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References 439

Index

AAffect heuristics, 379

Agency, 22, 26, 27, 219, 250, 252, 259–261,

374, 394, 397, 400, 403, 411, 414

Aha! moment, 20, 214

Analytic a priori, 71

Aphasia, 214

Art, 17–19, 21, 124, 274, 309, 373

Articulability, 332–334, 338

Artificial grammar, 31, 312, 337

Associationist psychology, 48, 71

Atmosphere effect, 109, 110

Autism, 209

Automation, 35, 339, 340, 342

BBackground knowledge, 19, 23, 29, 30, 32, 37,

39, 40, 123–125, 131, 132, 204, 205,

211, 226–228, 266, 268, 290, 298, 310,

311, 314, 315, 319, 322, 329, 330, 337,

338, 353, 357, 359–361, 369, 372, 373,

375–378, 398

Base rate neglect, 11, 122–124, 126, 382

Bayes theorem, 238, 382

Belief bias, 110

Bounded rationality, 37, 112, 136, 164, 189,

356, 395, 397, 403, 408

CCampus company, 36, 38, 283, 346, 360, 369,

371, 389

Capitalization of knowledge, 35–38, 345

CAS. See Complex adaptive systems (CAS)

Causal attribution, 2–4, 49, 61, 63–65, 67, 73,

81, 82, 88, 89, 132, 314, 315, 317

Causal cognition, 3, 56, 59–61, 65, 67, 69, 70,

72–74, 81, 384

Causal field, 4, 58, 61–63, 66, 67, 73, 131, 384

Causal laws, 2, 3, 49, 50, 58, 69, 70,

76, 129, 166

Causal mechanism, 3, 13, 54, 70, 143, 157,

272, 273, 276, 277, 298, 314, 349, 357

Causal realism, 3–5, 59, 69

Causal reasoning, 129–131, 384

Causal relation, 2–5, 14, 49–52, 54, 56, 58, 59,

61, 65, 66, 69–76, 82, 83, 86–89, 131,

145, 149–152, 157, 159, 191, 232–234,

236, 246, 272, 297, 318, 349, 384,

396, 405

Causality, 1–5, 47, 69–75, 83, 86, 89, 97, 131,

157, 166, 316, 355, 384

Codification, 30, 32–35, 306, 307, 319–321,

323, 325, 327–329, 331, 332, 338,

339, 342

Codified knowledge, 32, 325

Cognitive rationality, 6, 9–11, 111, 117, 119,

129, 131, 133, 162, 189

Cognitive realism, 1, 22, 24, 191, 192, 219,

231, 237, 242, 243

Cognitive rules, 31, 36, 38, 40, 239, 268, 311,

313, 314, 322

Cognitive unconscious, 213

Common sense, 4, 59, 73, 81, 82, 191, 206,

235, 236

Competential knowledge, 30, 32, 33, 35, 36,

281, 308, 310, 319–321, 323, 326, 327,

330, 333, 338, 346, 354

Complex adaptive systems (CAS), 41–44, 392,

396, 398, 405, 411, 415

Complexity, 27, 36, 37, 40, 42, 67, 81, 108,

112, 158, 183, 224, 250, 252, 346–349,

351, 352, 357–359, 369, 389

Conditional assertion, 227, 354

Confirmation bias, 10, 121, 123, 246, 383, 384

Consciousness, 19, 31, 154, 165, 168, 203, 205,

212, 309, 310, 333, 334

Context of discovery, 182

Context of justification, vi

R. Viale, Methodological Cognitivism, DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40216-6,# Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

441

Contrast model, 4, 73, 130

Conventionalism, 49, 191

Converging technology, 350, 352

Conversational criterion, 3, 63, 130

Conversational implicature, 378

Conversational maxims, 64

Copyright, 35, 36, 345, 346, 393

Counterfactual conditional, 63, 99

Co-variation, 130

Creativity, 17, 19–21, 81, 197, 198, 203, 204,

269, 369

Culture, 7, 15, 21, 22, 27, 28, 30, 52, 70, 96,

130–132, 173, 184, 197–199, 202, 207,

220, 253, 254, 267, 269, 270, 282, 283,

290, 296, 300, 315, 317, 328, 356, 369,

386, 393, 396, 398

DDecision making, 12, 14, 22, 27, 37, 39, 40,

161, 219, 224, 245, 251, 252, 254–256,

258, 260, 261, 337, 353–356, 369,

372–375, 379, 380, 414

Decoupling, 360, 376, 377

Deduction, 8, 99, 100, 104, 111, 156, 184, 186,

199, 224, 239, 355, 400

Deductive rationality, 6–8, 93, 184

Default realism, 5, 86, 87

Disciplinary matrix, 115, 378

Discovery, 1, 9, 10, 15, 17, 19, 24, 25, 76, 85,

117–119, 123, 128, 131, 150, 159, 160,

173, 177, 179, 181, 182, 189, 190, 204,

205, 233, 236, 237, 239, 240, 245–247,

270, 272, 273, 275, 276, 278, 280, 281,

297, 349, 350, 364, 395, 398, 400

Domain-generality of causality, 53, 56, 59

Domain-specificity of causality, 54, 56, 58,

75

Double helix, 400

Duality of mind, 379

Dyslexia, 157, 210

EEcological rationality, 190

Elitism, 22, 25, 224, 248, 260, 262, 265

Emotionism, 48

Empathy, 21, 209, 210, 215, 216

Empirical realism of causation (ERC), 2, 50, 52

Entrepreneurial University, 37, 41, 282, 283,

356, 364, 401, 406, 413, 416

Epistemological market, 24–27, 248–252,

260–262, 266

Evolutionary triple helix (ETH), 402, 409

Exemplar, 137, 232, 317

Experimental philosophy, 1, 2, 47–49, 82

Explicit knowledge, 230, 275, 298, 299, 308,

313, 319

FFalsificationism, 264

Feasibility, 5, 51, 83, 134, 136, 231

Feasibility criterion, 56, 59, 65, 83

First academic revolution, 368

First industrial revolution, 28, 35, 273, 275,

281, 282, 291, 322, 345, 348, 349, 351,

352, 354, 367, 399

Frame effect, 34, 183, 340

Fuzzy logic, 7, 98, 103, 185

GGestalt shift, 127

Government, 22, 26, 28, 36–38, 43, 44, 219,

250, 253, 255, 259–263, 278, 283, 287,

290, 292, 299, 346, 356, 360, 368, 370,

374, 377, 393, 398–402, 404, 407, 409,

411, 414, 415

Group, 12, 13, 22, 23, 26, 27, 39, 40, 53, 79,

110, 115, 123, 128, 140–142, 165, 175,

194, 195, 216, 220–222, 224, 225, 228,

230, 232, 239, 246, 248–252, 260, 262,

266, 269, 278, 284, 288, 297, 310, 316,

317, 329, 360, 365, 367, 370, 372, 373,

375, 387, 406

Group team, 378

Group think, 378

HHumean causality, 60, 87

IImplicit cognitive rules (ICR), 31, 32, 314,

318–322, 329, 330, 338, 356, 359, 371,

373, 375, 378

Implicit learning, 31, 32, 312, 313, 319, 321,

337, 338, 355

Incentive, 25, 27–29, 33, 36, 38, 41, 42, 44,

220, 225, 247, 255, 262, 278, 283,

288–290, 296–300, 333, 339, 341, 346,

362, 369, 370, 392–397, 403–407, 409,

411, 412, 414, 415

Incubation, 20, 213, 214, 382

442 Index

Induction, 205, 280, 281, 355

Industry, 28, 34, 36, 37, 39, 42–44, 171, 262,

263, 266, 271, 275–278, 280, 282, 289,

291–293, 295, 299, 340, 341, 346, 356,

359, 363, 371, 372, 387, 388, 398–402,

404, 406–410

Infant, 3, 5, 52, 54, 56, 69, 70, 72, 73, 76, 80,

84, 129, 232, 314

Informativeness criterion, 64

Innovation, 1, 19, 21, 27–30, 36, 37, 40–44,

164, 204, 205, 248, 254, 260, 262, 263,

265, 305, 309, 310, 320–323, 336, 346,

348, 349, 352, 353, 355–357, 359, 361,

363, 367–369, 388, 389, 391–393, 396,

397, 399, 401–406, 408–415

Innovation policy, 1, 368, 393

Insight, 20, 21, 211, 214, 327, 362, 365

Insufficient but Necessary part of an

Unnecessary but Sufficient (INUS), 4,

61, 73

Internalism, 78, 191

Intuition, 1–4, 7, 47, 48, 51, 54, 56, 59, 76, 82,

99, 100, 111, 185–188, 212, 236, 307,

314, 317, 355

Intuitive theories, 3, 4, 53, 54, 70, 74, 315

Invention, 15, 27, 35, 39, 88, 95, 159, 173, 207,

233, 267, 270, 271, 273–277, 281, 282,

284, 287, 288, 297, 317, 336, 345, 346,

348, 349, 352, 354, 357, 359, 367, 371,

398, 399, 401, 413

Irrational Escalation, 385, 386

JJanus scientist, 36, 346, 388, 402

KKalı scientist, 399

LLanguage, 6, 20, 31, 36, 40, 59, 65, 79, 80, 89,

94, 100, 102, 103, 111, 137, 156–158,

160, 161, 166, 167, 199, 200, 202,

208–210, 214, 233, 235, 311, 312,

326–331, 334–338, 342, 346, 350, 351,

353, 354, 375, 400

Left hemisphere, 20, 209, 210, 214

MMemory, 8, 13, 14, 40, 51, 77, 78, 80, 83, 106,

112, 113, 141, 156, 158, 159, 161, 167,

170, 174, 213, 236–238, 241, 313, 336,

337, 350, 351, 355, 375, 379, 381, 395

Mirror neurons, 21, 209, 215, 216

Mode 1, 362

Mode 2, 362

Modernism, 76, 78, 79, 228

Modularity of mind, 75

Modus ponens, 103, 104, 176, 355

Modus tollens, 103–105, 238, 355, 383

Moral reasoning, 48

Muller-Lyer illusion, 4, 74, 238

Myopia, 40, 374, 386

NNational Innovation System, 40, 391

Naturalized epistemology, 231, 233, 235

Naturalizing epistemology, 6, 50, 59, 65, 93,

188, 231

Neocorporatist triple helix, 402, 404

Neuroethics, 48

Nomological causality, 58

Norm theory, 63, 130

Normality criterion, 3, 4, 63, 64, 73

OObservable, 2, 5, 49, 83, 150, 151, 167, 194

Operational rules, 40, 376, 378–380, 384–390

PPaleologic thinking, 96

Patent, 28, 35, 36, 38, 39, 262, 263, 283, 288,

299, 345, 346, 352, 359, 360, 362–365,

367, 368, 370, 371, 374, 377, 393, 396,

400, 411

Perceptual modularity, 52

Physical causality, 52, 54, 60, 70, 87, 129

Polyvalent knowledge, 362

Pragmatism, 3, 77, 183, 193–196, 229–243, 269

Principle of common cause, 62, 149, 150, 157

Probabilistic contrast model, 3, 64, 65

Probability, 11, 29, 62, 77, 88, 120, 122–127,

134, 143, 144, 146, 147, 149, 151, 168,

184–187, 189, 227, 238, 264, 270, 296,

315, 355, 382, 385

Problem solving, 10, 14, 19, 36, 37, 39, 40,

118, 169, 174, 177, 181, 188, 190, 200,

241, 259, 264, 321, 331, 347, 354, 356,

358, 372, 375, 378, 380, 382, 387, 399

Propositional calculus, 95, 100, 110, 355

Prospect Theory, 385, 386

Psychological causality, 69, 70, 83, 97

Index 443

QQuasi firm, 27, 260, 262, 266

RRationality, 1, 50, 83, 93–137, 139, 162, 197,

219, 247, 290, 317, 356, 379, 395

Realism, 1, 50, 83–89, 114, 183, 203, 219,

245–266

Reasoning, 1, 2, 4, 6–8, 10–13, 17, 20, 36, 37,

39, 40, 47–49, 54, 56, 58, 59, 61, 63, 65,

71, 73, 76, 77, 82, 89, 95, 96, 98–103,

105, 107, 108, 110–113, 139–141, 158,

159, 161, 162, 164, 177, 184, 185, 187,

192, 198, 205, 220, 236–240, 245, 246,

268, 297, 314–317, 319, 347, 353–356,

358, 360, 369–375, 378–380, 390, 395

Reductionist conventionalism of causation

(RCC), 49

Reflective equilibrium, 10–12, 50, 82, 118,

121, 127, 128, 130, 133, 134, 187

Regional innovation system, 410

Regret theory, 383, 385

Relativism, 23, 226, 228, 269, 317

Relevance, 14, 27, 62, 64, 130, 147, 149, 150,

152, 252, 306, 336, 374, 382

Relevance theory, 62, 306

Reliabilism, 236

Right hemisphere, 20, 210, 214

Risk, 28, 29, 50, 77, 79, 135, 145, 154, 187,

267, 269, 284, 289, 292, 294–297, 300,

301, 355, 361, 369, 374,

385–387, 389

SSchizophrenic thinking, 97

Science Park, 342, 412, 415

Science policy, 1, 21, 24, 342

Scientific revolution, 322, 398

Screening-off, 62, 145, 149

Second academic revolution, 43, 364,

368, 407

Second industrial revolution, 35, 274, 289, 291,

323, 346, 349, 350, 352, 354, 398, 400

Selection task, 105, 355

Sentimentalism, 48

Single helix, 398

Situationism, 48

Skill, 18, 29–35, 43, 80, 81, 87, 95, 115, 129,

136, 140, 159, 164, 184, 187, 188, 200,

201, 207–210, 213, 222, 239, 245, 273,

290, 307–310, 312–314, 319, 320, 327,

330, 331, 338–342, 361, 371, 377, 397,

400, 408, 412

Social causality, 51, 52, 70

Social epistemology, 1, 21, 22, 24–26, 219,

245, 248, 250, 251, 253, 260, 261, 265

Social norms, 39, 161, 220, 225, 227, 241, 243,

353, 355, 359, 361, 380, 386

Social reliability, 24, 27, 242, 243, 245, 252,

253, 261

Spin-off(s), 4, 41, 44, 282, 287, 368, 395,

401, 405, 408, 409, 413

Start-up, 34, 341

Subjunctive conditional, 14, 62, 148, 149,

151, 152

Sunk cost, 386, 387

Supervenience, 3, 70

Syllogism, 8, 97, 108, 109, 112, 226

Synthetic a priori, 4, 69, 71, 72, 81

System 1 of Mind, 1, 47

System 2 of Mind, 1, 47

TTacit knowledge, 30, 38, 213, 230, 282, 299,

305–307, 329, 342, 354, 359, 360, 370,

371, 377, 396, 400, 401

Tacitness, 306, 335, 336, 341, 359

Technology transfer, 1, 38, 42, 260, 305, 307,

321, 348, 369, 371, 377, 387, 389, 403,

406, 412, 415

Theoretical realism of causation (TRC), 2,

50, 51

Thinking, 7, 20, 21, 36, 39, 40, 56, 61, 71, 74,

96, 120, 147, 207, 210–212, 214, 246,

251, 277, 315–317, 347, 354, 356, 361,

370, 372, 375, 384, 385, 390

Third industrial revolution, 322, 398–401

Time discounting, 40, 374, 386

TRC. See Theoretical realism of causation

(TRC)

Translatability, 331, 401

Triple helix, 37, 40, 41, 43, 44, 283, 356, 368,

388, 391

Truth, 1, 60, 75, 94, 119, 149, 163, 206, 219,

245, 276, 329, 353, 372, 401

UUncertainty, 258, 269, 385

University, 37–39, 41–44, 73, 104, 170, 221,

253, 262, 280, 283, 299, 301, 315, 317,

348, 356, 357, 359–362, 365, 368–370,

372, 374–377, 387, 389, 394–397,

399–402, 404–409, 412, 415, 416

444 Index

About the Author

Riccardo Viale is Professor of Epistemology of Social Sciences at the University

of Milano-Bicocca.

He is Editor in Chief of Mind & Society (Springer) and the author or editor of

many Books such as Modelling the Mind (with K.A. Moyeldin Said, H. Newton

Smith and K.V. Wilkes, Clarendon Press, 1990); Economics, Bounded Rationalityand the Cognitive Revolution (with H. Simon, M. Egidi and R. Marris, Elgar, 1992,

2008), Knowledge and Politics (Physica-Verlag, 2001), Biological and Culturalbases of Human Inferences (with D. Andler and L. Hirschfeld, Erlbaum, 2006), TheCapitalization of Knowledge (with H. Etzkowitz, Elgar, 2010), MethodologicalCognitivism vol 1 Mind, Rationality, and Society (Springer-Verlag, 2012).

His research Interests are the cognitive foundation of social action, the cognitive

theory of economic rationality, cognitive approaches in philosophy of science and

social epistemology, tacit knowledge and science policy.

R. Viale, Methodological Cognitivism, DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40216-6,# Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

445

Riccardo Viale

Methodological CognitivismVolume 1: Mind, Rationality, and Society

1. Introduction

Part I Cognitive Rationality and Society

2. Psychologism and Anti-Psychologism

3. The Mind-Society Problem

4. Cognition and Rationality of Beliefs in the Social Sciences

5. Brain, Mind and Social Action

Part II Cognitive Economics

6. Developing Simon’s Bounded Rationality

7. Feasibility and Realism in Cognitive Economics

8. Economic and Cognitive Rationality in Political Behaviour

9. Which Mind for Cognitive Economics?

10. Epistemological Pluralism and Economics

11. Neurocognition and Financial Behaviour

Part III Mind, Culture and Epistemological Universals

12. Subjective Rationality and Cultural Diversity

13. Biology and Culture of Human Inference

14. Cognitive Diversity in Western and Eastern Thinking

15. Adaptive Theory Change as Epistemological Universal

R. Viale, Methodological Cognitivism, DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40216-6,# Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

447