Punter
Transcript of Punter
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The Naxalite Movement in India from Independence-Present: Theoretical and Pragmatic
Challenges of Counterinsurgency within the Framework of a Constitutional Democracy
Cody William Punter
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Acknowledgements
First and foremost, I would like to express my gratitude to my supervisor, Dr. Rudra
Chaudhuri. As my supervisor, Dr. Chaudhuri imparted me with invaluable knowledge and
helped guide me in the right direction. Our conversations, whether during formal
meetings or in our more informal exchanges were always engaging. His enthusiasm both
as a professor and supervisor were a source of inspiration throughout my research and
writing of this paper. Without him this piece of scholarship would not have been possible.
I would also like to thank my professors, especially Antaol Lieven and Rudra Chaudhuri
who both taught my course on the Conduct of Contemporary Warfare. It was thanks to
their course that I was introduced to the issue of the Naxalite insurgency in India, and I
would not have been able to write about such an engaging topic without their support.
I would also like to thank my family for their moral and financial support. They have
continually provided me with the opportunity to expand my personal and academic
horizons. It is to them, above all that I would like to dedicate my dissertation.
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Introduction
It is an object of paramount importance that the cause which gave rise to [those
disturbances] should be fully understood and such measures adopted as are deemed
expedient to prevent a recurrence of similar disorders
Judicial Authorities in Calcutta - 1831 1
When India became an independent country in 1947, it became the worlds largest
democratic state. Since then it has gradually sought to establish a predominant presence in
South East Asia while seeking a greater role amongst developed countries in the West. In
recent years, it has become widely acknowledged as a world power in large part to the
exponential growth of its economy as a result of the governments policies of economic
liberalisation in the 1990s. While this has indeed raised its clout and reputation on the
international stage, the exponential growth of the economy has been paralleled by that of
an indigenous Maoist insurgency, which has challenged the political foundations upon
which this growth rests, for the past 60. The greatest challenge the insurgency has put
forward has been its rejection of the legitimacy of the Indian government based on the
abdication of its legal and constitutional duties to the most disenfranchised and politically
vulnerable social groups as set out in the constitution. In refuting the authority and
legitimacy of the Indian government the Maoist groups has presented itself as rival
political faction which has been able to achieve a great deal of popular support of the
populations which it claims to represent. By 2006, the extent of the political control
exerted by Maoist insurgency especially in the central region of India resulted in the
Indian Prime Minister declaring that the insurgency was the countrys number one
security threat.2
1Guha,Ranjit(1980)p3.2PMs speech at the Chief Ministers meet on Naxalism. April 13, 2006.
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According to one estimate, up to 74,000 sq km or Indian territory is under the
direct control of the Maoists (also known as the Naxalites).3 Moreover, as of 2007, the
Cabinet Secretary stated that the Maoists officially had a presence in 182 districts in 16
states. However, while the extent of the Maoist presence is alarming and disturbing for
the government, it is the exponential rise in Naxal-related violence over the past ten years
that has led to growing discontent about the movement. Over the past five years over 10,
000 civilians and security personnel have lost their lives as a result of Naxal Violence
with 2,732 deaths being reported in 2009 as against 1,769 in 2008.4 Despite the increasing
levels of violence, the Indian government has so far failed to come to terms with the
political issues which are raised by the growth and of the insurgency and has simply
resorted to trying to stop violence with violence.
While there has been a great deal written on the insurgency, the majority of what
has been written in English has been journalistic/editorial in style and content. As a result,
available literature on the topic of the insurgency has been either overly biased, or
narrative in nature, with little attempt to place the insurgency within a social scientific
frame of analysis. Moreover there has been little attempt to critically assess and compare
the theoretical underpinnings of Maoism and Indian democracy within a historical
context. Finally there has been little academic literature which has sought to critically
apply a comprehensive theory of contemporary counter-insurgency to the current situation
in India. Therefore this paper seeks to set the development of Maoist ideology against that
of Indian democracy within a historical narrative whilst evaluating the states response to
the Maoist insurgency within the framework of contemporary counterinsurgency theory.
The goal of this approach is premised on the belief that the political element
involved in both the development of the insurgency and the subsequent state response to it
3Singh,Harindar(2010)p4.4HindustanTimes,July06,2010.
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has been largely neglected. As the central tenet of counter-insurgency theory is that the
government must have a clear political aim to challenge that of the insurgent5, the need to
understand the development of the political ideologies of both Maoism and democracy is
fundamental to understanding how to formulate an effective counterinsurgency campaign.
Indeed if the Indian government is to be successful in carrying out a counterinsurgency
campaign it will have to acknowledge the primacy of political aims in determining its
overall strategy.
It should also be noted that the scope of this paper will be limited to the central
regions of India. This is because of the 85 million Indians who are officially classified as
scheduled tribes 70 million of them live in the heartland of India comprising the regions
of Chhattisgarh, Orissa, Bihar, Andhra Pradesh, Jharkhand, West Bengal, Marahartra and
Rajasthan.6 Thus while the government claims that 16 states are affected by Naxalism,
this paper will be focusing specifically on those areas with tribal populations.
Furthermore, of those states special attention will be given to Orissa, Andhra Pradesh
West Bengal, Bihar, Jharkand, and especially Chhattisgarh, as these states form a region,
otherwise known as the Red Corridor, which is the focal point of both insurgent and state
violence. Finally, although the Naxalite movement currently has many front
organisations, this paper will be focusing mainly on the current incarnation of the
Communist Party of India (Maoist). In addressing the insurgency in this manner, the
paper will be divided into three chapters.
The first chapter hopes to examine two separate but closely connected issues.
First it shows how Left-Wing ideologies in India, adopted from Maoism and Marxism-
Leninism, were used to politically mobilise peasant insurgencies, thus representing a
fundamental shift in the nature of peasant insurgency in India. Having established that, it
5Nagl,John(2005)p29.6Guha,Ramchanrda(2007)p3305.
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then demonstrates how the political ideology of the movement was crystallised and
subsequently transformed through external repression and internal splits resulting in the
development of a more sophisticated political ideology.
The second chapter is divided into two parts. The first part examines how after
having changed its political direction, the Maoist movement was able to exploit the states
failure to address problems related to the poverty, underdevelopment and fundamental
legal rights of tribals. In doing so the Maoist movement was able to establish itself as a
rival political ideology to that of the state leading to a broad support base amongst
impoverished rural areas which the movement came to control. The second part of the
chapter examines how at the turn of the Millennium the developmental and political
aspects of Maoism were accompanied by an increase in violence. The state responded to
this by resorting to violence without addressing the political and developmental
grievances of local populations, thus leaving the insurgency un-defeated.
The final chapter demonstrates how the states current response to the Naxalite
insurgency has failed to draw on its own experiences and contemporary lessons of
counter-insurgency. Moreover, the chapter suggests that in contrast to traditional counter-
insurgencies, as a constitutional democracy, India faces specific challenges related to its
institutional deficiencies and the high standards set by its legal framework. It then
concludes that failure to overcome these challenges has resulted in a crisis in the political
aim of the states counterinsurgency strategy, which ultimately fails to overwhelm the
political ideology of Naxalism.
In analysing and comparing the simultaneous development of the Maoist and
democratic political traditions in India, this paper hopes to show that the democratic
government of India has the resources to undermine the Naxalite insurgency. However
this is dependant on it having a clear political aim, through which it can confront the
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political challenges raised by the insurgency, and which is essential in order to bring a
peaceful settlement to the insurgency.
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Chapter 1
A revolutionary war is 20 percent military action and 80 percent political7General Chang Ting-chen of Mao Zedongs central committee.
During the colonial period, peasant insurgencies were a common form or resistance to the
injustices of un-even land distribution, Indias caste system, and colonial repression.
Between 1946-1951, in the Telangana region of Andhra Pradesh, India faced its first
insurrection of the post-colonial era and its single largest insurrection on its soil since the
1857 war of independence.8 While it was the later and much smaller rebellion in
Naxalabri that would give the Maoist movement in India its title, it is this movement that
provided the foundations for modern Left-oriented revolution in the name of social justice
and agrarian reform in India. What made it different from all the previous insurrections
and insurgencies that the Indian government and the East India Company had dealt with,
was that it was openly encouraged and organised by the Communist Party as a struggle
against forced labour, illegal exactions, unauthorised evictions and more generally the
feudal rule of the Nizam.9 It thus marked the beginning of a trend where peasant
resistance to the social injustices they were subject to were not simply sporadic acts of
defiance and violence organised by peasants in the name of peasants; they were now
being mobilised by educated members of the Indian intelligentsia with a view to securing
a political end.
The first introduction of Communism as a form of revolutionary struggle in
Telangana was a demonstration of the potency of the movements organisation and
ideology. Firstly it showed that when combined with the organisational capacity of the
Communist Party, high levels of peasant grievance could be effectively mobilised with
7Galula,David(1964)p89.8Singh,Prakesh(2006)p4.9Singh,Prakesh(2006)p5.
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concrete results. This is evident in that during the five years in which the insurgents were
fighting, they were able to establish control over approximately 3,000 villages.10 It also
showed that such control cost dearly in terms of human life as around 4,000 people were
killed in the struggle.11 Moreover, and perhaps most importantly, drawing on theories of
Marxist-Leninism and Maoism, the Communist Party purported to offer an alternative to
the state-led development paradigm, which was inadequate for addressing Indias well-
entrenched feudalism.12 Thus, although the Telangana insurrection was quelled in 1951
without having achieved their intended radical agrarian reforms, it left an indelible mark
on the history of peasant struggles and insurgency in India.
However, while the revolutionary leftist ideology was a potent tool, it was by no
means a single coherent line of thought something that became only too evident in the
lead up and subsequent aftermath of the events in Naxalabri. The rebellion itself, which
only lasted 72 days, was the result of a skirmish that erupted between a tribal youth who
was attacked by a landlords goons when he went to plough his land. This resulted in the
retaliation of the tribals in the area, who went about trying to forcefully capture back their
lands. While the rebellion had been unplanned and resulted from indigenous grievances,
a group of ultra-left ideologues regrouped to form the All India Coordination Committee
of Communist Revolutionaries (AICCCR) in May 1968 and proclaimed Allegiance to
the armed struggle and non-participation in the elections13 In effect the AICCR was to
form the armed revolutionary counterpart to the Communist Party of India (Maoist) the
party in power in West Bengal under the United Front.
However, while it all of those who formed the AICCCR agreed on the topic of
non-participation in government, in the immediate aftermath its formation, the AICCCR
10Ibid(2006)p5.11Ibid(2006)p5.12Chakrabarty,BiyutandKujur,RajatKumar.(2010)p41.13Iibd.(2010)p42.
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began to show internal rifts based on disagreements as how to best wage armed struggle.
The main point of contention to arise was over the question of class annihilation, with
AICCCR members basically split between two schools of thought. One was led by Charu
Mazumdar who maintained the need for immediate annihilation of class enemies, the
other by Kannhai Chatterjee who believed that the anihhalation of class enemies should
only take place after building up massive organised forces.14 This was to result in a split
of non-parliamentary leftist revolutionaries into two groups the Maoist Community
Centre (MCC) led by Chatterjee and the Communist Part of India (Marxist-Leninist) led
by Mazumdar.
Of those issues which were creating the greatest rifts were the topics of
annihalation, the use of firearms and the dependence on the petty bourgeois intellectual.15
Mazumdar was himself aware of the negative effects that this could have on the
movement and answered by attacking dissidents as centrists while vigorously defending
the party line of with an emphasis on the annihilation of class enemies.16 This constant
defence of class annihilation as a tactic was part of Mazumdars obsession with
revolutionary violence. Indeed, Mazumdar claimed that violence especially against class
enemies jotedors, bourgeois compradors was the key to achieving revolutionary
success. He decscribed his model for revolutionary success as follows:
rely on the the poor and landless peasants; educate them in Mao Tsetung
Thought; adhere firmly to the path or armed struggle; build guerrilla forces
and march forward along the path of liquidating the class enemies [authors
emphasis]; only thus can the high tide of struggle advance irresistibly.17
14Kujur,Rajat(2008)p3.15Singh,Prakesh(2006)p41.16Ibid.p42.17Ghosh,SunitiKumar(2009)p249.
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One of the results of this obsession was that it saw Mazumdar constantly looking to
exploit opportunities for open conflict. In particular he sought to harness the adventurism
and aggressiveness of disaffected male youths in urban areas. Indeed, although the
ultimate goal of Mazumdars revolution was to liberate India from feudalism by inciting
peasants to overthrow those who oppressed them, there was an almost tacit
understanding that the peasants could only become a revolutionary force after it was acted
upon by the revolutionary youth and students and by the working class.18
Mazumdars belief in the need to inspire those who were oppressed through
guerrilla violence would in effect become the modus operandi of the CPI (M-L) in the
years between the Naxalabri uprising in 1967 and Mazumdars death in 1972. Throughout
this period, various CPI (M-L) cadres operated across India. As per Mazumdars doctrine,
they largely carried out violence in urban areas. In West Bengal, where there had been
links between the AICCR and student movements before the formation of the Party,
youths and students were incited to start an iconoclastic campaign against Gandhi and
Nehru.19 Throughout Calcutta and its surrounding villages these campaigns manifested
themselves in the form of book burnings, attacks on educational institutions, and the
targeting and killing of landlords and security personnel. Similar attacks were organised
an carried out in other parts of the country under the initiative of the CPI (M-L) with
schools, businessmen and policemen being attacked in Districts across Bihar, Orissa and
Uttar Pradesh.20
As a result of the partys emphasis on bourgeois-led guerrilla conflict with specific
attention being paid to urban areas, the peasantry and their grievances came to occupy an
auxiliary role. As Kanu Sanyal, who was a key figure within the party pointed out, we
18Dasgupta,Rajeshwari(2006)p1924.19Ghosh,SunitiKumar(2009)p224.20Singh,Prakesh(2006)p71.
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had not faith in the heroic peasant masses we, the petty bourgeois leadership, imposed
ourselves21 Thus although the CPI (M-L) under Mazumdar claimed to be fighting against
the antiquated feudalism that restricted the rights and freedoms of tribals, they were
themselves guilty of using the tribals for their own ideological ends. While this may have
been justified at the time as a necessary measure for the achievement of a revolution, the
reality is that it had an alienating affect within tribal areas.
This alienation was further compounded by the state-response which the CPI (M-
L)-led violence invited especially in West Bengal. In response to the Maoist violence,
the government of India in conjunction with state governments undertook Operation
Steeplechase in the bordering districts of West Bengal, Orissa, and Bihar. 22 During this
period, a joint force of army and police personnel was organised and given increased
mandates for the carrying out of arrests and application of violence with the
implementation of acts such as the West Bengal Prevention of Violent Activities Acts
(1970) and the Maintenance of Internal Security Act (1971).23 After being carried out for
forty days, the operation was deemed a victory for state forces. Although it did not
achieve any clear political goals, Operation Steeplechase was deemed a success based
on the large amount of casualties inflicted upon CPI (M-L) cadres and their supporters
and the number of people arrested across all three states. As a result, violence dropped as
did the stealing or arms, but most importantly the administration was able to restore the
peoples confidence in the state.24
Thus although severe measures were required against the CPI (M-L) the
immediate threat which it posed to state-order was put down with relative ease. Amongst
21SanyalinDasgupta,Rajeshwari(2006)p192522Singh,Prakesh(2006)p99.23Ghosh,SunitiKumar(2009)p22724Singh,Prakesh(2006)p100.SinghpointsoutthatinBirbhumforexampleofthe
400knownactivistsknownintheareaonly150werecaught.
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those peasants who were fighting for the improvement of their social and economic
standing, many felt the Party betrayed them by placing its own political ideologies ahead
of their own political goals. That the need to seize power was put ahead of their own
agendas for agrarian reform was already an issue of contention; but that the move to seize
political power could be put down so easily and lead to further setbacks for tribals
increased the strain between the Party leadership and its tribal supporters. Thus in the end,
Mazumdars strategy and its subsequent failure had a demoralising effect on the peasants
and ended with considerably weakened support from various peasant association.25
The failure of Mazumdars tactical line also led to increased tensions amongst the
ideological proponents of Marxist-Leninism and Maoism in India leading to debates over
its political strategy and how best to implement it. At the core of the majority of
disagreements of various factions during the 1970s was whether the teachings of Mao Tse
Tsung were to be strictly adhered to, or whether there was room for variation and
adaptation. Mazumdar, who had been heavily influenced by Mao, believed that Maos
teachings were universally applicable and had to be strictly adhered to. However, in
seeking to achieve the level of success which Mao had in China, Mazumdar was keen to
achieve political ends faster than could be possible and his aim of achieving total
revolution in India by 1975 was inconceivably far-fetched given the circumstances of the
time. Moreover, he failed to predict that violence, especially in favour of urban targets
and educational institutions would have an alienating affect rather than an inspiring one.
Furthermore in seeking to adhere strictly to the Chinese model, Mazumdar was
neglecting some of the differences which existed, and which Mao himself had pointed
out, between the revolutionary situation in China as compared to other countries. 26 In this
regard, Mazumdars line of thought failed to take into account two major differences
25Ahuja,PratulandGanguly,Rajat(2007)p266.26Ibid248.
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between India and China. Firstly, India is home to a wide range of nationalities, religions
and languages whereas at the time of Maos revolution in China 94% of the population
were Hans.27 Secondly, one of the successes of Maos revolution is that it provided a
means of unifying China, which at the time of his revolution, had no central government.
India on the other hand, not only had the tradition of a centralised bureaucratic state
dating back to British rule, but ever since independence it had been subject to its own
unifying process under the democratic ideology of Nehru. As such, Mazumdars
revoltuonary goals for India based on strict adherence to Mao Tsetung Thought faced the
dual challenges of extreme regional divisions while having to contend with a rival
nationalist democratic ideology which was becoming increasingly entrenched in Indian
political culture.
The recognition of the shortcomings of Mazumdars strict adherence to Maoism
and the nature of Indias regional differences would ultimately lead to endless splits and
divisions throughout the 1970s, 80s and 90s. While many different lines of thought
emerged with the death of Charu Mazumdar and the failure of his revolutionary model,
one of the general conclusions reached amongst most parties was that pure military
struggle should be limited, and greater emphasis given to peasant struggles. Further
weight was added to this point when the Chinese communist issued a message in 1970 in
which they disapproved of annihilation carried out by secret squads and disagreed with
the view that guerrilla warfare was the only way to mobilise people against the enemy. 28
Indeed, if anything was to be learned from the failures of Mazumdars movement, it was
that Maos revolution did not provide the template for a successful revolution to be
replicated under the circumstances of 1970s India. However, while the failure of the
Naxalabri uprising had exposed the shortcomings of Mazumdars tactic of annihilation
27Ibid.p292.28Krishnaji,N.(1980)p1615.
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and the CPI (M-L)s overestimation of the capacity for a pan-Indian revolution, it did not
undermine the socialist-egalitarian ideology or the communist capacity for large-scale
organisation of disaffected populations. Rather, the decades following Naxalabri would
prove that Marxism-Leninism-Maoism was a versatile ideology that could be adapted to a
variety of settings and be employed to achieve the level of support which Mazumdar had
sought for the success of his revolution. Thus the idea of class annihilation was dropped
with an emphasis being placed on trying to come up with an Indianised version of
Marxism-Leninism-Maoism.29
ii
Having seen the Naxal movement swiftly crushed by 1972, through the arrest, death, and
fleeing of large numbers of its cadres, the Naxalite movement became scattered and
regionalised. However it would be wrong, as is often done in the literature on the history
Naxalism, to suggest that the period of rivalry and splits represents a lull in the movement
as a whole. As K.P Singh has pointed out, the various splits and dissensions during the
1970s 80s and 90s should be viewed as a process whereby each regional split led to a
faction seeking to increase its individual base of support thus leading to a growth in
organisational progress as opposed to regression.30 During this time there remained some
small factions operating in West Bengal, Bihar and Andhra Pradesh, which upheld
allegiance to Mazumdars line of class annihilation. However, for the most part, their
tactics remained relatively unsophisticated and unpopular. As a result they were put down
with relative ease by authorities conducting extensive police operations.31
29Chakrabarty,BiyutandKumarKujur,Rajat.(2010)p46.30Singh,P.K.(2008)p14.31Singh,Prakesh(2006)pp115-119.
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Those who supported the goals of Marxist-Leninist-Maoism in India recognised
that Mazumdars interpretation of Maoist ideology was crude and unsuited to the Indias
socio-economic condition. Thus one group that had belonged to the CPI (ML) formed a
new party called CPI (M-L) Liberation based in Bihar, and proceeded to undertake a
project of course-correction. As part of correcting the mistakes of the past, the group
suggested that greater emphasis should be put on mass peasant struggles while pure
military armed struggle should be limited in an attempt to provide an Indianised version
of Masixm-Leninism-Maoism.32 Moreover, implicit in the turn away from Mazumdars
ideology was an understanding that a swift revolution was not possible given the
circumstances of Indian social and political culture. Thus Mazumdars pipe dream of
overthrowing the Indian government by 1975 through a united struggle was abandoned in
favour of small scale regional organisation with an emphasis on winning over local
populations.
In keeping with this program of establishing themselves at a grassroots level the
Maoists sought to establish control over areas that were isolated and ignored by states
development and security initiatives. There were several reasons for this. Firstly in
choosing to establish themselves where the majority of the population was living below
the poverty line the revolutionaries faced a greater chance of mobilising populations in
favour of a new peoples revolution.33 Secondly, the areas chosen tended to be
characterised by their hilly and forested terrain, thus making them inaccessible to security
personnel. The combination of these two factors meant that the Naxalites would be able to
exert a combination of sympathy amongst and control over the tribal populations without
government interference.
32Kujur,Rajat(2008)p3.33Garg,Ruchir(2008)p27
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Of those groups who were able to garner popular support in remote tribal areas
over the next few decades, the Maoist Communist Centre and the Peoples War Group
were to become the most influential. The two groups had developed in different regions
along different lines. The PWG emerged in the period after the Emergency as a
reactionary response to the authoritarian repression which communist and Naxalite
leaders had faced and to the gradual acceptance of the parliamentary methods conceded
by the CPI (M-L) Liberation. 34 Meanwhile the MCC had existed since 1969 under the
name of Dakshin Desh and had evolved parallel to Mazumdars CPI (M-L) in opposition
to its brazen policies.35 Indeed, despite the emphasis placed on the splits within the
Naxalite movement during the 1970s and 1980s, with the PWG having renounced the
policies of predecessor, both it and the MCC came to a more sophisticated understanding
of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism.
In effect the central goal of their ideology remained that of their archaic
predecessor: the liberation of the people from all exploitation and the dictatorship of the
ruling classes through the violent overthrow of the Indian government.36 However the
strategy through which they hoped to achieve this was far more sophisticated than the CPI
(M-L)s had been. According to the PWG the success of an Indian Revolution was
dependant on liberating the countryside first through area wide seizure of power,
establishing guerrilla zones and base areas and then encircling the cities and finally
capturing power throughout the country. 37 Similarly the MCC, which was based out of
Bihar, proclaimed the need for a protracted peoples war along the lines set out by the
PWG and differed only in its emphasis on guerrilla warfare. The strategy of both the
34Singh,Prakash(2006pp.121-131.35Chakrabarty,BiyutandKujur,RajatKumar.(2010)p53.36Kujur,Rajat(2008)p7.37Chakrabarty,BiyutandKujur,RajatKumar.(2010)p52.
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groups thus showed a better understanding of the contemporary political, social and
military situation in which they were trying to establish themselves.
Indeed the evolution of strategic thinking amongst the PWG and the MCC was
apparent at the tactical level. While the leaders of the PWG did not completely give up
the notion of attacking security forces, the main points of their programs consisted in
concentrating on issues which directly affected tribals. Of those issues which PWG
claimed to give primacy were: the redistribution of land; enforcing payment of minimum
wages to the farm labour; imposing taxes and penalties; holding peoples courts;
enforcing a social code.38 Thus rather than simply attacking the governments inability to
ensure some of these social services, the members of the PWG attempted to win over
local population by providing an ideological and more importantly a material
alternative to the state as a benefactor and protector.
In seeking to gather support for their cause from local populations the various
Naxalite groups made a concerted effort to establish a strong presence in those areas
which were most isolated from the governments security forces and most ignored by its
development and social policies. As such, PWG was able to rapidly establish a strong
base in the Telangana region where it had chosen to base itself in 1980 given the
favourable terrain and the well-established history of popular rebellion in that area.
Meanwhile the MCC chose to set itself up in Bihar where it competed with the more
moderate Liberation as well as Party Unity. A few short years after having established
itself in Telangana, PWG was able to spread its influence across the borders of Andhra
Pradesh and into the Southern regions of Orissa and the Chhattisgarh region of Madhya
Pradesh as early as 1982. Meanwhile MCCs overtly military line became increasingly
influential amongst tribals in the central regions of Bihar.
38Singh,Prakesh(2006)p133.
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Regardless of the feasibility of these strategic aims, whether it was Liberation,
MCC or Party Unity in Bihar or PWG in Andhra Pradesh, at the grassroots level,
considerable bases of support were developed over the following decades. The range of
support varied from tribals in areas where the Naxalites established themselves, to those
who took up arms to form part of its military program. Thus, rather than having found
itself defeated by government repression in the wake of the Naxalabri uprising, the
revolutionary left in India was able to evolve and expand its sphere of influence, thereby
presenting an increasing threat to the authority and legitimacy of the Indian state by the
end of the century.
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Chapter 2
On the 26th
January 1950 [the founding of Indian Republic with its new Constitution], we
are going to enter into a life of contradictions. In politics we will have equality and in
social and economic life we will have inequality.39
B.R. Ambedka Chair of the committee that drafted the Constitution.
When they were drafting the Indian constitution, the founders of Indian democracy sought
to redress the injustices suffered by tribals during the colonial period. At the time of
Indian independence, Nehru proclaimed the dawn of an independent Indian democratic
state would be tasked with the ending of poverty and ignorance and disease and
inequality of opportunity40. Acknowledging some of the deep-seeded historical divisions
which were inherent in Indias caste society, Nehru presented his Objectives Resolution
to the Constituent Assembly of India on December 13, 1946. In it he proclaimed that
adequate safeguards shall be provided for minorities, backward and tribal areas and
depressed and other backward classes41 Subsequent legislation represented an attempt
by the state government to address these issues.
The two most important steps taken by the government in this respect were the
abolition of the caste of untouchables as a legal classification as well as the abolition of
the Zamindari system. The classification of individuals as untouchables was traditionally
accepted as part of Indias caste system and had meant that those individuals classified as
such were given lower legal status than those of higher castes. The implications of this
categorisation meant that untouchables were frequently treated as less than human and
were subject to a variety of injustices from not being allowed to draw water from
39Sen,Amartya(2005)p36.40Dreze,JeanandSen,Amrtya(1997)p5.41Guha,Ramachandra(2007)p3305.
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communal wells, to be subjected to lynching or burning over trivial matters, without
recourse to due legal process.42
The Zamindari system was equally a feature of Indias caste system, which saw
upper-caste members owning large amounts of land and often using this land to exploit
landless peasants by charging extortionate rents and interest rates. Moreover their legal
status as owners of the land permitted them to evict rentiers without proper cause, often in
the interest of generating a greater profit. The intention of the abolition of the Zamindari
system was to revoke the right of private intermediaries to control the land revenue
system with the goal of clearer definitions of private property rights with respect to land
ownership.43
However ground-breaking and well-intentioned these constitutional measures may
have been, in the years following their implementation, those populations who were most
marginalised by Indias uneven caste system, continued to face persecution and hard-ship.
On the one hand this was due to the lack of legal and pragmatic re-enforcement that these
initiatives received. Thus as Deze and Sen have pointed out, even with the abolition of the
Zamindari system land ownership structure in India has remained relatively unchanged
over the last forty years.44 On the other the Indian government failed to implement wider
reaching reforms which might provide more robust welfare to under-privileged tribals in
terms of political, gender, educational, healthcare, and legal rights.
Part of the problem has been the way in which the India economy has grown.
According to Jayati Ghosh, the models for economic growth in India since Nehru have
been plagued by a pattern of growth which has been fundamentally unbalanced and in
crucial respects unsustainable, [] as it failed to provide minimum basic needs to the
42Ahuja,PratulandGanguly,Rajat(2010)p255.43Dreze,JeanandGazdar,Haris(1997)p37.44Ibid.p37-8.
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bulk of the population and allowed for the persistence of absolute poverty among a fairly
large section of the population45 Over the last forty years, whether under Nehru or during
the period of rapid economic liberalisation in the 1990s under the guidance of the IMF,
India has been unable to implement institutional changes at the local level, thus leaving
landed proprietors and rich farmers to profit most in rural areas through maximising
short-term gains without regard for the needs of tribal populations.
Indeed, in 2004 a Report of the Expert Group on Prevention of Alienation of
Tribal Land and Its Restoration concluded that the development paradigm pursued since
independence has aggravated the prevailing discontent among marginalised sections of
society.46 The inefficiency of Indian development in providing for the most marginalised
sections includes lack of basic necessities in terms of access to food, clean water,
healthcare and education. The list goes on to include the adminstrations failure to
implement protective regulations in scheduled areas, resulting in land alienation, forced
eviction from land, dependence on money-lenders and often compounded by blatant
violence by state functionaries.47
In and of themselves, these shortcomings point to the failure of Indian democracy
to deliver the promises of the constitution from which the government derives its
legitimacy. However when held up against the spectre Naxalism these shortcomings
provided for the encroachment of an opposing ideology which was able on prey the
failures of the state. Indeed, as John Mackinlay has pointed out, one the main
characteristics contributing to the support of an insurgency is that there must be an
overwhelming sense of grievance for the insurgents to manipulate.48 With its ideological
45Ghosh,Jayati(1998)p169.46Banerjee,Sumanta(2008)p11.47Ibid.p11.48Mackinlay,John(2010)p22.
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turnaround in the late 1970s, the Maoists began to prove time and again that it was well
aware of this fact.
Throughout the 1970s, 80s and 1990s, the Maoists displayed a cautious and well-
organised approach to winning over local support in tribal areas. Already by the late
1970s the PWG, which was based in Telangana in the North of Andrha Pradesh set about
creating committees to isolate certain areas in order to assess and exploit the grievances of
the local tribal populations. Henceforth groups of Forrest Committees were created for the
jungle areas and Regional Committees for the plains areas.49 Furthermore, small squads or
dalams comprising between six to ten members would be organised and sent to talk to the
people and they would consult the tribals about their grievances. In particular they would
find out who was responsible for their problems. Once these individuals had been
identified usually landlords or government officials, the Maosits would go about killing
the most notorious amongst them.50
By either using direct acts of violence or simply intimidation, the armed cadres
would in effect use violence as an empowering tool, but not an end in itself. Indeed, in
contrast to the class annihilation which was seen as a strategic end in itself, the selected
application of violence as a tactic at a local level was intended to be more symbolic. In
this sense, the cautious application of force by Maoists can be explained as a form of
Propaganda of the Deed at the local level.51 Kumar Himanshu gives the example of how a
forest guard in Dantewada would punish a woman for carrying a bundle of firewood by
raping her. He would then ask for a three-ruppee fine, which if unpaid would lead to the
guard trying to extort Rs 300. The Naxalites were aware of the discontent this caused
amongst the population and would seize upon it by capturing a forest guard, trying him
49Singh,Prakesh(2006)p132.50Mukherji,Nirmalangshu(2010)p16.51Mackinlay,John(2010)p151.
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up, and having the tribals come to beat him.52 The list of methods used to gain popularity
amongst the population further include:
thrashing moneylenders and destroying promissory notes; attacks on or
sometimes elimination of people found to be harassing women; eve teasers
and those misbehaving with women being punished in praja (peoples)
courts; warning the landlords to distribute land; organising demonstrations
against the government on popular issues; and issuing statements to the
media53
Indeed the Maoists quickly learned that confronting those people and issues which the
local population viewed unfavourably was not only useful in gathering their support, but
also in driving state representatives and landowners off the land, allowing the Maoists to
take control.54
While some especially young males came to accept the Maoists because it
provided them with an outlet for violent action, there was much more to the Maoists
program which attracted tribals. For example in Dandakaranya in 1982, the Maoists saw
local agitation by Tendu collectors against exploitation and for better wages as an
opportunity for spreading their influence. During this period the PWG sent dalams into
the region and helped the tribal farmers occupy hundreds of acres of land.55 As such they
were able to empower the farmers and provide immediate results in terms of
landownership where the state had previously failed to do so.
While the government has the legal power to distribute land to the poor, it has
repeatedly failed to do so. As such Naxalite groups were able to gain influence by
performing the functions of the state in the forest areas of Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh,
52Kumar,Himanshu(2009)p11.53Reddy,K.Srivinas(2008)p94.54Muhkerji,Nirmalangshu(2010)p1655Garg,Ruchir(2008)p37.
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Maharashtra, Orissa, Bihar and Jharkhand.56 Although the seizure of land was not legal in
the eyes of the state, to the tribals who had suffered for generations, the Naxalites became
dispensers of justice. In those areas where Naxalites were able to gain increasing
influence throughout the 1980s and 90s, that is exactly the model that they have used for
their success by essentially providing a parallel government apparatus. Over time these
parallel governments have been able to achieve a high level of sophistication and
organisation. As armed groups gradually secured an area, they went about co-ordinating
economic, political and social reforms based on the needs of the local population.
Insofar as economic reforms are concerned, the Naxalites have made an effort to
improve land rights, increase minimum wages and secure common property resources.57
In Andhra Pradesh, the Naxalites seized on the governments indifference to the wages of
tendu leaf gatherers and secured both a minimum wage as well as a pay increase for the
tribals.58 Meanwhile in Central Bihar, where the MCC has traditionally exerted a great
deal of influence, Bela Bhatia who has done extensive field research in that region since
the mid 90s has pointed to the fact that in Naxal-dominated areas there has been a
significant rise in the average wage of tribal labourers as well as an equal wage for
women.59
Over time, through their capacity to defend the territories that they occupy and
their ability to mobilise local populations, the Naxalites have been able to establish their
own system of governance and justice. Part of this has been achieved through the creation
ofgram rajya committees or Revolutionary Peoples Committees (RPC), which have
been put in place in areas under Maoist control to provide the basic functions and services
56Banerjee,Sumanta(2008)p11.57Bhatia,Bela(2005)p1542.58Banerjee,Sumanta(2008)p11.59Iibid.p1543.
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of the state.60 By incorporating the local population in the political process these
committees have been able to achieve a level of co-operation and an ad-hoc form of
peoples rule. In Dandakaranya alone the Naxalites established RPCs in 500 villages,
and it is estimated that through these committees the Naxalites were able to wield
influence over 2000 villages.61
Moreover, the Naxalites have made a concerted effort to address the lack of law
and order in areas in which they came to establish a strong presence. On top of their
ability to run parallel administrations they have been able to institute jan adalats
(peoples courts) and systems of tax collection.62 The jan adalats have traditionally
been very harsh in their verdicts with the death penalty being common. However, while
their respect for traditional legal concepts such as due process and weighted sentencing
have resulted in concern, they have continued to be held with increasing frequency. The
trials are widely publicised before taking place and the fact that up to 5,000 villagers
might attend the trial attest to their popularity.63 Indeed one of the reasons that they are so
popular is that while the ineffectiveness of the local judicial system may keep a litigant
involved in a petty land dispute tied up in court for several years, at a jan adalatthe case
can be settled in a matter of no time.64 Their system of taxation too has been criticised
as it is based mostly on profits generated from extortion, levies, and theft by the armed
cadres. However, that they have been able to profit from the corruption of contractors,
government officials, businesses, mines, factories and forest contractors point just as
60Garg,Ruchir(2008)p35.61Ibid.p35.62Jha,SanjayK.(2008)p62.63Singh,K.P.(2008)p15.64Harivansh(2008)p23.
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much to the states inability to address fundamental inefficiencies its economic and
political system as it does to the Naxalites opportunism.65
It must be acknowledged therefore, that in failing to deal with the underlying
causes of tribal disaffection, the state has effectively allowed for a rival political and
socio-economic form of governance to establish its authority in certain regions of the
country. Indeed, where the Indian government has failed to provide substantive justice and
development, the Naxalite movement has been able to distinguish itself by becoming
directly involved in a struggle to capture the minds and beliefs of the population. 66
ii
The ability of the Naxalites to take advantage of the situation in India through the spread
of their ideology and their physical occupation of rural territory has been able to continue,
more or less unchallenged up until present day. Of those achievements that are particularly
impressive has been their ability to establish liberated zones over vast amounts of land,
over which the Naxalites wield uncontested control through a combination of political
mobilisation and coercion. As of June 2010, the Naxalites were able to claim the areas of
Dantewada, Bastar, Bijapur and Narayanpur in Chhattisgarh; Malkinigiri and Rayagada in
Orissa; West and East Singhbhum in Bihar; Gadchiroli in Maharashtra; West Midnapore
in West Bengal for a total of 72,000 square kilometers as being unquestionably under their
political and military control.67 Moreover, in the majority of these areas, the Naxalite
presence has been established for decades, such that in certain areas many people have
grown knowing the Naxalite leadership as the sole source of authority in those areas. The
65Ibid.p22.66Mackinlay,John(2010)p18.67Singh,Harinder(2010)p4.
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situation is such that in some areas it is possible to come across second or even third-
generation cadres.68
Having established strong bases through their close contact with disaffected tribal
populations, various Naxalite groups believed that there was a need to go beyond
establishing the support of tribals, with the aim of achieving the intended aims of their
revolutionary ideology. The significant turning point in this respect was the convening of
the Coordination Committee of Maoist parties and Organisations of South Asia
(CCOMPOSA), where Maoist groups across South Asia including the Nepalese Maoists,
reaffirmed their dedication to armed struggle. This led to the conclusion that the erstwhile
splits in the Indian Maoist movement needed to be reconciled with the intention of
forming a unified Compact Revolutionary Zone (CRZ) a Red Corridor spreading from
Nepal, through Bihar and the Dandakranya region to Andhra Pradesh.69
The conclusion of CCOMPOSA saw a series of mergers between Indian Maoist
groups. First came the unification of Party Unity and the PWG, which then became the
Communist Party of India (ML) (PW).70 This was followed by the 9th party congress of
the Peoples War in March 2001, where the leaders of the organisation concluded that in
order to achieve success it needed to increasingly militarise its operations. 71 This was in
turn followed by the announcement in 2003 that the two largest and most influential of
the Naxalite groups for the previous three decades MCC and PWG were merging to
form a unified command structure under the title of the Communist Party of India
(Maoist).72 This final merger confirmed the essence of what was said at the 9th congress in
2001 when the new group proclaimed in a joint press release that:
68Bhatia,Bela(2005)p1541.69Jha,Sanjay(2008)p66.70Singh,K.P.(2008)p16.71Singh,Prakesh(2009)p168.72Singh,K.P.(2008)p16.
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the immediate aim and program of the Maoist party is to carry on and
complete the already ongoing and advancing New Democratic Revolution.
This revolution will be carried out and completed through protracted
peoples war with the armed seizure of power remaining as its central and
principal task.73
Indeed, what makes the Naxalite movement different from the other insurgencies such as
those in Nagaland, Jammu and Kashmir is that it rather than seeking to contest the
authority of the Indian government to exercise its sovereignty over a given area based on
racial, religious, or territorial claims, the Naxalite movement seeks to challenge the
sovereignty of the democratic state by undermining the fundmental principles justice,
governance, monopoly of violence which underpin its authority. It is thus that as of 2006
the Indian Prime Minister proclaimed that the Naxalite movement in India was Indias
single largest security concern.74
Insofar as the state is concerned, the Naxalites increased sophistication and
organisation have resulted in an increase in their guerrilla and military capacity. As early
as the mid-1980s and reaching a peak in 1991, Naxalites began employing violence to
secure their political and territorial gains.75 While levels of violence remained at a
relatively stable level for the next decade, the 9th Congress of the PWG and the
subsequent creation of the CPI (M), was accompanied with a rapid increase in violence.
According to the Ministry of Home Affairs, between 2004 and 2008, 877 security service
personnel and 926 Naxalite cadres lost their lives as a result of violence between state
and Maoist forces.76 However, what is perhaps most troubling is that in this fight for
73Ramana,P.V.(2009)p753.74 PMs speech at the Chief Ministers meet on Naxalism. April 13, 2006.75Singh,K.P.(2008)p14.76MHAReportonNaxalism2008.MinistryofHomeAffairs;mha.nic.in
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authority and legitimacy between these tow factions, the number of civilians killed in
that period was estimated at 2,461.77
The prospects of further violence have only continued to grow as the Naxal
strong-holds expand their military capacity. In 2000, the Peoples War Group went about
setting up the Peoples Liberation Guerrilla Army (PLGA) in 2000 while smaller scale
militias had been being formed since the early 1980s continued to flourish.78 Since the
formation of the PLGA, it is estimated that 10,500 professional cadres have been trained,
supplied with around 7,300 weapons, many of which are more sophisticated than the
standard issue rifles of the Indian police.79 This is supplemented by its informal militia
which consist tribals armed with traditional weapons and is considered to number around
40,000 spread across villages under Maoist control. Moreover, these armed cadres and
militia are supported by large portions of disaffected populations. For example the
peasant-worker (DAKMS front in Dandakarnya has 100,000 members while its womens
front (KAMS) has nearly 90,000.80
However impressive the support base and military capacity of the Naxalite
movement is, its goal of overthrowing the Indian government is neither realistic nor in the
better interest of disaffected populations they claim to be fighting for. This is because the
goal of the Naxalites is to advance their project of protracted peoples war by
transforming the erstwhile guerrilla zones into liberated zones. Contrary to its title, once
77Ibid.78Sundar,Nandini(2006)p3189.79Ibid.p3189;Thakur,Sankarshan(2006):ReferringtotheNaxalites,apoliceman
fromBastarcomplainedthatTheyhaveak-47s,wehave303riflesandnot enoughammunition.MorovertheuseofImprovisedExplosiveDevices(IED)
andremotemineshavemadetheMaoistsincreasinglylethal,especiallydue tothestatesinsistenceonsendingoutlargepatrolsintoNaxalareasas
opposedtosmallergroupsassuggestedincounterinsurgencytheory.80Mukherji,Nirmalangshu(2010)p17.
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an area under Maoist control becomes declared liberated, the interests of the tribals
become second order to the Maoist political program:
Thereafter, the need to establish and secure their authority, protect their
armed squads from the police and paramilitary, secure the obedience of the
people living in the area to the sanghams set up by them etc., become matters
of predominant concern.81
The result of the Maoists attempt to consolidate its political gains against the authority of
the state has thus been an increase in violence and a retardation in the progress of tribal
interests, as Maoists target schools, roads, and other government sponsored development
projects.
In theory the state has greater resources and a broader base of legitimacy than does
the Naxalite movement, and thus should be able to reassert its sovereignty by
undermining the Naxalites base of support. However in 2009 the Home Minister, P
Chidambaram claimed that As a government we cannot sit back and say what there are
underlying causes. We have to combat violence so that the civil administration can
function82. Thus, rather than seeking to undermine the politics and developmental
programs of the Naxalites, the counterinsurgency initiatives of the government have
solely focussed on the insurgency as a problem of law and order.
The central tenet of the L&O approach to counterinsurgency theory is that the
primary consideration of counterinsurgency should focus on the targeting insurgents as
they are seen as the principal cause of the breakdown of law and order. The resulting
strategy relies heavily on the use of force at the tactical level and has as its primary goal
the elimination either through intimidation, coercion or attrition of those who threaten
to destabilise the functioning of the state. Conceived of as such, Indias counter-
81Balagopal,K(2006)p2185.82HindustanTimes.October16,2009.
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insurgency approach to the problem of Naxalism centres on two pivotal assumptions
that the restoration of the authority of the state as defined in terms of law and order is the
primary goal of counter-insurgency and that anyone who gets in the way of this goal is
considered to be an enemy of the state. The resulting conflict between the state and the
Naxalites each claiming to assert their authority has led to deterioration in the rights and
general welfare of the tribals leading to their alienation.
Of those initiatives which have been the most alienating have been those taking
place in the state of Chhattisgarh. Having been consistently occupied since 1980 and
increasingly becoming the focal point of Naxalite operations, in 2005 Mahendra Karma,
the opposition leader of the Chhattisgarh assembly put forward the idea for the formation
of the Salwa Judum. The group was organised the premise that the unrest created by the
Naxalites encroachment of progress in the area could be harnessed an used to counter it.
As a result bands of men and women, especially the young were recruited, funded, armed
and assured of the assistance and the support of the state. 83 Once armed, the civilians were
grouped with police and paramilitary forces and sent to force villagers into camps located
near major roads, with a view to sanitising the villages and being able control the
population. When villagers refused to relocate the Salwa Judum responded by burning
villages and raping women.84 Upwards of 50,000 people have been displaced as a result
of the governments relocation program and been refused the right to return to their
homes.85 Meanwhile within the camps, no suitable access to employment or land has been
made while lack of food, water and shelter has seen people resort to raiding nearby
villages.86
83Thakur,Sankarshan(2006)84Guha,Ramchandra(2007)pp.3310-3311.85Balgopal,K(2006)218486Sundar,Nadini(2006)p3187.
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Moreover, while the camps were allegedly opened to protect the people who
inhabited the villages from the violence of the Naxalites, it instead led to a polarisation of
the community in which tribals look upon their fellow countryman as an enemy.87 For the
state government, this has been seen as a success as it has allowed the Chief Minister to
proclaim with impunity that those who live in the camps are with us, and those who run
away are Naxalites88 you are either with us or against us. However the government has
failed to take into account the legal, political and security implications of arming civilians
without giving them proper training or specific political goals in fighting insurgents and
using them to force fellow villagers into makeshift camps. Furthermore, there was little
consideration given to how the Maoists might respond to the movement. As a tribal living
in the camps put it First it was the dalams, now there is the dalam, the Salwa Judum and
the danger of being blamed by both for reporting to the other89.
While the Salwa Judum has been led by the state government recent efforts by the
central government to defeat the Maoist insurgency have shown that the perception of the
insurgency as a zero-sum game emanates from the centre. In the Autumn of 2009, the
central government launched Operation Green Hunt. Like the Salwa Judum, Operation
Green Hunt was premised on the need to defeat insurgents as understood in traditional
military terms. While the government has refused to employ the army90, it has relied
heavily on its paramilitary force, the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) in conjunction
with the state police of the districts of Chhattisgarh, West Bengal, Orissa, and Jharkand.
87Kumar,Himanshu(2009)p8.88Ibidp8.89Thakur,Sankarshan(2006)90 Raju, Radha Vinod (2010) The reason for not using the army is because it is
trained to kill foreign enemies. The army has itself affirmed that it is not willing to engage with the insurgents. If it were to do so it require the
implementation of the Armed Forces Special Powers Act, which would provide for the suspension of certain fundamental rights. This would
ultimately be worst than the current situation where although rights are
beingignored,theyareatleastintheoryupheld.
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With an emphasis on eliminating insurgents, the CRPF has been accused of
indiscriminately attacking unarmed tribals on the basis of their being Naxalite
sympathisers. As with the Salwa Judum, the polarisation of tribals into enemies and
friends of the state has led to an over-dependant and indiscriminate dependence on
violence often against defenceless villagers.
Not only has this had a demoralising effect on the tribals, it has equally led to the
demoralising of the troops who are carrying out the operations. This is partly because,
government forces suffered a series of devastating losses as a result of Maoist attacks
carried out as counter-offensives against Operation Green Hunt. Of those loses, one
happened to be the single largest defeat when 75 CRPF and one local police
superintendant lost their lives in a Maoist ambush in Dantewada.91
While it is these recent attacks in particular that have gathered the greatest
criticism from the Indian public, the Maoists are aware that inflicting calculated losses
upon the state forces demoralises both the troops that are meant to be fighting them and
the government that is meant to be co-ordinating that fighting. Indeed when an entire
company of CRPF officers was wiped out in the Dantewada, rather taking the opportunity
to boost morale by replacing it and sending the message the Maoist violence would be
met with retaliation, the DG (government) elected to leave the post unfilled.92 This has led
to resentment towards the state as expressed by a member of the CRPF in Chhattisgarh
who commented that We are the expendables [] We count for nothing at least not in
Dehli.93
The result of the governments counter-insurgency operations on the ground have
therefore led to disaffection and disillusionment towards the state amongst both the
91Datta,Saikat(2010)p2.92Pandey,Brijesh(2010)93Ibid.
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populations affected by the insurgency and the states own security forces. Although the
Maoists goal of overthrowing the government has been claiming that the Maoist
insurgency is the countrys single largest security threat it has failed to properly address
the political challenge that it presents to the legitimacy of the government. While it may
be argued that the Maoists have recently undermined their own political goals as a result
of their increasing recourse to violence, the reality remains that they still have the support
of and control over significant tribal areas as a result of their political and developmental
work over the past three decades. Moreover, the governments overuse of force has done
little to re-establish its own legitimacy. The current situation is thus such that, while the
Maoists will find it difficult to expand outside their current areas of operation, the Indian
state will not be able to easily restore order and legitimacy in the tribal areas that have
passed out its grasp.
If it wants to bring a conclusion to the insurgency, the government will have to
address the political bankruptcy of its current counterinsurgency operations. Indeed, as
John Mackinlay has pointed out to win back the population the state needs to have a
political idea, a strategy that overwhelms the insurgent manifesto.94 Thus, if it is to
restore the legitimacy and authority of democracy in India, the government will have to
become more self critical, accountable, and most importantly more dedicated to winning
over local populations rather than focussing on defeating its enemies.
94Mackinlay,John(2010)p6.
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Chapter 3
I can fight Naxals but not Naxalism95
Rahul Sharma, Superintendant of police in Dantewada- 2008
While the Indian government has acknowledged that Naxalism poses a threat to the
sovereignty of the state, it has consistently focused on targeting insurgents whilst failing to
counter the political challenges raised by the movement. The resulting counterinsurgency
operations which have followed from this understanding of the insurgency have depended
on traditional military strategies without consideration for the effects that its application
has on populations affected by insurgency. Moreover, the state has continually failed to
provide physical and legal protection to those who are affected by the insurgency.
Contrary to the Indian governments current approach, in drawing on theories
from classical counter-insurgency theory, the American campaigns in Iraq and
Afghanistan gradually dropped the strategy of targeting insurgents in favour of a more
sensitive and calculated approach where the objective is not to defeat an enemy as in
conventional warfare, but rather to win the hearts and minds of the local population.96
The problem with targeting insurgents is that applying a disproportionate use of force on
the part of the state adds to the strength of an insurgency by further alienating the affected
population, whose support is required for a successful operation.97 In fact, the strategy of
targeting insurgents by the American army in Afghanistan and Iraq became looked on so
unfavourably that it became known as mowing the grass, because the killing of
insurgents would only increase the resentment of local populations, leading more of them
to join in the insurgents operation.98
95Chakravarti,Sudeep(2008)p376.96Kahl,ColinH.(2007)97Goswami,Nasrata(2010)p98Berman,Eli;Felter,Joseph;Shapiro,JacobN.(2010)
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Thus the strength of a counter-insurgency strategy must be assessed not by
quantifiable data such as the number of insurgents killed, but by the extent of support from
the local population.99 In order to win hearts and minds a comprehensive strategy which
includes a mix of population security, governance reform, economic development, and
leadership targeting is required.100 The assumption of this strategy is simple in that the
more effective the government is at providing services to civilians, the more likely it is
that they will prefer the government over the insurgents.101 In order to be able to
implement the various strategies at the tactical level the central tenet of counterinsurgency
theory claims that a government must have a clear political aim102. Indeed, to win back
the population the state needs to not only have a political aim, but a strategy that
overwhelms the insurgent manifesto.103
If one were to examine the policies of the central government over the last ten
years it would appear that it had come to terms with some of the basic aspects of
counterinsurgency theory. As early as March 2000 the then Home Minister L.K. Advani
stated that the Naxalite problem is linked to economic development and therefore, the
planning for security and development must go together104. In effect the rhetoric of the
centre has changed little as the Chief Minister with the support of Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh proclaimed that the government would be implementing a new two-
pronged strategy which provided for the dual implementation of security and
development.105 Thus if one were to take the words of the governments at face value, it
99Galula,David(1964)p79.100Bittle,Stephen,(2010)101Berman,Eli;Felter,Joseph;Shapiro,JacobN.(2010)102Nagl,John(2005)p29.103Mackinlay,John(2010)p6.104Reddy,ShashidharM.(2008)p51.105Sahni,Ajai.July(2010)
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would appear that not only has the government understood the importance of
counterinsurgency theory, but it has been practising it for the last ten years.
The problem however, is that in claiming to deal with both the security and
developmental needs of the populations affected by the insurgency, the government has
relied on catchphrases and empty rhetoric without any reference to the nuts and bolts of
what is available, a coherent strategy into which these capacities can be woven, and how it
is to be implemented.106 The reality as to why the details involved in the implementation
of counter-insurgency doctrine have yet to be applied are in effect related to its inability to
deliver effective governance, which is a cornerstone of any successful counterinsurgency
operation as it is necessary for ensuring the protection and the economic and social well-
being of the affected populace.107
The situation in India is thus different from traditional counter-insurgency
operations because expeditionary armies are for the most part responsible for the conduct
of the counter-insurgency while local systems of governance are entrusted to the local
population in order to provide legitimacy to the operation. In contrast, in fighting the
Maoist insurgency the Indian government is simultaneously responsible for its counter-
insurgency operation and the fulfillment of effective governance. The reason that this is
so important for India is that it is directly responsible to its electorate and the ability to
uphold the legal, security and social functions of the state are the source of its legitimacy.
While the goal of contemporary counter-insurgency is to provide a climate in which the
post-insurgent society can maintain political systems and institutions leading to long-term
stability it would be assumed that the pre-existence of such systems and institutions in
India would be advantageous in implementing a solution which is more sensitive to the
needs of the population.
106Sahni,Ajai.February(2010)107Singh,Harrinder(2010)p4.
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However, rather than facilitate the implementation of counterinsurgency doctrine,
India has been burdened by the existence of structural deficiencies in its political, legal
and security institutions. One of the greatest problems in this regard is the culture of
corruption which is such a part of Indian political and legal culture. In 2008, the
Association for Democratic Reforms, an independent watchdog based out of New Delhi,
claimed that nearly a fourth of the 540 Parliament members face criminal charges,
including human trafficking, immigration rackets, embezzlement, rape and even
murder.108 Meanwhile, according to the corruption Perception Index in 1995, India was
ranked 35th out of 41 countries, while in 2003, it remained in the bottom third of all
countries listed, ranking 83rd out of 133 countries.109 Thus rather than having a
bureaucracy which is accountable to the law and the people in practice the bureaucracy,
both at the centre and state levels has emerged as the locus of executive power,
accountable neither to the political establishment nor to the people.110 As one former
Home Minister put it: our whole administrative apparatus is in shambles and the
organised and highly qualified civil services based on open competitive examinations, on
the brink of extinction.111
Thus one of the ironies of the Indian situation, is that in contrast to the American
military in Iraq and Afghanistan which has shown a great capacity for self-criticism,
within the upper-ranks of the police-force, the military or the Ministry of Home Affairs
there has remained unresponsive to the needs of the people. Meanwhile, deliberations in
parliament and in the public has been divided along the rigid lines set out by the Ministry
of Home Affairs with those who support development being considered pro-Maoist, while
108WashingtonTimesJuly24th,2008.109Singh,Prakash(2006)p239.Furthermore,theWorldEconomicSurveyranked India45thoutof49countriesonthehonestyofitspublicofficials.110Chitalkar,Poorvi(2010)p9.111Singh,Prakash(2006)p250.
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those who support law and order are pro-government, as if the two were mutually
exclusive. As a result there has been relatively little constructive debate concerning its
counter-insurgency doctrine and its over-reliance on force. However while it would be
easy to blame the lack of debate within the states security apparatus for this shortcoming,
it is the civil government which has failed to hold its security forces accountable to the
criticisms of the public.
One of the central problems in the respect is the gap in accountability between the
central and state governments affected by Naxalism. While the central government has
maintained that Naxalism is a threat to national security, it has continually reaffirmed that
matters of law and order and development are matters of state importance.112 Indeed while
both the Ministry of Home Affairs and the Planning Commission have continually offered
to give money to states in need of support, they have failed to provide any political
directive for the implementation of successful operations.
The result of this has been an uneven response across the various afflicted states.
Thus on one hand there has been the response of the government of Chhattisgarh which
has taken a heavy-handed initiative without any political consideration for the negative
outcomes of its operations and initiatives such as the Salwa Judum. In contrast, in Bihar,
the governments approach to Naxalism has been lax due to a mutual understanding
between the Naxalites and the ruling coalition resulting in a lack of action being taken by
the state against the Naxalites.113 Somewhere in between these two extremes there is the
state of Andhra Pradesh, which has been actively debating the need for a comprehensive
112SeeReddy,M.Shashdhar(2008)pp48-58.Thisaccounttracesthevarious
responsesofthecentralgovernmentoftotherequestsmadebythe
governmentofAndhraPradeshforassistanceintacklingtheNaxalite insurgencybetween1998and2004.Asperastatementmadeonthe10th
December2002,publicorderandpolicebeingstatesubjects,itisfor concernedstategovernmentstodevisemethodsandtakeconcretestepsto
curbLeft-wingextremistviolence.113VinodRaju,Radha(2010)
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approach to counter-insurgency since the late 1980s. As a result it has gradually adopted a
political approach and applied a series of measures at the grass roots level. In doing so it
has acknowledged the importance of gradually building up the support of the population,
using small but well-trained forces which were paid a substantial 50% remuneration114
Moreover, police stations were re-occupied, fortified with barbed wire and heavy machine
guns and given excellent lines of communication. Finally, in acknowledging the need to
arrive at a political settlement, the government in Andhra Pradesh held peace talks with
the insurgents. Although the talks broke down the fact the government and the Maoists in
the region were willing to temporarily cease hostilities to search for a need for a political
settlement to the insurgency represented a progress in the governments approach to the
insurgency
While the experience of Andhra Pradesh has been looked upon as a success at the
state-level, the reality is that the majority of Naxalites simply fled to the states of Bihar,
Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Orissa and Bihar, where police are less well equipped to counter
guerrilla warfare. The problem with this imbalance is that in leaving state governments to
tackle problems of public order no coherent police effort of the kind required to fight
counter-insurgency can be established. So far the governments idea of a co-ordinated
approach has centred on how to use the paramilitary CRPF, while guaranteeing money to
states. The problem with this is that the while the CRPF is integral to the counter-
insurgency operations it can only be employed successfully if it has the intelligence
network and security infrastructure which can only come from established well-trained
local police forces. Moreover when money is handed out without conditions and a means
of ensuring that it is used effectively, it often gets wasted and embezzled. Thus the centre
114VinodRaju,Radha(2010)
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must go beyond relying on paramilitary forces and simply giving money to states and
instead put pressure on state governments to establish effective police forces.
The implementation of a state-wide program to improve its security forces should
be premised on the success of the Andhra model. One of the greatest problems in this
respect, is that there is a severe lack of police officers across the states of Chhattisgarh,
Jharkand, Mahrastatra, West Bengal and Orissa.115 One of the most important lessons to
be drawn from Andhra Pradesh and other successful counter-insurgency campaigns is that
there cannot be any substitute for guarding the populace by ensuring [a] physical
presence116 Therefore if the government wants to implement a comprehensive security
strategy across Naxal-affected states it will have to ensure that the severe crisis in police
vacancies is filled.117 Not only that but there should be an emphasis on recruiting local
populations to fill those vacancies. Indeed, as recently experienced by the American army
in Iraq and Afghanistan, one of the greatest difficulties encountered in initiating a
population centric counter-insurgency is the inability of expeditionary forces to
communicate with local populations and associate with local customs. This is just as
much the case in India where dialects vary across tribal areas. However, so far the
government has relied heavily on paramilitary forces such as the CRPF, which although
they have training in counter-insurgency, cannot provide the permanent presence and
local knowledge upon which the building of effective intelligence is based.
In order to ensure that the police focuses on protecting the population, the
government needs to ensure that the police forces are given adequate resources such as
weapons, communications, a defensible police stations and sufficient remuneration in
115Sahni,Ajai(2010)p3.116Singh,Harinder(2010)p4.117Sahni,AjaiFebruary(2010)p3. AccordingtoSahni,thedeficienciesinpoliceforcesgivenasapercentageas
respectivelyBihar33%;Orissa19%;Jharkhand21%;Chhattisgarh25%;
AndhraPradesh11%;WestBengal25%.
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order to ensure that police know that they have the support of the state. Moreover, rigid
training relating to the sensitivity required when dealing with local populations need to be
administered to any police officer who is going to be policing a Naxal affected area.
While this is fundamental to the success of counter-insurgency, it is probably the most
difficult facet of the security strategy as it is dependant on the need for a political
understanding of law and order. Even without taking into account the added sensitivity
required in a counter-insurgency, the level of corruption within the police force presents a
major challenge to successful counter-insurgency operations. Indeed according to a report
produced by Human Rights Watch in 2009, state police forces in India operate outside
the law, lack sufficient ethical and professional standards, are overstretched and
outmatched by criminal elements, and unable to cope with increasing public demands and
expectations118. If it is to win over local populations from the insurgents, the Indian
government will have to make a concerted effort to purge criminal elements from its
police force through drastic reforms and the application of the law to those forces which
are guilty of committing abuses such as torture, murder and rape.
Beyond the challenges inherent in the reform of its state police force, the central
government also faces the challenge of implementing development initiatives that are
beneficial to the populations who have been won over by the rudimentary improvements
made by the Naxalites. The governments Planning Commission recently put together a
panel of activists, journalists, professors, ex-police officers, and former politicians. It
concluded that if it is to effectively deal with the insurgency it will have to reverse the
current development paradigm pursued since independence which has aggravated the
prevailing discontent among marginalised society.119
118India:OverhaulAbusive,FailingSystem;www.hrw.org.119Banerjee,Sumanta(2010)p11.
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Howeverso far, the government has been unable to reconcile the political goals of
economic development as viewed by the central and state governments with the political
goals required in a counter-insurgency campaign. Thus, under the supervision of the
central government there have been several programs such as the National Employment
Rural Guarantee Act (NERGA) and the Backwards Districts Initiative, which have been
put in place under the supervision of the central government.120 However the
implementation of acts such as the NERGA has been poor as a result of the corrupt
bureaucracy of the state.121 Indeed of those areas that have been worst affected by
Naxalism, none have shown any serious dedication to providing sustainable development
to tribal populations. The reasons for this can be summed up by the fact that it remains in
the immediate economic interest of the state to push through development projects which
are centered on profit creation rather than jobs creation and conservation of specially
designated tribals areas.122
In part this can be blamed by pressure placed upon them as a result of the central
governments creation of Special Economic Zones under the SEZ Act of 2005, which has
essentially led to the creation of geographical regions with different economic laws to the
rest of the country in order to facilitate increased investment and economic activity.123 Of
those areas which have been designated for the implementation of SEZs, the Naxal-
affected states of Chhattisgarh, Orissa, Jharkhand, Marahastra and Karnatka, have a
variety of steel, iron and mining projects planned totaling US$ 85 billion of promised
120MinistryofHomeAffairsAnnualReportonNaxalism2009;http://mha.nic.in121SeeBanerjee,KaustavandSahaPartha(2010)p47.InmanycasestheNERGAhas failedtoevenguaranteeminimumwagesduetopoorimplementation,while
lowerlevelcorruptioningovernmentbankshasmeantthatoftenworkersdo notgetpaidatall.122SeeBanerjee,KaustavandSahaPartha(2010)123Chakrabarty,BidyutandKumarKujur,Rajat(2010)p165.
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government schemes.129 While the government is bound by Schedules V and VI to
provide for the rehabilitation of tribals displaced by development projects, it has so far
only rehabilitated 25%.130 Indeed rather than uphold the law in favour of the tribals, state
officials have been better known for manipulating land records in their own favour, in
order to claim tribal lands.131
Rather than employing laws to uphold the principle of justice as guaranteed in the
constitution and in favour of the population, the government has so far sought to use the
counter-insurgency as an excuse for flaunting the law. Take for example the issues of the
Salwa Judum. Since its inception, it has increasingly come under criticism from a wide
range of politicians, human rights activists and special reports and enquiries for its human
rights abuses and for being the product of an alliance between international and national
mining interests and the local elites, capitalising on local inter-tribe rivalries, mediated by
national and state policymakers.132 On the 10th of June 2008, the Supreme Court
acknowledged the widespread allegations of abuses on the part of the Salwa Judum by
ordering the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) to investigate into the
situation in Dantewada. While this should have been an opportunity to enforce the
governments commitment to legal accountability, rather than appointing an independent
committee to conduct an enquiry, the NHRC directed its police wing to constitute a fact-
finding committee.133 The resulting conclusions were neither objective nor neutral, as
violations by the Salwa Judum effectively went uncondemned and were rather held up as
an effective extension of law enforcement. Not only were the investigators themselves
129Ahuja,PratulandGanguly,Rajat(2007)p262.130Subramanian,K.S.(2010)P25.131Chakrabarty,BidyutandKumarKujur,Rajat(2010)p118.132Maringanti, Anant (2010) p 43.133Balgopal,K(2008)p10.
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