Regulatory Response and Changes to Regulatory … · Regulatory Framework Arising from the ......

Regulatory Response and Changes to

Regulatory Framework Arising from the

Lessons Learned from the Fukushima

Accident

Ph. JAMET

Commissioner

International Conference on

Effective Nuclear Regulatory Systems:

Transforming Experience into Regulatory Improvements

Ottawa, 8 – 12 April 2013

8 – 12 April 2013 International Conference on Effective Regulatory Systems 2

Content

� Introduction to general European Nuclear

Safety Organization

� Stress Tests and European Peer Review Process

� Outcome of the European Peer Review

� Outcome of the French Stress Tests

� Regulatory Challenges and Evolutions


General European Context for

Safety

� Safety is a national responsibility ( National Safety

Authority )

� National frameworks for safety comply with

European Directive

─ IAEA safety fundamentals

─ CNS

─ Report to European Commission

─ Peer review of national framework


ENSREG

� Created by the European Commission

� All European Regulators + European Commission

� Give advises to the European Commission


WENRA

� Private club of nuclear Regulators

� Non nuclear Regulators invited as observers

� Produce reference documents for European

harmonization


Content

� Introduction to general European Nuclear Safety

Organization

� Stress Tests and European Peer Review

Process





First Responses toFukushima Accident

French Level

� Targeted inspections by ASN

� Request for Complementary Safety Assessment (French

stress tests) from French Prime Minister (23 March 2011)

European Level

� Request for European sress tests and peer review from

European Council (24 and 25 March 2011)

� Terms of reference for European stress tests and peer

review drafted by WENRA and endorsed by ENSREG


General Approach of Stress Tests

� Targeted reassessment of robustness and safety

margins of nuclear installations in light of the first

lessons learned from Fukushima

� Technical topics:

─ External hazards

─ Loss of safety systems

─ Severe accident management

� Complementary approach to the continuous

improvement process


Stress Tests and Peer Review Steps(NPP)

� June – 31 October:

─ Assessment of plants by operators requested by nationalRegulators

� 31 October – 1 January:

─ Review of operators assessments by national Regulators

─ National report to the EC

� 1 January – 26 April:

─ Peer review of national reports


European Peer Review

� 80 experts from all over Europe for 4

months

� First-of-a-kind opportunity to shareresults and compare practicesbetween European countries

� Output:

─ European level recommendations

─ National level recommendations

� Public outreach


Participants

Nuclear Member States• Belgium

• Bulgaria

• Czech Republic

• Finland

• France

• Germany

• Hungary

• Lithuania

• Netherlands

• Romania

• Slovakia

• Slovenia

• Sweden

• Spain

• United Kingdom

European Commission

Nuclear Non-Member States• Ukraine

• Switzerland

Non Nuclear Member States• Austria

• Denmark

• Ireland

• Italy

• Luxembourg

• Poland

Observers• Canada

• Croatia

• IAEA

• Japan

• UAE

• USA


Content


Organization






National Level Conclusions

� 17 country reports with specificrecommendations

(see ENSREG website)


European Level Conclusions (1)

� Periodic Safety Reviews (PSR) are

essential for continuous improvement

of safety─ Necessity to re-evaluate natural hazards at

least every 10 years

� Need for European guidance on

assessment of natural hazards and

margins─ WENRA task group to be established


European Level Conclusions (2)

� Need to maintain containment integrity─ Urgent implementation of recognized measures (H2

explosion prevention…), for NPPs where they are

not yet implemented

� Need to strengthen the robustness ofNPPs to beyond design situations, as a

way to prevent accidents resulting from

unforeseen/extreme natural hazards and to

limit their consequences─ Bunkered equipment,

─ Mobile equipment and off-site rescue teams to

assist site…


Emergency Preparedness

� Strong demand for a European initiative on off-siteemergency preparedness resulting from public

interaction.

─ This subject was not part of the mandate of the peer

review.

─ Important work to be performed at national and international

levels on management preparedness and post-accidental

planning


Content


Organization






Specifics of French Approach

� Complementary safety assessment = French version ofstress tests

� Complementary safety assessment include:─ EPR (in construction)

─ Other installations than NPP

─ Social, organizational and human factors

� Highest priority installations (including all NPP) treated in2011, others from 2012 on

� Results of European peer review fully taken into account inASN positions


Steps in ASN Positions

�3rd January 2012 ASN conclusions: formal report

and ASN’s opinion about stress

tests

�26th June 2012 ASN legally binding requirements

(license conditions) to Utilities on

improvements to be implemented


ASN general conclusion

after stress tests

“the facilities examined offer asafety level that is sufficient forASN not to request the immediateshutdown of any of them […]. Atthe same time, ASN considersthat continued operation of thefacilities requires that theirrobustness to extreme situationsbe increased beyond the existingsafety margins, as soon aspossible.”


Improvements expected

Need for a « hardened safety core »

(technical and organizational measures)which remains operational under conditions considered in the stress tests

Establish a Nuclear rapid response force for NPPs (specialist

crew and equipment within 24 h to the site)

Reinforced measures to reduce

the risk of dewatering of the

spent fuel pools

Feasibility studies to protect the groundwater and surface waters in

case of severe accident

Organizational & human

Factors are essential to

nuclear safety• Renewal of the licenseeworkforces and skills• Organisation of the use ofsubcontracting• Research on these topics

Strengthening of the deviation

processing system

Targeted strengthening of the regulatory safety requirements/guidance�Conformity of the facilities�Earthquake, Flooding�Risks linked to other industrial activities


Content


Organization






Follow-up of French Stress Tests

� Checking implementation of the new license conditions

� Review and revision of regulatory requirements/guidance related tonatural hazards (earthquake and flooding) and risks linked to otherindustrial activities located in the vicinity of nuclear installations

� Completing the stress test for nuclear installations that were not inpriority 1

� Human and organizational factors aspects: ASN established aspecific Committee on Social, Organisational and Human factors,involving licensees and stakeholders

� Continuing work on post accident management issues (CODIRPA)


Follow-up of European Stress tests and Peer Review

� Establishment of national action plan by each country

involved in European stress tests (end of 2012)

� ENSREG peer review of national action plans

─ Ongoing

─ Seminar (end of April 2012)

� Further monitoring of implementation of national action

plans

� WENRA reference levels and objectives review to take into

account the conclusions from stress tests and peer review


Evolution of Safety Approach

� In many cases, regulatory requirements following

Fukushima accident were established in a pragmatic way,

in view of preliminary lessons learned

� Full understanding of the TEPCO Fukushima accident will

be a long term process extending over several years

� Necessary in-depth examination and potential revision of

current safety approach (INSAG, NEA, ..)

─ Robustness assessment to be included in safety

demonstration?

─ Evolution of Defense in Depth concept?


Evolution of Safety Objectives (1)

� The accident at Fukushima confirmed that,

despite all the precautions that are taken for

safety, an accident is always possible.

� It now appears clearly, and has been endorsed in

the conclusions of the extraordinary meeting of the

Contracting Parties to the CNS, that “nuclear

power plants should be designed, constructed and

operated with the objectives of preventing

accidents and, should an accident occur,

mitigating its effects and avoiding off-site

contamination.


Evolution of Safety Objectives (2)

� This objective now needs to be actually implemented.

─ For new NPPs

� It is consistent with WENRA safety objectives for new NPPs

(November 2010)

─ For existing NPPs.

� PSR of the existing reactors should be guided by this

objective of avoiding off-site contamination:

improvements should be implemented on the plants and

those which cannot meet the expectations should be shut

down.


Conclusion

� The necessary improvement of safety relies largelyon the action of the Regulators, for example byhaving the licensing basis updated.• The independence, the transparency and the rigorous

action of the Regulators are a necessary key to thisprocess.

� International cooperation is essential in thisprocess• Contribution to IAEA action plan (Update of safety

standards)

• High level commitment to peer reviews andtransparency of results (CNS, IRRS,…)

Regulatory Response and Changes to Regulatory … · Regulatory Framework Arising from the ......

Documents

Transcript of Regulatory Response and Changes to Regulatory … · Regulatory Framework Arising from the ......