 022 FAlLS
TD RUN
XPP-o2ef" --.-
5.7E-S/H
OR
-MANUAL VALVE
CLOSED <ANY 1 CF 4)
~ lJE-6/H 22.H
PUHP!:l FAILS <ALL CAUSES)
-DR
C.:.H
INSUFFICIENT POVER CN
BUS 802
INSUFFICIENT PCVER CN
BUS B9
CD-FE-17 ----.-
SHEET 40
CD--F'E-32
SHEETS 19, 34
I VALVE
HCV 39:54 FAILS CLOSED
=r= XVA3954C
0 2.2E-6/H
(1) ASSUME THAT THE PROBABIUTY OF FAILURE OF VALVES ON SUCTION OR DISCHARGE OF PUMPS TO BE NEGUGIBLE
22.H
XVS39540 -,....--
1.2E-51H 22.H
SHEET
!PERATDR ERRCNEDUSL'
CLD= VALVE HCV 3954
XVA3954U -.,--
I.OE-5/H 2:<.H
20
01-08-93 12: 46 F: \FIRE\FIRE20
SPC FIRE/EXPLOSION OVERCOOLIN G seve
PRESSURE REGULATOR
FAILURE <LO LID
NVI--YY -----,-
!.6E-5/H 22.H
seve TEMP CONTROL LDDP
REVERSED
DR
CH2DT-!O --,--
!.OE-5/H
* DENOTES ENABLING EVENT
22.H
9356 VALVE STUCK
UVL'!1356F ----,-
6ZE-5/H
9356 TEMP SENSOR
REVERSED
UVL93560 ----,-
2.2E-6/H
22.H><
22.11
seve TEHP CONTROL LDDP
INACTIVE
FE-21-oe ----,-
UCN93S6f ----,-
9356 TIC
SETPDINT L!l1ol
clE-4/H 22.H>!
FE-21--o3 --,--
DR
Til (-1)
CHILLED \lATER TEMP LDV
9356 TEHP SENSOR
STUCK
UST9356f -.---
3.3E-5/H cc.H><
SHEETS 30, 36
TI 9356 FAILS HlGH
CHILLED YATER FLDY HIGH MIS (-.!0)
INSTRUMENT GAS LDii PRESSURE C-U CAUSES
TCV 9356 TO PART! ALL T CLDSE
GAS REGUU\TDR
FAILURE <LDI.I)
NVI---Y -----,-
l6E-5/H 22.H
9356 CONTROLLER FAILS LOW
9356 TC
STUCK
UCN9356F -----,-
2.1E-4/H cc.H~
SHEET 21
MODERATE DISTURBANCES ENTER
INACTIVE LOOP
FE-21...()4 --,--
OR
DR
9356 TEMP SENSOR
STUCK
UST9356F ----,-
3.3E-5/H 22.Hlf
01-11-93 11: 39 F: \FIRE\FIRE21
SPC FIRE/EXPLOSION OVER COOLING seve
9364 TEI1P SENSOR
REVE:RSED
CST9364U ----,--
l.OE-6/H
LOOP IS
REVERSED
DR
ZZ.H
9364 nc
REVERSED
CCN9364U --,---
!.OE-6/H
* DENOTES ENABLING EVENT
9364 TIC
FAILS UJV
CCN936+T
zaH C.IE--5/H
HEATER S\I!TCH rAILS
OPEN
CS\1~361-D
&.H 3.0E-5/H
TU <-D CHILLED \lATER
TE:MP UJV
DR
ec.H
CD-FE-34
SHEET 21
9364 TIC
SETPOrNT LDV
CSP9364U
l.OE-5/H ec.H
9364 TEMP SENSOR FAILS HIGH
CST9364Z -,.--
3.3E-6/H
9364 TIC
STUCK
2.1E--4/H
2C.H
22.Ho<
SHEET 22
LOOP I$
INACTIV£
FE-2Z-o:5 --,--
OR
9364 TEMP SENSOR
STUCK
3.3E-5/H 22-H•
CHILLED \lATER TEMP
LD\1 (-1)
=r= CH2D-T-!
0 1.0/D &.H
==:J POWER
SWITCH STUCK =r=
CSVPDVI<F
0 3.oE-5/H 22.H•
01-08-93 12:57 F: \FIRE\FIRE22
SPC FIRE/EXP OSION
L
OPERATOR FAILS TO PUMP ABIJVE
HI-HI SUMP LEVEL
ORGANIC AND AQUEOUS SPILL GR£1\TER L_____.l
CD-FE-39 -r-
SHEET 27
THAN 300 GALLONS
DE IS FULL <A~SUMING 50;1, OF THE nNE
DUF!rNG EACH PROCESS CY
DTKFULL-----.-
0.5 1.0 ~
AND
CD-FE-35
SHEET 32
DE RUPTURE DR LEAK RESUL TJNG
IN A SPILL GR£A TER THAN 60 GPM
DE SYSTEM LEAK RESULTING IN A SPILL GREATER THAN 60 GPM
DTKT.DAYR --.-- +
7.3E-101H 3Sh
+ ASSUMED DURATION OF SPILL 7 DAYS
* DENOTES ENABLING EVENT
IGNmDN SOURCES PRESENT
~
SHEET 27
SHEET 24
SHEET 23
01-11-93 12:07 F: \FIRE\FIRE23
SPC FIRE/EXPLOSION
IGNffiCN SIJURCES PRESENT <SUMP PUMP
SYSTEM WRKS>
:-«
SHEET 27
PPSUMP,
1.0 1.0 •
DE RUPTURE OR LEAK RESULTING IN
A SPILL GREATER THAN 60 GPM
DE SYSTEM LEAK RESULTING IN SPILL
GREA TE:R THAN 60 GF'M
OTK12MNL ---.- +
7 3E -10/H .osH"
+ ASSUMED DURAllON OF SPILL IS BASED ON 30 GPM PUMPING CAPACITY OF SUMP PUMP
* DENOTES ENABUNG EVENT
SHEET 24
SHEETS 30. 53
CTKF"ULL--,--
o.s 1.0 ,.
01-08-93 13:24 F: \FIRE\FIRE24
SPC FIRE/EXPLOSION
SHEET 28
EVENT D PR SPILL I OF 3
H4NnJRD CONNECTORS L.d.K
PHCIDF3L ---,-
3.9E-6/H
* DENOTES ENABLING EVENT
4.0H
SHALL FIRE CAU= BY ORGANIC AND AQUEOUS SPILL
CO-FE-39 -,.-
SHEET 27
PR SPILL IS
FLAMMABLE
PTKSPIL3 --,--
OR
OTHER SPILLS CAUSE POiENTIAL
F"OR nRE
RUPTURE: OF
DECT
B1l<ll.HL -.,.--
LDE-Z 1.0,. 7.3E-!O/H
OR
:5.5H
SHEETS 1, 30
CD-f'E:-3$
SHEET 32
ORGANIC AND AQUEOUS
SPILL
DR
RUPTURE OF PRCD DR PRCD
DRAIN LINE
KPIS.OHL -.,.--
7.3E-9/H 4.0H
SHEET 41
FAILS FIRE
IGNITlDN SOURCES RESENT DPERATOR/SUMI
PUMP SYSTEM FAILS
CO-FE-41 -,.-
SHEET 27
RUPTURE OF DECD DR DECD
DRAIN LINE
3P!ll.HL -r-
7.3E-9/H 5.5H
UN£: OR GASKET LEAK, EVENT A OF PHR 32
SUMP PUMP FAILS
CD-FE-42 -,.-
SHEET 26
SHEET 25
10-26-93 13:54 F: \FlRE\FlRE25
SPC FIRE/EXPLOSION
* DENOTES ENABLING EVENT
TRANSFER UNE FROM DECT TO OECD LEAKS
CYCLE DURING BOIL!
1.3E-6/H 3.SH
LEAK RESUL TlNG FROM TRANSFER
FROM OECT TO OWST
2 HANtORD CONNECTORS
LEAK
OHCl.llHL ---.-
2.6£:-6/H .:SH
73E-!OIH 5.5H
OTHER SPILLS
DR
OECT SAMPLING UNE LEAK
1.3E--6/H
7.3E-!OIH
.SH
5.5H
OR
CD-FE-42
SHEETS. 25, 30
LEAKS RESULT FROM TRANSFER tROM THE
DE TO THE PRCD
1.3E-6/H
LOE-e
O.SH
RESULTING
SPILL lS FLAMMABLE
1.0><
PRCD ORGANIC LINE LEAK RECYCLE DURING BOtLUP
PHC3.0HL ----y-
1.3E-6/H
INVENTORY OF DRGANlCS
IN SUMP
l.OE-2
L5H
1.0 "
SHEET 26
DECD ORGANlC
LINE LEAK
1.3E-6/H 3.5H
10-26-93 13:59 F: \FIRE\FIRE26
SPC FIRE/EXPLOSION
SUHP DISCHARGE VALVE IGNmDN
SOURCE
1VMl8HI ---.--
UE-6/H .08H
DR
OTHER IGNmDN SDURC£S.. JUMPERS
BANGING. ETC.
IHCOTHRI -.--
1.0
SUMP DISCHARGE: VALVE IGNmDN
SOURCE
lVM!l.HI -,.--
llE-6/H l.OH
SUMP PUMP IGNITION SOURCE
IPP2.oHI ---.,-
3.0£-3/H
SHEETS 24-,28,30,53
SUMP PUMP
IGNITION SOURCE
1PP.18HI ---.,-
3.0£-3/H .OSH
6 VALVES
PR.I PRf"T, DECT <2l, seve IGNmDN SOURCES
OVMl.OHI ---.--
6.6E-61H .SH
IGNmDN SOURCES, 7 PUMPS, PR. PRFT, DE
AND OEeT
OPPILHI ---.,-
6.0£-3/H
** 5.5H
CO-fE-41
SHEETS 23. 25, 32
VALVES - PR. PR DECT <Z>, seve <Z> IGNmDN SOURCES
LOH
3 AGITATORS PR, PRFT, DE
IGNITION SOURCES
DAGllHI ---.,.-
DVM0.5HI -.--
G.6E-6/H .5H
ACTUATION
* DENOTES ENABLING EVENT
** ASSUME 2 PUMPS OPERATING ALL THE TIME DURING THE SPECIFIED TIME INTERVAL
BUBBLER 5~
INACTIVE
1SL5~25F
2.0E-4/H 3.0M•
5925 FAILS
7RY:sn5K
3.0E-6/H 3.0M•
BUBBLER :sn7
INACTIVE:
1SL5927f ----.---
2.0E-4/H
SHEET 27
7 PUMPS Pit PRFT, DE, DECT
IGN!TIDN SOURCE
3 AGITATORS PR, PRFT, DE
IGNmDN SDURC£
OPP13.HI ---.--
b.OE-3/H
** 6.5H
DAG13.HI --,-
9.0E-4/H 6.5H
SHEETS 23,25,32
3.0Ml<
OR
SUMP PUMP FAILS TO
START
lPPSUHPA ----.---
8.3E-6/H
ACTUATION 5927 FAILS
DR
RELAY 5927 FAILS TO
CLOSE:
7RY5927K -.-
3.0E-6/H 3.0Ml<
22.tfl<
OPERATOR FAILS TO PUHP OUT SUMP
lPPOPERT ----.---
l.OE-4 10 "
10-26-93 14:02 F: \FIRE\FIRE27
SPC FIRE/EXPLOSION
OTHER SPILLS CAUSE POTENTIAL FOR FIRE
SUMP PUMP VDRKS
CD-FE-46 -,---
SHEET 29
1.0
EVENT D
:LO•
PR SPILL 1 DF 3 HANFORD CDNNS LEAK
PHC.33HL ---.--
3.9E-6/H .17H
* DENOTES ENABLING EVENT
PR SPILL IS
FLAHHABLE
PTKSPIL3 -,.--
1.0E-2 1.0 "
RUPTURE OF
DECT
BTK.33HL ---.--
7.3E-10/H .17H
SPILL CONTAINED IN DITCH COVERS EVENT C DF PHR
FE-28-Q<I--,-OR
SHEET 27
7.3E-9/H l7H
SHEET 29
7.3E-9/H l7H
SHEET 28
10-26-93 14:06 F: \FIRE\FIRE28
SPC FIRE/EXPLOSION
TRANSfER LINE
I iRANSF"ER
FROM DECT TD fRDI1 DECD LEAKS DECT TD
D'w'ST BHC.3H1L
L3E-6/H .17H
2 HANfORD CONNECTORS
LEAK =r= BHCD\ISTL
0 2.6E-6/H
7.3E-!0/H
* DENOTES ENABLING EVENT
.!7H
.!7H
OTHER SPILLS
DR
I
1.3E-6/H .17H
7.3E-!O/H .!7H
DR
AND
SHEET ZB
TRANSFER FROM THE DE TD THE PRCD LEAK
KHC.3HRL
1.3E-6/H .17H
SHEET ZB
RESULTING SPILL IS
FLAMMABLE
PR!PRFT CONTENTS ARE
FLAMMABLE
!.OE-2 1,0 M
DR
PRCD ORGANIC
LINE LEAK
PHC.3HRL.
1.3E-6/H .17H
l.OE-2 LO •
DECD ORGANIC
llNE LEAK
VHCOECllL
1.3E-6/H .17H
SHEET 29
10-26-93 14:09 F: \FIRE\FIRE29
SPC FIRE/EXPLOSION
SMALL FIRE NCT
EXTINGUISHED
CD-fE-08 --,-
SHEET 25
MDV 9278 INADVERTENTLY
CLOSES
UMY9278C -,..-
l.OE-7/H CZ.H
APCR CLOUD E:XPLOSICI CAUSED BY PRESSURE
RELIEF TO SPC
CD-FE-49 ----r-
SHEET 33
T SYSTEM CN DE;. DEl D. OECD PLUGGED CAUS 'ESSURE: REl..IEl'" TO SP
MDV 1041/9278
CLOSES
DR
MllV 1041 INADVERTANTLY
CLOSES
UVM1041C -,.----
l.OE-7/H 22.H
OR
!PERA TOR INADVERT AN CLOSES HOY
1041/9278
UVMI041Y -.----
seve PLUGGED
DVERCDDLED
LOE-5/H 22.H
CO-FE-21 ---,-
SHEET 21
DAMPERS fAll CLOSED <ALL CAUSES>
CD-FE-52 -----,-
SHEET 31
+ INCLUDES; DC MOTOR FOR CAMERA. UGHTING, ELECTRIC WIRE. ELECTRICAL CONNECTORS
* DENOTES ENABLING EVENT
CD-FE-SG -----,-
SHEET 32
SPC VENTILA TIDN
FAlLS
DR
SHEET 1
YlTRIF1CATION BUILDING
HVAC FAlLS
CD--FE-53
SHEET 31
I.OE-3 1.0 )li
SUMP PUMP SYSTEM 'JDRI<S
71TSPC-2 --,-
SHEET 30
GN!TllJN SOURCES SUM MP lNTERLDCK WRKS\--------7
<ALL CAUSES)
CD-FE-48
SHEET 33
1.0 1.0 ,.
SUFnCIENT :BENZENE VAPOR PRESENT
IN SPC
(\ OR
SPlLLS CAUSE POTENTIAL FOR
SMALL nRE
CO-F"E-51
SHEET 28
IGNITlON SOURCES PRESENT OPERATOR/
SUMP PUMP \JDRKS
~ SHEET 24
DTHE:R lGN!TllJN SOURCES OPERATOR/ SUMP PUMP \JDRKS
4\JKSPCDl ----r- +
LOE-4 LO •
UME DR GASKET LEAK EVENT A Of PHR 32
SUMP PUMP FAILS
CD-FE-42 ---,--
SHEET 26
10-26-93 14:13 F: \FIRE\FIRE30
SPC FIRE/EXPLOSION
ALL iHREE DAMPERS FAILS
CUJSED
VBSYI4AB -.--
RUPTIBLE POVER SUPPLY, UPS Yl4
OR
LOSS OF" POlNER
SOURCES
FE-31-o4 --.--AND
CD..f'E-52
SHEETS 30, 32
OPERATilR ERRONEOUSLY
CLOSES DAMPER
'nSYI4BB -.--
I.OE-8/H 22.H lOE-8/H 22.H
BATTERY DEAD
LOE-6
BATIERY DEAD
<ALL CAUSESl
22.H
RECTIF'IER LOSS OF" FUNCTION
VRE--f' -,---
!.OE-6/H 22.H
INVERTE:R LOSS OF FUNCTIDN
EIN--F" ---,-
LOE-4/H
(1) ASSUME DAMPERS FAIL TIGHTLY CLOSED
(2) BASED ON A 2-0UT-4 SUCCESS CRITERIA
LDSS OF" AC POWER
INPUT
OR
22.H
llLD\IER I FAILS
<RANDOM CAusal
VBL--1-V -.--
BLOlNER I F'AD..S
<ALL CAu=
OR
INSUF"F'lCIENT PO\IER ON
J!US !)<}
CO-FE-17 ---,-
7.6E-S/H 22.H SHEET 40
INSUFFICIENT POYER
ON BUS 701
INSUF"F'lCIENT POWER ON
BUS :BlO
CD-FE-33 ---,--
SHEET 40
BLOlNER 2 FAILS
<RANDOM CAUSES>
VBL-2-V ---,.-
7.6E-51H 22.H
BLOlNER 2 F'AlLS
<ALL CA=l
FE-31-o9 ---,-
DR
INSUmCIENT POWER ON
BUS ll'9
co-FE-17 ---,-
SHEET 40
SHEET 31
CD..f'E-53 I FE-31-Q7 I
I (2) SHEETS 30, 32
BLOlNER 3 FAILS
<RANDOM CAUSES)
VBL-3-V ---,.-
BLOlNER 3 FAlLS
<ALL CA=)
OR
INSUF"FICIENT PC\IER ON
BUS BIO
CD-FE-33 -.--
7.6E-5/H 22.H SHEET 40
BLO\IER 4 F'AILS
<RANDOM CAUSESl
VJ!L-4-V -,---
7.6E-5/H 22.H
BLDWER 4 FAILS
<ALL CAUSES)
FE-31-U ---r-
OR
lNSUF"F'lCIENT POlNER ON
BUS BlO
CO..f'E-33 -.--
SHEET 40
01-08-93 13:34 F: \FIRE\FIRE31
SPC FIRE/EXPLOSION
DAMPERS FAIL
CLIJSED
cc-rr-se ---.--
SHEET 31
SPC VENTJLA TIDN
FAILS
FE-32-05 ---,--
DR
VTTRIFICATIDN BUD..DTNG
HVAC FAILS
~
SHEET 31
SHEET 27
sumCIENT BENZENE VAPOR PRESENT
TN SPC
ORGANIC AND AQUEOUS SPILL > 300 GALLIJNS
~
SHEET 23
FE-32-06 ---,--
DR
SPILLS CAUSE POTENTIAL FDR
SMALL FIRE
~
SHEET 25
OTHER IGNITION SOURCE <SUMP PUMP
SYSTEM FAILS)
4FLSPCDI -.-
LOE-3 1.0 "
+ INCLUDES: DC MOTOR FOR CAMERA, LIGHTING, ELECTRICAL WIRE, ELECTRICAL CONNECTOR
* DENOTES ENABLING EVENT
SHEET 32
IGNITlDN SOURCES PRESENT, SUMP PUMP
SYSTEM FAILS
CD-FE-41 -,.--
SHEET 27
+
10-26-93 14:18 F: \FIRE\FlRE32
SPC FIRE/EXPLOSION
SYSTEM PRESSURIZES 'oiHILE OE IN ORGANlC
EVAPORATION
CE: STEAM SUPPLY PROVIDES TDO
MUCH HEAT
CD-FE-31 ----,--
SHEET 18
FE-33-()5 --.-DR
LDSS OF" CONDENSING <tlECD AND SCVC) DUE T
INERT :BLANKETING
CD-FE-54 -----.,.-
SHEET 36
* DENOTES ENABLING EVENT
£NZ£NE OVERPR£SSU DURING OE
EVAPORATION
AND
DE ORGANIC EVAPORATION
21-43
.047 1.0•
CD-FE-30 -----.--
SHEET 37
DR
CO-FE-JZ
SHEETS 2, 6
liND
SPILL ACCUMlJLATES IN SUMP-DPERATOR
PUMPS iD A HOT PR
CO-FE-55 ---r--
SHEET 53
INTERLOCK 14 PR PRESS HH FAILS TD SHUT OFT DE STEAM
CO-FE-11 -,.-
SHEET 37
SHEET 30
BENZENE GE:NE:RATIDN IN PR 4/43
PRDlSTCY -.-----
.0~3 1.0 )II(
PR STE:AM SUPPLY PROVIDES iDO
MUCH HEAT
CO-FE-16 -----.--
SHEET 18
SHEET 33
OVERPRESSURE DURING BENZENE GENERA TIDN
IN PR
AND
SYSTEM PRESSURIZES 'WHILE BENZENE BEING
GENERA TED IN PR
FE-33-06 -.--OR
LDSS Df CCNDE:NSING <PRCD liND SCVC) DUE TD INERT BLANKETING
CD-FE-54 -----.,.-
SHEET 36
INTERLOCKS l+ & 15 fAIL iD SHUT Dff
PR STEAM
Cll-FE:-71 ----,--
SHEET 56
PRCD CODLING
INSUFfiCIENT
CD-FE-18 ---.--
SHEET 19
01-11-93 13:45 F: \FIRE\FIRE33
SPC FIRE/EXPLOSION
CO-FE-58
SHEETS 13, 18
l.SE-!5/H ez.H SHEET 35
MANUAL VAL YES CUJSEJ)
<ANY 1 OF 3) 'CV 9346 FAILS CLO
CALL CAUSES)
INADEG!UA TE fl. []VI HRU PROCESS COOUN
\1 A TER SYSTEM
TCV 9346 FAlLS CLDS£D
<RANDOM CAUSESl
\JVA934GC -or--
\IVA10F:lX -,--
S.3E-7/H
2.2E-6/H 22.H
22.H
II~ 9346 TRANSDUCER FAILS HIGH
\.IIP9:34GZ --,----
6.4E-6/H
FE-34-o3 -r--
DR
22.H
TEMPERATURE CONTROLLER 9346
FAILS HIGH
VCN9:34GZ --r--
CO-FE-32 -,--
SHEET 20
2.1E-5!H 22Ji
TEMPERATURE ELEMENT 9:l4G A
FAILS LDVI
\IST9346Y -.--
3.3£-6/H 22.H
SHEET 34
01-08-93 13:44 F: \FIRE\FlRE34
SPC FIRE/EXPLOSION
TEMP SENSOR
TE 2346 FAILS LIN
MSi2346Y -----,---
3.3£-6/H 2.0H
MCN2346Y -r---
2.1E-5/H
* DENOTES ENABLING EVENT
2.0H
VALVE: 2346 FAILS
CLDSED
MVL2346C --.----
2.2E-6/H 2.0H
PLATE HX006 FOULS
HHX-006H ----,---
!!iE-5/H
DR
CIJ-f"E-60
SHEETS 19, 34
INADEQUATE HEAT REMOVAL THRU HEAT
EXCHANGER 006
e.oH
OR
INADEQUATE HEAT REMOVAL TD CODLING
TD\JE:R SYSTEM
Wt;::::[
LOE-4/H e.oH
PLATE HJ( 016 F'DULS
MHX-016H ---,---
1.5E-5/H C.OH
OPERATOR FAILS TO S\I!TCH OVER
TD HX 016
MHX-<l16T ---,--
LOE-2 LO ><
SHEET
INADEQUATE HEAT REMOVAL THRU HEAT
EXCHANGER 016
FE-35-06 --,.-
OR
TEMPERATURE ALARM 2346
INACTIVE
MTA2346F -----,.-
1.9E-4/H .5M•
35
INADEQUATE HEAT REMOVAL TO COOLING
TO'W'ER SYSTEM
9W--F _____,.-
!.OE-4/H
TEI1PERA TURE SENSOR 2246
FAILS L0\1
MST2346Y -----,.-
3.3E-6/H
2.0H
2.0H
01-08-93 13:45 F: \FIRE\FIRE35
SPC FIRE/EXPLOSION
* DENOTES ENABLING EVENT
CO-FE-21 --r--
SHEET 21
BENZENE PRESENT
10/44
Q.23 1..1)><
l.J)E-6/H cO.H
HOV-~7$ FAILS
CUJSED
I.OE:-7/H 22.H
CD-FE-:54
SHEET 33
~I 1041 FAILS
LOW
USP1041Y
:3.4E-5/H 22.H
I
~I 93L3 FAILS
LOY/
USP9313Y
3.4E-5/H
MOV-1041 FAILS
CLIJ=
l.J)E-7/H
22.H
22.H
SHEET 36
PIC 1041 FAILS LD'W
UCN1041Y ---.-
2.1E:-5/H 22.H
1o-2E>-93 14:22 F: \FIRE\FIRE36
SPC FIRE/EXPLOSION
* DENOTES ENABUNG EVENT
PSHH 9313
INACTIVE
GS\<193131'" -,---
3.0£:-5/H
PSHH 104-1
INACTIVE
RS\1104-!F" ---r-
3.0E-5/H
** COMMON CAUSE INITIATING EVENT (SHEET 18)
O.SMJM
O.SM><
INTERLOCK 15 :BYPASSED
DE PRESS HH
7IT-15U ---r-
LOE-3
INTI:RLOCK 14
:BYPASSED
m-14U -.--
1.oE-3
1.0>1
1.0~
DR
RELAY 9313 rAILS TD
OPEN
GRY9313D -r--
3.0E-6/H 3.0Mm.
CD-f'E-11
SHEET 33
RELAY 1041 FAILS
m OPEN
7RY1041D -.--
J.OE-6/H 3.0M~
DE STEAM fLDV VALVE >CV 9301 FAILS VIDE OPEN
GVA930l0 -,---
2.2E-6/H
**
22.H
DE STEAM FLDV VALVE FCV 9301 FAILS VIDE OPEN
GVA930lD ----,---
2.2E-61H
**
22.H
SHEET 37
02-01-93 15:00 F: \FIRE\FIRE37
SPC FIRE/EXPLOSION
*
MANUAL VALVES FAILS CLOSED <ANY 1 OF e>
CVAl102X
HEATER FAILURE
<HIGH T£11PERATURE>
HEATER CONTROLLER
FAILURE <HIGH)
CCNHEATZ -.---
2.1(-5/H 22.H
BUTTERFLY VALVE 188!i rAILS CLOSED
(ALL CAUSES>
DR
5.6E-7/H ZZ.H J
0 z.3E-SIH 22.H l.ZE-5/H
DENOTES ENABLING EVENT
11ANIJAL VALVES CLOSED
(Am 1 or 7)
L'9E-6/H 22.H
CHILLER i1 FAILS <OFf)
CCH--IF
6.9E-6/H
ez.H
CHILLER Ill FAlLS <DFF> ALL CAUSES
FE-38-04 -,-
[JR
ZZ.H
INSUF'f!CIENT PDVER
DN t1CC B7D2
INSUFFICIENT PO\iER ON BUS:BlO
CO-FE-33
SHEET 40
CQ-FE-61
SHEET 15
INSUF'FIClENT PD\IER
ON BUS BB02
INSUFFICIENT PD\JER ON
BUS B9
CO-FE-17
SHEET 40
CHILLER De FAILS (!JFF)
ALL CAUSES
FE-39-05 -r-
DR
1NSUFF1CIENT FL!l'J THRU PUMPS 201 AND 202
CO-F"E:-62 -r-
SHEET 39
CHWR M2 fAlLS <Dm
CCH---2F
G.9E-6/H
0 2.3E-5/H
ez.H
ez.H
SHEET 38
PLUG VALVE HCV 8318
rAlLS CLOSED
CVP8318C -.---
22E--GIH 22.H
:sufTERFLY VALVE 18~7 rAlLS CLOSED
<ALL CAUSES>
DR
0 teE-5/H ZZ.H
SV 9319 FAlLS
CLOSED
CVS8318C -.---
l2E-SIH 22.H
MANUAL VALVES rAlLS CLOSED <ANY 1 Or V
CVAE102X
S.GE-7/H 22.H
0 LOE-e LO•
01-08-93 13:52 F: \FIRE\FIRE38
SPC FIRE/EXPLOSION
DPERATIJR TURNS OfF PUMP 201
CPP-eO!U --,--
l.OE-5/H 2Z.H
PUI1P ZOL FAILS TD RUN CALL CAI.JSO)
DR
INSUFFICIENT P!l'viER
ONMCC 702
INSUFFICIENT PO'W'ER ON
BUS BlO
Cll-FE-38 -----.-
SHEET 40
MANUAL VALVES CLOS£D
(AN'f 1 DF Zl
CVA3LD2X -----.-
5.6E-71H 22.H
PUMP 201 rADLS TD RUN
<RANDOM CAUSES)
CPP-201V ---,--
5.7E-5/H 2Z.H
MANUAL VALVES CLOSED
(AN'f 1 OF Zl
CYA4102X -----.-
5.6E-7/H 22.H
PUMP 202 rADLS TD RUN
(RANDOM CAUSES>
CPP-Z02V -r--
5.7E-5/H ZZ.H
PUI1P Z02 FAILS TD RUN <ALL CAUSES)
DR
INSUF'F'IC!ENT PO'W'ER ON MCC
202
INSUITICIE:NT' PO'W'ER ON
BUS B9
C!J-I"E-17 --,--
SHEET 40
SHEET 39
DPERATDR TURNS Orr PUMP 202
CPP-202U -.,..--
LOE-5/H ZZ.H
01-08-93 13:54 F: \FIRE\FIRE39
SPC FIRE/EXPLOSION SHEET 40
INSUF"FlCIENT PDVER
BlO CD-IT -:33 ONHUS (1)
SHEETS 20,31,38.39,45 SHEETS 20.31.38,39.41
CCT BREAKER BlD-511 FAILS
TD CLOSE
ECBB105K ---.-
3.0E-3
LOSS DF OFFUTE PC\IER
DR
1.0 "
PO\IER F"RDM BUS BlO
UNAVAIUIBLE
DR
CD-fE-80
THIS SHEET
DIESEL DG 200 FAILS TD
START OR RUN
EDG-200A ---.--
3.0E-2 LO "
* DENOTES ENABLING EVENT
DIESEL DG 100 FAILS TO START DR RUN
<ALL CAU$ES)
UNDERVIJLTAGE RELAY FAlLS
TD CLOSE
ERYWD9K --.--
3.0E-61H 3.0M><
TIMER F"AILURE
3.0E-f
TIE BREAKER FAILS TD
CLOSE
ECB-TlEK ---r--
3.0E-3
1.0 )II
l.O~
LOSS OF OFFSlTE POWER
TIE BREAKER FAlLS TO
CLOSE
ECB-TIEK ---r--
3.0E-3 1.0 ~
TIMER F"AILURE
3.0E-4
PC\tER FROM BUS B9
UNAVAILABLE
UNDER VOLT AGE RELAY FAILS
TO CLOSE
ERYUVlOK ---r--
DR
3.0E-6/H 3.0M~
l,Q M
DIESEL DG 200 FAILS TD START DR RUN
<ALL CAUSES>
DIESEL DG lOll fAILS
CCT BREAKER B9-5B FAlLS
TO CLOSE
ECBB9-5K
3.0E-3
TD START OR RUN 1----.1 <ALL CAUSES>
DR
1.0 "'
CD-IT-81
THIS SHEET
DIESEL DG 100 FAILS TO START
DR RUN
EDG-lOOA
** J9 1.0 "
** CONDITIONAL PROBABILITY OF THE SECOND DIESEL GENERATOR (DG) FAILS TO START GIVEN THAT FIRST DG FAILS TO START
(1) SHORTS AND OPEN CIRCUITS NOT MODELLED ()1-08-93 13:55
F: \FIRE\FIRE40
SPC FIRE/EXPLOSION
ISOLATION
DAMPER #! FAILS TO Cl.IJSE
VDA-1-K -..-----
3.0C-3 10.
VDA-2-K -,----
S.OE-3
* DENOTES ENABLING EVENT
1.0•
ISOLATION
DAMPER 'i13 FAILS TO CLOSE
VDA--3-K -,----
3.0E-3
HS"w"JNITK --,--
l.OE-5
1.0 ..
1.0 ..
ISOLATION DAMPERS f"AIL TO CLOSE <1\LL CAUSES>
MANUAL SlGNAL F"AILS
OPERATOR FAILS TD MANUALLY INITIATE
CDe SYSTEM
H-oP-A-T -,---
coe
AUTOMATIC SIGNAL FAILURE
CD-fE-67 ---,.-
SHEET 42
i.OE-2 1.0 )I
BATTERY DEAD
EllA--F ---,.-
1.4E-6/H
OR
:BATTERY !'"AILS
<1\LL CAUSES>
DR
3.liM><
CD-fE-63
SHEET 25
NO RELEASE DR ONLY PARTIAL RELEASE 01'"
CDe THRU NOZZLE$
SHEET 41
l.OE-4 LOHD
SS Of UNINTERRUPTIBUE Po\IER SUPPLY
RECTinER fAILURE
ERE--F -,---
LOE-6/H 3.0M"
INSUFI'"ICIENT PO\IER ON
BUS B710/B10
CD-fE-33 -..-----
SHEET 40
UPS 'f!S
OR
CC-FE-66
SHEET 43
INVERTER fAILURE
EINCDe-F -r--
LOE-4/H
OPEN DR SHORT CIRCUIT ON Yt5 DC BUS
El!SY15DB -r--
LOE-8/H
3.0M~
3.0M"
01-08-93 13:56 F: \FIRE\FIRE41
SPC FIRE/EXPLOSION
THERMAL DETE:CTDF< BOARD #l FAILURE
HPE--117 -,-----
3.0E-6/H SY.
CONTROL RELAY *1 CONTACTS
FAIL TO CLOSE
HF<Y--lK ----.-
3.0E-6/H 3.0M><
* DENOTES ENABLING EVENT
VOLTAGE COMPARITOR llol
lNACiiVE
HCL--lF -,-
3.0E-6/H .SY ..
LOVER THERMISTOR #1
RESIST AHCE LDV
HDT-lY -,-
15E-5/H .SY><
VOLTAGE: COMPAR!TllR ,;2
INACTIVE
HCL-2F ---,----
3.0E-6/H .5Y•
UPPER
THERMrSTllR 112 RESISTANCE Lll'J
HDT--2Y ---,----
lSE-5/H .SY•
SHEET 42
CONTROL RELAY ~CONTACTS
FAIL TO CLIISE
HRY---21< ---,----
3.0E-GIH 3.0M><
THERMAL DETECTOR llOARDI!2 FAILURE
HPE--2F ---,----
3.0E-6/H .SY><
01-08-93 13:57 F: \FIRE\FIRE42
SPC FIRE/EXPLOSION
MASTER VALVE FAILS
"TO OPEN
HVSMASTD --,--
l.OE-3 LO "
LOSS OF UNlNTERRUPTIBLE
PCIJER SUPPLY
CQ-FE-66 --,--
SHEET 41
* DENOTES ENABLING EVENT
INITIAL DISCHARGE C02 SUPPLY
FAILURE
OR
INITIAL DISCHARGE VALVE FAILS
"TO OPEN
HVSINITD ----,---
1.0E-3 1.0 "
NOZZLES PLUGGED
HNZ--P ----,--
2.7E-7/H .SY><
LOY PR=URE C!le STORAGE
TANK :11
HTK-1Y -,.--
1.0E-4 LO "
ALARM SIGNAL NOT GENE:RATED F'RDM C02 DNTRDL SYSTEM PANE
ca-FE--64 ----,--
SHEET 41
MASTER VALVE FAILS
TO OPEN
HVSMASTD --,--
1.0E-3
C!le SYSTEM CONTROL PANEL
FAILURE INACTIVE
HPE--F ----,--
3.0E--6/H .SY><
SHEET 41
1.0 2
LOCKED OPEN VALVE
CLOSED
HVMLOC-c ---.,-
t.OE-4 1.0 •
AlARM SIGNAL NOT GENERA' YEN INITIAL DISCHAR C02 SUPPLY FAILURE
FE-+3-o5 ----,--
DR
REMOTE MANUAL C02 eNDED REl.EASE SIIITtH FAILURE 'TlJ CLOSE
HSVEXTDK ---,--
LOE-5 1.0><
EXTENDED DISCHARGE C02
SUPPLY FAILURE
DR
HVSEXTDD ---,--
!.OE-3
OPERATOR FAILS 'TlJ MANUALLY INITIATE
C02 SYSTEM
l.OE-2 1.0,.
1.0 2
SHEET
LIN PRESSURE C02 STORAGE
TANK 82
HTK--lY -,.--
43
1.0E-4 l,02
LOSS OF UNII<TERRUPTIBLE PCVER SUPPLY
CD-FE-66 --,--
SHEET 41
10-26-9.3 14:26 F: \FIRE\FIRE43
SPC FIRE/EXPLOSION
MDV 1041 FAILS TO
PI\RTIAU Y CLOSE
DR
seve MOV 1041
INACTIVE
~
3.0E-3
OPERATOR F"AILS 10 C1lJS£ MDV 1041
co-Ft:-BG ---r--
SHEET 52
02 ANALYZER 3"105
INACTIVE
C!lNTRCLLER 1041 FAllS TO PARTIALLY
CLOSE MDV 1041
SOLID STATE CDNiRDLLER 1041
INACTIVE
OR
RELAY CR3C CONTACTS FAIL
TO OPEN
UAI3+05F" I ** -...---- 7RYCR3CD --.,.-
3.4E-5/H ~.H~ 3.CE-6/H 3.0M"
1.0,.
1HIS SHEET, SHEET 52
~ ANAL 'IZER 340~ FAILS TO GENERATE
CLOSE SIGNAL
02 ANALYZER 3+0~
INACTIVE
UA1340~ J *** ----,-
DR
RELAY CR6C CONTACTS
F"AILS TO OPEN
7RYCR6CD ---,..--
3.0E-3
6.8E-4/H ~Z.Hll 3.0E-6/H 3.DM~
10
MOV 9278 FAILS 10
PARTIALLY CLOSE
OR
LQm
OPERATOR FAILS TO PARTIALLY CLOSE
MOV 9~78
CD-F"E-96 --.---
SHEET 52
SHEET 44
CIJNiRIJLLER '9278 FAILS TO CLOSE
MDV 9Z78
SOLID STATE CONTROLLER '9~78
INACTIVE
UCN9Z78F ---r--
Z.1E-5/H 3.0t1J!
CD-FE-84 ----.---
THIS SHEET
* DENOTES ENABLING EVENT
** ANNOUNCED FAILURE
*** UNANNOUNCED F AlLURE
01-08-93 14:05 F: \FIRE\FIRE44
SPC FIRE/EXPLOSION
6.3E-7/H ZO.H 3.2E-:5/H ZO.H
VAPORIZER FAILS TO
PROVIDE HEAT
ZVPBCIJ2F ----,-
6.'3E-61H 22.H
CO-F'E-72
SHEETS 3,~,9,11
INSUmCIENT PO'w'ER ON
BUS B9
CO-F'E-17 -r--
SHEET 40
2.0E-~/H 22.11 !.OE-6/H 3.0M
SHEET 45
01-08-93 14:06 F: \FIRE\FIRE45
SPC FIRE/EXPLOSION
PCV 1104 FAILS OPEN
QVD1040 ----,--
1.6E-6/H 22.H
= fUl\1 INCREASES
FROM PR
F"E-46-02 ---r--
DR
PERA TOR ERRONEDUSL TURNS ON PR
HIGH fUl\1 PURGE
QOPPRPRU ---r-
:LOE-5/H 22.H
* DENOTES ENABLING EVENT
PCV 1101 FAILS OPEN
QVIUOlD -r--
1.6E--6/H 22.H
CD-F"E-93 ---r--
SHEET 57
PR STEAM fLDIJ VALVE 1027
FAILS TO CLOSE
RVAJOC7K --,--
6.&-5/H 22-li"
PR STEAM BLOCK VALVE
FAILS TO CLOSE
RVK--K ~
6.eE-5/H O.:;M>E
SHEET 12
FlC-1107 INTERLOCK LOOP 1
INACTIVE
FE-46-03 ---r--
DR
FT 1107
INACTIVE
QSfU07F -----,---
7.9£-5/H
FI-92<!7 INACTIVE
QSf9227f ---r--
7.SE-5/H 3.0M•
3.0M>o<
.tl9
RELAY HR4 fAILS
TO OPEN
7RYHR4-D ------.,---
3.0E-6/H
RELAY HR9 FAILS
TO OPEN
7RYHR9-D ---r--
3.0E-6/H 3.0M•
3.0M•
SHEET 46
LO •
IN"I'E:RLDCK 1 BYPASSED
7IT-IU --,---
LOE-3
INTERLOCK 4
BYPASSED
7IT--4U ---r--
LOE-3 1.0 N!
LO •
BOTH PR STEAM VALVES FAIL
TO CLOSE
Cll-FE-25 ---r-
THIS SHEET
1o-26-93 14:30 F: \FIRE\FIRE46
SPC FIRE/EXPLOSION
SHEET 55
PCY~ I PCV nH
I n n77
FAlLS FAlLS lNACTIYE OPEN OPEN =r_
L6E-6/H 22.H 1.6E-6/H 22.H 7.SE-5/H 3,()MD
* DENOTES ENABLING EVENT
I
DE STEAM RE!..AY HR9 VALVE I'AlLS FAILS
TO CLDSE TO OPEN
GVA9301K 7RYHR9-D
6.2E-5/H 22.HO< 3.0E-6/H
.07 I.o•
lNTERLDCK 4
BYPASSED
7IT--4U
3.0M>< l..OE-3
SHEET
LO ><
47
10-18-93 15:27 F: \FlRE\FIRE47
SPC FIRE/EXPLOSION
F"T-5960 >AILS HIGH
TSf"SSbOZ
7.BE-6/H
* DENOTES ENABLING EVENT
** COMMON CAUSE INITIATING EVENT
PRSTEAMD -.---
.D9
22.H
1.0•
RELAY HR3 >AILS
TD OPEN
7RYHR3-D
:l.OE-6/H
INTERLOCK 2 INACTIVE -
Fl-5860
n:-4S-o2 -.---OR
3.0M>o
SHEET 50
INTERLOCK LOOP 2 BYPASSED
7lT--2U ----,.-
LOE-3 LO "
PR STEAM llLDCK VALVE
FAILS TD CLDSE
RVK--K ----,--
6.2£-5/H O!iM~
INTERLOCK LDDP 11 NACTIVE (PR) EXHAUS
C6H6 CIJNC HHH
co-F"E-'93 -.---
SHEET 57
PR STEAM VALVE 1027
FAILS TD CLDSE
RVA1027K -.,-
6.2E-5/H 22-HO<
SHEET 48
10-26-93 14:36 F: \FJRE\FIRE48
SPC FIRE/EXPLOSION
ENZENE GENERA TlON IDE DURING HEA TUP AN
EVAPORATTON 3/44
OESTEA>IO ---,--
.07 LO ><
* DENOTES ENABLING EVENT
F"T-5860 FAILS HIGH
TSFSB60Z I ** -..,.--
7.sE-6/H ee.H
** COMMON CAUSE INITIATING EVENT
RELAY CR3 FAILS
TO OPEN
7RYCR3-ll ------,---
3.0E-6/H
INTERLOCK e INACTIVE
I'I-5860
rE-49-02 ---,--
OR
3.0M•
INTERLOCK LOOP 2
BYPASSED
7!T--2U ~
:!.OE-3
SHEET 12
CO-rE-77 --.--
SHEET 50
1.0"
INTERLOCK LOOP U INACTIVE (!JE) PVVH
XHAUST C6H6 CONC HH
DE STEAM VALVE rAILS
TO CLOSE
GVA9301K -..,.--
CO-FE-91 -..,.--
SHEET 55
6.2E-51H 22-Hm
SHEET 49
1D-26-93 15:33 F: \FIRE\FIRE49
SPC FIRE/EXPLOSION
BASE LOAD CDNTR!L LCDP
REVERSED
~ DR
5960 FLD\ol SENSOR
REVERSED
TCN5a60U TSF5860U TVLZ034C
** ' LOE-6/H 22.H !.OE-6/H 22.H l.OE-6/H 22.H 2.2E-6/H 22.H
** DENOTES COMMON-CAUSE INITIATING EVENT
SHEETS 48.4-9
5860 FIC
FAILS HIGH
TCN5860Z --,.-
2.1E-SIH 22.H
LARGE <UNCONTROLLABLE>
DISTURBANCES
DR
i¥D I.OE-5/H 22.H
FT-5S60 FAR..S HIGH
TSF5860Z
7.8E-6/H
SHEET 50
** 22.H
DO\.INSTREAM PVVH PRESSURE INCREASES AUSES P4 TD INCREA:
CD-FE-78
~
SHEET 51
1o-26-93 14:45 F: \FIRE\FIRE50
SPC FIRE/EXPLOSION
PVV :BLD'w'ER FAILS TO
RUN
TBL-o20V --,-
7.6£-5/H
:BOTH BLD\IERS fAIL TO
FUNCTION
PVV BUJ'w'ER fADLS TO RUN <ALL CAUSES)
BALL VALVE 5962 JNADVERTENTL Y
Cl..IJSES
22.H
;;c: 'vK5862C --,-
22E-6/H 22.H
AND
STANDBY BLD\JER fADLS TO START
<ALL CAUSES>
OR
BALL VALVE SSG-4-FAILS TO
OPEN
TVK5864D ---,-
9.3E-6/H 22.H•
* DENOTES ENABLING EVENT
DIJI/NSTRE:AM PVVH PRESSURE INCREASES 1-----.,1
CAUSES P-'1 TO INCREASE CD-FE-78
SHEET 50
HEADER PRESSURE CONTROL LOIJP CAUSES
P4 TO INCREASE
STANDBY PVV BLD\IER FAILS
TO START
T9L-030A -..,.--
OR
3.0E-3 LO•
PD 5861 SENSOR
REVERSED
TPD5861U -.--
!.OE-6/H 22.H
HEADER PRESSURE CDIITRDL DEVICES
REVERSED
LOE-6/H e2.H
SlC REVERSED
TCN-SICU --.--
LOE-6/H
SHEET 51
e2.H
01-08-93 14:16 F: \FIRE\FIRE51
SPC FIRE/EXPLOSION
* DENOTES ENABLING EVENT
2 ANAL VZERS 340!5 A 409 FAIL TO GENERA.
CLOSE SIGNAL
C!l-FE-8f --.--
SHEET 44
DCS INACTIVE
7CPDCS-F -..-
Z.OE-4/H
DR
22.Hl<
SHEET 44
PIC 10~1
INACTIVE
UCNPIC-F ---.--
z.tE-4/H zz.H><
OPERATOR FAILS TD INCREASE SYSTEM
PRESSURE
UCNPREST --.--
l.OE-2 1.0 "
SHEET 52
01-08-93 14: 17 F: \FIRE\FIRE52
SPC FIRE/EXPLOSION
SPILLS CAUSE POTENTIAL FDR
SMALL FIRE
co-n:-st -,.-
SHEET 28
* DENOTES ENABLING EVENT
ORGANIC AND AQUEOUS SPILLS
GREATER THAN 300
CD-fE-37 --r--
SHEET 24
SHEET 27 ().3';> LO•
OPERATOR ERRDNEOUSL Y
PUMPS TO HOT PR
QPRPUMPT --.--
1.oE-o3 LO •
DCS INACTIVE
7CPCCS-F ---.-
2.0E-4/H 22.HM
PR TEI1P SENSOR
INACTIVE
QST1030F ----r-
3.3E-5/H
SHEET 53
22.HM
01-13-93 16:31 F: \F1RE\F1RE53
~ L()
fw w I (/)
z 0 (/)
0 _j o_ X w ~ w ~
LL
u o_ (/)
::::s::: z <( _I
m >_j _I <( z 0 fz w fz w 0 <( 0....
(f)
I f-
SPC FIRE/EXPLOSION
* DENOTES ENABLING EVENT
** ANNOUNCED FAILURE
*** UNANNOUNCED FAILURE
BENZENE ANAL VZER 1\I-3+07
INACTIVE
UAl3+07f --,---
3.4E-5/H
.....
4.®
SHEETS 13,47,49
6.2E-5/H 2BH"
ANAL YIER I I ANAL YIER Al-3407 INACTIVE
CALL CAUSES)
DR
'w'RONG CALII!RATION
GAS USED
UAI3407U ---,-
I.OE-4 1.0 2
RELAY CR3A FAILS
TO CLOSE
7RYCR3AK ---r-
3.0E-6/H 3.0Ml<
:BENZENE ANALYZER 1\I-3408
INACTIVE
UAI3408f --,--- ••
G.SE-4/H 12.0H2
AI-3408 INACTIVE CALL CAUSES)
OR
RELAY CRGA fAILS
10 CLOSE
7RYCR6AK ---r-
3.0E-6/H 3.0M"
SHEET 55
\/RlJNG CALIBRJ\ liON
GAS USED
UAl3407U --r--
LOE-4 1.0 "
1o-2S-93 14:47 F: \FIRE\FIRE55
~ L()
1-w w I (/)
z D t----i
(/)
D _j o_ X w ~ w Ci t----i
u_
u o_ (/)
~
~ co
t w _j
>-::l <( z 0 F z ~ z
SPC FIRE/EXPLOSION
SHEET 55
* DENOTES ENABLING EVENT
PR STEAl'! FLD>I BLDCK VALVE
fAILS TD CUISE
RVK--K ---.---
b.2E-5/H O.SM><
PR STEAl'! VALVE 1027
FAILS TO CLOSE
RVA1027K -.--
6.2E-5/H 22.H•
SHEET 57
1o-26-93 14;50 F: \FIRE\FIRE57
SPC FIRE/EXPLOSION
AND
OR
PSHH PR STEAM '9313 VALVES FAlL
INACTIVE T1l CLOSE
GSV/931:3f CO-fE-13
) :3.0E-5/H O.SMl< 1.0E-3 LO " 3.0E-6/H 3.0M>< THIS SHEET
* DENOTES ENABLING EVENT
** COMMON CAUSE INITIATING EVENT (SHEET 18)
SHEET 33
PSHH 1041
INACTIVE
3.0E-5/H D.sM•
PR STEAM BLOCK VALVE
fAILS TO CLOSE:
RVK--K ____,.-
PR STEAM VALVES fAIL
TO CLOSE
fE-58-D4 ----,--AND
6.ZE--5/H O.!SM><
PR HH PRESSURE INTERLOCK 14 FAILS
D SHUT OFF PR STEA
OR
THIS SHEET
PR STEAM FLD'w' VALVE FCV 10C7 FAILS 'HIDE OPEN
RVA10e70 ----,--
ZZE-6/H
**
22.H
SHEET 58
RELAY 1041 fAILS
TO OPEN
7R'I'1041D ------,--
3.0E-6/H :3.0M•
lNTERLDCK 14 BYPASSED
<PR PRESS HH>
m-14U ------,--
l.OE-:3 1.0 "'
1o-2S-93 15:37 F: \FIRE\FIRE58
OJ L()
~ w w I (f)
z 0 (f)
0 _j Q_
X w ~ w a:: LL
u Q_ (f)
~ z <t: _j
rn
>_j _j
<t: z 0 1-z ~ z w 0 <t: Q_
(})
I 1-
0 CD
f---w w I (/)
z 0 (/)
0 _j
Q_
X w ~ w cr: LL
u Q_ (/)
y: z ~ _j
co >_j _j
~ z 0 1-z ~ z w 0 ~ Q_
(J)
I 1-
SPC FIRE/EXPLOSION
* DENOTES ENABLING EVENT
** COMMON CAUSE INITIATING EVENT
FLIN ELEMENT 1027 FAILS
LD\1/INACTIVE
RSF"1027Y
7.BE-6/H
FLDV ELEMENT 9301 FAILS
LOWINACTIVE
GSF"9301V ----,-
** 22.H
** 7.8£-6/H 22.H
DR -RELAY 1027
FAlLS TO OPEN
7RY1027D
3.0£:-6/H
7RY93010 ----,-
3.0E-6/H
3.0MJK
3.0M"
SHEET 18
PR STEAM VALVES F"AIL
TD CLOSE
SHEET 58
CO-F"E-79
SHEET 18
DE STEAM VALVE FCV 9301 FAILS 'wTIIE OPEN
GVA93010 --r-
2.2£-6/H 22.H
SHEET 61
01-11-93 14-:01 F: \FIRE\FIRE61
PR DEFLAGRA ON PR HIGH FLOW C02 REQUIRED
(PVVS LEL ANALYZERS REMOVED FROM SERVICE)
BENZENE CCNC BET\JEEN LEL AND UEL
ITRUEl
C6HGUEL---,--
LO 10.
* DENOTES ENABLING EVENT
DXIDI\NT CCNC
ABOVE HOC
C02 FL0\.1 RATE TOO LCV AT
LDCATTDN 6
MCC2 (6)_.<S1)1<35>,C:32:> [-!J
OUTPUT [Jf BV-1109
CD-PR-QI ----.-
SHEET 2
PRCil"'-
0.0 0.04~
PR TANK STATIC CHARGE
PTK--1 ---.-
!.OE-9/H !.OH
PR AGITATOR IGNlTIDN SDURC£
'OPERATES !OCJ"/. Of TIMSl I
PAG--1 ---.-
3.llE-4/H l..OH
SHEET 1
11-02-93 10:33 F:\PR\PR1
PR DEFLAGRATION PR HIGH FLOW C02 REQUIRED
* DENOTES ENABLING EVENT
INTERLOCK LDDP 6 INACTIVE PR
C02 fLIN LLL
CO-PR-Q.4. ----.-
SHEET 5
CLOSE SIGNAL GENERATED
FOR BV-U0'9
CD-PR-11 ---,-
SHEET 9
DR
:BV-1109 NADVERTENTL 'f CLOSES!
<RANDOM CAUSES>
QVKUO~ ---,-
2.2£:-6/H lOH
SHEET 1
SHEET::>
DCS GENERATES SIGNAL TO CLIJSE
BV-1109
7CPDCS-I -.----
2.DE--4/H LOH
SHEET 2
11-02-93 10:35 F:\PR\PR2
PR DEFLAGRATION PR HIGH FLOW C02 REQUIRED
C02 SETPCINT
LDV
QCN1107X --,---
l.OE-5/H !.OH
CLOSE SIGNAL GENERATED
fOR FCV-1107
SHEET 10
FCV-1107 FAILS CLOSED <ALL CAUSES)
PR-Q3-06 --,---DR
DCS GENERATES SIGNAL TD a..DSE
BV-1109
71
2.0E-4/H !,OH
* DENOTES ENABLING EVENT
FC-1107 FAILS HIGH
QCN!l07Z --,--
2.1E-SIH
INTERLOCK LDDP 6 INACTIVE PR
Cll2 FLC\1 LLL
CD-PR-Q4. ---r-
SHEET 5
ARGE aJNC!lNTRCLLAB' DISTURBANCES
!.OH
HI FLO\/ C02: NFBL
PR-03-Il:l ----r--
OR
'-...-/ 7.8E-6/H !.OH
fCV-1107 FAILS
FULLY CLOSED
e.cE-6/H l.OH
** COMMON CAUSE INillAllNG EVENT
0 3.3£-5/H
SHEET 8
Cll2 Nfl!L CAUSES/ PASSES DISTURBANCES
REisULTS IN MCil2 (3!B) Ct!J
•• l.OH
OR
MCil2 f57) C-lOJ
PR--o3-o5 ___,.-
AND
LOSS Of NORMAL Cll2
SUPPLY
SHEET 40
FT-!W7 REVERSED
••
SUPPLY FAILURE OXYGEN INSTEAD
OF C02
NTK---u ---,---
Hl FLDV C02 Nfl!L
REVERSED
QCN1107U --,---
LOE:-6/H
!.OE-7H !.OH
LIJSS OF BACKUP
PURGE SUPPLY
SHEET 41
SHEET 3
LOH
FCV-1107 REVERSED
QVL1107U ---,-
l.OE-6/H LOH
11-02-93 10:44 F:\PR\PR3
PR DEFLAGRA Tl ON
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK
SHEET 4
01-12-93 12:58 F:\PR\PR4
PR DEFLAGRATION PR HIGH FLOW C02 REQUIRED
INTERLOCK FT-1107 INACTIVE. LDDP 6 FAILS HIGH DR
BYPASSED REVERSED Cll--PR-07
7IT-6U lHIS SHEET
DR
I..OC-3 1.0 ..
FT-1107 FT-1107 INACTIVE REVERSED
QSF:J:1F I QSF1107U
** ** 7.8E-5/H 1.0Hlf 7.BE-61H l.nH 1.0E-b/H LOH
* DENOTES ENABLING EVENT
** COMMON CAUSE INITIATING EVENT
HIS-1173 FAILS TD
OPEN
\J 3.0E-5 LO,.
RELAY HRS FAILS TD
CLOSE
7RYHR5-I<
3.0E-b/H 3.0M><
SHEETS 2,3
BLOCK VALVE 1100 FAILS TO CLOSE
\J ME-3 LO><
"---->.
THIS SHEET
SHEET 5
10C-3 1.0 "
01-12-93 13:02 F:\PR\PR5
CD
fw w I (/)
z 0 f<( 0:::: C) <( _j
LL w 0
0:::: ()_
~ z <:( _j
m
>_j _j <( z 0 1-z w 1-z
w 0 <( (]_
(f)
I I-
I'--
~ w w I (/)
z 0 ~ <(
cr: 0 <( _j
LL w 0
cr: Q_
::,<::: z <:( .....J m >-~ z 0 F z w fz w 0 <:( 0..
(f)
F
cor--'<til:: .. o._
~~ 1'1~ 'fi.L C))
I 0 ~
PR DEFLAGRA TION PR HIGH FLOW C02 REQUIRED
INTERLOCK HIS-1173 PI-2779 RELAY HR7
LOOP 9 FAILS TO lNACTIVE FAILS TO BYPASSED OPEN CLOSE
7IT--9U 7S\11173D QSP2778f" 7RYHR7-K
LOE-3 1.0 • 3.0E-5 :1.0• :l.4E-4/H 0.5M .. 3.0E-6/H 3.0M•
* DENOTES ENABLING EVENT
BLOCK VALVE PI-2778 1100 FAILS INACTIVE TO CLOSE
PVKllOOK OSP2778F
3.0E-3 LO • 3.4E-4/H D.SM•
SHEET 8
INTERLOCK LOOP 9
BYPASSED
71T--9U
I.OE-3 1.0.
REJ...AY HR7 rAILS TO
CLOSE
7RYHR7-K
3.0E-6/H 3.0M>~
01-12-93 13;08 F:\PR\PR8
PR DEFLAGRATION PR HIGH FLOW C02 REQUIRED
RELAY PSHHX1041 CONTACTS OPEN <ALL CAUSES>
PR
RELAY PSHHX104l CONTACTS
OPEN
7Rn04u -.-
3.0E-6/H l.OH
OR
RELAY HR4 CONTACTS
OPEN
7RY-HR41 --.-
3.0E-6/H
&
l.OH
CO-PR-46 ---.--
SHEET 39
CD-PR-13 --.-
SHEET 11
RELAY HR3 CONTACTS
OPEN
7RY-HR31 --.-
3.DE-6/H
** CLOSE SIGNAL DUE TO TWO CAUSES:
(1) SPURIOUS FAILURES OR
3.0E-6/H I.OH
~ ~
l.OH SHEET 12
(2) TROUBLE IN PWH WHICH REQUIRES PR FEEDING TO STOP
NOTE: INACTIVE INTERLOCK MEANS FAILURE TO STOP PR FEED
CD-PR-U 1 r .... -.,..-u,. 1 **
SHEET 2 OR
TI -60'1-1 F"AILS HIGH AND INTERLOCK LOOP
3 INACTIVE
CO-PR-15
SHEET 13 ::l.OE-6/H t.oH
RELAY HR9 CONTACTS
OPEN IN
7RY-HR91 co-pR-16
3.0E-6/H LOH SHEET 14
I
I COX17
SHEET 16
RELAY CR3A CONTACTS
E OPEN
7RYCR3Al
3.0E-6/H LOH
SHEET 9
p
SHEET 20
AI-34C7 GENERATES EXHAUST C6H6 HHH
LOCK LOOP 11 INAC
CO-PR-18
SHEET 19
11-02-93 10:53 F:\PR\PR9
PR DEFLAGRA ON PR HIGH FLOW C02 REQUIRED
RELAY PSHHX1041 CONTACTS
OPEN
7RY10411 ----,--
3.0E-6/H l.OH
RELAY HR4 CONTACTS
OPEN
7RY-HR41 -.--
3.0E-61H !.OH
PTf-1041 GENERATES PR & ~NTERLDCK LOOP 14 F,
TD SHUTDOWN PR F'EED
CD-PR-46 --,---
SHEET 39
Ctl-PR-13 -.--
SHEET 11
RELAY HR3 CONTACTS
OPEN
7RY-HR31 -.-
3.0E-6/H
** CLOSE SIGNAL DUE TO TWO CAUSES:
(1) SPURIOUS FAILURES OR
3.0E-6/H
!.OH
RELAY HRl CDNT ACTS OPEN
<ALL CAUSES)
TI-6041 F'Ail.S H[GH AND INTERLOCK LOOP
3 INACTIVE
CO-PR-15
t.oH SHEET 13
RELAY HR9 CONTACTS
OPEN
T 7RY-HR91
SHEET 12 3.0E-6/H
(2) TROUBLE IN PWH WHICH REQUIRES PR FEEDING TO STOP
NOTE: INACTIVE INTERLOCK MEANS FAILURE TO STOP PR FEED
SHEET 3
RELAY HR6 CONTACTS
OPEN
SHEET 10
RELAY CR3A CONTACTS OPEN
<ALL CAUSES)
DR
SHEET 20
7RY-HR61 T :l.JlE-6/H l.OH
-9277 GENERATES SCV EXHAUST F'LOV HHH & ERLDCK LOOP f lNACTI E
CO-?R-16
1.0H SHEET 14
SHEET 16
RELAY CR3A CONTACTS
OPEN
7RYCR3A1
30C-6/H l.OH SHEET 19
11-02-93 10:59 F:\PR\PR10
PR DEFLAGRA TION PR HIGH FLOW C02 REQUIRED
FC-1107 REVERSED
l.OE-6/H
PR C02 CONTROL LOOP
REVERSED
I I
1.0H
FCV-1107 I REVERSED
D67UI l.OE-6/H !.OH
NOTE: INACTIVE INTERLOCK MEANS FAILURE TO STOP PR FEED
* DENOTES ENABLING EVENT
I INSTRUMENT AIR HIGH
PRESSURE
I
1.6E:-5/H
SHEET 11
CD-PR-20 -.,---
SHEET 28
PR C02 fLIN CONTROL DDP CAUSE:$ DR PASSE
DISinJRl!ANCES CAUSE: M32 t .. ll
I
DR
MODERATE EXTERNAL
DISTURBANCES
I UPSTREAM
CONTROL LOOPS ARE INACTIVE
0-I I
SHEETS 9,10
F"T-1107 GENERATES HHH SIGNAL
DR
INTERLIJCK LOOP 4 INACTIVE seve
EXHAUST Flll\4 HHHH
FCV-1107 FAILS OPEN
7.& -6/H LOH
FC-1107
FAILS LIN
ARGE <UNCDNTRDLLABL DISTURBANCES PR CDE
FLO\./ CONTROL
DR
:INSTRUMENT ADR HIGHHIGH PRESS [ +lOJ
CAUSES FCV-110 TO FAIL FULLY CLOSED
QCN1107Y -----.--
! 62E=blH ] DH 2.1E-5/H I I I
LOH
I GVLll07F
l.OH 2.1E:-4/H l.OH~ 6.21:-5/H l.OH~
F1 1107 SENSOR
INACTIVE
llSf'l107F -----.--
7.&-5/H UIHl<
C02 PRESSURE RE:GULI'>TDR FAILS
HIGH HIGH [+lOJ
QPC1107Z ---.---
1.6E-6/H LOH
nc-11o7 SETPIJINT
HIGH
QSPll07U -----.--
l.OE-5/H l.OH
1Q-26-93 09:33 F:\PR\PR11
PR DEFLAGRATION PR HIGH FLOW C02 REQUIRED
2034 VALVE
REVERSED
l.GE-6/H
* DENOTES ENABLING EVENT
BASE LOAD CONTROL LOOP
REVERSED
l.OH
f!C-5860 REVERSED
l.OE-6/H
FJ-5860 fAILS
LD\ol
TSF5860Y ----.,-
f!-3860 GENERATES PYYH EXHAUST FLO\/
LLL SlGNAL
IN[ERLDCK LDDP 2 INACTI! GIV N THAT Fl-5960 GENER~ TES
PVV EXHAUST FLIJV LLL siGNAL
DR
INSUFT!CIENT DILUTION AIR M2
C-!J
CO-PR-22 --,--
SHEET 30
7 .BE -6/H l.OH
UJH
c034
BASE UlfiD AIR FLD\ol CONTROL LOOP
CAUSES M2 C-!J
DR
FC VALVE FAILS CLOSED
3860 FC
FAILS HIGH
2.2E-6/H LOH 2.1E-5/H LOH
NOTE: INACTIVE INTERLOCK MEANS FAILURE TO STOP PR FEED
LARGE OJNCDNTRDLLABLD
DISTURBANCES
LOE-5/H LOH
n-sa6o FAILS HIGH
7.8E-61H
SHEET 12
LDH
P4 [·1-!0J DDWNSTREfiM PVVH PRESSURE
INCREASES
CO-PR-23 --,--
SHEET 26
01-12-93 14:34 F:\PR\PR12
PR DEFLAGRATION PR HIGH FLOW C02 REQUIRED
9 AND
I TI-6041 rAILS L0\1
=r= TST6041Y
0 7.BE-61H l,OH
---FAILURE u SHUTDC\JN
PR FEED PUMP
[]
OR
INTERLOCK HIS-1173 LOOP 3 FAILS TO
BYPASSED OPEN
71T--3U 7SVI1173D
l.OE-3 LO " 3.0E-5 1.0 •
* DENOTES ENABLING EVENT
NOTE: INACTIVE INTERLOCK MEANS FAILURE TO STOP PR FEED
SHEETS 9,10
RELAY HRl BLOCK VALVE CONTACTS FAll. 1100 FAll.S TO TRANSFER TO CLOSE
7RY-HRlD PVKllOOK
3.0E-6/H 3.QMJ< 3.0E-3 1.0 "
FAILURE TO CLOSE PPT MDV-1100 <ALL CAUSES:>
DR
RELAY HRl CONTACTS FAIL
TO TRANSF"ER
7RY-HR!D
3.0E-6/H 3.0M•
SHEET 13
INTERLOCK LOOP 3
BYPASSED
71T-3U -----r-
l.OE-3 1.0 "
1(}-26-93 09:42 F:\PR\PR13
PR DEFLAGRATION PR HIGH FLOW C02 REQUIRED
NOTE: INACTIVE INTERLOCK MEANS FAILURE TO STOP PR FEED
Fl-'JF::I I Ut.NI:.!<:A II:..~ HHH ::>J.\1 I
SHEET 32
n-9277 FAlLS HIGH
USF9277Z ---,-
7.SE-6/H LOH
SHEETS 9,10
M6NC [+ll TOTAL FLOYRATE
JNPUT TC seve
SHEET 15
SHEET 14
01-12-93 14:47 F:\PR\PR14
PR DEFLAGRA TION PR HIGH FLOW C02 REQUIRED
FT-1107 REVERSED
QSFI!O?U ---,-
LOE-6/H l.OH
PR C02 CONTROL LOOP
REVERSE:D
QCNI!07U ---,-
LOE-6/H UlH
NOTE: INACTIVE INTERLOCK MEANS
FAILURE TO STOP PR FEED
* DENOTES ENABLING EVENT
FCV-1107 REVERSED
QVL1107U
LOE-6/H
.... LOH
HIGH AIR
PRESSURE [-ll
L6E-5/H
** COMMON CAUSE INITIATING EVENT
DI,}jl U~.OMNt...L~ 1....1-'!U.lJ::. l'l~C. F I
DR
'-./ 7.8E-6/H
!.OH 7.0C-5/H l.OH•
-l.OH
SHEE1S 14-. 21
F"IC 1107 INTERLOCK LDDP 1 INACTIVE
PR C02 FLll\1 HHH
Z.IE:-5/H
:J UPSTREAM
CONTROL LOOPS ARE INACTIVE
I PR-r-07 I DR
2.1E-4/H LOH•
LOH
ARGE <UNCONTRDLLABI IISTURllANCES ENTER Pi
C02 FLO\J CONTROL
QVL1107D ----.---
6.2E-6/H
6ZE-5/H !.OH><
I.OH
SHEET 15
FIC-1107 SETPDINT
HIGH
QSPII07U ---,-
LOE-5/H LOH
PCV-1108 tAILS HIGH
1.6E-6/H LOH
01-12-93 14:50 F:\PR\PR15
PR DEFLAGRA TION PR HIGH FLOW C02 REQUIRED
NOTE: INACTIVE INTERLOCK MEANS FAILURE TO STOP PR FEED
INA
SHEET .34
TI-9356 FAlLS HIGH
UST9356Z ----.--
2.3E-6/H
SHEETS 9,10
TIC-9356 GENERATES
seve TEMP HHH
LOH
Cll-PR-29 -,..--
SHEET 17
SHEET 16
01-12-93 14-:51 F:\PR\PR16
PR DEFLAGRA TION PR HIGH FLOW C02 REQUIRED
'9356
PRESS HI HI UOJ CAUSES TCV '9356 TD FAIL FULLY CLOSED
PRESSURE REGULI\TDR
FAILURE <HI-HI)
NVI--ZZ ------r--
1.6E-6/H l.OH
SCVC TEMP CIINTRDL LO!lP
REVERSED
I
DR
I
CH2DTHO --,---
!.OE-5/H
I 9356
l.OH
NOTE: INACTIVE INTERLOCK MEANS F AlLURE TO STOP PR FEED
* DENOTES ENABLING EVENT
9356 VALVE
fAlLS CLOSED
UYL9356C ----,--
2.26:-6/H
9356 VI\LVE STUCK
UVL9356f ----r-
6.&-5/H lOH•
!.OH
SCVC TEMP CONTROL LOOP C PASSES DISTUR!lAN
RESULTS IN T7 [ .. ll
CD-f'R-~8 PR-17-ot
SHEET 16
935& TIC
SETPDINT HIGH
USP9356U ------r--
LOE-5/H
MOD
seve TEMP CONTROL LOOP
INACTIVE
9351> TC
STUCK
OR
UCN9356F ---.-
2.1E-4/H LOH"
CD
DR
CHILLED \tr/ATER FLO\ol LD\1 Ml8 [-101
9351> TEMP SENSOR
INPCTIVE
UST9356F -.----
3.3E-5/H !.OH><
'9356 CDNIRDLL£R FAILS HIGH
INSTRUMENT AIR PRESS HI (+ll
CAUSES TCV 9351> TD AlL PARTIPoLL'f CLO:
PRESSURE REGULATOR
FP.rLURt: <HIGH>
L6E-5/H !.OH
SHEET
MODERATE DISTURBANCES ENIER
INP.CTIVE LOOP
PR-17-o4
9356 TC
STUCK
UCN~356F ------r--
e.lE-4/H
OR
LOH>
OR
93:56 TEMP SENSOR
STUCK
USH356F ------r--
3.3E-5/H
17
LOH•
01-14-93 08;57 F:\PR\PR17
PR DEFLAGRA TION PR HIGH FLOW C02 REQUIRED
9364 TEMP SENSOR
REVE:RSED
CST9364U -,---
I.OE-6/H l.OH
LDDP IS
REVERSED
DR
9364 TlC
REVERSED
et:m:J6.4U ---,--
I.OE-6/H I.OH
TC-9364
FAILS HIGH
CCN936H -,---
Z.!E-5/H
NOTE: INACTIVE INTERLOCK MEANS FAILURE TO STOP PR FEED
* DENOTES ENABLING EVENT
UIH
HEATER SVIICH
FAILS CLOSED
CSV9:J6.4C -,---
3.0E-5/H
TU !-tll CHILLED II ATER
TEMPERATURE HIGH
DR
lOH
CD-PR-29
SHEET 17
TlC-9364
SETPOINT HIGH
~
l.OE-5/H lOH
9364 TEMP SENSOR
FAILS UlVI
CCN93641" -,---
2.1E-4/H I.OH><
LOOP IS
INACTIVE
CST93641" -,---
3.3E-5/H
SHEET 18
1.0HM
CHILLED \1 ATER TEMPERATURE HIGH
C+U
CSIIPDVRI" ----r--
31>E-5/H I.OH><
01-12-93 14:57 F: \PR\PR18
PR DEFLAGRATION PR HIGH FLOW C02 REQUIRED
PR-30
SHEET 36
INTERLOCK LOOP 11 -3+07 INACTIVE PVV
1AUST C6H6 CDNC HHI
CO-PR-34 -----.---
SHEET 35
NOTE: INACTIVE INTERLOCK MEANS FAILURE TO STOP PR FEED
EVENTS \JHICH CAUSE C6H6
CONC C+ll
CO-PR-32 --,--
SHEET 21
SHEE1S 9,10
AI-3407 FAlLS HIGH
UAI3407Z --r--
~.4E-5/H 1JlH
SHEET 37
SHEET 19
11-02-93 11:06 F:\PR\PR19
PR DEFLAGRA TION PR HIGH FLOW C02 REQUIRED
lNTERLDCK LOOP U
BYPASSED
1.0E-3 1.0 II(
FAILURE TO SHUT D[]YIN PR
FEED PUMP
7S\JU73D --,--
3.0E-5 1.0 "
* DENOTES ENABUNG EVENT
RELAY CR6A CDNT ACTS FAIL TO TRANSFER
7RYCR6AD ----,--
3.0E-6/H 3.0Mo<
RELAY CONTACTS
CR6A OPEN
7RYCR6A1 ----,--
3.0E-6/H 1.0H
AND
BLOCK VALVE UOO FAILS TO CLOSE
PVKIIOOK --,-
3.0E-3 1.0•
SHEETS 9, 10
INTE:RLDCK LOOP U -3407 INACTIVE PVV HAUST C6H6 CDNC HH
CD-PR-34 ----,--
SHEET 35
FAIL.UE TO CLOSE PPT HCV-1100 <ALL CAUSES)
7RYCR6AD ----,--
3.0E-E./H 3.0M•
SHEET 20
AI-3406 GENERATES PVVH EXHAUST C6H6 CDNC HHH -=r
AI-340-B ___ -fAILS HIGH
::r= UAI3'108Z
6 3.4E-51H l.OH
--INTERLOCK LOOP U
BYPASSED
~ T 1.0E-3 1.0 M SHEET 37
Q-ND EVENTS \JHICH
CAUSE C6H6 CDNC C+IJ
CD-PR-32 --,-
SHEET 21
11-02-93 11:14 F:\PR\PR20
PR DEFLAGRATION PR HIGH FLOW C02 REQUIRED
CR
EXCESSIVE :BENZENE FLOV fRDM seve
M7BZ [+ll
CAU
SCVC VENT GAS TEMP TOO HIGH T7 [ +ll
INTERLOCK 5 INACTIVE
eD-PR-36 ---,--
SHEET 2.2
AND
INTERLOCK LOOP 5 INACTIVE SCVC
TEMP HHH
eo-PR-:37 --r--
SHEET 33
DR
NOTE: INACTIVE INTERLOCK MEANS FAILURE TO STOP PR FEED
* DENOTES ENABLING EVENT
EXCESSIVE NON-CllNllENSmU::S
GET INTD SCVC CAUSE M7BZ [.,.ll
INTERLOCK LOOP 4 INACTIVE SCVC
EXHAUST FLCW HHH
CQ-PR-21 -,.---
SHEET 31
SHEETS 19, 2.0
N6NC [Til TOTAL F"L0\1 RATE INPUT
TO seve
SHEET 15
INSUmCIENT DILUTION AIR
M2 [-!]
Cil-PR-:35 -r-
SHEET 25
SHEET 21
10-26-93 10:39 F:\PR\PR21
PR DEFLAGRA TION PR HIGH
9356
PRESS (+101 CAUSES TCV 9356 TO FAlL
FULLY CLOSED
PRES SUR£ REGULATOR
FMLURE <HI-HD
NVI--zz __...,.-
L6E-6/H !.OH
I
FLOW
I
C02
OR
+ 9356
CH2DT+10 ---,-
LOE-5/H
REQUIRED
I I
l.OH
I 9356
UVL9356C -,.--
22E-6/H l.OH
TU [+l.J CHILLED \lATER
TEMPERATURE HIGH
NOTE: INACTIVE INTERLOCK MEANS F AlLURE TO STOP PR FEED
* DENOTES ENABLING EVENT
9356 VALVE STUCK
UVL9356F -,.--
SCVC TEMP CONTROL LDDP R PASSES DISTURBAN
R£SULTS IN T7 [ +ll
PR-22-01
DR
LARGE <UNCONTRDLLAl!LD
DISTURBANCES
PR-22-63
OR
9356 TIC
SETPDINT HIGH
TI-'9356 FAlLS LDW
9356 TC
STUCK
UCN9356F ---r-
DR
9356 TEMP SENSOR
IN .. CnvE
~
6.&-5/H l.OH"' e.JE-4/H 1.0~ 3.3E-5/H LOH"
** COMMON CAUSE IN IT! A TING EVENT
CO-PR-36
SHEET 21
CHILLED 'w'A"TER FLD'w' Ul';/ M18 [-!OJ
INSTRUMENT AIR SS HIGH [+1J CAUSE
TCV 9356 TO FAlL PARTIALLY CLOSED
PR£SSURE REGULATOR
F" AlLURE <HIGH>
NVI--Z __...,.-
1.6E-SIH l.OH
9356 CONTROLLER FAlLS HIGH
9356 TC
STUCK
UCN9356F --.---
etE-4/H l.OH~
SHEET
MODERATE
DISIURBANCES ENTER INACTIVE LOOP
PR-22-04
DR
DR
93!56 TEMP SENSOR
STUCK
UST9356F ----,---
3.3E-5/H LOH2
22
01-12-93 15:11 F:\PR\PR22
PR DEFLAGRA TION PR HIGH FLOW C02 REQUIRED
9364 TEMP SENSOR
REVERSED
CST9364U -r--
l.OE--6/H l.DH
LOOP IS
REVERSED
DR
936.4 TlC
RE:VERSED
CCN~364U -..---
l.OE--6/H 1.0H
9364 TIC
FAlLS HIGH
CCN936+Z -r--
C.!E-5/H
NOTE: INACTIVE INTERLOCK MEANS FAILURE TO STOP PR FEED
* DENOTES ENABLING EVENT
----- ---- --- -
!.OH
Til [+ll CHILLED \lATER
TEMPERATURE HIGH CO-PR-39
SHEET 22
JV~P11~ 'wf"''-»~ IU 1~+1] I
HEATER 936.4 S"oi!TCH TIC
FAILS CLOSED SETPCINT HIGH
CS'oi9364C CSP9364U
3.0E-S/H I.OH l.[E-5/H LOH
9364 TEMP SENSIJR
FAILS LD\J
CST9364'f
3.3E--6/H l.OH
'9364 TIC
STUCK
2J.E-4/H l.OHMI"
SHEET 23
LDDP IS
INACTIVE
PR-23-05 -..---OR
9364 TEMP SENSOR
STUCK
CST9364F" ---r-
3.3E-S/H l.OHJI(
CHILLED \1 ATER TEMPERATURE HIGH
C+U
CH2D-T+l --,--
l.Q/D
POWER SWITCH STUCK
CSVPOVRF" ----.----
3.0E-5/H
l.OH
l.OH»t
01-12-93 15:13 F:\PR\PR23
PR DEFLAGRATION
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK
SHEET 24
01-12-9.3 15:14 F:\PR\PR24
PR DEFLAGRA TION PR HIGH FLOW C02 REQUIRED
BASE LOAD CDNORIJL LOOP
REVERSED
I R
2034 FC-5960 see.o VALVE REVERSED FLO\/ SENSOR
REVERSED REVERSED
TVL2034U TSF5B60U
l.OE--6/H l.OH l.OE--6/H l.OH LOE--6/H
NOTE: INACTIVE INTERLOCK MEANS FAILURE TO STOP PR FEED
-l.OH
INSUFTICIENT DILUTlDN
AIR
BASE LOAD AIR FLll\1 CONTROL LDDP
CAUSES 112 1 -U
DR
2084 FC VALVE
F AU.S CLOSED
TVL2034-C
2.2E-6/H LOH
M2 HJ CO-PR-35
SHEET 21
INiERLOCK LOOP 2 IS INACTIVE
VH EXHAUST F"LD\1
5Bb0 nc
FAILS HIGH
TCN5860Z
2.1E-5/H LOH
** DENOTES COMMON CAUSE INITIATING EVENT
LARGE <UNCONORIJL.LABLD
DISTURllANCES
5960 FIC
SETPD!NT L0\1
TSP!S960U
LOE-5/H LOH
n-5Be.o FAlLS HIGH
TSF5B60Z
7.BE--6/H
SHEET 25
** lOH
DD'w'NSTREAM PVVH PRESSURE INCREASES
CAUSES P4 1+101
CD-PR-23
SHEET 26
01-12-93 15:16 F:\PR\PR25
PR DEFLAGRATION PR HIGH FLOW C02 REQUIRED
PW BLD\IER fADLS TO RUN <ALL CAUSES)
CR
BOTH BLDVERS FAIL TO
FUNCT!DN
AND
STANDBY BLD\IER FADLS TO START
<ALL CAUSES>
!lR
PVV BLDVER FAILS TO
RUN
BALL VALVE 5962 JNADVERTENTL Y
CLDSES
BALL VALVE 5964 FAILS TO OPEN
TBL-D20V -r--
7.6E-5/H LOH
TVK5862C ----r-
2.2E-61H I.OH
NOTE: INACTIVE INTERLOCK MEANS FAILURE TO STOP PR FEED
* DENOTES ENABLING EVENT
TYK5864D --.---
3.0E-3 LO•
DCI.INSTREAM
PWH PR£SSURE lNCREI\SES
CAUSES P4 C+!OJ
HEADER PRESSURE CCNTRCL LCCP
CAUSES P4 [+!OJ
STANDBY PW BLINER FAILS
TO START
TBL-o30A -,--
CR
3.0E-3 l.O•
CD-PR-23
SHEETS 12.25
PD 5861 SENSOR
REVERSED
!.OE--6/H l.OH
HEADER PRESSURE
CONTROL DEVICES REVERSED
DR
PDIC 5861 REVERSED
TCN5S61U ---.---
LOE-6/H LOH
SHEET 26
SIC REVERSED
!.OE-6/H LOH
01-12-93 15:18 F:\PR\PR26
PR DEFLAGRA Tl ON PR HIGH FLOW C02 REQUIRED
l.OE-3
FI-U07 INACTIVE
a37F I
7.8E-:S/H
1.0 "
1.0Hl<
FAILURE TO SHUTDDVN PR
FEED PUMP
7.8E-6/H l.OH
CR
FC-1107 REVERSED
QCNU07U
l.OE--6/H
NOTE: INACTIVE INTERLOCK MEANS FAILURE TO STOP PR FEED
* DENOTES ENABLING EVENT
\J 3.0E-:S
** '-.-/ l.OH 3.0E--61H
** DENOTES COMMON CAUSE INITIATING EVENT
SHEET 15 AND
LO "
3.0tu<
BLOCK VALVE 1100 FAILS TD
CLOSE
PVKUOOK ---r--
3.0E-3 l.G~
FAIWRE TO CLOSE PPT MDV-1100 <ALL CAUSES>
OR
FT-1107 INACTIVE/FAILS LOW/REVERSED
CD-PR-41 ---r--
THIS SHEET
SHEET 27
INTERLOCK LCCP 1
BYPASSED
m-1u ---.---
l.OE-3 1.0"
01-12-93 15:21 r:\PR\PR27
PR DEFLAGRA TION PR HIGH FLOW C02 REQUIRED
INTERLOCK LOOP 1
BYPA=
7IT--IU ----y-
LOE-3 1.0•
FAILURE TD SHUTDO'w'N PR
F"EED PUMP
7S\11173D -.---
3.0E-5
NOTE: INACTIVE INTERLOCK MEANS FAILURE TO STOP PR FEED
* DENOTES ENABLING EVENT
1.0 ..
RELAY HR+ CONTACTS FAIL
TO TRANSFER
3.0E-6/H 3.011><
BLOCK VALVE 1100 FAILS TD
CLOSE
PVKIIOOK --.-
3.0E-3 LO "
FAILURE TO CLOSE PPT MCV-UOO <ALL CAUSES>
7RY-HR4D -r--
3.0E-6/H 3.0MM:
INTERLOCK LOOP 1
BYPASSED
LOE-3
SHEET 28
1.0.
10-26-93 10:44 F:\PR\PR28
PR DEFLAGRATION PR HIGH FLOW C02 REQUIRED
INTERLOCK LDOP 2
!lYPASSED
7!T-2U --,--
l.OE-3
FT-:5860 INACTIVE
TSF5660F ---.-
7.8E -5/H l.OHl<
1.0"
FT-5860 FAILS HIGH
TSF5860Z ---.-
7.8E-6/H
FAILURE TD SHUTDOWN PR
FEED PUMP
DR
FT-5860 INACTIVE/FAILS HIGH/REVERSED
** l.OH
PR-a-ll6 ---.--DR
CD-PR-42
THIS SHEET
FT-S860 REVERSED
TSF5860U ----r-
1.0E-6/H ** l.OH
NOTE: INACTIVE INTERLOCK MEANS FAILURE TO STOP PR FEED
* DENOTES ENABLING EVENT
HIS-1173 FAILS TD
DPEN ::::c
7SWI173D
0 3.0E-5
~ RELAY HR3 FAILS TD
CLOSE
=:c 7RYHR3-K
0 3.0E-6/H
** DENOTES COMMON CAUSE INITIATING EVENT
Cll-PR-40
SHEET 25 AND
l.Ol< 3.0E-3 LO "
3.0MJ<
FAILURE TD CLOSE PPT MOV-1100 <ALL CAUSES)
DR
FT-5960 INACTIVE/FAILS HIGH/REVERSED
THIS SHEET
SHEET 29
INTERLOCK LDDP e
BYPASSED
m-w --,--
l.OE-3 1.0 "
01-12-93 15:27 F:\PR\PR29
PR DEFLAGRA TION PR HIGH FLOW C02 REQUIRED
INTERLOCK LDDP 2
BYPASSED
7IT--2U ---.-
I.OE-3 1.0 •
7S1Jl!73D ---.-
3.0E-5
NOTE: INACTIVE INTERLOCK MEANS FAILURE TO STOP PR FEED
* DENOTES ENABLING EVENT
1.0 ..
RELAY HR3 CONTACTS F"AILS
TO TRANSFER
7RY-HR3D --.--
3.llE--G/H 3.011•
CO-PR-22
SHEET 12
BLOCK VALVE 1100 F"AILS TO
QDSE
PVK!!OOK ----.---
3.0E-3 LO "
7RY-HR:lD ----r-
3.0E--GIH 3.0M>«
SHEET 30
lNTERLDCK LDDP 2
BYPASSED
7IT--2U ---,---
LOE-3 1.0.
1o-26-93 10:50 F:\PR\PR30
PR DEFLAGRA TION PR HIGH FLOW C02 REQUIRED
lNTERUJCK HIS-1173 FT-9277 LDDP 4 FAILS TO INACTIVE
BYPASSED OPEN
7IT--4U 7S\ffi73D USF9277F
f 10£-3 10• 3.0E-5 10. 7.9E-5/H
NOTE: INACTIVE INTERLOCK MEANS FAILURE TO STOP PR FEED
* DENOTES ENABLING EVENT
RELAY HR9 CONTACTS FAIL
TO TRANSFER
7RY-HR9D
LOH• 3.0£--6/H ::J.OM•
SHEETS 11 ,21
BLOCK VALVE 1100 FT-9277 FAILS TO INACTIVE
CLOSE
PVKl!OOK USF9277F
3.0E-3 1.0 " 7.9E-5/H I.OH><
SHEET 31
RELAY HR'9 CONTACTS FAIL l1J TRANSFER
7RV-HR9D
3.0E-6/H 3.0M><
INTERLOCK LDDP 4
:BYPASSEII
m-4U
10E-3 LO •
10-26-93 10:54 F:\PR\PR31
PR DEFLAGRATION PR HIGH FLOW C02 REQUIRED
INTERLOCK LDOP 4
BYPASSED
m--4U ---.--
LOE-3 1.0 •
7S\J1173D ---.--
3.0E-5
NOTE: INACTIVE INTERLOCK MEANS FAILURE TO STOP PR FEED
* DENOTES ENABLING EVENT
1.0 )I
FI-:;,;, 1 !.Jt..1'4C.rtM u;y nnn ynJNI I
RELAY HR9 CDNT ACTS FAIL
TO TRANSFER
7RY--HR9D ----.--
3.0E --6/H 3.0M•
BLOCK VALVE 1100 FAILS m
CLOSE
PYK!IOOK -,-
:l.OE-3 LO ><
7RY-HR9D ---,---
3.0E-6/H 3.0M><
INTERLOCK LOOP 4 BYPASSED
7TT--4U --,---
LOE-3
SHEET 32
LO•
1o-26-93 10:57 F:\PR\PR32
PR DEFLAGRATION PR HIGH FLOW C02 REQUIRED
FAD..URE TO SHUTDO'w'N PR
rEED PUMP
DR
Tl-9356 INACTIVE/FAILS
LO.,
DR \.._}
LOE-3 1.0"
T!-9356 TI-935G INACTIVE FAILS
LD'W
UST~356F UST'9356Y
** 3.3E--5/H l.OH~ 3.3E-6/H LOH
NOTE: INACTIVE INTERLOCK MEANS F AlLURE TO STOP PR FEED
* DENOTES ENABLING EVENT
HIS-U73 FAILS TO
OPEN
Cll-PR-43 7S'w'l!73D
THIS SHEET
\_ 3.0E-5
3.0E--6/H 3.0M~
** DENOTES COMMON CAUSE INITIATING EVENT
SHEET 21 AND
BLOCK VALVE 1100 FAILS TO
CLOSE
PVKUOOK
LO >< 3.0E-3 1.0 ~
I"AiiiiRE TO CLOSE PPT MOV-1100
<ALL CAUSES>
THIS SHEET
SHEET 33
INTERLOCK LOOP 5
BYPASSED
7IT-SU ----r--
l.OE-3 1.0 "
01-12-93 15:40 F:\PR\PR33
PR DEFLAGRATION PR HIGH FLOW C02 REQUIRED
INTERLOCK LDDP 5
B'fl'ASSED
m--su ----,--
LOE-3 1.0 •
7S\11!73D --,-----
3.0E-5
NOTE: INACTIVE INTERLOCK MEANS FAILURE TO STOP PR FEED
* DENOTES ENABLING EVENT
1.0 ..
RELAY HF<6 CDNTACn F'AIL
TD TRANSFER
7RY-HR6D --...--
3.0E--6/H 3.0M•
BLDCK VALVE 1100 FAILS TD
CLOSE
PVK!!OOK ----,--
3.0E-3 LO "
7RY-HR6D --...--
3.0E-6/H 3.0M><
SHEET 34
INTERLOCK LOOPS
B'fl'ASSED
7IT--5U --,---
I.OE-3 LD•
10-26-93 11:01 F:\PR\PR34
PR DEFLAGRATION PR HIGH FLOW C02 REQUIRED
FAILURE TD SHUTDOVN PR
FEED PUMP
OR
INTERLOCK LDIJP 11
BYPASSED
m--uu
DR \....._/
LDE-3 1.0 ..
AI-3407 \IRDNG INACTIVE CALIBRATION
GAS
UAI3407f UAIPVVHU
3.4E-5/H 1.0~ LDE-4 1.0 "
NOTE: INACTIVE INTERLOCK MEANS FAILURE TO STOP PR FEED
* DENOTES ENABLING EVENT
SHEETS 19, 20 AND
\.... 3.0E-5 LDl< 3.0E-3 1.0 ~
3.0E-6/H 3.0M~
FAILURE TD CLOSE PPT MDV-1100 <ALL CAUSES:>
DR
THIS SHEET
SHEET 35
INTERLOCK LDOP 11
BYPASSED
m--uu ~
l.OE-3 1.0 "
1G-26-93 12:14 F:\PR\PR35
PR DEFLAGRATION PR HIGH FLOW C02 REQUIRED
INTERLOCK LOOP 11
B'IPASSED
7!T-11U ----,---
LOE-3 1.0.
7S\Jl173D -.,.--
3.0E-5
NOTE: INACTIVE INTERLOCK MEANS FAILURE TO STOP PR FEED
* DENOTES ENABLING EVENT
1.0 Ml
RELAY CR3A CONTACTS FAIL
TO TRANSFER
7RYCR3AD --y-
3.0E-6/H 3.0M=
CIJ-PR-30
SHEET 19
BLOCK VALVE 1100 FAILS TO
CLOSE
PVK!!OOK ---.---
:J.OE-3 LO "
7RYCR3AD -.-
3.0E-6/H 3.0M"
INTERLDCK LOOP 11
B'fi'ASSED
7!T-!1U ----,---
I.OE-3
SHEET 36
1.0.
1o-2S-93 11:09 F:\PR\PR36
PR DEFLAGRA TION PR HIGH FLOW C02 REQUIRED
A!-3408 INACTIVE/ FAILS LDIV
DR
!.OE-3 1.0 .. 3.0E-5 LO•
'WRONG CALIBRATION
GI\S
UA!PVVHU
3.4E-5/H LOHS! LOE-4 1.0 •
SHEETS 19, 20
BLOCK VALVE 1100 FAILS TD CLOSE
cc-PR-o6
1HIS SHEET
\J 3.0E-3 LO•
RELAY CR6A CONTACTS fAIL
TD CLOSE
7RYCR6AK
3.0E-6/H 3.0M•
"----"
1HIS SHEET
SHEET 37
INTERLOCK
LOOP U BYPASSED
7!T-11U
!.OE-3 1.0•
11-02-93 11:17 F:\PR\PR37
PR DEFLAGRATION PR HIGH FLOW C02 REQUIRED
INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
SHEET 38
10-18-93 13:36 F:\PR\PR38
PR DEFLAGRA TION PR HIGH FLOW C02 REQUIRED
lNTERLDCK LOOP 14
BYPASSED
LOE-3 LD•
FAILURE TO SHUTD!l\JN
PR FEED PUMP
DR
H!S-1173 FAILS TO
OPEN
S,OE-5 1.0 ..
RELII Y PSHHX1041 CONTACTS FAIL TO TRANSFER
s.OE-6/H 3.011><
NOTE: INACTIVE INTERLOCK MEANS FAILURE TO STOP PR FEED
* DENOTES ENABLING EVENT
BLOCK VALVE 1100 FAD...S TO CLOSE
3.oE-3 :1.0•
<AlLURE TO CLOSE PPT MOV-1100 <ALL CAUSES>
DR
RELAY PSHHX1041 CONTACTS <AIL
TO TRANSITR
7RY1041D -----.-
AND
3.0E-6/H 3.011•
SHEETS 9.10
INTERLOCK LOOP 14
BYPASSED
7IT-14U ---,--
PT-1041 FAILS HIGH
PSP1041Z ---.----
PT-1041 GENERATES HH SlGNAL
CR
3.0E -5/H lOH
1,0E-3 LO •
SHEET 39
PR REACTOR PRESSURE IS HlGH
MDY-1041 SPURIOUSLY
CLOSES
PVK1041C ---,--
1.0E-7/H 1,0H
10-26-93 11:32 F:\PR\PR39
PR DEFLAGRATION PR HIGH FLOW C02 REQUIRED
CHECK VALVE C12C
rAILS CLOSED
NVXC12CC ----.--
S.OE-7/H LOH
MANUAL VALVE CLDSE:D
ANY1Dr7
NVG1DF7X ----.--
3.2E-5/H LOH
PRESSURE RELIEf VALVE STUCK OPEN
ANYI01'"6
NVY1DF60 ----.--
l.SE-8/H l.OH
VAPORIZER FAILS TO
PROVIDE HEAT
NVPC02-f ----.--
6.9£-6/H I.OH
(1) SHORTS AND OPEN CIRCUITS NOT MODELLED
* DENOTES ENABLING EVENT
** CONDI'TlONAL PROBABIU1Y OF 'THE SECOND DIESEL GENERATOR (DG)
FAILS TO START GIVEN THAT FIRST DG FAILS TO START
LOSS 01'" Dri'"SITE PD"'IER
LOSP--
.33Y LOH
3.DE-3/H
DR
PRESSURE REGUU\ TING VALVE 7601X rAILS CLOSED
NO ELECTRIC PINER TO VAPORIZER
INSUFFICIENT POVER INPUT
TO BUS ll!O
NVI7601C ----r--
L6E-5/H l.OH
SOLENOID VALVE 7600
rAILS CLDSED
NVS7600C ----.--
L2E-5/H
POVER F'RDM DI=t. DG 200 BUS B9 rAILS TD :START
UNAVAILABLE OR RUN
DR **
3.0E-2 l.ll"
LO " OlS 1,0 •
LOH
SHEET
fLOW CONTROL VALVE 7600
rAILS CLOSED
NCV7600C ----.---
2.2E-6/H LOH
40
01-12-93 16:02 F:\PR\PR40
PR DEFLAGRA TION PR HIGH FLOW C02 REQUIRED
MANUAL VALVE CLOSED
ANY 1 OF" 3
ZVG1DF3X --.--
L4E-!5/H LOH
PR-41-ol --,--
DR
PR£SSURE REGULATING VALVE fAILS CLOSED
ANY 1 OF" 2
~
3.2E-!5/H LOH
CQ-PR-51
SHEET 3
IVYI239D ---,-
2-0E-9/H LOH
SHEET 41
01-12-93 16:03 F: \PR\PR41
PVVH DEFLAGRA TION lt.t< l..t"V v HJ JJ:='KlNU 1"'"1": ,. 11..C:DING
PR HIGH FLOW C02 REQUIRED
(PYVS LEL ANALYZERS REMOVED FROM SERVICE) 1
1 1
SHEET 11
* DENOTES ENABLING EVENT
~--··- '" .. " --~ ·~ I ~ ~Gc~ I I I:~; FEEDING 21 +4 HR:S PRESENT
AND
INSUFTICIE:NT DILUTION AIR
M2 [-IJ
CD--PV-01 ----,--
SHEET 5
CD-PV-()2 ---,-
SHEET 2
PRFEED---r-
.045 1.0~
EXCESSIVE BENZENE FLDV FRDM seve
M?BZ [+ll
TI-'9356 INTERLOCK LDDI'<S) S
INACTIVE
CD-PV-12 -,--
SHEET 10
DR
llE-5/H
EXCESSIVE N[JN--CDNDENS!BLES
GET INTO seve CAUSE M7:BZ [+IJ
:sf
FJ-9277 INTERLOCK LDDPC:S) 4
INACTIVE
MI>NC [+IJ TOTAL FLDVRATE INPUT TO SCVC
CD-N-10 ----,--
SHEET 9
CD-PY-04 ---,-
SHEET 4
DR
PVVH :BLDYIER MECHANICAL IGNITION
SOURCE
TBLj-1
IJE-5/H LOH
SHEET 1
1Q-16-93 10:34 F: \PVVH\PVVH1
PVVH DEFLAGRA TION PR HIGH FLOW C02 REQUIRED
LOE-6/H
PRESS HI HI C +101 CAUSES TCV '93:56 TO rAIL FULLY CLDSEll
PRESSURE REGULATOR
FAILUR£ <HI-HI)
NVI--ZZ --..---
1.6E-6/H l.OH
SCVC TEMP
I CONTROL LOOP REVERSED
-OR
CH2CTHO ----.---
I.OE-5/H
* DENOTES ENABLING EVENT
++ COMMON CAUSE INJllATlNG EVENT
=-.,---
!.OH
TU t+ll CHDLLED VATER
TEMPERATURE HIGM
6.CE-5/H I.OHJ<
:SCVC~P CONTROL LC~ PASSES ll!STURB
............. ~ TU.,....,. r .• ,
DR
LARGE
I <UNCCNTROLLA1El
seve TEMP CCNTRDL LDDP
INACTIVE
9356 TC
STUCK
C!JE-4/H
DISTURBANCES
OR
9356 TIC
SETPillNT HIGM
I.OHJ<
9356 TEMP SENSOR
STUCK
3.3E-:S/H I.OH!<
SHEET 1
TI-9:356 rAILS LOV
CHILLED VATER fUlV LCV MIS [-!OJ
INSTRUMENT AIR HlGH PRESSURE t+ll CAUSES
TCV 9356 TO PARTIALLY CLOSE
PRESSURE REGULATOR
FAILURE <HIGH>
NVI--Z
L6E-5/H I.OH
9356 TC
STUCK
UCN9356F --,.-
2.1E-4/H
SHEET
MODERATE
DISTURBANCES ENTER INACTIVE LDOP
9356 CONTROLLER FAILS HIGH
DR
UPSTREAM DEVICES ARE
INACTIVE
I.OH~
DR
9356 TEMP SENSllR
STUCK
UST'9356F --,---
3.3E-5/H L.DH~
2
01-12-93 10:57 F: \PVVH\PVVH2
PVVH DEFLAGRATION PR HIGH FLOW C02 REQUIRED
936<4 TEMP SENSIJR
REVERSED
CSTI'364U ---,--
LOOP IS
REVERSED
CCNn64U
9364 TIC
FAlLS HIGH
CCN9364Z
!.OE-6/H l.OH !.OE-6/H !.OH C.!E-5/H
* DENOTES ENABLING EVENT
!.OH
T11 [+!J CHILLED \lATER TEMPERATURE
HIGH CO-PV--()5
SHEET 2
HILLED VATER CDNTRD llDP CAUSES OR PASSE
DIStuR!IANCES CAUSES Tn lr+!l
OR
HEATER 9364 S'w'ITCH TIC
FAILS CLOSED SETPOINT HIGH
CS\19364C CSP9364U
3.0E-5/H LOH l.OE-5/H !.DH
9364 TIC
STUCK
CCN9364F
Z..tE-4/H LOHIII
9364 TEMP SENSIJR
FAILS LOV
CST9364Y
3.3E-6/H LOH
9364 TEMP SENSOR
STUCK
CST9364F
3.3E-5/H l.OH><
SHEET 3
LOOP IS
PV-03-05 ----.-OR
POWER S\JITCH STUCK
CS\IPOVRF -----r--
3.0E-5/H l.OHlK
CH20-T+! ----,---
1.010 !.OH
01-09-9:> 15:19 F: \PVVH\PVVH3
PVVH DEFLAGRA TION PR HIGH FLOW C02 REQUIRED
PR C02 CONTROL LOOP
REVERSED
I R
FT-U07 >C-1107 REVERSED REVERSED
**
LOE--6/H l.OH lOE--6/H l.OH
* DENOTES ENABLING EVENT
>CV-ll07 REVERSED
QVLI!07U -.--
LOE-6/H
** COMMON CAUSE INITIATING EVENT
PV-04-05 ---,-
lOH
INSTRUMENT CD2 PRESS HIGH [+1J
CAUSES FCV-1107 TO PARTIALLY CLOSE
PRESSURE REGULATOR
FAILURE <HIGH>
NV!--z ---,-
L6E-!5/H lOH
AND
FT-1107 FAILS LDV
l!07 SENSOR STUCK
QSF1107F --,-
7.8E-5/H !.OHJ<
SHEET 1
FC-1107 FAILS LOV
1107 FIC
STUCK
OR
QCN!l07F --.--
2.!E-4/H LOH~
DR
FCV-U07 FAILS OPE:N
QVL11070 -,.....-
6.2E-6/H
1107 VALVE STUCK
QVL1107F -,.....-
6.2E-5/H
LOH
l.OH~
SHEET 4
OPERATOR SETS FIC-1107
SETPDINT HIGH
QSP1107U --.-
+.!5E-4/H lOH
INSTRUMENT C02 PRESS HI HI
CAUSES FCV -1107
TO FULLY CLOSE
PRESSURE REGULATOR I'" AlLURE
HL HI
NVl--zz ---,-
1.6E-6/H LOH
01-10-93 11:33 F: \PWH\PWH4
PVVH DEFLAGRA TION PR HIGH FLOW C02 REQUIRED
2034 VALVE
REVERSED
BASE LCAD CDNTRDL LCDP
REVERSED
5960 FL!]\,/ SENSOR
REVERSED
TYL21l34U -.-- TS!l860U I #
l.OE--6/H l.OH !.OE--6/H l.OH lOE--6/H l.OH
* DENOTES ENABLING EVENT
** COMMON CAUSE INITlATING EVENT
INSUFFICIENT DILUT][IN
AIR M2 [-lJ
BASE LOAD AIR FL0\1 CDNTRDL LOOP
CAUSES H2 [ -lJ
DR
2034-FC VALVE
fAILS CLOSED
TYL2034C -..---
2.2E-G/H lOH
CD-PY-01
SHEET 1
5960 tiC
FAILS HIGH
TCN5BE.OZ ----.---
2.l.E-5/H l.OH
LARGE <UNCDNTRDLLABLD
]!STURllANCES
TSP5860U ----.---
lOE-5/H !.OH
SHEET 5
FT-5960 FAILS HIGH
TS!l860Z I ++
7.9£--6/H LDH
D!]\,/NSTREAM PVVH PRESSURE INCREASES
CAUSES P4 [•!OJ
CD-PV-QE. ---,--
SHEET 6
01-10-93 11: 39 F: \PV'VH\PV'VH5
PVVH DEFLAGRA TION PR HIGH FLOW C02 REQUIRED
PVV BLD\tER D20 FAIL.S
TD RUN
TBL-02DV ----r-
7.6E-5/H
PW BLD\IER fAIL.S TD RUN <ALL CAUSES)
DR
LOH
* DENOTES ENABLING EVENT
MDV 5862 !NADVERTANTL Y
CLOSES
TVM5962C ----r-
LOE-7/H I.OH
MDV 5864 FAIL!
TD OPEN
TVM5964D ----r-
3.0E-3
DIJ\o/NSTREAM PWH PRESSURE
INCREASES CAUSES P4 C+lOJ
STANDBY BLDIJE:R FAIL.S TO START
<ALL CAUSES>
DR
1.0 )I[
STANDBY PVV BLD\IER 030
FAIL.S TD START
TBL-D30A -,--
3.0E-3 LO "
CD..PV-()6
SHEET 5
PD5861 SENSOR
REVERSED
TPD5861U ---.--
LOE-6/H !.OH
HEADER PRESSURE CONTROL DEVICES
REVERSED
DR
PDIC 5861 REVERSED
TCN~861U -r--
!.OE-6/H lOH
SHEET
SIC REVERSED
TCN-SICU -r--
!.OE-6/H lOH
6
01-10-93 11:44 F: \PWH\PWH6
PVVH DEFLAGRA TION PR HIGH FLOW C02 REQUIRED
PR C02 :BV-1109 fAILS TO
CLOSE
QVKU09K ---,-
3.0E-3
FIC-1107 INACTIVE
G!SF1107f ----.--
7.8E-5/H 1.01il'
1.0"'
FT-1L07 fAILS
LOW
QSFl107Y ----.--
7.8E--6/H
* DENOTES ENABLING EVENT
fAILURE TO CLOSE PR C02 BV-1109
<ALL CAUSES>
DR
FT-1107 INACTIVE/f" All.S LOW REVERSED
PV-Q7-Q6 --.-----DR
••
l.OH
** COMMON CAUSE INITIAllNG EVENT
CD-PV-15
lHIS SHEET
FC-1107 REVERSED
QCNU07U ----.--
l.OE--6/H
**
LOH
AND
INTERLOCK LOOP 1
:BYPASSED
~ m-w
0 1.0E-3 LOl<
:::=J.._ RELAY HR4 FAILS TO
CLOSE
=r:::::: 7RYHR4-K
0 3.0E--6/H 3.0111<
CD-PV--ll7
SHEET 4-
6.2E-5/H LOH><
f AlLURE TO CLOSE PR C02 fCV-U07
<ALL CAUSES)
DR
FT-1107 INACTIVE/FAILS LDV /REVERSED
CO-PV-15 -,......-
THIS SHEET
SHEET 7
INTERL!JCK LOIJP 1
BYPASSED
7IT-1U ---.--
LOE-3 LO ><
01-12-93 11:04 F: \PVVH\PVVH7
PVVH DEFLAGRA TION PR HIGH FLOW C02 REQUIRED
PR C02 BV-U09 FI-S660 FAILS TD INACTIVE/F AU.S
CLOSE HIGH/REVERSED
QVK1109K
DR
3.0E-3 1.0 ..
Fl-5960 rAILS HIGH
TSf5860Z
** 7.8£-5/H l.Otil< 7.8E-6/H l.OH
* DENOTES ENABLING EVENT
** COMMON CAUSE INillAllNG EVENT
INTERLOCK LOOP 2
:BYPASSED CD...PV-17
1HIS SHEET
\.J !.OE-3 10 •
FT--5860 REVERSED
TIF5860U
•• l.OE-6/H 1.0H 3.0E-G/H 3.0M>!
\.J "---"
6.2E-5/H LOH• THIS SHEET
SHEET
INTERLOCK LOOP 2
BYPAS<:ED
7IT-2U
I.OE-3 1.0 •
8
01-12-93 11:07 F: \PVVH \PV\IH 8
PVVH DEFLAGRA TION PR HIGH FLOW C02 REQUIRED
lNTERLOCK LOOP 4
BYPASSED
F AlLURE TO CLOSE PR CDZ BV-UO~
<ALL CAUSES>
PR CDe DV-110!7 FAILS TO
CLOSE
QVI(jj09K --,--
FI~en INACTIVE
USI'9277F -,--
LOE-3 1.0• S.OE-3 l.D • 7.8E-5/H
* DENOTES ENABLING EVENT
l.OH•
REU\Y HR!> FAILS TO
CLOSE
7RYHR9-K -,--
3.0E-6/H 3.0M><
PR C02 FCV-1107 F"AILS TO
CLOSE
QVL11D7K ---,--
6.2E-05/H LOH•
FI-~77
INACTIVE
USF92nF -,--
7.SE-5/H
F"AILURE TO CLOSE PR CDZ FCV-1107
<ALL CAUSES>
DR
l.OH>«
INTERLOCK LOOP 4
BYPASSED
7IT--4U ---,----
l.OE-3
SHEET 9
LO •
RELAY HR!> FAILS TO
CLOSE
7RYHR9-K -,--
3.0E-6/H 3.0MlK
01-13-93 09:16 F: \PWH\PWH9
PVVH DEFLAGRA TION PR HIGH FLOW C02 REQUIRED
INTERLOCK
LOOP 5 BYPASSED
71T-5U ---,--
l.OE-3 1.0 J(
RELAY' HR6 FAILS TD
Cl..IJSE
7RYHR6-K ---.----
3.0£-6/H 3.0M>!
* DENOTES ENABLING EVENT
FAILURE TD Cl..IJSE PR C0C DV-11~
<ALL CAUSES>
PV-IO-Q6 --,.-
DR
n-9356 INACTIVE
UST'J356F -----.---
3.3E-5/H WH~
** COMMON CAUSE INITIATING EVENT
THIS SHEET
TI-9356 FAILS LD'ol
UST9356Y ----.---
3.3E-6/H
PR C02 BV -1109 FAILS TD
Cl..IJSE
QVKII~K ---,-
3.0E-3
** l.OH
1.0 ..
PR C02 tCV-1107 FAILS TD
CLOSE
QVL1107K --,-----
6.2E-5/H l.OH><
FAILURE TO CLOSE PR COC FCV-1107
<ALL CAUSES:>
CD-PV-19 ---,--
THIS SHEET
SHEET 1 0
INTERLOCK LOOP 5
BYPASSED
71T-5U -----.---
l.OE-3 1.0 Ml
01-12-93 11:15 F: \PV\IH \PVVH1 0
PVVH DEFLAGRA TION PR HIGH FLOW C02 REQUIRED
INTERLOCK LOOP U
BYPI\SSED
m-nu -.--
f AlLURE TD CLOSE PR CC2 BV-1109
<ALL CAUSES>
QVK1109K -r--
BENZENE ANALVZERS ~07A~~08 L-----/
INACTIVE
AND
PV-II-Q4 -r-- THIS SHEET
AND
LOE-3 LO• 3.0E-3 10 •
BENZENE ANAL VZER A!-3407
lNACTIVE
3.4E-5/H LOH•
* DENOTES ENABLING EVENT
** ANNOUNCED FAILURE
*** UNANNOUNCED FAILURE
ANALVZER AI-3407 INACTIVE
<ALL CAUSES>
UAI34-07U ----..---
LOE-4 :1.0 •
RELAY CR3A FAILS
TO CLOSE
7RYCR3AK -,.-
3JlE-6/H 3.0M•
BENZENE ANALyzER Al-3409
INACTIVE
UAI~OB~ -,.---
G.BE-4/H I.OH><
SHEET 1
PR C02 FCV-1107 fAILS TD
CLOSE
QVL1107K -,.---
6.2E-5/H !.OM><
ANALYZER AI-~08 INACTIVE
<ALL CAUSE:S>
7RVCR6AK -,.-
3.0E-6/H 3JlM><
fAILURE TO CLOSE PR C02 FCV-1107
<ALL CAUSES>
OR
BENZENE ANAL VZERS ~07 AND 3408
INACTIVE
CO-PV-20 -r-
THIS SHEET
RONG CAUBRA TlON GA USED FOR ANALYZERS
~07 A~ ~08
UAI34-07U -,.---
I.OE-4 10 •
SHEET 11
INTERLOCK LOOP 11
BYPASSED
m--uu --.-
LOE-3 1.0 "
10-18-93 11:14 F: \PVvH\PV\IH11
liST OF TABLES
TABLE 1
TABLE 2
TABLE 3
TOP EVENTS DESCRIBING FIRE/EXPLOSION
TOP EVENTS DESCRIBING EXPLOSIVE CONCENTRATION/FLAMMABLE MIXTURE
HAZARD SEVERITY
TABlE 1
TOP EVENTS DESCRIBING FIRE/EXPlOSION -- -···- ---
OlD 8 DIGIT lEVEl 3 ANNUAl NEW
TOP EVENT DESCRIPTION NAME FOR HAZARD SHEET FREQUENCY ANNUAl ClASSIFI- NO. * YR-1 FREQUENCY TOP EVENT CATION? lATE WASH YR-1
FTA
I INSIDE PROCESS VESSEl INCLUDING PVVH I I FIRE/EXPLOSION WITHIN PRFT (ALL PERIODS) TOP-PRFT YES FE-2 4.3 X 10-7 SAME
FIRE/EXPLOSION WITHIN PR (HI FLOW CO? REQUIRED) TOP-PR-- YES PR-1 1.4 X 10-5 2.6 X 10-6
FIRE[EXPLOSION WITHIN PR 1NON-FEEDING PERIOD) TOP-PR-- YES FE-4 8.5 X 10-7 SAME
I FIRE/EXPLOSION WITHIN OE (ALL PERIODS) TOP-OE-- YES FE-8 8.9 X 10-7 SAME
FIRE/EXPLOSION WITHIN OECT (ALL PERIODS) TOP-OECT YES FE-10 3.4 X 10-7 SAME
FIRE/EXPLOSION WITHIN PVVH (HI FLOW C07 REQUIRED) TOP-PVVH YES PV-1 3.7 X 10-9 2.8 X 10-8
FIRE/EXPLOSION WITHIN PVVH (NORMAL PERIOD) TOP-PVVH YES FE-12 2.3 X 10-8 2.4 X 10-8
I OUTSIDE PROCESS VESSEL (IN SPC) I I LARGE FIRE (WHEN OE IS FULL) TOPLFIRE YES FE-23 5.5 X 10-7 SAME
SMALL FIRE NOT EXTINGUISHED (DURING ORGANIC TRANSFERS) TOPS FIRE NO FE-25 1.1 X 10-4 SAME
EXPLOSION CAUSING REVERSE FLOW OUT OF SPC (ALL TOP LARGE YES FE-30 2.7 X 10-S SAME PERIODS)
I SUM OF LEVEL 3 HAZARD EVENT FREQUENCIES I ls.o x 10-5 13.3 X 10-5 I
E:\WSRC\REPTB93\TABLES\TABLE1 11/29/93 3:03pm
TABlE 2
TOP EVENTS DESCRIBING EXPlOSIVE CONCENTRATION/FlAMMABlE MIXTURE
FTAP INSTRUCTIONS SHEET OlD NEW NO.* ANNUAl ANNUAl
TOP EVENT DESCRIPTION FREQUENCY FREQUENCY PROCESS -- TRUE -- YR-1 YR-1 8 DIGIT 8 DIGIT lATE WASH NAME FOR NAME FOR fTA TOP EVENT IGNITION
SOURCE(S)
EXPLOSIVE CONCENTRATION WITHIN PRFT TOP-PRFT FE-02-02 FE-2 6.4 X 10-5 SAME 1 EXPLOSIVE CONCENTRATION WITHIN PR (HI FLOW C02 REQUIRED} TOP-PR-- PR-01-02 PR-1 2.4 X 10-2 4.3 X 10-3
EXPLOSIVE CONCENTRATION WITHIN PR (NORMAL PERIOD} TOP-PR-- FE-04-05 FE-4 7.4 X 10-5 SAME
EXPLOSIVE CONCENTRATION WITHIN OE TOP-OE-- FE-08-02 FE-8 6.3 X 10-5 SAME
EXPLOSIVE CONCENTRATION WITHIN OECT TOP-OECT FE-10-02 FE-10 1.1 X 10-4 SAME
EXPLOSIVE CONCENTRATION WITHIN PVVH (HI FLOW C02 REQUIRED} TOP-PVVH PV-01-07 PV-2 3.6 X 10-6 5.9 X 10-6
EXPLOSIVE CONCENTRATION WITHIN PVVH (NORMAL PERIOD) TOP-PVVH FE-12-03 FE-12 4.4 X 10-5 4.5 X 10-5
ORGANIC/AQUEOUS SPILL GREATER THAN 300 GALLONS FE-24-03 FE-24 3. 2 X 10-6 SAME SPILLS THAT CAUSE POTENTIAL FOR SMALL FIRE FE-25-03 FE-25 8.0 X 10-2 SAME
FE-27-01 EXPLOSIVE CONCENTRATION OF BENZENE IN SPC TOP LARGE FE-27-02 FE-30 SAME FE-30-09 3.8 X 10-4
FE-32-04
E:\USRC\REPTB93\TABLES\TABLE2 12/13/93 2:33pa
TABLE 3
HAZARD SEVERITY
HAZARD FATALITY/INJURY INVESTMENT DURATION RATING ($ MILLIONS) (DOWN TOWN)
3 Multiple fatalities > 10 > 6 months
2 Single fatality or 1 - 10 1-6 months multiple injuries
1 Serious injury 0.1 - 1 1 week-1 month
0 No injury < 0.1 < 1 week
E:\USRC\REPTB93\TABlES\TABlE3 12/13/93 2:39pm
LIST OF FIGURES
FIGURE 1A VITRIFICATION BUILDING LAYOUT (BEFORE HAN MODIFICATIONS)
FIGURE IB VITRIFICATION BUILDING LAYOUT (AFTER HAN MODIFICATIONS)
FIGURE 2 SALT PRECIPITATE PROCESSING FLOW DIAGRAM -INITIAL STUDY
FIGURE 3 PRECIPITATE HYDROLYSIS PROCESS OVERVIEW
FIGURE 4 SIMPLIFIED PRECIPITATE HYDROLYSIS PROCESS FLOW DIAGRAM WITH HARDWIRED INTERLOCKS (HAN ADDITION/NITRITE DESTRUCTION)
FIGURE 5 SEQUENCE AND DURATION OF OPERATIONS (HAN ADDITION/NITRITE DESTRUCTION)
FIGURE 6 SALT PROCESS CELL FIRE PROTECTION
FIGURE 7 SIMPLIFIED PRECIPITATE HYDROLYSIS PROCESS FLOW DIAGRAM WITH HARDWIRED INTERLOCKS (LATE WASH PROCESS)
FIGURE 8 PRECIPITATE HYDROLYSIS PROCESS TIME CYCLE (LATE WASH PROCESS)
FIGURE 9 SUMMARY FAULT TREE (SHEETS 1 AND 2)
FIGURE 10 PR FAULT TREE (SHEETS 28 AND 28A)
FIGURE 11 DIGRAPH FOR THE PROCESS VESSEL VENT SYSTEM (PWS)
~
........ H
WELD
TEST
Cfl.L
FIGURE lA - VITRIFICATION BUILDING LAYOUT (BEFORE HAN MODIFICATIONS)
~[E~ "fi...T CFI I CPC I..IM:IMe REDC
PRCD sc;vc
:. m~r
CDI1C
p~~~.~.ECD 00~ 0 ~~;FS5CBB R.R. IEll
h OE -'~,. SFHT
OECT
\___ PRECFfTAlE I'ROCESSNJ m.t.
.... --fEED ORGANIC
fROM IN TANk PRECIPITATION TO INCINERATOR
........ ......,., H
WElD
TEST
CfiL
FIGURE 18 - VITRIFICATION BUILDING LAYOUT (AFTER HAN MODIFICATIONS)
~CE~ M:l.. T C"F1 I CPC ~ REDC
PReD seve PR v /OEeD
CDI1C
o~~-'~~ 0 : 0 o-e1Cit.. PR:J:ESS rn a A.A. IEll . . 4 OE P T PRBT
OEel
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FIGURE 2 SALT PRECIPITATE PROCESSING FLOW DIAGRAM - INITIAL STUDY
Figure 3
PRECIPITATE HYDROLYSIS PROCESS OVERVIEW Noncondensibles/Vapors To Process Vessel
Vent Header (PVVH)
Noncondensibles/Vapors Noncondensibles/
Precipitate Slurry from Pump Pits
Noncondensibles/ Vapors
PRCD
PR FEED TANK (PRFT)
Carbon Dioxide
c:::b:,
Formic Acid
cu___., Formate
HAN (for nitrite
destruction process
only)
PRECIPITATE REACTOR
(PR)
c:::b:,
AO.
Vapors
OECD
COND. ooo.r, I I I
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ORG.
(OE) OECT
c:b
Aqueous Product to Chemical Processing Cell
'------~ Hg to Purification W20<9101G-105-021-
PRBT
c:::b:,
To SRAT 4 '
A
[j] FSHI+< (P\IV><)
c
H
FIGURE 4 - SIMPliFIED PI HARD WI RED I I
FSUL •• (PIIVH) III
1li>+H @ (PWH)(j]
P!H< (S PC) E]
10
[flED PRECIPITATE HYDROlYSIS PROCESS flOW DIAGRAM WITH fiRED INTERlOCKS CHAN ADDITION/NITRITE DESTRUCTION)
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tor& era&-... _ ::::"'~~~:=·-~.::=:.":.~so!~= JIRFTd .ua up to-be~ d IBid ma.un.l. PHP TocaJ ~ umc IMJ' 6crm.: alta'~,.,:.:., .trh PRF'fi&II:IPk= l't- Noeftdl:t m:: =-OE~I'fiTT Opon-.
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FIGURE 5 - SEQUENCE AND DURATION OF OPERATIONS (HAN ADDITION/NITRITE DESTRUCTION)
I
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-= ~a.o
u .. ..... IE::!
1-0
40
OPERATION
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(141 PR STE.AM ST'RIPI"'NCl
lUll OE TRANSFER PUMP RUNNINQ (RI!X:YCLL ORGAN'IQ
(ltll COOL TO SOC
(17) PR SAMPl..E PUMP RL'NNlNG
(UII PR SAMPLE ANALYSIS
(ltll PR TRA)';SP"ER PI.IMP RIJNNlNC IPR TO PRBT 'ffiA.'lSF'ER)
(301 ADD WATER
a: (21) OE AGITATOR RUNNlNG IHICH SPI!ZD;
~~ MIX CONTENTS TO I!XI"RACT CESIUM)
{
li€ 1221 OE AGITATOR RUNNING (WI'W SF I!Zt1)
0~ (2.Sl HEAT OE TO 10 C; DlsnLL BI!XZJ!NE
1241 HEAT TO 100 C; OE STE.AM ST'RIPI"'NCl
(2.5) OECT SAMPU: PIMP Rl.!NNINa
1261 COOL TO SOC
"'!!:! (27) OECT SAMPI..E PIMP RIJNNING
~~~~ 1281 OECT SAMPI..E ANALYSIS '
~~ 12111 OECT TRANSP"ER PI.IMP R1JNN1NO (OECT TO OWST TRANSF'ER)
T, II. CA.LI.OWAT. 4/18/IH
PRECIPITATE HYDROLYSIS PROCESS TIME
1m O.l§
llli'Zm 1.0
~ g ..... :-~•'•'{•'•'•'•'•~',';',',f,',\','•'•'4•'•'•'1;.,.,N,','j 4.0
E5l l.O<·.w.w·l
1.0
m::J 1.0
x.: .·:1. . .:·
,.~
4.0
10
TOTAL Cfa.lt tw:11: m ~ DRs.
Hole:~ time U 45 bra IWIUIJIDlln,g the !liiWilpled before l:iKh I'R batch and llfu:r the organic In the OECT Iii tranakrred to the OWST. Since the I'RFT'III'III ~up to two batches ol feed m.attrlal, PHP Tota 1 Cycle Ume m.ay decmoee llfu:r ~ ta gain with I'RFf u.mpk ~pf'I)CIOdure. No credit 111'1111 tAkEn lOr ng PRFT ()peratloiUI (1), 121. 131 du.rl:n4 0£ cycle.
,.,..,.;. '~···;-:>:~~,:.;.·.· .~:OY.•/<·?:'·Y/1,.;'
24.6
~· WYN·l@.:.:-,...:if;{f}:-. .I
91.0
p
...
0..8 EiEI
fl'(c46f(f~""':l 111!'.1!!:11
• •
2C TIME, HRl
FIGURE 5 - SEQUENCE AND DURATION OF OPERATIOI
ME CYCLE
edit ON
--+--------------------.· aD 1.0
.·
fJ..·.·.w.·.·f··i:&·············~.~·.· ····~·.·.·.£j
--+----------------------+----~~·-.w«,·x.-i
-+-----·· cu -+------·· 0.11
-+------+ M3bP.£-#W
1.0
12.0
I 11.0
n.o . x•·:-· ···"'"' ,. 2. 0
--+--------------------+-----------------..Em --+----------------------+---------------------.~·O·~"EH·~···~'···E·E'·~·m --+----------------------+--------------------~~-·~···0----.~ Emm
20
HRS
30
TIONS CHAN ADDITION/NITRITE DESTRUCTION)
1.0.
40
SPRAY WATER f-EADER
(DELETED IN LATE WASH MODIFICATIONS)
THERNIST~ . JUMPERS
\V • II'£RTANT NOZZLE
EXHAUST TUNN£L .. l' TO SAt«> FILT~R
SUMP DITCH CCTV ( 2)
LEL MONITOR
PLATFORM SUMP PUMP
4 1 REMOVABlE FIRE WAll
FIGURE 6 - SALT PROCESS CELL FIRE PROTECTION
INERT ANT NOmE
CEll COVERS
SPC AIR Slm.Y
CClV PlATFORM
SPRAY WATER HEADER (DElETED II lATE !lASH 140DIFICATIOIS) '
HEADER PIPING
INSU..ATED vtssas
SUMlP Plt1P
li.::.J.Ji! .. !Jlilli.·,JJiji.·J,Jj·.iili!i!li·j·J~~~,~~[·:!~·~ii.l~j!j~!iiiiiJI/i'l!:!i/ii i .;::iii!!lii.ljililil/ii1!!!1 1lil.[:
ElEVATION VIEW
FIGURE 6 - SALT PROCESS CEll FIRE PROTECTION <CONTINUED)
FIGURE 1
~tttt.·rwe
SIMPliFIED PRECIPITATE HYDROlYSIS PROCESS FlOW DIAGRAM WITH HARDWIRED INTERlOCKS (lATE WASH PROCESS)
._,. ...u.r••J~£il IIJr~-m•••
I@
-&]PCcct,...~IIIS..£IIIm.•.._~Tnoc~ccr.,.,...•~NL~~&
~ ·-~,.. ....
FIGURE 7 A
(ID ( PFQ 80 wru.L OR Pa.ll
R F&+t (SPC) s
c
H
SIMPliFIED WITH HARDW:
RiU1. I' (PVVH)m
PT·10.C1
a. I ~I Hll ....
ILiJ &PC CXII ARE
10 11
SIMPLIFIED PRECIPITATE HYDROLYSIS PROCESS FLOW DIAGRAM ~ITH HARDWIRED INTERLOCKS (LATE WASH PROCESS)
!iUL •• (PWHJIIJ
1141
CCC
FCV·2Ds.t
FO
~ .. .
A!H+ti@)(PWH)[j] (Ct!-111)
Tl-80.1 T3
@ ---------=------------j FC FIC·S<IID
1D'WC
12
ta~ WIRI>IlO!rPI'TI£
'Cllt111J AIP/.1.8
A
B
c
0
H
OPERATION
I!! I
II
r-~ 0011 U'Wl"lOMI'
• PRFT SAIII'!l: PUIIP & AClrA'ltl!-
• PRFTSAIII'll:AIW.lSS
; I ADO I'CJI>GC/CATALlSTlO I'll
II O£nA.'<Snlll'lliiP IIOIIIIIIIC [ll!A.'m:JI~H!ZL lOPIQ
• PRs.ull'!Ll'lliiPI!llllllliC
~ Ill PRAai"AlOR Jlt!lllllliC
~ • PR POSr C!DCCAI.AIUIICIIT SAli!U A!1AL.
I • HtATTO F!lJl TDCP.IJO CJ
u. PR1TTRA'<lfllll'lliiPI!llllllliC IIUDI!iC JCT 10 CJ
IIU !fOUl PRJCTIO CJOI.SI!CiliS
IIU HEATPRTD lDOC
1101 PRS!EAMSl1IIPP!liC
114 CllO!.TOSCC
IIU PR SMIPLt PUIIP RL,_'NI!IC
114 I'll SAMP!LAJW:ISS
u PR1'liAI<SF!:Ill'lliiPIIl!IR!IIC"'-10 PR!!rnoA.<SFilll
.. -·m:a
il I 1111 O£AC!TA10RJIIlllliiiiCII!IlH-
MIX COII1!:HT510 !:XIIIACf~
• 0£ AC!TJCTCRilll!OIIIiC 11.D1r ft!lll
~ 1111 HtAT0£1070C;~IEIIZ!X!
• HtATTO IIIOC:CESI&UISIIIIA'IPIC
• Cll0!.10SCC
mill • O£CT SOOUPUIIP lll1l1i11IG
• O£CT lWII'IZAIIAL1!11!1
• 0£CT1IWIS'D l'lliiP 1UIII11IC ~~ (OECT10 OIIST1W051!111
T. a. CAU.OWAJ', 1/JiteJ 'ftac·DW'PI' TU:
FIGURE 8 PRECIPITATE HYDROLYSIS PROCESS TIME CYCLE <LATE WASH)
[J u
r:z:::.:J u
-~················.·-''' .. ----- - c::::3
"'r=::~ ------------- u
'IOfAL C!IU '!IllS. 411lllla.
11o1<: qode-lii46Jn...,_. 1he mTII ampled bofcn, '"ell PRIIItd! md oft<r lb<ctpnfcllltb<OtCT Is !nnS<md lo lbe 00/ST. Sblae lbe PRITIIf!...,.upto!wollltd!<ori le<d ""'<1111. PIIP1blal qod<Ibe'"'l' clt:mu: Ill.,. ~Is pin wllh PRIT smplelllllylb ~ 11o cndn wu 1lkm lor pn:!Olmln& PRFT q.n~..,. Ill. Cll.IJ! duzmC 0!: c:ytle.
----=------- t:::l - IU : JU : l .. j
.. c=::J ==---=r==u -------------------+--------.~ u
.. ----------------+----------------1--.... ,... ··J u
EJ u
----------------+---------------+-----------------+--•' ... i:ir .. ··· ... -... , -------------------+-------------------+------------------+----------~ .... ~ u
--------------------+-------------------+-------------.c u ----------------------+----------------------~--------------•C u
w -~u
.... ····'ii0£ZJU
~u
m-·-· .. -..... -~·~·-·.;··-·.· .. · ·.·.·.··! u -------------+-------------+-------------+-------------+-..::.. ___ "" ....... r::::J:
10 20
'l'IME,BRS
30 40
~~~ ~ ~
I I
~ ~
I
il ~
11~ ~8
OPERATION
IQ TRANSFER PREC!P!TKrn FROM I..PWI'TO PRIT
Ill PRFl' SAMPLE PUMP & AGITATOR RUNNJNG
Ill PRFl' SAMI'IJ> ANALYSIS
Ill ADD FORMIC/CATALYSfTO PR
111 OE TRANSFER PUMP RUNNING tJ'RANSFER AQUEOUS HEEL TO PR)
Ill PR SAMPLE PUMP RUNNING
m PR AGITATOR RUNNING
(Ill PR POsr CHEMICAL ADDITION SAMPLE ANAL.
' PI HEAT TO FEED TEMP. (90 C)
(If! PRFT TRANSFER PUMP RUNNLVG (FEEDING AT 90 C)
(IU HOLD PR AT 90 C FOR 5 HOURS
llJt HEAT PR TO 100 C
lUI PR SIEAM SI'RlPPING
(l(j COOL TO SOC
(Ill PR SAMPLE PUMP RUNNING
(lfll PR ~ANALYSIS
(17) PR TRANSFER PUMP RUNNING (PR TO PRBT TRANSFER)
, ..
(Itt ADD WATER '
(Ill! OE AGITATOR RUNNING (HIGH SPEED; MIX COIID:NI'S TO ElCl'RACT CESIUM)
~ OE AGITATOR RUNNING (LOW SPEED)
lUI HEAT OE TO 70 C; DISTILL BENZENE . (1:11 HEAT TO 100 C; CE STEAM STRIPPING ,, (1:11 COOL TO SOC
..
'.
!Ill OECT SAMPLE PUMP RUNNING ~~.:
Ill OECT SAMPLE ANALYSIS
Ill OECT TRANSFER PUMP RUNNING (OECT TO owsr TRANSFER)
T. B. CALLOWAY, D/28/D'A WBRC·DWPF TU:
'
'
FIGURE 8 PRECIPITATE H
I!J TOTAL CYCLE TOm= 46 HJU. u E:;:;:;:;:::;::l Note: Cycle tfme Is 46 hrs aooummlng
u the PRIT Is sampled before each
--+1:::;:;:::;:::::;:;:::;:;:::::;:::::::·:::;:;:::::::;:;:;:;:;:;:] PR batch and after the organlc In the OEC Is transferred to the OWST. Since the
u PRIT will store up to two batches of feed material, PHP Total Cycle tfme may
!:::::::::::::::! decrease after apertence Is gain with -, PRIT sample ~s!s procedure. No cred: u
1!:::::::::·:·:1 was taken for pr ormlng PRIT Operation
u (1), (2), (3) durtng OE cycle.
- t:::;::::::!:::j u
~:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:-:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·
I 27.8 -.. •• ,.,.,::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::.:::::::::::::::::::::::::! ...
f·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:j 10
~ F:···················;·;·;·;·;·3 u
11.8 _... 1::::::·:::·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:::;:;:;:;:::· v
10
TIME, l
:TATE HYDROlYSIS PROCESS TIME CYClE (lATE WASH)
II"S assummlng ore each 'rganlc In the OECI' ST. Since the 3 batches of Cycle tlme may e fs gain wtth ·ocedure. No credit ! PRFT Operations :!e .
• ·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:-:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:::1 ...
-----+-_.m ------1--_.i:!:!:::;:;:;:;:;:;:;:;:;:;:;:.:!:!:!:::;:;:;:;:;:;:;:;:;:;:;:;:;:;:;:;:;:;:;:;:;:;l ...
__ ..;..... __ ---!-----------+-· 1:,:::::::::;.;.;::::::::::::.::::::::::::::::::::::::::::;::::::::::::::::::.;::::
l:!:!:!:!:i:i:ii u
l:;:;:;:!:!:!:;:;:::u::::::::::::;:;:;:::::::;:;:;:;:::::::l
--------~~------------------------+---------------~~ m:;:·:·>:·l
u
----------~--------------~[m ... ----------~----------------~CJ ... -------1---------------l--..~· ~::.:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:-:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·
12.0 :·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·: s.e
.. :·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·: s.e
----------~-------------------------+-------------------------• .. ~u .. [:!:·:·:·:·:·:!:!:!:!:!:i:!:!:!:i:!:!:!:!:·:·:·:!:!:!:;:::;:!:!:!l
--------~--------------------------~--------------------------+-----------~~ !:·:·:·m:·:l
20
TIME, HRS
30 u
40
FIGURE 9 SUMMARY FAULT TREE - CASE 9
FIRE OR EXPLOSION IN PROCESS
VESSEL VENT SYSTEM (PVVH)
(STANDBY PERIOD) liENZOE ctH;
IN PVYH ABCJ\IE LfJ..
IR
HIGH C02 I'UJV ~DE HEAiU" AND EVA~ATlDN
LOSS 1:1' mUI11ll'l AIR PVVH JU!IIE BENZE
GO£Rjt,TIIJ't.l
INSUmCJENT Fl.ll'O 1:1' DILUTIIJI AIR
lN PVYH
CD-9-Z --r--
SHEET 2
FT-~660 rAILS 1-«~
'-.../ 7.8£-6/H
* DENOTES ENABLING EVENT
** COMMON CAUSE INITIATING EVENT
JNTERLIJCI( 2 INACTIVE PVVH
EXHAUST FLITW LLL
t:E STEM J V/>J.VE FAILS TO a..DSE
... [C-10] [G-5]
22.H 6.2E-~/H 22Jf•
CXYGENMC -.-
1.0 t.o•
IlflERLIJCI( UJOP 11 lNACTIVE <DD, PVYH EXHAUST C6H6 CDNC HHH
DE STEAM VALVE tAILS
Til CLOSE
GVA9301K
6.2E-5/H 22. ...
SHEET 1
wT = 2.3 x 1 o-8/YR
IGNITION SDJRCES PRESENT
DR
PVVH I£A TER IGNITION
SOURCE
THEPVVHI -.-[C-9]
J.LE-6/H 22Jf
INTERLOCK LDDP 12 lNACTIVE (CD PVVH LfJ.. HHH
DE STEAM VALVE tAILS
TD ClllSE
GVA930ll( ---.----
6.2E-5/H 22.10<
PVVH BLDIIER HECHANIC'Il IGNI~ SOURCES
TBL--l ----.--
UE-:5/H
[C-11]
zaH
BENZENE GENERA TIIJN IN DE l:llJRIHG HEATLP
D EVAPDRATIIJN 3/4
DESTEAMD -.-
.tr7
[G-5]
I.Gll
11-29-93 17:17 E: \WSRC\REPT89J\FIGURES\SPCE1
FIGURE 9 (CONT.) SUMMARY FAULT TREE
FIRE OR EXPLOSION IN
VENT SYSTEM (PVVH)
CASE 9
PROCESS VESSEL
(STANDBY PERIOD)
Z03o4 VALVE
REVERS Ell
TVL2Q3.W
LO£-&!H 22.H
[D-7]
INSlFFICIENT f1..D\( IF DIWTIEINAIR 1--------,1
IN PVVH
G9-2-2 --r-
DR
2G:* F'C VALVE
FAILS CLOSED
2..2E-&IH
[D-7]
CD-9-Z
SHEET 1
22.H
* DENOTES ENABLING EVENT
** COMMON CAUSE INITIAllNG EVENT
:5960 F1C
PRSTEAMC --,---
.0'9 1.0 ..
F'AILS HIGH
TCN59(,0Z
2.1E-51H 22.H
[D-10]
[E-3]
INTERLOCK U INACTIV!: <PR> PVVH EXHAUST
C6H6 tH1
CD-9-4 ---.--
lHIS SHEET
!5860 F'IC
SETPDINT Lll\(
TSPSebOU
LOE-5/H ::l3.H
[D-10]
~-1
SHEET 1 AND
!Nlt:RLOCK 1Z INACTIVE <PR> PVVH LEL ~H
CD-9-4 --r-
THIS SHEET
FT-!5860 F'A!LS
HIGH
TSF5960Z u
JNTERI..DCI( e INACTIVE PVVH
EXHAUST LLL
OR
PR STEAM VALVE AND PR STEAM BLOCK 1------.1
'ALVE: F"AILS TO a...DS
PR STEAM Fl.ll\1 'l!UlCK VALVE
F' AILS T1l CLOSE
[E-3]
62E -5/H 3.0I!JOI
PO ~861 SENSOR
REVERSED
TPDSSG!U
AND THIS SHEET
PR STEAM VALVE 1027
F'A!LS TO CLOSE
[E-3] 6ZE-51H ee.H=
PDIC :se61 REVERS Ell
TCNSS61U .. 7.eE-&IH 22.H LOE-&IH 22.H LOE-6/H 22.H
[C-10] [C-9] [C-9]
I
SHEET 2
F'T-5960 FAILS HIGH
TSr.5860Z I •• --.---
7.8E-€./H
[C-10]
22.1-1
I SIC REVERSED
,r
6cu,
L0£-6/H 22.H
[B-11]
11-29-93 17:24 E:\WSRC\REPTB93\nGURES\SPCE2
PR DEFLAGRATION PR HIGH FLOW C02 REQUIRED
INTERLIJCI( UIJ' l
BYPASSED
71T--'-f0 ~
LOI:-3 2.0• 3.0£~ 1.0 ..
RELAY 1'«1-F"AILS TO
OPEN
7RY-HR4D ---..--
3.0E~H 311M11
IIUJCI( VALVE 1100 F"AILS TD
a.oS£
3.0E:-3 LO•
DIFFERENT
FIGURE 10
vAlllJ:lE:- roa.= PPT lfJV-1100 <ALL CAUSES>
7RY-HR4K ---..--
3.01:-(;JH 3.o ...
lNTERLOCK LID' 1
BYPASSED
7IT---1U ---,..-
L0£-3
SHEET 28
LO•
ORIGINAL FAULT TREE AS APPEARED IN THE LATE WASH FTA NOTE: INACnvE INTERLOCK MEANS
FAILURE TO STOP PR FEED
., DENOTES ENABLING EVENT 12-13-93 12:25 E:\WSRC\REPTB93\AGURES\PR28
PR DEFLAGRATION PR HIGH FLOW C02 REQUIRED
INTERLOCK LID' 1
JYPASS£1!
?lf--tu -.-
LIE-3 UIB 3.0£-5 1.0.
~El.AT I'R4 CIJNT ACTS I'" AIL.
TD TRANSI'"ER
7RY4R4D ---.-
3.0[-6/H 3.01411
AND
SHEET 11
DI..DCK VI'L vt 1100 FAILS TD
a.oS£
PV1<1100K -.--
3.111:-3
SAME
LO "
r AlLURE TD O.DSE PI'T ICJV-UOO <ALL CAUSES>
7RY-HR4D ---.-
3.0E-<SIH 3.0100
FIGURE 10 (CONTINUED)
SHEET 28
JNTER!..DCK LID' 1
JYPASSED
7IT---1U -,..--
LOE-3 LD•
REVISED FAULT TREE AS APPEARS IN APPENDIX C OF THIS REPORT
NOTE: INACTNE INTERLOCK NEANS
F"AIWRE TO STOP PR F"EED
• DENOTES ENABLING EVENT 12-13-93 12:30 E: \WSRC\REPT893\FIGURES\PR28A
l--;:;:<. I "" I \...~;;._.../
i't:t I•E·S, MS-.
f(l~~\ IAU9,1 ~L ~-".o \<:':"Ji.,;::: ,,,, • "'
T!):: , .. , \5) . ,. ,. ;~"~ , "" ~-~~-::~.TI-9356 BZ II' x:.:_···~.! Al-4713 ...--... "-. ':,;;:'
~ ~'l.:lL><•t n7 t1 -~. ,,~\ .- ~r "' •
'fS-HHH :@ L--,,,-1 1~:-/1.1 SHHH ~-'"" 1--::--•\,:!.) f -~~ '''"' ~---l ~ I ' ''....J) ..... ---.... .. M7 ~1-..-~i ~ '~:.:/ A::P1" ~-"'
L \ ":\._"::J •',,,I V•n' / .·: ~~\, - ---- :: .: ' CJ 'c. '~--~' ':\ l,,,v.} "-,,, ,,t NC l•g;::B [ J·'•~l ~~-- F _ _.JGJ:il, \ ~;· ..,:_, · ., '---"".... •;r·.r 111\i'' t..i.;, n-:o ..,.~-~ 1..- .,_ ''"/;.\
\ -~ - \ ~~-...!.~~./ ~I. t•j t y l"~ // 7'·1· ' \ '- _;:_ '~ I ~- t-27:" ,,r-••' .--!...{ / ,/ /- I Q
\ \ (I,;.:;. \...r..::. __ ./ -·-~A"t-t•fl-9277 ' 1~: ''• / _/ / G D
/~-:'\, ] t><.tr l
o_ .... ~/
"'' ·- - "'71- I -,-- ' / --,.~--., -.,_~- _.:..;;.•' .~5-HHH ~ / .--!----:· .· /·: Al-3407
'"" ~ . ::');:l<("~" .. :"\ . ··:~: ":V ~ "'!/' I"''" i •' "'-0, J ·~- '~'•'PR 1., •, ' ''" \_ I, l' _., i\ 1 \...:~...-· t.-... -r.~_.J
111 /.1' PRESSURE "''IJ/ir'1..i~:i\"\.. '1.--......_ \l I //
• ll' \....!_ l.. ~ \ \ r.' I ! -, \ --:0 .~. CONTROL. ~., PT-104-i' "' ~';· 1/\1 // I i .. ;:- 01 ~, LOOP .. ~"l ~ .... I'-- .... - / •~--· -- -i c»J • ~·~~,Yc._ '• ' ,,P.SrHHH ""- i ~~ / I ,/ '-~__) " __,.,......---_F. ~II J- ~ ...... ~ [;oo ---;~::~..' ••• , \ ... '-1-~i"' ""' I / )/ I /
.-. II \ , __ _::
1• @::"1·------:-c.,.~J "- 1 / / \ ,/
I ' "->=•I \'-,_ -_, "-- ~ ""' I ' I / \ ~ •• •.l"T \~ ----. ·-::-., "' \ / / -~\
I I '· .. _ • "' ' .. / ' I ' I - ... ..._____ ~-- -- --..___~.......__'L ,. \ / I'- :~v L::~~ -------------?f?BLO ,I( v.A:~VE I ,.'/ -----, <~·.-m:l1 1 ,~~;~... .r _.....-·---"'~!;;' // 1 \ sv- ~9\ 1 _..i
f .... i;:~ ~~~- ll l.CCP / ~ ~--~~~ll:J // ! \ \ •' ~- \ • •' ('-'" I " / _./ I \ \ I -~ \"-"· ! !'" / A ---- \ '--..\ I[ / FLOW _ ':;. / / />;- ;~;';';, 11 ----\:--~-- ~ i
'"""-----.J.. ,// 1 ~- ----=-""·r) CONTROL t.t.~l-Oq--:.,~- ~~l 1 J..$.,0..-;f."__;·./ _________ ,---- '\ ---------_rrL,: -'~" /?1 ]-~)V '0'' 1m ____ .--~
11 -------- 1 \ VALVE
r,--t, 1 ,._, 1 n~.---- --- \ I
·~~· (-;:;;;;.. .. Hi 4~ + _____ ...... / __ .... '!__:~:~~:;!}..----- -~~ t _..
TOP NODE FIRE/EXPLOSION
~~}--;7~~:~--J2~>' ' '
PWH BASELOAD RATE CONTROL
LOOP
:: -~·
f ·" \ "-.:.:'-~-· '\ ' ~/'-_:--=- ~~------ I 'F\.CV-1107
\ , .• ,L,~ •r-'}0 --- :!• "' '/ '--<------:-.;::~ ~-~ /I' ·~~~.;,
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FT-1107 FS-HHH
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Fig .. 11 -- Digraph for the Process Vessel Vent System