Reimagining global democracy from world parliament to global digital deliberation and...

Joe Mitchell Reimagining global democracy Summer 2012

Reimagining global democracy: from world parliament to global digital deliberation and participation

Joseph Mitchell for MA Global Governance, University of Waterloo

Abstract

Globalisation presents the latest challenge to democracy, as rules made at the global level lack the consent of the world’s people. As a solution to this, several scholars propose a world parliament, but such an institution would struggle to be effective and legitimate. Instead, global democracy should be reimagined as a decentralised and networked form of governance, as can be seen in digital deliberation and participation. While digital democracy will grow over several decades, there are aspects that can be applied in the shorter term to democratise existing global governance institutions, particularly through non-electoral accountability. Potential criticisms of this model include fears over the relationship between capitalism and democracy, and the representative nature and capability of digital users, but responses can be made to each of these criticisms. Further research should aim to build a more robust evidence base for the development of global digital democracy and suggest actions to pursue it.

Acknowledgements

The author is grateful for the advice of Professor William Coleman, Dr. Dan Gorman and Dr. Andrew Thompson.


Table of contents

1. Introduction...................................................................................................................................1

2. The historical development of global democracy..........................................................................2

2.1. Democracy in ancient and pre-industrial ages....................................................................2

2.2. Democracy in the industrial and modern ages....................................................................3

2.3. Democracy in the post-modern, global age........................................................................4

3. Global representative democracy...................................................................................................7

3.1. A world parliament............................................................................................................7

3.2. Problems with a world parliament and representative democracy.....................................9

3.3. Summary..........................................................................................................................11

4. Towards a global digital democracy............................................................................................12

4.1. Global deliberation..........................................................................................................12

4.2. Global participation.........................................................................................................15

4.3. Global demos...................................................................................................................17

4.4. Summary..........................................................................................................................19

5. Democratising the global governance institutions.......................................................................20

5.1. Non electoral accountability............................................................................................20

5.2. Electoral accountability...................................................................................................22

5.3. Global governance institutions and social media.............................................................23

5.4. Global governance institutions and open data..................................................................24

5.5. Summary..........................................................................................................................26

6. Limitations of the democratising global governance agenda.......................................................27

6.1. Global democracy is not possible alongside global neoliberalism...................................27

6.2. The tyranny of those who show up..................................................................................29

6.3. The realistic limits of global digital democracy...............................................................30

6.4. Language and digital divides...........................................................................................30

6.5. Summary..........................................................................................................................32

7. Conclusion and agenda................................................................................................................33


If you want to stay sane in this world, you have to have the intelligence to be pessimistic in the short term and optimistic in the long term.

Daniel Barenboim1

1. Introduction

This paper proposes reimagining global democracy, not as an extrapolation of representative democracy as seen in national governance, but in a deliberative and participative form enabled through digital communication. It suggests that the only appropriate response to the liberalised economic structures and regulations that have led to such rapid globalisation - and the resulting global problems - is a complex, decentralised and liberal political response from global citizens.

This argument is elucidated over seven sections. Section two presents a brief overview of the development of the theory and practice of democracy and suggests that cosmopolitan democracy is the most advanced theory of global democracy. However, section three argues that the institutional solution for enacting global democracy proposed by cosmopolitan democrats – a world parliament – is untenable for several reasons. Instead, section four argues for a reconceptualisation of the conditions of democracy and a shift away from electoral involvement towards flexible and ‘always-on’ networks of participation and deliberation at the global level. It provides contemporary examples of such use of digital communication technology, which suggest that this model is realistic.

Section five admits that global digital democracy is in a nascent form and so examines how power-holding global institutions, both public and private, can be made more democratic through digital technologies; in particular through the use of social media and a movement towards open knowledge. Section six anticipates four problems with the model of global digital democracy: the power of global private interest, the unrepresentative nature of those who participate in the digital space, the likelihood that digital participation can solve complex or zero-sum global problems and the language and digital divides. It responds to each of these, suggesting that none conclusively weakens the model. The conclusion in section seven reiterates the main arguments and calls for more research on global digital democracy and urges increased uptake and protection of, and support for, open digital deliberation and participation, anywhere in the world.

As the quote above advises, this paper is optimistic about the long term realisation of global democracy.

1 BBC Radio 3, 2012. On 27 July, 2012, Daniel Barenboim conducted the West–Eastern Divan Orchestra, made up of players from Israel and several Arabic countries, in Beethoven’s 9th Symphony. The libretto from the symphony – the ‘Ode to Joy’ – is a call for universal brotherhood. Immediately after the concert, Barenboim travelled across London to carry the Olympic flag at the opening ceremony for the London 2012 Olympic Games.

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2. The historical development of global democracy

This section summarises the history of democratic thought, especially those developments that could be considered precursors to ideas of global democracy. From democracy’s first recorded practice in Athens, through to the age of revolutions and the development of representative democracy, to recent calls for global democracy, this section shows that efforts to theorise systems of governance for world peace have been made throughout history, but the term ‘global democracy’ is a relatively new concept. This is partly because the use of the term ‘global’ in political terms is itself a recent construct. Following brief descriptions of Athenian democracy, modern representative democracy, and advocacy for world federalism, the term global is expanded and the demands for global democracy explained.

2.1. Democracy in ancient and pre-industrial ages

The first recorded experiments in democracy occurred in Athens around 500BC. The ancient city state initiated the practice of decision-making by plebiscite – in this case, a show of hands of all free men, the only eligible voters. This is now known as direct or unitary democracy, and is practised only rarely today.2 Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye argue that this unitary kind of democracy, whereby attempts are made to reach consensus among all those present, is favourable to the modern ‘adversarial’ kind of democracy, but that ‘no one has figured out how to make unitary democracy work at a scale larger than the city-state.’3

Following the fall of Athens to Alexander the Great, this form of direct democracy was lost. The end of the Greco-Roman period led to the Dark and Middle Ages, in which systems of monarchy flourished. During this time, governance systems were still debated, on religious grounds in particular. Scholars such as Francisco Suárez questioned the validity of central rule and earned the wrath of the Vatican by suggesting that power was legitimised from the people upwards.4

In 1648, the Treaty of Westphalia was signed, establishing the principle of national sovereignty and self-determination in the governance structure of Europe. It followed a historical trend of developments in governance following major wars: seen in Rousseau’s call for obedience to the ‘general will’ following the War of Austrian Succession, and Kant’s development of the idea of perpetual peace following the bloody revolution in France.5 The outcome of the Treaty of Westphalia, nation-state sovereignty, became the governance standard around the world and continues to determine much of economic, social and political affairs today. The most recently created nation state joined the community of states as recently as 2011. This standard of ‘self-determination’ established by Westphalia does not necessarily include governing by the consent of the people within a nation state. In itself, therefore, the treaty did not advance any kind of democracy, which only appeared again in the late eighteenth century.2 Most notably the Swiss cantons of Appenzell Innerrhoden and Glarus, though it is likely that in smaller local governments similar practices are informally followed. 3 Keohane and Nye, 2002:2284 Murphy, 1999.5 Hemleben, 1943: 182-183.

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2.2. Democracy in the industrial and modern ages

The age of revolutions, particularly in France and in what became the United States of America, heralded the return of rule by consent and the end of monarchies, across Europe at least. Rather than the direct democracy practised in Athens, revolutionaries constructed systems of representative democracy based upon constituencies and offices. While revolutionary leaders moved across borders to spread their new ideas, democratic developments were internal to the nation states.

However, the events did inspire Immanuel Kant to create a revolutionary theory of his own, his plan for perpetual peace, which has formed a blueprint for scholars and activists since it was first published in 1795. As well as immediate measures to secure the cessation of violence, Kant provided three ‘definitive articles’ that would form the basis of perpetual peace: state governance by republicanism, a federation of states under international law, and one world citizenship law. This latter article is even today a revolutionary idea, marking Kant as one of the earliest global thinkers. Kant wrote that the third article was based upon peoples’ ‘common possession of the surface of the earth’.6 Again ahead of his time, Kant called for a world conference to establish the legal principles of the perpetual peace and a league of nations.7

In the late 1800s and early 1900s, building upon the work of Suaréz, Grotius, Kant and others, nation states began to build a body of international law and a number of functional international organisations in fields such as health and communications. This consolidated the position of the nation state in governance. Even following the traumatic, globally-affecting world wars of the twentieth century, the world peace conferences formed of nation state government representatives do not create any new systems of governance. Though the United Nations has furthered the cause of democracy at the national level, by playing a significant role ending colonialism and supporting free elections, it does not deserve the epithet designated by Paul Kennedy in his book ‘Parliament of Man’.8 An idea for the UN representatives to be elected by the nations passed without discussion at the San Francisco conference.9

Although never realised, several more radical suggestions for governance changes were made at the time of the foundation of the UN. In particular, considerable attention was given to world government. Both politicians and academics argued for the development of a democratic world federation, a concept which had grown in popularity between the world wars. The matter was discussed in US politics, and the US Congress passed a non-binding ‘Sense of Congress’ resolution stating their support for the ‘strengthening of the UN and to seek its development into a world federation’.10 It was signed by popular US politicians such as John F. Kennedy, Gerald Ford, and more conservative figures too. At the same time, several new books were published in favour of stronger supranational governance, including

6 Kant, 1897:19.7 Patomaki, 2005: 111.8 Jolly et al, 2009 ; Kennedy, 2006.9 Camilieri, 1924.10 Weiss, 2012: 25

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works on world, as opposed to international, law; on placing all nuclear fuel under the control of the UN; and proposing a world constitution.11

The Cold War rapidly put a halt to further development of these ideas. The activities of Senator Joseph McCarthy in the US led to a direct association of ‘international’ with ‘communist’, and the discourse around the American role changed from one of the US working with the world to build peace, to one of the US as a defender of freedom. Members of one pro-federation organisation, the World Federalist Movement, resigned ‘in fear of McCarthy ruining their careers.’12 The post war period outside of the US was marked by Western Europe’s pursuit of regional integration, and the Global South’s fight for independence from colonialism. The idea of a world federation slipped out of intellectual consciousness and any ideas of global democracy were replaced by schools of realism and power relations.13

2.3. Democracy in the post-modern, global age

In the decades after the collapse of the movement for world federalism, the word ‘global’ began to be used in academia and beyond.14 In the late 1960s and throughout the 1970s, the rise of neoliberal policy and extensive deregulation helped fuel the process of globalisation, which saw capital movements move around the world more freely,15 encouraged by international financial institutions throughout the 1980s. The term, and the issues associated with it, perhaps reached worldwide public consciousness in the 1990s, highlighted by the Battle of Seattle in 1999.

The use of ‘global’ to describe business and social affairs reflects the fact that globalisation’s effects went far beyond the legal relations of states and the pursuit of the prevention of violent conflict, the main aims of the UN. In this post-modern, global age, academics question the nation state as the appropriate atomic structure for analysing governance issues beyond national territories. Scholars discuss the power of transnational business and activist organisations. Better communication technology, as well as growth in international travel, allows networks of interest, from tax authorities to terrorists, to build greater connections. These elements render a new world in which the nation state struggles to maintain control of national policy, let alone its voice at the world table.

Members of the public, hundreds of millions of whom struggled to achieve democratic rule only recently in Central and Eastern Europe, Latin America and Africa, now find themselves affected by forces they have no say over. Citizens going about their business in one state find themselves buffeted by global financial shocks, climate change, or pandemics caused halfway around the world. New global public bads emerge in the forms of transnational terrorism and 11 Ibid.12 Citizens for Global Solutions, n.d..13 The World Federalist Movement today campaigns on less controversial issues than its name suggests. Headquartered in New York with a staff of 50 and members across 80 countries, it appears to carry some weight in international politics. The organisation points to recent successes such as the creation of the International Criminal Court and, more optimistically, the development of the Responsibility to Protect. World Federalist Movement – Institute for Global Policy, 2010.14 Scholte, 2005: 43-44.15 Ferguson et al, 2010.

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drug or people-trafficking networks. Power becomes fragmented and multi-scalar, operated by unelected technocrats or private corporations richer than entire states, with accountability not to the people, but to bond markets, boards or a small coterie of governments.

Thus a problem of democracy is renewed. Nation states and their representative parliaments no longer seem appropriate. The issue is best summarised by George Monbiot: “everything has been globalized except our consent. Democracy alone has been confined to the nation state.”16

This is not only a problem for democrats, but for anyone interested in effective global relations or solutions to global problems. There is a link, as the UN-sponsored Commission on Global Governance points out, between legitimacy and effectiveness.17 More emphatically, Jan Arte Scholte argues that a lack of accountability in global governance is ‘a core challenge for anyone concerned with obtaining decent human lives for all in the twenty-first century.’18 It is for this reason that Richard Falk suggests that global democracy ‘presents itself as an attractive normative project...the classless achievement of a more just social and political order.’ He argues that without global democracy, ‘there will have to be some hegemonic rule that guides global affairs, or there will be dysfunctional chaos.’19 Faced with these latter two options, global democracy seems favourable, but calls for such political structures are not supported by nation state governments. Paradoxically, the powerful nation states, who consistently support democratisation within other nation-states, do not apply the principles of self-determination to the global level.20

In sum, this new economic and political structure ‘demand[s] a new normative and conceptual understanding of democracy.’21 The most radical response to that demand has been from cosmopolitan democrats. This theory, developed in the 1990s by David Held and Daniele Archibugi, calls for a renewed model of democracy to create governance structures that account for the changed economic structure. David Held’s model attempts to protect individual autonomy against multinational forces through protection of democratic law across a scale from local to global. In reality, he argued, this required a supranational criminal court, an international court of justice with compulsory jurisdiction, and reform of the UN Security Council.22 Daniele Archibugi uses the same normative framework to suggest five priorities for global institutions: restrict the use of force, support acceptance of cultural diversity, strengthen self-determination, monitor internal affairs and develop participatory management of global problems.23 It is this latter priority, italicised here, that has been neglected in much of the discussion of global democracy.

16 Monbiot, 2003: 1.17 Commission on Global Governance, 1995: 66.18 Scholte, 2011: 4.19 Falk, 2012: 278-279.20 Falk and Strauss 2001: 220. 21 Bohman, 2007: 3.22 Held, 1995.23 Archibugi, 2008: 88.

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2.4. Summary

This section argued that ideas of global democracy developed only recently. The power of the Westphalian model of nation states has, since its earliest existence, overcome any alternative structure that might meet the goals of world peace. Today, when global social and economic structures touch almost all areas of human behaviour, governance concerns go far beyond violent conflict, but the same structural problems remain. The response to the lack of consent-based governance at the global level has been new strands of political thought. This section highlighted the views of cosmopolitan democrats, themselves guided by earlier work, especially by Kant. The cosmopolitans have not met with universal acclaim, but as Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye suggest, ‘designing effective and legitimate institutions is [the] crucial problem of political design for the twenty-first century.’24 The next section, therefore, reviews the most commonly held suggestion among cosmopolitans and those remaining world federalists: a world or global parliamentary assembly.

24 Keohane and Nye, 2002: 242.

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3. Global representative democracy

This section describes the various conceptions of a world parliamentary assembly in order to deliver representative democracy at the global level. It briefly reviews different academic suggestions, the reasons to support such a parliament, and a contemporary political campaign for a UN Parliamentary Assembly. It then examines the problems with these conceptions and suggests that the potential for effective design of such an institution, the likelihood of its creation and its potential legitimacy are weaker than the advocates suggest.

3.1. A world parliament

Over the last 15 years, various models of a world parliament have been suggested. The authors of the models struggle with the perceived conflict between equal representation of the world’s people and fears about a truly representative organisation’s efficacy. George Monbiot eschews national borders, instead dividing the world into ten-million-member constituencies across borders, with direct elections in each – a direct reflection of parliamentary systems in the Commonwealth.25 Joseph Camilleri et al propose a more complex system of parliamentary houses - a global parliament rather than a world parliament – which would include groups of leaders from transnational corporations, labour groups, civil society organisations, and ultimately a UN Parliamentary Assembly linked to the existing General Assembly.26 Andrew Thompson and Jan Aart Scholte suggest that to avoid the difficulties of designing a new world parliament, a small democratic step could be taken by the formation of a Civil Society Forum to enhance the voice of the marginalised in global governance.27

Daniele Archibugi focuses on the role of such a parliament. He envisages a World Parliamentary Assembly that would have the authority to decide which level of government should take a decision in the case of a transnational issue. This is a unique idea which suits the cosmopolitan theory of respecting subsidiarity. He proposes a parliament for the administration, rather than the exercise, of power. The assembly would be directly elected from existing states.28

Johan Galtung theorises several potential forms. One model would upgrade the power of heads of state (perhaps a Group of 193), another would upgrade the power of heads of UN agencies. Similarly to Thompson, Scholte and Camilleri et al, he also suggests capturing the global element by involving houses of corporate and civil society actors. He argues that the UN could appoint a civil society forum, which would meet in August of each year in order to guide the General Assembly, which takes place each September. Ultimately, however, Galtung argues that there is no alternative to worldwide direct elections, which are ‘bound to come sooner or later.’29

25 Monbiot, 2003.26 Camilleri et al, 2000.27 Thompson, 2008; Scholte, 2008.28 Archibugi, 2008.29 Galtung, 1995.

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Scholars have also discussed the method of establishing such a parliament. They argue that this could occur by UN Charter alteration, but that is unlikely to occur due to the veto powers of the permanent five members of the Security Council.30 Greater opportunities lie outside the UN system in a stand-alone treaty process between willing nations, as gave rise to the unique Rome Statute, yet this would risk losing ‘global’ legitimacy. The more informal suggestions of fora of civil society organisations or corporate members could be unilaterally created by those actors.

Proposals for a world parliament as a method of re-establishing consent-based governance structures, as opposed to a different type of democratic system, are not always justified. Direct democracy is largely ignored, perhaps on the assumption that, as Keohane and Nye spell out, unitary democracy for six billion seems utopic. There seems to be an unwritten assumption that there are only two types of democracy, as well as an assumption that representatives do a relatively good job in the national systems, and that it is possible to simply recreate the national structures at a global or world level.

Only a few scholars do not rely on these assumptions. Richard Falk and Andrew Strauss suggest that a parliament is the only institution that allows ‘interest-group pluralism’ to flourish, compared with contemporary global governance in which ‘unelected interest groups speak for the citizenry as a whole.’31 Daniele Archibugi argues that a parliament would work because it builds on existing institutional governance; efforts to go beyond this would entail a world government, which risks creating a tyrannical centre and is likely to be unpopular.32 Public support would seem like an obvious reason for such a structure, but it is hard to determine the will of the global public. The small amount of polling data that exists suggests that the public of at least 18 countries are broadly positive towards the idea of ‘more democracy at the UN’ and the idea of electing their UN representative.33

The most advanced project derived from these ideas is the campaign for a UN Parliamentary Assembly (UNPA), led by the Campaign for a Democratic UN. The UNPA would be populated with representatives from national or regional parliaments until direction elections were possible. The UNPA would perform consultation on the work of the General Assembly before gaining ‘genuine rights of information, participation and control vis-à-vis the UN and the organizations of the UN system.’34 In 2011, the European Parliament voted to ask the Council of the European Union ‘to advocate the establishment of a UNPA within the UN system in order to increase the democratic nature, the democratic accountability and the transparency of global governance and to allow for greater public participation in the activities of the UN.’35

There are several real organisations that currently seek to involve national parliamentarians at the international or global level. The Inter-Parliamentary Union was formed in 1889 to ‘foster coordination [among parliaments]...exchange experiences...defend human rights...and

30 UN Charter, Chapter XVIII, Article 108.31 Falk and Strauss, 2001: 212.32 Archibugi, 2008.33 Council on Foreign Relations, 2009. 34 Campaign for the Establishment of a United Nations Parliamentary Assembly, n.d..35 Bummel, 2011. The Council will decide on the matter in 2012.

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strengthen parliamentary democracy.’36 The Union has been criticised for not supporting the development of UNPA.37 Another group, Parliamentarians for Global Action, is more typical of global governance institutions. Its 1300 members operate on an ad-hoc, non-partisan basis, to rally support for relatively uncontroversial global issues. Several other organisations exist to involve national parliamentarians in the work of specific institutions or issues, such as the Parliamentary Network on the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Parliamentary Assembly, or the Climate Parliament.38 Anne-Marie Slaughter suggests that these networks tend to be unsuccessful compared with their equivalent judicial and executive networks, due to the closeness of national legislators to their constituencies (they are designed to be parochial, not global), the short-term nature of their posts, and their broad job remit.39

3.2. Problems with a world parliament and representative democracy

The problems with the idea of a world parliament reflect the design and size of its constituencies and the real likelihood of it being created. More fundamentally, the idea that global democratic consent for governance can be concentrated at an apex does not appropriately reflect the way global governance has emerged.

Firstly, it is difficult to determine a structure that could represent the world’s population without being too vast to function. Most of the models suggest that the constituency borders should be nation states, which risks repeating a mistake made in the European Parliament: the national constituencies create an adversarial parliament in which the public vote for a member to ‘defend their interests.’40 None of the suggestions made include the idea of global proportional representation or a presidential system - perhaps felt so unrealistic that nobody dared propose it - that would coalesce publics around issues instead of locations, thus leading to more cosmopolitan global political parties. This would require party lists for voters to choose from, and global political links are currently weak. However, history suggests that this idea would have potential: in the early 1900s, transnational labour groups had millions of members and were successful in creating certain influential labour standards.41 Slaughter suggests that a global parliament would be 'huge and unwieldy, its members too removed from their purported constituents' and would only have time to engage in 'vague deliberation.’42

36 Inter-Parliamentary Union, n.d.. The IPU’s strategy for 2012-2017 has three priorities, the second of which is ‘greater international involvement of parliaments.’ This includes developing a ‘parliamentary division to the work of the United Nations and other multilateral institutions.’ It does not mention a UNPA. IPU, 2011.37 Daniele Archibugi called the IPU ‘part of the problem, not the solution, for global democracy.’ Bummel, 2010.38 For more, see www.pnowb.org, www.nato-pa.int and www.climateparl.net.39 Slaughter, 2004: 105.40 See the proposal of Duff, 2012. 41 For example, the Second International was influential in creating the norm of the 8-hour day, practised around the world. The first and second ‘internationals’ had many millions of members, but collapsed during World War 1, which proved nationalism to be a greater force than solidarity. Later iterations, notably Comintern, would never quite gain the global policy setting power. Contemporary transnational Islamic parties such as Hizb-ut-Tahrir have similarities with those older organisations. The Online Encyclopaedia of Marxism (www.marxists.org/glossary) is a good source for information on these groups.42 Slaughter, 2004: 237. This is arguably a problem at national levels too. As governance gets more complex with interdependency across borders, but also across industries, social programmes and so on, representative

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Secondly, a world parliament may be unfeasible: the world is not yet ready for such an idea. Thomas Weiss hints at the lingering concerns related to the fears of a world government, suggesting that the idea is a taboo subject.43 The polling data mentioned above showed that a world parliament has support from many countries around the world, though not from the United States or Australia.44 More importantly, the reaction of large undemocratic states to this idea is not known. Any parliament that did not include the world’s most populous nation could not claim to speak for the world. Jeffrey Laurenti argues that if the parliament lacks authority and legitimacy in the absence of China, politicians from democratic nations will not invest their time in it. He argues that UNPA is an idea whose time has not yet come.45

Thirdly, it is not clear that a parliament would be sufficient to close the legitimacy gap in global governance. There would be a complex balancing act to perform with national and regional legislatures, with some arbiter of decision-making necessary. Several of the models above suggest that a parliament should include transnational corporations or civil society organisations, which also raises doubts as to legitimacy and authority. While these are powerful actors, they cannot pass for democratic representatives. George Monbiot suggests that inclusion of civil society organisations would be a ‘disaster for democracy...the world's peoples would be represented by animal welfare charities and cancer research trusts.’46 Scholte points out that both progressive and conservative causes would have to be represented in any such forum.47 Moreover, these organisations are already involved in global governance. Their power should be scrutinised before it is increased.48

A similar, but more fundamental critique applies to the idea of the creation of another single institution. A parliament would present authority and power in global governance as something to be controlled at an apex. But it may be impossible for a single institution to appropriately reflect the affairs of seven billion people. Heikko Patomaki suggests that theorists are unable to overcome ‘the domestic analogy...[and the idea that] the experience and institutions of modern, Western men in a domestic polity can and should be applied to the society of states or the world as a whole.’49 The global democracy debate has defined global democracy too narrowly by only looking to representative democratic models. Patomaki instead suggests that global democrats should focus on the process of democratisation, rather than on the idea of some utopian end-state. Global democracy must be ‘grounded in realist analysis of context, actors, social relations and mechanisms, and its

parliament looks weaker.43 ‘I cannot recall a single undergraduate or graduate student inquiring about the theoretical possibility of a central political authority exercising elements of a universal legal jurisdiction. Certainly no younger scholar would wish to cut short her career by writing a dissertation about it.’ Weiss, 2012: 2444 Council on Foreign Relations, 2009.45 Laurenti, 2009. Laurenti is the Director for Policy Studies at the UNA-USA, so can be assumed to be a UN supporter. 46 Monbiot, 2003: 80-81.47 Scholte, 2011: 310. 48 Freidrichs, 2005: 53. He refers to these groups as 'transatlantic civil society', quoting the Yearbook of International Organisations, which shows that 85% of CSOs are headquartered in Europe or the US. One World Trust did a review of the accountability of CSOs, IGOs, TNCs and in some respects, TNCs proved more accountable than CSOs. Kovach et al, 2003.49 Patomaki, 2005: 104. Tevio Teivainen, 2012, argues, similarly, that to ‘change that world beyond the territorial limits of states, we need to develop new ways of thinking apolitically about transformative agency’ (143).

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transformative possibilities.’50 For example, a more basic condition of democracy should be pursued, such as the power of public deliberation. A better theory of global democracy would understand a more flexible distribution of power.51

3.3. Summary

This section reviewed proposals for a world parliament, finding that most scholars lacked a sufficient explanation for why democracy should be pursued in representative form at the global level. In fact, in light of the problems considered above, it is clear that representative democracy would be a weak response to the need for global consent-based politics. If, as Patomaki suggests, a theory of global democracy must abandon the domestic analogies and think in terms of democratising processes, then global democracy must be reimagined. In the next section, this paper develops ideas inspired by digital communications and collaborative digital production, and suggests that a global digital deliberative and participative democracy is a stronger proposal.

50 Ibid.51 Frey, 2005.

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4. Towards a global digital democracy

The last section showed that a world parliament may not solve the democratic deficit in global governance. This section presents an alternative. It argues that digital communications technology creates the conditions for global democracy. Rather than adapting the United Nations system, or copying domestic models, it is inspired by Richard Falk, who suggests global democracy can only emerge from a rupture in global society.52 This rupture is happening through the digital information and knowledge revolution. As seen throughout history, communications technology will disrupt and change governance.53 This section is partly descriptive of change already occurring and partly predictive of change over the next few decades.

This section suggests that digital democracy is a ‘grass-roots’ phenomenon. Millions of micro-level campaigns or globally-oriented actions are digitally connected to become democratic macro-demands for change or macro-solutions to specific global governance problems. As opposed to elites inventing another top-down governance institution, the model outlined here is of global democracy as a self-establishing force.54 It suggests that as our understanding of democracy went from city-state level to representative national government, it can move back towards the inclusive unitary approach of those city-states, but on a global scale.55

This section proceeds by examining some of the fundamental elements of democratic governance: public deliberation, public participation and, more controversially, a global demos.56 The role of digital communications technology is discussed in regard to each element.

4.1. Global deliberation

In this paper, political deliberation is taken to mean the public process of the expression of individual views and of free engagement with others on certain subjects with a view to determining the best course of action. In a deliberative space, good ideas rise, others fall, through discussion of the merits among the public. In this space, the public creates social norms, establishes priorities, and determines the boundaries which demarcate the realms of possible action.57 At a global level, this is the space in which global governance is discussed and the methods for its democratic control will be developed.

For deliberation to be effective and inclusive, people must have equal access to information and the ability to publish their views. Slaughter says that the first ‘basic principle to ensure an

52 Falk, 2012. Mathias Koenig-Archibugi makes a similar argument, 2012:175. 53 A good example is provided by The Economist, 2011, which compared the arrival of the printing press and reformation with social media and the Arab Spring. 54 Monbiot, 2003: 117.55 Bohman, 2007: 20-21.56 These were chosen from a range of democracy-concerned readings in the bibliography. Bohman, 2007 and Dryzek, 2008 were particularly influential. 57 Doris Fuchs’ discussion of discursive power describes these aspects well. Fuchs, 2005.

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inclusive, tolerant, respectful and decentralised world order is global deliberative equality.’ 58 Global democracy must establish this and maximise the possibilities of participation. While Slaughter described informal deliberation as the goal of transnational networks of judges, finance ministers or industry figures, global democracy goes beyond those groups to all people everywhere. Martin Albrow and Fiona Holland suggest that ‘an open global society’ will occur when ‘Jefferson’s idea of the power of ideas is joined to Habermas’ view of full and free communication’.59 Thus any inequality in communicative and receptive capacity leads to unequal access to knowledge, which weakens the open discussion necessary for global democratic development.

Greater global deliberation is essential not only as part of global democracy, but also to build the case for global democracy, which is not yet widely understood. This is partly because global governance and the need for better public oversight of, and accountability from, the actors at that level is itself not well understood. This will take time, as will the cultivation of global trust and solidarity. The dialectical process required across cultures and languages is most eloquently described by John Dryzek:

“Democracy is about communication as well as voting, about social learning as well as decision making; it is the communicative aspects that for the moment can most straightforwardly by pursued in the international system.”60

Similarly, Amartya Sen says that democratic deliberation helps citizens to learn from each other and helps society to form values and priorities.61 For global democracy, all citizens must be able to join the conversation. Keohane and Nye use this principle to refute ideas of global democracy, because the ‘world as whole lacks...a corresponding public space for discussion.’62 This is no longer true: the internet provides at least 2.3 billion people with a digital voice; including one billion mobile broadband subscriptions, a number growing at 40% per year.63 Digital technology provides the platform for thousands of linked ‘spaces’ for constant global deliberation and the subsequent development of social norms, codes of conduct, and reputations. This allows people to coalesce around an issue at any level from local to global, reflecting the polycentric, multi-scalar nature of global governance. Within ten years, a majority of humanity will have equal access to information, knowledge and the ability to publish to the rest of the world. The ease and instantaneity with which good ideas or arguments will be shared around the world can help establish a meritocratic global discussion.

Throughout history, the ‘democratisation of knowledge has been a driving force in democracy,’ but there has never been such a democratisation as this.64 While problems of language, access and culture will limit this deliberation – issues are discussed in section six – the information revolution still represents a transformative change. Whereas other systems of

58 Slaughter, 2003: 29-30.59 Albrow and Holland, 2008 : 270.60 Dryzek, 2006: 25.61 Sen, 1999: 10.62 Keohane and Nye, 2002: 234.63 International Telecommunication Union, 2012. 64 Camilleri et al, 2005: 26.

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governance are challenged by the involvement of huge numbers of people, digital deliberation benefits, as it sees greater engagement in micro issues, greater numbers of voters, individual actions, and more connections between similar-minded people.

In James Bohman’s description of a global deliberative space, he suggests that participants must acknowledge freedom and equality for all others in the space, and themselves address ‘an indefinite audience.’65 Though Bohman was writing before the advance of social media, both these ideas are good descriptions of the digital public square. Users do publish online to an ‘indefinite audience’: they do not know who will read their posts or the extent of support for their views. Furthermore, the nature of the popular web platforms makes it hard to avoid the acknowledgement of freedom and equality of others in the space: the designers of the platform set the rules for posting and the same rules apply to all users.

Digital communications technology provides an open space for constructing whatever users are able to produce, which gives people the opportunity to define their own deliberative space. They might be invited to discuss a particular document online, but if it has no relevance or interest to them, they can create a new deliberation space on a different subject. Anonymous web spaces, such as Reddit, provide ‘fringe’ areas of popular deliberation, which, as the history of art demonstrates, are often productive of creative ideas. The realisation of these digital spaces, compared with their absence in traditional media, supports Scholte’s call for ‘greater political space and more respectful hearing for radical critics of predominant capitalist and rationalist structures of contemporary global politics.’66 The vast range of (potential) spaces also prevents monopolies of information. In 1995, Johan Galtung warned of the danger of single global media ownership, such as the powerful network of companies owned by Rupert Murdoch. He suggested that ‘global democracy is only as a good as global media’ and that an ideal exchange of information would resemble local bulletin boards and town hall meetings.67 This is today a reasonable description of contemporary global possibilities in the online space.

One of the most used online publishing spaces is Twitter. It has 150m active users, of whom a large proportion are from the US, but the site sees significant numbers of Brazilian, Indonesian and Malaysian users too.68 Twitter is a micro-blogging platform, in which users have 140 characters to make their point, whether banal or profound. They may include one or more links to substantiate their post. Users can repost, reply or ‘mention’ other users’ posts and discussions can be followed by anyone. Reputations are built, and users gain followers based upon trust and the quality of their posts. A few celebrities bring real world recognition with them and so start with a larger audience than merit would suggest, so it is not a perfectly democratic platform. However, it is completely open: any user can ask questions of any other user, or follow any other conversation. The growth in user numbers of the platform shows greater numbers of politicians, activists and non-elite people are converging in this one space.

65 Bohman, 2007: 60.66 Scholte, 2011: 341.67 Galtung, 1995: 28.68 Graham and Stephens, 2012.

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Even in undemocratic countries, microblogging is opening possibilities for discussion and establishing an understanding of deliberation. China’s most popular microblog is Sina Weibo, which is regulated, but not owned, by the government, and has several hundred million users. While there is little English-language analysis of this platform so far, anecdotal evidence suggests that local governments are willing to engage with citizens through microblogging and that Weibo has been the catalyst for growing online activism with impact in the real world.69 These spaces represent the global public square necessary to build global deliberative democracy.

4.2. Global participation

The development of a global deliberation space will not necessarily lead to consent-based global policy, because there is no clear route to move from an idea agreed upon in global discussion to global action. This is as opposed to national governance, in which public deliberation might lead to a motion in a political party, further discussion by elected representatives and eventually legislation. This subsection suggests that global digital democracy could instead develop global policy and its delivery through global digital participation.

In essence, digital collaboration and participation among the public in global affairs is the most transformative effect of digital technology for democracy. Rather than activism, in which people aim to encourage or place pressure on governments to act, the global public, or enthusiasts and experts among them, develop projects which deliver the global services that they themselves desire. This reflects a shift towards functional collaboration to achieve certain goals, similarly to some of the earliest international organisations, rather than places of political debate, such as the post-war international organisations and particularly the UN General Assembly.70 It is the desire for solutions to particular problems that drives public involvement and voluntarism. So far these examples mainly involve producing more and better quality information on global issues to influence policy, but in future, delivery of global policy could arise through digital participation.

One of the earliest digital examples of the transformative effects of technology, which created a small, but important revolution in global health governance, was the development of ProMED-mail in 1994. The service, which still operates, is a simple email list of doctors and public health technicians, used to share news of disease outbreaks anywhere in the world. This small, open association had significant effects on traditional international health relations. Prior to its existence, infectious disease information was shared by government medical departments to other governments through the World Health Organisation (WHO), which could not prevent a country from hiding information on disease outbreaks. ProMED’s data, from practitioners not governments, was more reliable, so much so that when the WHO developed new International Health Regulations in 2005, member states agreed that the WHO could draw on this non-official information. This simple digital tool ended the official

69 The Economist, 2012a and The Economist, 2012b. See also Hewitt, 2012 and Magistad, 2012. 70 Lederer and Mueller, 2005: 2.

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monopoly on global health information, and empowered medical professionals in any locale to act globally.71

Other examples suggest that digital participation can deliver global goods regardless of existing organisational efforts. The best contemporary examples come from the provision of information, particularly using digital mapping, in which users work to provide stronger evidence bases for global policy. In the global environmental sphere, technology is being used to link users to collectively monitor deforestation in the Amazon. This is something international organisations, such as the UN Environmental Programme, have been unable to do. The Sistema de Alerta de Desmatamento platform connects local and global activists, harnessing the latter to monitor copious real-time satellite data to feed information to the former, who can take appropriate action to prevent further deforestation. Their joint actions will have positive effects globally: helping limit climate change. In this case, support was provided by Google Earth Outreach, whose manager suggests that a ‘collaborative monitoring community, powered by the internet, [has] never been possible before.’72 This is one example of the active participation that individuals can take in global governance, regardless of their nationality, expertise or affiliation.

There are even examples of participation in global security governance, a field generally seen as managed by realpolitik and powerful states, with limited global normative restrictions. An end to the monopoly of information on global security through digital participation could herald more democratic solutions. One example of a digital development that helps to build that evidence base is Ushahidi, a crowdsourced disaster or conflict monitoring platform, built by volunteers in Kenya to allow citizens to send information via SMS messages to a central web platform. It has proved fast and accurate in mapping real-time local events in a range of different contexts, opening the data gathered to the world for analysis and response.73 Clearly, an actual digital participative response, in the event that the data called for intervention, is difficult to imagine. The crowd only provides the information, it does not control the physical means to intervene. However, there are emerging signs that private actors – such as hackers - could play a role in punishing transgressors of global democratic norms.74

The above examples will be indicative of greater and more complex digital participation in the future. Those interested in global governance solutions will not need to lobby national representatives to present their views at an international organisation, instead they will build collaborative solutions themselves. This presents questions of accountability and legitimacy of those taking part, which are discussed in section six.

71 International Society for Infectious Diseases, n.d., and Zacher and Keefe, 2008: 48.72 Souza, 2012. While Google support necessary now, good candidate for crowdfunding.73 See www.ushahidi.org. For an evaluation of its use in Haiti, see Morrow et al, 2011. Even more remarkably, a charity called Satellite Sentinel is using commercial satellite imagery of Sudan to prove when and where attacks happened. It is easy to imagine how this data could be opened up for teams of volunteers to review, highlight and feed to the world (see www.satsentinel.org).74 Individual hackers under the label ‘Anonymous’ have already acted several times in what they believe to be the global public good, see, e.g. Perlroth, 2011.

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4.3. Global demos

Demos is a Greek word (δημοι) meaning ‘the people or commons of an Ancient Greek state, especially a democratic state, such as Athens.’75 It has become used as a term for a political community in a specific location; it is in this sense that this paper uses it. The demos is relevant because a criticism levelled against the idea of global democracy is that there is no global demos: no shared sense of political union and no common global value set.76 The term is not entirely uncontroversial. This subsection reviews three varied approaches to demos: firstly that the demos already exists, secondly that democracy in fact creates a demos, and thirdly that demos is actually unnecessary for global democracy. The subsection then shows that digital democracy helps establish demos, whichever approach is taken.

Firstly, the argument that a global demos already exists can be made by reference to our ‘common humanity.’ This is most clearly demonstrated in the establishment of the United Nations and in the lofty preamble, as well as in the legally-binding articles of the UN Charter. The concepts of self-determination, human rights and above all, peace, were supported by every country on earth having legally ratified the Charter of the United Nations.77 It is likely that the vast majority of people on earth at least support the goal of peace.

The second argument is that a demos is a product of socialisation, in which institutions are created first. Archibugi provides the example of the United States of America to demonstrate this. He argues that a demos - ‘Americans’ - was constructed by the institution of nationhood and the symbols of the flag and anthem that were created by a small group of leaders. 78 In Europe, alternatively, institutions have failed to create a demos, perhaps in part due to the political design mentioned earlier. Europe is instead a loose group of national demoi. 79 Similar arguments that suggest a global demos would be built from global democratic institutions have been suggested by several other scholars.80 Given that any kind of group consciousness, whether it concerns values, community or solidarity, is likely to be a product of social interaction in which a cognitive shift occurs due to arguments, context, events, and learning, this seems like a reasonable argument.

The third argument that demos is in fact a myth can be split into three: it does not exist, or it exists in a multiple and flexible sense, or it is in fact a misleading and wrongly-pursued idea. Firstly, in an example like India, it may be hard to identify a demos, but India can still claim to be a democracy. The country is home to a wide variation of races, religions, languages and a complex social caste system. This plurality could prevent the existence of any kind of political ‘community’ or shared values. Yet all Indians receive the same legal voting rights, at

75 "demos, n.". OED Online, 2012.76 Keohane and Nye suggest that a demos must have a ‘degree of shared understanding.’ 2002: 236. Bohman suggested that Demoi (peoples) be used instead at the global level. Bohman, 2007:2. See also, Marchetti, 2012: 23; Laurenti, 2009.77 UN Charter, Preamble, Article 1(1-5). 78 Archibugi, 2008: 143.79 Voters elect an MEP for their region, rather than voting from a party list to represent their views for the whole of Europe. There is a campaign for the European Parliament to move towards x-European seats: Duff, 2012.80 Murphy, 1999 describes the work of Pierre Teilhard de Chardin on collective consciousness and the foundation of unity. Chardin argues that eventually humanity will come together in a world public space. Murphy himself argues that there has to be some sort of ‘rupture’ that provokes this (p.126).

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least in theory. Global democracy may be the same: a vast plurality of views, cultures, religions and other divides exists, but individuals have the same access and voice in the global digital public space. Secondly, cosmopolitan democrats would argue that there is no such thing as a single global demos. Instead, the demos is constantly changing. Following globalisation, demoi form around issues, fates or identities, such as ‘climate refugees’ or indigenous peoples, rather than locations.81 As a result, global democracy would require flexible decision-making structures and institutions. Lastly, Jurgen Habermas argues that the idea of demos is actually normatively backward. He argues that politics must be decentralised and be rid of the metaphysical and inaccurate assumption of a ‘people’ whose ‘collective will’ is expressed. Instead we must recognise the individual as part of the whole.82

A conception of global digital democracy can satisfy any of these approaches to demos. Firstly, if demos is a sociological construct, global digital democracy’s prospects are strengthened by the effects of digital social networking platforms. Seventeen years ago, well before the internet’s broad public use, the Commission on Global Governance claimed that a ‘new generation...are neighbours to a degree no other generation on earth has been.’83 If globalisation has created a ‘smaller world’ then digital technology has connected it, eroding the restrictions of time and distance, and potentially reducing ‘otherness’. Internet users can today connect with others on platforms such as Facebook, on which nearly one in seven people on the planet is now represented.84 This may increase people’s awareness of the effects of their actions upon others, which, coupled with the ability to empathise, could create a sense of community necessary for a global demos.

Secondly, if a demos must be flexible and multi-scalar, as cosmopolitan democrats would argue, digital democracy copes well with this: it allows the creation of platforms at little to no cost and allows multiple membership of demoi or demos, which are flexible according to peoples’ wishes. This is a unique element provided by digital democracy: individuals can join in any debate or participatory project that interests them, anywhere in the world, thus removing the problem of constructing fixed constituencies for a world parliament. The digital space allows what Bohman called ‘distributed publics.’85 A good example of this is in ‘urban publics’ for the governance of cities. Local communities tend to lead deliberation on local subjects, but they are likely to experience common problems and thus could share common solutions with similar cities around the world. Digital communities allow networking across the globe on these matters, sharing ideas and values. Membership of this ‘global urban demos’ does not render the city-dweller any less a part of their national or regional demos.86

Thirdly, if the idea of demos is in fact misleading because it discounts the individual, as Habermas claimed about the falsehood of ‘collective will’, digital democracy does not have to repeat this mistake. Digital deliberation can occur at an individual-to-individual level. In larger participative projects an individual’s view can be uniquely recorded as well as categorised as part of a group. This allows a more complex understanding of political views

81 The author is grateful to Prof. Will Coleman for this point.82 Habermas quoted in Bohman, 2007: 31.83 Commission on Global Governance, 1995: 356.84 Facebook claims it has 955 million monthly active users. See Facebook, 2012.85 Bohman, 2007: 15. 86 In this sense, cities are especially useful spaces for helping people understand a multilevel form of democracy.

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and renders political labels such as left or right less useful. The technology allows clear macro-impressions to be made from the vast quantity of individual data. Digital technology enables this to occur in real-time, and data-visualisations can be performed to increase public understanding of macro trends.

4.4. Summary

This section proposed a reimagining of global democracy as a ongoing process of global deliberation and participation in the digital space. It suggested that digital democracy provides a solution to any problems, should they exist, with the creation or existence of a global demos.

The democratisation of knowledge and information is the first step towards and main focus of contemporary global digital participation, but it is possible to conceive of participative global policy-making and ultimately even of better global policy delivery. Some of these long-term issues are dealt with in section six. The next section, however, suggests that while the foundations of global digital democracy are being created, digital communications technology also has positive implications for the current system of global governance. It suggests that the existing institutions of global governance, currently far more powerful than global participatory movements, can be democratised through digital means.

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5. Democratising the global governance institutions

This paper argues that global democracy is not best served by a world parliament. Instead it suggests a digital deliberative and participative democratic model, which will be a constant project over the coming decades. Currently, digital deliberation and participation does not lead to sufficient global action. Instead, the making and delivery of global policy rests with the institutional bodies of global governance: any effort to create global democracy must aim to democratise these institutions. Robert Dahl believed that international organisations could never be democratic, partly since they lack elected officials.87 But the challenge of global governance institutions is much broader than only international organisations. Global digital democracy will have to drive openness and transparency in civil society organisations, transnational corporations as well as international organisations.

James Bohman argues that the ‘weak publics’ of the internet can only demonstrate global opinion and that they will become strong only when they are able ‘to exercise influence through institutionalised decision procedures.’88 The examples in the fourth section have shown ‘internet publics’ are capable of acting entirely independently, but in the short term, perhaps over the next decade, this section supports Bohman’s view. It suggests that democratisation of global governance institutions can be pursued via non-electoral accountability and recognises some potential role for digital electoral accountability too. It then presents two subsections on social media and open data, two popular themes in digital media that will help democratise existing institutions.89

5.1. Non electoral accountability

Accountability for the exercise of power is not only provided by elections. This is most clearly elucidated by Jan Arte Scholte, who suggests that there are four elements to accountability in a system in which A has power over B.90 First, transparency is required to understand where power lies and how that power is exercised by A in a way that might affect B. Second, consultation is required where A intends to act in a manner that may affect B, in order that B could alert A of this, and request changes to A’s plan. Third, independent evaluation is required to demonstrate the true effects of A’s action upon B. Fourth, correction is required if B is unfairly or unjustly suffering from A’s action, which should lead to remediation, or even A’s removal from power. This subsection argues that digital communication allows B, the affected party, to directly work to hold A accountable. In the paragraphs that follow, digital democracy is discussed in relation to each of these four elements.

87 The other reasons that Dahl gives: global people are not all free to express themselves, there are no political aprites, nor are there global citizens equal under one law. Archibugi, 2008: 134-135.88 Bohman, 2007: 82.89 A note on word choice: ‘institutions’ is used to capture more than ‘organisation.’ Organisations are assumed to have headquarters, letterheads, etc., whereas institutions are more flexible arrangements, such as such as the Wolfsberg Group. A large international relations literature exists on this subject: Simmons and Martin, 2002, gives a good overview.90 Scholte, 2011.

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Digital communication has reduced the resources required for institutions to become transparent, voluntarily or not. Global institutions can publish more detailed and explanatory web sites and open their databases or they can be subject to involuntary transparency through leaks to digital platforms such as WikiLeaks or through less controversial methods such as independently-authored Wikipedia pages. Digital information does not expire or disappear, at least as long as server space exists. Once published it is nearly impossible to prevent its dissemination around the world. Digital tools often automatically record author names and the dates of any alterations. When Slaughter described the lack of transparency in global transnational policy-making networks, she argued there was a need for ‘a public sphere for the operation of government networks, to help citizens understand.’91 This is now being realised, along with a greater expectation of transparency.

Consultation between A and B can happen more often, more easily, globally, and far less expensively due to digital media platforms that exist solely for the purpose of consultation or through institutions’ dedicated consultation web platforms; such as the World Bank’s e-publishing, which creates the space for online comment and discussion on draft publications.92 While consultation such as this has yet to reach a large audience, and it requires educated, literate audiences as well as enthusiasm by the institutions themselves, this too reflects positively on global democracy. Digital technology allows large amounts of consultation data to be handled or visualised easily, and by taking place in one shared digital space, consultees may find it easier to work together on a constructive and powerful response.

Evaluation requires independent and thorough monitoring of the effects of A’s action on B. This may mean that vast amounts of data need to be analysed, and that independent authors need to be found. Digital platforms allow data to be collected and analysed far more easily. It can be done automatically by following ‘digital exhaust trails’ or digital ‘footprints’ left by internet users, or ‘crowdsourced’ by encouraging a large group to participate in data entry. 93 This group-sourced data is harder to corrupt, and the global deliberative space renders evaluation more independent and more stringent.94 When publishing an opinion or joining a public debate in a digital space is a possibility for the majority of the world’s people, the quality of evaluation and its analysis should rise, as a greater number of worldviews are brought together and the merits of an argument are more widely discussed.

Correction involves changing policies to mediate the ill effects of a policy, to compensate B, or even to remove A. In this area global digital democracy can not yet achieve much, because correction such as compensation requires a legal structure. However, some elements of correction are possible: a digital community could decide to collectively remediate or support B following A’s action. Further, digital campaigns could put A under a public spotlight and, by sheer moral weight, force a response. These campaigns could encourage member states to act against an international organisation, or for consumers or shareholders to act against a

91 Slaughter, 2003:235. Slaughter did mention the role that ‘virtual spaces’ could play, but was writing long before the popularity of social media. 92 See, e.g., www.opendta.org. Digital consultation products can be bought off-the-shelf via companies such as Delib: www.delib.net. Accessed 17 August, 2012.93 Global Pulse, 2011.94 See Goldman, 2004, for an example of problematic pre-digital ‘independent’ consultation and evaluation carried out by the World Bank in South East Asia.

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transnational corporation, or for members to act against a civil society organisation. While ultimate accountability through correction would be met by A losing their job, global digital democracy can not yet force this, though some ideas for electoral accountability are suggested in the next sub-section.

In sum, there is not yet a democratic revolution within global governance institutions, but pressure is increasing on global institutions to open up and if necessary, publicly explain or justify their actions. It is the connections that digital communication creates between the institutions and the people, which allows the pursuit of non-electoral accountability. Every time an institution’s ideas, arguments, policies or data are published online, and each time a member of staff of these institutions engages online, transparency is increased, and global governance gains a little more democratic potential.

5.2. Electoral accountability

Electoral accountability, as practised in national governance institutions for parliaments, mayors, presidents - and in some jurisdictions, judges or police chiefs - does not exist in the same sense in the global governance institutions. These national elections present an opportunity for holding power accountable and typically also represent a moment at which a significant part of a population participates in their democracy. At the global level, this is ‘easier to state than to implement’.95 Not only is there the size of the electorate to consider, but there are many areas of decision-making and power, which complicates the issue of to whom accountability is owed, and from whom it should be expected.

Digital voting is already being used to shape global policy priorities, which may show the potential of online voting. One recent example saw the organisers of the UN Conference on Sustainable Development (or ‘Rio+20’) establish a voting platform to try to make an authoritative case for prioritisation of certain goals, which were presented to national political leaders. The organisers first invited public deliberation on ten topics led by experts in each field, then invited each topic group to nominate ten global goals. These were presented to the global online public for a vote. The impact of the voters’ decisions, such as whether national negotiators were influenced by this global popular support, is not yet known and would require further research. However, the ease with which the platform appeared to be established and the level of response, thought to be over a million votes, suggests this type of global online voting platform may become more common.96

The next step for electoral accountability in institutions would be global elections for leadership positions. Throughout history, only one such election has been attempted. The board of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, which coordinates the naming protocol for the internet and has ‘an important impact on the expansion and evolution of the internet,’ ran global direct digital elections in 2000 to elect five board ‘members-at-large’ from nominations via the internet.97 Hans Klein suggests that while the election presented several challenges, it broadly refuted sceptics who view global elections as

95 Archibugi, 2008 : 286.96 See vote.riodialogues.org.97 Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, 2010.

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impossible: the community deliberated sensibly and many typical national institutions sprung up at the global level in response to the election.98 Despite ICANN’s decision not to run further elections – they subsequently changed their governance structure – their experience proved that running such an election is relatively simple. The size of a potential digital electorate is today both considerably larger and more reflective of the world population.

It is also possible for an interested party to simply hold a digital vote without the approval of an institution. For example, one small global governance weblog set up an informal poll for the recent election of the President of the World Bank and received 3,500 votes and generated much debate.99 It is not hard to imagine a more professional operation and a substantial education campaign resulting in a substantial electorate. The moral legitimacy conferred by this vote might influence institutional voting reform or force national governments to reflect the global verdicts.

One more radical proposal to establish electoral accountability for global governance institutions, which would adequately reflect their complex, networked and multi-scalar nature, would be to mirror this in a complex, multi-scalar digital voting platform. One example of such a platform is LiquidDemocracy, developed by a German political party to ensure that its members all had a say in the party’s policy positions.100 It is based on preferential and delegated voting: a member does not have to vote every time, they can instead delegate their votes to somebody else, for as long as they trust them. The trustees can allow the manager of their vote the authority to delegate further, such that votes ‘trickle up’ in a digital network of delegated responsibility, which can flex according to reputations, expertise and so on. People seeking change on an issue could request votes from individuals or other delegates on different occasions, creating a hybrid between direct and representative democracies – a flexible, flowing style of democracy. The preferential element in the voting allows for ranked decision-making, which is arguably a more equitable way of finding agreement across a range of opinions and a complex electorate. There will probably further digital innovations of this sort in future.

5.3. Global governance institutions and social media

This subsection, and the next, look at two still-emerging digital themes and their application to global governance. Social media refers to the information published by internet users and the ability of connections to be made between them. In its most popular forms this includes weblogs, social networking sites and photo and video sharing. Many global governance institutions run their own weblogs and many more have a presence on social networking sites. Some of the most popular institutions have over a million connections with individuals or other institutions. Institutions use social media differently: some sign post their events or publications, others, more promisingly, engage with citizens. For example, following Jim Kim’s election to President of the World Bank, the institution invited questions from the public via social networks and he answered them in a web video, translated into four

98 Klein, 2001. Scholte, 2011b refers to ‘this unique experiment’ as ‘highly problematic’, but this is an unfair reading of Klein’s article.99 See www.worldbankpres.org. Accessed 17 August 2012.100 See www.liquiddemocracy.org. Accessed 17 August 2012.

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languages.101 Compared with traditional media interviews, digital social networks allow leaders of institutions to maintain a constantly-updated presence, to informally discuss their work and to connect with the public in a way that forms a permanent, transparent, accessible record.

Social media can help lead to institutional transparency, a vital part of non-electoral accountability. Social media lowers the barriers to public inquiries and to finding useful information already published. It also helps improve the consultation element by making it easy for institutions or their staff to share ideas and proposals in the early stages of their development, in a more informal style than a bureaucracy would typically encourage. For example, consultation can be ongoing, rather than based on deadlines. Social media can also improve evaluation processes, as individuals can easily check records of an institution’s previous claims and connections can be made to directly link those affected with those who took the decision at the institution. The nature of the media means that every institutional response to questions from the public will be open for discussion and comment. Improving the correction element of non-electoral accountability is more of a challenge for social media, though examples do exist of moral outrage changing the behaviour of such institutions, particularly corporations, and this effect will grow with greater membership.102

The aspect of social media with the most transformative potential for institutions is the digital presence of actual policy-making institutional staff members, rather than press officers or corporate channels. If decision-making individuals operate openly in the digital space, then the lack of political representation of the public is less of a problem, as they can communicate directly with the international civil servant, factory manager or campaigner that concerns them. People do not need to elect someone to ‘represent’ their interests, they can pursue it for themselves.103 Several leaders of global governance institutions have online profiles and use them appropriately to respond to questions, to seek the opinions of others or to share their current reading list.104 However, the majority either have no digital presence, or have a presence, but use it only to broadcast their views, as opposed to debating issues with other users. This may change as a generation of staff more exposed to digital technology gain more senior positions in these institutions.

5.4. Global governance institutions and open data

The term ‘open data’ refers to institutional databases which have been published online for public use. A growing quantity of data held by national governments is being shared online, such as databases of expenditure, pollution rates, reported crimes, and so on. One useful global example showing what the global public can do with open data from nations is an

101 World Bank, 2012. The World Bank reported that they received 1,000 questions and comments from 62 countries.102 Consumer goods and apparel companies, such as Apple, Nike and Reebok, have come under the most pressure. See, e.g., Sage, 1999.103 The limits of this approach may not just be set by leaders of global institutions. Member states, donors or private sector partners may discourage public engagement in an open manner.104 Examples include the Administrator of UNDP, Helen Clark, the President of the International Fund for Agriculture and Development, Kanayo Nwanze; the Head of the European Parliament, Martin Schultz; the CEO of Virgin Group, Richard Branson; the director of the anti-poverty advocacy group One, Jamie Drummond; both Bill and Melinda Gates of the Gates Foundation, and many more.

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attempt by OpenSpending.org to track every government financial transaction in the world. 105 Another smaller example, but with a similar potential for transformative effects, is the effort by the Danish Refugee Council to publish real-time feedback on their aid programme from those it is supposed to help. This is revolutionary in the aid field, in which agencies are typically accountable only to their donors. By opening this data, any interested people around the world can review it, comment, provide assistance or flag up concerns to the institution.106

The open data ‘movement’ is largely led by a diverse group of national governments, some of whom formed the Open Government Partnership in 2011 to ‘make governments better’.107 The Open Government Partnership Declaration states that open governments will ‘increase the availability of information about governmental activities, support civic participation [and] increase access to new technologies for openness and accountability’ among other things. Countries can sign up to the declaration providing they meet minimum criteria.108 This clearly encourages transparency within national governance and membership of the OGP club provides an incentive and social norming in favour of openness. However, the partnership currently only includes national governments: it should be widened to include global governance institutions.

Some such institutions already support the open data movement, such as the World Bank.109 Others, particularly in the science field, have always published their data, recognising the value in opening up to fellow experts around the world.110 However, there are hundreds of lesser known institutions operating in global governance that could become more transparent. The data held by international financial institutions, for example, is presumably - or hopefully - particularly robust and detailed; making global economic governance claims relies on complex economic data. Yet these institutions are some of the most closed in global governance.111

In terms of open data and the private sector, extractive industries have been under pressure from activists for several decades to ‘publish what you pay’ to display any corrupt payments to governments. Opening the data of powerful private institutions would expand this effort and generate useful information for the global public. Open Corporates, an enthusiast-created platform, scrapes public information on over 40 million corporations in 52 jurisdictions and publishes it in a user-friendly way online. They argue that ‘few parts of the corporate world are limited to a single country, and so the world needs a way of bringing the information together in a single place, and more than that, a place that's accessible to anyone, not just

105 See www.openspending.org. Their data includes most European and North American governments, but also data on Cameroon and Kenya. 106 Ayala, 2012. 107 Open Government Partnership, n.d..108 The criteria are based on a points system, by which your position on transparency indexes developed by various NGOs (e.g. on access to information get points based on score in RighttoInfo.org index developed by Open Society Initiative; on Citizen Engagement they use the EIU’s Democracy Index). Makes some tough demands of countries. The founding governments of the OGP were Brazil, Indonesia, Mexico, Norway, Philippines, South Africa, United Kingdom and the United States.109 See data.worldbank.org.110 For example, the Inter-Governmental Panel on Climate Change. See www.ipcc-data.org.111 Mattli and Woods, 2009.

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those who subscribe to proprietary datasets.’112 Although the site relies upon good national data reporting, it forms a useful example of the ways in which the open data movement is likely to focus on the private sector over the next decade. The global private sector is likely to show some intransigence, but simply opening non-proprietary data would create information that could help change the system.113 This kind of data could help local activists vet factories and working conditions, rather than relying on local government agencies that might not have the will or capacity to enforce global standards.

In sum, open data improves transparency, making it easier to see the exercise of power and to discuss and evaluate the use of that power. Further, it democratises the knowledge on which global policy arguments are constructed. Open data allows anyone in the digital space the opportunity to construct robust policy ideas and strengthen their arguments in global deliberation. Online enthusiasts are also proving skilled at visualising data such that even a weak grasp of data-handling or statistics does not prevent people from analysing such information. Eventually, open data and the tools to use it will enable inspired individuals or networked groups of globally-minded citizens to build their own constructive solutions (‘open solutions’) to global governance problems.

5.5. Summary

This section has shown that the democratisation of global governance institutions, as with global democracy as a whole, is most rapidly developing in terms of freer information, which in this case improves non-electoral accountability most obviously through increased transparency. The democratisation of knowledge and of access to global policy makers, through open data and social media will create a more direct and participatory system. In the long term, innovations in digital collaboration may render certain institutions resistant, particularly those that are too bureaucratic to react to change or those whose principals, member states or shareholders, would lose from democratisation.114 In the meantime, however, these institutions hold the budgets and much of the knowledge necessary to scale-up better solutions for management of global affairs. Democratising the institutions through digital means is an important first development of a global digital democracy.

This paper has thus far presented an optimistic view of the potential of digital communications technology to lead to global democracy. The next section considers the limits of these arguments.

112 See www.opencorporates.org 113 Shadbolt, n.d.. The apparel company, Nike, have experimented with open data (Turoczy, 2011).114 Keohane and Nye, 2002, suggest that a lack of transparency in international organisations is politically efficacious for member states (p. 221).

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6. Limitations of the democratising global governance agenda

This section attempts to anticipate criticism of the general thesis put forward in this paper –ideas which have arisen throughout the paper, but that are listed here to avoid repetition. Four potential criticisms are identified: the dangers created by neoliberalism, the issues with direct or participatory democracy as the ‘tyranny of those who show up’, the real limits of global digital democracy when faced with complex or zero-sum problems, and finally the language and digital divides that could prevent a true global public space. Each argument is outlined and followed by a counterargument below.115

6.1. Global democracy is not possible alongside global neoliberalism

The first criticism suggests that as neoliberal forces drove globalisation, the interests of global capital-owners will compete with any attempt to build a global democracy that would reflect the interests of everyone else. Bhupinder Singh Chimni criticises cosmopolitan democrats for their failure to recognise the importance of economics in global politics.116 In his view, in order to enact global democracy, the economic system must be changed. There are several examples of the effects of economic globalisation on global governance, including in global economic governance, which is led by international financial institutions, at which voting structures are determined by national income, not by population. These international organisations, along with the Group of Seven, Eight or Twenty countries, the Bank of International Settlements and several private organisations, have been criticised for coming under the undue influence of private interests.117 Another more subtle example of private influence is shown in the distinction between the World Economic Forum, an agenda-setting organisation whose annual conference presents many opportunities for networking between business leaders and political leaders, and the World Social Forum, which fails to generate the same discursive influence.

The response to this argument is twofold. Firstly, it is conceivable that the norm of transparency and accountability, as outlined in section five, will grow even in transnational corporations. Clearly, the private sector, as befits its name, is the most closed part of global governance. Yet everything this paper has described thus far suggests that private sector organisations too will be unable to avoid opening up; if not they will face creative destruction at the hands of more collaborative, cooperative production methods. This relates to the second, broader and more fundamental response to Chimni: digital participation is something of a revolution itself. It is driving non-market-driven collaboration and production and it is changing the traditional assumption of the value of intellectual property rights. In digital communities, users direct their resources, often time and expertise rather than money, based 115 This paper assumes throughout that democracy is an appropriate state for global governance to aspire to. As Amartya Sen says: democracy ‘is intrinsically important to human life ... [and has a] constructive function in the formation of values. These merits are not regional in character.’ 1999:16. Yet this is not uncontroversial. Arguments from various scholars in fields such as critical political theory and anthropology suggest that the universalisation of democracy is not value-neutral. Due to limited space, and the underlying assumption of the paper, these are not dealt with here, but the author is grateful to Professor Will Coleman for his guidance on this issue.116 Chimni, 2012.117 Mattli and Woods, 2009.

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upon interest or need, not on wage or price signals. According to classical economics, this does not happen, least of all with people who have never met.118 While there is a risk that private interests will attempt to exercise discursive power in the digital space as they do in the offline world, the greater publishing freedom and overall transparency that the space provides will limit their success.

A counter-response from Chimni might be that in this global deliberative and participative democracy, it is still wealthy individuals, those who have benefitted from the economic status quo, who sit in the vanguard. The most popular digital social network is run by an American company, the governors of internet rules are almost universally Western, and a substantial majority of material on the internet is in the English language.119 Further, much of the digital public space relies on privately-owned hardware: servers based in a offline location in a specific legal jurisdiction, which may, for example, require oversight by local intelligence agencies. Public spaces also rely on private companies, who may come under pressure from governments to restrict the ability of global public platforms, as seen in the difficulties that Wikileaks experienced in its relationships with American host companies.120

The counter-response above is limited by the fact that there is growing involvement in the creation of digital spaces for democratic goals outside North America and Europe. The Ushahidi platform, mentioned above, was developed in Kenya and has been used by organisations across the world.121 Brazil is home to Imazon, the charity partnering with Google to design crowdsourced forest monitoring. India is home to world-leading programmers, developers and civil society activists responsible for websites such as I Paid A Bribe, a digital accountability platform. Anyone with access to the internet, an idea and some coding knowledge has the capacity to build solutions. While they may not currently have the market power of Google or Facebook, they will in time. Furthermore, regarding the collision of private and public interests, several recent online campaigns have been successful in preventing private sector efforts to increase intellectual property protection in the digital space.122 This hints at both the growing political power of internet freedom defenders, but also at a growing understanding of the value digital collaboration among legislators. Finally, the risks of interference by governments or private interests can be mitigated through the distribution of infrastructure and fall-back infrastructure around the world. In sum, the vision of global digital democracy that this paper provides reflects ‘the decentralised face of global democracy’, an idea which Chimni himself supports.123

118 This is comprehensively examined in Benkler, 2006. 119 Facebook is headquartered in California. On language see Lobachev, 2008. On internet governance see Mackinnon, 2012.120 The Economist, 2010.121 The short film on the Ushahidi website gives several examples. 122 In the United States, the Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA) was abandoned after concerted action by internet activists, in Europe the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement met a similar fate, with help from the European Parliament.123 Chimni, 2012: 245.

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6.2. The tyranny of those who show up

The second criticism of the model suggested in this paper is that digital participation and deliberation, like direct democracy, is only for experts and enthusiasts. George Monbiot calls this the ‘dictatorship of those who show up’.124 He argues that representative democracy would involve more of the global public and create greater democratic legitimacy for global action.125 It is true that it cannot be said that there was global political demand for the sort of platforms discussed above; they were built by enthusiasts who believed in their value. To borrow an offline example, the global geo-engineering experiments being carried out by US scientists are hardly democratic. Their actions could have global effects, but they did not seek the global public’s permission. Though not illegal, these actions could be detrimental to the planetary biosphere, yet the group is only truly accountable to the funders of their projects.126 It is hard to imagine that as much risk is posed by an online project, but the same principle applies: a small group may contribute to discussions of global policy; another small group might start to construct corresponding digital plans. It is hard to know what level of participation is needed to claim legitimacy. For example, those who write the articles for Wikipedia are a miniscule group compared to the site’s overall audience, but Wikipedia is a democratic platform: anyone can edit it, it is open to all, and it is free to access.

One response to these arguments is to accept the existence of a relatively small vanguard as part of the nature of revolutions in governance: only the rich and well-educated have the free time, or ‘cognitive surplus’ to build global democracy.127 This reflects Barrington Moore’s argument that the bourgeoisie is responsible for bringing about liberal democracy.128 Another response is that global digital democracy values the quality of participation, not the quantity, as representative democracy does, though overall it is clear that global digital democracy will require greater public involvement than currently exists.

Two other aspects of digital democracy can help mitigate the risks presented above. Firstly, those building the infrastructure of global deliberative democracy appear to be motivated by altruistic means: their dedication of time to build platforms, visualise data, and deliberate online, perhaps builds legitimacy via respect for their voluntary efforts rather than by the quantity of people involved. Secondly, many leaders in the digital space, especially those building crowdsourcing platforms, tend to act transparently by constantly explaining their actions online and soliciting comments and questions: demonstrating non-electoral accountability. If they did not, they would rapidly lose reputation and their trust networks in the digital space.

124 Monbiot, 2003:119.125 This idea that participation is in fact greater in representative democracy seems weak. Firstly, the act of voting is not the limit of participation in most democracies. Secondly, if it were, it would only reflect a greater quantity of involvement compared with the quality of participation in digital democracy. 126 Lucaks, 2012.127 Shirky, 2010.128 Koenig-Archibugi, 2012: 176.

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6.3. The realistic limits of global digital democracy

A third critique is that there are two limits to what online collaboration can realistically achieve. The first is due to complexity and the second due to zero-sum situations in global governance. For example, given the complexities of global finance, it should not be expected that a global public will crowdsource a solution to the banking crisis; nor, given the unequal distribution of the costs and benefits of climate change, should we expect participative democracy to secure global mitigation policies. Furthermore, most of the global digital democracy examples given in this paper concern the improvement of global evaluation and monitoring, rather than delivery. A global tax, for example, might be agreed upon in the deliberative space, but without the tools of coercion to collect it, it would have to be voluntary. This reflects a wider debate about the correct balance to be struck between legal regulation and reliance on social norms, of which only a few responses can be considered below.

Firstly, if the global financial system were more open, greater global deliberation could occur: thousands of economic analysts may together provide a more accurate picture than the small closed groups that manage these institutions currently. Secondly, in terms of zero-sum games, it is not necessarily the case that the ‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ approach will always be taken. It is conceivable, for example, that voluntary wealth transfers from rich to poor will increase as the global deliberative space makes a better case for the immorality of global inequality. Digital platforms have already led to successful ‘crowdfunding’ for public projects in the built environment, becoming an additional source of revenue to local government taxes.129 The results of the early stages of global digital democracy, such as increased transparency, better worldwide connections, and solidarity, may eventually provoke a far stronger global normative power. This normative power will reduce the need for coercion of individuals, companies or governments. It may not solve all global problems, but given that global digital democracy is ‘a non-centralised, non-territorial, non-exclusive system’ of governance, it may be the best that global democracy can do without global government.130

6.4. Language and digital divides

A fourth challenge goes to the deliberative potential of digital democracy in particular, as it concerns the lack of a common language and the lack of universal access to the global digital space. The language divide is reflected by Will Kymlicka, who doubts that a global deliberative space could ever exist. He argues that languages, vernacular ones especially, create territories regardless of borders.131 The term ‘global governance’ itself, as Lederer and Mueller have pointed out, ‘has an Anglo-American cultural imprint.’ It does not translate well into Spanish, and the Italian and German languages simply adopt the English term.132

129 See e.g. www.spacehive.com. It could be argued that this is simply online philanthropy – another example of private interest determining provision of goods and services. However, crowdfunding allows a far greater number of people to take part, and, until global government is realised, is perhaps the most democratic solution imaginable for global governance. 130 Patomaki, 2005: 117. He was describing a different model, but the outcome would be the same.131 Bohman, 2007: 83. 132 Freidrichs, 2005: 52-53.

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There are several responses to this. Written content on the internet is predominantly in English, but as digital communications technology develops the voice of individuals rather than institutions, this should shift over time to reflect the languages spoken throughout the world. Alternatively, or at the same time, the global public space might, without any particular intent, place even greater pressure on people to learn English in order to take part in the global conversations. The behaviour of group responses in this area is hard to predict without new research. There may also be technological or crowdsourced solutions to issues of translation. Several websites, most notably the lecture and discussion site TED.com, rely successfully upon the goodwill of volunteer translators. This in itself is a good example of global digital democracy, in which the most influential arguments in any language should grant their authors a high merit-based reputation, which in turn directs speakers of other languages to volunteer their time to translate such arguments. To keep up with the large quantity of material published online, several corporations are also working on translation software, which ‘learns’ by its mistakes, and is good enough to provide a sense of most material.133

The digital divide is the term used for the issue of the advantages gained by having access to the internet, and the disadvantages experienced by those who do not have access.134 Currently, the development of global digital democracy is not inclusive of those whose governments censor access to the internet and of those who do not have the resources to access the internet. Internet access is still a privilege enjoyed by the few – around 40% - rather than a right of the many, which must change if global digital democracy is to be realised.135

There are reasons to be optimistic in regards to each group. Firstly, for those who have censored access, it is extremely difficult for a government to censor everything they might wish to censor. In the same way that powerful forces tried and failed to control the printing press, they will try and eventually fail to control the internet. A related reason is that non-democracies, though wishing to maintain ‘stability’ at home, may not actually be adverse to people in the national territory engaging in global debates as a ‘safe practice’ area or as a ‘safety-valve’. Both of these responses can be evidenced with examples from China. On the one hand, there are ways for the more technically able to escape the censors by using proxy servers based in freer jurisdictions.136 More enterprisingly, and unsurprisingly given the literature on ‘everyday resistance’, there are linguistic tricks used in the public space to avoid censorship.137 Furthermore, the Chinese government has, on occasion, relaxed the censorship of heated political debates, as in the aftermath of the Wenzhou hi-speed train crash, which killed 39 people in 2011. Users of China’s most popular social network openly discussed the issue and strongly criticised the government response for five days before the censors began to remove posts.138 These are small examples compared with the oppression that exists

133 Google Translate, for example, can be ‘taught’ by both human correction and its own algorithms, which analyse human-translated material published online.134 See, e.g., Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2002. 135 Approximately 2.3 billion have access to the internet, according to the International Telecommunication Union, 2012.136 See, e.g., Lawson, 2011.137 See, e.g., Scott, 1985.138 BBC World Service, 2012. See also: Murphy, 2012.

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constantly in China, but they may be indicative of a more open future. The sheer mathematics of China suggests that the government would have an extraordinary, impossible task to censor a potential network of a billion people over the long term.

On the issue of those who are too poor to afford the technology and subscription fees to access the internet, or those who live in rural areas where access is limited, global trends too suggest a positive future. Communication technology, particularly in the field of mobile communication, is growing rapidly across the world.139 Joseph Camilleri et al suggest that internet access should be universally available, in order to ensure that all people can take part in global digital democracy. They suggest that global institutions can support this goal through low-interest loans to the developing world for investment in digital communications infrastructure.140

6.5. Summary

This section collated four criticisms of the model of the global digital democracy. It questioned whether democracy could be realised in the face of powerful private interests; whether online participation could truly be judged to be democratic; whether the digital democracy could provide anything more than a platform for action where there is universal agreement; and whether the language or digital divides would prevent the growth of a global digital deliberative space. In response, it suggested that a global networked public can overpower individual private interests; that the openness of those enthusiasts and experts will prevent the ‘tyranny of those who show up’; that in the absence of global government, digital democracy will enforce policies through global social norms; and that increased access and new uses of technology and voluntary translation will limit the problems with global divisions. These were theoretical arguments and responses and there is a need for in-depth research on this subject to build a more robust argument; this is considered in the concluding section below.

139 Mobile broadband access is expected to reach 3.2bn by 2015, according to the GSMA, 2012.140 Camilleri et al, 2000: 30-31. Several countries recognise internet access as a human right, and a report from the UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression called on states to ensure universal access to the internet as a matter of priority. United Nations, 2011.

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7. Conclusion and agenda

This last section provides a brief recapitulation of this paper, a methodological criticism and suggestions for further research, and some final thoughts on building global digital democracy.

This paper proposed a model of global digital democracy as a response to the lack of accountability and legitimacy in global governance. It reviewed ideas for a world parliament, but found this approach problematic for several reasons. Instead, it suggested that the digital communication revolution creates the conditions for global democracy through global deliberation, participation, and, if necessary, a global demos. It then examined digital solutions by which accountability, especially through non-electoral means could be developed in existing global governance institutions. It anticipated four criticisms of a model of global digital democracy, but concluded that as long as access to digital communication continues to widen, and as long as openness and meritocracy are allowed to flourish, these criticisms do not negate the overall argument.

A considerable limitation of this paper is its use of anecdotal evidence to support the case for the growth and success of digital deliberation and participation. To build the case for global digital democracy, a more robust evidence base is required, particularly around three key areas. Firstly, as regards the democratisation of global institutions, evidence of the effects of social media use and open data is required. This could include case studies, such as following the development of a specific global policy area and the impact digital engagement has on it. Secondly, concerning global deliberation and participation, there is a need for data on participation to identify any demographic biases, and social psychological research to identify whether perceptions of otherness or solidarity change in the digital space. Thirdly, evidence is needed on the effects of government policy on internet freedom, online literacy, national digital divides and on maintaining a robust digital infrastructure. Evidence on censorship is essential too.

This paper took an optimistic view of the development of global digital democracy, with good reason. The world wide web was created only 15 years ago. Its effects on society have been extraordinary. In 15 years time, it is reasonably conceivable that a vast majority of the world’s people will be connected in a shared space using user-friendly, politically-empowering technology. Today, there is much that can be done to realise this democratic vision. Individuals should join the existing deliberation spaces and practice engagement with others that they have never met. Global institutions should promote staff engagement in the digital space, be prepared to open their knowledge to the world, and be ready to act on open solutions coming from anywhere. Governments must act to protect the free, decentralised nature of the internet and must join a range of global actors to ensure that the digital divide is closed. If global democracy is built, it will be built by everybody.

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