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1 World Bank | Multi-Donor Trust Fund for Sustainable Logistics (MDTF-SL) CONTRACT NO. 7182655 AGRILOGISTICS – Nigeria Improving Inland Transport Modalities for Vegetables and Food Crops between Production Zones, Urban Conglomerations and Export Hubs Results of the surveys, the living lab workshops and the pilot projects Final Report August 2018 TASTE / Agrofair Technical Assistance for Sustainable Trade & Environment Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized

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    World Bank | Multi-Donor Trust Fund for Sustainable Logistics (MDTF-SL)

    CONTRACT NO. 7182655

    AGRILOGISTICS – Nigeria Improving Inland Transport Modalities for Vegetables and Food Crops between Production

    Zones, Urban Conglomerations and Export Hubs

    Results of the surveys, the living lab workshops and the pilot projects

    Final Report

    August 2018

    TASTE / Agrofair Technical Assistance for Sustainable Trade & Environment

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    Agrofair Benelux B.V. Technical Assistance for Sustainable Trade & Environment (TASTE) Koopliedenweg 10 2991 LN Barendrecht The Netherlands Luud Clercx Project manager E-mail: [email protected] Cell phone: +31 6 460 53 031 SKYPE: luudclercx

    mailto:[email protected]:[email protected]

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    CONTENTS

    SUMMARY ............................................................................................................................................... 7

    1. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................... 9

    2. THE CONTEXT - UPDATE .................................................................................................................. 9

    2.1. Tomato sector policy ................................................................................................................... 9

    2.2. Violence – clashes between Fulani herdsmen and farmers ...................................................... 11

    2.3 Round table discussions tomato sector .................................................................................... 11

    2.3.1. Roundtable discussions crates (GAIN May 11 and May 18, 2017) ........................................ 12

    2.3.2. Kaduna State Stakeholders Forum (21-22 February 2018) ................................................... 13

    2.3.3. Agribusiness summit (27 April 2018) .................................................................................... 13

    2.3.4. Nigeria Tomato Investment Round Table Jigawa State (11 May 2018) ................................ 13

    3. SURVEY AMONG FARMERS, HAULIERS AND TRADERS (PART II, NORTHEN REGION) ................... 14

    3.1. Methodology: Baseline Survey- Northern Region (Kano and Kaduna States) .......................... 14

    3.2 Socio-economic attributes ........................................................................................................ 14

    3.3. Postharvest quality drivers ........................................................................................................ 16

    3.4. Conclusions and recommendations from the survey ............................................................... 18

    4. THIRD MISSION TO NIGERIA (6 – 13 JANUARY) ............................................................................. 20

    5. SECOND LIVING LAB WORKSHOP .................................................................................................. 21

    5.1. Agenda ....................................................................................................................................... 21

    5.2. Expectations .............................................................................................................................. 22

    5.3. Mapping of value chains ........................................................................................................... 23

    5.4. Identification of bottlenecks, causes of losses and possible solutions ..................................... 23

    5.5. Proposed projects ..................................................................................................................... 23

    6. PROPOSED PILOT PROJECTS / KICK-OFF WORKSHOP THE NORTH 12 – 16 FEBRUARY ................. 25

    6.1. Agenda kick-off workshop, 13 – 14 of February 2018 .............................................................. 25

    6.2. Pilot project 1: use of plastic crates .......................................................................................... 26

    6.3. Pilot project 2: raised platforms for improved sun-dying of tomatoes .................................... 27

    7. FEEDBACK WORKSHOPS ON THE PILOT PROJECTS IN THE SOUTH-WEST AND THE NORTH ......... 28

    7.1. Feedback workshop pilot projects South-East, IITA, Ibadan, 13 of January ............................. 28

    7.1.1. Agenda ................................................................................................................................... 28

    7.1.2. Group work: comparison plastic crates and raffia baskets ................................................... 29

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    7.1.3. Results of the trial ................................................................................................................. 29

    7.1.4. Towards a business model for the introduction of plastic crates ......................................... 32

    7.1.5. Meeting with enumerators ................................................................................................... 33

    7.2 Feedback workshop pilot projects North, Tahir Guest Palace, 23 of April ............................... 33

    7.2.1. Agenda ................................................................................................................................... 33

    7.2.2. Comparison plastic crates - raffia baskets / drying tables and drying on the ground .......... 34

    Pilot project plastic crates ..................................................................................................................... 34

    Pilot project raised platforms for improved sun-drying ........................................................................ 34

    7.2.3. Results of the trials ................................................................................................................ 35

    Pilot project plastic crates ..................................................................................................................... 35

    Pilot project raised platforms for improved sun-drying ........................................................................ 37

    7.2.4. Towards a business model for the introduction of plastic crates ......................................... 38

    7.2.5. Towards scaling up of improved dried platforms ................................................................. 39

    7.3 Crates – in search for a business model .................................................................................... 40

    7.4. Towards improved sun-drying of tomatoes .............................................................................. 42

    8. FOURTH MISSION TO NIGERIA (21 – 28 APRIL 2018) .................................................................... 43

    8.1. Consultation of development organizations ............................................................................. 43

    8.2. Video production ....................................................................................................................... 44

    9. PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS ........................................................................................................ 45

    9.1. Post-harvest losses and the tomato sector and upscaling proven innovations ........................ 45

    9.2. The living lab methodology as tool for improvement of value chains ...................................... 45

    10. IMMEDIATE OBJECTIVES AND PROJECT RESULTS ..................................................................... 46

    11. PROSPECTS – NEXT STEPS ......................................................................................................... 46

    OVERVIEW OF ANNEXES........................................................................................................................ 48

    ANNEX 1 ................................................................................................................................................ 48

    Questionnaires used and combined survey report ............................................................................... 48

    ANNEX 2 ................................................................................................................................................ 48

    Workshop presentations and worksheets ............................................................................................ 48

    ANNEX 2.4 ............................................................................................................................................. 50

    Baseline validation questions, after presentation of survey results, 8 – 9 January 2018, Kano ........... 50

    ANNEX 2.5 ............................................................................................................................................. 52

    Examples of worksheets used (a complete set of all sheets is in the DROPBOX), Kano ....................... 52

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    ANNEX 2.6 ............................................................................................................................................. 56

    Main bottlenecks in the tomato value chain, 8 – 9 January 2018, Kano .............................................. 56

    ANNEX 2.7 ............................................................................................................................................. 60

    Bottlenecks, solutions, proposed pilot projects, 8 – 9 January 2018, Kano.......................................... 60

    ANNEX 2.8 ............................................................................................................................................. 63

    Priority projects and second best projects of the round tables, 8 – 9 January 2018, Kano .................. 63

    ANNEX 2.9 ............................................................................................................................................. 70

    Summary of evaluation of the workshop, 8 – 9 January 2018, Kano .................................................... 70

    ANNEX 2.10 ........................................................................................................................................... 71

    Measurement tool introduction of plastic crates, kick-off workshop, 12 – 14 February 2018, Kano .. 71

    ANNEX 2.16 ........................................................................................................................................... 76

    Comparison Raffia baskets vs Plastic crates for 5 value chains, South-East, workshop 13 January ..... 76

    ANNEX 2.17 ........................................................................................................................................... 91

    Comparison Raffia baskets vs Plastic crates for 3 value chains, North, workshop 23 of April 2018 .... 91

    ANNEX 2.18 ......................................................................................................................................... 101

    Comparison Raffia baskets vs Plastic crates for 8 value chains, summary sheet................................ 101

    ANNEX 2.19 ......................................................................................................................................... 103

    Comparison sun-drying on the ground versus sun-drying on raised platforms, 23 April, Kano ......... 103

    ANNEX 2.20 ......................................................................................................................................... 105

    Elements for a business model, South West, workshop 13 of January 2018, Ibadan ........................ 105

    ANNEX 2.21 ......................................................................................................................................... 107

    Elements for a business model, North, workshop 23 of April 2018, Kano ......................................... 107

    ANNEX 2.22 ......................................................................................................................................... 108

    Elements for a business plan for improved sun-drying of tomatoes on raised platforms .................. 108

    ANNEX 2.23 ......................................................................................................................................... 109

    Structure and cost price structure across the tomato value chain (Coffey International, 2013) ....... 109

    Annex 2.23 A – Tomato Value Chain ................................................................................................... 109

    Annex 2.23 B – Comparison of Supply Chain Trading ......................................................................... 110

    Annex 2.23 C. - Cost price structure across the value chain (See also Excel file)................................ 111

    ANNEX 2.24 ......................................................................................................................................... 113

    Business model crates ......................................................................................................................... 113

    ANNEX 3 .............................................................................................................................................. 116

    Overview of activities and meetings ................................................................................................... 116

    ANNEX 4 .............................................................................................................................................. 121

    Overview workshops ........................................................................................................................... 121

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    ANNEX 5 .............................................................................................................................................. 122

    References (updated) .......................................................................................................................... 122

    ANNEX 6 .............................................................................................................................................. 134

    Abbreviations ...................................................................................................................................... 134

    ANNEX 7 .............................................................................................................................................. 137

    Abstract presented to the IHC Congress. Istanbul .............................................................................. 137

    ANNEX 8 .............................................................................................................................................. 138

    Presentation keynote speaker Agribusiness & Food summit, 27 of April 2018, Lagos ....................... 138

    ANNEX 9 .............................................................................................................................................. 139

    Logical framework: overview .............................................................................................................. 139

    A. Immediate objective 1 ................................................................................................................... 139

    B. Immediate objective 2 .................................................................................................................... 140

    C. Immediate objective 3 .................................................................................................................... 141

    D. Immediate objective 4 ................................................................................................................... 142

    E. Immediate objective 5 .................................................................................................................... 143

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    SUMMARY This is the final report of the research project “AGRILOGISTICS – Nigeria. Improving Inland Transport Modalities for Vegetables and Food Crops between Production Zones, Urban Conglomerations and Export Hubs”, financed by the Multi-Donor Trust Fund for Sustainable Logistics (MDTF-SL), administrated by the World Bank. Officially, the project started in April 2017, with the signature of the contract between the World Bank and Agrofair Benelux B.V. In December, a budget neutral contract extension was granted, until August 30, 2018. The first task was to complete the project team. The initial team (formed when the concept note was submitted in May 2015), with Luud Clercx (Agrofair, team leader) and Mrs. Eruore Peace Quadt (of the consultancy firm “Netherlands - Nigeria Solutions”), Nigerian, resident of the Netherlands, ex-employee of the Business Department of the Netherlands Embassy in Abuja, with an extensive network in Nigeria, was completed with Mr. Milindi Sibomana (PhD), agricultural value chain researcher from Rwanda, with Mr. Emmanuel Akinwekomi, Nigerian consultant with a lot of experience in extension work with small farmers in Nigeria, and with Mr. Frits Blessing, logistics expert, with practical experience in applying the “living lab” methodology. Contact was also established with a research group from Wageningen University & Research (WUR), which in practice resulted in close collaboration and joint implementation of workshops in Nigeria. Mr. Emmanuel Akinwekomi was contracted on full time basis via the IFDC, which provided for an “institutional anchor” in Nigeria. As was outlined in the project proposal (submitted in December 2015), the main research theme would be centred to the participatory investigation of causes of the enormous post-harvest losses in the tomato value chain in Nigeria, and work out possible solutions. To that effect, review of literature took place, and key informants and players were interviewed during the four field missions of the project team and numerous SKYPE conferences. The main findings were laid down in the Inception Report (June 2017) and updated in the Progress Report (December 2017) and the present Final Report (August 2018). Also a video documentary was made. In the field in Nigeria, a so-called “living lab” methodology was applied, a participatory approach in which the stakeholders of the tomato value chain, farmers, transporters and traders with different interests, were put together to map the value chains, to analyse the causes of post-harvest losses, to propose solutions, and work together in the implementation and evaluation of pilot projects These sessions took place in the South-West and the North; the results of two surveys among tomato farmers, transporters and traders in these regions were input for the discussions in the first workshops. In the pilot projects two innovations were tested: the introduction of returnable plastic crates to pack and transport the tomatoes, and the use of raised platforms for improved sun-drying of tomatoes. Both innovations had a positive effect on the reduction of post-harvest losses, and were widely accepted and welcomed by different stakeholders. The testing of plastic crates and raised platforms in Nigeria is not new, and the results confirmed and the outcome of previous tests. What has been new is the living lab participatory approach, in which stakeholders with different interests were able to analyse the advantages from the viewpoint of their particular interests.

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    The fact that the plastic crates and raised platforms were accepted and welcomed as considerable improvements, increases the viability of these innovations. However, the implementation of a feasible business model, especially for the introduction of plastic crates, remains a huge challenge, due to the highly fragmented character of the tomato value chain (small farmers, small wholesalers, small transporters, small retailers) and the weak integration and lack of strong organisations of farmers, transporters or traders. There are no economies of scale and commitment within the chains are weak. These are exactly the ingredients that are needed for the introduction and circulation of crates. Unlike the beer industry for example (where the use of plastic returnable crates is normal practice), there is no central organizing player in the chain. There are no strong associations of farmers, traders or transporters that could assume a similar role in the tomato value chains. Therefore, the alternative of third-party solutions is on the table: service companies that buy a huge quantity of crates and lease or rent them to farmers or traders. Specific business models for such solutions should be worked out for different regions and circumstances, and financial instruments, market promotion, regulation by market authorities, supportive policies by State and Federal Governments and capacity building are needed to create a good environment for the introduction of crates at massive scale. Sooner or later, this will happen. The use of plastic crates is the normal practice all over the world in value chains of fresh fruit and vegetables. We hope that our research project will has been a modest contribution to a more sustainable tomato value chain with less losses in Nigeria. By this means, we would like to thank stakeholders, farmers, transporters and traders for their enthusiast participation in this project, and the World Bank for their confidence and funding. Barendrecht, The Netherlands August 27, 2018 The research team Milindi Sibomana Eruore Peace Quadt Frits Blessing Emmanuel Akinwekomi Hans Willem van der Waal Luud Clercx

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    1. INTRODUCTION This is the second progress report and final report combined of the research project on tomato losses in Nigeria. It should be read as the third part of the reports. The inception report (June 2017) In the inception report we presented an overview of the context in which the post-harvest losses take place: the macro-economic developments and policies, changing market structures, sector policies, initiatives in the tomato sector from development organisations, structural factors affecting productivity, and some specific factors: drought, conflict, pests (Tuta absoluta). Also some concepts related to food security, food losses and sustainability were presented: the main determinants and causes of food losses, the importance of well-functioning urban wholesale markets, the interconnectedness of agri-food chains and networks due to globalisation. In the inception report the main research questions and a logical framework were formulated, with immediate objectives, expected results / outcomes and activities / outputs. The first progress report (December 2017) In the first progress report, a description was given of the main activities carried out between July – December: the results of a first exploring mission to Nigeria by the project team; an explanation and results of the survey in the South-West among 48 farmers, 44 hauliers and 48 traders; the exploring mission to the North, 29 – 31 of October, and a report on the first living lab workshop in Ibadan, 2 – 3 November. An overview was presented of the implementation of the survey in the North, among 158 farmers, 89 hauliers and 109 traders; and the kick-off workshop for the pilot projects, 8 – 9 December: mainly oriented at the introduction of plastic returnable crates in 5 supply chains. The present report (June / August 2018) In the present report, an overview will be presented of the results of the survey in the North, the living lab workshop in the North, the results of both pilot projects in the South-West and North. We also will present an update on the tomato policy of the Government of Nigeria (launched in May 2017). By way of conclusion, some scenarios for feasible business models for the introduction of plastic returnable crates will be worked out, product of the discussions in the feedback workshops in the South-West and North which took place on January 13 and April 23, respectively, and in meetings with development organisations, government and private sector companies in Abuja, Lagos and Kano, during the third mission (January 6-14) and fourth mission (April 21 – 28). 2. THE CONTEXT - UPDATE 2.1. Tomato sector policy On 11 of April 2017, the Federal Ministry of Industry, Trade and Investment (FMITI) announced the development of a new tomato sector policy. (Olanite 2017; Edeh 2017a, 2017b; AETS Consortium 2018). In 2016, the tomato sector in Nigeria was severely hit by the Tuta absoluta pest 1, which dramatically affected the availability of fresh tomatoes on the market. Importers lobbied with success with the

    1 Tuta absoluta is a species of moth known by the common name tomato leafminer. The larva feeds voraciously upon tomato plants, producing large galleries in leaves, burrowing in stalks, and consuming apical buds and green and ripe fruits. It is capable of causing a yield loss of 100%. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tuta_absoluta

    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tuta_absoluta

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    government to make foreign exchange available for the massive import of tomato paste and tomato paste concentrates, backed by labour union officials. Due to a shortage of raw material for the tomato processing industry, and lack of national production and storage capacity (in terms of quantity and quality), they feared closing of processing factories and loss of jobs. (Businessday Online editor, 2016). This situation continued in 2017, although tomato supplies were better, with less incidence of the Tuta absoluta. (Sunday et al., 2018). The objectives of this sector policy reform in April 2017 were the import substitution of tomato paste, to stimulate investments in the national tomato processing industry and create employment, and contribute to the reduction of the huge post-harvest losses (especially in the glut period when there is an oversupply of tomatoes). Each year, 150.000 MT of tomato paste are imported, valued at US$ 170 million, more than double the amount of 5 years ago (Sunday et al., 2018). Current demand for fresh tomatoes is 2.45 million MT, and the country produces 1.8 million MT of which 40% is lost due to poor post-harvest handling and transport (Edeh 2017a, 2017b; Okojie, 2017a). The proposed instruments for policy implementation were a combination of price policy and extension services by the government to the tomato sector. The policy was applauded by stakeholders (Okejie, 2017a, 2017b) but also met scepticism (Oroho 2017; Nwafo 2017; NAN 2017). It was argued that complementary policies were needed to support farmers to increase their productivity and with accessible financial services, with low interest rates (Okojie 2017b). The main measures of the new tomato sector policy comprise the following, amongst others (AETS Consulting, 2018): ▪ The classification of greenhouse equipment as agricultural equipment in order to eliminate import

    duty ▪ Cessation of the import of tomato paste, powder and concentrate for retail sale, and of tomatoes

    preserved in vinegar or acetic acid ▪ An increase in the tariff on tomato triple concentrate from 5 to 50%, with an additional levy of USD

    1,500 per metric tonne ▪ Restriction of the import of tomato concentrate to sea ports, with the aim of addressing the

    current abuse of the ECOWAS Trade Liberalisation Scheme (ETLS); ▪ Introduction of a zero-rate tariff (for both customs and excise duty and VAT) on the import of

    equipment for the production of tomato concentrate ▪ A 3-year tax holiday for investors in tomato-processing plants using fresh fruit to produce paste in

    Nigeria ▪ Removal of the current monopoly on agricultural insurance enjoyed by the Nigeria Agricultural

    Insurance Corporation (NAIC) to allow private sector players into the market ▪ Development of good agricultural practices (GAPs) to be followed in Nigeria in order to guide both

    increase yields and bring production into line with international standards ▪ The institutional provision of credit support to all tomato farmers ▪ Establishment of an inter-professional forum comprising input dealers, Government agencies,

    processors and packers, farmers’ associations, banks and donor agencies for regular dialogue on the entire tomato chain

    ▪ The inclusion of tomato production and processing in the list of industries eligible for investment incentives administered by the Nigeria Investment Promotion Commission (NIPC)

    The policy measures were implemented at a moment when there was still an considerable supply gap during certain periods of the year, exacerbated by the 40% - 50% post-harvest losses. It would take time to achieve sufficiency in production. In this vision, the greenhouses would take care of the year round production of fresh tomatoes for the urban conglomerations (such as Lagos), with higher yields

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    and better control of pests and diseases, and the open field production in the North would be for industrial processing (Ojewale and Baily, 2018; Okojie 2018). Triple concentrate tomato paste is not the same as finished tomato paste (with massive imports from China, in 2014 alone US$ 170 million, affecting local processors), but is a raw material that is of added value to the local tomato paste industry. The NASCON factory in Kano (Dangote), the only manufacturer of tomato paste concentrate in Nigeria is paralyzed, because the supply to the factory is not functioning (Nwafo 2017, Okejie 2018) 2. Therefore, representatives of the processing industry and watchers of the tomato industry argue for a step-wise implementation, to be able to organize and invest in local supply and processing (Oroho, 2017; Nwafo, 2017). A tariff barrier was considered counterproductive and premature. (Nwafo, 2017). The tomato policy was also frustrated since importers of tomato paste anticipated the measures by importing large quantities of tomato paste before the policies were announced, according to several stakeholders. (NAN, 2017). Furthermore, eight months after the announcement of the policy, the abolition of import duties on greenhouses had not taken effect at customs level, due to the lack of an appropriate HS custom code for greenhouses (Ojewale and Baily 2018; Okojie 2018; Ojewale 2018a; Ojewale 2018b). So it remains to be seen to which extent the federal policy will be effective as instrument to improve the perspectives of the tomato sector. 2.2. Violence – clashes between Fulani herdsmen and farmers The past year saw increasing violence and armed clashes between herdsmen and farmers, especially in what is called the “middle belt” , but also in tomato producing states as Kaduna. The attacks caused hundreds of deaths, tens of thousands of internally displaced persons and is affecting food security (Ihembe, 2018). Structural solutions are far away, such as the creation of corridors for cattle movement, electronic registration of cattle , creation of special grazing areas and ranches, and massive planting of high-yielding cutting grass (such as napier grass, also known as giant king grass or elephant grass (Pennisetum purpureum)), which would put an end to the nomadic way of life and open grazing practiced by the Fulani herdsmen. The degradation of natural resources and climate change are among the underlying causes of the insecurity in the countryside (Agbola 2018). In the press, the lack of capacity of the government to put an end to the violence is heavily criticised. The crisis -which does not date back to yesterday but has continued for many years- is also symptomatic for the structural lack of attention for cumulative problems and challenges in the agricultural sector, the main source of employment for Nigerians. 2.3 Round table discussions tomato sector During the past year, several roundtable discussions took place to discuss the perspectives of post-harvest loss reduction and investments in the tomato sector.

    2 The project team visited the plant in November 2017 and talked with the Manager, Mr. Kaita. Indeed the shortage of supply by small producers was the main problem, and the factory was not functioning. Therefore, DANGOTE was thinking of planting tomatoes on own farms. A daily supply of 30 to 40 trailers of 30 MT is needed, sourced from small producers (1200 MT) to operate the plant at full capacity. At this moment this is impossible due to a combination of lack of organisation of the supply and the fluctuating prices on the fresh tomato market; farmers prefer to bet on this market.

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    2.3.1. Roundtable discussions crates (GAIN May 11 and May 18, 2017) On May 11 2017, the Global Alliance for Improved Nutrition (GAIN) organized an expert workshop, followed by a multi-stakeholder workshop, May 18, 2017, to discuss the concept for commercializing the use of Reusable or Returnable Plastic Crates (RPCs) as packing method to reduce post-harvest losses in the tomato value chains, with representatives from the federal and state governments, development organisations, traders, researchers, crate manufacturing companies, private sector agribusinesses and banks. The use of proper crating (instead of raffia baskets) was identified as one of the most appropriate and proven solutions to reduce postharvest loss of perishable fresh fruits and vegetables in Nigeria. (GAIN, 2017a). The participants in both workshops explored workable models, trade-offs and incentives for lending, leasing and owning crates, to promote adoption of the crate at a wide scale. (GAIN 2017a, 2017b). The following were the most important recommendations of the expert workshop (GAIN 2017a): ▪ Cleaning of the crates before re-use is essential to conserve the quality of the tomato. ▪ Rigid stackable and nestable crates are preferable for long hauls – empty collapsible crates occupy

    less space but are fragile. ▪ Crate adoption rates increase when farmers and other stakeholders have a clear understanding of

    the benefits of crate usage, and when crates are readily available; continuous awareness raising is needed.

    ▪ Training is needed on how to pack, handle, store and clean the crates. ▪ A closed supply chain network is the best option for a crating business model, that is, when all

    supply chain actors use the crates continually to pack, load and transport to their buyer and then the buyer is able to return crates back to farmer.

    ▪ It is most efficient when farmers have a 2-3 times as many crates on farm as generally two thirds of the crates will be in transit and/or at the market.

    ▪ The greatest challenge to crate adoption is the availability of crates and the upfront costs of purchasing crates.

    The main recommendations of the multi-stakeholder seminar can be summarized as follows (GAIN 2017b): ▪ There is a business case for the use of returnable plastic crates and for investment in a crate leasing

    business; however a proper cost-benefit analysis needs to be conducted and disseminated to stakeholders to show the value in switching to crates.

    ▪ A workable business model in crate leasing business is required to attract investment funding. ▪ Financial institutions should work with relevant stakeholders to ensure access to funding for the

    purchase of crates for use and as a leasing / renting business. ▪ The Lagos State Government should ensure that markets are adequately and timely sensitized

    (especially Mile 12) prior to the introduction of legislation on the crating policy for handling fresh fruits and vegetables.

    ▪ The Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (FMARD) and the Standards Organization of Nigeria (SON) should actively collaborate with other regulatory agencies to ensure the standardization of crates recommended for use, and ensure adherence to food safety practices for handling fresh fruits and vegetables.

    Different business models were discussed: crates owned or leased by farmers or dealers; or owned, leased or rented by a third party.

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    These options were also discussed in the feedback workshops in the South-West (January 13) and North (April 23); further elaboration in Section 7.3 of this report. 2.3.2. Kaduna State Stakeholders Forum (21-22 February 2018) On the Kaduna State Stakeholders Forum, 21 – 22 February 2018, hosted by the Government of Kaduna, one of the biggest tomato producing states in Nigeria, a National Stakeholders Committee for Governance, Promotion and Regulation of Tomato Sector in Nigeria was formed, with several sub-commissions and a shared agenda (Oluwo, 2018): ▪ Stabilize farmgate prices across the country ▪ Promote continuous awareness ▪ Advocate for the implementation and reinforcement of the tomato sector policy of the Federal

    Government (see Section 2.1 of this report) ▪ Strengthen the adoption of good handling pre- and post-harvest practices, such as the introduction

    of plastic crates ▪ Promote investments in fresh produce logistics and storage Emmanuel Akinwekomi of IFDC, member of the research team, also attended this meeting. It is unclear how follow-up will be given to the commitments and agreements. 2.3.3. Agribusiness summit (27 April 2018) On April 27, a one-day Agribusiness summit was organized by the magazine BusinessDay online, with financial support from the Netherlands Embassy. The reduction of post-harvest losses was one of the themes of the summit, highlighted in a keynote address (van der Waal, 2018, see Annex 8). On the summit, the need for investment in the logistics and cold chain was emphasised; and several speakers advocated for a stronger role and appropriate policies of the financial institutions to support the agricultural sector, heavily affected by structural underinvestment. 2.3.4. Nigeria Tomato Investment Round Table Jigawa State (11 May 2018) Together with TECHNCOSERVE, the government of Jigawa State organized a round table conference with stakeholders of the tomato industry in May 2018 in Dutse, capital of the state. The challenge of the post-harvest reduction and need to invest in improved tomato distribution chains and processing plants, were the central themes of discussion. The audience called on the government to boost public investment in infrastructure to improve access of farmer to the markets. For the private sector (domestic and foreign), several investment opportunities were listed: (1) The growing market (including ECOWAS, 340 million people); (2) Filing the output gaps with improved domestic production (now covered by imports of tomato paste); (3) Improve efficiency in production and reduce post-harvest waste of 45%; (4) Add value by processing (paste, drying, canning, grinding); (5) Invest in infrastructure and distribution (plastic crates, cold storage, collection centres and pack house facilities); and (6) Financial services (leasing, loans). (Sagagi, 2018).

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    The following dimensions were mentioned as main challenges: the lack of competitiveness and low productivity of the current sectors (agriculture and processing); poor infrastructure, non-reliable power grid and electricity; and the difficult access to finance. 2.3.5. Concluding remarks Several “tomato state” governments took initiatives (Kano, Kaduna, Jigawa), together with representatives of the private sector (often organized in the NABG or NCDA), several financial institutions and NGOs or development organisations engaged in the tomato value chain (such as GAIN, IFDC, PYXERA and GEMS4) to explore pathways to reduce post-harvest losses. The introduction of plastic crates, investment in tomato processing plants and improvement of infrastructure are recurrent recommendations. As main unsolved challenges, the following are frequently mentioned: (1) the introduction of appropriate business models for the introduction of plastic crates, for investment in the cold chain and post-harvest handling in the highly fragmented tomato sector; (2) the difficulties in organizing farmers, traders or transporters; (3) the structural underinvestment in public infrastructure (roads, rail); and (4) the lack of access to finance for agribusinesses and small farmers due to high interest rates and other barriers. 3. SURVEY AMONG FARMERS, HAULIERS AND TRADERS (PART II, NORTHEN REGION) 3.1. Methodology: Baseline Survey- Northern Region (Kano and Kaduna States: December, 2017) In December 2017 a baseline survey was conducted with value chain actors operating in the states of Kano and Kaduna. The actors included tomato producers, hauliers and traders. The data collection was carried out in Kano and Kaduna, however some of the surveyed participants, mainly hauliers, also had operational bases in Benue, Enugu, Gombe and Plateau. The survey questionnaire and data storage tool was designed by the core project team, while on-ground execution was performed by a team of enumerators from IFDC. Data analysis was performed using SPSS 16.0 statistical software and involved trends analysis, frequency measures and mean determinations including standard errors. The main markets in the area were the Badume market, Dutse-Wei, KGTM and YanKaba, with Mile 12 in Lagos also serving as a major end market for the Northern tomato supply chain. The outcome of the baseline survey was validated in a follow-up workshop with the value chain actors, held in Kano (January 2018, details see Section 5 of this report). The aim of the survey was to capture a snapshot of the current state of this particular value chain and to identify gaps in the chain which can then lead to adoptable interventions for reducing postharvest losses in the tomato value chain. For an extensive report on both surveys, see Annex 1.4. 3.2 Socio-economic attributes Similar to the survey in the South-West of the country, this survey involved detailed engagement with producers, transporters and traders involved in the tomato industry with production in the states of Kano and Kaduna. 151 tomato farmers, 89 transporters and 109 traders were engaged in this survey. The farmers and traders were based in Kano and Kaduna state, while the transporters also had bases

  • 15

    in Gombe, Plateau, Benue and Enugu. Some of the socio-economic attributes of the participants are presented in Tables 1 - 3. The results of the baseline survey show that, contrary to the South-West which had 85% of interviewed farmers as male, 100% of farmers interviewed in Kano and Kaduna were male. Transporters were all male which was somewhat expected, while only one female trader (0.9%) was interviewed in this Northern region survey, which contrasted starkly with the 45% of female traders interviewed during the South-West survey. Overall, the cultural context in the North was found to differ with observations in the South-West, showing that the primary decision makers, among participants surveyed in Kano and Kaduna, for value chain activities were male. The majority of participants were educated under the Arabic school system. Table 1. Tomato producers

    Variable Sub-type %

    Gender Male 100

    Female 0

    Education

    Primary school incomplete 8.6

    Primary school complete 22.5

    Secondary school incomplete 13.2

    Secondary school complete 21.2

    Higher education 4.0

    Arabic school 71.5

    Producer Association Member 63.6

    Non-member 36.4

    Age

    18-35 years 39.7

    36-50 years 39.1

    >50 years 21.2

    Tomato Growing Experience

    3-9 years 13.4

    10-20 years 53

    >20 years 33.6

    State Kaduna 35.8

    Kano 64.2

    N = 151

    Table 2. Tomato transporters

    Variable Sub-type %

    Gender Male 100

    Female 0

    Education

    Primary school incomplete 9.0

    Primary school complete 19.1

    Secondary school incomplete 9.0

    Secondary school complete 34.8

    Arabic school 44.9

    Higher education 10.1

    Truck ownership Owns the truck 23.9

    Driver for individual/company 76.1

    Transporter Association Member 60.5

    Non-member 39.5

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    Table 3. Tomato traders

    Variable Sub-type %

    Gender Male 99.1

    Female 0.9

    Education

    Primary school incomplete 6.4

    Primary school complete 19.3

    Secondary school incomplete 7.3

    Secondary school complete 17.4

    Higher education 11.0

    Arabic school 74.3

    Trader Association Member 76.9

    Non-member 23.1

    Age

    18-35 37.4

    36-50 38.3

    >50 24.3

    State Kaduna 25.7

    Kano 74.3

    N= 109

    3.3. Postharvest quality drivers Overall, the main factor influencing low postharvest shelf-life in the Northern survey was similar to what was observed in the South and this is that there is limited infrastructure for postharvest treatment of tomatoes. Farmers in both regions also mentioned unsuitable varieties, with limited shelf-life capacity as one of the challenges. Figure 1 depicts the challenges affecting tomato shelf-life as perceived by producers and traders as well as factors influencing poor efficiency in the transport of tomato from the North of Nigeria.

    Age

    20-30 years 36.4

    31-50 years 60.2

    > 50 years 3.4

    State

    Benue 3.4

    Enugu 1.1

    Gombe 1.1

    Kaduna 28.1

    Kano 65.2

    Plateau 1.1

    N= 89

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    Figure 1. Factors influencing postharvest losses as mentioned by producers, hauliers and traders. Poor varieties and inadequate transport were also considered as the major factors influencing shelf-life according to traders surveyed. Poor roads and roadblocks were also expressed as limiting factors to efficient transport of tomatoes. From observing the challenges mentioned by the different actors it is apparent that poor transportation and unsuitable varieties were common themes that came out in the data.

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    Other factors mentioned by farmers included: ▪ Diseases e.g. jushi ▪ Lack of funding for setting up infrastructure ▪ Market instability, price instability ▪ Pest infestation ▪ Lack of ready market at time of harvest Additionally, traders also mentioned: ▪ Exposure to sunlight ▪ Warm temperatures during the postharvest period ▪ Pests and diseases ▪ Glut ▪ Poor market conditions ▪ Excess rotting due to high rainfall Finally, when hauliers responded “other”, they mentioned: ▪ Security challenges including armed robbery ▪ Challenges with law enforcement agencies i.e. task force 3.4. Conclusions and recommendations from the survey The data collected during this study show that there are similarities and differences between the tomato value chains in the Northern and Southern regions of the country. As captured during the survey in the North, a substantial portion of the harvest in the North is destined for Southern markets. This was noted in conversations with farmers, hauliers and traders in the Kano and Kaduna areas. This further confirms the work done by van der Waal (2015), which discusses a high dependence on tomatoes from the Northern provinces, while discussion with value chain stakeholders in the Lagos and Oyo areas also revealed importation of tomatoes from the republic of Benin and Cameroon. Such long distances to market, with current transport and handling infrastructure, further promote tomato damage in-transit and contribute to high post-harvest losses between field/collection centre and market. Furthermore due to production fluctuations, in the Kano and Kaduna regions, the survey revealed glut and scarcity periods as a significant driver of profitability and consequently yield loss. In these areas where a 60 kg basket of tomatoes fluctuated in price from an average of US$ 4 during the glut period to US$ 41 during the scarcity period (with extremes reported of close to US$ 100 per basket in the scarcity period), during the glut period some farmers mentioned that they would leave the crop to rot in the field because it was not profitable to incur harvest costs. In Lagos and Oyo, this fluctuation was noted but was not as extreme as in the Northern region, with an average of US$ 16.50 for a 45 kg basket during the glut and US$ 47.90 for the same basket in the scarcity period. Furthermore, pest and disease control was noted as an area for improving production quantity and fruit quality at harvest. Improvements at both the pre- and postharvest levels are therefore critical. The farmers surveyed made their own recommendations on what should be done to reduce postharvest losses of tomato in the chain. These recommendations are presented in the table below:

    Farmer mentioned recommendations to reduce postharvest losses of tomatoes in the value chain:

    Stage Suggested Solutions

    Pre-harvest To improve yield ▪ Loans for production inputs ▪ Good management practices

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    ▪ Access to fertilizers at subsidized rates ▪ Access to pesticides at subsidized rates ▪ Government intervention for training ▪ Access to agricultural machinery at low cost

    Post-harvest ▪ Construction of farm packhouses ▪ Better handling e.g. smaller volume to reduce damage to tomatoes ▪ Companies to buy excess produce at a reasonable price ▪ Guaranteed market ▪ Availability of cold storage facilities

    The main interventions noted, based on the survey are presented below: ▪ Improved seed variety, suitable for the agro-climatic conditions in the area, with appropriate shelf-

    life characteristics is needed. Previous interactions with farmers around Lagos revealed that they purchased bulk seed and fertilizer from agro-dealers without knowledge of the seed characteristics (e.g. maturity period, shelf-life traits etc.), or appropriate application rates for fertilizer resulting in poor production which influences profitability. Practically, farmers should be encouraged to:

    - Establish on-farm demonstration plots before purchasing seed in bulk is suggested to identify

    the suitable variety for their agro-climatic conditions.

    - Establish on-farm demonstration plots evaluating different fertilizer application rates, before

    using on their entire field.

    - Perform soil testing, to determine their particular soil condition, and use this data in

    collaboration with their local agro-dealers to determine appropriate fertilizer rates for their

    tomato production.

    ▪ Actors involved in provision of technical support to farmers are encouraged to deliver improved

    extension services, with information and training on fertilizer use and irrigation scheduling.

    ▪ Improved harvest timing. Harvesting at later ripening stage is possible if the distance (and

    transport) to market is not a major challenge. Since the survey showed that market demand is

    higher for red tomatoes, so harvesting at a later ripening stage e.g. light red, would result in

    tomatoes arriving on the shelf at this preferred ripening condition, with a shorter distance to the

    major national market, the risk of in-transit damage and general spoilage is lower hence riper fruit

    can be transported.

    ▪ Improved postharvest handling; from in-field harvesting to loading and offloading. Use of

    improved packaging materials to buffer the effect of poor road infrastructure. With the Lagos state

    government seeking to pass a bill on the mandatory use of plastic crates for the transportation of

    fresh produce within Lagos, it is imperative that the operational contexts of the value chain actors

    (e.g. in the tomato value chain) are taken into consideration, to enable adoption of the improved

    packaging, these include:

    - Use of appropriate size containers to prevent overloading of produce e.g. offering a variety of

    crate sizes to fit different volume needs across the chain.

    - Use appropriate plastic crates with sufficient ventilation slits.

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    ▪ Additionally, as noted from previous engagements with value chain actors in Nigeria, this study

    showed that the hauliers played no major role in packaging of tomatoes, with only 20% claiming

    involvement in re-packaging during the haulage operation. Ownership of packaging therefore rests

    with the producers and traders and these should be the target for packaging interventions such as

    crates.

    ▪ Improved logistics schedule for delivering tomatoes in non-refrigerated vehicles e.g. harvesting in

    the late afternoon and transporting in the evening to take advantage of ambient cool conditions.

    This practice already has some adoption in Nigeria, therefore motivating for further adoption, with

    increased road security at night and better road infrastructure, fresh produce logistics can be

    significantly improved.

    ▪ Better quality control of chemicals for insect management in the field, to avoid use of adulterated

    chemicals.

    ▪ Better production scheduling to mitigate effect of glut.

    ▪ Better variety selection and coordination with processing plants, so that farmers are able to sell to

    both fresh market and processing industry.

    ▪ Provision of postharvest infrastructure such as evaporative cooling chambers for farmers to be

    able to harvest earlier and hold inventory on the farm to avoid selling at the low glut prices. If this

    chamber was at the market it could also facilitate since traders can offer farmers a fair price and

    sell at a profit when supply is low. With EC technology, farmers could harvest at the breaker stage

    and store fruit for at least 2 weeks before the fruit turns fully red, which is the market preference.

    For the questionnaires used, and a combined survey report (the surveys from the South-West and the North), see Annex 1.1 – Annex 1.4. 4. THIRD MISSION TO NIGERIA (6 – 13 JANUARY) A third mission was organized between 6 and 13 January, during which the second living lab workshop took place (8 – 9 January, Kano) and the first feedback workshop on the pilot project in the South-West (13 January, Ibadan). (See sections below). In between these workshops, meetings took place with the president of the Cold Chain Development Association, plant managers of two manufacturers of plastic crates (SHONGAI and CELPLAS), with several representatives of the Nigeria Agribusiness Group (NABG, Best Foods, Naija Pride) and with the director operations of the Nigeria Railway Corporation (NRC). Main findings: cold chain, transport by rail, production of plastic crates ▪ Investments in the cold chain and cooling trucks are mainly done in the chains of poultry and

    fish, in urbanized regions, not yet in fresh fruit and vegetables. Demand from supermarkets for cooled products is the main driver behind the cold chains.

    ▪ A trial of cooled transport of tomatoes by the NABG resulted in good quality tomatoes, but also in costs that are too high. The distance to the farms and road conditions do not allow for starting cooled transport from the farmgate; cold stores at aggregation points are needed.

    ▪ Cooled transport can be problematic due to inspections along the hauling route, when container units are opened, and the cold chain is interrupted. A system is needed in which inspection takes place upon exit and then the containers are sealed.

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    ▪ Cold storage is seen mainly at the end-point of the chains (markets), not upstream at farm level due to high costs and instability of the electric grid. Solar powered cold stores are small and expensive.

    ▪ The meeting with the Director of Operations of the Nigerian Railway Corporation (NRC) strengthened the impression we had after the meeting with the regional director of the NRC in Kano on October 30, 2017, that the Nigeria railways suffers from chronic underinvestment and abandonment by the government. At this moment, there are no conditions, in terms of availability of suitable rolling stock and organisation, to think of transport of fresh tomatoes from the North to the urban conglomerations in the South – not even as small pilot project 3. Any steps in this direction should come from the market (including the purchase of suitable wagons) and has to be demand-driven. At this moment there are no conditions that this service could be offered by the NRC. After this interview, the project team definitely abandoned the idea of a trial / pilot project with transport of tomatoes by rail (as was suggested in the progress report).

    ▪ Crate manufacturers SHONGAI and CELPLAS can produce suitable nestable and stackable plastic crates for transport of tomatoes with capacity of 20 – 25 kg, with economic lifetime of 5 years (recycled plastic) or more (virgin prime material). Recycling of used and worn-out crates is also offered by both companies. Prices vary from NGN 1.600 per crate (SHONGAI) – NGN 2.490 per crate (CELPLAS). (The crates of SHONGAI are in fact designed and used for the transport of fish. The crates of CELPLAS were used by PYXERA and also in our pilot projects). Minimum orders are 5.000 crates or more.

    ▪ The Nigeria Agri Business Group (NABG) is interested in scaling up the introduction of plastic returnable crates, to pursue the standardization of crates and to promote business models for leasing or renting. At this moment the company Connect Rail is hiring crates for NGN 250 per trip. Assuming a capacity of 20 kg per crate, that would imply NGN 500 for 40 kg. The price of a raffia basket for 50 kg tomatoes is 400 NGN, which implies that the transport cost per kg is slightly higher using crates; the losses are less and a higher percentage of tomatoes is of good quality (“class A”). These are the factors to take into account in order to develop a feasible business model.

    5. SECOND LIVING LAB WORKSHOP The second living lab workshop took place 8 and 9 of January 2018, in the Tahir Guest Palace in Kano, with 39 participants, including the enumerators (5) and the project team (5). Three presentations were used as tool for the plenary sessions, and several worksheet formats for the group work in each of the three round tables. See Annex 2. 5.1. Agenda The main points of the agenda were: Day 1, Monday 8 January 2018 Plenary session ▪ Explanation of the project, background (see presentation Annex 2.1).

    3 In October the project team discussed the possibilities and possible arrangements of a pilot project of transport of tomatoes via rail from Kano to Lagos – and the regional director of NRC referred us to the central office of NRC.

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    ▪ Explanation of the concept of “living lab” including pilot project, stressing the ownership of the participants – the role of the project team is just to facilitate (see presentation Annex 2.3).

    ▪ Presentation of all participants. ▪ Presentation and discussion of the results of the survey (see presentation Annex 2.2). Round table sessions ▪ Forming of five working groups or “round tables” (named “Yankaba group”, “Zainab’s group”,

    “Kaura’s group”, “Manu group” and “Zaira-Kaduna group”); appointment of a moderator and reporter for each working group.

    ▪ Exercise to register the expectations / ambitions of the participants of this workshop. ▪ Mapping of the supply chain and of the interaction of all stakeholders in the chain (“free

    mapping”). ▪ Mapping of the money flow, information flow and operational flows in the supply chain. Plenary session ▪ Plenary presentation of value chain maps elaborated by the groups. Day 2, Tuesday 9 January 2018 Plenary session ▪ Wrap up previous day. ▪ Explanation of criteria for pilot projects (see presentation Annex 2.3). Round table sessions ▪ Back to the work in round tables (the same “Yankaba”, “Zainab ”, “Kaura”, “Manu” and “Zaira-

    Kaduna” groups). ▪ Identification of bottlenecks and possible solutions in the supply chain. ▪ Identification of losses and main causes. ▪ Zoom in on 2 possible solutions, appreciation of these choices by other groups (with blue stickers),

    in visiting rounds of 15 minutes each of the whole group (except the moderator) to see and comment the result (the so-called “world café” dynamic).

    ▪ Work out one worksheet for the first priority project, and one sheet for the second priority project, taking into account SMART criteria (Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Realistic, Time-bound).

    5.2. Expectations Each group worked out their expectations that were summarized in a plenary meeting as follows:

    Group / table Region Expectations

    Kaura group Makoda - Bagwai ▪ New ideas of how to solve problems with the Tuta absoluta worm (low insecticide efficacy)

    Manu group Dorawa - Sallan ▪ Market exploration (glut problem) ▪ Effective transport network (farm → collection

    centre) ▪ More varieties are provided (resistant against pests /

    diseases)

    Ibrahim group (Yankaba group)

    Yankaba market ▪ Loss reduction solutions ▪ Reduction of pests / diseases (Tuta absoluta) ▪ Good transportation network

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    Ismael group (Zaira-Kaduna)

    Dutse Wai - Kulá - Marare

    ▪ Development of value chain ▪ Improved road network ▪ More processing facilities to buy from traders

    Zainab group Gasin Malam - Daka Soye

    ▪ Knowledge on planting for improved post-harvest quality

    ▪ Access to plastic crates ▪ Cold transportation ▪ Disease resistant seed ▪ Improved access to inputs, e.g. pesticides

    In the plenary discussion it had to be made clear that several expectations were out of the scope of the project (such as improvement of roads etc.); and that the focus of the project would be merely on the reduction of post-harvest losses. 5.3. Mapping of value chains As a first exercise the participants in the five round tables worked out a “free map” of the supply chain, from production to consumer. Participants were asked to brainstorm and to identify all possible stakeholders and relations. Some worked out a linear map, others a network map, with less or more detail. This exercise was useful to visualize and identify the players and relations in the chain. (See example of a “free map” in Annex 2.5) In a second exercise a more structured map of the chain was elaborated. Participants were asked to identify different inflows and outflows (or processes) of money, information and tomato operations, at the level of farmers, hauliers, traders and retailers. This way an illustration or precision of the relations between the stakeholders of the chain was created, in different dimensions (information, money, goods). (See an example of this mapping in Annex 2.5). 5.4. Identification of bottlenecks, causes of losses and possible solutions The next day, and based on the work of the previous day, the five round tables identified the main bottlenecks in the chains and possible solutions, in a broad approach, in which the main problems in the chain were identified, from lack of credit, bad state of the roads, pest and diseases, lack of access to quality seed to bad loading practices. In a subsequent exercise, participants were asked to zoom in on possible solutions for the post-harvest losses in the tomato chain. See Annex 2.6 and Annex 2.7 for a transcription of these exercises by the three working groups. 5.5. Proposed projects After identifying bottlenecks and causes of losses, the next step was the identification of projects that would contribute to the solution of the bottlenecks in the tomato value chain and especially the post-harvest losses. Members of the groups could indicate their preferences with green dots on the worksheet (stickers). The other two groups reviewed the worksheet and could also indicate their preference with a blue dot. The overall score is in the table below. See Annex 2.5 for an example of the sheets that were used.

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    Round table Priority project Second priority Third priority

    1. Yankaba group Total score: 47 Total score: 31 Total score: 5

    1. Trial on the use of insecticides

    13 green dots (own score) 18 blue dots (other score)

    2. Advocacy to authorities on removing checkpoints

    2 green dots (own score) 3 blue sots (other score)

    3. Small scale methods local preservation techniques

    15 green dots (own score) 32 blue dots (other score)

    2. Zainab’s group Total score: 23 Total score: 21 Total score: 18

    1. Improved drying methods

    10 green dots (own score) 13 blue dots (other score)

    2. Use of plastic crates 10 green dots (own score) 8 blue dots (other score)

    3. Cold storage 10 green dots (own score) 11 blue dots (other score)

    3. Kaura’s group Total score: 49 Total score: 18 Total score: 16

    1. Introduce new methods of drying tomatoes

    17 green dots (own score) 32 blue dots (other score)

    2. Introduction of plastic crates

    12 green dots (own score) 6 blue dots (other score)

    3. Introduction of better vehicles

    13 green dots (own score) 3 blue dots (other score)

    4. Manu group Total score: 30 Total score: 17 Total score: 11

    1. Provision of plastic crates

    6 green dots (own score) 5 blue dots (other score)

    2. Drying powder to reduce moisture

    16 green dots (own score) 14 blue dots (other score)

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    3. Small plastic baskets to pick tomatoes

    8 green dots (own score) 9 blue dots (other score)

    5. Zaira - Kaduna group

    Total score: 30 Total score: 17 Total score: 11

    1. Introduction of plastic crates

    6 green dots (own score) 5 blue dots (other score)

    2. Modular processing factory

    16 green dots (own score) 14 blue dots (other score)

    3. Cooling vehicle 8 green dots (own score) 9 blue dots (other score)

    Project Mentioned how many times Score

    Crates 4 58 (average 14,5)

    Improved drying 3 119 (average 39,6)

    Cooling 2 38 (average 19,0)

    Others (all different) 1+1+1+1+1+1+1 129 (average 21,5)

    TOTAL 15 344

    Four of the five groups mentioned the introduction of plastic crates, and three groups mentioned improved drying methods as possible pilot project to reduce post-harvest losses. These ideas were also the most feasible. Once the choices were clear, each round table was asked to work out the priority project and the second best project a bit more in a project worksheet. (See Annex 2.8 for a summary sheet). 6. PROPOSED PILOT PROJECTS / KICK-OFF WORKSHOP THE NORTH 12 – 16 FEBRUARY In line with the living lab workshop 8 and 9 January, two pilot projects were selected: the introduction of plastic returnable crates in three long haul value chains with two repetitions (6 measurements), and the construction of three raised platform for improved drying of tomatoes, with two cycles of tomato drying (6 measurements). These projects were further planned in a kick-off workshop with stakeholders, which took place on 13 and 14 of February in the Tahir Guest Palace in Kano, led by Wageningen University and the IFDC. The next day 15 of February was used for the training of the 5 enumerators in the methods and formats for data collection. 6.1. Agenda kick-off workshop, 13 – 14 of February 2018 Main points of the agenda of the kick-off workshop were as follows: Day 1, Tuesday 13 February 2018

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    Plenary session ▪ Brief introduction. ▪ Introduction to the objectives of the project: presentation, reflection on the living lab workshop 8

    – 9 January. ▪ Explanation of pilot project 1: the use of plastic crates, and discussion of variables to be measured. Round table sessions (1 group for each of the 3 supply chains) ▪ Supply chain mapping, interactions between actors. ▪ Plan for distribution and ownership of the crates and scales. The option was given to return the

    crates and scales after the pilot project, or to buy them for half of the cost price. To that effect, each of the participants signed a distribution agreement.

    ▪ Each supply chain: Map the chain as detailed as possible and work out an activity plan for the experiment with plastic crates, including responsibilities, targets, timeline, agreements & commitment.

    Plenary session ▪ Each group / value chain presenting its plan. Round table sessions, plenary discussion ▪ Discussion of success factors: drivers for success, risks and barriers; how to overcome risks. Day 2, Wednesday 14 February 2018 Plenary session ▪ Wrap up previous day. ▪ Monitoring and targets of crate use (weight, quality, price) ▪ Introduction of pilot project 2: the construction of raised platforms for improved droning of

    tomatoes on three farms. Day 3, Thursday 15 February 2018 ▪ Meeting facilitators and enumerators: training in monitoring and data collection tools, and in the

    script for visual registry (short videoclips and interviews – later perhaps to be used as promotional material).

    6.2. Pilot project 1: use of plastic crates It was decided that the pilot project with introduction of plastic crates would take place in 3 value chains, during 2 cycles, all to Lagos (long haul). In all chains there were 4 farmers for each wholesaler. Each one received crates (and baskets), but only 1 farmer would be followed in each chain. In total, 12 farmers would participate. On average, between 10 – 20 crates per farmer were distributed. Although no data collection would take place with 9 farmers, they would have the experience of working with crates; and they would share their experience in the feed-back workshop. The returning of the crates was identified as a challenge, but it was decided to wait for the outcome of eventual negotiations between farmers and transporters. An amount of 300 crates (manufactured by CELPLAS) was transported to Kano; 3 analogue scales were bought, to be used for weighing crates and baskets at the farmgate. The team of Wageningen

  • 27

    University bought 5 small digital scales, to be used for measurement of the weight of tomatoes with different quality classes at retail level, which requires more precision. It was decided to look for retailers in Lagos who had participated in the first pilot project in December for the South-West, and to include them again in the pilot project with crates, with tomatoes now coming from the North. These retailers already knew what the project was about and collaborated in an earlier stage. For safety reasons it was decided that the enumerators would not travel over land from Kano with the trucks to Mile 12 market; they would travel to Lagos by plane and connect again with the transporter on the market. The quality and weight of the tomatoes packed in raffia baskets were compared to the quality and weight of tomatoes in plastic crates along the chain; the same chain was experimental group and control group at the same time. Three labelled crates were compared with 3 labelled baskets. The following variables were registered, at two different moments 1. Farmer, after harvest, weight of quality A, B, C, D, before loading 2. Wholesaler / collector: weight before loading 3. Agent, weight upon arrival 4. Retailer, weight upon collection 5. Retailer, before sales weight of quality A, B, C, D For an overview of the data collection tool, see Annex 2.10. The enumerators made a WhatsApp group shared with the WUR research group and the project team, to share their impressions with hundreds of pictures and several videos. The hypothesis tested here were the following: ▪ Tomatoes packed in raffia baskets lose quality more rapidly than tomatoes packed in plastic

    returnable crates. ▪ Due to this loss of quality, the total price paid for tomatoes transported in raffia baskets will be

    less than tomatoes transported in plastic crates. Factors influencing quality of tomatoes are related to the characteristics of the road and the vehicle, the weather, the distance and time elapsed between harvesting and loading, transport to wholesale markets and retailer. All these data were registered in the data collection tool. The results of the data collection in the field in the 5 supply chains of the pilot project in the South-West (December), and in the 3 supply chains of the pilot project in the North (February – March) were validated and discussed in the feedback workshop held on 13 of January in Ibadan and 23 of April in Kano, respectively. See section 7 here below. 6.3. Pilot project 2: raised platforms for improved sun-dying of tomatoes On three farms in the North, simple raised platforms were built, of 2 x 8 meters, with bamboo, a metal mesh and net (put during the night) to protect the tomatoes from insects. Two drying cycles were carried out, in March – April. The weight and quality of the tomatoes on these platforms were compared to tomatoes dried on the ground.

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    The following variables were tested and compared (ground – table), in two repetitions (total 6 measurements): 1. Weight of the tomatoes, at the beginning and at the end of drying. 2. Visual appearance of dried product at the end of drying. 3. Farmer preference the product from the 2 drying methods. 4. Time of drying (as decided by the farmer, who would determine if the product was suitably dry). 5. The price of the dried product. The exact location of the trial sites was determined with GPS coordinates, in order to monitor the weather conditions at each site. The enumerators made a WhatsApp group to share hundreds of pictures and stories with the project team. The hypothesis tested here were the following: ▪ Tomatoes dried on the ground lose quality and are contaminated. ▪ Tomatoes dried on raised platforms have a better price. The results of the pilot project were discussed in the feedback workshop 23 of April. 7. FEEDBACK WORKSHOPS ON THE PILOT PROJECTS IN THE SOUTH-WEST AND THE NORTH 7.1. Feedback workshop pilot projects South-East, IITA, Ibadan, 13 of January On January 13, a one day feedback workshop took place at the IITA campus, Ibadan, on the pilot project with crates, with a total of 46 participants, of which 35 persons were farmers, hauliers or traders. In addition, a database was available from the Wageningen team and separate reports on four value chains. The Wageningen team summarized their findings in a PowerPoint presentation (Plaisier et al., 2018a, see Annex 2.13). 7.1.1. Agenda The agenda of the workshop was as follows (see Annex 2.11): Plenary session ▪ Introduction ▪ Explanation of the methodology for group work (Annex 2.12) Group work (5 groups, according to the 5 value chains that participated in the pilot project) ▪ Advantages and disadvantages of the use of raffia baskets and plastic crates (results in Annex 2.16). Plenary session ▪ Presentation of results advantages and disadvantages of raffia baskets and plastic crates. ▪ Presentation of findings of the pilot project (Annex 2.13). ▪ Explanation of the methodology for proposing a suitable business model for the introduction of

    plastic crates. Group work ▪ Working out business model for introduction of plastic crates (results in Annex 2.20).

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    Plenary session ▪ Presentation and discussion of the group work. ▪ What’s next – follow-up and commitments second round (with Wageningen team, June – July). Meeting with enumerators ▪ Evaluation, what went well, what went wrong? 7.1.2. Group work: comparison plastic crates and raffia baskets In the comparison of the plastic crates and the traditional raffia basket, all handling activities were evaluated along the whole chain, from harvest to the retailer; and also taking into account all means of transport: from tricycle, motorcycle, car, minibus, to truck, and some general aspects, such as ventilation, avoid contamination, ease of cleaning and avoid damage to tomatoes. The total score in favour of plastic crates on all these items was overwhelming: 87,4%. Details, see Annex 2.15. Some highlights from the plenary discussion that followed the group work (Plaisier, 2018b): ▪ In general terms, the conclusions of the group work were confirmed in the plenary discussions: an

    overwhelming preference for the plastic crates. ▪ For some hauliers, returning of the raffia baskets is easier than plastic crates; crates are nestable

    but nested raffia baskets occupy even less space and can be pressed. ▪ Ownership of the crate is an issue. If the farmer owns the crate he should have enough: a certain

    number of crates will be circulating in the chain (with tomatoes) but he / she also needs empty crates to harvest.

    ▪ Sometimes small baskets are used for harvesting, in those cases plastic crates will not be used at that stage.

    ▪ With crates there is less handling (which is better to preserve quality), these can be used already in the field for harvesting. Crates can be washed, raffia baskets not. Loading and offloading is faster with crates.

    ▪ Main challenge is the returning of the crates, and the related costs. 7.1.3. Results of the trial After the group work, the Wageningen team presented the results of the measurements (Plaisier 2018a, see Annex 2.13) 4. Between 11 – 23 of December 2017, the crates were introduced in 5 short-haul value chains, in two cycles and measurement rounds, parallel to the use of raffia baskets as control group. A limiting factor was the end of the harvesting season in the South-West: low volumes of tomato available, and invasion of tomatoes from the North in the Mile 12 market (especially during the second cycle), with varieties preferred by the consumer (Royal variety, round tomatoes, as opposed to what is called the Kerewa variety, elongated oval tomatoes). Therefore, only 2 crates and 2 baskets were used as sample in each round and value chain. In the second cycle, the prices went up considerably, just before Christmas. The following five value chains were selected for the pilot project: (1) Value chain 1

    4 The presentation was deliberately given after the group work, to avoid influencing opinions of the participants by the outcome of the trial.

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    ▪ Farm location: Oloka village, Ogbomoso, Oyo State ▪ Retail market: Oja Oba, Ibadan, Oyo State (2) Value chain 2 ▪ Location of the two farms: Ipapo, Oyo State ▪ Wholesale market: Sasa, Ibadan ▪ Retail markets: Gbagi, Ibadan, and Ode Aje, Ibadan (3) Value chain 3 ▪ Farm location: Oloka village, Ogbomoso, Oyo State ▪ Wholesale market: Ile Epo Oja at Iyanapaja, Lagos ▪ Retail markets: Ile Epo Oja at Iyanapaja, Lagos, and College B/S Agege (4) Value chain 4 ▪ Farm location: Odo Oba, Ogbomoso, Oyo State ▪ Retail market: Okokomaiko market (5) Value chain 5 ▪ Farm location: Saba village, Iseyin, Oypo State ▪ Wholesale markets: Mile 12, Lagos, and Bodija, Ibadan ▪ Retail markets: Iyana Iba, Lagos, and Bodija, Ibadan The data collection procedure was as follows: (1) Weighing of empty crates and baskets (to obtain the net weight of the tomatoes) (2) Sorting (quality A, B, C), the volume of each quality as weighed, directly after harvest (3) Before loading the crates and baskets were weighed (total weight) (4) At arrival to the wholesale point, the crates and baskets were weighed (total weight) (5) At offloading at the retail point, the crates and baskets were weighed again (6) After sorting by the retailer (quality A, B, C) the different qualities were weighed again, and also

    the tray for displaying or selling (to obtain the net weight of the tomatoes) By means of load tracking, product loss data were retrieved along the value chains. Both the product losses in the traditional case (raffia baskets) and in the intervention case (plastic crates) were measured simultaneously; the farmer transported both in raffia baskets and in plastic returnable crates. A comparison between baskets and crates was made for each value chain, for total loss and for the loss of “Quality A”. A loss was measured by comparing the start of the value chain (farm) with the end of the value chain (retailer). During the process of tracking the load the teams followed the product batch and made observations that could be relevant for the evaluation of the specific conditions and circumstances in which the product was handled, packed, transported, etc. For each packaging type 1-2 product samples were taken from the entire batch from a specific individual farmer which were labelled for tracking it through the entire value chain. The samples were labelled by means of coloured ribbons, whereby each product sample that was supplied by a specific farmer was marked with a colour by attaching a ribbon to the farmer’s basket and plastic crate. Data retrieval on product losses was done by weighing of product by local enumerators at different points in the value chain by means of scales. When entering the value chain the tomatoes were classified into class A, B, C or D product. Classification of product qualities in the value chains and in Nigeria in general is not transparent. The recording of data during load tracking was done on a data recording sheet (see Annex 2.10). Observations by the enumerators were also recorded on the observations sheet. This sheet contained specific questions regarding specific circumstances at the measurement points, transport, observations by the retailer and other relevant observations.

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    The scope of the value chain defined for this research was from farm-gate (post-harvest) to retailer (pre-sale to consumer). Product losses that occur before harvest and after sales by the retailer were not taken into account. Other variables measured: weather conditions; time of harvesting, loading, offloading, arrival; waiting times at farm, delays during transport; distances to the wholesale and retail market(s); type of vehicles; road conditions; price paid to the retailer of different qualities. Details, see Annex 2.10 and Annex 2.12. The main aggregate results (5 value chains, 2 cycles) are summarized below:

    Item measured Raffia baskets Plastic crates

    More “Quality A” remains when using plastic crates 65% 85%

    Less total weight loss from farmer to retailer with plastic crates 11% 5%

    From the point of view of quality loss the conclusion is, that crates performed better than the baskets. Quality A was better maintained when the product was packed in plastic crates. More high quality tomatoes and less losses, result in improved income at the retail level. Some of the highlights of the narrative reports of the enumerators (Oluwaseun 2018, Olufolajimi 2018, Akinpelumi 2018, Ogunfusika 2018): ▪ Where available, farmers use the shadow of big trees to keep tomatoes in better conditions while

    waiting for transport ▪ Lack of irrigation is a limiting factor to plant more tomatoes ▪ In sorting tomatoes on the farm (quality A, B, C), firmness, color and freshness are main criteria.

    However, there are no uniform standards to classify tomatoes. Quality A: Firm good tomato, good color (two sizes: big and small). Quality B: Firm good tomato, but unripe. Or a smaller red tomato in some cases. Quality C: Still good, but less firm and some spots. Or yellowish red or yellowish green. Or already damaged and watery. Quality D: Damaged tomatoes.

    ▪ Due to the small quantity of tomatoes, after sorting different qualities of tomatoes are put back in the same crate or basket, but in different layers, with quality A on top, to attract customers.

    ▪ On some farms harvesting takes place in the middle of the night, for two reasons: (1) to maintain the quality of the tomato, when it is fresh and cool; and (2) to transport it as early as possible to the market, avoiding traffic jam and be on time when the markets open (wholesale markets start at 5 AM, retail market at 6 AM, approximately).

    ▪ For farmers, organizing transport to bring small volumes of tomatoes to the market can be very challenging. Harvest only can start when transport is arranged and secured.

    ▪ In these value chains, payment flows are as follows: (1) Farmer pays the driver; or dealer pays but deducts the transport cost from the payment to the farmer; (2) Farmer pays the dealer for the basket provided by him; this is deducted from the payment of the dealer to the farmer; (3) The dealer pays for loading / offloading to the carriers, pays the entry fee to the market (government) and dealers’ association; (4) Retailer to the dealer or wholesaler. Prices paid depend on the quality and the volumes available on the market place (also from the North). (5) Retailer pays loading / offloading to carriers and transport costs from the wholesale location to the retail spot, in case the retail market is located elsewhere.

    ▪ Farmers like the crates, but there is also concern on the transport that has to be paid for returning the empty crates.

    ▪ Transporters find it easier to load and carry crates than raffia baskets. ▪ The use of plastic crates is lauded by retailers: quality is preserved, less waste, less “give-away

    quality C or D”, and easier handling. When they buy tomatoes in raffia baskets they sometimes buy the tomato and the basket. In the case of crates these are simply returned.

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    ▪ Dealers are concerned with perceived less volume of tomatoes transported in crates as compared to tomatoes transported in (overloaded) raffia baskets.

    ▪ Training to carriers is need to load / offload and carry the baskets and crates with more care. ▪ Main factors that contribute to waste and losses: (1) During transport phases from farm to dealer

    and from dealer to retailer, especially when the road is in a bad shape; (2) Careless handling during loading / offloading and carrying; (3) When sales are poor, and the product stays long time on the market (in this case the retailer suffers losses).

    The trial took place under specific circumstances: the end of the season. The trial will be repeated in July 2018, during the high season for tomato production in the South-West. The participants in the workshop validated the results of the trial and confirmed the main conclusions. During the plenary discussion that followed the presentation, the following remarks were made (Plaisier, 2018b): ▪ In some occasions, the retailer starts selling Quality B and C, if the shelf life of Quality A is good

    enough. Then there is less risk that there will be leftovers. Often, restaurants and hotels prefer Quality C and D, when tomatoes are used for sauces. Better and more expensive quality tomatoes are bought by the middle class.

    ▪ There was some concern that if quality of the tomatoes improves due to massive introduction of plastic crates, availability of cheap tomatoes of Quality C and D will be less; now bought by poorer segments of urban population. However, if better productivity and less waste will occur, the supply of quality tomatoes will increase and this will result in affordable prices.

    ▪ At