68

PUTIN’S COSSACKS

folklore, business or politics?

Jolanta Darczewska

NUMBER 68WARSAWdEcEMBER 2017

PUTIN’S COSSACKSfolkloRE, BUSiNESS oR politicS?

Jolanta darczewska

© copyright by ośrodek Studiów Wschodnichim. Marka karpia / centre for Eastern Studies

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EditorAnna Łabuszewska

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translationJim todd

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CONTENTS

tHESES /5

iNtRodUctioN /8

pREfAcE /11

I. tHE cHARActERiSticS of coSSAckdoM iN RUSSiA: BASic coNcEptS /12

1. The ‘Cossack state’ in modern Russia /122. The legal status of Cossackdom: the ‘Cossack state service’ /183. The ‘Cossack troops’ /234. The ‘Cossack component’ as a subject in education and state

policy /31

II. tHE iNStitUtioNAliSAtioN of tHE coSSAck QUEStioN /43

1. The Kremlin’s strategic objectives /432. The institutional system for governing the Cossacks /50

SUMMARY /60

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 THESES

• The rhetoric of social engineering is repeatedly used in the Russian narration on the Cossack nation. This social engineering has been served by historically-rooted slo-gans such as ‘the Cossack state’ and ‘registered Cossacks’. Terms such as ‘the Cossack state service’ and ‘the Cossack component’ are also functionally marked concepts. These appear in different contexts (the patriotic education of children and young people, the so-called civil society of Russia and its allegedly traditional conservative values, the creation of pro-defence attitudes, military reserves, a social factor combating the new threats posed by cul-ture, information, illegal migration, etc.). Such concepts are the product of the Kremlin’s political technology – by shaping the military organisation of society and its con-frontational attitude, it is not so much describing a real-ity as creating one.

• The legal status of the modern Russian Cossack nation, which is also referred to as ‘neo-Cossackdom’, situates it within the framework of the ‘third sector’, i.e. non-commercial organi-sations for the public benefit. This serves to emphasise its ability to organise itself. In fact, the Cossack military associ-ations of today have little to do either with grassroots social initiatives or the non-governmental sectors, not to mention folklore or historical re-enactment associations. Their ba-sic distinguishing features are their control by the Kremlin and the exchange of mutual benefits (they serve the Kremlin in exchange for concessions and contracts). This is the result of the Kremlin’s long-term policy, which has led to the con-version of a spontaneous social movement into a movement controlled from the top down.

• The favourable political situation at present (including the concessions the Kremlin has awarded the Cossacks in the

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field of small businesses) is swelling the ranks of Cossack organisations with officers from the security and defence sectors who are leaving to the reserves (these are the roots of the predominant part of the neo-Cossack elite); radicals who are hungry for publicity and influence; and random individuals who are looking for ways to resolve their fi-nancial problems. This has led to a change in motivation for the neo-Cossacks, especially the younger generation. For them, neo-Cossackdom has opened up a career path, because other options are blocked to them; it offers easier access to education and a stable income.

• The Cossacks’ imprecise legal, political and social status allows the Kremlin to assign them to different roles: from paramilitary organisations that are intended to educate young people in the spirit of patriotism and obedience, via volunteer fire departments and forest guards, police reserves preventing crime, combating terrorism, extrem-ism and illegal migration, up to the role of irregular forces in information warfare and the fight against illegal bor-der crossings, civil defence and territorial defence forces. Their permanent incorporation into the security and de-fence system is guaranteed by their non-hierarchical or-ganisational structure, the subordination of the Cossack troops to the President, as well as their ever-closer ap-proximation to military standards. This is the main mes-sage of the Strategy of policy towards the Russian Cossacks to 2020.

• The implementation of this strategy is distinguished by the strongly bureaucratic system for managing the neo-Cossacks’ development, as well as the Putin system’s ina-bility to generate new projects. Those currently being im-plemented under the banner of self-financing are merely replicating the old ones, preserving the pathologies of the Russian political & economic system. The Kremlin is

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placing the burden of implementing its policy on the re-gional authorities: the ‘self-financing’ of the Cossack or-ganisations mainly consists of them concluding more or less profitable contracts, financed by the regions.

• The new wave of Cossack-mania in Russia has coincided with a U-turn by the Kremlin away from its previously declared modernisation of Russia and in the direction of traditionalism, a transition which clearly accelerated af-ter the events on the Maidan in Kiev. The Kremlin’s ally in its Cossack policy is the Orthodox Church, and their plat-form for cooperation is the concept of ‘Orthodox Russian civilisation’, which among other things shapes an attitude of civil obedience. Both the state and the Church have ex-ploited the image of Cossackdom as a ‘free state’, and they present the Cossacks as a model of civil society (which is also an argument for the existence in Russia of a subject society), as well as the bearers of conservative Orthodox values fighting the rot of the West, Islamic fundamental-ism, the ‘fifth column’ and other threats to ‘Russian civi-lisation’.

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INTRODUCTION

The roots of contemporary Cossack-mania in Russia

The Russian Cossacks of today, also known as the neo-Cossacks(неоказачество), is in equal measure a product of a top-downKremlinpolicyandabottom-upnationalistmovement.Cossacknationalism is clearly linked to a similar trend dating from thebeginningofthe20thcentury1.Thiswasarandomconfluenceofmodernisationinthemilitarysphere,conflictbetweenthecentreandtheperiphery,andtensionsintheRussianEmpire(Cossacksversus peasants; Cossacks versus non-Russians, the so-calledинородцы). Two competing projects of Cossackdom emerged atthattime:

1)theethnicvariant,withtheemphasisonthe‘Cossack’nationasaseparateethnos,havingtherighttoautonomyandthedevelop-mentoftheirownculture;and

2)theimperialvariant,depictingtheCossacksasapillaroftheempireandthegreatRussianpeople,loyalintheirservicetothestateanditsOrthodoxvalues,focusedonstrengtheningRussianstatehood.

The disintegration of the empire, followed by the ‘de-Cossack-isation’ of the Soviet Union and the deportations under Stalin,completelypreventedtheCossacksmakinganyradicaldemandsformanydecades,butdidnotuprootthesedesiresentirely.Theneed to strengthen the Cossacks’ newly conscious distinctive-nessand‘ethnicity’re-emergedattheendoftheexistenceoftheSoviet Union, when the Don, Terek and other ‘Republics’ were

1 Б.Корниенко,ПравыйинационализмаидеологияДон(1909-1914),Изда-тельствоЕвропейскогоуниверситетавСанкт-Петербурге,Sankt-Peters-burg2013.

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proclaimed, and (in November 1991) the creation of a Union ofCossackRepublicsofSouthernRussiawasannounced.

TheRussianstate’sfirstreactionstoCossackseparatismwerecha-otic,andmoresymbolicinnaturethananythingelse.InJuly1992theSupremeCouncilpassedaresolutionontherehabilitationofthe Cossacks, supplementing an earlier resolution on the reha-bilitationoftherepressedpeoples.Meanwhile,thelocalgovern-ments in southern Russia exploited ethnic tensions, politicisingtheCossacks’effortstoovercomepovertyand‘surviveinthehos-tileenvironment’ofsouthernRussia(i.e.bystressingtheirsta-tusasthe‘host’,aswellasthespecificlawsconcerninglanduse)inthestruggleformaterialresourcesandpowerintheregions.However,thedecreewhichBorisYeltsinsignedin1995onastateregister of Cossack associations in the Russian Federation testi-fiedtothestartofanewpolicytowardstheCossacks:itdefinednotonlythechallengefacingthestate,butalso itsstrategicob-jectives. Nevertheless, its implementation was only undertakenafterthepoliticalchangesattheturnofthecentury.Conditionsto change the relationship between the state and the Cossacksbecame more favourable thanks to the centralisation of power,together with a change of emphasis in the direction of Russianimperial tradition. The idea of a state register of Cossacks tookconcreteshapeina lawonthestateserviceofRussianCossack-dom,whichVladimirPutinsignedin2005.Thislawalsoreceivedasolidideologicalfoundation:theethnologicalaspectoftheCos-sackcommunitywaspushedintothebackground,anditsmissionofstate-buildingwasemphasised.TheCossackassociationswerebroughtoutofdeep-freeze,reinforcedwithpeoplefromoutside,andpro-Kremlinactivistswereplacedattheirhead.However,thepolicyof‘statising’theCossackcommunitydidnotabolishthedi-visionsexistingwithinit.Amoreradical,thoughpoorlyheededelementstillcallsfortherecognitionoftheCossacksasanation,and seeks to restore their autonomy and direct democracy un-dertheruleoftheatamans.However,thevastmajorityofpeoplewhodeclarethemselvesCossacksbelievethatsuchdemandsare

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unrealisticatthepresenttime;theyparticipateintheKremlin’sprojectsandpoliticalgames,countingonthelattertoprotectthegroup’sinterests.Criticstreatthemas‘crossdressers’whosupportPutin.Termssuchas‘anewtypeofCossack’or‘theneo-Cossacks’areincreasinglybeingusedtodescribethisgroup.

ThecurrentwaveoffashionfortheCossacksinRussiaisprimar-ily linkedwiththefunctionassignedto themasareservebodyfortheArmedForces,andwiththetop-downimpositionoftradi-tionalism.Since2012,intheofficialvisiontheyhavebecomethevanguardofan‘organic’EurasiancivilisationandtheOrthodoxconservativevaluesofthe‘Russianworld’.The‘Cossackelement’ofKremlinpolicy,asidealisedinthestate’snarrative,ispresentedasananchorofsecurityanddefencefortheRussianFederation,afoundationalelementofcivilsociety,andasymbolofnationalendurance. This policy has definitively moved beyond the localcontextofsouthernRussia,althoughinpropagandaitisstillbe-ingportrayedasaprocessof‘therebirthofCossackdomwithinitshistoricalborders’.

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PREFACE

TheprocessreferredtoastherebirthofCossackdominRussiaiscomplicated and has not been fully researched. Among Russianobservers itarousesextremeopinions:somesee itasamargin-al social phenomenon, a kind of political folklore; others as themorallyandphysicallyhealthynucleusofthenation,thebasisofmodernparamilitaryformationsdefendingthenationalandcul-turalbordersoftheRussianFederation,aswellasabasisof‘civilsociety’. Still others emphasise the opportunistic nature of theprocess,basedontheinfluenceofgreedyradicalsandcareeristslookingforconcessionsandhandoutsfromtheKremlin.

Thistextattemptstointerpretthisquestionintermsofasocio-political process which has resulted in the transformation ofabottom-up,spontaneousmovementintoonecontrolledfromthetop.Regardlessofthisfundamentalchange,theCossacks(morespecifically,theneo-Cossacks)stilldefinethemselvesasacultur-alandhistoricalcommunity,withtheaidoffeaturessuchastheirdefensive,pro-Russianstatementality,theirmilitarisedlifestyleand service to the state, their Orthodox religion, and their dis-tincttraditionsandcustoms.Inthefirstpartofthiswork,theof-ficialnarrativeoftheCossacksisexaminedthroughtheprismofcertainkeyconcepts.Theconceptsdiscussed(theCossackstate,the Cossack register, registered Cossackdom, the Cossack stateservice)currentlybearheavyloadsofmisinformation,asaresultof their being torn away from their historical context and relo-catedintoday’sRussianrealities.

ThesecondpartofthetextisdedicatedtotheRussianFederation’sstrategicpolicyobjectivesregardingneo-Cossackdomandtheor-ganisationalsystemwhichhasbeensetuptoimplementthispolicy.

Thetextconcludeswithalistofthefunctionsassignedtotheneo-Cossacks, that is, the Kremlin’s long-term interests as linked tothecommunity.

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I. THE CHARACTERISTICS OF COSSACKDOM IN RUSSIA: BASIC CONCEPTS

1. The ‘Cossack state’ in modern Russia

The historical term ‘Cossack state’, which bears a certain propaganda load with it, fits well into the official narrative as it conceals the existence of neo-Cossackdom. At the same time, though, it causes a kind of cognitive dissonance: the anachronistic Cossack community is portrayed as a symbol of freedom on the one hand, and on the other as a pillar of Russian ‘civil society’ which is distinguished by its service to the state and its identification with a militarised way of life.

The concept of the ‘Cossack state’ remains obscure, something to which the various legal solutions have contributed. The Cossack state service today includes both the so-called ‘na-tive-born’ Cossacks and the ‘crossdressers’ (as people ‘work-ing as Cossacks’ are defined), who have little in common with traditional Cossackdom and its idealised and exalted values. The process of Cossackdom’s rebirth in the reality of the Putin regime has led to its transformation into ‘neo-Cossackdom’, that is, an auxiliary part of the ruling power corporation, to which it is linked by its common corporate interests (service, business, politics). Even today, the division of the Cossacks into ethnic and imperial subgroups has not been overcome.

Contrarytotheofficialnarrative,whichdealswiththeCossacksasabastionofhealthytraditionalism,theystillsharetheprob-lemsofRussiansocietyasawhole:passivity,corruption,atomisa-tion,mutualdistrust,conformism,susceptibilitytomanipulationbythegovernment,widespreadpovertyaccompaniedbystrongstratification in terms of property ownership, unemployment,andtheoutflowofyouthfromtheirtraditionalplacesofresidence.ThepublicimageoftheCossacks,especiallyamongtheoldergen-eration, is still burdened by the policy of their discreditation

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duringtheSovietperiod,accordingtowhichtheCossackisstillabarbarianwithanahaika(atraditionalkindofwhip),analco-holic,axenophobe,anextremist,anenemyofprogress.

The grass-roots movement, which was very lively in the 1990s,improved its image by presenting itself as a ‘repressed ethnos’and ‘an ethnos of free people’. During the collapse of the SovietUnion’ssocio-politicalandeconomicregime,whichwasaccompa-niedbyawaveofethnictensions,theCossackswhoassertedtheirrights(inaxenophobicmanner)totheirhistoricalhomelandsinthesouthofRussiaweretolerated,andevensomewhatpamperedbythelocaladministrations,asasocialfactorpreventingethniccrime(byCaucasianorganised-crimegroups),Islamicfundamen-talismandextremism.Theconceptofthe‘Cossackstate’,asitwasthen semi-officially introduced into circulation, was willinglytakenupbytheCossacksthemselves,whotreateditassynony-mouswiththehistorical ‘freeCossackstate’,andasasubstitutefor ethnicity. Paradoxically, this concept (albeit understood dif-ferently, as a pro-state and defensive mentality) was reinforcedbyregionalofficials,andalsoenteredthepoliticallexiconofthefederalbureaucracy,whichdeclareditssupportfortherebirthofCossackdominRussia.

Thecurrentpopularityofthistermisbasedbothonitsdirectlinkto the imperial tradition, and on the obfuscation of those of itshistorical referents which do not fit into contemporary Russianreality.Historically,‘Cossackdom’refersprimarilytoawayofor-ganisingsociallifeonaseparateterritoryonthebasisofmilitarydemocracy,withthechieftain(ataman/hetman)beingchoseninafreeelection.AsaborderlandcommunitybetweentheoldPol-ishRepublicandthePrincipalityofMoscow,theCossacksinfactlivedoutsidethestatesocietiesofthetime;theywereonlylinkedtothestatesofPolandandMoscowbytheCossackregistrysys-tem, which guaranteed the Cossacks regular pay in return fortheirparticipationinthewarsofthattime.Cossackunits,whichinthedaysoftheRussianEmpirewereorganisedinto11‘Cossack

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troops’,i.e.11separateterritorial-militarystructures,participat-ed intheconquestandcolonisationof theempire’snewterrito-ries,andalsoguarded itsborders in theCaucasus,Central AsiaandtheFarEast.

Thehistorical terms ‘Cossackstate’and ‘registeredCossackdom’asusedtoday,whichhavebeenborrowedfromtheterminologyoftheFirstPolishRepublicandtakenoutoftheirhistoricalcontext,contain a sizable burden of misinformation. One abuse of theseterms, forexample, involves thediscussionabouttherebirthofRussian Cossackdom in its historical homelands. These ‘home-lands’ were mostly located on the territory of today’s UkraineandKazakhstan,whereasCossackshavenowappearedinplaceswheretheyhadnotpreviouslybeen:inthecentralpartofRussia(inMoscow,theyhaveexchangedtheirhorsesformotorcycles),inKareliaandKaliningrad; infact,theyarerepresentedinallthemilitarydistrictsandmostofthefederalentitiesoftheRussianFederation,aswellasinRussian-occupiedCrimea2.

2 TheCrimeanCossackCircle(okrug)appearedin2015(Российская газета – Крым,4June2015).ItwasbasedontheCrimeanhundredoftheTerekTroops,whichhadoperatedforyearsunderthedirectionofVadimIlovchenko(thelocalpressnamedthecircleastheCrimeanTroopsandIlovchenkoasitsata-man).ThehundredtookanactivepartintheRussianseparatistmovementinCrimeaaswellastheso-calledCrimeanspring.Theformalregistrationofthiscirclehasstillnotbeencompleted,astheCrimeanCossacksarestillundergoingdetailedexaminationbytheFSBandtheInteriorMinistrywithregardtotheircriminalrecord.The association of the Cossacks of Karelia was registered in 2012. The re-gional authorities have adapted their laws to federal legislation (https://mustoi.ru/kazachestvu-zaxotelos-v-karelii-gosudarstvennuyu-podder-zhku/;http://www.gov.karelia.ru/gov/News/2017/05/0503_16.html).Theexplanatory memorandum to the regional law on the Cossacks in the Re-publicofKareliastates:“TheCossack’sexperiencewillhelptosolvemanyproblems related to the security of the region, the protection of borders,improvingthecriminal-pathologicalsituation,andwillimprovethesocio-economicstabilityoftheregion.”The social Baltic Cossack Associations group, which operated in Kalinin-gradasof2015,hasbecometheregisteredBalticIndividualCossackCircle.ItsatamanMaksimBugaistryingtobuilduptheimageofthe‘BalticCos-sacktroops’asanimportantpowerstructureintheKaliningradregion,andhasannouncedtheirclosecooperationwiththearmyandpolice.Bugapar-

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Accordingtodifferentestimatestherearebetween2and7millionCossacks in Russia. The discrepancy is perpetuated by the Cos-sacksthemselves,aswellasbytheKremlin’sofficialpropaganda:byhighlightingthescaleofthephenomenon,themagicofnum-bersisintendedtostrengthenandpromotetheideaofCossack-dom.Contrarytothe‘ethnicity’oftheCossackspropagatedbytheatamans3,whoconductedboisterouscampaignsbeforeeverycen-sustoencouragethepopulationofsouthernRussiatograntthem‘Cossacknationality’,theirethnicidentityremainspoor.Duringthe 2002 census, 140,000 people reported ‘Cossack nationality’;inthenextcensusin2010,thefigurewasonly67,000.ThevastmajorityofCossacksareconcentratedintheRostovoblast.Inad-dition,theresultsofthe2010censushighlightedtheartificialand‘delicate’natureoftheCossackquestion.Accordingtotheadopt-edmethodology, the ‘Cossacks’weretreatedasanethnographicgroupoftheRussianethnos.Thefigureincludedrespondentswhoinadditionto‘Cossacknationality’gavetheRussianlanguageastheirmothertongue.IfaCossackgaveUkrainianashisnativelan-guage,hewasautomaticallyassignedtotheUkrainianminority.Asaresult,forexampleintheKrasnodarkrai,whichisthenomi-nal home territory of the ‘canonical’ Kuban Troops, comparedto Russians (4,522,962 people, 88.25% of the total population),Armenians(281,680people,5.5%)andUkrainians(83,746people,1.63%),‘Cossacks’areamarginalgroup(5899people,0.1%)4.Inad-dition,accordingtotheofficialstatistics,53%ofCossacksarecity

ticipatedintheeventsinCrimeain2014alongwithsevenBalticCossacks(seehttp://lawinrussia.ru/content/baltiyskoe-kazachestvo-perezhilo-no-voe-rozhdenie).

3 The nationality of ‘Cossack’ appeared under the ‘nationality’ heading onthecensusformsattheinitiativeofViktorVodolatsky,atamanoftheDonTroops.Therewasaself-servingaspecttothisdemand:theatamanscountedongrantsfromthefederalbudgetwhichweregiventoofficialminorities.TheyenthusiasticallydrewupontheexampleoftheVolgaGermans,whoatthattimewerebeinggivenspecialfavoursbythegovernmentbecauseoftheirmassemigrationtoWestGermany.

4 Д.Куренов,СкольконасамомделеказаковвРоссииинаКубани,https://www.yuga.ru/articles/society/7524.html

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dwellers5,whichalsocallstherevivalofCossacktraditionsintoquestion, as their natural habitats were the stanitsa (campsite)andthehutor(farmstead).

The distinguishing factor of the ‘neo-Cossack’ is not ethnic, butcultural(traditionalclothes,Orthodoxreligion,richfolklore,tra-ditions,militarymentality).TheKremlin’spolicyconsciouslyob-fuscatestheCossacks’ethnicambitionsinanycase,treatingthemas a healthy component of the Russian people. The traditionallypro-statenationalismandOrthodoxreligionoftheCossackshastodaybecomepartof‘Russianconservatism’and‘Orthodoxcivi-lisation’;thusthe‘Cossackquestion’hasbecomepartofthe‘Rus-sian question’. According to the methodological interpretationoftheFirstCossackUniversity,“Formally,aCossackmaybeanycitizenoftheRussianFederationwhoidentifieswithCossackdomanditsspecificwayoflife,whopracticesitstraditionsandethicalprinciples”6.Thelegaldefinitioninthefederallawfrom2005onthestateserviceofRussianCossackdomisequallyvague;itstatesthat“RussianCossacksarecitizensoftheRussianFederationwhoaremembersofCossackassociations”7.Accordingtothegovern-ment’sFederalAgencyforNationalityAffairs8“Cossacksarenota nationality, but a cultural-historical community (...); Kalmyksand Buryats have joined Cossackdom without renouncing theirnationality”.TheAgencyestimatesthatmodernRussianCossacks

5 InlargecitiestheCossacksprefernottoopenlydisplaytheirethnicdis-tinctiveness:duringthe2010censusonly609MuscovitesdeclaredCossacknationality,andinSt.Petersburgthefigurewas34.SeeН.Кучеров,Гдеживутказаки?,http://kazak-center.ru/publ/novosti_kazak_inform/rossi-jskoe_kazachestvo/gde_zhivut_kazaki/153-1-0-1246

6 Казачийкомпонентввысшемобразовании,onthewebsiteoftheMoscowUniversityofTechnologyandManagement:http://mgutm.ru/kazachestvo/formation.php

7 Федеральныйзаконот5декабря2005г.N154-ФЗОгосударственнойслужбероссийскогоказачества,Российская Газета,8December2005,https://rg.ru/2005/12/08/kazachestvo.html

8 Агентствоподеламнациональностей:запоследние6летчислоказаковвРоссиивырослов4раза,https://www.currenttime.tv/a/28156818.html

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includeoverfortynationalities,andoverthepastsixyearstheirnumbershavequadrupled.

The above-mentioned Agency has confirmed that ‘neo-Cossack-dom’(thenewCossackcommunity)istodaymadeupofbothde-scendantsoftheCossacksoftheRussianEmpireandcitizensoftheRussianFederation,whohave“joinedit”.Thereasonsfordo-ingsoarevarious:somearegovernedbyaromanticimageofCos-sackdom;othershavecometoexpectconcessionsandprivilegesfromthestate;stillothersarelookingforsolutionstotheirfinan-cial problems through the possibility of additional income. ThestatutoryconditionsforadmissiontothemilitaryCossackassoci-ationsarenotprohibitive:itisrequiredtosubmitanapplication,testifytotheOrthodoxreligion,tobewithoutacriminalrecord,undergoathree-monthtrialperiod,andthenthereisacollegialdecisionbytheGeneralAssembly,i.e.the‘Cossackcircle’.Womenmayalsojointheassociations9,althoughthisisinviolationoftheCossacks’traditionalsocialmodel.Thepredominantpartoftheireliteisderivedfromtheministriesofforce.Thisstateofaffairsisfavouredbylaw:therankofCossackcanbeassignedtopersonsservingorinthereserveoftheMinistryofDefence,theMinis-tryofInternalAffairs,theFederalSecurityService,theFederalSecurityService,thebodiesofjusticeandthepublicprosecutor’soffice. For native-born Cossacks, these ‘non-natives’ are treatedironicallyas‘crypto-Cossacks’,‘theself-proclaimed’,‘crossdress-ers’. According to Oleg Gubenko10, a representative of the TerekCossacks,descendantsofnative-bornCossacksnowmakeupnomore than 30% of the Cossack organisations’ members. Radicalrepresentativesofthenationalist-ethniccurrentcommonlyjux-tapose the concept of ‘Cossack’ with the term ‘Cossackdom’, i.e.the‘realCossackethnos’,incontrastwiththe‘crossdressers’who

9 Р. Минеев, «Не только махать шашкой». Атаман рассказал о жизнисовременногоказачества,http://www.krsk.aif.ru/society/ataman_pav-el_artamonov_zachem_kazakam_nuzhen_zakon

10 AfterГосударствоиказачество,Казачество Москвы,28August2016,http://казачествомосквы.рф/news/gosudarstvo_i_kazachestvo/2016-08-28-1184

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favourtheimperialcurrent(callingthelatter‘имперцы’,thatis,supportersoftheneo-imperialideology)11.

2. The legal status of Cossackdom: the ‘Cossack state service’

Neo-Cossackdom has little in common with the ethos of a ‘free people’: its supposedly ‘bottom-up’ initiatives are controlled from the Kremlin and subject to strict control. Moreover, crucial to the Kremlin are the Cossacks’ military/discipli-nary features, which are covered by the term ‘Cossack state service’. This concept, which is of essential importance today in the official narrative, has supplanted previous considera-tions on the revival and rehabilitation of the ‘Cossack nation’ in the public debate. In the face of the authorities’ increasing demands of this service, the Cossack organisations have not been and still are not able to recruit the necessary number of Cossacks to it. This has led to the Cossack associations rein-forcing their ranks with representatives of the armed forces and other government departments of force who have been dismissed to the reserves, as well as random individuals (in-cluding so-called freaks and radicals, often with criminal re-cords), in a way which the current political situation favours. The legal regulations concerning the Cossack service have in-troduced a division of the Cossacks into ‘registered’ and ‘un-registered’ groups.

The relevant legal definition is found in Article 5 of the above-mentioned act concerning the state service of Russian Cossack-dom,whichstatesthatCossackswillperformtheirmilitaryser-viceintheirownseparateunitsofthearmedforces,theNationalGuardtroops,andintheFSB’sbordertroops.Inaccordancewith

11 SeeМ.Струкова,Казаки-семьполитическихтрендов,https://rusmoni-tor.com/marina-strukova-kazaki-sem-politicheskikh-trendov.html

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thisregulation,Cossackstateserviceincludesthefollowingobli-gations:

1) participation of Cossack associations in keeping military re-cords,inorganisingthemilitary-patrioticeducationofconscriptsandtrainingthereservists;

2) participation in preventing crime and removing the conse-quences of emergencies and natural disasters, civil and territo-rialdefence;

3) participation in protecting public order, ecological and fire-fightingprotection,defendingthestateborderandactinginthefightagainstterrorism;

4)otheractivitiesbasedontheCossackassociations’agreementswiththemilitaryadministrations,thefederalbodiesofexecutivepower and their territorial organs, and also with the executiveauthoritiesofentitiesoftheRussianFederationandtheorgansofthelocalgovernmentauthorities.

Inpractice,Cossackstateservicetakesmanyforms(militaryser-vicebybothconscriptedandcontracttroops,self-defenceunits,sentries,patrols,volunteerteamsforsecurityatmassevents,andlastlyvicesquadsandcyber-volunteers).Thisisdonewithinthecommunity,oronthebasisofcontractsbetweenthefederal&lo-cal authorities and members of the registered associations. Theprocedure for transferring them to the state registry is deter-minedbyArticle6oftheabove-mentionedact.

Theproblemliesnotonlyinthefactthat,accordingtotheapplica-bleprovisions,theCossackservicedoesnothavethebasicattrib-utesofstateservice,suchasthestatusofastateworker,employ-mentcontracts,fixedsalariesorsocialprotection.Thisispartiallyavoluntary,socialkindofservice,andpartiallycontractualwith-intheframeworkoftheCossackassociations.Suchdifficultiesof

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interpretation also arise from the legal status of these associa-tions. In the civil code revised in May 2014 (Article 123.15), theCossackassociationsaredefinedas“associationsofcitizens,re-cordedinthestateregister,formedwiththeaimofmaintainingthetraditionallifestyle,farmingandcultureofRussianCossack-dom,andalsowithotheraimsasprovidedforinthelawonthestateserviceofRussianCossackdom,whichvoluntarilyandinthestatutorymannerhavetakenuponthemselvesobligationsinthefieldofservice to thestateorothers.”Thecivilcodeunambigu-ouslyqualifiedtheCossackassociationstotheinstitutionsoftheso-calledRussian‘thirdsector’:non-governmentalnon-commer-cialorganisations(for thepublicbenefit).Themanner inwhichthey were entered into the state register is determined by theregulationsoftheMinistryofJustice,whichmaintainsthisreg-ister.Anyapplicationtojoinshouldincludethefollowingitems:1) the statutory objectives of the organisation (the maintenanceofthetraditionallifestyle,farmingandcustomsofCossackdom);2)dataconcerningthesizeoftheorganisation’smembership(de-pending on the level: rural and hutor (farmstead) organisationsshouldcontainatleast10members,municipalorganisations30,district-level150,oblast-level500,andamilitaryCossackassocia-tion1000members;3)theobligationoftheassociation’smemberstoservethestateandothers.

TheCossacks’legalcapacityisboundtothestateregister,althoughthisdoesnotmeanthatthe‘unregistered’areofnointeresttotheRussian authorities. This is because in addition to the registry,manyotherorganisations,clearlysupportedandentrustedwithtasksbytheKremlin,arealsoinoperation.Manyofthese–suchastheUnionofCossacks,establishedin1990(i.e.stillintheSovietperiod),andledwithoutabreaksincethenbytheatamanPavelZadorozhny – changed their status to registered associations in2012underpressurefromtheKremlin.RegisteredandsocialCos-sackassociationshaveparticipatedonanequalfootinginmilitaryexpeditions, and have performed various overt and covert mis-sions. In 2014, Terek, Kuban and Amur Cossacks from Belgorod

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madetheirpresenceinCrimeaclearlyfelt,asdidtheunregistered‘wolves’hundreds’ledbyIgorGirkin(a.k.a.Strelkov)andthelocalCrimeanCossacks,whoatthattimewerecitizensofUkraine.

Onespectacularexampleofanactionby‘unregistered’groupsistheso-calledCossackNationalGuardoftheAlmightyDonArmyunderatamanNikolaiKozitsyn,whichwasformedinApril2014tosupporttheRussianwaragainstUkraineintheDonbas.Volun-teersledbyhimoccupiedthetownsofAntratsyt,Severodonetskand others, where they “entered at the request of their Cossackbrothers,whorepresent80%ofthepopulation,andwheretherewas a threat of a repetition of the events of the Maidan”12. ThisbodycameintoconflictwiththeauthoritiesoftheLuganskandDonetsk ‘People’s Republics’, and discredited themselves amongthelocalpopulationasaresultoftheirdrunkenbrawling,andattheendofthesameyeartheywithdrew.However,Kozitsynstillkeeps the Ukrainian community under psychological pressure,scaring them with the guard’s still growing potential, which isbasedonthenewly-createddistrictsoftheAlmightyDonArmyinsouth-eastUkraine(Lugansk,Donetsk,Kharkov,etc.)13. InJanu-ary2017heannouncedanewcall-upofCossackvolunteerstotheso-calledDonetskPeople’sRepublic.AtamanKozitsynisaknightof 28 state orders, including the Order of the Red Standard andtheRedStar ‘ForPersonalCourage’ofPetertheGreatandAlex-ander Nevsky, and also has awards from the Russian OrthodoxChurch.HealsoholdstherankofgeneraloftheCossacktroops,awardedbythePresidentoftheRussianFederation.Hehashada typical career for a Cossack general: after completing InteriorMinistrytraininginKharkovin1985heworkedinapenalcolony.Hewasfiredforprofessionalmisconduct,startedaprivateenter-prise,andwasinvolvedintherenaissanceoftheDonCossacks.

12 АтаманНиколайКозицини«Казачьянациональнаягвардия»,http://www.apn.ru/index.php?newsid=36029

13 М.Бондаренко,Донскиеказакиготовятсявпоход,Независимая Газета,3February2017,http://www.ng.ru/regions/2017-02-03/6_6920_kazaki.html

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He participated in the Transnistrian conflict (1992), and foughton the side of the Serbian leader Slobodan Milošević, as well aswiththeseparatistAbkhazandOssetianforcesinGeorgia(2008).HeoperatesindependentlyoftheregisteredDonTroops,andhasopenlycarriedoutmissionsentrustedhimbytheKremlin(ashehasstated,heissubjectonlytotheLordandtoPresidentPutin).

Examplescanalsobegivenofcaseswherearegisteredgrouphaschangeditsstatustounregistered.Since2014theCentralCossackAssociation has been headed by the ataman Ivan Mironov. Hispredecessor,atamanValeryNalimov,currentlyrunstheCentralCossack Troops’ Interregional Social Organisation, and is con-tinuingthisgroup’sactivitiesintheBalkans.Athisinitiative,in2011theSaintSava’sCossackStanitsawasformed,whichinturnresultedinthecreationin2016oftheBalkanCossackArmybasedin Kotor, Montenegro, assembling 26 Serbian Cossack organisa-tions14.UnregisteredCossackorganisationsaremoreusefulwhenfulfillingtheroleof ‘Russianfifthcolumns’,astheycancamou-flagetheirtieswiththeRussianstatemoreeffectively.

ThefluidityoftheboundarybetweenregisteredandunregisteredCossackscanbedemonstratedbythefateoftheUnionofCossackTroopsofRussiaandAbroad,whichwasregisteredinGermanyin1993andledfromtheoutsetbytheunregisteredDonatamanViktorRatiyev.InRussia,thisinternationalorganisationwasdel-egalisedaspartofthere-registrationofCossackassociationsor-deredin2012;itsassetsweretakenoverbyanassociationledbyatamanViktorVodolatsky,anactiveparticipantintheKremlin’sprojects15.Thisnewgroup,whichwasregisteredbytheMinistry

14 Forexample,seeРоссиясоздаётнаБалканахрусскоевойско,http://pol-texpert.org/15763-rossiya-sozdaet-na-balkanah-russkoe-voisko; Russia’sFriends Form New ‘Cossack Army’ In Balkans, https://www.rferl.org/a/balkans-russias-friends-form-new-cossack-army/28061110.html

15 ViktorVodolatskyistheformeratamanoftheDonTroops,aformerdeputygovernorofRostovoblast,amemberofUnitedRussia,chairmanoftheDumacommitteeonthepatrioticeducationofchildrenandyoungpeople,vice-presidentoftheDumacommitteefortheCIS,Eurasianintegrationandcom-

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ofJusticeinDecember2014,adoptedthenameoftheUnionofMil-itaryCossacksofRussiaandAbroad(itsRussianabbreviationre-mainedunchanged).Officiallythepurposeofthisre-registrationprocesswastoregulateandordertheCossackworld,aswellasthefunctionsoftheindividualassociations.However,theexam-pleofthisoneorganisationclearlyshowsthattherealideawastosubjecttheCossacksinRussiaandabroadtoclosercontrol,mak-ingiteasierfortheKremlintocarryoutitspolicies16.

3. The ‘Cossack troops’

Assigning the Cossacks to all the roles they perform – from paramilitary organisations that deals with the patriotic (and Orthodox) education of young people, through the fire brigades, forest guards, crime prevention, the fights against terrorism and extremism, the protection of public facilities, the defence of state borders, as well as participation in the civil defence and territorial defence organisations – falls within the competence of the Cossack associations’ military staffs, which are currently being created or reconstructed. In the public space, these associations are called the ‘Cossack troops’. These so-called troops, which, by virtue of the dis-cipline prevailing within them, could only conventionally be classified as irregular troops, are treated in the official narrative as a permanent element of Russia’s security and

municationwithcompatriotsabroad,amemberofthePresidentialCouncilforInterethnicRelations,andalsoholdsotherfunctions.

16 ThemainstatutorytaskofthisorganisationistoworkwithforeignCossackassociations(itisofficiallyaffiliatedwithCossacksfrom43countries).ItsFirstGreatKrugwasattendedbyrepresentativesofthePresidentialAdmin-stration,oftheRossotrudnichestvoagency,theMinistryofCivilDefenceandEmergencySituations,theRussianOrthodoxChurch,aswellasAleksandrBorodai,thefirstPrimeMinisteroftheso-calledDonetskPeople’sRepublic,whichprovesthesystemicsupportoftheseparatists.TheagendacoveredtheCossacks’participationinthepreparationformobilisationoftheRussianFederation’sArmedForces.(СоюзКазаков-ВоиновРоссиииЗарубежья.Перезагрузка началась, http://kazak-center.ru/news/sojuz_kazakov_voinov_rossii_i_zarubezhja_perezagruzka_nachalas/2015-02-19-2934).

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defence architecture. In fact, they are a form of territorial organisation for the Cossack associations. This is based on a principle of centralisation, that is, of the hierarchical sub-ordination of the lower-level structures to the structures at the higher level.

In Russia there are currently eleven military Cossack societies(военные казачьи общества, hereafter VKO) in operation; theseare vertically structured associations of locally registered or-ganisationsinoneormoreregions(atthehutor,stanitsa,urban,districtandoblastlevels),withthesupremeatamanatthetopofthepyramid.Eachlower-levelstructureiscontrolledbyahigher-levelstaff.Bya1995decreefromPresidentBorisYeltsin,tocreateastateregisterofCossackassociationsintheRussianFederation,tenVKOsappearedbetween1996and1998.Thelastone,theCen-tralVKO,wascreatedbyPresidentVladimirPutininDecreeNo.574from2007.Aswasannouncedbackin2012,theseorganisa-tionswereoriginallytohavebeenmergedintoasingleAll-Rus-sianMilitaryCossackAssociation,butasofnowthishasstillnotbeen established. These paramilitary associations, which drawupon historical traditions and are commonly referred to as theCossacktroops,havebecometheprimaryplatformfortherela-tionship between the state and Cossackdom. According to datafrom2014,theyinclude506,000Cossacks,numberinginthefol-lowingregions17:

• Kuban–146,000(29%),• Don–126,000(25%),• Central–75,000(15%),• Yenisei–66,000(13%),• Terek–30,000(6%),• Orenburg–25,000(5%),• Volga–14,000(3%),

17 ThejournalistNikolaiKucherov,citedabove,hasdrawnupondatafromtheFederalAgencyforNationalities'Affairs.

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• Trans-Baikal–6000(1%),• Siberia–6000(1%),• Amur–6000(1%),• Irkutsk–4500(1%).

The official data has been deliberately inflated. These numbers,as is apparent from statements by Nikolai Doluda, ataman ofthe Kuban Troops’ VKO, cover both the Cossacks themselvesandtheirfamilies.InhisannualreportfromDecember2016,hestatedthattheformationheleadsnumbers48,557Cossacks(5392morepeoplethanin2015),andmorethan160,000peopleinto-tal, along with their families18. The Kuban VKO consists of 555organisations, including 9 at oblast level, 59 district and 487 atthemunicipal,stanitsaandhutorlevels.Somesourceshavehigh-lightedatendencyof‘aging’amongtheVKOs’members,resultinginadeclineintheirnumbers.MorerealisticdataiscitedbytheKremlinpropagandistVladislavGulevich19,who(probablywhiletakingtheagecriteriaintoconsideration)hasestimatedthepo-tentialirregularCossackserviceataround300,000.TheCossacksthemselves are responsible for this informational chaos: for ex-ample,theCossackInformational-AnalyticalCentre20statesthattheprogrammefordevelopingthestate/publicpartnershipwiththeRussianCossacksfor2017-2025hasbeenallocated765millionroubles(US$13m)inthestatebudget.Theintendedresultofthisis“anincreaseinthenumberofCossackmilitaryassociationmem-bersfrom180,000people(2016)to206,000bytheyear2025.”

TheCossackmilitaryassociations,whichareobligedtokeeprecordsandprovidepre-conscriptiontraining,aswellasretrainingforthe

18 Казачьей милиции нужно будет выдать оружие – главный казакКубаниНиколайДолуда,http://krasnodarmedia.su/news/572269

19 В.Гулевич,Казакивыйдутнаслужбу,23October2016,http://www.se-godnia.ru/content/180892

20 Вопросыфинансированияказачестванафедеральномирегиональномуровнях,http://kazak-center.ru/news/voprosy_finansirovanija_kazach-estva_na_federalnom_i_regionalnom_urovnjakh/2016-12-03-3216

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reservesoftheRussianFederation’sArmedForces,areofparticu-larinteresttotheKremlin.Infact,theyaresubjecttopresidentialjurisdiction: the President approves their statutes, appoints theatamansandgivesthemthehighestranks(Cossackgenerals)21.Theatamansgenerallycomefromtheministriesofforce(themostre-centnominationshavecomeinmostcasesfromtheRussianFeder-ation’sArmedForces),andmakeuppartoftheregionalauthorities(asaruletheyaredeputygovernors,responsibleforsecurityanddefenceintheregion).Forexample:atamanDoludaoftheKubanTroops,whoatthesametimeisdeputygovernoroftheKrasnodarkrai,overseesissuesrelatedtoconscription,themilitaryrecordsofthereserves,civildefenceandterritorialdefence.Inhissparetime,heperformsmarriages,ashealsooverseesthelocalZAGS(Органы записи актов гражданского состояния,theequivalenttotheCivilRegistryOffice).Itisdifficulttoseethissystemasbeingafairsub-stitutefortheCossacks’previousautonomyanddemocracy,whentheatamanwaselectedatageneralmeeting(krug),althoughfor-mallythecustomhasbeenretained:thePresidentappointstheata-manattherequestofthekrug.

Themechanismforrecruitingtheeliteneo-Cossacks,andthe‘ci-vilian’functionstheyperform,canbeillustratedbythefollowingsummary:

Ataman (degree) Previous professional career and current administrative function

Cossack General Ivan Mironov (Central Cos-sack Troops)

Reserve FSB general; deputy governor of Samara oblast

Cossack Colonel Viktor Goncharov (Don Troops)

Professional soldier; deputy governor of Rostov oblast

21 http://ввко.рф/legislation/orders-and-dispositions/225-polozhenie-o-po-ryadke-prisvoeniya-kazachih-chinov-kazakam-volzhskogo-voyskovogo-kazachego-obschestva.html

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Ataman (degree) Previous professional career and current administrative function

Cossack General Nikolai Doluda (Kuban Troops)

Professional soldier, deputy governor of Krasnodar krai

Cossack Colonel Gen-nady Privalov (Siberian Army)

Professional soldier; head of the military administration of the Omsk oblast

Military starshyna Alek-sandr Żurawski (Terek Troops)

Professional soldier; head of the committee for nationalities of the Stavropol krai

Cossack Colonel Yuri Ivanov (Volga Troops)

Former head of department in the Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Situations in the Samara oblast; head of the Ministry’s Supreme Board in the oblast

Cossack General Pavel Artamonov (Yenisei Troops)

Professional soldier: no further information available

Cossack Colonel Gen-nady Chupin (Trans-Baikal Troops)

Former prosecutor in Chita; deputy gover-nor of the Trans-Baikal krai

Cossack General Nikolai Shakhov (Irkutsk Troops)

Professional soldier: advisor to the governor of the Irkutsk oblast

Cossack General Vladimir Romanov (Orenburg Troops)

Former commander of the Interior Troops of the Ural oblast; deputy governor of the Sverdlovsk oblast

Cossack Colonel Vladimir Stepanov (Amur Troops)

Police colonel, former head of prison service delegation in Khabarovsk krai, head of de-partment for cooperation with Cossacks in the administration of Khabarovsk krai

In addition, the ‘Cossack troops’ include the Independent BalticCossackDistrictinKaliningrad,headedbythemilitarystarshyna

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Maksim Buga, and the Independent Northwest Cossack Districtbased in St. Petersburg, led by the Cossack colonel Vitaly Mar-tynenko.

Specialattentionsurroundsthe‘DonTroops’basedinRostov,the‘Kubans’(Krasnodar),andthe‘CentralTroops’(Moscow)becauseof their numbers, as well as their formal and informal duties.TheDonmilitaryassociationowesitshighstatustoitsfirstata-manViktorVodolatsky(whoisnowapoliticalactivistinUnitedRussia);theKubanstothegovernoroftheKrasnodarkraiAlek-sandr Tkachov (now minister of agriculture), and the CentralTroops to their proximity to the Kremlin, which counts on theCossacks’supportincrisissituations.Thetroopsarecoveredbythe patronage of the president, as well as that of local adminis-trations(thegrantsforCossacktroopscomeoutoflocalbudgets).ThelackofalocalpatronresultedinadecreaseinthenumbersoftheTerekTroops’VKO,whichacquiredacertainnotorietyduringthe Chechen wars because of the ‘Yermolov battalion’22. Its par-ticipationintheChechenwars,andintheOssetian/Ingushcon-flictonthesideoftheOssetians, ledtothisVKObeingexpelledfromChechnyaandIngushetia,andtheliquidationofitsdistrictorganisations (in Grozny, Sunzha, etc.). These events, as well asaseriesofsubsequentschisms,reduceditsnumbersbymorethanhalf:leavingasidethereliabilityofthedata,atthetimeofitsreg-istrationinthe1990sitincluded70,000Cossacks,butcurrentlythatnumberisestimatedat30,000.

Theparadesofthe‘Cossacktroops’enjoyconsiderablepublices-teem. Spectacular changes of the guard are the specialty of theKuban Troops’ VKO. It was also the only such group honouredby participation in the central victory parade in Moscow on9May2015,albeitformundanereasons:itistheonlyassociation

22 YermolovwasaCossackataman,conqueroroftheCaucasus.TotheCossacksthisnamehadovertonesofpropaganda,andtheChechenstookitasaprovo-cation.Thebattalionwasdecimatedinaseriesofambushes.

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maintaining a special honour guard which provides the settingforstateandchurchcelebrations,bothinMoscowandinthere-gions. The Kuban Cossacks’ participation in the parade was forpropagandareasons23,toemphasisethehistoricalandcontempo-rarymeritsoftheCossacks(duringtheeventsinCrimeain2014).

By presidential decrees (no.s 168, 169, 170 and 171), since 2010theVKOshavehadunifieduniformsandranks;theyhavebeenobliged to introduce special Cossack IDs (a type of small mili-tarybookletinpassportformat,issuedbytheterritorialmilitarypoliceforfiveyears,withapossibleextensionforafurtherfiveyears). These have made it easier for the Ministry of Defence tokeeprecordsofthemilitaryreserves.Mostofthepagescontaintheterm‘militaryservice’,whereinareenteredthebearer’smili-taryrank(butnottheirCossackrank;thelatterisclassedasan‘internalrank’forusewithintheVKO),hismilitaryspeciality,aswellasthetraininghehasattended.ThehighestrankintheVKO,thatofCossackgeneral,isawardedbythePresidentofRussia,butthehigherofficerranks,theso-calledmainranks(suchasesaul,starshyna,Cossackcolonel,sotnik)areawardedbythePresident’srepresentative in the federal oblast, while the lower ranks areconferredbythegovernoroftheregion.Aseparatedecreeregu-lates the possession of hand weaponry, sabres (shashko) and thetraditionalnahaika.EquippingtheCossackformationswithsmallarms(whichtheCossackshavelongbeenclamouringfor)isstillacontentiousmatter for thegovernment(althoughparticipantsinspecialactionsdoreceivethem:someobserversclaimthatata-manKozitsynwithdrewfromtheDonbaswhenhisCossacksranoutofammunition).

Disciplineintheseso-calledtroopsispoor.Accordingtotheabove-mentionedatamanDoluda, in2016thelegallymandatedannual

23 УчастиеказаковвюбилейномпарадеофициальноподтвердиливМи-нистерствеобороныРФ.Подробности,http://www.vkpress.ru/vkinfo/uchastie-kazakov-v-yubileynom-parade-ofitsialno-podtverdili-v-minister-stve-oborony-rf-podrobnosti/?id=76219

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krugsforaccountingandelectingleaderswereheldinonly5outof9districtsoftheKubanTroops’VKO,andinonly15ofthe59lo-calorganisations.Theatamanalsoharshlycriticisedtheirmili-taryinsubordination:56%oftheregionalorganisations’atamansfailedtoturnupformilitaryfieldexercises.Cossacksparticipat-inginpatroldutiesoftenconductthemselvesarbitrarily:theyas-saultthievesanddrugaddictswiththeirnahaikas,putcriminalsinirons,conductunlawfulinvestigations,andsoon.

‘Military’ discipline is also breached by atamans of individualtroops. In September 2013, Metropolitan Cyril of Stavropol, thechairmanoftheSynodCommitteeforCooperationwithCossack-dom,imposedaclericalpunishment(epithymia)ontheatamansof the Terek (Sergei Klimenko24), Central (Valery Nalimov) andTrans-BaikalVKOs(SergeiBobrov),onchargesofseparatistac-tivities among the troops entrusted to them, which resulted intheirdismissalfromtheirduties.Intheofficialpress,thesubjectwas taboo; from the Cossack forums25, in which the case raisedawaveofcriticismoftheChurch,itisknownthatthemetropoli-tan’sdecisionwasagreeduponwithAleksanderBeglov,theheadof the Presidential Council for Cossackdom. The disgraced ata-manswereremovedfromtheCouncil.

24 Policemajor-generalSergeiKlimenkowasappointedbyPresidentPutinin2012asatamanoftheTerekTroopswiththerankofCossackGeneral(intheofficialnarrative:hewaschosenasatamanduringtheGreatKrug).HecameintoconflictwiththeheadoftheNorthernCaucasianFederalDistrict,AleksandrKhloponinandtheauthoritiesoftheStavropolkrai,andthensettheCossacksagainsttheauthoritiesandeachother.Asmentioned,hede-mandedthetransfertotheTerekTroopsofthecognacfactoryinKizlyarandtheKavkazminkurortresursybusinessresponsibleformanagingtheholidayresortsandmineralwatersintheCaucasus,andtookhisdemandsdirectlytoPresidentPutin,bypassingthelocalauthorities.Klimenko'sre-movaldeepenedthesplitwithintheTerekTroops,asasignificantpartofhisfollowerslefttheforceandbecamemoreradical,publiclycriticisingboththeauthoritiesandtheOrthodoxChurch.

25 Ктоикаксегодняправитказаками?,http://kazak-center.ru/news/kto_i_kak_segodnja_pravit_kazakami/2013-09-23-2631

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Penaltiesliketheabove-mentionedlevelledagainsttheCossacksarebecomingamorecommonmanifestationoftheirpunishment:inMay2017inKrasnodar,theOrthodoxChurchimposedanepi-thymiaonsixCossackswhohadbeenworkingwiththeelectoralstaffoftheoppositionactivistAlekseiNavalny.TheKubanTroops’VKOexpelledoneofitsmembersforthesamereason.Thelegalinstruments used against the Cossacks are not discussed in thecentralmedia,althoughechoesofhigh-profiledetentionspersistinthelocalpress26.ItisalsoworthmentioninginthiscontexttheamendmentpassedthisyeartothelawontheRussianCossacks’stateservice,whoserapidapprovalbytheDumawasannouncedbyPresidentPutin27.Theamendmentexpandedallthelimitsandrestrictionsoftheanti-corruptionlegislationtotheatamans;theyweredeprivedofthefeestheyhadreceivedfortheCossackasso-ciations’smallbusinesses,andhenceforththeymustalsosubmitanannualreportabouttheirownincome,aswellasthatoftheirwivesandminorchildren.

4. The ‘Cossack component’ as a subject in education and state policy

The essence of the state’s new policy towards Cossackdom is found in the term ‘the Cossack component’. This emphasises the allegedly colossal patriotic, spiritual, civic and economic

26 OneexampleisthecaseoftheatamanAnatolyKuslivy,founderanddirectoroftheprivateCossackcadetcorpsinSimferopol,whichhasbeengoingonformorethanayear.InApril2016hewasarrestedonchargesofpaedophiliaandexploitingtheworkofhiscadets.Thestatemediaimmediatelydistanceditselffromtheataman,callinghima‘pseudo-Cossack’anda‘crossdresser’,andan-nouncedtheappointmentofastate-runCossackcadetschool(М.Аванесова,Ряженыхнамненадо,https://gazetacrimea.ru/news/ryajenih-nam-ne-na-do-22671).Socialmediahaveinturnbeenusedtoorganisepicketsandpostedpetitions by the cadets’ parents demanding the ataman’s release (https://vk.com/club52077285).Thisincidenthasalsoprovedtobeanexcellentcon-tributiontothepracticeoftheKremlin’spolicytowardstheCossacks.

27 Федеральныйзаконот1мая2017г.N82-ФЗОвнесенииизмененийвста-тью5Федеральногозакона"Огосударственнойслужбероссийскогоказачества", Российская Газета, 3 May 2017, https://rg.ru/2017/05/03/kazaki-dok.html

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potential of the Cossacks, who in the official narrative has be-come a model for Russian society, its economic enterprise and its pro-defence activity. The Cossacks, as a kind of ‘healthy’ grassroots organisation of society, innately opposed to oppo-sitionist organisations, constitute the most important argu-ment for the existence of a civil, subjective society in Russia. Like the concept analysed above, the term does not so much describe reality as creates it.

The new wave of Cossack-mania in the national narrative has coincided with the return of the previously announced ‘mod-ernisation of Russia towards traditionalism’, which clearly ac-celerated after the events on the Maidan in Kiev. ‘Faith’ in the national narrative has been strengthened by the Orthodox Church, which stresses that the Cossacks have always stood in the defence not only of Russia’s borders, but of the Orthodox faith.

Theterm‘theCossackcomponent’appearedinthecontextofthepatriotic education of children and youth as the name of an in-dividualschoolsubject.Thetextbooksandmethodologicalguide-lineswerepreparedbytheRazumovskyStateUniversityofTech-nologyandManagementinMoscow,whichsince2014hasactedastheFirstCossackUniversity.ByadecisionofthePresidentialCouncil forCossackAffairs, this institutebecamethemethodo-logicalcentreandtheheadquartersforimplementinginnovativetechnology inCossackenterprisesandfarms.Thechoiceof thisinstitutewasjustifiedbythelackofqualifiedmanagementper-sonnelintheagriculturalregionsofcompactCossackresidence,whichmakesitdifficultforthemtoorganisetheirownagricul-turalprocessingplants.TheCossackUniversityeducates150suchprofessionalsperyear(10attheUniversityofMoscow,theothersin18regionalbranches).TheUniversitystressestheimportanceoftheCossacksasasubstantialpartofcivilsociety28.

28 Казачийкомпонентввысшемобразовании,http://mgutm.ru/kazach-estvo/formation.php

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According to education minister Olga Vasileva29, the Cossackcomponent is one subject in the continuous education which90,000childrenandyoungpeoplein4000institutions(kinder-gartens,schools,CossackclassesandCossackcadetcorps,voca-tionaltrainingcentresanduniversities)areundergoing.TheyareinculcatedwithacoherentsystemofpatrioticeducationbasedonCossack traditions, as well as comprehensive military-patrioticprograms,includingdrills.Thesubjectalsoincludesciviceduca-tion,shapingthephilosophicalandethicalattitudesinthespiritof Orthodoxy, the protection of regional cultural heritage, etc.MinisterVasilevapresentsthisprojectasakindofassistanceforCossacksinthefieldofvocationaltrainingandeconomiceduca-tion,placingit–inaccordancewiththespiritofthenationalnar-rative–inthecontextoftheCossackassociations’self-financingprogramme.This isoneelementofabroaderplanfor thepatri-otic education of children and adolescents, based (among otherelements) on the unified standards for historical and culturaleducationintroducedin2014.Thishasbornefruitinthereturnofideologytoschools,asthesestandardspromoteanideologyofaperceptionoftheworldthroughtheprismofthe‘Russianworld’(русский мир),thatis,acivilisationbasedontraditional,spiritu-ally Orthodox values. These educational activities are activelysupportedbytheOrthodoxclergy,whohaveexpandedthistopictoincludediscussionsofreligioussecurity,thatis,theabilitytoresistpressurefromforeigncultures30.

Since 2016 the ‘Cossack component’ school subject has also in-cluded training in cyber-warfare. This is confirmed by increas-inglynumerousreportsofCossackcyber-volunteers.Theirtasks

29 From a report of the meeting of the Council for Cossack Affairs for thePresidentoftheRFon16November2016:СостоялосьзаседаниеСоветаприПрезидентеРоссийскойФедерацииподеламказачества,http://ввко.рф/news/632-v-moskve-sostoyalos-zasedanie-soveta-pri-prezidente-rossiyskoy-federacii-po-delam-kazachestva.html

30 Практическаялекция:„Религиознаябезопасность”,https://ok.ru/mgu-tuim.ru/topic/66111008394087

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allegedlyincludesearchingforprohibitedcontentontheRussianinternet, unmasking criminal socialnetworks that promoteex-tremismandterrorism,andcombatinginformationalaggressionby the West, etc. These cyber-volunteers, groups of which haveappearedindifferentregions,arerequiredtosweartheCossackoath31.AttheirrallyattheFirstCossackUniversityinApril2017–whichwasattendedbyrepresentativesofthePresidentialCoun-cilforCossackAffairs,theheadofthegovernmentagencyforsu-pervisingInternetcommunicationRoskomnadzor,theheadoftheSecureInternetLeague,andFatherTimofey(Chaykin),whohasbeenappointedbytheChurchtothestudents’pastoralcare–theirroleasdefendersofthevirtualandculturalboundariesofRussiawasemphasised,asweretheirspecialmerits.Asstated,withinjustsixmonthstheCossackcyber-volunteers’missionsledtotheblockingof26,000portalspromoting‘terrorismandextremism’and‘radicalUkrainianpropaganda’.32

Theabove-mentioneddevelopmentof ‘Cossack’economicpoten-tialcanbeinterpretedontheonehandasamodernvariantoftheexchangeofmilitaryserviceforreliefandconcessions,whichisfamiliarfromhistory;andontheotherhand,asareproductionof the process from the early 2000s when there was a massiveinfluxofsiloviki intotheeconomy,andwhenseniorrepresenta-tives of the security structures took up managerial positions incompaniesandontheirsupervisoryboards,leadingtotherena-tionalisationandconcentrationofthestate’seconomicassets.Inthepresentcase,thisprocesshascomedowntotheregionallevel,andnowinvolvesregionalsecurityelites.Asthenewadministra-torsofallotmentsfromthestatelandfund,theyaresupposedto

31 The Kaliningrad Cossack Institute of Technology and Design, which isabranchoftheFirstCossackUniversity,hasalreadytrainedandswornintwointernetteams(И.Марков,ВКалининграденачнетсяформированиеказачьейкибердружины,Комсомольская Правда,16March2017,http://www.kaliningrad.kp.ru/online/news/2685452.

32 М.Лемуткина,Казакинашливинтернетедьяволаиобъявилиемувойну,Московский Комсомолец,12April2017,http://www.mk.ru/social/2017/04/12/kazaki-nashli-v-internete-dyavola-i-obyavili-emu-voynu.html

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guaranteethetechnologicalleapforwardofRussianagriculture,to develop the production of organic food, agro-tourism, horsestables,equinetherapy,etc.

Bypresentingneo-Cossackdomasthemanagementoftheagricul-turalandfoodproductionsector,theofficialnarrativeemphasisestheCossacks’roleinensuringRussia’sfoodsecurityandtheself-sufficiency of Russian agriculture, which has been of interest totheKremlinsincetheintroductionin2014ofWesternsanctionsonfoodimportstoRussia.Sensinganopportunity,theCossackasso-ciationshavebeguntooffertheirmediationinthefoodtrade33.Thiseconomicentrepreneurship,inadditiontotheself-financingoftheCossack troops, is additionally intended to lead to the settlementofSiberiaandtheFarEast,thesafesupplyoffoodtostrategiccon-sumers(thearmedforces,theStateReservesCommittee,Rosatom,theRussianrailways,Gazprom,Rosneftandothers),aswellasstatecontroloverfoodprices,bothwholesaleandretail.Thisnarration,asitshapesreality,isbeingdisseminatedbytheatamans:the‘Cos-sacktroops’theycontrolproducefoodandgainacompetitivead-vantage, namely broad access to strategic consumers. It seemssignificantthatthispublicdiscoursehascompletelyfailedtotaketheprinciplesofthemarketeconomyintoaccount.Thisdiscoursecontainsnoinformationonthesourcesofanyfundingforsuchpro-jects,makingitdifficulttoforecastnotonlytheireffectiveness,butalsowhethertheycanevenbeimplemented.

Another potential source of cash flows for the Cossacks is theirpaid security service. This business is a tried and tested way offunding security departments outside the state budget. In thecaseoftheneo-Cossacksitisseenasalmostanecessity:themili-tary Cossack associations have been obliged to appoint and reg-ister security companies. This is a short-term solution, subjecton the one hand to a political climate which favours expanding

33 http://kuban24.tv/item/kubanskie-kazaki-zapustili-internet-yarmarku-dlya-sel-hozprodukcii-179511

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businessopportunitiestothemorebroadlyunderstood‘corpora-tionsofforce’,andontheothertoobjectiveeconomicconditionsandthestateofthenationalbudget.

Theproblemisthatthemarketforsecurityserviceswasdivideduplongago,andthenewserviceprovidershavetofacepowerfulcompetition.Thenatureofthiscompetition,andofthecompeti-tiveadvantagethe‘Cossacks’have,canbeindirectlyseeninanin-cidentwhichtookplaceattheendof2015.Aftercutstopositionsin the Russian Interior Ministry (which mainly affected postsoutside the ministry itself), the ‘Cossack Guard’ Private Protec-tionEnterpriseinMoscowsignedacontractwiththeMoscowcityauthoritiestoprotect34Moscowcourts.Afteritwasrevealedthatthecontracthadbeensignedwithoutapublictenderprocedure,theCossackswithdrewfromtheservice.Such‘oversights’aretobeeliminatedthankstoadraftamendmenttothelawontheRus-sianCossacks’stateservice–presentedtotheDumaon11October2016andapparentlypreparedbytheRussianNationalGuard,byadecreefromtheDeputyPrimeMinisterDmitryRogozin–whichstatesthattheCossackswillbemorewidelyinvolvedinprotect-ing essential state facilities of federal importance without theneed to undergo a tendering procedure34. However, the projecthasstillnotbeensubmittedforconsiderationintheDuma.

The supervision of such protection of important locations, spe-cialtransports,routesandinstallations,aswellastheprotectionof the property of natural and legal persons, is the responsibil-ityoftheabove-mentionedFederalServiceoftheNationalGuardTroops, founded in 2016. It also exercises supervision (‘federalstate control’) over private protective undertakings, and over

34 Росгвардияпредлагаетказакамохранятьминистерстваипрокуратуру,Аргументы и Факты,12October2016,http://www.kuban.aif.ru/politic/de-tails/rosgvardiya_predlagaet_kazakam_ohranyat_ministerstva_i_proku-raturu; Казаки могут начать служить в Росгвардии, 22 March 2017,https://www.kavkazr.com/a/kazaki-mogut-nachat-sluzhit-v-rosgvar-dii/28384551.html

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http://казачествомосквы.рф/news/ataman_sergej_shishkin_kazaki_za_sozdanie_chvk/2017-01-20-1382

http://казачествомосквы.рф/news/ataman_sergej_shishkin_kazaki_za_sozdanie_chvk/2017-01-20-1382

armsinciviliancirculation35.TheNationalGuardhasexpressedinterest in increasing the Cossack contingent in its service bymeansofconscription,aswellasinbroadeningthescopeoftheCossack protective service, which presents itself as a necessityduetothevastterritoryoftheRussianFederationandthedensityofstrategiclocationsinareasoflowpopulationdensity,especiallyinSiberiaandtheFarEast.

TheRussianNationalGuard,togetherwiththeMinistryforCivilDefenceandEmergencySituationsandtheMinistryofDefence,hasofficiallyexpresseditsoptimismbystressingtheimportanceofthecooperationbetweentheCossacksandtheterritorialbod-iesofthemilitaryadministration.Moreover,theregisteredCos-sackshavebeeninvolvedforalongtimeintheprotectionofpub-licorderandpublicfacilities(mainlyOrthodoxchurches,schoolsandkindergartens).Before theNationalGuardwasestablished,theconditionsforjoiningthistypeofactivitywerenotprohibi-tive:itwasenoughtocompletea‘localassistant’scourse36.

Thecurrentlyobservedboominthe‘businessofforce’(includingthe Cossack security companies and the private military compa-nies,whichareonlyintheinitialstageoflegislation37)canbein-terpreted in different ways, including as a transition to Cossackself-financing.WeshouldalsonotethatthisappliestotheformallyregisteredCossacks,whohavebeenreinforcedbysoldierssenttothereserves, andbyofficersof thestructuresof force, forwhomtheCossackshavealwaysbeenabrand-name,acommercialtrade-markofferingspecificservices.TheKremlinhasalwaystreatedthe‘businessofforce’notonlyasawaytosolvetheproblemofwhat

35 Accordingto thegovernment newspaper Rossiyskaya Gazeta (5 July2016)therearehalfamillionprivatesecurityguardsworkinginRussia,andmorethan7millionweaponsofvariouscalibresinprivatecirculation.

36 А.Бойко,Росгвардияприрастаетесауламииатаманами,Комсомольская Правда,11October2016,http://www.kp.ru/daily/26592/3608699/

37 С. Шишкин: Казаки за создание ЧВК, http://казачествомосквы.рф/news/ataman_sergej_shishkin_kazaki_za_sozdanie_chvk/2017-01-20-1382

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todowithpeoplesenttothereserves,butalsoasareserveforthearmedforceswhichisinaconstantstateofcombatreadiness.Call-ingitafoundationofcivilsocietyandofthestate/publicpartner-ship seems to be an abuse: expanding the security and defencesectorstranslatesinfacttoanexpansionoftheuseofviolenceasaregulatorintherelationshipbetweenthestateanditscitizens.

Onespectacularelementoftheauthorities’policyregardingtheCossacksisthepropagandaofthestate,whichusesalltheforcesand means at its disposal to this end. Every day sees the use ofslogansandsymbols,asevidencedbythetermsdiscussedabove,whicharecommoninofficialnarratives.Thesearereinforcedbyaseriesofrecurringimages:parades,changesoftheguard,anda 14-episode television series based on Mikhail Sholokhov’s And quiet flows the Don,whichwasretoldin2015intheformofasoapopera.Cossackfolkloreplaysarolewhichisdifficulttooveresti-mate, as it has in fact been promoted by professional state songand dance ensembles such as the Kuban Cossack Choir, the en-sembleoftheDonCossacksfromRostov,theStavropolyegroup,andthe‘CossacksofRussia’fromLipetsk.Theirinternationalap-pearancesareeffectivePRforRussia38.

Theroleofthe ‘Cossackcomponent’,asamorallyandphysicallyhealthyreserveofthearmedforcesoftheRussianFederation,isstressedinmilitarypropaganda39.TheMinistryofDefence,whichhadpreviouslybeenstronglyopposedto thewider involvement

38 Hereishowtheperformancesbythe‘CossacksofRussia’wereadvertisedinPoland:“TheCossackshowwilltakeplaceaspartofatouraroundPolishcities.ThePolishaudience(...)willbeabletoseethemforthefirsttimeonthePolishstage.Andallofitenvelopedinanimpressivestaging,enrichedwithcolourfulfolklorecostumes,decoratedinastyleofthesongs,somewhatcontentious,butverycharacteristicofthe‘Cossack’regions.Anothercharac-teristicfeatureoftheshowisalsothebreathoffreedomthatthespectatorscansense,whichafterall,isanintegralattributeofCossacklife.”(https://zabrze.com.pl/i,oszalamiajacy-wielki-balet-kozacki,200274,29932.html).

39 Д.Сергеев,ОседлатьТ-80:начтоспособныроссийскиеказаки,13Novem-ber2016,ТВЗвезда,https://tvzvezda.ru/news/forces/content/201611130847-y6uz.htm

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of the unskilled Cossacks in defence tasks40 and turning it into‘a kind of army’, is now (at least declaratively) changing its ap-proach, placing the emphasis on giving the Cossacks militarytrainingasanorganisationalbaseforterritorialdefence.Accord-ing to Nikolai Makarov, the main ideologue of Russia’s militaryreforms,chiefofgeneralstaffoftheRussianarmy,andcurrentlyanadvisortoDefenceMinisterSergeiShoigu,theCossackswillformthecoreofthereserveandcontractservicesinthearmy.Aspartoftheofficialnarrative,thegeneralhasstatedthattheGen-eral Staff will gradually create ‘Cossack troops’ with the aim ofcreatingatleastoneCossackbrigadeineachmilitarydistrict41.

According to General Konstantin Sivkov, Vice-President of theAcademyofGeopoliticalSciences,“theCossacksmayproveuse-fulasaprotectiveforceandasdefenceoffacilitiesandroads,intimesofbothpeaceandwar,againsttheactionsoftheenemy,hissabotageandterroristattacks,andatthemomentofadeclarationofastateofwar,asaforceforitssecurity.”Thegeneralalsospecu-lated42uponthecreationofterritorialforcesoftheNationalGuardonthebasisofCossacktroops.

This idea was eagerly received by some atamans, who arguedthat the existing legislation already assigned the Cossacks ter-ritorialdefencecapabilities(defendingastateofemergencyandmartiallaw,protectingpublicorder,protectingimportantstate,industrial and military facilities, fighting terrorist and banditgroups, the additional protection of Russia’s borders, removingthe consequences of natural disasters and humanitarian disas-ters,etc.).Theresponsesbytheatamansaspostedonthewebsites

40 Министерство Обороны Российской Федерации недовольно отно-шениемказаковквоеннойслужбе,http://kazak-center.ru/news/1/2012-02-06-1827

41 Е. Созаев-Гурьев, Генштаб увеличивает число казачьих частей,Известия,3August2012,http://izvestia.ru/news/532117

42 K.Сивков,Kaзачествокакновыйродвойск.Вечерка,15April2014;http://vpk-news.ru/articles/19450

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ofmilitaryCossackassociations43serveasanaturalextensionofmilitarypropaganda.Theyalsoserveaninformationalfunction(by spreading the idea of Cossackdom, explaining its strategicrole,givingintroductorynotes,etc.).

ThetoneofthispropagandahasbeensetbytheKremlin.Forex-ample, during Putin’s presidential election campaign in 2012, hemadeastatementconcerningthestrategicimportanceoftheCos-sacks — a ‘great group, numbering of millions of Russians’. ThePresidentclearlyemphasisedthattheCossacksareunderthecareof the Kremlin, because “after the revolution of 1917, the Cossackcommunityfellvictimtothebrutalrepression,whichwasade fac-togenocide.Despitethis,theCossackssurvivedandpreservedthememoryoftheirowncultureandcustoms.Thestatenowhasadutytohelpthem,toinvolvetheminmilitaryserviceandactivitiesor-ganisedforyoungpeople,providethemwithassistanceinbringingthemupinaspiritofpatriotism,offerthemmilitarytraining44.”

‘Faith’inthestate’snarrativehasbeenboostedbyPatriarchCyril,whohasascribed‘theopportunityforarealrevivalofCossackdom’toitsmoralregeneration,meaningclosercooperationwiththeOr-thodoxChurch.Duringameetingwiththeatamansof‘theCossacktroopsofRussia,UkraineandBelarus’,thepatriarchexpressedthemissionoftheOrthodoxChurchinbroadterms:“TheRussianOr-thodoxChurch,onwhosecanonicalterritorytheCossackstateap-peared, bears responsibility for its spiritual service around theworld45.”Buttheclergymanhasalsocomplainedthat“theCossacks,likemanyoftheircountrymenwhowerebroughtupinSovietreal-ity,finditverydifficulttolivethelifeoftheChurch.”Hethusrec-ommendedthatparticularattentionbepaidtotheyounggeneration

43 Seeforexamplewww.don-kazak.ru;http://vko-ckv.ru;http://slavakubani.ru;www.terkv.ru;http://www.allcossacks.ru;http://ввко.рф;http://звко.рф;http://казакисибири.рф

44 Высказыванияоказачестве,http://rkouvao.ru/?page_id=36845 ПатриархКирилл:Воцерковлениеказачества–единственныйпутьего

возрождения,5December2012,http://www.pravoslavie.ru/57905.html

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oftheCossackstate,whoshouldbebroughtupinthespiritoftheOrthodox tradition; the patriarch assigned the Cossack state therole of “the vanguard of the Orthodox brotherhood of battle” andof“thespiritual,culturalandsocial forcesof theRussianworld.”46

Television propaganda is directed at both foreign and domesticaudiences.Attheendof2016,RTannouncedaprojecttoresettleCossacksinRussia’sborderregions47.ByadecisionoftheDeputyPrimeMinisterDmitryRogozin in2017,apilotprogrammewasintroducedtodefendthecountry’sborderintheFarEast(thebor-derswithChinaandJapanwillbeguardedbyCossacksfromtheUssuriandTrans-BaikalTroops)andtheEuropeanpartofRussia(theborderwithPolandandLithuaniaistobeprotectedbyiso-latedunitsofCossacksfromKaliningrad).Around3000personsaretobeinvolvedinthisprogramme,whichistobeself-financedbytheparticipants.ItprovidesfortheallocationofCossackswhoareactiveandproveninservicetoareasoflandwheretheywillbe engaged in cultivation and breeding livestock. Over time, asannounced,theexperimentistobeextended:theentireRussianborderlandissupposedultimatelytobeprotectedbyCossacks.

ThepropagandaaimedattheCossacksthemselvescarriesames-sage of persuasion and education, as seen in a report48 aboutaforthcomingdraftlawintheDumaregulatingtheissueofCos-sackuniformsanddistinguishingmarks.Asstressed,therighttowearthemwillbedeniedtomembersoftheCossacksocialorgan-isations.TheofficialmediaarethussuggestingthattheKremlin,as it works for formal uniformity within the Cossacks, will not

46 See,forexample,PatriarchCyril’sspeechattheopeningofthe5thInterna-tionalCongressofCossacksinNovocherkassk,14October2015(http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/4245143.html).

47 КазакамдоверятохранятьграницыРоссиисПольшей,Литвой,КитаемиЯпонией,RT,18October2016,https://russian.rt.com/article/326739-ka-zakam-doveryat-ohranyat-granicy-rossii-s-polshei

48 Запретитькарнавал:ряженыхказаковмогутобъявитьвнезакона,RT,25November2016,https://russian.rt.com/russia/article/335504-ryazheni-ye-kazaki-vne-zakona

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tolerate unregistered, ‘self-proclaimed’ organisations that harmtheimageofthe‘realCossacks’.Thishaslittletodowiththesitu-ationinreality,ascanbedemonstratedbytheactivityofatamanKozitsyn in Ukraine, or the growing number of attacks on theKremlin’spoliticalopponents(theattackinSochionmembersofPussy Riot, the assault on the Sakharov Centre in Moscow, twoattacksontheoppositionpoliticianAlekseiNavalny,andprolif-eratingcasesofradicalactivitiesbyCossackssuchasthebreakupof marches by Hari Krishna groups and demonstrations by gaypeople, the ostentatious destruction of forbidden food importsin supermarkets, etc.) carried out by arbitrary, self-proclaimedCossacks.Theperpetratorsoftheseincidents,asRussianhumanrights defenders have regularly reported, are under the protec-tionoftheKremlin,andhaveneverborneanylegalconsequences.

Above all, however, the official propaganda deploys a sense ofthreatfromtheWest,aswellasprideinthenewterritorial‘con-quests’. This is mainly due to the past experiences of the Putinregime:oneeffectivetool forconsolidatingbothsocietyandthegovernmentistomobilisetheminthefaceofthreatsfromterror-ism,extremism,foreignculture,a‘RussianMaidan’,etc.AstheydisplayedtheirjoyaftertheannexationofCrimea,theCossackscollectively insistedontheirmerits; theyevenstartedbraggingabout‘Balticneo-Cossacks’49.ThismeansthattheyhavejoinedinthegameimposedonthembytheKremlin,andatpresenttheyareclearlypresentingthemselvesastheguarantorsofitspolicy.

49 Ю. Каменский, Балтийское казачество пережило новое рождение,Политобразование,29October2016,http://lawinrussia.ru/content/balti-yskoe-kazachestvo-perezhilo-novoe-rozhdenie

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II. THE INSTITUTIONALISATION OF THE COSSACK QUESTION

The alleged values of Cossackdom as portrayed by the state and the Orthodox Church (loyalty, patriotism, observance of the ethical standards of Orthodoxy, the traditional model of a large family, and above all a militarised lifestyle) coincide with the objectives of the Kremlin, for whom a ‘statified’ Cos-sackdom is equivalent to its use as a model group of so-called civil society. For that reason, the Kremlin has been placing emphasis in its official state documents and programmes on the patriotic education of Cossack youth, reinforcing the sen-timent of state service, and preparing Cossacks for military service and the defence of public order, including expanding their repressive functions (breaking up opposition demon-strations and harassing opposition activists). Transforming the Cossacks into a systemic element of the state’s security and defence architecture will lead to the regional authorities bearing the costs of this process.

1. The Kremlin’s strategic objectives

The Kremlin’s vision of the Cossacks is manifested in the docu-mentsdedicatedtothem.ThefirstsuchdocumentwastheConcept of the Russian Federation’s state policy towards the Russian Cossacks,from2008.Itischaracterisedbygreatvagueness,althoughitdidgivetheCossacks’activity thedirectionofdevelopmentdesiredby the Kremlin, by laying the emphasis on their state service.Amorepreciselydefineddocument,whichfitsinwiththeKrem-lin’soverallplansforensuringthestate’sinternalandexternalse-curity,istheStrategy for the development of the Russian Federation’s state policy towards the Russian Cossacks to 202050,whichPresident

50 СтратегияразвитиягосударственнойполитикиРоссийскойФедерациивотношениироссийскогоказачества,http://state.kremlin.ru/council/16/news/16682

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Putinapprovedon15September2012.Asstatedinthepreamble,theKremlinintendstoachieveitspolicyobjectivesinthefollow-ingmanner:

• by creating economic conditions which would involve themembers of the Cossack associations in the service of thestate;

• developingthespiritualbasesofthetraditionallifestyleanduniqueformsofcultureofRussianCossackdom;

• increasingtheCossacks’roleintheeducationofyoungpeopleinaspiritofpatriotismandloveforthehomeland,aswellasareadinesstoserveit,inwhichtheCossackcadets’corpsareintendedtoplayanimportantrole;

• developingandintensifyingcontactsbetweentheCossacksinRussiawithCossacksinthecountriesoftheCommonwealthofIndependentStates.

Thisstrategycommitsthefederalbodiesofstatepower,thebod-ies of power of theRussian Federation’s republics, andother lo-cal government authorities to implementing a coherent policytowardstheCossackswhichshouldtakethefollowingquestionsintoaccount:

• organisingtheRussianCossacks’stateservice;• improving the relationship between state power & the local

administrationsandtheCossacks;• supportingtheCossacks’economicdevelopment;• protectinganddevelopingCossackculture,aswellasworking

withtheCossackyouth,itspatrioticandmilitaryeducation,itsphysicalandspiritual/religioustraining;

• supporting the international activities of the Russian Cos-sacks;

• protectingtheheraldicliveryoftheRussianCossacks’activi-ties (i.e. standardising the distinguishing marks, uniformdesigns and regalia of individual Cossack troops), as well asdefendingtheirhistoricalheritage.

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Thevaguewording,alongthe linesof ‘strengtheningtheroleofthe Cossacks in resolving the state’s and local tasks’, ‘the maxi-mum use of the potential ofCossack organisations andcommu-nities in harmonising inter-ethnic, inter-religious and inter-confessionaldialogue’and‘managementoftheborderareasandotherpoorlyinhabitedoruninhabitedterritoriesoftheRussianFederation’doesnotconcealthebasicobjective,whichistocon-solidatethestilldividedanddiffuseCossackorganisations.Thisstrategyhasunderpinnedthelong-termgoalsassociatedwiththedevelopmentofneo-Cossackdombyincludingitintothefollowingspheres:

• the security and defence system of the Russian Federation,throughdirectserviceinthearmedforcesoftheRussianFed-eration,servinginthemilitaryformationsofso-called‘othertroops’,andinthereservesoftheArmedForces;

• thepublicsecuritysystem;• thesystemofprotectionagainstenvironmentalandfirehaz-

ards,andofremovingtheconsequencesofemergencies;• thesystemfordefendingthestateborder.

Theseaimsarenotnew.Since1992,Cossackshavebeenprotect-ingtheresidenceofthePatriarchandCossackborderguardregi-ments,aswellasvolunteermilitiapatrols,hadalreadybeencre-atedinthedaysofPresidentBorisYeltsin.ThemilitaryCossackassociations’mannerofoperationandthesigningofcontractswiththem were regulated in 2009 by then-Prime Minister VladimirPutin inGovernmentOrderno.806.However, thedevelopmentoftheCossacksandthereinforcementoftheirstatusasamilita-risedcommunitywereunderpinnedwithquantifiableprivilegesandconcessionsinanofficialdocumentforthefirsttime,whichwas justified by moving the Cossacks to a self-financing model.Another innovation was the scale of the project, which coveredthe whole territory of the Russian Federation (including all themilitarydistricts),aswellasthespecificmechanismsforimple-mentation.Thesewerespreadoverthreestages:

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Stag

e 1 (

2012

-201

4)

•The creation of a central database of Cossack organisations through their duplicate registration; issuing their members new Cossack IDs;

•The creation of a legal basis for the transition of Cossack organi-sations to the self-financing model (the establishment of private protection companies, the assignment to Cossack communities of agricultural allotments from the state land fund);

•Development of Cossack education (the ‘Cossack component’);•Securing the state’s information policy (Cossack websites; book se-

ries, sociological studies)

Stag

e 2

(201

5-20

18)

•Improving the federal and local legal bases for the Cossacks’ state service;

•Recruiting ‘Cossack’ military units to 80% capacity;•Signing contracts with members of the military Cossack associa-

tions for their voluntary participation in the reserves, to be called up during states of emergency and at the outbreak of war;

•Appointing private protection companies for all Cossack troops;•Adopting regional and municipal programmes to support the devel-

opment of the Russian Cossacks;•Implementing programmes for creating/reconstructing the mili-

tary headquarters of Cossack associations.

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e 3 (

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0)

•Transferring all Cossack associations to the state registry, ensuring that 100% of their members hold the new Cossack IDs;

•National service to be carried out by at least 35% of the military Cos-sack associations’ members;

•Cossack military associations are to be self-financing organisations (on the basis of their contracts with local authorities, their private businesses and farms);

•Members of military associations are included in the records of the reserves of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, to be called up during states of emergency and the outbreak of war;

•In the Southern Military District, an experiment is being carried out to call up the organisational reserve of one or two Cossack mili-tary associations;

•Extending continual Cossack education programs for Cossack youth in the CIS countries, as well as establishing a network of summer camps for patriotic and civic-military education for young Cossacks within the CIS.

•The organisation of a World Forum for Cossack Orthodox Youth and a World Congress of Cossacks.

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The main executors of this strategy are the ministries and gov-ernmentagencies,andthe‘subcontractors’arethelocalauthori-tiesoftheRussianFederation’sentities.Initiallythegovernmentapprovedtheannualseriesofplansfor2012and2013.However,theplanforactionstoimplementtheStrategy of the state’s policy towards the Russian Cossacksintheperiod2014-16,whichhadbeenconfirmed on 29 July 2014, was criticised as being ineffective ateliminatingthedivisionsamongtheCossacks51.Thegovernmentconfirmedtheplanofactionsforthelaststageof implementingthe Strategy on 17 February 2017 (by Decree no. 285-p), obligingthegovernmentsofRFentitiestoparticipateinitsexecutionandpreparetheirownplansfor implementation52.Thesewillbesu-pervisedbytheFederalAgencyforNationalityAffairs,whichwillreport to the government on the current status twice a year, inFebruaryandAugust.

Duetocentralisation,andthefederalcentreholdingtheexclusiverighttomonitorthesecurityanddefencesector,thelocalauthori-ties’roleislimitedtoperformingthetasksimposedbythecentre.Thelistofthesetasksisgrowing:accordingtoanamendmenttothelawonthemobilisationandmobilisationpreparationsmadeinFebruary201753thegovernorsandheadsoftheregionalandlo-calauthoritieswillbepersonallyresponsibleforthepreparationsandimplementationofthemobilisationuponadeclarationofwar.InthiswaytheywilleasetheburdenontheMinistryofDefence,whichmanagesthemobilisationsystem,activatesthetrainingofthereserves,andassessesthestateofmobilisationpreparedness.Fromtheministry’spointofview,theseevaluationshavenotbeensuccessful.Oneproposedremedyisanexperimentinvolvingthesigningofshort-termcontracts(for3to5years)withthoseCos-

51 Чтобы вместо консолидации казачества не происходило его разъе-динение, http://kazak-center.ru/news/vmesto_konsolidacii_kazachest-va_proiskhodit_ego_razedinenie/2017-01-16-3246

52 https://government.consultant.ru/documents/371606653 Федеральныйзаконот22февраля2017г.N-19-ФЗ,Российская Газета,

27February2017,https://rg.ru/2017/02/27/mobilizaciya-dok.html

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sacksremaininginthereservesoftheRussianFederation’sarmedforces54.Thissolution,asmaybeassumedonthebasisofthepub-licdiscussion,isintheinterestofboththelocalauthoritiesandtheCossacks.

Ananalysisoftheseexecutivedocumentsleadstotheconclusionthat this policy has been subject to extreme bureaucratisation.Forexample,theMinistryofJusticeissupposedtohavedevelopedatimetabletoaddtheCossackorganisationstotheStateregistry;carriedoutananalysisofhowthelocalauthoritiesapplythelegalactsconcerningtheCossacks;anddrawnupandintroducedtheadoptionofnewlaws,includingthelawontheCossacks’develop-ment. A significant part of these laws are also purely formal innature. For example, the Federal Security Service is committedto employing the Cossacks to defend the borders (as they havedone since the 1990s); the National Guard is to expand the Cos-sacks’serviceinitsownunitsanddefendstatelocations(thisisastatutoryobligationforboththeCossackforcesandtheNationalGuard);andtheInteriorMinistryistoincludeCossackmilitaryassociationsinthedefenceofpublicorder(whichtheyhavedoneforanumberofyears).

Thisbureaucraticinflationcanbeseeninthewordingofsimilarplans for the individual local authorities of the Russian Federa-tion, which have been obliged to make such preparations. Also,eachoftheprojectsmentionedintheplanintheRostovoblast55willbesubjecttoreports(twiceinthereportingyear).

54 Минобороныищетпутипосокращениюфактовуклонениярезерви-стамиотпрохождениявоенныхсборов,Военное Обозрение,6October2015,https://topwar.ru/83755-minoborony-ischet-puti-po-sokrascheniyu-faktov-ukloneniya-rezervistami-ot-prohozhdeniya-voennyh-sborov.html

55 Обутверждениипланамероприятийпореализациив2017-2020годахСтратегииразвитиягосударственнойполитикиРоссийскойФедерациивотношениироссийскогоказачествадо2020годавРостовскойобласти,http://www.donland.ru/documents/Ob-utverzhdenii-plana-meropriyatijj-po-realizacii-v-2017-%E2%80%93-2020-godakh-Strategii-razvitiya-gosu-

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Inaccordancewiththelegalprovisions,thestate’spolicytowardstheCossackswillbefundedfromboththefederalandlocalbudg-ets.Duetothelackofcomprehensive,reliabledata,theexpensesforthispurposearedifficulttoestimate;fromtheresidualinfor-mationavailable,itappearsthatitismostlytheregionalauthori-tieswhichhavetobearthesecosts56.Forexample,itisknownthatin2017-2019Rostovoblastwillspendmorethan2billionroubles(US$33.9m)ontheCossacks.TheexpenditureofKrasnodarkraionimplementingthe ‘KubanCossacks’programmein2014-2016amounted to 3.1 billion roubles (US$52.5m). The largest sumsfrom this programme have been spent on organising the stateserviceoftheCossacks(1.8billionroubles,orUS$30.5m),theCos-sackcadetcorps(730millionroubles,orUS$12.4m),theactivitiesof the Kuban Cossacks’ state company (458 million roubles, orUS$7.8m),andonmilitary/patrioticeducation(64millionroubles,orUS$1.1m).TheCrimeanCossacks,towhomthe2017–2020planhasallocated37.6millionroubles(US$640,000),arefinancedaspartofaprogrammeentitled‘Thedevelopmentofcivilsocietyandthecreationofconditionstoensurenationalconsent’.ThegreaterpartofthisamounthasbeenallocatedtothedevelopmentoftheCossacks’stateservice.Thestructureofregionalexpenditureisthusapartofthemoregeneralupwardtrendinspendingonse-curityanddefenceattheexpenseofsocialspending.Moreover,itisknownthatindividualprojectsinvolvingtheCossackshavealsobeenfinancedfromthepresidentialgrants’fund57,aswellasfromsponsorshipsthatareinitiatedbythestateandtheOrtho-doxChurch.

darstvennojj-politiki-Rossijjskojj-Federacii-?pageid=128483&mid=134977&itemId=24908

56 Вопросыфинансированияказачестванафедеральномирегиональномуровнях,http://kazak-center.ru/news/voprosy_finansirovanija_kazach-estva_na_federalnom_i_regionalnom_urovnjakh/2016-12-03-3216

57 Thisreferstopresidentialgrantstothird-sectororganisationsforprojectsintheareasof‘preservinghistoricalmemory’,‘theprotectionofhealth,propa-gandaofahealthylifestyle’,‘thepatrioticeducationofchildrenandyouth’andothers.Seehttp://президентскиегранты.рф/Project/View/13166

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These stated commitments to supporting the Cossacks’ socio-economic development (which some columnists have claimed isabreakwiththeCossackphilosophyofpoverty)havebeenaccom-paniedbytheKremlin’striedandtestedmethodsofgrantingcon-cessionsforawiderangeof‘businessesofforce’runbytheCossacktroops,andannouncingtheextensionoftheprogrammeallocatingthemlandfromthestatelandfund.Thecostsforthedevelopmentof the Cossacks’ military service are borne by the local budgets.The‘self-financing’oftheCossacktroopsmainlyconsistsofthelo-calauthoritiessigningmoreorlessprofitablecontractswiththem.Thishasraisedscepticismamongsomeobservers,whorecallthatinthepast,similarmechanismsledtothecriminalisationoftheregionsandthetransformationoftheCossackregimentsintothelocalauthorities’privatemilitias,andthecreationofmurkycon-nectionsbetweenpoliticsandtheeconomy.Todaytoo,ashasbeenemphasised, the territorial delegations for the administration ofsecurityanddefenceofthecountrysharemoreeconomicinterestswiththelocalauthoritiesthanwiththefederalcentre.Inthiscon-text,theweaknessoftheCossacks’privateandcooperativeowner-shipwereconfirmedbythefateof42,000hectaresoflandallocatedtoCossackassociationsinStavropolkraiinthe1990s;theselandswerere-appropriatedbythethenleadersoftheCossackrevival58.

2. The institutional system for governing the Cossacks

The bureaucratic mechanisms for the development of Cossack-dom built into the Strategy for the development of the Russian Federation’s state policy towards the Russian Cossack to 2020 are being implemented by the structures for ‘cooperation with the Cossacks’ created for this purpose. These have appeared in most central government departments, in all the federal dis-tricts, as well as in those local administrations which have

58 А.Мащенко,Мы–рыцариРоссии.ПарадоксывозрожденияказачествавРоссии,Ставропольская Правда,13January2017,http://www.stapravda.ru/20170113/paradoksy_vozrozhdeniya_kazachestva_v_rossii_99509.html

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been obliged to adopt separate legislation on the development of the Cossacks’ state service compatible with federal legisla-tion. At the top of this hierarchical and bureaucratised pyra-mid is the Presidential Council for Cossack Affairs.

The government’s policy towards the Cossacks assumed a sys-temicnaturewiththecreationin2009ofthePresidentialCouncilforCossackAffairs,whichwasinterpretedasanextensionofthepersonalpatronageofthePresidenttotheCossacks.Inprincipleithasadvisoryandconsultativefunctions;itpreparespresiden-tiallegalactsandstrategypapersonthedevelopmentofCossack-dom.Itiscurrentlycomposedmainlyoftroopatamansandother‘registered’ Cossack organisations, as well as representatives ofthestateadministration;itwasapprovedbyPresidentialDecreeNo.414of20December2016.ThecouncilisheadedbyAleksandrBeglov,theplenipotentiaryrepresentativeofthePresidentintheCentral Federal District; and its presidium includes three vice-presidents(thedeputyprimeministersAleksandrKhloponinandDmitryRogozin,andtheactingsecretaryoftheCouncil&headofthePresidentialAdministration’scommitteeforinternalpolicyAndrei Yarin). The composition of the presidium was expandedto include the Council of the Cossack Troops’ Atamans, chairedby Nikolai Doluda, and the Expert-Consultative Committee ledbyMuratZiazikov,whoisresponsibleforinter-ethnicrelationsinthePresidentialAdministration.ThePresidentoftheCouncilisdirectlysubordinatetothecommitteesforthedevelopmentofCossackdomestablishedinallfederaldistricts,andtothestruc-tureforcooperationwithCossackdomintheindividualentitiesoftheRussianFederation.

TheworkoftheCounciliscarriedoutby15permanentcommit-tees,whichserveatthesametimeascoordinationbodies:

• thecommitteetoimprovetheorganisationofstateserviceandotheraffairs(headedbyIvanMironov,atamanoftheCentralCossackTroops);

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• the committee for cooperation between the Ministry of De-fenceandtheCossackassociations(ValeryGerasimov,ChiefoftheGeneralStaffoftheArmedForcesoftheRussianFedera-tion);

• thecommitteefortheprotectionofforestsandwildlife(Alek-sandrPanfilov,deputyheadoftheagencyforforestryRosles-khoz);

• thecommitteefortheimprovementofcooperationwithRus-sian Cossackdom (Timur Prokopenko, former head of theYoungGuardmovement,deputyheadofthePresidentialAd-ministration’sCommitteeforInternalPolicy);

• thecommitteeforcooperationwithCossacksocialorganisa-tions(AndreiYarin,headofthePresidentialAdministration’sCommitteeforInternalPolicy);

• the committee for the development of state policy towardstheCossacks(IgorBarinov,headofthegovernment’sFederalAgencyforNationalityAffairs);

• the committee for normative legal acts (Maxim Travnikov,deputyministerofjustice);

• the committee for supporting the Cossacks’ economic devel-opment(AleksandrPetrikov,deputyministerofagriculture);

• thecommitteeforthedevelopmentoftheCossacks’educationsystem(OlgaVasileva,ministerofeducation);

• thecommitteeforscientificresearchandcooperationwiththemedia(VasilyShestakov,PresidentoftheInternationalSam-boFederation);

• thecommitteeforthedevelopmentofCossackculture(Alek-sandrZhuravsky,deputyministerofculture);

• thecommitteefortheforeignactivityofRussianCossacks(OlegVasnetsov,DirectoroftheMFA’sdepartmentforCossacks);

• thecommitteeforCossackcooperationwiththeRussianOr-thodoxChurch(LeonidPokrovsky,a.k.a.Cyril,MetropolitanofStavropol);

• thecommitteeforCossackheraldry(GeorgiVilinbakhov,theheadoftheHeraldicCounciloftheRussianFederation’sPresi-dentialAdministration);

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• the committee for supervision and monitoring (Andrei Kul-ba,deputyheadof thePresidentialAdministration’sControlBoard).

Thecommitteesareusuallychairedbyafederalofficial,whilethedeputyisusuallyarepresentativeoftheCossacks.Forexample,thecommitteeforculture59consistsof26members,includingthedirectorsofartisticensembleswiththestatusofstate-owneden-terprises(suchastheKubanCossackChoir,theCossacksofRus-sia, the Trans-Baikal Cossacks), the ministers of culture of thefederal entities, representatives of departmental culture com-mittees,andthemediaworld.TheCommissionischairedbythedeputyministerofcultureoftheRussianFederation;hisdeputyisVladimirRomanov,atamanoftheOrenburgTroops.TheKrem-lin’sprojectsarealsocarriedoutbymembersofthecouncilwhoarenotincludedintheabove-mentionedcommittees.Forexam-ple Sergei Pospelov, a member of the Council and president oftheRussianYouthorganisation,wastheinitiatoroftheCossackYouthCircleforum(May2016)which‘decided’tocreatetheCos-sackYouthUnion.(Theco-organisersoftheCircleweretheMin-istryofScienceandHigherEducation,theadministrationoftheRostovoblastandtheFirstCossackUniversity)60.

ThisextensiveorganisationofcooperationbetweenthestateandtheCossacksisreminiscentoftheoldcommand-and-distributionsystem.Separatecellsdedicatedtothisareaofstatepolicyhaveappearedinindividualministries.Platformsforcooperationwith

59 http://culture34.ru/news/%D0%A1%D0%BE%D1%81%D1%82%D0%B0%D0%B2%20%D0%BA%D0%BE%D0%BC%D0%B8%D1%81%D1%81%D0%B8%D0%B8.pdf

60 AsreportedbyKubanTVon22March2017,theFirstAssemblyoftheKubanBranchofCossackYouth,whichwasformedonthebasisoftheCossackclass-esandCossackacdetcorps,willtakeplaceinSeptember2017(morethantheyearafteritwascreated!).Thiscanbeinterpretedasbureaucraticsluggish-nessinaregionusuallyregardedasaleaderinsupportingtheKremlin'stop-down initiatives. http://old.kubantv.ru/kuban/kazachyu-molodezh-kubani-obedinyat-v-soyuz/

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foreign Cossack organisations within the Russian Foreign Min-istryincludeadepartmentforcooperationwithCossackassocia-tions and a separate committee supporting the development ofRussian Cossackdom’s international activities61, which periodi-callyacquaintsCossackorganisationswiththeirplansforinter-nationalactivities.

Theimplementationofthestateprojectsissupervisedbyagovern-ment-runInter-AgencyCommitteefortheImplementationof theStrategy for developing the Russian Federation’s state policy towards Russian Cossackdom to 2020.SinceNovember2016the‘official’chair-manoftheCommitteehasbeenIgorBarinov,theheadoftheFed-eralAgencyforNationalityAffairs,whoisamemberoftheCouncilforCossackAffairs.Localadministrations,inadditiontoindividu-aldepartmentsforcooperationwiththeCossacks,havesetupstateenterprises,suchastheCossacksoftheKuban,theCossacksoftheDon,andtheCossackCentreforStateServiceinVolgograd62,whichemployCossacksandimplementtheseprojects.

ContrarytoitsearlierpledgestheMinistryofDefence,whichisthemainbeneficiaryofthispolicy,hasnotsetupaseparatestruc-tureforthecollaborationwiththeCossacks,althoughtheyworktogetheronadailybasis,asevidencedbythedetailedinstructionsissuedbytheMainOrganisationalandMobilisationDirectorateof the General Staff of the Russian Federation’s Armed Forces63

61 Материалыкомиссииповопросамказачьихобществ,http://www.mid.ru/materialy-komissii-po-voprosam-kazac-ih-obsestv/-/asset_publisher/aLRfN6MT9msV/content/id/185558

62 СозданогосударственноеказенноеучреждениеРостовскойобласти«КазакиДона»,5February2014,http://www.donland.ru/news/Sozdano-gosudarstvennoe-kazennoe-uchrezhdenie-Rostovskojj-oblasti-Kazaki-Dona?pageid=92218&mid=83793&itemId=51298;ОгосударственнойпрограммеКраснодарского края «Казачество Кубани», http://docs.cntd.ru/docu-ment/430655711

63 Организация учета членов казачьих обществ, http://www.ataman-ovko.ru/official_documents/metods/organizatsiya-voinskogo-ucheta-chlenov-kazachikh-obshchestv/;ПриказминистраобороныРоссийскойФедерации, http://www.ataman-ovko.ru/official_documents/executive/

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concerningthekeepingofrecords,pre-conscriptiontrainingandretrainingforreservists,commonprojectsinthefieldofpatrioticeducationforyoungpeople,etc.Accordingtotheplan,themin-istryreserves certainunits forCossack militaryassociations inwhichtheirrepresentativesparticipateinmilitaryservice(usu-allyinthevicinityofthetroops’placeofresidence;forexample,conscriptsfromtheCentralCossackAssociation’stroopsarede-ployedinthe4thCantemirArmouredBrigadeinNaro-Fominsk64;conscriptsfromtheDonetskTroopsgotoUnit45767inKamensk-Shakhtinsk,andthosefromtheKubanTroopsgototheCossackunitoftheAir-LandingTroopsinNovorossiysk).

Since2012,thecooperationbetweentheCossacksandtheGener-alStaffhasoccurredwithinthecontextoftheterritorialdefence(OT) of the Russian Federation65. The closer ties between thesebodieshavebeendemonstratedbypartialreportsaboutaseriesofgroupsofmobilisedCossackreserves.Itisalsoknownthat,inac-cordancewiththeprovisionsofPresidentialDecreeNo.370datedJuly2015onthecreationofpersonalarmedforcesoftheRussianFederation’smobilisedreserves66,thedefenceministryhassignedcontractswiththeCossacksforthemtoremaininthereservesof

prikazy-ministra-oborony-rf/prikaz-ministra-oborony-rossiyskoy-feder-atsii-745-.php

64 See Военная служба в Вооруженных Силах Российской Федерациикак один из видов несения государственной службы казакамиЦентральногоказачьеговойска(http://ckwrf.ru/).

65 ThiscoincidedwiththeamendmenttoArticle22ofthelawonthedefenceoftheRussianFederation,whichwasextendedtoincludeadefinitionofter-ritorialdefence(OT).Thiswilloperateattheoutbreakofwarandconsistsoftwoelements:(1)toprotectanddefendimportantstatefacilitiesand(2)tocombattheassaultsandsabotageoftheenemy.TheOTorganisation,aspartofthestate'smilitarysystem,willbecontrolledbytheMinistryofDefenceatthemilitarydistrictlevel.Sofar,theMinistryofDefencehasnotcreatedaseparateOTcommand,butsince2013elementsofithavebeensuccessivelyintroducedintothescenariosfortheannouncedexercisesandunannouncedtestsofcombatreadiness.

66 Указ Президента Российской Федерации о создании мобилизацио-нного людского резерва Вооруженных Сил Российской Федерации,http://static.kremlin.ru/media/acts/files/0001201507170019.pdf

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specificmilitaryunits.Theseformabaseforthegradualretrain-ingofreservists.TowardstheendofApril2017,theterritoryoftheAlexanderNevskyGuards’EngineeringBrigadeoftheSouth-ernMilitaryDistrict,locatedinKamensk-Shakhtinsk,sawanex-ercisebyOTsoldierssupplementedwithCossacksfromtheDonTroops.Inaccordancewiththeplan,in2017troopmusterslastingthreedayswilltakeplaceonceamonth67.

Therearealsosignsthattrainingiscurrentlyproceedinginin-dividual,non-barrackedconditions,attimeswhichareconveni-entforworkingreservists;thistrainingpresentsitselfasapilotprogrammeforsupplementingOTunitswithreservetroops.ThisprogrammewastestedduringtheKavkaz-2016exercise,duringwhich,ashasbeenreported,the47thOTDivisionwascreatedinSevastopol.Forthemostpart itwasmadeupofreservistsfromoutside Crimea – from Rostov (the territory of the Don Troops)andtheKrasnodarkrai(theterritoryoftheKubanTroops)–whoweretransportedtotheirassemblypointsbyair.ThismeansthattheOTunitwassetupwithoutregardtotheprincipleofthelocalnatureofterritorialdefence.Inthiscontext,itcannotberuledoutthattheMinistryofDefence’splansregardingtheneo-CossacksgobeyondtheOT.InCrimeain2014,Cossackswereusedaspartoftheoccupationforces,andwerealsousedforspecialactions.ItisenoughtomentiontheactionsoftheunidentifiedCossackswhointerruptedthejointnavalexercisesbetweentheUSandUkrainein2006,andremovedtheUkrainiannationalflagfromthetopofamountainnearSevastopolin200968,nottomentionthereportsbytheUkrainianSecurityServiceofCossacktrollingbrigadesontheinternet69.

67 Боевая учеба казаков-резервистов, http://kazak-center.ru/publ/novo-sti_kazak_inform/naibolee_vazhnye/boevaja_ucheba_kazakov_rezervis-tov/174-1-0-4283

68 І.Лосєв,Україна.ХХІстоліття.Козацтво.Алечиєвоно?,http://www.3republic.org.ua/ua/ideas/11498

69 В Украине зафиксированы три типа фейковых громад за которымистоятроссийскиеспецслужбы–СБУ,112.ua,23May2017,https://112.ua/

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AdistinctplaceinthesystemsupportingtheCossacks’stateser-viceisheldbytheSynodCommitteeforCooperationwithRussianCossackdom, which was formed in March 2010 by a decision oftheHolySynodoftheRussianOrthodoxChurch.TheCommittee,undertheleadershipofCyril,MetropolitanofStavropol70,hasitsheadquarters in the Don Monastery in Moscow. This is also theMetropolitan’s official residence, as it is for the correspondingcommitteeonthePresidentialCouncilwhichitalsodirects.Since2011 themonastery hasbeen protectedby11registeredCossacktroopsinrotation.

AswereadinthestatutesoftheSynodCommittee,itsobjectivesincludethefollowing:

• dissemination of the fundamentals of the Orthodox faithamongthemembersof individualCossackcommunitiesandorganisations;

• coordinationoftheactivitiesoftheclergyworkingwiththeCossacksbothwithinRussiaandbeyonditsborders;

• organisationoftraineeshipsandtrainingforclergyminister-ingtotheCossacks;

• carryingoutthecontinualsupervisionofCossackcommuni-tieswithregardtotheirreligiosity;

• disseminationamongtheCossacksofreligiousliteratureandscientific/methodologicalmaterials;

• thedevelopmentofthepublishingbusinessandpresentationsofinformationanddocumentsrelatingtothemutualsupportbetweentheOrthodoxChurchandtheCossacks71.

obshchestvo/v-ukraine-zafiksirovany-tri-tipa-feykovyh-gromad-za-koto-rymi-stoyat-rossiyskie-specsluzhby-sbu-391522.html

70 http://www.skvk.org/71 http://www.skvk.org/dokumenty/ustav-sinodalnogo-komiteta-po-

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In2010,theCommitteealsoadopteditsownstrategy.Adocumententitled The fundamental directions of spiritual/educational work with the Cossack communitiesunderlinestheimportanceoftheCos-sack/Church partnerships, of creating an organisational struc-tureforworkwithintheCossackenvironment,ofpreparingtheOrthodox‘hard-core’believersintheworldofculture,aswellasinthecivic-patrioticeducationofCossackfamilies,promotingthecultural-historicalCossacktraditionsamongchildrenandyoungpeople,aswellasbroadeningthecircleofeconomicpartnersintheworkofspiritualandcivic-patrioticeducationoftheCossackcommunity72.

Asisapparentfromthedocumentscited,thespiritualministryoftheCossackshastakenonanunambiguouslypro-statedimen-sion,confirmingthealliancebetween‘thealtarandthethrone’.TheChurch’sofficialpositionclearlydemonstratestheloyaltyofthe Church hierarchs. And not only that: like the Kremlin, theChurchisplayingtheCossackcardandstrengtheningitspositioninsocietybydoingso.Theplatformfortheco-operationbetweenthe State and the Orthodox Church is the concept of ‘Orthodoxcivilisation’whichformsthebasisofthecivilisationalparadigmoftheRussiangovernment’spolicy,accordingtowhichinterna-tional relations is a space for either competition or cooperationbetween civilisations. Orthodox civilisation, with Russia at itshead,standsasacounterbalanceto‘degenerate’Westerncivilisa-tion.BoththeChurchandthestatehavedefinedtheboundariesoftheirinterestsinthisway;thisiswhytheydeemitsoimportanttomaintaintheintegrityoftheterritorycoveredbytheadminis-trationoftheMoscowPatriarchate,towhichitsforeignactivitieshavebeensubordinated.

72 http://www.skvk.org/dokumenty/osnovnye-napravleniya-duxovno-pros-vetitelskoj-raboty-v-kazachix-obshhestvax

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AsMetropolitan Cyrilrecently statedona website addressed toUkrainian Cossacks73, the Synod Committee’s press service isconducting a wide-ranging information and propaganda cam-paignamongCossacksinUkraine,Belarus,Serbia,Bulgaria,theCzechRepublic,Germanyandothers.AccordingtotheMetropoli-tan,“theChurchisacentreofattractionforthecommunitiesofcompatriotsabroad.Theyareseekingtopreservetheirnationalidentity,andtouniteinordertomaintainaunifiedspiritualandculturalspaceintheCIScountriesandfurtherabroad.”

TheforeigndimensionoftheSynodCommittee’sactivitiesiswellportrayedintheforumsforOrthodoxCossackyouth.At its ini-tiative,theFirstEurasianCossackYouthForumtookplaceinJuly2016inSt.Petersburg(withthesupportoftheFoundationfortheDevelopmentofCossackdomandthelocalauthorities).Thisyear,the Second Eurasian Forum ‘Cossack Unity 2017’ took place inSevastopol,withthesupportoftheauthoritiesofSevastopolandtheRepublicofCrimea74.

73 www.pravkazak.org.ua/materialy/novosti-otdela/434-intervyu-mitropol-ita-kirilla-po-itogam-raboty-sinodalnogo-komiteta-po-vzaimodejstviyu-s-kazachestvom-v-2016-godu(noaccess).

74 www.skvk.org/44044

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SUMMARY

NEO-COSSACKDOM AS A SYSTEMIC, ALL-IN-ONE TOOL OFTHE KREMLIN

In the recent history of Russian Cossackdom, two periods areusually highlighted: (1) the exuberant movement launched attheendoftheSovietUnion,and(2)the‘statified’movementsub-jecttostrictcontrolbytheauthoritiesoftheRussianFederation.WhereasthefirstperiodwascharacterisedbytheCossacks’ fo-cusontheirownproblemsandtheirstrugglefortheirownim-ageasasocialforceinthecomplexethnicandpoliticalsituationinsouthernRussia, thesecondindicates theKremlin’s fearthattheCossacksmaybecomeanindependentpoliticalforce,anotherhotbedofseparatismandethnicconflictswithintheRussianFed-eration.TheCossacksstartedtoemergeintothelimelightthankstoYeltsin’s1995decreeontheregistryofCossackorganisations.The division into registered and unregistered (social) CossackswasestablishedbyafederallawonthestateserviceoftheRussianCossacksin2005.Theformal,highlybureaucratisedandKrem-lin-controlled Cossack military associations were a let-downtoasubstantialpartoftheCossackcommunity,andledtotheirgradualabandonmentofthesegroups.

Thecurrentstageischaracterisedontheonehandbyadeclareddesire to overcome these divisions, and on the other by the au-thorities’ awareness that modern Cossackdom will not of itselftransformintoacivilsocietycapableofself-organisationandself-governance. Obstacles to implementing this scenario have beensystemically cleared away (by legal and organisational means);Inaddition,thereisnoroominRussianpoliticalculturefortheagency of society. The Cossacks’ superficial ‘self-organisation’ iscontrolledandmaintainedfromthetopdown,andsupportedeco-nomically and ideologically by the Kremlin. The instrumentali-sationoftheCossacks’militarisedlifestyle, theircolourfulcul-turalsymbolism,andtheirauraofpowerareaccompaniedbythe

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grantingofspecialrightstothem(suchastherighttoaseparatemodeofmilitaryservice,easyaccesstograntslandfromthestatelandfund,theCossackschools,additionalopportunitiestomakemoneyinprivateprotection,civilandmilitarycompanies)whicharenotavailabletoothercitizens.Similarly,theKremlin-orderedre-registrationoftheCossackassociationsisintendedtoprovidean infrastructure for the desired model of development for so-calledcivilsocietyinRussia.

Neo-Cossackdom,whichtheKremlinregardsasasystemicaux-iliary element in its security and defence architecture, is stillpresented as ‘the free Cossack state’, the bearer of ‘military de-mocracy’.Since2012ithasalsobecomeacarrierofconservativeOrthodoxvalues,fightingwiththedegenerateWestandIslamicfundamentalism,etc.Thisisaclearnodtothehistoricalmemoryof the Cossacks, highlighting their cultural distinctiveness andmilitary-defensivewayoflife.Thismemoryhasmainlybeenusedinstrumentally in the military-patriotic education of childrenandyoungpeople,aswellasinimplementingtheCossacks’mili-tary functions (in the reserves, in civil and territorial defence).TheCossackexperiment,astestedinthesouthofRussia,hasnowbeenextendedtotheentireterritoryoftheRussianFederation.Itisaninflatedpolitical-militaryprojectoftheKremlin,mobilis-ing society in the face of alleged new threats (illegal migration,extremism, terrorism, cultural threats, cyber-crime, the fightagainstinformationalaggressionbytheWest).

Thepolitical,socialandlegalstatusofneo-Cossackdomremainsundefined.Itsorganisationsandassociationshavelittletodowitheitherthe‘troops’ortheNGOthirdsector,orthefolkloreandre-enactment societies with which they are sometimes associated.TheirbasicdistinguishingmarksaretheircontrolbytheKrem-linandtheexchangeofmutualbenefits(inexchangeforconces-sionsandcontracts).Paramilitaryassociationsarebeingorgan-ised from the top down, which has changed the neo-Cossacks’motivations,includingthoseoftheyoungergeneration.Forthem,

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neo-Cossackdomcanopenupacareerpath,becausetheotheral-ternativesareblockedoff;itcanalsoprovideastableincome.Thefavourablepoliticalsituationalsoattractsradicals; thesecanbeusedtoaccomplishvariousobjectivesoftheKremlin,whichcanalwayscutthemoffifnecessary.

Inthisseriesofpolitical-military,business,historicalandsocialprojects,theneo-Cossackshavebeencastintheroleofauxiliariestotherulingcorporationofpower.Theyhavebecomeinstrumen-talisedasamulti-functionaltoolfortheKremlin.Theirfeaturesarelistedinthefollowingtable:

Function Method of implementation

military

•the organisational base of the civil and territorial de-fence of the Russian Federation;

•reserve personnel, in a state of permanent standby;•auxiliary formations of the border patrol;•volunteer forces in armed conflicts which Russia does

not officially participate in;•cyber-warfare and informational warfare;

law & orderand repres-sion

•volunteer auxiliary police teams;•private security services for state and municipal facili-

ties;•security at mass events, Olympics and soccer champi-

onships;•interventions during opposition meetings;•checks on supermarkets for the sale of forbidden food

imports;

economical

•relieving the federal budget for security and defence by means of self-financing Cossack military associations;

•production of food for the armed forces and other stra-tegic consumers;

•ensuring the food security of the Russian Federation;•Cossack entrepreneurship as a screen for businesses

run by the institutions of force when not involved in combat;

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Function Method of implementation

political

•strengthening Russian statehood;•disciplining national minorities; •a tool to fight the opposition;•supporting the special services in their active engage-

ments; •outposts of the ‘Russian world’ in countries of the ‘near

and far abroad’;

social

•the militarisation and military organisation of society;•the government’s social infrastructure;•the patriotic upbringing of youth and society in a spirit

of service to the state;•the social factor in the fight against new threats (Islam-

ic fundamentalism, extremism, illegal migration, etc.);•volunteer patrols of the civil militia; •preventing drug addiction, work with pathological and

dysfunctional families;

cultural/ideological

•shaping a new civilisational identity for Russian soci-ety;

•strengthening neo-imperial ideology (Cossacks as the vanguard in Russia’s Eurasian ideology);

•an instrument of ‘defence’: the fight against Western values and the dissemination of so-called traditional conservative values, based on Orthodoxy;

decorative

•participation in parades on Red Square and state cel-ebrations (this mainly applies to the Kuban Honorary Troops);

•support for regional initiatives and patriotic celebra-tions;

•providing security for the Orthodox Church and mon-asteries, including the seat of the Patriarch;

•dignifying the religious services of the Russian Ortho-dox Church;

•Cossack folklore as PR for Russia, e.g. national song and dance ensembles: the Kuban Cossack Choir, the Song and Dance Ensemble of the Don Cossacks of Rostov, the Stavropolye group, the Cossacks of Russia from Lipetsk, and others.

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Attheend,itisworthemphasisingthatthepresentrelationshipbetweenthestateandtheCossacksischaracterisedbythelegalandorganisationalsolutionswhichhavebeenimposedonthelat-ter. At the propaganda level, it is distinguished by an ability tocooperateinstrengtheningthemilitaryorganisationofthestateand society. The Cossacks’ militarised lifestyle is an excellentbackgroundtospectacularinformationalactivity.Thestructureandshapeoftheso-calledCossacktroops,togetherwiththeirev-er-closerapproximationtomilitarystandards,allowstheirsys-temicintegrationintothesecurityanddefencesystems,whichisthemainmessageoftheStrategy of the Russian Federation’s policy towards the Cossacks to 2020. However, the question of how wellthedevelopmentoftheneo-Cossacks ismanaged,aswellasthePutin system’s ability to generate new projects and correctivemechanismsforthem,remainsproblematic.Thosecurrentlybe-ingimplemented,withregardtothenewstrategicobjectives,aremerelyreplicatingtheoldideas,andthuspreservingthepatholo-giesoftheRussianpolitical-economicsystem.

JOLANTA DARCzEWSKA