pulpmedia team of the EuroTurco forum

Issue 1

EDITORIAL

Editors: Juan Estheiman Amaya (ES), Theodor Hall (CH) Video Editor: Martha Saunders (UK)Editorial Assistant: Yaprak Damla Yildirim (TR)Journalists: Ignasi Cortés Arbués (ES), Ilgaz Azra Atilgan (TR), Uzelac Nikola (RS), Konstantinos Andronikidis Patakakis (GR), Mirjam Pieters (NL), Louis Shankar (UK), Britta Thiemt (DE)

We find ourselves in a time of transition. Every day, we are bombarded with drama-tic news, images and stories of problems that occur around the world. It is unde-niable that the issues in Syria, Iraq, Gaza or Ukraine are changing the world that we live in. It is also true that even thou-gh we see them as priorities, realistically there is very little we can do to change them.In the city between two continents, two realities, we present you an editorial con-cept that looks to bring us and you clo-ser to our immediate environments. With PULP, we aim to give you a more realistic

down-to-earth point of view of the diffe-rent issues that surround us. For examp-le, problems such as the violation of fun-damental rights or gender inequality are ones that we majorly tend to locate out-side of our borders. Unfortunately, these are problems that commonly also occur in the streets of our own cities.This issue tries to link complex subjects that take place at a European level, with situations and contexts that we can take part of. We bring light on these matters, because we believe that this is where we can realistically make an impact as young citizens.

Juan and Ted

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Mean Girls tells the story of the Plas-tics, proper teen royalty. The ques-tion that keeps them occupied most

of the time is who can or cannot sit with them. To keep their thoughts straight, the-ir hairs untangled and their clique exclusi-ve they use a set of rules such as wearing pink on Wednesdays and allow a mem-ber to wear a ponytail only once a week. Why this is relevant to know is because the European Council (EC) fo-cuses on a similar dilemma of inclusi-on, though on a different scale, when handling the accession progress of the European Union (EU). The rules are dif-ferent but the game is still the same. Article 49 of the Treaty on Euro-pean Union (TEU) states that “any Euro-pean country may apply for members-

hip if it respects the democratic values of the EU and is committed to promo-ting them“ . Having democratic values is one of the core criteria defined in Co-penhagen in 1993 and are commonly referred to as the Copenhagen criteria. The Copenhagen criteria are divided in four areas: rule of law, fre-edom of expression and media, ci-vil society and regional cooperation. Rule of law includes that mem-ber states should have an indepen-dent and impartial organ of judiciary. Freedom of expression and media is one of the keystones the EU is built on and the-refore an important criterion. To ensure this freedom themost important thing is for the state institutions to create a safe en-vironment for the media to express itself.

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The criterion of civil society co-vers the influence and participation of the civil society organisations of an app-licant state. In 2008 the Civil Society Facility was established to support ci-vil society initiatives in applicant states. The regional cooperation is a criteri-on that is especially relevant for the Western Balkan countries. It focuses on finding com-mon solutions for a shared problem on fields such as transportation, the environment and economy. The Regional Cooperation Council (RCC) is a regionally owned organ that focu-ses on cooperation from the Western Balkan countries. The EU is a member of the RCC. After the Copenhagen crite-ria are met the applicant state is allowed to sit with “the Plastics”. However, be-ing allowed to sit with the Plastics is

only a first step to actually becoming a Plastic, or in this case a Member State. The applicant state enters the next sta-ge of the accession process. They have shown their potential to become a Member State. However, the applicant state will first go th-rough an intensive and detailed examination by the EC in cooperation with the applicant state. This process is known as screening. The screening is vital for the negotiation process that will follow. During the screening process the EC and the applicant state will thoroughly go over every relevant aspect for joining the EU. They are guided by 35 so called chapters that cover a variety of policy fields. Depending on the country, a num-ber of chapters are opened. This means that in those policy fields the applicant state needs to make adjustments in their legislation pro-cess to meet the EU criteria. Once they have accordingly done so that chapter will be pro-visionally closed. The moment all the chapters are provisionally closed, the application state is ready to officially become a Member State. How long the negotiation process takes de-pends per country. In the movie Mean Girls the Plasti-cs decide to include a new member in their group. The issue is that within the Plastics it-self there are still a number of unsolved prob-lems. There is a tension between the members of the group and the joining of a new member resolves in the Plastics falling apart. I believe this is the most important lesson to be learned from Mean Girls. In the EU there is a lot of tension between the Mem-ber States and euro-scepticism is gaining more and more followers. The United Kingdom even threatens to leave the EU. The vision of enlargement of the EU is a good one. Howe-ver, the EU cannot handle any more pressure. To ensure that the EU with all of its Member States can sustain itself, it is essential that we put a halt on the enlargement until the major problems within the EU are solved. Lets save the EU from the fate the Plastics had to suffer.•

A source of knowledge can come in most unexpected for-ms. In this case from the movie Mean Girls, STATES MIRJAM PIE-TERS (NL). What can the Euro-pean union learn from teen royalty?

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As Varys said in “A Clash of Kings”, power is a shadow on the wall, yet shadows can kill. ISIS has certainly proved the statement, horrifying the world after being an inter-nationally inert cell for years. Where do they come from and where does their ambition end? How do you kill a shadow? Ignasi Cortés (ES) investigates the true nature of the Sunni Jihadist group and how its news have distur-bed our summer.

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The Islamic State: a deathly shadow

The recent events in Northern Iraq and Syria have surely terri-fied the population of the West,

leading to the condemnation of the Islamic State by the European Union on its whole and obviously by the Uni-ted States. What is rather surprising, however, is the fact that this organi-sation has begun to have real interna-tional impact this summer, after Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, leader of the armed group, declared an Islamic caliphate in June 29, proclaiming himself as the new caliph. How is it possible that an organisation we had barely heard about suddenly strikes out of the shadows with this strength and military reach? The IS, formerly ISIL or ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant/Is-lamic State of Iraq and Syria), is a Sun-ni organization that was founded back in 1999, which derived from the Iraqi branch of al-Qaeda. With the entrance of American and other allied troops to Iraqi territory in 2003 to bring “free-dom” to the country, and destroy the weapons of mass destruction allegedly owned by Saddam Hussein’s govern-ment, the IS began to act as a terrorist group, plotting several attempts during the war period. However, the presence of foreign troops did not allow the IS to

expand, and for that reason, they rema-ined as just another group of radicals. As US President Barack Oba-ma ordered, back in 2011, the return of the troops from Iraq, ISIS could finally enjoy some freedom of action in the isolated areas of Northern Iraq, and set the foundations to what it is to-day. Moreover, as the Syrian Civil War kicked off in spring of that same year, the Islamic State could begin to act be-hind Syrian borders, which enabled them to kidnap Western journalists and capture soldiers marching under different banners. The chaos under which Syria has been over the last th-ree years has become the perfect co-ver for the IS, as it has granted them time, space, and resources, the three key ingredients to the development of their medieval and dictatorial state. The Islamic State can be desc-ribed as medieval state with the re-sources of the twenty-first century; in mid-2014, Iraqi intelligence ext-racted information that revealed that the organization’s assets were worth $2 billion. Yes, the IS is the ri-chest jihad in the world, and its eco-nomical power is perhaps what has permitted the beginning of a pro-per old-school jihad (or Holy War),

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where a state or kingdom conquers new territories with the sole objective of con-verting the population to Islam, and sla-ughtering by the thousands those who refused to be converted. The dreadful part of this is that when this occurred in the Middle Ages, those who refused were killed by a sword, whereas now, hundreds of civilians are killed everyday by far more effective means, leaving the more rudimentary methods for propa-gandistic purposes. It is this propagan-da that has reached us, and affected our perspective of Islamic radicalism. Finally, the most worrying featu-re regarding the Islamic State is probab-ly the religious façade. It is assumed that the motivation for a jihad is no other than the expansion of Islam. However, the Islamic State does not discriminate with its systematic murder; Shiites, Ch-ristians, Yazidis, other religious minori-ties and even the Sunnis, which are sup-posed to share their beliefs with ISIS, are victims of torture and arbitrary murder. But why would the Islamic State murder those who share their own beliefs? The answer is actually simple: most of the members of the jihad have a mediocre Islamic education. Some of them have never read the Koran and their motiva-tion to fight in the conflict is not even

religious. These cases are the ones that are treated with greatest concern, as those who fight for religion have just been brainwashed to follow a certain ideology, but those who buy “Islam for Dummies” before travelling to Syria to fight, those are the ones that murder in-discriminately. The motivations of these people raise a much darker issue: what is wrong with society to create such mons-ters? The Islamic State is not just ano-ther conflict in European foreign affairs: it is the main affair. An organisation that commits arbitrary murders, publishes videos of beheadings of journalists, and has threatened to re-occupy an area un-der European jurisdiction – the jihadists claimed Andalusia, in the south of Spa-in, as part of the territory to annex to their caliphate – has to be the first issue to be tackled. The shadow is no longer an intangible threat; the IS has the mo-ney, it has the army and it has the wea-pons, and these assets are growing on a daily basis due to the religious and ra-dical ideology that attracts people from the “outside world” and traps those who live in the area. The Islamic State is no longer a phantom menace, but a fully developed plethora of chaos, destructi-on and death. •

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PERPETUAL STRUGGLESame story in every city. But who cares about problems when a group of people aim to reach their goal? Nikola Uzelac (RS) interviews the President of EYP Serbia to talk about the difficulties some NGOs face.

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After the recent elections of EYP Serbia, Danilo Laban has been chosen to take the wheel of the Ser-bian National Committee. We arranged a meeting in Danilo`s birthplace, city of Novi Sad, in lovely restau-rant on the city square. Waiting for the waiter, I noticed him bursting of self-confidence and eagerness to ex-press himself to the wide audience. Chief in command of EYP Serbia seemed to be a perfect person to talk to about the work of non-governmental organisations, bearing in mind his many years of activism and contri-butions to the National Committee.

As the President of one non-governmental organiza-tion, particularly in this case of a national EYP com-mittee, how would you evaluate the importance of ex-istence of NGOs?Danilo: Definitely as a crucial aspect of the personal de-velopment of young people. I think that is one of the rea-sons why are we taking part in organisations. Beside per-sonal development, being a part of a NGO results as an important step in our lives that represents a point when we stop being young people and become adults.

What are the possible problems that could occur to NGOs while working with youths?Danilo: My experience tells me that there is always re-pulsion present towards the very idea of volunteering and different ways of activism. That is definitely something that changes throughout the years. When we reach the point where the youth understands that some NGOs exist only because of them, the repulsion vanishes, and mem-bers get eager to cooperate and understand the point hid-den behind the idea of particular NGO.

How to overcome that problem?Danilo: All NGOs are always trying hard to show what the actual benefits of joining some organisation are. Their main goal is to put the young people on the right path, or give them a hand reaching their goal. So, whenever some member understands that, the problem is partially solved.

In what measure do culture, history and mentality af-fect on NGOs work, regionally speaking?Danilo: Unfortunately, I can only speak about this based on my experience of working with people from urban ar-eas. I`m afraid I am not informed about the situation in rural areas, however I guess it is definitely unenviable. Regionally speaking, the mentality is a big problem, since we are not able to recognise the opportunities to work on

ourselves, therefore we always have to be moved by oth-ers. That is the main reason why are we difficult to move towards progress.

Speaking of the process of European integration of non-EU countries, what benefits are NGOs, primarily EYP, brining in?Danilo: People always forget that becoming a part of EU is not just about respecting the laws and various rules, but mentally becoming a part of it. It is important to reveal to young people that becoming a part of one big family represents a chance for developing personal capa-bilities as well as experiencing political and economical advance. Not only with body but also with soul. A big number of young people, who are not involved in NGOs and different sorts of activism, are really difficult to ex-plain to the importance of spiritual progress. I consider changing their way of thinking as a huge role of an NGO like EYP, especially here in Serbia.

How would you evaluate the work and ascent of EYP Serbia in last couple of years and, since Serbia is in a similar position to Turkey, what would you say about the impact of it on the process of European integration?Danilo: Talking about EYP Serbia, I am very glad to say that in the last couple of years we are walking down the road of progress. I think that an indicator of the success of our work is the amount of members gathered around our organisation. Besides all of this, I think that a long path is in front of us, and that there is still plenty of room for progress and improvement. When we look back at the impact on European integration, it all begins with pop-ularisation and affirmation of our national committee. Unfortunately, the impact itself is still far away of its potential and its ideal form, since Serbia, as an non-EU country is a very hard environment to make progress like that, primarily because of its conservativism. However, we hold our heads up and still giving our best.

Can you equate the problems of Serbian NGOs, such as EYP, with the ones in the countries that are also trying hard to become a member of EU, such as Turkey?Danilo: I think that the problems we are facing are rel-atively similar, and I`m sure that the organizations that are working inside the borders of the EU have much eas-ier job, since their environment is much more natural for their work and results are more obvious. I`m sure that is definitely something EYP Turkey is facing as much as EYP Serbia, however I truly believe that both of organi-sations are giving their best to change that, and reach the better work environment by becoming a part of EU. •

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As the humani-tarian crisis in Syria is deepe-ning, more and more civilians seek safety out-side of Syria’s borders. Britta Thiemt (DE) explo-res which problems and difficulties aut-horities and refugees are facing on the rocky road to integration.

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As the political situation and the violence against civilians in Syria is further deteriorating, and with over 3 Million Syrians already on the run, the need for long-term accommoda-tion and support of Syrian refugees seems apparent. Lebanon, Turkey, Jordan and Iraq are overwhelmed with the increasing influx of asylum seekers. Camps near the Syrian bor-der are overcrowded; food, water and medical supplies are scarce. In Greece and Italy, whe-re many Syrians and refugees from elsewhere try to enter the EU at its coasts, authorities are unable to cope with the influx of refugees. Due to the complete lack of a proper asylum system, refugees are left alone, in the streets, without food, shelter or medi-cal care. At the Refugee Centre in Bramsche, there is no such suffering in sight. When walking across the compound, I see playgrounds. Fo-otball fields. Laundry drying in the late summer sun. People cycling or walking around. Youngsters my age singing. Children running and lau-ghing.People smiling. About 800 refugees from 27 nations are currently accommo-dated in Bramsche. After their arrival here, they are taken to the hospital for a medical check-up; they are scheduled for a hearing at the German Federal Ministry for Migration and Refugees (BAMF) and subsequently transferred to a permanent home in one of the province’s towns or villages after a maximum stay of 90 days. There, they wait for the decision if they can start a new life in Germany, or have to start over back home. The problem here in Bram-

sche is not the lack of resources to fulfil refugees’ basic needs. Germany is one of the pioneers in asylum se-ekers’ living conditions. And yet, Mr Conrad Bramm, Director of the RAC Bramsche, is far from being satisfied: “In my opinion, it is the government’s responsibility to support refugees, to prepare them for work step by step, to give them opportunities for edu-cation and integration into society.”. However, the municipalities are wi-dely unprepared for the arriving refu-gees, who are left alone with a place to live and a food allowance but without the necessary language skills and knowledge about German society. Hence, they often end up isolated and without perspective. “It happens that people just get forgotten,” says Andre-as Biedendieck, who works as a social

worker at the RAC. You can hear the frustration in his voice and see it in his eyes. Biedendieck takes me to his office. On our way, we pass a tru-ck waiting to be unloaded. The staff member responsible for the delivery is not in today, the truck driver has to return again tomorrow. “Understaf-fed,” Biedendieck murmurs. “Always understaffed…” The social worker is currently responsible for 158 cases. 158 people. “I would like to sit down with each of them and a translator when they arri-ve, talk about why they’re here, what they need.” But translators are scarce, and so is the money and time. In addition to the regular inf-lux of asylum seekers, the RAC now also has to take care of the quota refu-gees the German government agreed to resettle from Syria’s neighbouring countries. When the conflicts in Sy-ria escalated in early 2013, several EU member states, among them Sweden, Austria, Finland, France and Ger-many agreed to welcoming resettled refugees currently living in camps of the UNHCR (United Nations Refugee Agency). Germany committed to ac-cepting 25,500 resettled Syrians and to grant them asylum upon arrival. Unlike regular asylum seekers, quota refugees from Syria are selected at the borders and then immediately provi-ded with a passport, unemployment benefits and a free German language course after only two weeks. “It sounds wonderful to the voters,” Biedendieck remarks bitterly. Because the reality is not quite that wonderful: only quota refugees retrie-ved from Lebanese camps are granted special status and guaranteed right of residence in Germany directly. Syri-ans who enter Germany on their own face very different perspectives: whi-le deporting refugees back to Syria is banned since 2011, people have to persevere in temporary accommoda-tion with far less financial and perso-nal support than quota refugees, des-pite the only difference between them being the way they came to Germany. Or maybe, it is not the only difference. Biedendieck shows me a list of Syrian quota refugees who were recently retrieved from Lebanon by the German government. He asks me to look at the column for religious af-filiation: almost all of them are Chris-tians. Quite surprisingly, considering that 75% of Syrians are Sunni Mus-lims, while only 10% are Christians. “They’re considered a better fit,” Bie-dendieck explains. He does not seem to agree. •

The street I turn into is lined by young oak trees on either side. The sun is flickering through the light green

leaves so pleasantly that I almost for-get the seriousness of the big,

grey sign that guided me into the alley. It said

“Refugee Admission Centre” (RAC).

I am on my way there, to

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The God’s School shutdown

It was September 3rd 1844 when the Ecumenical Patriarch Germanos IV inaugurated the Theologi-cal School of Halki, which proved to be the most

important theological school of the Eastern Orthodox Church. Many orthodox theologians, priests, bishops and patriarchs studied at the Halki, including the cur-rent Patriarch of Constantinople Bartholomew. In 1971 the Turkish parliament enacted a law which banned all private universities in Turkey. The Turkish Constitution of 1961 stated that “Only the Turk-ish Armed Forces and police are allowed to open private colleges.” As a result the School of Halki was closed and the Patriarchate lost the engine for its human resources. Over the years, governments and international organi-sations worldwide, including the United States, the Unit-ed Nations and the European Union have condemned the closure of the Halki and asked for the immediate

reopening of the school, as the current situation violates the Orthodox minority’s rights. The American Congress has passed resolutions that support the reopening of the Halki, the European Union has raised the issue as part of the negotiations for Turkey’s accession in the EU and the Turkish government itself has many times publicly committed to reopening the Seminary. However, in exchange Turkey asks for a gesture of friendship from the Greek government. As the Turk-ish Prime Minister, and now President, once stated, Turkey can reopen the Halki’s Seminary as soon as the two mosques in Athens are rebuilt and Greece allows the Muslim minority in Thrace to elect its own mufti. In addition he also stated that Turkey has opened Tra-bzon’s Sümela Monastery and Akdamar churches for religious ceremonies and expects the same efforts from Greece on mosques.

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Nevertheless, Turkey asks for a deal from a country which certainly has very close ties with the Patriarchate, but still, as the Orthodox people in Turkey are Turkish civilians, it does not directly affect the Greek govern-ment. Also the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs con-sider the issue as not a bilateral Greek-Turkish negoti-ation but rather a matter of respect for the rights and religious freedoms of Turkish citizens themselves. The Turkish government has launched a demo-cratic initiative process called the Unity and Fraternity Project. The primary goals of the initiative are the im-provement of the democratic standards and the end of terrorism in Turkey and thus there are references for each recognised minority in Turkey. The Greek Ortho-dox initiative includes all steps taken and steps that will be taken from the Turkish government that affects this religious minority.

What the government however failed to include in the initiative was the reopening of the Halki. This action was criticised by the Patriarch who stated that it might be reasonable for Turkey to ask respect of the Turkish Muslim minority from Greece, but the Patri-arch has nothing to do with that, as he and the whole community are Turkish citizens who vote and pay their taxes. The matter does not affect only the Orthodox minority which resides in the country but it also affects Turkey’s relations with other states and organisations, including the European Union, member of which Tur-key want to become. The country must continue to democratise itself, comply with International Law and decisions taken by the International court of Human Rights to create the base for a true democratic state. •

The God’s School shutdown

Founded in 1844 the Theological School of Halki was the main theological school of the Eastern Orthodox Church until it was closed due to a Turkish Parliament’s law that banned all private colleges. The Turkish government has many times pledged itself to reopen the School but no further steps have been taken. Konstantinos Andronikidis (GR) investigates.

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Tradition and poweRThough social media berated Deputy-Prime Minister Bülent Arinç for his com-ments regarding women laughing in public, little is comical about worries sur-rounding gender inequality in Turkey. Turkey, with the only diminishing rate of working-women in the muslim world, could be regressing under the influence of Erdoğan’s AKP. Political power may not be the only thing to be wrestled back as traditional roles mark an ever increasing rift between the genders, writes Muham-mad Oleolo (UK).

The twin frontiers in the battle for Women’s Rights in Turkey.

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15 vTradition and poweRThough social media berated Deputy-Prime Minister Bülent Arinç for his com-ments regarding women laughing in public, little is comical about worries sur-rounding gender inequality in Turkey. Turkey, with the only diminishing rate of working-women in the muslim world, could be regressing under the influence of Erdoğan’s AKP. Political power may not be the only thing to be wrestled back as traditional roles mark an ever increasing rift between the genders, writes Muham-mad Oleolo (UK).

The twin frontiers in the battle for Women’s Rights in Turkey.

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“Turkey is an interesting country re-garding women’s rights”

I sat typing the last few paragraphs of this article on a bus in my hometown in England. With the sto-ries and perspectives of three people living in Tur-

key; Myriam, Yaprak and Furkan and a large, but inad-equate, amount of research ( given the breadth of the issue) in my mind, I noticed with intrigue a group of young muslim women wearing the hijab. Their laughs, drawing attention from no one but myself, held for me a certain irony; that such a mundane occurrence, could elsewhere be a powerful symbol of protest against gen-der inequality. In all honesty my initial understanding of the situation of women in Turkey was woefully ignorant. In school, what we learned of Turkey was that it was the first secular state with a muslim majority, thereby the first granting women self-determination in regards to their own bodies, education and entry into work. I was surprised about Turkey being ranked 120th in the Eco-nomic Forum’s Gender Gap index , assuming initially that it must be cultural rather than institutional barriers enforcing this gap. From what I have heard and read, both seem to be the case. I feel that no clearer marker is present of these barriers than employment;

“Imagine every possible way you can to discourage women from working, and here it is in place”

Out of 26 million employable women, 9.5 mil-lion have work which equates to a 36% employment rate. This is 28% less than the EU average. As the above quote from Myriam suggests, the gender gap in the workplace is propped up by more than just one element. Myriam works in architecture and notes that the few women who work in this field do so almost exclusively in the office-based, design phase as opposed to the ap-plication phase. Coupled with what she notes is a “dra-matic wage gap”, one cannot help but feel that at least in this field, the perceived value of the genders is not equal.

Nonetheless, both of my female interviewees note that this is not the only barrier in place. Yaprak explains that many women stay at home not because of these institu-tional handicaps but because they feel they can’t work. She notes that many choose a traditional way of life be-cause they consider it “the right way to live”. What is undeniable is that men, not women, benefit financially from this attitude with men making 6.47% more than women in the median section of the wage distribution and 3% overall . Interestingly, at the top end of the scale women actually make 5% more than men suggesting that the belief that women aren’t as valuable in the workforce is based on erroneous foundations. Ultimately, this got me thinking about men’s part in all of this and their possible role in shaping a gender-equal Turkey. Furkan, while supportive of in-creased campaigning on behalf of women suggests that Turkish men should “open their eyes a little”, hinting that the close-mindedness of all Turks but men in par-ticular is the main cause of gender inequality. In this capacity I wanted to know to what extent this closed-mindedness is a result of national media. Furkan provided insight into this as well:

“The Turkish media shows what it wants when it wants... women’s rights especially is not given the care it de-serves” Yaprak and Myriam had yet more valuable in-sights into this issue, while Yaprak explains that much of the Turkish media is owned by supporters of the Jus-tice and Development Party (AKP) and thus supports Erdoğan, Myriam points out that the media language is “exclusively anti-woman”, filled with slut-shaming and victim-blaming, a phenomenon by no means exclusive to Turkey, but which coupled with media and political power appears far more dangerous. Universally, there was contempt held for Er-doğan and his government by all three of the progres-sive people I interviewed. Yaprak rebukes the con-servativism of the AKP, suggesting that all it’s talk of

17 vcaring about women is merely superficial and Furkan highlights that the AKP narrative contributes to women believing that only domestic issues are worthy of their time. In her criticism of Erdoğan, Yaprak commented on the Islamic influence the AKP wishes to impose on Turkey’s secular state. She spoke respectfully but criti-cally of how Islam has indeed played a decisive role in women accepting subordination and with dissenting voices such as Konca Kuriş silenced by religious pow-ers, it is difficult even for a person with an Islamic back-ground as myself to deny that a bigoted misogyny walks around with an Islamic face.

“It is very possible to read the Qur’an as a liberal(-ish), and liberating(-ish, again) text - but that would clash with current structures of power, but it is still entirely possible” This quote from Myriam’s interview highlights something of pragmatic significance; well over 90% of Turks are Muslim , islam as a way of life would be diffi-cult to expunge but conservative interpretations are just as valid in the realm of ideas as liberal ones. Perhaps the task for younger Turks is, as Furkan points out, to “find a balance”, recognising that ones religious commit-ments shouldn’t limit the ability of others to live their life to the fullest (many of my muslim friends in Britain were shocked by the public laughter debate). It can be recognised however that practices such as the funeral prayer (of which Yaprak gives a heartbreaking personal account) are inherently patriarchal and are deeply in-grained in Islamic life and finding compromises may be difficult.

“ It is easier in certain ways to defend wom-en’s rights here than in some of the other Muslim nations. I wouldn’t say it can be a “model”, because I believe we have a very long way to go regarding women’s libera-

tion, but Turkey does have a long and rich history of women’s rights struggles, so the struggle can actually be a model. The best part of the movement in Turkey is that it has always included elements of race and class, therefore it has always been intersec-tional. From the first seeds planted during Ottoman times and in the early Republic, to the Kurdish women’s incredible fight for emancipation, there is a really rich cultural heritage, that is not “white” and “alien” as western feminism is for the Muslim wom-an. In this sense, the feminist and women’s movements in Turkey are definitely worth studying. As far as the state policies are concerned though, I wouldn’t wish what we have here on my worst enemy”- Myriam I began writing research for this article with the belief that Turkey was a role model for the Islam-ic world; an example that a secular, progressive state can have a Muslim majority and although I have heard much about Turkey’s regression on it’s secularism, I can say as an outsider I see glimmers hope in the views of the people I have corresponded with. It can be said that this article has not maintained jour-nalistic integrity and had a bias towards progressive at-titudes in Turkey. While word limit and time restraints contribute to the one-sidedness, I am of the opinion that self-criticism is far more integral in yielding pos-itive results than self-efficacy. The progressive voice which challenges the patriarchal power structure is sig-nificant in that once a nation or a body, religious or sec-ular, stops being self-critical it quickly descends into a dysfunctional and self-righteous hypocrisy. That being said, the critical voices of Turkish youth are speaking and the world is obliged to listen. •

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I’m an agnostic: I have no idea whether or not there’s a god but

I’m definitely not religi-ous. There are times wit-hin history and countries in the world today where that statement would lead to a death sentence. Thankfully, within the EU, that is not the case; we are protected by Ar-ticle 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which states that, “Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscien-ce and religion.” This is obeyed by all 47 mem-bers of the Council of Europe, thereby inclu-ding not just the EU but also Russia and Turkey. However, the Ar-ticle goes on to clarify that this freedom, “shall be subject only to such limitations as are presc-ribed by law and are ne-cessary in a democratic society.” This freedom is not absolute. For examp-le, the French ban on face covering, including the niqāb, arguably the most prominent case in recent years. This crea-ted controversy across the country and sparked debate around the wor-ld; the law, however, has prevailed. Similarly, in 2004 a law on ‘secularity and conspicuous religi-ous symbols in schools’ was passed, banning the wearing of conspicu-ous religious symbols in

French public schools. Such an issue has yet to arise on the same scale in the UK. Howe-ver, there are distinct differences between the relationship between the church and the state in France and the UK, spe-cifically England. Whe-reas France has the cons-titutional requirement of laïcité - the distinct separation of religious and political activity - England has the Church of England as its official religion, with the Que-en as both the Head of State and the Supreme Governor of the Church of England. Although the majority of this re-lationship is now a mere formality, 26 diocesan bishops have seats in the House of Lords, where they can wield signifi-cant sway when it comes to certain issues. The closeness of the church and the state, therefore, has caused problems of a different nature in Eng-land, most recently with the issue of same-sex marriage. This case illust-rates the importance still given to religious freedom. Here, the go-vernment implemented a ‘quadruple lock’ ensu-re that their position on Article 9 of the ECHR was “utterly beyond dou-bt.” Religious freedom is undoubtedly important. In France, it can come

second to national law, but that which has been put in place for the pro-tection of citizens. In the case of same-sex marri-age in England, though, it is arguably supported by national Canon law: both give the church the final say on the matter. But is it right for this to be the case? Should a religious per-son be denied the cho-ice to marry whomever they want, however they want? Is it right to prote-ct one freedom yet deny another? Article 12 of the ECHR states, “Men and women of marriageab-le age have the right to marry and to found a family, according to the national laws governing the exercise of this ri-ght,” and has therefore been used for the pro-posal of same-sex mar-riages across Europe. However, the 2010 case decided by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) of Schalk and Kopf v Austria clarified that this does not exp-licitly oblige member states to legislate for sa-me-sex marriages. This was partly due to the phrasing of the Article (“men and women”) and the 1950s understanding of marriage. Despite this, though, 10 Euro-pean nations - Belgium, Denmark, France, Ice-land, Luxembourg, Net-

herlands, Norway, Por-tugal, Spain, Sweden and the UK (excluding Nort-hern Ireland) - now le-gally recognise same-sex marriage. In England, du-ring the consultation period and leading up to the legislative phase, the Church of England, as well as the Methodist Church of Great Britain and the Catholic Chur-ch in England and Wa-les, were vocal in their opposition to the pro-posal of same-sex mar-riage. In response to the Government Equalities Office Consultation on Equal Civil Marriage, the Church of England stated that it “cannot support the proposal to enable ‘all couples, re-gardless of their gender, to have a civil marriage ceremony’.” The final law, which came into force on 13 March 2014, legally barred the Chur-ch of England, and the Church of Wales, from conducting same-sex marriages, due to Ca-non law already in pla-ce. It went further: to only include an ‘opt-in’ system for those religi-ous organisations who do wish to conduct sa-me-sex marriages; and to provide protection for religious organisations against legal challenge if they do not want to car-ry out such marriages. •

The relationship between the church and the government across Europe va-ries hugely. Famously, France has explicitly secular government, but elsew-here this is not the case, such as in England. Louis Shankar (UK) argues that the conflict of church and state has lead to contention during the passage of legislation, for example with the Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act in 2013.

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