REM - Digests - Rule 117-127.doc

7/27/2019 REM - Digests - Rule 117-127.doc

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C R I M I N A L P R O C E D U R E | 1

TEST OF IDENTITY OF OFFENSES

People v. Doriquez

FACTS:

Appellant Romeo Doriquez was charged with the offense of grave oral

defamation before the CFI of Iloilo

Six days later, he was indicted before the same court for discharge of

firearm

Upon arraignment, he pleaded not guilty to the two indictments

He moved to dismiss both informations

o One of his contentions is that the institution of criminal

action for discharge of firearm places him in double

jeopardy for he had already been in jeopardy once in the

municipal court of Batad, Iloilo which dismissed, without his

consent, the information charging him with the offense of

alarm and scandal based on the same facts.

The court denied the motion to dismiss

MR was also denied

Hence, this appeal

ISSUE: WON the said appellant was placed in double jeopardy by chargingthe offense of discharge of firearm.

HELD:

For double jeopardy to attach in his favor, the accused must prove, among

other things, that there is "identity of offenses," so that, in the language ofsection 9, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Court, his "conviction or

acquittal ... or the dismissal of the case (without his express consent)shall be a bar to another prosecution for the same offense charged orfor any attempt to, commit the same or frustration thereof, or for anyoffense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in theoffense charged in the former complaint or information." It is altogetherevident, however, that the offense of discharge of firearm is not the crime of

alarm and scandal, nor is it an attempt or a frustration of the latter felony.

Neither may it be asserted that every crime of discharge of firearm

produces the offense of alarm and scandal. Nor could the reverse situation

be true, for the less grave felony of discharge of firearm does not include or

subsume the offense of alarm and scandal which is a light felony.

Although the indictment for alarm and scandal filed under article155(1) of the Revised Penal Code and the information for discharge offirearm instituted under article 258 of the same Code are closelyrelated in fact (as the two apparently arose from the same factualsetting, the firing of a revolver by the accused being a commonelement), they are definitely diverse in law. Firstly, the two indictmentsdo not describe the same felony - alarm and scandal is an offenseagainst public order while discharge of firearm is a crime againstpersons. Secondly, the indispensable element of the former crime isthe discharge of a firearm calculated to cause alarm or danger to thepublic, while the gravamen of the latter is the discharge of a firearmagainst or at a certain person, without intent to kill.

It is a cardinal rule that the protection against double jeopardy may be

invoked only for the same offense11 or identical offense. A single act mayoffend against two (or more) entirely distinct and unrelated provisionsof law, and if one provision requires proof of an additional fact orelement which the other does not, an acquittal or conviction or a

dismissal of the information under one does not bar prosecutionunder the other.

ACCORDINGLY, the present appeal is dismissed.

DEPOSITION IN CRIMINAL CASES

[G.R. No. 108229. August 24, 1993.]DASMARIAS GARMENTS, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. RUBEN T.REYES, Judge, Regional Trial Court, Manila, Branch 50, and

AMERICAN PRESIDENT LINES, LTD., respondents.

DOCTRINE:

Depositions are chiefly a mode of discovery. They are intended as a meansto compel disclosure of facts resting in the knowledge of a party or otherperson which are relevant in some suit or proceeding in court. Depositionsand the other modes of discovery (interrogatories to parties; requests foadmission by adverse party; production or inspection of documents othings; physical and mental examination of persons) are meant to enable aparty to learn all the material and relevant facts, not only known to him andhis witnesses but also those known to the adverse party and the latter'sown witnesses. In fine, the object of discovery is to make it possible for allthe parties to a case to learn all the material and relevant facts, fromwhoever may have knowledge thereof, to the end that their pleadings or

motions may not suffer from inadequacy of factual foundation, and all therelevant facts may be clearly and completely laid before the Court, withoutomission or suppression.

FACTS:

Sometime in September, 1987 the American President Lines, Ltd. (APLsued Dasmarias Garments, Inc. to recover the sum of US $53,228.45 aswell as an amount equivalent to twenty-five percent (25%) thereof asattorney's fees and litigation expenses.

In its answer dated December 1, 1987, Dasmarias specifically denied anyliability to the plaintiff , and set up compulsory counterclaims against it.

The case was in due course scheduled for trial and on that that date APLpresented its first witness. The case was reset for reception of thetestimony of two (2) more witnesses in APL's behalf.

At the hearing, instead of presenting its witnesses, APL filed a motionpraying that it intended to take the depositions of H. Lee and Yeong FangYeh in Taipei, Taiwan, and prayed that for this purpose, a "commission orletters rogatory be issued addressed to the consul, vice-consul or consulaagent of the Republic of the Philippines in Taipei . . ."

Five (5) days later APL filed an amended motion stating that since thePhilippine Government has no consulate office in Taiwan in view of its "one-China policy," there being in lieu thereof an office set up by the President"presently occupied by Director Joaquin Roces which is the AsianExchange Center, Inc.," it was necessary and it therefore prayed "thatcommission or letters rogatory be issued addressed to Director JoaquinRoces, Executive Director, Asian Executive Exchange Center, Inc., Room901, 112 Chunghsiao, E. Road, Section 1, Taipei, Republic of China, tohear and take the oral deposition of the a forenamed persons . . ."

The motion was opposed by Dasmarias.

Trial Court resolved the incident in favor of APL. The court opined that "theAsian Exchange Center, Inc, being the authorized Philippine representativein Taiwan, may take the testimonies of plaintiff's witnesses residing there bydeposition, but only upon written interrogatories so as to give defendant theopportunity to cross-examine the witnesses by serving crossinterrogatories."

Dasmarias sought reconsideration by motion filed June 25, 1991 on thefollowing grounds:

1. authority of the Asian Exchange Center, Inc. (AECI) to takedepositions has not been established, it not being one of thoseso authorized by the Rules of Court to take depositions in aforeign state;

2. AECI's articles of incorporation show that it is not vested withany such authority;


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3. to permit deposition-taking by commission without the authorityof the foreign state in which deposition is taken constitutesinfringement of judicial sovereignty; and

4. depositions by written interrogatories have inherent limitationsand are not suitable to matters dependent on the credibility ofwitnesses; oral testimony in open court remains the "`mostsatisfactory method of investigation of facts'" and "`affords thegreatest protection to the rights and liberties of citizens.'"

MR was denied because "filed out of time" and being a mere rehash ofarguments already passed upon.Dasmarias instituted a special civil action of certiorari in the CA to nullifythe orders of the Trial Court.

CA restrained enforcement of the orders of March 15, 1991 and July 5,1991 "in order to maintain the status quo and to prevent the infliction ofirreparable damage and injury upon the petitioner."After due proceedings, CA rendered judgment on Dasmarias' petition forcertiorari and upholding the challenged orders of the Trial Court.

MR denied. Hnce the petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a party could present its evidence by taking the deposition

of its witness in a foreign jurisdiction before a private entity.

HELD: YES

Depositions are principally made available by law to the parties as a meansof informing themselves of all the relevant facts; they are no thereforegenerally meant to be a substitute for the actual testimony in open court ofa party or witness. The deponent must as a rule be presented for oralexamination in open court at the tr ial or hearing. This is a requirement of therules of evidence. Section 1, Rule 132 of the

Indeed, any deposition offered to prove the facts therein set out during atrial or hearing, in lieu of the actual oral testimony of the deponent in opencourt, may be opposed and excluded on the ground that it is hearsay: theparty against whom it is offered has no opportunity to cross-examine thedeponent at the time that his testimony is offered. It matters not thatopportunity for cross-examination was afforded during the taking of thedeposition; for normally, the opportunity for cross-examination must be

accorded a party at the time that the testimonial evidence is actuallypresented against him during the trial or hearing.

It is apparent then that the deposition of any person may be taken whereverhe may be, in the Philippines or abroad. If the party or witness is in thePhilippines, his deposition "shall be taken before any judge, municipal ornotary public" (Sec. 10, Rule 24, Rules of Court). If in a foreign state orcountry, the deposition "shall be taken: (a) on notice before a secretary orembassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agentof the Republic of the Philippines, or (b) before such person or officer asmay be appointed by commission or under letters rogatory" (Sec. 11, Rule24).

Leave of court is not necessary where the deposition is to be taken before"a secretary or embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul, orconsular agent of the Republic of the Philippines," and the defendant'sanswer has already been served (Sec. 1, Rule 24). After answer, whetherthe deposition-taking is to be accomplished within the Philippines oroutside, the law does not authorize or contemplate any intervention by thecourt in the process, all that is required being that "reasonable notice" begiven "in writing to every other party to the action . . (stating) the time andplace for taking the deposition and the name and address of each person tobe examined, if known, and if the name is not known, a general descriptionsufficient to identify him or the particular class or group to which hebelongs . . . "(Sec. 15, Rule 24). The court intervenes in the process only ifa party moves (1) to "enlarge or shorten the time" stated in the notice (id.),or (2) "upon notice and for good cause shown," to prevent the deposition-taking, or impose conditions therefor, e.g., that "certain matters shall not beinquired into" or that the taking be "held with no one present except theparties to the action and their officers or counsel," etc. (Sec. 16, Rule 24), or(3) to terminate the process on motion and upon a showing that "it is beingconducted in bad faith or in such manner as unreasonably to annoy,embarrass, or oppress the deponent or party" (Sec 18, Rule 24).

Where the deposition is to be taken in a foreign country where thePhilippines has no "secretary or embassy or legation, consul generalconsul, vice-consul, or consular agent," then obviously it may be taken only"before such person or officer as may be appointed by commission or undeletters rogatory. (Section 12, Rule 24)

Letters rogatory, on the other hand, may be defined as "(a)n instrument senin the name and by the authority of a judge or court to another, requestingthe latter to cause to be examined, upon interrogatories filed in a causepending before the former, a witness who is within the jurisdiction of thejudge or court to whom such letters are addressed". Section 12, Rule 24just quoted states that a commission is addressed to "officers . . designated . . . either by name or descriptive title," while letters rogatory areaddressed to some "appropriate judicial authority in the foreign state.Noteworthy in this connection is the indication in the Rules that lettersrogatory may be applied for and issued only after a commission has been"returned unexecuted," as is apparent from Form 21 of the "JudiciaStandard Forms" appended to the Rules of Court, which requires theinclusion in a "petition for letters rogatory" of the following paragraph, viz.:

It further appears that the commission is to be coursed through theDepartment of Foreign Affairs conformably with Circular No. 4 issued byChief Justice Claudio Teehankee on April 6, 1987, pursuant to thesuggestion of the Department of Foreign Affairs - directing "ALL JUDGESOF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTSMUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS IN CITIES, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS AND

MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS" "to course all requests for thetaking of deposition of witnesses residing abroad through the Department oForeign Affairs" to enable it and "the Philippine Foreign Serviceestablishments to act on the matter in a judicious and expeditious manner;"this, "in the interest of justice", and to avoid delay in the deposition-taking.

Petitioner would however prevent the carrying out of the commission onvarious grounds:

1. The first is that the deposition-taking will take place in "a foreignjurisdiction not recognized by the Philippines in view of its 'one-Chinapolicy.'" This is inconsequential. What matters is that the deposition is takenbefore a Philippine official acting by authority of the Philippine Departmentof Foreign Affairs and in virtue of a commission duly issued by thePhilippine Court in which the action is pending, and in accordancemoreover, with the provisions of the Philippine Rules of Court pursuant towhich opportunity for cross-examination of the deponent will be fullyaccorded to the adverse party.

2. Dasmarias also contends that the "taking of deposition is a mode opretrial discovery to be availed of before the action comes to trial." Not so.Depositions may be taken at any time after the institution of any actionwhenever necessary or convenient. There is no rule that limits deposition-taking only to the period of pre-trial or before it; no prohibition against thetaking of depositions after pre-trial. Indeed, the law authorizes the taking ofdepositions of witnesses before or after an appeal is taken from thejudgment of a Regional Trial Court "to perpetuate their testimony for use inthe event of further proceedings in the said court" (Rule 134, Rules oCourt), and even during the process of execution of a final and executoryjudgment (East Asiatic Co. v. C.I.R., 40 SCRA 521, 544).

3. Dasmarias further claims that the taking of deposition under thecircumstances is a "departure from the accepted and usual judiciaproceedings of examining witnesses in open court where their demeanocould be observed by the trial judge;" that it is "inherently unfair" to allowAPL, "a foreign entity suing in the Philippines, to present its evidence bymere deposition of its witnesses away from the 'penetrating scrutiny' of thetrial Judge while petitioner is obligated to bring and present its witnesses inopen court subject to the prying eyes and probing questions of the Judge."

Of course the deposition-taking in the case at bar is a "departure from theaccepted and usual judicial proceedings of examining witnesses in opencourt where their demeanor could be observed by the trial judge;" but theprocedure is not on that account rendered illegal nor is the depositionthereby taken, inadmissible. It precisely falls within one of the exceptionswhere the law permits such a situation, i.e., the use of a deposition in lieu ofthe actual appearance and testimony of the deponent in open court andwithout being "subject to the prying eyes and probing questions of theJudge." This is allowed provided the deposition is taken in accordance withthe applicable provisions of the Rules of Court and the existence of any ofthe exceptions for its admissibility e.g., "that the witness is out of theprovince and at a greater distance than fifty (50) kilometers from the place


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of trial or hearing, or is out of the Philippines, unless it appears that hisabsence was procured by the party offering the deposition; or . . . that thewitness is unable to attend to testify because of age, sickness, infirmity, orimprisonment, etc." (Sec. 4, Rule 24, supra, italics supplied) is firstsatisfactorily established (See Lopez v. Maceren, 95 Phil. 754). cdll

The Regional Trial Court saw fit to permit the taking of the depositions ofthe witnesses in question only by written interrogatories, removing theproponent's option to take them by oral examination, i.e., by going to Taipeiand actually questioning the witnesses verbally with the questions andanswers and observations of the parties being recorded stenographically.The imposition of such a limitation, and the determination of the causethereof, are to be sure within the Court's discretion. The ostensible reasongiven by the Trial Court for the condition that the depositions be taken"only upon written interrogatories" is "so as to give defendant(Dasmarias) the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses by servingcross-interrogatories." The statement implies that opportunity to cross-examine will not be accorded the defendant if the depositions were to betaken upon oral examination, which, of course, is not true. For even if thedepositions were to be taken on oral examination in Taipei, the adverseparty is still accorded full right to cross-examine the deponents by the law,either by proceeding to Taipei and there conducting the cross-examinationorally, or opting to conduct said cross-examination merely by serving cross-interrogatories.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the petition forreview on certiorari. Costs against petitioner.

DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE

RENE S. ONG, MAGDALENO B. ALBARRACIN, JR., PETRONIO C.AALIWIN and J. O. NERIT, petitioners, vs. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

SYLLABUS:

REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE;REMEDY IN CASE OF DENIAL THEREOF; EXCEPTION. Indeed, the

rule generally prevailing is that "certiorari does not lie to review a trial

court's interlocutory order denying a motion to dismiss (or to acquit), which

is equivalent to a demurrer to evidence, filed after the prosecution had

presented its evidence and rested its case. An order denying a demurrer toevidence is interlocutory. It is not appealable. Neither can it be the subject

of a petition for certiorari (Tadeo v. People, 300 SCRA 744 [1998])."

However, Tadeo itself states that "[f]rom such denial (of the demurrer to

evidence), appeal in due time is the proper remedy, not certiorari, in the

absence of grave abuse of discretion or excess of jurisdiction, or an

oppressive exercise of judicial authority." Consequently, if the denial of the

demurrer to evidence is attended by grave abuse of discretion, the denial

may be assailed through a petition for certiorari.

FACTS:

Zeny Alfonso purchased a paper bag-making machine from the Solid

Cement Corporation. When she went to the corporation's Antipolo

plant, however, no machine could be given to her, it appearing that

the machine sold had been earlier mortgaged to a creditor, who,unfortunately, refused to release the mortgage. Herein petitioners

offered to return the money paid by Mrs. Alfonso but she refused and

instead filed a criminal complaint with the City Prosecutor of Makati.

An Information for estafa and other deceit based on Article 318 of the

Revised Penal Code was filed with the MeTC. After pre-trial, the

prosecution presented as its sole witness complainant Zeny Alfonso.

The prosecution then formally offered its documentary evidence and

rested its case. The admissibility of these documents was questioned

by petitioners.

Petitioners filed a motion for leave to file demurrer to evidence,

attaching thereto their demurrer. In their pleading, petitioners stressed

that all the documents being uncertified photocopies bearing

unidentified or unauthenticated signatures are inadmissible in

evidence.

The MeTC denied the Demurrer to Evidence. The Court noted from

the documentary evidence on record that the machine subject of the

transaction between the complainant and the accused is mortgaged to

another creditor, who, incidentally, refused to release the mortgage on

said subject machine. Indeed, this strongly suggests the existence oa prima facie case that would warrant a trial on the merits.

On certiorari, the RTC granted the Demurrer to Evidence and ordered

the MeTC to dismiss the case. The CA, however, set aside the RTC

decision, and ruled that after denial of their demurrer to evidence

petitioners should have filed an appeal to the RTC.

ISSUE: W/N the MeTC committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied

their demurrer to evidence?

HELD: YES, the Supreme Court held that given the paucity of evidence

against petitioners, it was grave abuse of discretion for the trial court to

deny petitioners' demurrer to evidence. There was no competent and

sufficient evidence to sustain the indictment.

The present case presents one such exception warranting the resort to the

remedy of certiorari, the trial court judge having committed grave abuse o

discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying petitioners

demurrer to evidence. A demurrer to evidence is an objection by one of the

parties in an action, to the effect that the evidence which his adversary

produced is insufficient in point of law, whether true or not, to make out a

case or sustain the issue. The party demurring challenges the sufficiency of

the whole evidence to sustain a verdict. The court, in passing upon the

sufficiency of the evidence raised in a demurrer, is merely required to

ascertain whether there is competent or sufficient evidence to sustain the

indictment or to support a verdict of guilt.

In the instant case, there is no competent and sufficient evidence to sustain

the indictment or to support a verdict of guilt against petitioners. As pointedout by petitioners, all documentary evidence submitted by the privatecomplainant were uncertified photocopies of certain documents, thesignatures on which were either unidentified or unauthenticated. Beingprivate instruments, their due and valid execution and their genuinenessand authenticity must first be established, either by the testimony of anyone who saw the writing executed or by evidence of the genuineness of thehandwriting of the maker hereof. A painstaking perusal of the testimony ofthe prosecution's sole witness reveals, however, that the due execution andauthenticity of these documents were never proved. In fact, the prosecutiontook no effort to prove the due execution and authenticity of thesedocuments during the presentation of their sole witness. Absent such proof,these documents are incompetent as evidence. . . . Thus . . ., beingincompetent evidence, the only evidence the prosecution could rely on toprove petitioners' guilt would be the sole testimony of the privatecomplainant. Unsupported by any other evidence, said testimony isinsufficient to sustain a finding of culpability.

JUDGMENT

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,vs.

MARILYN RAFAEL VILLAMAR, accused-appellant.

FACTS:

Villamar and Cortez agreed that the formers baby will be adopted by the

latter. Pursuant to their agreement, Cortez executed a Sinampaang

Salaysay. However, Villamar had a change of heart and she no longe

wanted to have her baby adopted. Villamar went to Cortezs house to ge

the baby and to destroy the Sinumpaang Salaysay.Cortez refused so


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Villamar became angry and a fight ensued between the two. Cortez

suffered various lacerated wounds on the head.

An information for illegal detention and frustrated murder was filed against

Villamar. The trial court convicted Villamar for serious illegal detention and

less serious physical injuries, but at the same time acquitted her on the

charge of frustrated murder. Hence this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused may be held liable for grave coercionalthough the information charges her of the crime of illegal detention?

HELD: Yes.

While Villamar did compel Cortez to do something against the latter's will, itmust be stressed that the same cannot be categorized as an act of illegaldetention. Still, when Villamar was erroneously charged for illegaldetention, such oversight will not preclude a guilty verdict for thecrime of grave coercion. In the early case of U.S. v. Quevengco, and,recently, in People v. Astorga, we ruled that the offense of grave coercionis necessarily included in illegal detention; as such, an information forillegal detention will not bar the accused from being convicted ofgrave coercion, instead of the original charge.

Villamar is not liable for illegal detention because she had no intentionto kidnap or deprive Cortez of her personal liberty.

The actuations of Villamar appear to be more of a product of a mother'sdesperation and distraught mind when her plea for the return of her childwas refused by Cortez, unmindful of the consequences which her recklessoutburst would cause to the latter. In a celebrated case, this Court rejectedthe kidnapping charge where there was not the slightest hint of a motive forthe crime. Under the law, as presently worded, it is essential that thekidnapping or detention was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom.In the instant case, there is no showing whatsoever that Villamar wanted toextort money from Cortez prior to their confrontation.

The elements of kidnapping and serious illegal detention under Article 267of the RPC are: (a) the offender is a private individual, (b) kidnaps ordetains another that will deprive the victim of his liberty, (c) the act of

detention is illegal and (d) in the commission of the offense any of thefollowing circumstances are present the detention lasts for more thanfive (5) days; it is committed by simulating a public authority, seriousphysical injuries are inflicted or threats to kill are made and the personkidnapped is a minor, female or public officer. It is important that indubitableproof be presented that the actual intent of the malefactor was to deprivethe offended party of his/her liberty, and not when such restraint of libertywas merely an incident in the commission of another offense primarilyintended by the offender.

The crime of grave coercion has three elements: (a) that any person isprevented by another from doing something not prohibited by law, orcompelled to do something against his or her will, be it right or wrong; (b)that the prevention or compulsion is effected by violence, either by materialforce or such a display of it as would produce intimidation and,consequently, control over the will of the offended party; and (c) that theperson who restrains the will and liberty of another has no right to do so; in

other words, that the restraint is not made under authority of law or in theexercise of any lawful right.

NEW TRIAL OR RECONSIDERATION

G.R. No. L-52728 January 17, 1990

AVELINO C. AGULTO, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON.FRANCISCO Z. CONSOLACION, Presiding Judge of Branch II of the

Court of First Instance of Davao; and the PEOPLE OF THEPHILIPPINES, respondents.

FACTS:

An INFORMATION for bigamy was filed against the petitioner AvelinoC. Agulto: That on or about December 30, 1968, x x x the accused,

having been previously united in lawful marriage with Maria PilaGaspar, which marriage is still in force and subsisting and withouhaving been legally dissolved, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniouslycontracted a second marriage with Andrea Suico.

After the trial was finished and the parties had rested, but before

judgment was promulgated, the accused filed a MOTION TOREOPEN THE TRIAL on the ground of newly discovered evidence, acopy of a marriage contract between Andrea Suico and Romeo

Vergeire contracted on July 19, 1960, before Andrea's marriage to thepetitioner.

The COURT denied the motion: It was filed too late because theaccused, with due diligence, could have discovered the so-callednewly-discovered evidence sooner and could have presented it duringthe trial, it appearing that he was appraised of the alleged marriage ofAndrea Suico and Romeo Vergeire on October 17, 1972.

Petitioner's MR was denied. He filed a petition forcertiorariin the CA.

PETITIONER: The evidence was not available to petitioner at the timeof the presentation of his evidence but only after the parties hadrested their case.

RESPONDENTS: The alleged newly discovered evidence does nobear the seal of the justice of the peace who solemnized the marriageMoreover, the document does not indicate the municipality and theprovince where the municipal court is located. The xerox copy of thealleged marriage contract is not properly certified and authenticatedand on its face, it appears that the marriage was celebrated without amarriage license.

CA denied the petition forcertiorarifor lack of merit. Hence, thipetition for review.

ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals and the trial court gravely abusedtheir discretion in refusing to reopen the trial NO

HELD:

A distinction should be made between a Motion for New Trial and a

Motion to Reopen Trial.

MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL:o May be filed afterjudgment but within the period fo

perfecting an appeal (1, Rule 37)o In civil or criminal actions, it may be applied for and granted

only upon specific, well-defined grounds set forthrespectively in Rules 37 (1) and 121 (2).

MOTION TO REOPEN TRIAL:o There is no specific provision in the Rules of Court for

motions to reopen trial. However, it is a recognizedprocedural recourse or devise, deriving validity andacceptance from long established usage. The reopening oa case for the reception of further evidence beforejudgment is not the granting of a new trial

o May be presented only aftereither or both parties haveformally offered and closed their evidence, but beforejudgment.

o The reopening of a case for the reception of additiona

evidence after a case has been submitted for decision bubefore judgment is actually rendered is controlled by noother rule than that of theparamount interests ojustice , resting entirely in the sound judicial discretionof a Trial Court; and its concession or denial, by saidCourt in the exercise of that discretion will not be reviewedon appeal, unless a clear abuse thereof is shown.

Petitioner's motion to reopen the trial on the ground of newlydiscovered evidence was not supported by evidence that marriagewas still existing when Andrea Suico wed the petitioner.

Considering the defects of the xerox copied document which theaccused Agulto claims to be his "newly-discovered evidence," the triacourt's order denying his motion to reopen the trial was properlysustained by the CA.

PERIOD TO APPEAL

G.R. No. 170979 February 9, 2011JUDITH YU, Petitioner, vs. HON. ROSA SAMSON-TATAD and the

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

FACTS:


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Based on the complaint of Spouses Sergio and Cristina Casaclang,an INFORMATION for estafa against the petitioner was filed with theRTC.

The RTC convicted the petitioner and it imposed the penalty of 3months of imprisonment, a fine of P3.8M and the payment of anindemnity to the Spouses Casaclang in the same amount as the fine.

14 days later, the petitioner filed a motion for new trial with the

RTC, alleging that she discovered new and material evidence thatwould exculpate her of the crime for which she was convicted, butthe Respondent Judge denied the motion.

Petitioner filed a notice of appeal with the RTC , alleging that

pursuant to our ruling in Neypes v. CA, she had a "fresh period" of15 days from 11/3/2005, the receipt of the denial of her motion fornew trial, or up to 11/18/2005, within which to file a notice of appeal.

The respondent Judge ordered the petitioner to submit a copy of

Neypes for his guidance.

The prosecution filed a MTDF the appeal for being filed 10 days late,arguing that Neypes is inapplicable to appeals in cr iminal cases.

The prosecution filed a motion for execution of the decision. The RTC

considered the twin motions submitted for resolution.

Consequently, the petitioner filed the present petition for prohibitionwith prayer for the issuance of a TRO and a writ of preliminaryinjunction to enjoin the RTC from acting on the prosecutions motions

to dismiss the appeal and for the execution of the decision. PETITIONER: The RTC lost jurisdiction to act on the prosecutions

motions when she filed her notice of appeal within the 15-dayreglementary period, applying the "fresh period rule" enunciated inNeypes.

OSG: Neypes applies to criminal actions since the evident intention ofthe "fresh period rule" was to set a uniform appeal period provided inthe Rules.

SPOUSES: Petitioner cannot seek refuge in Neypes to extend the"fresh period rule" to criminal cases because Neypes involved a civilcase, and the pronouncement of "standardization of the appealperiods in the Rules" referred to the interpretation of the appealperiods in civil cases; nowhere in Neypes was the period to appeal incriminal cases, 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of CriminalProcedure, mentioned.

ISSUE: Whether the "fresh period rule" enunciated in Neypes applies toappeals in criminal cases YES

HELD:

The right to appeal is not a constitutional, natural or inherent right itis a statutory privilege and of statutory origin and, therefore, availableonly if granted or as provided by statutes. It may be exercised only inthe manner prescribed by the provisions of the law. The PERIOD TOAPPEAL is specifically governed by 39 of BP 129, 3 of Rule 41 ofthe 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and 6 of Rule 122 of the RevisedRules of Criminal Procedure.

In Neypes, the Court modified the rule in civil cases on the counting of

the 15-day period within which to appeal. The Court set a freshperiod of 15 days from a denial of a motion for reconsiderationwithin which to appeal, thus: The "FRESH PERIOD RULE" shallalso apply to RULE 40 governing appeals from the MTC to the RTC;RULE 42 on petitions for review from the RTC to the CA; RULE 43 on

appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the CA and RULE 45governing appeals by certiorari to the SC.

It is the denial of the motion for reconsideration that constituted thefinal order which finally disposed of the issues involved in the case.The 15-day period is counted from receipt of the order dismissing amotion for new trial or motion for reconsideration or any final order orresolution.

While Neypes involved the period to appeal in civil cases, the Courtspronouncement of a "fresh period" to appeal should equally apply tothe period for appeal in criminal cases under 6 of Rule 122 of theRevised Rules of Criminal Procedure, for the following reasons:

(1) BP 129 makes no distinction between the periods to appeal in acivil case and in a criminal case. 39 of BP 129 states that "theperiod for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards,judgments, or decisions of any court in all cases shall be 15

days counted from the notice of the final order, resolutionaward, judgment, or decision appealed from."

(2) The provisions of 3 of Rule 41 and 6 of Rule 122, thoughdifferently worded, mean exactly the same. There is nosubstantial difference between the two provisions insofar aslegal results are concerned the appeal period stops runningupon the filing of a motion for new trial or reconsiderationand starts to run again upon receipt of the order denying

said motion for new trial or reconsideration. It was this

situation that Neypes addressed in civil cases. No reason existswhy this situation in criminal cases cannot be similarlyaddressed.

(3) While the Court did not consider in Neypes the ordinary appeaperiod in criminal cases under 6, Rule 122 since it involved apurely civil case, it did include Rule 42 on petitions for reviewfrom the RTCs to CA and Rule 45 governing appeals bycertiorari to this Court, both of which also apply to appeals incriminal cases, as provided by 3 of Rule 122 of the RevisedRules of Criminal Procedure.

If the modes of appeal to the CA (in cases where the RTC exercisedits appellate jurisdiction) and to this Court in civil and criminal casesare the same, no cogent reason exists why the periods to appeal fromthe RTC (in the exercise of its original jurisdiction) to the CA in civiand criminal cases under 3 of Rule 41 and 6 of Rule 122 of theshould be treated differently.

It would be an absurd situation because a litigant in a civil case wil

have a better right to appeal than an accused in a criminal case asituation that gives undue favor to civil litigants and unjustlydiscriminates against the accused-appellants. It suggests a doublestandard of treatment when we favor a situation where propertyinterests are at stake, as against a situation where liberty stands to beprejudiced.

We hold that the petitioner seasonably filed her notice of appeal onNovember 16, 2005, within the fresh period of 15 days, counted fromNovember 3, 2005, the date of receipt of notice denying her motion fonew trial.

WHEREFORE, the petition for prohibit ion is hereby GRANTEDRespondent Judge Rosa Samson-Tatad isDIRECTED to CEASE and DESIST from further exercising jurisdiction ovethe prosecutions motions to dismiss appeal and for execution of thedecision.

EFFECT OF APPEAL TO NON-APPELLANTS

SALVATIERRA v. CA

FACTS:

An information for homicide was filed against the petitioners

Upon arraignment, all the accused pleaded not guilty

Two eyewitnesses were presented by the prosecution pointing toLuis Alina as the one who actually stabbed the victim while the otheaccused did not do anything

Accused Asuncion, Ramirez and Salvatierra filed separate

motions to dismiss/demurrer to evidence for the alleged failure of theprosecution to show that there were conspiracy with Alina in killing thevictim

TC did not resolve the motion and found all the accused guilty

Accused Alina, Asuncion and Salvatierra appealedo The CA stressed that under Sec. 1 of Rule 122 of

Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure the accused Ramirezand Ignacio who did not appeal from the decision of TC wilnot be affected by the judgment of the appellate courexcept insofar as it is favorable to them.

o However, CA affirmed the TC decision withmodifications with respect to the penalty

Petitioners Salvatierra. Asuncion and Ramirez filed a petition fo

review on the principal contention that the conspiracy was not proven.

ISSUE: WON THE OTHER ACCUSED WHO DID NOT APPEAL SHOULDBE AFFECTED BY THE DECISION.

HELD: The petition is impressed with merit.


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Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreementconcerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it

To our mind, the strict requirement that conspiracy must be proved by

evidence beyond reasonable doubt was not satisfied by the prosecution.

Nowhere in the prosecutions evidence was it shown that the defendants

acted in concert towards a common criminal purpose to kill Rolando

Samonte. There is no evidence on record to show that the other fouraccused knew of Alinas intent to kill the victim nor that they were present at

the scene intentionally to render physical or moral support to insure Alinas

success in killing Rolando Samonte.

Rule 122, section 11 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure states that anappeal taken by one or more of several accused shall not affect thosewho did not appeal except insofar as the judgment of the appellatecourt is favorable and applicable to the latter. In the case before us,accused Jun Ignacio and Manuel Ramirez, although they did notappeal from the decision of the trial court, are likewise acquitted of thecrime charged for the reason that the findings of this Court withregard to the absence of conspiracy among the accused and thatAlina acted on his own are similarly applicable to them. This Courtaffirms the finding of the appellate court that Alina is guilty of thecrime charged. Alina, who did not appeal from the decision of the

appellate court, is accordingly bound thereby.

RULE 126: SEARCH AND SEIZURE

[A.M. No. RTJ-93-964. February 28, 1996]

LEOVIGILDO U. MANTARING, complainant, vs. JUDGE MANUEL A.ROMAN, JR., RTC, Branch 42, Pinamalayan, OrientalMindoro; and JUDGE IRENEO B. MOLATO, MTC, Bongabon,Oriental Mindoro, respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; NEW TRIAL; REMEDY AVAILABLE TO PARTIESDENIED OF A FAIR AND IMPARTIAL TRIAL. - There is a remedyavailable to the party seeking the disqualification of the judge. If heis denied a fair and impartial trial, caused by the judges bias or

prejudice, he can ask for a new trial in the interest of justicewhich will be granted if that is really the case .

2. ID.; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; SEARCH WARRANT; WARRANT OFARREST; BASIS FOR ISSUANCE. - The issuance of a searchwarrant and of a warrant of arrest requires the showing ofprobabilities as to different facts. In the case of SEARCHWARRANTS, the determination is based on the finding that (1) thearticles to be seized are connected to a criminal activity and (2) theyare found in the place to be searched. It is not necessary that aparticular person be implicated. On the other hand, in arrest cases,the determination of probable cause is based on a finding that acrime has been committed and that the person to be arrested hascommitted it.

3. ID.; ID.; WARRANT OF ARREST; REQUIREMENTS FORISSUANCE. - It is now settled that in issuing WARRANTS OFARREST in preliminary investigations, the investigating judge must:

(a) have examined in writing and under oath the complainant and hiswitnesses by searching questions and answers; (b) be satisfied thatprobable cause exists; and (c) that there is a need to place therespondent under immediate custody in order not to frustrate theends of justice.

D E C I S I O N

MENDOZA, J.:

Respondent Judge Ireneo B. Molato is the presiding judge of theMunicipal Trial Court of Bongabon, Oriental Mindoro. On January 7, 1993,an administrative complaint was filed against him and Judge Manuel A.Roman, Jr., presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court of Pinamalayan,Oriental Mindoro, Branch 42, by Leovigildo U. Mantaring, Sr., who chargedthem with conduct unbecoming of members of the judiciary. On February

21, 1994, after the parties had filed their respective pleadings andsupporting documents, this Court dismissed the complaint against the twofor lack of merit. The motion for reconsideration filed by complainant wassubsequently denied.

What is before us now is the Supplemental Complaint filed byLeovigildo U. Mantaring, Sr. against Judge Ireneo B. Molato, which chargeshim with harassment. It is alleged that because of the filing of the firscomplaint against him, respondent Judge Ireneo B. Molato should haveinhibited himself from conducting the preliminary investigation of a criminacase considering that the respondents in that case were complainant andhis son. Instead, it is alleged, he took cognizance of the case and orderedthe arrest of complainant and his son, Leovigildo Mantaring, Jr., out ofhatred and revenge for them because of the filing of the first case by thecomplainant.

The Supplemental Complaint was referred to the Office of the CourAdministrator which, in a Memorandum dated 25 November 1994recommended the dismissal of the case for lack of merit. Nonetheless, theCourt required the respondent Judge Ireneo B. Molato to comment.

In his Comment dated July 6, 1995, respondent judge denies theallegations against him. He avers that on the application by SPO4 PacificoL. Fradejas, he issued a search warrant which resulted in the seizure from acertain Joel Gamo of a home-made gun, a hand grenade, five liveammunitions for Cal. 38 and three live ammunitions for 12 gauge shotgunthat on August 25, 1993, a complaint for Illegal Possession of Firearms andAmmunition was filed against Joel Gamo in which the herein complainanLeovigildo, Sr. and his son, Leovigildo, Jr., were included; that finding thatthe house in which the firearms and ammunition had been found wasowned by complainant and his son, he concluded that there was probablecause to believe that complainant and his son were guilty of illegapossession of firearms and ammunition and accordingly ordered theiarrest. Respondent judge claims that he inhibited himself from the caseafter he was ordered by the Executive Judge, RTC, Branch 41Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro.

In his Reply complainant contends that as the search warrant wasissued only against Joel Gamo and Mantaring, Jr. it was wrong forrespondent judge to find probable cause against him on the theorythat, as owners of the house in which the firearms and ammunitionswere found, they had constructive possession of the same. Helikewise contends that respondent judge did not inhibit himself until after thepreliminary examination was terminated and the warrant of arrest issuedand only after complainant had filed a petition for inhibition which theExecutive Judge found to be well taken.

On October 16, 1995, this case was referred to the OCA foreevaluation, report and recommendation. On January 12, 1996, the OCAsubmitted a Memorandum, recommending dismissal of the supplementacomplaint for lack of merit, for the following reasons:

(1) It is erroneous for herein complainant to equate the application for the issuance ofsearch warrant with the institution and prosecution of criminal action in a trial court.(Malaloan vs. Court of Appeals, 232 SCRA 249). Complainant cannot insist that sinchis name was not included in the search warrant, the house designated to be searcheddid not belong to him, and that he was not present at the preliminary investigation owitnesses preparatory to the issuance of the questioned warrant of arrest, there was nobasis for respondent judge to order his arrest.

(2) No taint of irregularity attended the issuance by respondent judge of the warrant ofarrest against complainant and his son. Neither was the charge that the warrant o

arrest was issued by respondent judge in the spirit of anger, hatred or harassmenpurposes substantiated.

To begin with, it cannot be contended that complainant LeovigildoMantaring, Sr. could not be proceeded against simply because he was noincluded in the search warrant issued against Gamo and LeovigildoMantaring, Jr., who is apparently his son . The determination of probablecause in preliminary investigations is based solely on the evidencepresented by the complainant, regardless of whether or not therespondent in that case is named in the proceedings for a searchwarrant. As correctly pointed out by, the OCA,[1]the issuance of a searchwarrant and of a warrant of arrest requires the showing of probabilities as todifferent facts. In the case of search warrants, the determination is basedon the finding that (1) the articles to be seized are connected to a criminaactivity and (2) they are found in the place to be searched. It is nonecessary that a particular person be implicated. On the other hand, inarrest cases, the determination of probable cause is based on a finding that
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a crime has been committed and that the person to be arrested hascommitted it.

In this case, the arrest of herein complainant and his son, togetherwith Joel Gamo, was ordered on the basis of respondents finding that theplace from where the guns and ammunitions were seized belonged tocomplainant Leovigildo Mantaring, Sr. and the testimonies of witnessespresented by SPO4 Fradejas. Of course complainant denies that the housein which the firearms and ammunition were found belonged to him andclaims that at the time of the search he was in Manila. The provincialprosecutor subsequently dismissed the case against complainant onprecisely these grounds, i.e., that the house did not belong to complainantand he was in Manila at the time the search and seizure wereconducted. But to say this is not to say that respondent acted arbitrarily orthat he abused his powers so as to give ground for administrativedisciplinary action against him. It is only to say that he committed an errorof judgment for which complainants remedy is judicial.

What we think requires serious consideration is the contention by thecomplainant that respondent judge should have inhibited himself fromconducting the preliminary investigation of the criminal case, consideringthat the respondent was the present complainant, who had earlier filed anadministrative case against the judge and another one.

We are not unmindful of the cases in which it was stated that themere filing of an administrative case against a judge by one of the partiesbefore him is not a ground for disqualifying him from hearing a case. [2]Anexamination of these cases reveals, however, that the administrativecases were filed during the pendency of the cases, and it is evidentthat the administrative cases were filed only to force the judge toinhibit himself from the consideration of the case before him . As thisCourt held, if on every occasion the party apparently aggrieved wereallowed to stop the proceedings in order to await the final decision on thedesired disqualification, or demand the immediate inhibition of the judge onthe basis alone of his being so charged, many cases would have to be keptpending or perhaps there would not be enough judges left to handle all thecases pending in all the courts.[3]On the other hand, there is a remedyavailable to the party seeking the disqualification of the judge. If he isdenied a fair and impartial trial, caused by the judges bias orprejudice, he can ask for a new trial in the interest of justice which willbe granted if that is really the case.[4]

But, in the case at bar, an administrative complaint againstrespondent and Judge Manuel A. Roman, Jr. had previously been filed andit was paramount that respondent was free from any appearance of biasagainst, or hostility toward, the complainant. The impression could not behelped that his action in that case was dictated by a spirt of revenge againstcomplainant for the latters having filed an administrative disciplinary actionagainst the judge. The situation called for sedulous regard on his part forthe principle that a party is entitled to nothing less than the cold neutrality ofan impartial judge.

This circumstance should have underscored for respondent the needof steering clear of the case because he might be perceived, rightly orwrongly, to be susceptible to bias and partiality. For his judgment must notbe tainted by even the slightest suspicion of improbity or preconceivedinterest in order to preserve at all times the faith and confidence in courts ofjustice by any party to the litigation.[5]

Indeed prudence should have made respondent judge heed theadmonition that a spotless dispensation of justice requires not only that thedecision rendered be intrinsically fair but that the judge rendering it must atall times maintain the appearance of fairness and impartiality.[6]

Moreover, we think it was improper for respondent judge to haveissued the warrants of arrest against complainant and his son without anyfinding that it was necessary to place them in immediate custody in order toprevent a frustration of justice. It is now settled[7] that in issuingwarrants of arrest in preliminary investigations, the investigatingjudge must:

(a) have examined in writing and under oath the complainant and hiswitnesses by searching questions and answers;(b) be satisfied that probable cause exists; and(c) that there is a need to place the respondent under immediate custody inorder not to frustrate the ends of justice.

In this case, respondent judge justified the issuance of the warrant ofarrest on the following ground:

In view of the above considerations [referring to the antecedent facts], it isthe honest belief and finding of the Court that there is sufficient probablecause that the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition wascommitted and that the named three (3) accused Joel Gamo, LeovigildoMantaring, Sr. and Leovigildo Mantaring Jr. are the ones probably guiltythereof for which reason Warrant of Arrest was issued by undersignedagainst them.

He thus ordered the issuance of warrant of arrest solely on his finding ofprobable cause, totally omitting to consider the third requirement that theremust be a need to place the respondent under immediate custody in ordernot to frustrate the ends of justice.

The framers of the Constitution confined the determination oprobable cause as basis for the issuance of warrants of arrest and searchwarrants to judges the better to secure the people against unreasonablesearches and seizures. Respondent judge failed to live up to thisexpectation by refusing to inhibit himself even when his very impartialitywas in question and worse by issuing a warrant of arrest withoudetermining whether or not it was justified by the need to prevent afrustration of the ends of justice. Parenthetically, the records show thathe criminal complaints against herein complainant and his son wereeventually dismissed by the Provincial Prosecutor, but not without thefollowing parting words:

It cannot be gainsaid that respondents Mantarings were greatly

prejudiced and suffered damages as a consequence of their inclusion in thecriminal complaint. The unfortunate incident could have been avoided hadthe Honorable Municipal Trial Judge exercised the necessary prudence andjudicial perpecuity [sic] expected of an impartial Judge in the conduct opreliminary investigation before issuance of warrant of arrest.

WHEREFORE, respondent judge Ireneo B. Molato isREPRIMANDED and WARNED that commission of similar acts in the futurewill be dealt with more severely. All other charges are dismissed for lack ofmerit.

G.R. No. 104879 May 6, 1994

ELIZALDE MALALOAN and MARLON LUAREZ, petitioners,vs.

COURT OF APPEALS; HON. ANTONIO J. FINEZA, in his capacity as

Presiding Judge, Branch 131, Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City;HON. TIRSO D.C. VELASCO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge,

Branch 88, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City; and PEOPLE OF THEPHILIPPINES, respondents.

REGALADO, J.:

Creative legal advocacy has provided this Court with anotherprimaeimpressionis case through the present petition wherein the parties haveformulated and now pose for resolution the following issue: Whether or noa court may take cognizance of an application for a search warrant inconnection with an offense committed outside its territorial boundaryand, thereafter, issue the warrant to conduct a search on a placeoutside the court's supposed territorial jurisdiction.1

The factual background and judicial antecedents of this case are best taken

from the findings of respondent Court of Appeals 2on which there does noappear to be any dispute, to wit:

From the pleadings and supporting documents before the Court, it can be gathered thaon March 22, 1990, 1st Lt. Absalon V. Salboro of the CAPCOM Northern Secto(now Central Sector) filed with the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City anapplication for search warrant. The search warrant was sought for in connection withan alleged violation of P.D. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunitionsperpetrated at No. 25 Newport St., corner Marlboro St., Fairview, Quezon City. OMarch 23, 1990, respondent RTC Judge of Kalookan City issued Search Warrant No95-90. On the same day, at around 2:30 p.m., members of the CAPCOM, armed withsubject search warrant, proceeded to the situs of the offense alluded to, where a laborseminar of the Ecumenical Institute for Labor Education and Research (EILER) wasthen taking place. According to CAPCOM's "Inventory of Property Seized," firearmsexplosive materials and subversive documents, among others, were seized and takenduring the search. And all the sixty-one (61) persons found within the premisessearched were brought to Camp Karingal, Quezon City but most of them were laterreleased, with the exception of the herein petitioners, EILER Instructors, who were
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indicated for violation of P.D. 1866 in Criminal Case No. Q-90-11757 before Branch 88of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, presided over by respondent Judge TirsoD.C. Velasco.

On July 10, 1990, petitioners presented a "Motion for Consolidation, Quashal of SearchWarrant and For the Suppression of All Illegally Acquired Evidence" before the QuezonCity court; and a "Supplemental Motion to the Motion for Consolidation, Quashal ofSearch Warrant and Exclusion of Evidence I llegally Obtained.

On September 21, 1990, the respondent Quezon City Judge issued the challengedorder, consolidating subject cases but denying the prayer for the quashal of the searchwarrant under attack, the validity of which warrant was upheld; opining that the samefalls under the category of Writs and Processes, within the contemplation of paragraph3(b) of the Interim Rules and Guidelines, and can be served not only within theterritorial jurisdiction of the issuing court but anywhere in the judicial region of theissuing court (National Capital Judicial Region);. . .

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the said Order under challenge, having beendenied by the assailed Order of October 5, 1990, petitioners have come to thisCourt via the instant petition, raising the sole issue:

WHETHER OR NOT A COURT MAY TAKE COGNIZANCE OF AN APPLICATIONFOR A SEARCH WARRANT IN CONNECTION WITH AN OFFENSE ALLEGEDLYCOMMITTED OUTSIDE ITS TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION AND TO ISSUE AWARRANT TO CONDUCT A SEARCH ON A PLACE LIKEWISE OUTSIDE ITS

TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION.

Respondent Court of Appeals rendered judgment, 3 in effect affirming thatof the trial court, by denying due course to the petition for certiorariandlifting the temporary restraining order it had issued on November 29, 1990in connection therewith. This judgment of respondent court is nowimpugned in and sought to be reversed through the present recoursebefore us.

We are not favorably impressed by the arguments adduced by petitioners insupport of their submissions. Their disquisitions postulate interpretativetheories contrary to the letter and intent of the rules on search warrants andwhich could pose legal obstacles, if not dangerous doctrines, in the area oflaw enforcement. Further, they fail to validly distinguish, hence they do notconvincingly delineate the difference, between the matter of (1) the courtwhich has the competence to issue a search warrant under a given set offacts, and (2) the permissible jurisdictional range in the enforcement of suchsearch warrant vis-a-vis the court's territorial jurisdiction. These issues

while effectively cognate are essentially discrete since the resolution of onedoes not necessarily affect or preempt the other. Accordingly, to avoidcompounding the seeming confusion, these questions shall bediscussed seriatim.

I

Petitioners invoke the jurisdictional rules in the institution of criminal actionsto invalidate the search warrant issued by the Regional Trial Court ofKalookan City because it is directed toward the seizure of firearms andammunition allegedly cached illegally in Quezon City. This theory is soughtto be buttressed by the fact that the criminal case against petitioners forviolation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 was subsequently filed in thelatter court. The application for the search warrant, it is claimed, wasaccordingly filed in a court of improper venue and since venue in criminalactions involves the territorial jurisdiction of the court, such warrant is void

for having been issued by a court without jurisdiction to do so.

The basic flaw in this reasoning is in erroneously equating the applicationfor and the obtention of a search warrant with the institution andprosecution of a criminal action in a trial court. It would thus categorize whatis only a special criminal process, the power to issue which is inherent in allcourts, as equivalent to a criminal action, jurisdiction over which is reposedin specific courts of indicated competence. It ignores the fact that therequisites, procedure and purpose for the issuance of a search warrant arecompletely different from those for the institution of a criminal action.

For, indeed, a warrant, such as a warrant of arrest or a search warrant,merely constitutes process. 4A search warrant is defined in our jurisdictionas an order in writing issued in the name of the People of the Philippinessigned by a judge and directed to a peace officer, commanding him tosearch for personal property and bring it before the court. 5A search

warrant is in the nature of a criminal process akin to a writ of discovery. It isa special and peculiar remedy, drastic in its nature, and made necessarybecause of a public necessity. 6

In American jurisdictions, from which we have taken our jural concept andprovisions on search warrants, 7such warrant is definitively consideredmerely as a process, generally issued by a court in the exercise of itsancillary jurisdiction, and not a criminal action to be entertained by a court

pursuant to its original jurisdiction. We emphasize this fact for purposes ofboth issues as formulated in this opinion, with the catalogue of authoritiesherein.

Invariably, a judicial process is defined as a writ, warrant, subpoena, oother formal writing issued by authority of law; also the means oaccomplishing an end, including judicial proceedings, 8or all writs, warrantssummonses, andorders of courts of justice or judicial officers. 9It is likewiseheld to include a writ, summons, ororderissued in a judicial proceeding toacquire jurisdiction of a person or his property, to expedite the cause oenforce the judgment,10or a writ, warrant, mandate, or other processissuing from a court of justice. 11

2. It is clear, therefore, that a search warrant is merely a judicial processdesigned by the Rules to respond only to an incident in the main case, ione has already been instituted, or in anticipation thereof. In the latte

contingency, as in the case at bar, it would involve some judiciaclairvoyance to require observance of the rules as to where a criminal casemay eventually be filed where, in the first place, no such action having asyet been instituted, it may ultimately be filed in a territorial jurisdiction otherthan that wherein the illegal articles sought to be seized are then locatedThis is aside from the consideration that a criminal action may be filed indifferent venues under the rules fordelitos continuados or in thoseinstances where different trial courts have concurrent original jurisdictionover the same criminal offense.

In fact, to illustrate the gravity of the problem which petitioners' implausibleposition may create, we need not stray far from the provisions of Section15, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court on the venue of criminal actions andwhich we quote:

Sec. 15. Place where action to be instituted.

(a) Subject to existing laws, in all criminal prosecutions the action shall be instituted andtried in the court of the municipality or territory wherein the offense was committed orany one of the essential ingredients thereof took place.

(b) Where an offense is committed on a railroad train, in an aircraft, or any other publicor private vehicle while in the course of its trip, the criminal action may be instituted andtried in the court of any municipality or territory where such train, aircraft or othevehicle passed during such trip, including the place of departure and arrival.

(c) Where an offense is committed on board a vessel in the course of its voyage, thecriminal action may be instituted and tried in the proper court of the first port of entry orof any municipality or territory through which the vessel passed during such voyagesubject to the generally accepted principles of international law.

(d) Other crimes committed outside of the Philippines but punishable therein undeArticle 2 of the Revised Penal Code shall be cognizable by the proper court in whichthe charge is first filed. (14a)

It would be an exacting imposition upon the law enforcement authorities othe prosecutorial agencies to unerringly determine where they should applyfor a search warrant in view of the uncertainties and possibilities as to theultimate venue of a case under the foregoing rules. It would be doubly so icompliance with that requirement would be under pain of nullification of saidwarrant should they file their application therefor in and obtain the samefrom what may later turn out to be a court not within the ambit of theaforequoted Section 15.

Our Rules of Court, whether of the 1940, 1964 or the present vintage, andfor that matter, the Judiciary Act of 194812or the recent JudiciaryReorganization Act, 13have never required the jurisdictional strictures thathe petitioners' thesis would seek to be inferentially drawn from the silenceof the reglementary provisions. On the contrary, we are of the view that saidstatutory omission was both deliberate and significant. It cannot but mean


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that the formulators of the Rules of Court, and even Congress itself, did notconsider it proper or correct, on considerations of national policy and thepragmatics of experience, to clamp a legal manacle on those who wouldferret out the evidence of a crime. For us to now impose such conditions orrestrictions, under the guise of judicial interpretation, may instead bereasonably construed as trenching on judicial legislation. It would betantamount to a judicial act of engrafting upon a law something that hasbeen omitted but which someone believes ought to have been embracedtherein. 14

Concededly, the problem of venue would be relatively easier to resolve if acriminal case has already been filed in a particular court and a searchwarrant is needed to secure evidence to be presented therein. Obviously,the court trying the criminal case may properly issue the warrant, uponproper application and due compliance with the requisites therefor, sincesuch application would only be an incident in that case and which it canresolve in the exercise of its ancillary jurisdiction. If the contraband articlesare within its territorial jurisdiction, there would appear to be no furthercomplications. The jurisdictional problem would resurrect, however, wheresuch articles are outside its territorial jurisdiction, which aspect will beaddressed hereafter.

3. Coming back to the first issue now under consideration, petitioners, afterdiscoursing on the respective territorial jurisdictions of the thirteen RegionalTrial Courts which correspond to the thirteen judicial regions, 15invite our

attention to the fact that this Court, pursuant to its authority granted bylaw, 16has defined the territorial jurisdiction of each branch of a RegionalTrial Court 17over which the particular branch concerned shall exercise itsauthority. 18From this, it is theorized that "only the branch of a RegionalTrial Court which has jurisdiction over the place to be searched could grantan application for and issue a warrant to search that place." Support forsuch position is sought to be drawn from issuances of this Court, that is,Circular No. 13 issued on October 1, 1985, as amended by Circular No. 19on August 4, 1987.

We reject that proposition. Firstly, it is evident that both circulars were notintended to be of general application to all instances involving searchwarrants and in all courts as would be the case if they had been adopted aspart of the Rules of Court. These circulars were issued by the Court to meeta particular exigency, that is, as emergency guidelines on applicationsfor search warrants filed only in the courts of Metropolitan Manila andother courts with multiple salas and only with respect to violations of

the Anti-Subversion Act, crimes against public order under theRevised Penal Code, illegal possession of firearms and/orammunitions, and violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act. In otherwords, the aforesaid theory on the court's jurisdiction to issue searchwarrants would not apply to single-salacourts and othercrimes.Accordingly, the rule sought by petitioners to be adopted by the Court wouldactually result in a bifurcated procedure which would be vulnerable to legaland constitutional objections.

For that matter, neither can we subscribe to petitioners' contention thatAdministrative Order No. 3 of this Court, supposedly "defining the l imits ofthe territorial jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts," was the source of thesubject matter jurisdiction of, as distinguished from the exercise ofjurisdiction by, the courts. As earlier observed, this administrative order wasissued pursuant to the provisions of Section 18 of Batas Pambansa Blg.129, the pertinent portion of which states:

Sec. 18. Authority to define territory appurtenant to each branch. The SupremeCourt shall define the territory over which a branch of the Regional Trial Courtshall exercise its authority. The territory thus defined shall be deemed to be theterritorial area of the branch concerned for purposes of determining the venue ofall writs, proceedings or actions, whether civil or criminal.

Jurisdiction is conferred by substantive law, in this case Batas PambansaBlg. 129, not by a procedural law and, much less, by an administrativeorder or circular. The jurisdiction conferred by said Act on regional trialcourts and their judges is basically regional in scope. Thus, Section 17thereof provides that "(e)very Regional Trial Judge shall be appointed toa region which shall be his permanent station," and he "may be assigned bythe Supreme Court to any branch or city or municipality within thesame region as public interest may require, and such assignment shall notbe deemed an assignment to another station . . ." which, otherwise, wouldnecessitate a new appointment for the judge.

In fine, Administrative Order No. 3 and, in like manner, Circulars Nos. 13and 19, did notper se confer jurisdiction on the covered regional trial couror its branches, such that non-observance thereof would nullify their judiciaacts. The administrative order merely defines the limits othe administrative area within which a branch of the court mayexercise its authority pursuant to the jurisdiction conferred by BatasPambansa Blg. 129. The circulars only allocated to the three executivejudges the administrative areas for which they may respectively issuesearch warrants under the special circumstance contemplated therein, bulikewise pursuant to thejurisdiction vested in them by Batas Pambansa Blg129.

Secondly, and more importantly, we definitely cannot accept the conclusionthat the grant of power to the courts mentioned therein, to entertain andissue search warrants where the place to be searched is within theiterritorial jurisdiction, was intended to exclude other courts from exercisingthe same power. It will readily be noted that Circular No. 19 was basicallyintended to provide prompt action on applications for search warrants. Itspredecessor, Administrative Circular No. 13, had a number of requirementsprincipally a raffle of the applications for search warrants, if they had beenfiled with the executive judge, among the judges within his administrativearea. Circular No. 19 eliminated, by amendment, that required raffle andordered instead that such applications should immediately be "takencognizance of and acted upon by the Executive Judges of the RegionaTrial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, and Municipal Trial Court under whosejurisdiction the place to be searched is located," or by their substitutesenumerated therein.

Evidently, that particular provision of Circular No. 19 was never intended toconfer exclusive jurisdiction on said executive judges. In view of the facthowever, that they were themselves directed to personally act on theapplications, instead of farming out the same among the other judges aswas the previous practice, it was but necessary and practical to requirethem to so act only on applications involving search of places located withintheir respective territorial jurisdictions. The phrase above quoted wastherefore, in the nature of an allocation in the assignment of applicationsamong them, in recognition of human capabilities and limitations, and not amandate for the exclusion of all other courts. In truth, AdministrativeCircular No. 13 even specifically envisaged and anticipated the nonexclusionary nature of that provision, thus:

4. If, in the implementation of the search warrant properties are seized thereunder and

the corresponding case is filed in court, said case shall be distributed conformably withCircular No. 7 dated September 23, 1974, of this Court , and thereupon tried anddecided by the judge to whom it has been assigned, and not necessarily by the judgewho issued the search warrant.

It is, therefore, incorrect to say that only the courtwhich has jurisdictioover the criminal case can issue the search warrant, as would be theconsequence of petitioners' position that only the branch of the court withjurisdiction over the place to be searchedcan issue a warrant to search thesame. It may be conceded, as a matter of policy, that where a criminal caseis pending, the court wherein it was filed, or the assigned branch thereofhasprimaryjurisdiction to issue the search warrant; and where no suchcriminal case has yet been filed, that the executive judges or their lawfusubstitutes in the areas and for the offenses contemplated in Circular No19 shall haveprimaryjurisdiction.

This should not, however, mean that a court whose territorial jurisdiction

does not embrace the place to be searched cannot issue a search warranttherefor, where the obtention of that search warrant is necessitated andjustified by compelling considerations of urgency, subject, time and placeConversely, neither should a search warrant duly issued by a court whichhas jurisdiction over a pending criminal case, or one issued by an executivejudge or his lawful substitute under the situations provided for by CirculaNo. 19, be denied enforcement or nullified just because it was implementedoutside the court's territorial jurisdiction.

This brings us, accordingly, to the second issue on the permissiblejurisdictional range of enforcement of search warrants.

II


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As stated in limine, the affiliated issue raised in this case is whether abranch of a regional trial court has the authority to issue a warrant forthe search of a place outside its territorial jurisdiction. Petitionersinsistently answer the query in the negative. We hold otherwise.

1. We repeat what we have earlier stressed: No law or rule imposes sucha limitation on search warrants, in the same manner that no suchrestriction is provided for warrants of arrest. Parenthetically, in certain

states within the American jurisdiction, there were limitations of the timewherein a warrant of arrest could be enforced. In our jurisdiction, no periodis provided for the enforceability of warrants of arrest, and although withinten days from the delivery of the warrant of arrest for execution a returnthereon must be made to the issuing judge, 19said warrant does notbecome functus officio but is enforceable indefinitely until the same isenforced or recalled. On the other hand, the lifetime of a search warrant hasbeen expressly set in our Rules at ten days 20but there is no provision as tothe extent of the territory wherein it may be enforced, provided it isimplemented on and within the premises specifically described thereinwhich may or may not be within the territorial jurisdiction of the issuingcourt.

We make the foregoing comparative advertence to emphasize the fact thatwhen the law or rules would provide conditions, qualifications or restrictions,they so state. Absent specific mention thereof, and the same not beinginferable by necessary implication from the statutory provisions which are

presumed to be complete and expressive of the intendment of the framers,a contrary interpretation on whatever pretext should not be countenanced.

A bit of legal history on this contestation will be helpful. The jurisdictionalrule heretofore was that writs and processes of the so-called inferior courtscould be enforced outside the province only with the approval of the formercourt of first instance. 21Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act, theenforcement of such writs and processes no longer needs the approval ofthe regional trial court. 22On the other hand, while, formerly, writs andprocesses of the then courts of first instance were enforceable throughoutthe Philippines, 23under the Interim or Transitional Rules and Guidelines,certain specifiedwrits issued by a regional trial court are now enforceableonly within its judicial region. In the interest of clarity and contrast, it isnecessary that said provision be set out in full :

3. Writs and processes.

(a) Writs of certiorari, prohibition mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus andinjunction issued by a regional trial court may be enforced in any part of the region.

(b) All other processes, whether issued by a regional trial court or a metropolitan trialcourt, municipal trial court or municipal circuit trial court may be served anywhere in thePhilippines, and, in the last three cases, without a certification by the judge of theregional trial court. (Emphasis ours.)

We feel that the foregoing provision is too clear to be further belabored orenmeshed in unwarranted polemics. The rule enumerates the writs andprocesses which, even if issued by a regional trial court, areenforceable only within its judicial region. In contrast, it unqualifiedlyprovides that all other writs and processes, regardless of which courtissued the same, shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines. Asearlier demonstrated, a search warrant is but a judicial process, not acriminal action. No legal provision, statutory or reglementary, expressly

or impliedly provides a jurisdictional or territorial limit on its area ofenforceability.On the contrary, the above-quoted provision of the interimRules expresslyauthorizes its enforcement anywhere in the country, sinceit is not among the processes specified in paragraph (a) and there is nodistinction or exception made regarding the processes contemplated inparagraph (b).

2. This is but a necessary and inevitable consequence of the nature andpurpose of a search warrant. The Court cannot be blind to the fact that it isextremely difficult, as it undeniably is, to detect or elicit informationregarding the existence and location of illegally possessed or prohibitedarticles. The Court is accordingly convinced that it should not make therequisites for the apprehension of the culprits and the confiscation of suchillicit items, once detected, more onerous if not impossible by imposingfurther niceties of procedure or substantive rules of jurisdiction throughdecisional dicta. For that matter, we are unaware of any instance wherein a

search warrant was struck down on objections based on territoriajurisdiction. In the landmark case ofStonehill, et al. vs. Diokno, eal.,24the searches in the corporate offices in Manila and the residences inMakati of therein petitioners were conducted pursuant to search warrantsissued by the Quezon City and Pasig branches of the Court of FirsInstance of Rizal and by the Municipal Courts of Manila and QuezonCity, 25but the same were never challenged on jurisdictional groundsalthough they were subsequently nullified for being general warrants.

3. A clarion call supposedly of libertarian import is further sounded bypetitioners, dubiously invoking the constitutional proscription against illegasearches and seizures. We do not believe that the enforcement of a searchwarrant issued by a court outside the territorial jurisdiction wherein theplace to be searched is located would create a constitutional question. Norare we swayed by the professed apprehension that the law enforcemenauthorities may resort to what could be a permutation of forum shopping, byfiling an application for the warrant with a "friendly" court. It need merely berecalled that a search warrant is only a process, not an action. Furthermorethe constitutional mandate is translated into specifically enumeratedsafeguards in Rule 126 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure for theissuance of a search warrant, 26and all these have to be observedregardless of whatever court in whichever region is importuned for oactually issues a search warrant. Said requirements, together with the ten-day lifetime of the warrant 27would discourage resort to a court in anothejudicial region, not only because of the distance but also the contingenciesof travel and the danger involved, unless there are really compellingreasons for the authorities to do so. Besides, it does seem odd that suchconstitutional protests have not been made against warrants of arrest whichare enforceable indefinitely and anywhere although they involve, not onlyproperty and privacy, but persons and liberty.

On the other hand, it is a matter of judicial knowledge that the authoritieshave to contend now and then with local and national criminal syndicates ofconsiderable power and influence, political or financial in nature, and sopervasive as to render foolhardy any attempt to obtain a search warrant inthe very locale under their sphere of control. Nor should we overlook thefact that to do so will necessitate the transportation of applicant's witnessesto and their examination in said places, with the attendant risk, danger andexpense. Also, a further well-founded precaution, obviously born oexperience and verifiable data, is articulated by the court a quo, as quotedby respondent court:

This court is of the further belief that the possible leakage of information which is ofutmost importance in the issuance of a search warrant is secured (against) where theissuing magistrate within the region does not hold court sessions in the city omunicipality, within the region, where the place to be searched is located. 28

The foregoing situations may also have obtained and were taken intoaccount in the foreign judicial pronouncement that, in the absence ostatutory restrictions, a justice of the peace in one district of the county mayissue a search warrant to be served in another district of the county andmade returnable before the justice of still another district or another courhaving jurisdiction to deal with the matters involved. 29In the present stateof our law on the matter, we find no such statutory restrictions both withrespect to the court which can issue the search warrant and theenforcement thereof anywhere in the Philippines.

III

Concern is expressed over possible conflicts of jurisdiction (or, moreaccurately, in the exercise of jurisdiction) where the criminal case ispending in one court and the search warrant is issued by another court forthe seizure of personal property intended to be used as evidence in saidcriminal case. This arrangement is not unknown or without precedent in oujurisdiction. In fact, as hereinbefore noted, this very situation wasanticipated in Circular No. 13 of this Court under the limited scenariocontemplated therein.

Nonetheless, to put such presentiments to rest, we lay down the followingPOLICY GUIDELINES:

1. The court wherein the criminal case is pending shall have primaryjurisdiction to issue search warrants necessitated by and for purposes osaid case. An application for a search warrant may be filed with another


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court only under extreme and compelling circumstances that the applicantmust prove to the satisfaction of the latter court which may or may not givedue course to the application depending on the validity of the justificationoffered for not filing the same in the court with primary jurisdictionthereover.

2. When the latter court issues the search warrant, a motion to quash thesame may be filed in and shall be resolved by said court, without prejudice

to any proper recourse to the appropriate higher court by the partyaggrieved by the resolution of the issuing court. All grounds and objectionsthen available, existent or known shall be raised in the original orsubsequent proceedings for the quashal of the warrant, otherwise they shallbe deemed waived.

3. Where no motion to quash the search warrant was filed in or resolved bythe issuing court, the interested party may move in the court where thecriminal case is pending for the suppression as evidence of the personalproperty seized under the warrant if the same is offered therein for saidpurpose. Since two separate courts with different participations are involvedin this situation, a motion to quash a search warrant and a motion tosuppress evidence are alternative and not cumulative remedies . In order toprevent forum shopping, a motion to quash shall consequently be governedby the omnibus motion rule, provided, however, that objections notavailable, existent or known during the proceedings for the quashal of thewarrant may be raised in the hearing of the motion to suppress. The

resolution of the court on the motion to suppress shall likewise be subject toany proper remedy in the appropriate higher court.

4. Where the court which issued the search warrant denies the motion

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