Republic Act No. 9700 August 7, 2009AN ACT STRENGTHENING THE COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN REFORM PROGRAM (CARP), EXTENDING THE ACQUISITION AND DISTRIBUTION OF ALL AGRICULTURAL LANDS, INSTITUTING NECESSARY REFORMS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6657, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN REFORM LAW OF 1988, AS AMENDED, AND APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFORSection 19.Section 50 of Republic Act No. 6657, as amended, is hereby further amended by adding Section 50-A to read as follows:"SEC. 50-A.Exclusive Jurisdiction on Agrarian Dispute. - No court or prosecutor's office shall take cognizance of cases pertaining to the implementation of the CARP except those provided under Section 57 of Republic Act No. 6657, as amended. If there is an allegation from any of the parties that the case is agrarian in nature and one of the parties is a farmer, farmworker, or tenant, the case shall be automatically referred by the judge or the prosecutor to the DAR which shall determine and certify within fifteen (15) days from referral whether an agrarian dispute exists: Provided, That from the determination of the DAR, an aggrieved party shall have judicial recourse. In cases referred by the municipal trial court and the prosecutor's office, the appeal shall be with the proper regional trial court, and in cases referred by the regional trial court, the appeal shall be to the Court of Appeals."In cases where regular courts or quasi-judicial bodies have competent jurisdiction, agrarian reform beneficiaries or identified beneficiaries and/or their associations shall have legal standing and interest to intervene concerning their individual or collective rights and/or interests under the CARP."The fact of non-registration of such associations with the Securities and Exchange Commission, or Cooperative Development Authority, or any concerned government agency shall not be used against them to deny the existence of their legal standing and interest in a case filed before such courts and quasi-judicial bodies."

LAND CONVERSION (REFERENCE: http://afrim.org.ph/IDLS/files/original/4e0171313f02a7b89fdbd08223a517d6.pdf)What is an illegal conversion? It is the conversion of the landowners agricultural land into the following reasons: With the intent to convert the land into any non-agricultural use and to avoid the application of RA 6657 to its landholdings; With the intent to dispossess the landowners tenant farmers; or To sell, transfer, convey or change the nature of lands outside urban centers and city limits, either in whole or in part, after the affectivity of RA 6657.

What are the different ways in committing illegal conversion? There are two ways of committing illegal conversion: Elements of the 1st type: The offender is the landowner He/She converts his/her agricultural land into non-agricultural use without authority or clearance from DARThe intention of the conversion is to avoid the application of RA 6657 and to dispossess the farmers of the land tilled by them Elements of the 2nd type: Offender is the landowner He/She changes the nature of the agricultural land, in whole or in part Land is located outside urban centers and city limits Act was committed after 15 June 1988

G.R. No. 78517 February 27, 1989GABINO ALITA, JESUS JULIAN, JR., JESUS JULIAN, SR., PEDRO RICALDE, VICENTE RICALDE and ROLANDO SALAMAR,petitioners,vs.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ENRIQUE M. REYES, PAZ M. REYES and FE M. REYES,respondents.Bureau of Agrarian Legal Assistance for petitioners.Leonardo N. Zulueta for Enrique Reyes, et al. Adolfo S. Azcuna for private respondents.PARAS,J.:Before us is a petition seeking the reversal of the decision rendered by the respondent Court of Appeals**on March 3, 1987 affirming the judgment of the court a quo dated April 29, 1986, the dispositive portion of the trial court's decision reading as follows;WHEREFORE, the decision rendered by this Court on November 5, 1982 is hereby reconsidered and a new judgment is hereby rendered:1. Declaring that Presidential Decree No. 27 is inapplicable to lands obtained thru the homestead law,2. Declaring that the four registered co-owners will cultivate and operate the farmholding themselves as owners thereof; and3. Ejecting from the land the so-called tenants, namely; Gabino Alita, Jesus Julian, Sr., Jesus Julian, Jr., Pedro Ricalde, Vicente Ricalde and Rolando Salamar, as the owners would want to cultivate the farmholding themselves.No pronouncement as to costs.SO ORDERED. (p. 31, Rollo)The facts are undisputed. The subject matter of the case consists of two (2) parcels of land, acquired by private respondents' predecessors-in-interest through homestead patent under the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 141. Said lands are situated at Guilinan, Tungawan, Zamboanga del Sur.Private respondents herein are desirous of personally cultivating these lands, but petitioners refuse to vacate, relying on the provisions of P.D. 27 and P.D. 316 and appurtenant regulations issued by the then Ministry of Agrarian Reform (DAR for short), now Department of Agrarian Reform (MAR for short).On June 18, 1981, private respondents (then plaintiffs), instituted a complaint against Hon. Conrado Estrella as then Minister of Agrarian Reform, P.D. Macarambon as Regional Director of MAR Region IX, and herein petitioners (then defendants) for the declaration of P.D. 27 and all other Decrees, Letters of Instructions and General Orders issued in connection therewith as inapplicable to homestead lands.Defendants filed their answer with special and affirmative defenses of July 8, 1981.Subsequently, on July 19, 1982, plaintiffs filed an urgent motion to enjoin the defendants from declaring the lands in litigation under Operation Land Transfer and from being issued land transfer certificates to which the defendants filed their opposition dated August 4, 1982.On November 5, 1982, the then Court of Agrarian Relations 16th Regional District, Branch IV, Pagadian City (now Regional Trial Court, 9th Judicial Region, Branch XVIII) rendered its decision dismissing the said complaint and the motion to enjoin the defendants was denied.On January 4, 1983, plaintiffs moved to reconsider the Order of dismissal, to which defendants filed their opposition on January 10, 1983.Thus, on April 29, 1986, the Regional Trial Court issued the aforequoted decision prompting defendants to move for a reconsideration but the same was denied in its Order dated June 6, 1986.On appeal to the respondent Court of Appeals, the same was sustained in its judgment rendered on March 3, 1987, thus:WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error thereof, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.SO ORDERED. (p. 34, Rollo)Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari.The pivotal issue is whether or not lands obtained through homestead patent are covered by the Agrarian Reform under P.D. 27.The question certainly calls for a negative answer.We agree with the petitioners in saying that P.D. 27 decreeing the emancipation of tenants from the bondage of the soil and transferring to them ownership of the land they till is a sweeping social legislation, a remedial measure promulgated pursuant to the social justice precepts of the Constitution. However, such contention cannot be invoked to defeat the very purpose of the enactment of the Public Land Act or Commonwealth Act No. 141. Thus,The Homestead Act has been enacted for the welfare and protection of the poor. The law gives a needy citizen a piece of land where he may build a modest house for himself and family and plant what is necessary for subsistence and for the satisfaction of life's other needs. The right of the citizens to their homes and to the things necessary for their subsistence is as vital as the right to life itself. They have a right to live with a certain degree of comfort as become human beings, and the State which looks after the welfare of the people's happiness is under a duty to safeguard the satisfaction of this vital right. (Patricio v. Bayog, 112 SCRA 45)In this regard, the Philippine Constitution likewise respects the superiority of the homesteaders' rights over the rights of the tenants guaranteed by the Agrarian Reform statute. In point is Section 6 of Article XIII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution which provides:Section 6. The State shall apply the principles of agrarian reform or stewardship, whenever applicable in accordance with law, in the disposition or utilization of other natural resources, including lands of public domain under lease or concession suitable to agriculture, subject to prior rights, homestead rights of small settlers, and the rights of indigenous communities to their ancestral lands.Additionally, it is worthy of note that the newly promulgated Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 or Republic Act No. 6657 likewise contains a proviso supporting the inapplicability of P.D. 27 to lands covered by homestead patents like those of the property in question, reading,Section 6. Retention Limits. ...... Provided further, That original homestead grantees or their direct compulsory heirs who still own the original homestead at the time of the approval of this Act shall retain the same areas as long as they continue to cultivate said homestead.'WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals sustaining the decision of the Regional Trial Court is hereby AFFIRMED.SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 139083.August 30, 2001]FLORENCIA PARIS,petitioner, vs. DIONISIO A. ALFECHE, JUAN L. ALFECHE, MAXIMO N. PADILLA, DIONISIO Q. MATILOS, Heirs of GREG A. ALFECHE, DIONISIO W. MATILO, SIMPLICIO L. ADAYA, TEOFILO M. DE GUZMAN, FRANCISCO B. DINGLE and MARIFE NAVARO,respondents.D E C I S I O NPANGANIBAN,J.:Homesteads are not exempt from the operation of the Land Reform Law.The right to retain seven hectares of land is subject to the condition that the landowner is actually cultivating that area or will cultivate it upon the effectivity of the said law.The CaseThe Petition for Review before us assails the June 4, 1999 Decision of the Court of Appeals[1](CA), in CA-GR SP No. 45738, which affirmed the ruling of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB).The decretal portion of the CA Decision reads:WHEREFORE, [there being] no grave abuse of discretion x x x committed by DARAB, the instant petition is herebyDENIED DUE COURSEandDISMISSED.Costs against the petitioner.[2]The Decision of the DARAB, which was affirmed by the CA, had disposed as follows:WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision dated March 19, 1992 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a new one is entered:1.Declaring the private respondents to be full owners of the land they till pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27 and Executive Order No. 228;2.Declaring the validity of the Emancipation Patents issued to private respondents; and3.Dismissing the case.[3]The FactsThe Court of Appeals narrates the facts thus:Petitioner is the registered owner of a parcel of land situated at Paitan, Quezon, Bukidnon with an area of 10.6146 hectares, more or less, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-8275 and another property with an area of 13.2614 hectares covered by Original Certificate of Title No. P-4985, also located at Paitan, Quezon, Bukidnon; the said parcels are fully tenanted by private respondents herein who are recipients of Emancipation Patents in their names pursuant to Operation Land Transfer under P.D. 27 (Annexes A, A-1 to A-18) notwithstanding the fact that neither the tenants nor the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) [has] paid a single centavo for the said land.Petitioner and the tenants have not signed any Land Transfer Production Agreement.Petitioner and her children have been deprived of their property without due process of law and without just compensation, especially so that the tenants have already stopped paying rentals as of December 1988 to the damage and prejudice of petitioner.Petitioner contends that since she is entitled to a retention of seven (7) hectares under P.D. 27 and/or 5 hectares and 3 hectares each for her children under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL), the tenants are not supposed to acquire the subject land and the Emancipation Patents precipitately issued to them are null and void for being contrary to law.Petitioner further alleged that she owns the subject property covered by OCT No. P-4985 as original homestead grantee who still owned the same when Republic Act No. 6657 was approved, thus she is entitled to retain the area to the exclusion of her tenants.As regards TCT No. 8275, petitioner has applied for retention of seven hectares per Letter of Retention attached as Annex B, that the lands subject of the instant petition are covered by Homestead Patents, and as decided by the Supreme Court in the cases of Patricio vs. Bayug (112 SCRA 41) and Alita vs. Court of Appeals (170 SCRA 706), the homesteaders and their heirs have the right to cultivate their homesteads personally, which is a superior right over that of tenant-farmers.Petitioner moved for the cancellation and recall of the Emancipation Patents issued to private respondents-farmers and to restore to petitioner and her children the ownership and cultivation of the subject lots plus payment of back rentals from the time they stopped paying the same until ejected therefrom.Respondents filed their answer dated May 29, 1991 and admitted the generation and issuance of Emancipation Patents to private respondents as tenant-farmers thereof and the Supreme Court rulings on the Bayug and Alita cases relative to homestead patents, but denied the rest of the material allegations for want of knowledge or information as to the truth relative thereto.Respondents alleged that when the subject lands were covered under P.D. 27, the petitioner was repeatedly informed and invited by the DAR Office at Valencia, Bukidnon to thresh out the matter; that petitioners right to retain seven (7) hectares is not absolute since she owns other agricultural landholdings, thus disqualifying her to retain the area, aside from the fact that she has other properties sufficient to support her family as shown in the Certification of the Provincial Assessors Office listing down the petitioners landholdings (Annex 2).By way of special affirmative defenses, respondents averred that the criteria set forth under P.D. 27 were observed before the generation of the Emancipation Patents; that under Executive Order No. 228, the tenant-farmers under P.D. 27 are deemed full owners of the lands they till and the lease rentals paid by them should be considered as amortization payments; that under LOI 474, petitioner who owns more than seven (7) hectares of lands are not entitled to retention.Respondents prayed for the dismissal of the case.They likewise prayed that the Emancipation Patents issued to private respondents and their peaceful possession of their farm lots be respected.The Adjudicatora quoconducted a hearing and afforded the parties their day in court and the opportunity to present their evidence.On August 13, 1991, the Adjudicatoraquoissued an Order for the parties to submit their respective position papers with evidence to buttress their allegations.On March 10, 1992, the Adjudicatora quorendered the decision, thus:WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, this Adjudicator declares the following:1.That all the Emancipation Patents issued to tenants-respondents shall be cancelled and recalled;2.That the Register of Deeds of Malaybalay, Bukidnon shall cancel all Emancipation Patents registered under the names of the herein tenants-respondents; and3.That back rentals due to the petitioners, which were given to the LBP as amortizations, shall be given to the said petitioner.[4]On appeal, the DARAB reversed the adjudicator.Ruling of the Court of AppealsThe CA rejected the claim of petitioner.It ruled that she could not retain her homesteads, since she was not the actual cultivator thereof.It also held that she and her heirs had not been deprived of their right to retain the area mandated by law, because the records showed that they had other agricultural landholdings.Finally, it ruled that she had not been deprived of her properties without just compensation, since Section 2 of Executive Order 228 declared that tenant-farmers of agricultural lands under P.D. 27 are deemed owners of the land they till and the lease rentals paid by them shall be considered as amortization payments.[5]Hence, this Petition.[6]The IssuesIn her Memorandum, petitioner submits the following issues for our consideration:I.Whether or not the original homesteads issued under the public land act [are] exempted from the operation of land reform.II.Granting arguendo that homesteads are not exempt, whether or not the Emancipation Patents issued to the respondents are valid notwithstanding lack of payment of just compensation.III.On the assumption that homesteads are exempt from land reform and/or the emancipation patents are illegally issued hence, void, can the respondents be ejected from the premises in question?[7]The Courts RulingThe Petition is partly meritorious.Respondents are entitled to the lands they till, subject to the determination and payment of just compensation to petitioner.First Issue:Petitioners Homesteads NotExempt from Land ReformPetitioner contends that because the subject properties are covered by homestead patents, they are exempt from the operation of land reform.In support of her position, she cites the casesAlita v. CA[8]andPatricio v. Bayug,[9]in which the Court ruled that homesteaders had a superior right to cultivate their homesteads as against their tenants.Petitioners contention is without legal basis.Presidential Decree (PD) No. 27, under which the Emancipation Patents sought to be cancelled here were issued to respondents, applies to all tenanted private agricultural lands primarily devoted to rice and corn under a system of share-crop or lease-tenancy, whether classified as landed estate or not.[10]The law makes no exceptions whatsoever in its coverage.Nowhere therein does it appear that lots obtained by homestead patents are exempt from its operation.The matter is made even clearer by Department Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 1978, which states: Tenanted private agricultural lands primarily devoted to rice and/or corn which have been acquired under the provisions of Commonwealth Act 141, as amended, shall also be covered by Operation Land Transfer.Unquestionably, petitioners parcels of land, though obtained by homestead patents under Commonwealth Act 141, are covered by land reform under PD 27.Petitioners claimed entitlement to retain seven (7) hectares is also untenable.PD 27, which provides the retention limit, states:In all cases, the landowner may retain an area of not more than seven (7) hectares if such landowner is cultivating such area or will now cultivate it.Clearly, the right to retain an area of seven hectares is not absolute.It is premised on the condition that the landowner is cultivating the area sought to be retained or will actually cultivate it upon effectivity of the law.In the case at bar, neither of the conditions for retention is present.As admitted by petitioner herself, the subject parcels are fully tenanted; thus, she is clearly not cultivating them, nor will she personally cultivate any part thereof.Undoubtedly, therefore, she has no right to retain any portion of her landholdings.Even under the current primary law on agrarian reform, Republic Act (RA) No. 6657, to which the application of PD 27 is suppletory, petitioners lands are subject to land reform.The said Act lays down the rights of homestead grantees as follows:SEC. 6.Retention Limits. Except as otherwise provided in this Act, no person may own or retain, directly or indirectly, any public or private agricultural land, the size of which shall vary according to factors governing a viable family-sized farm, such as commodity produced, terrain, infrastructure, and soil fertility as determined by the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) created hereunder, but in no case shall retention by the landowner exceed five (5) hectares.Three (3) hectares may be awarded to each child of the landowner, subject to the following qualifications: (1) that he is at least fifteen (15) years of age; and (2) that he is actually tilling the land or directly managing the farm; Provided, That landowners whose lands have been covered by PD 27 shall be allowed to keep the area originally retained by them thereunder; Provided, further,That original homestead grantees or their direct compulsory heirs who still own the original homestead at the time of the approval of this Act shall retain the same areas as long as they continue to cultivate said homestead.(italics supplied)Indisputably, homestead grantees or their direct compulsory heirs can own and retain the original homesteads, only foras long as they continue to cultivatethem.That parcels of land are covered by homestead patents will not automatically exempt them from the operation of land reform.It is the fact of continued cultivation by the original grantees or their direct compulsory heirs that shall exempt their lands from land reform coverage.In the present case, as previously pointed out, neither petitioner nor her heirs are personally cultivating the subject homesteads.The DAR and the CA found that respondents were the ones who had been cultivating their respective portions of the disputed properties.However, petitioner can retain five (5) hectares in accordance with Section 6 of RA 6657, which requires no qualifying condition for the landowner to be entitled to retain such area.This ruling is in line withAssociation of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform,from which we quote:x x x.In any event, assuming that the petitioners have not yet exercised their retention rights, if any, under PD No. 27, the Court holds that they are entitled to the new retention rights provided for by RA No. 6657, which in fact are on the whole more liberal than those granted by the decree.Petitioners heirs, however, are not entitled to awards of three (3) hectares each, since they are not actually tilling the parcels or directly managing the farm.Patricio v. Bayug and Alita v. CANot ApplicablePetitioner insists that the appellate court ignored the ruling of the Court inPatricio v. Bayug[11]andAlita v. CA.[12]She relies on the following pronouncement inPatricio:We hold that the more paramount and superior policy consideration is to uphold the right of the homesteader and his heirs to own and cultivate personally the land acquired from the State without being encumbered by tenancy relations.[13]She also cites the statement inAlitathat the inapplicability of P.D. 27 to lands covered by homestead patents like those of the property in question finds support in the aforecited Section 6 of RA 6657.[14]A closer look at these cases shows that they are not applicable to the issues in the present case.InPatricio, the owner and his heirs had previously cultivated the homestead, which was later sold but subsequently reconveyed to the former.After the reconveyance, the owners heirs wanted to resume their cultivation of the homestead, but the previous buyers tenants did not want to leave it.InAlita, the owner was also desirous of personally cultivating the homestead; but the tenants, not wanting to relinquish it, were asserting their own right to continue cultivating it.Thus, under these circumstances, the Court upheld the right of the homestead owners over that of the tenants.In the case at bar, petitioner herself has not personally cultivated the parcels of land.Neither has she or her heirs expressed, at any time, any desire to cultivate them personally.She is invoking, yet is clearly not intending to ever actually exercise, her alleged right as homesteader to own and personally cultivate them.Thus, the rulings in bothPatricioandAlita, which are in line with the state objective of fostering owner cultivatorship[15]and of abolishing tenancy,[16]would be inapplicable to the present case.Since petitioner and her heirs have evinced no intention of actually cultivating the lands or even directly managing the farm, they will undoubtedly continue to be absentee landlords.Therefore, to blindly and indiscriminately apply the ruling in the cited cases would be tantamount to encouraging feudalistic practices and going against the very essence of agrarian reform.This we cannot sanction.Second Issue: Just CompensationIt is undisputed that the subject parcels were covered by Operation Land Transfer under PD 27, and that private respondents were identified as beneficiaries.In fact, Emancipation Patents have already been issued to them.Petitioner, however, claims that she was not paid just compensation and, thus, prays for the cancellation of the Emancipation Patents issued to respondents under PD 27. She contends that it is illegal for the DAR to take property without full payment of just compensation[;] until full payment is done the title and ownership remain with the landholder.[17]Petitioners contention has merit.Section 2 of PD 266 states:After the tenant-farmer shall have fully complied with the requirements for a grant of title under Presidential Decree No. 27, an Emancipation Patent and/or Grant shall be issued by the Department of Agrarian Reform on the basis of a duly approved survey plan.On the other hand, paragraphs 8 and 9 of PD 27 reads as follows:For the purpose of determining the cost of the land to be transferred to the tenant-farmer pursuant to this Decree, the value of the land shall be equivalent to two and one-half (2 ) times the average harvest of three normal crop years immediately preceding the promulgation of this Decree;The total cost of the land, including interest at the rate of six (6) per centum per annum, shall be paid by the tenant in fifteen (15) years of fifteen (15) equal annual amortizations[.]Although, under the law, tenant farmers are already deemed owners of the land they till, they are still required to pay the cost of the land, including interest, within fifteen years before the title is transferred to them.Thus, the Court held inAssociation of Small Landowners in the Philippines v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform:[18]It is true that PD 27 expressly ordered the emancipation of tenant-farmers as of October 21, 1972 and declared that he shall be deemed the owner of a portion of land consisting of a family-sized farm except that no title to the land owned by him was to be actually issued to him unless and until he had become a full-fledged member of a duly recognized farmers cooperative.It was understood, however, that full payment of the just compensation also had to be made first, conformably to the constitutional requirement.In the case at bar, there is no showing that respondents complied with the requirement of full payment of the cost of the parcels of land.As they themselves admitted,[19]their value had not even been determined yet.In the absence of such determination, the Court cannot rule that just compensation has already been fully paid.Presidential Decree 27 and subsequently Executive Order (EO) 228, which recognized the rights acquired by tenant-farmers under PD 27, provide in detail the computation to be used in arriving at the exact total cost of the parcels of land.Evidently, therefore, the law recognizes that their exact value, or the just compensation to be given to the landowner, cannot just be assumed; it must be determined with certainty before the land titles are transferred.Although EO 228 provides that the total lease rentals paid for the lands from October 21, 1972 shall be considered as advance payment, it does not sanction the assumption that such rentals are automatically considered as equivalent to just compensation for the land.The provision significantly designates the lease rentals as advance, not full, payment.The determination of the exact value of the lands cannot simply be brushed aside, as it is fundamental to the determination of whether full payment has been made.Necessarily, the lease rentals admittedly paid by respondents until December 1988 cannot, at this point, be considered as full settlement of the value of the lands or as just compensation for them.The value of the subject lands was never determined; thus, there is no amount that can be used as basis for applying the lease rentals.Under the circumstances, actual title to the subject lands remains with petitioner.Clearly then, under PD 27 and EO 228,the application of the process of agrarian reform to the subject lands is still incomplete.Considering the passage of RA 6657 before the completion of the application of the agrarian reform process to the subject lands, the same should now be completed under the said law, with PD 27 and EO 228 having only suppletory effect.This ruling finds support inLand Bank of the Philippines v. CA,[20]wherein the Court stated:We cannot see why Sec. 18 of RA 6657 should not apply to rice and corn lands under PD 27.Section 75 of RA 6657 clearly states that the provisions of PD 27 and EO 228 shall only have a suppletory effect.Section 7 of the Act also provides ---Sec. 7.Priorities. The DAR, in coordination with the PARC shall plan and program the acquisition and distribution of all agricultural lands through a period of (10) years from the effectivity of this Act.Lands shall be acquired and distributed as follows:Phase One:Rice and Corn lands under P.D. 27; all idle or abandoned lands; all private lands voluntarily offered by the owners for agrarian reform; x x x and all other lands owned by the government devoted to or suitable for agriculture, which shall be acquired and distributed immediately upon the effectivity of this Act, with the implementation to be completed within a period of not more than four (4) years emphasis supplied).This eloquently demonstrates that RA 6657 includes PD 27 lands among the properties which the DAR shall acquire and distribute to the landless.And to facilitate the acquisition and distribution thereof, Secs. 16, 17 and 18 of the Act should be adhered to.InAssociation of Small Landowners of the Philippines v. Secretary of Agrarian Reformthis Court applied the provisions (of) RA 6657 to rice and corn lands when it upheld the constitutionality of the payment of just compensation for PD 27 lands through the different modes stated in Sec. 18.In determining the amount to be paid petitioner, all lease rentals paid by respondents to her after October 21, 1972 should be deducted therefrom.This formula is intended to put into effect the provision of Section 2 of EO 228.Third Issue:Tenants Cannot Be EjectedPetitioner submits that aside from cancelling the Emancipation Patents issued to respondents, the ejectment of the latter from the premises should be ordered by the Court, in accordance with the doctrine inPatricio.Petitioners position is unfounded.As earlier explained,Patriciofinds no application to the case at bar.Thus, there is no justification for ejecting respondents.Besides, Section 22 of RA 6657 expressly states that actual tenant-tillers in the landholding shall not be ejected or removed therefrom.Furthermore, there is no reason for ejecting the tillers with respect to the area of five hectares, which petitioner may choose to retain.Section 6 of RA 6657 further states:The right to choose the area to be retained, which shall be compact or contiguous, shall pertain to the landowner;Provided, however, That in case the area selected for retention by the land owner is tenanted, the tenant shall have the option to choose whether to remain therein or be a beneficiary in the same or another agricultural land with similar or comparable features.In case the tenant chooses to remain in the retained area, he shall be considered a lease holder and shall lose his right to be a beneficiary under this Act.In case the tenant chooses to be a beneficiary in another agricultural land, he loses his right as a lease-holder to the land retained by the landowner.The tenant must exercise this option within a period of one (1) year from the time the landowner manifests his choice of the area for retention.In all cases, the security of tenure of the farmers or farm workers on the land prior to the approval of this Act shall be respected.The current provision on retention removes the necessity, present under PD 27, of ejecting actual tillers.Under the current law, landowners who do not personally cultivate their lands are no longer required to do so in order to qualify for the retention of an area not exceeding fivehectares.Instead, they are now required to maintain the actual tiller of the area retained, should the latter choose to remain therein.WHEREFORE, the Petition is partiallyGRANTED.The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is herebySET ASIDE.The Decision of the provincial agrarian reform adjudicator isREINSTATEDwith the modification that the lease rentals, which respondents have already paid to petitioner after October 21, 1972, are to be considered part of the purchase price for the subject parcels of land.SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 86044 July 2, 1990VICTORINO TORRES,petitioner,vs.LEON VENTURA,respondent.Public Attorney's Office for petitioner.Melosino Respicio for private respondent.GANCAYCO,J.:This nation has a wealth of laws on agrarian reform. Such laws were enacted not only because of the constitutional mandate regarding the protection to labor and the promotion of social justice but also because of the realization that there is an urgent need to do something in order to improve the lives of the vast number of poor farmers in our land.Yet, despite such laws, it is a fact that the agrarian problems which beset our nation have remained unsolved. Majority of our farmers still live a hand-to-mouth existence. The clamor for change has not died down.One need not go far in order to search for the reason behind this. We all know that our beautifully-worded agrarian laws have never really been effectively implemented. Unscrupulous individuals have found various ways in order to get around the laws. Loopholes in the law and the ignorance of the poor farmers have been taken advantage of by them. Consequently, the farmers who are intended to be protected and uplifted by the said laws find themselves back to where they started or even in a worse position. We must put a stop to this vicious cycle and the time to do it is now.This case serves to remind those who are involved in the execution of agrarian laws that it is the farmer-beneficiary's interest that must be primarily served. This also holds that agrarian laws are to be liberally construed in favor of the farmer-beneficiary. Anyone who wishes to contest the rights of the farmer to land given to him by the government in accordance with our agrarian laws has the burden of proving that the farmer does not deserve the government grant.Posed before Us for resolution in this petition for review oncertiorariis the question of to whom ownership and possession of a certain landholding rightfully belongs: to petitioner who was the tiller of the land when Presidential Decree No. 27 was promulgated, or to private respondent in whose favor petitioner transferred his rights over the land in consideration of P5,000.00.The following facts can be gathered from the records of this case:Petitioner was the leasehold tenant of a 4,000 square-meter parcel of land included in the Florencio Firme Estate and located at Caloocan, Cabatuan, Isabela. In 1972, when Presidential Decree No. 27 was signed into law, petitioner was the tiller of the aforementioned piece of land and was automatically deemed owner of the property. Under Presidential Decree No. 27, any form of transfer of those lands within the coverage of the law is prohibited except as otherwise provided therein.In 1978, urgently in need of money, petitioner was forced to enter into what is called a "selda" agreement, with private respondent, wherein he transferred his rights of possession and enjoyment over the landholding in question to the latter in consideration of a loan in the amount of P5,000.00 to be paid not earlier than 1980. As part of the agreement, petitioner signed an "Affidavit of Waiver" whereby he waived all his rights over the property in favor of private respondent. According to petitioner, it was also agreed upon by them that upon the payment of the loaned amount, private respondent will deliver possession and enjoyment of the property back to petitioner.Two years later or in 1980, petitioner offered to pay the loaned amount but private respondent asked for an extension of one more year to continue cultivating the land and enjoying its fruits. Because of this, the money being offered by petitioner to pay for the loan was utilized for other purposes. In 1981, though petitioner really wanted to get the property back, he could not do so because he lacked the necessary funds. It was only in 1985 when petitioner was able to save enough money to make another offer but this time private respondent categorically denied said offer and refused to vacate the land.Hence, petitioner filed a complaint with the barangay captain of Magsaysay, Cabatuan, Isabela stating therein that he mortgaged his land to private respondent and that he already wanted to redeem it. On the scheduled date of hearing, private respondent failed to appear.Upon the issuance by the barangay captain of a certificate to file action, petitioner filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Cauayan, Isabela for the recovery of possession of the parcel of land in question. After due trial, the said court rendered a decision in favor of petitioner with the following dispositive portion:WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered:(1) DECLARING the affidavit of waiver (Exh. 1) executed by the plaintiff waiving his right as a leasehold tenant to the defendant null and void;(2) ORDERING the defendant, his agents, tenants or any person or persons acting on his behalf to deliver immediately the possession of the land in question to the plaintiff;(3) DECLARING the loan of P5,000.00 received by the plaintiff from the defendant in 1979 including interest thereon considered paid as of December 1, 1983;(4) ORDERING the defendant to pay the plaintiff total damages and in the amount of P5,200.00 up to December 1, 1986; and(5) ORDERING the defendant to pay the plaintiff 6 cavans of palay at 50 kilos per planting season from December 1, 1986, or their equivalent at the NFA price of P3.50 per kilo, until the possession of the land in question is delivered to the plaintiff.1On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the decision of the trial court was reversed. Hence, this petition for review oncertiorari.2Taking into consideration the circumstances surrounding this case and bearing in mind the constitutional mandate on the promotion of agrarian reform, We rule in favor of petitioner.It is not disputed by private respondent that petitioner was in fact the tiller of the subject land when Presidential Decree No. 27 was promulgated in 1972. As a consequence of the law, petitioner was granted the right to possess and enjoy the property for himself.The conflict arose when petitioner, by force of circumstances, transferred possession of his land to private respondent in consideration of a sum certain. As to what was actually the contract that was entered upon is being contested by the two parties herein. Petitioner has insisted from the very beginning that the agreement entered into between him and private respondent was one of mortgage and that private respondent promised to give back to him his landholding upon payment of the loaned amount. The stand of private respondent, on the other hand, is that petitioner relinquished all his rights over the property in his favor, as expressly written in the Affidavit of Waiver that petitioner signed.In its decision, the trial court ruled in favor of petitioner having found his version more convincing than that of private respondent whose evasive attitude did not go unnoticed therein. The trial court further ruled that the transfer of property from petitioner to private respondent is null and void for being violative of Presidential Decree No. 27. The Court of Appeals, on the other hand, believed that petitioner completely waived his rights over the land as evidenced by the Affidavit of Waiver he executed. According to the Court of Appeals, the said Affidavit of Waiver is valid because at the time of its execution, petitioner was not yet the owner of the land there having been no title issued to him yet. As such, continued the Court of Appeals, the Affidavit of Waiver did not violate Presidential Decree No. 27. The Court of Appeals further added that petitioner abandoned his landholding and received benefits under the agreement, hence, should not be rewarded at the expense of private respondent.After a careful scrutiny of the two conflicting decisions and an exhaustive study of the laws and jurisprudence applicable to this case, We affirm the judgment of the trial court. First, of all, We have given much weight to the finding of the trial court that what was entered upon by the parties herein was a contract of mortgage. It need not be stressed that in the matter of credibility of witnesses, We rely heavily on the findings of the trial court because it had the opportunity to meet them face to face. As the trial court observed, petitioner's version is more convincing because of the apparent evasive attitude of private respondent as compared to the candid testimony of the petitioner.3Indeed, We find it hard to believe that petitioner, who has been tilling the land in question for a long, long time would suddenly lose interest in it and decide to leave it for good at a time when he knew that full ownership over the same was soon going to be in his hands. Furthermore, if the situation were otherwise, petitioner would not have made repeated offers to pay for the amount he borrowed from private respondent and demand from the latter the possession of the land. He would not have even thought of bringing an action for the recovery of the same if he honestly believed that he had already given it up in favor of private respondent. Petitioner, or anyone in his right mind for that matter, would not waste his time, effort and money, especially if he is poor, to prosecute an unworthy action. If at all, petitioner is an example of a poor tenant farmer who, due to sheer poverty, was constrained to mortgage his only land4to somebody else5 situation which Presidential Decree No. 27 sought to prevent by providing an explicit prohibition on transfers.The above finding notwithstanding, and assuming that petitioner really waived his tenancy rights in favor of private respondent, this case should still be resolved against private respondent. The transfer would still be void for being made in violation of Presidential Decree No. 27.We shall now take a closer look at the law.Presidential Decree No. 27 was signed into law in view of the fact that the old concept of land ownership by a few has spawned valid and legitimate grievances that gave rise to violent conflict and social tension.6The law points out that reformation must start with the emancipation of the tiller from the bondage of the soil.7The fundamental policy of the law is reflected in its title, to wit: PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 27 DECREEING THE EMANCIPATION OF TENANT FROM THE BONDAGE OF THE SOIL, TRANSFERRING TO THEM THE OWNERSHIP OF THE LAND THEY TILL AND PROVIDING THE INSTRUMENTS AND MECHANISM THEREFOR. This policy is intended to be given effect by the following provisions:xxx xxx xxxThe tenant farmer, whether in land classified as landed estate or not, shall be DEEMED OWNER of a portion constituting a family size farm of five (5) hectares if not irrigated and three (3) hectares if irrigated; (Emphasis supplied).xxx xxx xxxTITLE TO LAND ACQUIRED PURSUANT TO THIS DECREE OR THE LAND REFORM PROGRAM OF THE GOVERNMENT SHALL NOT BE TRANSFERABLE except by hereditary succession or to the Government in accordance with the provisions of this Decree, the Code of Agrarian Reforms and other existing laws and regulations; (Emphasis supplied).xxx xxx xxx8The law is clear and leaves no room for doubt. Upon the promulgation of Presidential Decree No. 27 on October 21, 1972, petitioner was DEEMED OWNER of the land in question. As of that date, he was declared emancipated from the bondage of the soil. As such, he gained the rights to possess, cultivate, and enjoy the landholding for himself. Those rights over that particular property were granted by the government to him and to no other. To insure his continued possession and enjoyment of the property, he could not, under the law, make any valid form of transfer except to the government or by hereditary succession, to his successors.Yet, it is a fact that despite the prohibition, many farmer-beneficiaries like petitioner herein were tempted to make use of their land to acquire much needed money. Hence, the then Ministry of Agrarian Reform issued the following Memorandum Circular:Despite the above prohibition, however, there are reports that many farmer-beneficiaries of PD 27 havetransferred the ownership, rights, and/or possession of their farms/homelotsto other persons or have surrendered the same to their former landowners. All these transactions/surrenders are violative of PD 27 and therefore, null andvoid.9(Emphasis supplied.)We do not agree with the Court of Appeals when it ruled that petitioner's land is not included in the legal prohibition since petitioner has not yet acquired absolute title to the land having failed to comply with all the conditions set forth by the law. With regard to the legal prohibition, We hold that title refers not only to that issued upon compliance by the tenant-farmer of the said conditions but also includes those rights and interests that the tenant-farmer immediately acquired upon the promulgation of the law. To rule otherwise would make a tenant farmer falling in the category of those who have not yet been issued a formal title to the land they till easy prey to those who would like to tempt them with cash in exchange for inchoate title over the same. Following this, absolute title over lands covered by Presidential Decree No. 27 would end up in the name of persons who were not the actual tillers when the law was promulgated.Furthermore, the evidence on hand shows that Certificate of Land Transfer No. 096267 covering the land in question is in the name of petitioner Victorino Torres.10This is admitted by private respondent.11InGloria de Oliver vs.Sisenando Cruz, et al.,12the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that:The rights and interests covered by the Certificate of Land Transfer are beyond the commerce of man. They are not negotiable except when it is used by the beneficiary as a collateral for a loan with the rural bank for an agricultural production.Having settled that the contract of transfer entered into between petitioner and private respondent is voidab initio, We now go to the issue of whether or not the principle ofparidelicto13applies to this case. We rule in the negative. Public policy and the policy of the law must prevail. To hold otherwise will defeat the spirit and intent of Presidential Decree No. 27 and the tillers will never be emancipated from the bondage of the soil.InCatalina de los Santos vs.Roman Catholic Church,14this Court ruled that thepari delictodoctrine is not applicable to a homestead which has been illegally sold in violation of the homestead law. One of the reasons given by this Court for the ruling is that the policy of the law is to give land to a family for home and cultivation.InAcierto, et al.vs.De los Santos, et al.,15where the principle was reiterated, this Court, through Justice Alex Reyes, made the following pronouncement:Appellants, however, contend that the voiding provision of the Act may not be invoked in favor of plaintiffs as their predecessor in interest wasin pari delicto, and that, since the same provision says the illegal sale shall have the effect of annulling the grant and cause the reversion of the property and its improvements to the State, plaintiffs may no longer claim the homestead. Similar contentions were made in the case ofCatalina de los Santos vs.Roman Catholic Churchof Midsayap et al., G.R. No.L-6088, decided February 25, 1954, but they were there overruled, this Court holding that thepari delictodoctrine may not be invoked in a case of this kind since it would run counter to an avowed fundamental policy of the State, that the forfeiture of the homestead is a matter between the State and the grantee or his heirs, and that until the State had taken steps to annul the grant and asserts title to the homestead the purchaser is, as against the vendor or his heirs "no more entitled to keep the land than any intruder.16The pronouncements in the two above-mentioned cases were adopted by this Court inAngeles, et al.vs.Court of Appeals, et al.,17wherein We ruled that the sale of the homestead by the homesteader is null and void and his heirs have the right to recover the homestead illegally disposed of.In view of all the foregoing, We hold that the contract, being voidab initio, must be given no effect at all. The parties in this case are to be placed in status quo which was the condition prevailing prior to the execution of the void contract.WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 15482 is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cauayan, Isabela in Civil Case No. Br. XIX-167 is hereby ordered REINSTATED. Costs against private respondent.SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 103125 May 17, 1993PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR, represented by GOV. LUIS R. VILLAFUERTE and HON. BENJAMIN V. PANGA as Presiding Judge of RTC Branch 33 at Pili, Camarines Sur,petitioners,vs.THE COURT OF APPEALS (THIRD DIVISION), ERNESTO SAN JOAQUIN and EFREN SAN JOAQUIN,respondents.The Provincial Attorney for petitioners.Reynaldo L. Herrera for Ernesto San Joaquin.QUIASON,J.:In this appeal bycertiorarifrom the decision of the Court of Appeals in AC-G.R. SP No. 20551 entitled "Ernesto N. San Joaquin, et al., v. Hon. Benjamin V. Panga, et al.," this Court is asked to decide whether the expropriation of agricultural lands by local government units is subject, to the prior approval of the Secretary of the Agrarian Reform, as the implementator of the agrarian reform program.On December 22, 1988, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Camarines Sur passed Resolution No. 129, Series of 1988, authorizing the Provincial Governor to purchase or expropriate property contiguous to the provincial capitol site, in order to establish a pilot farm for non-food and non-traditional agricultural crops and a housing project for provincial government employees.The "WHEREAS" clause o:f the Resolution states:WHEREAS, the province of Camarines Sur has adopted a five-year Comprehensive Development plan, some of the vital components of which includes the establishment of model and pilot farm for non-food and non-traditional agricultural crops, soil testing and tissue culture laboratory centers, 15 small scale technology soap making, small scale products of plaster of paris, marine biological and sea farming research center,and other progressive feasibility concepts objective of which is to provide the necessary scientific and technology know-how to farmers and fishermen in Camarines Sur and to establish a housing project for provincial government employees;WHEREAS, the province would need additional land to be acquired either by purchase or expropriation to implement the above program component;WHEREAS, there are contiguous/adjacent properties to be (sic) present Provincial Capitol Site ideally suitable to establish the same pilot development center;WHEREFORE . . . .Pursuant to the Resolution, the Province of Camarines Sur, through its Governor, Hon. Luis R.Villafuerte, filed two separate cases for expropriation against Ernesto N. San Joaquin and Efren N. San Joaquin, docketed as Special Civil Action Nos. P-17-89 and P-19-89 of the Regional Trial Court, Pili, Camarines Sur, presided by the Hon. Benjamin V. Panga.Forthwith, the Province of Camarines Sur filed a motion for the issuance of writ of possession. The San Joaquins failed to appear at the hearing of the motion.The San Joaquins moved to dismiss the complaints on the ground of inadequacy of the price offered for their property. In an order dated December 6, 1989, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss and authorized the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of the property upon the deposit with the Clerk of Court of the amount of P5,714.00, the amount provisionally fixed by the trial court to answer for damages that private respondents may suffer in the event that the expropriation cases do not prosper. The trial court issued a writ of possession in an order dated January18, 1990.The San Joaquins filed a motion for relief from the order, authorizing the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of their property and a motion to admit an amended motion to dismiss. Both motions were denied in the order dated February 1990.In their petition before the Court of Appeals, the San Joaquins asked: (a) that Resolution No. 129, Series of 1988 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan be declared null and void; (b) that the complaints for expropriation be dismissed; and (c) that the order dated December 6, 1989 (i) denying the motion to dismiss and (ii) allowing the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of the property subject of the expropriation and the order dated February 26, 1990, denying the motion to admit the amended motion to dismiss, be set aside. They also asked that an order be issued to restrain the trial court from enforcing the writ of possession, and thereafter to issue a writ of injunction.In its answer to the petition, the Province of Camarines Sur claimed that it has the authority to initiate the expropriation proceedings under Sections 4 and 7 of Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337) and that the expropriations are for a public purpose.Asked by the Court of Appeals to give his Comment to the petition, the Solicitor General stated that under Section 9 of the Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337), there was no need for the approval by the Office of the President of the exercise by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the right of eminent domain. However, the Solicitor General expressed the view that the Province of Camarines Sur must first secure the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform of the plan to expropriate the lands of petitioners for use as a housing project.The Court of Appeals set aside the order of the trial court, allowing the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of private respondents' lands and the order denying the admission of the amended motion to dismiss. It also ordered the trial court to suspend the expropriation proceedings until after the Province of Camarines Sur shall have submitted the requisite approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform to convert the classification of the property of the private respondents from agricultural to non-agricultural land.Hence this petition.It must be noted that in the Court of Appeals, the San Joaquins asked for: (i) the dismissal of the complaints for expropriation on the ground of the inadequacy of the compensation offered for the property and (ii) the nullification of Resolution No. 129, Series of 1988 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Camarines Sur.The Court of Appeals did not rule on the validity of the questioned resolution; neither did it dismiss the complaints. However, when the Court of Appeals ordered the suspension of the proceedings until the Province of Camarines Sur shall have obtained the authority of the Department of Agrarian Reform to change the classification of the lands sought to be expropriated from agricultural to non-agricultural use, it assumed that the resolution is valid and that the expropriation is for a public purpose or public use.Modernly, there has been a shift from the literal to a broader interpretation of "public purpose" or "public use" for which the power of eminent domain may be exercised. The old concept was that the condemned property must actually be used by the general public (e.g. roads, bridges, public plazas, etc.) before the taking thereof could satisfy the constitutional requirement of "public use". Under the new concept, "public use" means public advantage, convenience or benefit, which tends to contribute to the general welfare and the prosperity of the whole community, like a resort complex for tourists or housing project (Heirs of Juancho Ardano v. Reyes, 125 SCRA 220 [1983]; Sumulong v. Guerrero, 154 SC.RA 461 [1987]).The expropriation of the property authorized by the questioned resolution is for a public purpose. The establishment of a pilot development center would inure to the direct benefit and advantage of the people of the Province of Camarines Sur. Once operational, the center would make available to the community invaluable information and technology on agriculture, fishery and the cottage industry. Ultimately, the livelihood of the farmers, fishermen and craftsmen would be enhanced. The housing project also satisfies the public purpose requirement of the Constitution. As held inSumulong v. Guerrero, 154 SCRA 461, "Housing is a basic human need. Shortage in housing is a matter of state concern since it directly and significantly affects public health, safety, the environment and in sum the general welfare."It is the submission of the Province of Camarines Sur that its exercise of the power of eminent domain cannot be restricted by the provisions of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (R.A. No. 6657), particularly Section 65 thereof, which requires the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform before a parcel of land can be reclassified from an agricultural to a non-agricultural land.The Court of Appeals, following the recommendation of the Solicitor General, held that the Province of Camarines Sur must comply with the provision of Section 65 of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law and must first secure the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform of the plan to expropriate the lands of the San Joaquins.InHeirs of Juancho Ardana v. Reyes, 125 SCRA 220, petitioners raised the issue of whether the Philippine Tourism Authority can expropriate lands covered by the "Operation Land Transfer" for use of a tourist resort complex. There was a finding that of the 282 hectares sought to be expropriated, only an area of 8,970 square meters or less than one hectare was affected by the land reform program and covered by emancipation patents issued by the Ministry of Agrarian Reform. While the Court said that there was "no need under the facts of this petition to rule on whether the public purpose is superior or inferior to another purpose or engage in a balancing of competing public interest," it upheld the expropriation after noting that petitioners had failed to overcome the showing that the taking of 8,970 square meters formed part of the resort complex. A fair and reasonable reading of the decision is that this Court viewed the power of expropriation as superior to the power to distribute lands under the land reform program.The Solicitor General denigrated the power to expropriate by the Province of Camarines Sur by stressing the fact that local government units exercise such power only by delegation. (Comment, pp. 14-15;Rollo, pp. 128-129)It is true that local government units have no inherent power of eminent domain and can exercise it only when expressly authorized by the legislature (City of Cincinnati v. Vester, 28l US 439, 74 L.ed. 950, 50 SCt. 360). It is also true that in delegating the power to expropriate, the legislature may retain certain control or impose certain restraints on the exercise thereof by the local governments (Joslin Mfg. Co. v. Providence, 262 US 668 67 L. ed. 1167, 43 S Ct. 684). While such delegated power may be a limited authority, it is complete within its limits. Moreover, the limitations on the exercise of the delegated power must be clearly expressed, either in the law conferring the power or in other legislations.Resolution No. 129, Series of 1988, was promulgated pursuant to Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 337, the Local Government Code, which provides:A local government unit may, through its head and acting pursuant to a resolution of its sanggunian exercise the right of eminent domain and institute condemnation proceedings for public use or purpose.Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 337 does not intimate in the least that local government, units must first secure the approval of the Department of Land Reform for the conversion of lands from agricultural to non-agricultural use, before they can institute the necessary expropriation proceedings. Likewise, there is no provision in the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law which expressly subjects the expropriation of agricultural lands by local government units to the control of the Department of Agrarian Reform. The closest provision of law that the Court of Appeals could cite to justify the intervention of the Department of Agrarian Reform in expropriation matters is Section 65 of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, which reads:Sec. 65. Conversion of Lands. After the lapse of five (5) years from its award, when the land ceases to be economically feasible and sound for, agricultural purposes, or the locality has become urbanized and the land will have a greater economic value for residential, commercial or industrial purposes, the DAR, upon application of the beneficiary or the landowner, with due notice to the affected parties, and subject to existing laws, may authorize the reclassification or conversion of the land and its disposition:Provided, That the beneficiary shall have fully paid his obligation.The opening, adverbial phrase of the provision sends signals that it applies to lands previously placed under the agrarian reform program as it speaks of "the lapse of five (5) years from its award."The rules on conversion of agricultural lands found in Section 4 (k) and 5 (1) of Executive Order No. 129-A, Series of 1987, cannot be the source of the authority of the Department of Agrarian Reform to determine the suitability of a parcel of agricultural land for the purpose to which it would be devoted by the expropriating authority. While those rules vest on the Department of Agrarian Reform the exclusive authority to approve or disapprove conversions of agricultural lands for residential, commercial or industrial uses, such authority is limited to the applications for reclassification submitted by the land owners or tenant beneficiaries.Statutes conferring the power of eminent domain to political subdivisions cannot be broadened or constricted by implication (Schulman v. People, 10 N.Y. 2d. 249, 176 N.E. 2d. 817, 219 NYS 2d. 241).To sustain the Court of Appeals would mean that the local government units can no longer expropriate agricultural lands needed for the construction of roads, bridges, schools, hospitals, etc, without first applying for conversion of the use of the lands with the Department of Agrarian Reform, because all of these projects would naturally involve a change in the land use. In effect, it would then be the Department of Agrarian Reform to scrutinize whether the expropriation is for a public purpose or public use.Ordinarily, it is the legislative branch of the local government unit that shall determine whether the use of the property sought to be expropriated shall be public, the same being an expression of legislative policy. The courts defer to such legislative determination and will intervene only when a particular undertaking has no real or substantial relation to the public use (United States Ex Rel Tennessee Valley Authority v. Welch, 327 US 546, 90 L. ed. 843, 66 S Ct 715; State ex rel Twin City Bldg. and Invest. Co. v. Houghton, 144 Minn. 1, 174 NW 885, 8 ALR 585).There is also an ancient rule that restrictive statutes, no matter how broad their terms are, do not embrace the sovereign unless the sovereign is specially mentioned as subject thereto (Alliance of Government Workers v. Minister of Labor and Employment, 124 SCRA 1 [1983]). The Republic of the Philippines, as sovereign, or its political subdivisions, as holders of delegated sovereign powers, cannot be bound by provisions of law couched in general term.The fears of private respondents that they will be paid on the basis of the valuation declared in the tax declarations of their property, are unfounded. This Court has declared as unconstitutional the Presidential Decrees fixing the just compensation in expropriation cases to be the value given to the condemned property either by the owners or the assessor, whichever was lower ([Export Processing Zone Authority v. Dulay, 149 SCRA 305 [1987]). As held inMunicipality of Talisay v. Ramirez, 183 SCRA 528 [1990], the rules for determining just compensation are those laid down in Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, which allow private respondents to submit evidence on what they consider shall be the just compensation for their property.WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the questioned decision of the Court of Appeals is set aside insofar as it (a) nullifies the trial court's order allowing the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of private respondents' property; (b) orders the trial court to suspend the expropriation proceedings; and (c) requires the Province of Camarines Sur to obtain the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform to convert or reclassify private respondents' property from agricultural to non-agricultural use.The decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED insofar as it sets aside the order of the trial court, denying the amended motion to dismiss of the private respondents.SO ORDERED