Public Disclosure Authorized · 2016-07-08 · CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS (As of November 30, 2009)...

Document of The World Bank

Report No: ICR00001220

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT (TF-50973)

ON A MULTI-DONOR TRUST FUND GRANT

IN THE AMOUNT OF

$52.82 MILLION EQUIVALENT

TO THE

ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN (Formerly known as Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan)

FOR A

NATIONAL EMERGENCY EMPLOYMENT PROGRAM PHASE I (NEEP I)

December 17, 2009

Sustainable Development Department Afghanistan Country Management Unit South Asia Region

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS (As of November 30, 2009)

Currency Unit = Afghani

SDR1.00 = $1.61 $1.00 = AFN48.45

AFGHAN FISCAL YEAR

March 21 – March 20

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS ARTF Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust

Fund MoF Ministry of Finance

CDC Community Development Council

MPW Ministry of Public Works

DDR /RLS

Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration/ Rural Livelihood Support

MRRD Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development

ECE-PWP

Emergency Community Empowerment and Public Works Project

M&E Monitoring and evaluation

ERR Economic rate of return NEEP National Emergency Employment Program

FM Financial management NERAP National Emergency Rural Access Project

GRM Grant Reporting & Monitoring NRAP National Rural Access Program IA Implementing Agency PDCU Program Development and

Coordination Unit ICR Implementation completion report PDO Project Developmental Objective IP Implementation Partner PIU Program Implementation Unit ISR Implementation status report PRR Priority Reform and Restructuring JPMU Joint Program Management Unit SIDA Swedish International Development

Agency MIS Management information system UNOPS United Nations Office for Project

Services MIWRE Ministry of Irrigation, Water

Resources and Energy VOC Vehicle operating cost

Vice President: Isabel M. Guerero

Country Director: Nicholas J. Krafft

Sector Manager: Michel Audigé

Project Team Leader: Hasan Afzal Zaidi

ICR Team Leader: Mesfin Wodajo Jijo

ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN

NATIONAL EMERGENCY EMPLOYMENT PROGRAM, PHASE I

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Data Sheet

A. Basic Information............................................................................................................ i B. Key Dates ........................................................................................................................ i C. Ratings Summary ............................................................................................................ i D. Sector and Theme Codes................................................................................................ii E. Bank Staff .......................................................................................................................ii F. Results Framework Analysis .........................................................................................iii G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs........................................................................ iv H. Restructuring ................................................................................................................. iv I. Disbursement Profile ...................................................................................................... v

1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design ............................................... 1 2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes............................................... 5 3. Assessment of Outcomes .......................................................................................... 12 4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome......................................................... 18 5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance...................................................... 19 6. Lessons Learned........................................................................................................ 22 7. Comments on Issues Raised by Grantee/Implementing Agencies/Donors............... 24 Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing .......................................................................... 25 Annex 2. Outputs by Component.................................................................................. 26 Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis ................................................................. 27 Annex 4. Grant Preparation and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes ....... 31 Annex 5. Summary of Grantee’s ICR............................................................................ 32 Annex 6. List of Supporting Documents....................................................................... 35

MAP: IBRD 37438

i

A. Basic Information

Country: Afghanistan Project Name: National Emergency Employment Program - Phase I

Project ID: P091036 L/C/TF Number(s): TF-50973

ICR Date: 12/24/2009 ICR Type: Core ICR

Lending Instrument: SIL Grantee: AFGHANISTAN

Original Total Commitment:

USD 61.6M Disbursed Amount: USD 52.8M

Revised Amount: USD 52.8M

Environmental Category: B

Implementing Agencies: Ministry of Irrigation, Water Resources and Energy Ministry of Public Works Ministry of Public Works United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS)

Cofinanciers and Other External Partners: B. Key Dates

Process Date Process Original Date Revised / Actual

Date(s)

Concept Review: 12/24/2002 Effectiveness:

Appraisal: Restructuring(s):

Approval: 03/14/2003 Mid-term Review: 03/31/2005

Closing: 09/30/2004 03/31/2009 C. Ratings Summary C.1 Performance Rating by ICR

Outcomes: Satisfactory

Risk to Development Outcome: Substantial

Bank Performance: Satisfactory

Grantee Performance: Satisfactory

C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR) Bank Ratings Borrower Ratings

Quality at Entry: Satisfactory Government: Satisfactory

Quality of Supervision: Satisfactory Implementing Agency/Agencies:

Satisfactory

Overall Bank Performance:

Satisfactory Overall Borrower Performance:

Satisfactory

ii

C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance Indicators

Implementation Performance

Indicators QAG Assessments

(if any) Rating

Potential Problem Project at any time (Yes/No):

No Quality at Entry (QEA):

None

Problem Project at any time (Yes/No):

No Quality of Supervision (QSA):

None

DO rating before Closing/Inactive status:

Satisfactory

D. Sector and Theme Codes

Original Actual

Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing)

Irrigation and drainage 20 20

Other social services 40 30

Roads and highways 40 50

Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing)

Conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction 17 17

Other social protection and risk management 33 33

Rural non-farm income generation 17 17

Rural services and infrastructure 33 33 E. Bank Staff

Positions At ICR At Approval

Vice President: Isabel M. Guerrero Mieko Nishimizu

Country Director: Nicholas J. Krafft Alastair J. McKechnie

Sector Manager: Michel Audige Guang Zhe Chen

Project Team Leader: Hasan Afzal Zaidi Amer Zafar Durrani

ICR Team Leader: Hasan Afzal Zaidi

ICR Primary Author: Mesfin Wodajo Jijo F. Results Framework Analysis

Project Development Objectives (from Project Appraisal Document) The objective of the Project was to assist the Recipient in providing employment in rural areas at a minimum wage, as a safety net, to as many people and in as short a time as might be feasible.

iii

Revised Project Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority) When the National Emergency Employment Program (NEEP) was launched in 2002 with funding from the multi-donor Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF), the immediate priority of the new Transitional Government was to capture humanitarian and other emergency assistance for the promotion of a nationwide employment generation and infrastructure renewal program. It was expected that the grant would be fully disbursed by the end of 2004. The program proved to be a good delivery mechanism for transferring purchasing power to rural communities to help re-start the local economy. However, it had less success in directly targeting those most in need of social protection, notably the disabled and women heads of household. At the same time, significant levels of new investment in rural infrastructure started to take place outside the NEEP framework, as resources were being channeled through more specialized parallel national programs. Employment opportunities and wage rates rose significantly in many parts of the country, though labor markets remained often isolated and poorly integrated. In some areas, competition for labor during peak demand times of the year rightly called into question NEEP#s feasibility as a precise social protection instrument. The justification for NEEP primarily as a provider of short-term employment and relatively small amounts of supplementary income (per household) needed to be revisited. Accordingly, the government-led review of NEEP during 2004-05 recommended that the program be re-oriented to the provision of rural infrastructure, thus creating long-term assets to underpin the local economy while continuing to create much-needed employment. With the new focus, NEEP-I secured additional funding of $20.2 million from the ARTF, formalized in Amendment No. 2 to the Grant Agreement dated November 2005. The amendment modified the Project Development Objective and replaced the PDO indicators with a new set. The project objective was changed to: the nation-wide quality rehabilitation, reconstruction and maintenance of essential rural access infrastructure using appropriate labor-based approaches, thereby creating short-term opportunities for the rural poor. In 2007 yet more funding ($16.0 million) became available from the ARTF to enlarge the program of road works. It was formalized by Amendment No. 3 to the Grant Agreement dated January 2007. (a) PDO Indicator(s)

Indicator Baseline Value

Original Target Values (from

approval documents)

Formally Revised Target Values

Actual Value Achieved at

Completion or Target Years

Indicator 1 : Cross-drainage structures, incl. bridges rehabilitated, meters. Value quantitative or Qualitative)

n.a. 9700

Date achieved 03/14/2003 03/31/2009 Comments (incl. %

iv

achievement) Indicator 2 : Irrigation schemes rehabilitated (hectares) Value quantitative or Qualitative)

n.a. 24000

Date achieved 03/14/2003 03/31/2009 Comments (incl. % achievement)

Indicator 3 : Un-skilled labor days of employment generated. Value quantitative or Qualitative)

n.a. 5420000


Indicator 4 : Un-skilled labor days of employment generated. Value quantitative or Qualitative)

5420000

Date achieved 03/31/2009 Comments (incl. % achievement)

(b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s)

Indicator Baseline Value

Original Target Values (from

approval documents)

Formally Revised

Target Values

Actual Value Achieved at

Completion or Target Years

Indicator 1 : Amount of incremental non-World Bank funds channeled through the NEEP NRAP

Value (quantitative or Qualitative)

n.a. n.a.


v

G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs

No. Date ISR Archived

DO IP Actual

Disbursements (USD millions)

1 01/02/2009 Satisfactory Satisfactory 52.82 H. Restructuring (if any) Not Applicable

I. Disbursement Profile

vi

Note: Funds were disbursed periodically from ARTF into UNOPS’ imprest account. From there, UNOPS disbursed them against project expenditures month by month.

1

1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design

1.1 Context at Appraisal

Ravaged by nearly three decades of conflict and political instability, Afghanistan was and remains one of the world’s poorest and longest suffering countries. At the time of appraisal a large majority of the population still lacked access to basic services, especially in the rural areas. An estimated 4 to 7 million people remained vulnerable to hunger, with a large number dependent on food and humanitarian aid. The aftermath of September 11, 2001 precipitated change in the political and military situation in Afghanistan. An interim administration was established in December 2001, leading to an Emergency Loya Jirga (Grand Assembly) which paved the way for a new constitution, an elected president (2004) and parliament (2005) for a more representative government within four years. The war and the resulting neglect had left the few existing public assets severely dilapidated. After the World Bank re-engaged in Afghanistan in late 2001, the destruction was further compounded by a severe drought, which lasted until 2004. The conflict and the drought resulted in massive population displacements and disruption of livelihoods. For the four fifths of the Afghan population living in rural areas, incomes were at subsistence level. Poor and deteriorated infrastructure further increased costs to the rural population and slowed the recovery of the rural economy. For many years, public infrastructure had not been maintained, irrigation canals had accumulated sediment and, in many places, structures were in need of repair, leading to reduced water supply and consequently reduced farm productivity. Unpaved roads were in poor condition and bridges were down, providing limited access and causing very low speeds. Even short trips often required an overnight stay. Hence despite long distances, animal-drawn carts competed with motorized transport in many parts of rural Afghanistan. The more than 25 years of war had also prevented maintenance and new investment from taking place. This left the road network only partially usable at very high transportation costs. Interventions from maintenance to reconstruction were widely needed. Employment opportunities in rural areas remained limited. Recently imposed restrictions on border-crossing to Iran and Pakistan further reduced prospects for Afghan migrant labor. The return of refugees and internally displaced populations to their places of origin further distressed local labor conditions. The Transitional Government of Afghanistan had articulated a clear strategy for the country’s reconstruction through its National Development Framework. Restoration of livelihoods and social protection were top priorities and the first pillar of the framework. The National Emergency Employment Program (NEEP), launched in 2002, was the main investment program for social protection of vulnerable groups aimed at providing timely, efficient, self-targeting and widespread social safety nets based on cash-for-work schemes. NEEP activities involved a wide range of sectors: roads, irrigation, urban development, natural resource management, soil conservation, and reforestation. They

2

also included capacity building activities to ensure effective planning, delivery, monitoring and evaluation. Afghanistan was able to meet the criteria for a Post-Conflict Recovery Grant under the Bank’s policy OP 2.3. The Bank seized this opportunity to quickly prepare a program of IDA grants for early support to post-conflict recovery, in which a grant for an Emergency Community Empowerment and Public Works Project ($42 million) formed part. The objectives of its Labor-Intensive Public Works component were: (i) to provide employment in rural areas at a minimum wage, as a safety net, to as many people and in as short a time as might be feasible; and (ii) to rehabilitate in a sustainable way irrigation capacity and provincial- and district-level roads. This component ($16 million) provided an opportunity to sustainably design, as a logical next step, the NEEP-I project which is the subject of this report. Afghanistan did not have a social protection policy when NEEP was formulated and is only now (in 2009) beginning to define such a framework. However, the Emergency Community Empowerment Project generated useful lessons regarding (i) the use of productivity norms versus a fixed wage rate, and the use of participatory rural appraisal methods to support communities in identifying and selecting their poorest members for employment on NEEP-I sub-projects. The project proved that it could serve as a safety net while creating much needed assets. Table 2: Development of the National Rural Access Program

NEEP NERAP

LIWP - Labor Intensive Works Project

NEEP-I: National Emergency Employment Program Phase I

NEEPRA- National Emergency Employment for Rural Access

DDR/RAL -Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration/Reintegration and Livelihoods

NERAP-National Emergency Rural Access Project

Closing 12/31/10

2001/2002 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10

LIWP (IDA) US$ 16.69 M Closed 12/31/04

NEEP I (ARTF) US$ 36.82 M Increased 11/28/05

NEEP I (ARTF) US$ 50.62 M Increased 1/24/07

LIWP (IDA) US$ 16.69 M

Effective 6/11/02

NEEP I (ARTF) US$ 16.62 M Reduced 6/4/03

NEEPRA (IDA) US$ 39.2 M Effective 7/22/03

NEEPRA (IDA) US$ 39.2 M Closed 9/30/07

NEEP I (ARTF) US$ 50.62 M Closed 3/31/09

NEEP I (ARTF) US$ 25.4 M Effective 3/14/03

NEEP DDRR/RALS (JSDF) US$ 19.6 M Effective 8/28/04

NEEP DDR/RALS (JSDF) US$ 19.6 M Closed 3/30/08

NERAP (IDA/ARTF) US$ 142 M Effective 11/17/08

NEEP MID TERM REVIEW

Note: LIPW was a component of the Emergency Community Empowerment and Public Works Project

3

Table 2 shows the sequence of the various emergency/post-conflict operations supported by IDA and other donors over the past seven years in the realm of rural infrastructure. Designed under the preceding project, NEEP-I and NEEPRA were prepared in parallel and became effective within one month of each other. This allowed for the mobilization of significant resources from two complementary funding sources to support the same objective. The implementation of NEEP was successful enough to attract donors to contribute additional funds to scale up the project’s scope and keep functioning beyond this initial 18-month target. In this regard it continued operating as parallel financing with a series of other grants and credits funding emergency employment and the improvement of rural roads and other infrastructure. 1.2 Original Project Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators

NEEP-I’s original aim was to assist the government in providing employment in rural areas at a minimum wage, as a safety net, to as many people in as short a time as possible. It was to be monitored through the following key performance indicators. The implementing agencies were to be the Ministry of Public Works (MPW) and the Ministry of Irrigation, Water Resources and Energy (MIWRE.

PDO Indicators (called ‘Performance Indicators’ in the Grant Agreement)

1. 25% of the allocation to Grant Categories 1a and 1b would be disbursed within 3 months of the date of the agreement between MPW/MIWRE and the Beneficiaries

2. 100% of the allocation to Grant Categories 1a and 1b would be disbursed within 9 months of the date of the agreement between MPW/MIWRE and the Beneficiaries

3. 3 million person-days of labor performed under subprojects within 6 months of the date the Grant was signed

4. 5 million person-days of labor performed under subprojects within 9 months of the date the Grant was signed

5. 750,000 disabled person-days of targeted employment performed by the time the Project was completed.

6. 5,000 kilometers of roads repaired under subprojects by the completion of the Project

1.3 Revised PDO and Key Indicators, and reasons/justification

As an emergency post-conflict operation, the NEEP-I project formulation lacked the social protection policy framework (diagnostics and institutional set-up) normally required to underpin a Bank-supported safety net program. As implementation proceeded, it became clear that the kind of rural road and canal irrigation works being pursued, while highly valued by local communities, were blunt instruments for transferring cash to those most in need of social protection. The gradual shift in emphasis toward integrated and sustainable rural access led the umbrella NEEP to evolve from a safety net approach to the National Rural Access Program (NRAP). The revised objective of the NEEP-I therefore became the nation-wide quality rehabilitation, reconstruction and maintenance of essential rural access infrastructure using appropriate labor-based approaches, thereby creating short-term opportunities for the rural poor.

4

The key performance indicators were amended to read:

Revised PDO Indicators 1. 3,100 km of roads rehabilitated 2. 9,700 m of structures repaired 3. 5,420,000 days of short-term labor employed

1.4 Main Beneficiaries

The project’s primary beneficiaries were rural households in all the 34 provinces traversed by the roads to be rehabilitated. Among these families the project indirectly benefitted the most vulnerable --the disabled and female-headed households—by employing able-bodied male family members. Among the infrastructure targeted was the Shamalan Canal and irrigation network in Helmand Province, which was repaired; the farmers who relied on it were also beneficiaries. The MPW, MIWRE and the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD), brought in in 2005, were also beneficiaries1. With the support of this project, these institutions built reasonable capacity in procurement, financial and contract management. The local private contractors have grown in terms of their management and contract execution capacity, and the local shura (community elders) and elected community development councils (CDCs)i have benefitted through their experience in implementing community contracts.

1.5 Original Components

At the outset the Project had two components:

Road Sector Labor-Intensive Public Works ($21.95 million ): Subprojects were to be carried out in the road sector using the services of: (a) a team of management experts to help launch the activities and support their overall management; and (b) a core team of locally recruited road engineers in each province to assist with: (i) the design and costing of subproject proposals; (ii) providing technical support to villagers and small contractors carrying out the subprojects; (iii) supervising the works; (iv) making payments; and (v) managing and controlling expenditures. Irrigation Labor-Intensive Public Works ($3.47 million) : Sub-grants were to be made to beneficiaries for carrying out subprojects in the irrigation sector using services parallel to those above.

1.6 Revised Components

The irrigation component was later discontinued, while the road component was split into secondary and tertiary roads to be executed by the MPW and MRRD respectively. Discontinuing the irrigation component was consistent with the new emphasis given to rural access as NEEP evolved into NRAP. MIWRE benefited from direct World Bank

1 MRRD was brought in when the Project was amended (Amendment No. 2, see Section 1.7). By then MIWRE had changed its name to the Ministry of Energy and Water. It no longer participated in the Project by the time of Amendment No. 3.

5

funding for irrigation projects. This restructuring was formalized in January 2007 through Amendment No. 3 to the ARTF Grant Agreement. $35.41 million were allocated to secondary roads and $13.93 million to tertiary roads.

1.7 Other Significant Changes

Amendment No.1 to the Grant Agreement (June 2003): Three months after the grant was approved, the Government requested cancelation of $8.8 million from this grant, so that the trust funds could be redirected to support its general operating budget, outside the terms of the Project. NEEP-I’s objective remained the same but the disbursement targets were duly scaled down. Amendment No.2 to the Grant Agreement (November 2005): The objective was modified to reflect the shift in focus of the NEEP from employment creation to provision of durable rural access infrastructure, and its evolution to NRAP, at the same time as the funding was increased from $16.62 million to $36.82 million. The performance targets were modified to reflect the revised scope and expanded scale of funding. Amendment No.3 to the Grant Agreement (January 2007): The Grant amount was increased from $36.82 million to $52.82 million, and the performance indicators were adjusted to reflect the increased resources.

2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes

2.1 Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry

Continuation of Previous Activities: The project design was based on the Government’s successful Emergency Community Empowerment and Public Works Project launched in 2002 and the SIDA-funded Shamalan Canal Project, which provided a ready platform for road-related projects, as well as the labor-intensive restoration of an important irrigation scheme. (See Section 1.1.) This previous experience enabled the project team to respond quickly to the prevailing priorities in Afghanistan. Simplicity of Design: The project was kept simple with two main components: road works and irrigation works. This simplicity was appropriate for the prevailing conditions. Implementation arrangements addressed the weak capacity of MPW and MIWRE by providing for a so-called ‘Implementing Partner’ (IP) to oversee implementation of the works and to build capacity in the ministries. The IP selected was the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS). Pro-Poor Community-Led Targeting: Most infrastructure works were expected to be relatively straightforward, labor-based and requiring few specialized skills —such as earthworks for basic earth roads, involving preparation of construction materials, stone dressing, ditch digging, gabion2 making, road maintenance, or snow clearing. Such works

2 wire nets filled with rocks for retaining walls and to stabilize embankments (see photo in Section 3.5)

6

are known in Afghanistan as Level-1 contracts and can be managed by local communities without need of formal enterprises and bidding. Labor can be selected by local community leaders, after making announcements in local mosques; the shura head or community development council (CDC) chooses workers from the list of applicants. The project set a ceiling of $30,000 per contract for such procurement. Targeted Beneficiaries: High expectations had been established regarding the performance of NEEP-I as a safety net instrument. Efforts were made to include the most vulnerable groups. However, it soon became clear that the labor-intensive nature of the works as well as prevailing social norms prevented the disabled and women from taking part in the works, except for activities such as weaving of gabion nets, which women could do within the confines of their family compound. The inherent conflict was debated between the desire to target employment to the most needy, versus the practicalities of who would be fittest and most socially acceptable for works of this nature.

2.2 Implementation The following are the main factors affecting implementation during the project life: 2.2.1 Shift in Focus: Towards the end of 2004, a government-led review3 of NEEP led to the shift from a social safety net designed to create jobs, to an investment program to upgrade rural access. It could still be argued that local basic infrastructure would create numerous jobs in rural areas, but it was acknowledged that it was not the best way to target the most needy. But the new focus was to improve community infrastructure that would yield social returns over many years. This also had implications for procurement. So-called ‘Level 2 contracts’ would be formal contracts, mostly over $30,000 per contract, with local firms offering some experience in civil works. More ambitious road works requiring heavy equipment could be included –though the program still focused on existing alignments. The performance indicators were also changed from targets purely focusing on disbursement to include the quantity of the infrastructure improved (see Section 1.3).

2.2.2 Security Environment. Increasing insecurity severely hampered subprojects, particularly in the southern and eastern provinces. The project continued to operate in less secure areas because of the potentially large and visible gains from road rehabilitation works and resultant employment opportunities for the rural population. The implementation mechanism was adjusted depending on the security situation, more use being made of community-based contracting wherever contractor firms were unable to work. All reasonable precautions were taken to balance project implementation and supervision with the need to ensure the safety of staff.

3 “The Road from Emergency Employment towards Integrated Rural Access: Re-orientation of the Afghanistan National Emergency Employment Program to the Rural Access Program”, Report No. 19, South Asia Human Development Sector & Sustainable Development Sector, November 2006

7

2.2.3 Inadequate Capacity of Contractors: According to UNOPS records, a number of contracts were delayed because contractors did not have the funds to mobilize their plant and machinery to implement subprojects. Level 2 contracts entitle contractors to a mobilization allowance to help them procure and mobilize plant. However, in practice these allowances often were released only after the plant had been delivered on site, leaving the contractor to find his own working capital for mobilization. Since this was rarely available, works were delayed. For Level 1 subprojects, contracts stipulated an advance payment of $1,000 within 14 days of signing the contract. These subprojects were implemented through the shura or the CDCs and were expected to be completed within three months. There were delays in disbursing funds to the shuras, but solutions were found.

2.2.4 Competition from Poppy Production: In some regions competition from poppy harvesting also caused delays. Because of seasonal considerations, it often happened that NEEP activities coincided with the peak poppy cultivation. Workers found more lucrative employment opportunities as sharecroppers on poppy farms, causing attendance on NEEP subprojects to fall or become irregular. Poppy cultivation was at a low in winter, when frost and snow could also prevent or disrupt NEEP activities.

2.2.5 Role of the Implementing Partner. The task of managing implementation was contracted to UNOPS, which supported the three line ministries, MPW, MIWRE and MRRD. Recourse to an implementing partner (IP) was essential, due to the weak capacity of the ministries. Without the IP it was unlikely that the project could be delivered. The International Labor Organization also provided focused technical assistance for cash-for-work operations. Implementation was satisfactory throughout the project life but during the early years procurement and financial management were rated less than satisfactory. UNOPS had difficulties finding competent staff to manage the fiduciary aspects and this led to errors in procurement and late delivery of audit reports. The Mid-Term Review report noted that their major weakness was their inability to monitor, evaluate and report on program implementation in a timely way. These issues were addressed during project supervision, and subsequent missions noted a progressive improvement in quality and timeliness of reporting. Despite constraints of security and high staff turnover, UNOPS managed to deliver nationally.

2.2.6 Mid-term Review: A review of NEEP was undertaken at the end of 2004. At that time, there were four Bank-managed projects under NEEP at various stages of implementation (in chronological order LIPW, NEEP-I, NEEPRA, and DDR/RLS) –LIWP and NEEPRA were IDA grants and credits, DDR/RAL was funded by JSDF and NEEP-I by the ARTF. It was deemed logical to review the NEEP program in its entirety rather than focus on a single funding source. Thus, there was no separate mid-term review specific to NEEP-I. Instead, recommendations were made on the general NEEP implementation, focusing on three aspects: quality of engineering works, social protection, and institutional impacts. Its findings were endorsed by the Bank and formed the basis of recommendations made for the whole NEEP program.

8

The NEEP/NEEPRA review was government-led, strengthening ownership and providing the impetus for the Government to implement the recommendations. Particularly as regards institutional impact, the review suggested the establishment of program implementation units (PIUs) in the two line ministries, MPW and MRRD, which created greater local ownership and involvement, while allowing a slow phasing out of the international presence in managing the project. It was this review that suggested that, for greater effectiveness, the Government should focus NEEP on the delivery of rural infrastructure aiming to promote rural growth and reduce rural poverty primarily through the provision of local access infrastructure. It stated that NEEP’s central objective needed to be simplified to focus on rural roads, with nationally recognizable outputs that were owned by all tiers of government. It noted that targeting of the poor and vulnerable under NEEP had not been highly successful, and that there was a need to revisit NEEP’s role as a social safety net, as well as the expectations from the direct income transfers. The Government took immediate steps to implement the Review’s recommendations. NEEP’s name was duly changed from National Emergency Employment Program to National Rural Access Program. 2.2.7 Government Commitment was consistent and well engaged at preparation as well as throughout the project. The Government assigned staff and gradually employed more civil servants and consultants to work on the project rather than relying fully on UNOPS. Rural access was, and is even more now, identified as one of the priorities of the Afghan Government, and the administration has been working with the donor community to establish functional programs and develop a comprehensive rural access policy. The progress on the latter has been slower than hoped due to the country context. The NRAP was identified in the May 2008 Afghanistan National Development Strategy as one of the 15 key programs for the implementation of the Comprehensive Agriculture and Rural Development Sector Strategy, to be implemented between 2008 and 2013. 2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation and Utilization The indicators in the M&E framework were of outputs more than outcomes. However, they were appropriate to the conditions under which the project was to be implemented. Initially, UNOPS struggled to monitor and report on program implementation on a timely basis. The provision of monthly and quarterly reports improved over the project period to give a satisfactory basis with regards to the quality of data and identification of issues to be addressed. The indicators, the original and later revised, were used to monitor progress and report them in the Grant monitoring reports. A consolidated MIS system materialized only late in the project. This impeded the Government and donors from making some timely interventions where they were required.

9

2.4 Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance Social and Environmental Safeguards The works carried out created little need to displace and resettle people. Social safeguard issues were probably inadequately addressed until late in the project period. The staffs of the implementing ministries and UNOPS were unaware of Bank procedures and no records were kept of processes undertaken in connection with land acquisition, voluntary donations or community compensation to affected persons. No specific social safeguards monitoring or supervision was undertaken. The PIUs and the IP feel that sufficient attention was given to all aspects of social inclusion and adequate consultation was carried out, especially considering the difficult country environment, but they agree that the processes were not satisfactorily documented.

Similarly, environmental impacts – such as the felling of trees or changes to the flow of water courses-- were small and in some cases benign –such as reduced land erosion. The environmental safeguard issues also were probably not adequately addressed until the later stages of the project. But supervision was consistent, responsive to client needs, adapting well to the circumstances on the ground. To institutionalize the Environmental and Social Management Framework for the subprojects, the Bank’s specialist provided recommendations which were implemented. The presence of a specialist in the Bank’s country office, although late in project implementation, allowed for regular interactive consultation and active support of the line ministries and local communities. In the early years, there was also limited safeguards capacity in the World Bank office, which made it hard for the ministries staff to become conversant with the requirements. One crucial aspect addressed systematically was the clearance of mines from project sites. This was done by a certified agent who ensured the adequate clearance of mines from the field before contractors were mobilized. As a result no major incidents were reported. Financial Management After three decades of conflict, the Afghan government faced a daunting challenge to rebuild its public administration to effectively manage and use public resources, including the large inflow of development aid. The Bank has played a role in helping the Government establish the basic legal framework underlying the public financial management (PFM) and public procurement systems. Significant progress has been made in establishing a functioning PFM system under the direction of the Ministry of Finance (MoF). Project accounting, payments, financial statements and responsibility for submission of audited financial statements are centralized within MoF. The government-wide PFM systems, which are used for all IDA and ARTF projects, were assessed, applying the Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability performance measurement framework in 2005 and at the end of 2007. They were found to be better than the average of low-income countries, particularly on accounting, recording and reporting.

10

Records of the project’s funds receipts and disbursements from inception until closure were maintained by UNOPS and at MoF’s Special Disbursement Unit. All underlying supporting documents for the expenditures were kept by UNOPS. UNOPS had good FM capacity to facilitate project disbursements. Record keeping was moderately satisfactory. The funds flow arrangement was satisfactory. All payments to UNOPS were centrally controlled by MoF, and UNOPS had adequate internal controls for project disbursements. This has been managed appropriately since the project began. Initially financial reporting was poor: monthly and quarterly financial reports – including the mandatory financial monitoring reports to be submitted quarterly to the Bank – were not prepared regularly and also did not contain all required information. However, reporting improved considerably over time. Annual audited financial statements were submitted regularly, although not within the time stipulated in the Grant Agreement. The audit opinion of the Control and Audit Office of Afghanistan was unqualified for the first year (SY1383), while qualified opinions were issued in the later three years (SY1384, SY1385 and SY1386). The audit report for SY1386, due in September 2008, was not received until August 2009, because the international audit firm had been recruited late. Responses to key findings arising from the Bank’s review of these reports were received from UNOPS/MRRD and found to be satisfactory. A financial management review in August 2009 included a review of project expenditure transactions up to end of the disbursement grace period, and there were no key issues.

Procurement

At appraisal the Bank agreed to follow UNOPS’s procedures for procurement of civil works. However, during ex-post review it was found that UNOPS followed procedures such as interviews of contractors to verify qualification information. It also did not have standardized procurement documents and procedures for contracts below the prior review level. In some cases, the unfamiliarity of UNOPS staff with Bank procedures led to the award of contracts without the Bank’s ‘no objection’. Corrective action was taken. Unfortunately though, UNOPS did not always have competent procurement staff. In 2006-7 it was unable to hire a competent international procurement specialist for more than a year, despite several international advertisements. But it improved over time, and local staff also built up their capacity. In addition, due to poor designs there were quantity variations which resulted in cost escalations. In several instances UNOPS charged non-project related activities to the project. This was found out during ex-post reviews and later UNOPS was requested to reverse the charges, and did so. UNOPS did not maintain proper files in respect of hiring consultants. The project was, however, constantly supervised for procurement from the Bank’s country office, leading to prompt and timely corrective actions being undertaken.

11

Due to strict adherence to Bank’s procurement procedures, it was noted that many contractors were not meeting the commercial conditions and post-qualification requirements. The commercial responsiveness was improved by having pre-bid meetings regardless of the value of the contract. At these meetings checklists were prepared in both English and Dari and explained to the potential bidders how to fill them out. The documents were translated into the local language and made available to potential bidders. This initiative was found beneficial in a context where many potential bidders were still relatively inexperienced and did not speak English. It enabled more bids to become commercially responsive. Further, in place of a bid security, a bid security declaration was introduced. Based on the ad hoc survey of the contracting community and, considering the post- conflict nature and limited economic activity during the conflict, a downward adjustment of the post qualification requirements for civil works contracts was followed with regard to capacity, experience in completing similar works, and requirement for liquid assets for contracts up to $1.5 million equivalent. These adjustments helped to expand the pool of local contractors qualified to bid, thus facilitating contract award during the initial round of bidding. This is an issue requiring a balancing of risks. Qualifying too few contractors risks a lack of responsive bids within range of the expected cost, whereas low standards for qualifying bring a risk that some contracts will go to firms who fail to perform. In Afghanistan’s circumstances, the balance struck seems to have been appropriate. The Bank also led several capacity building workshops for the staff of the implementing ministries and UNOPS to improve their procurement knowledge. Over time it was found that staff developed a much better understanding of procurement requirements.

The overall procurement actions under the project are rated as moderately satisfactory.This sums up the early shortcomings followed by some later improvements.

2.5 Post-completion Operation/Next Phase NEEP-I served as a launch platform for NEEPRA approved in June 2003 and also for a further operation NEEP-DDR/RLS ($19.6 million) funded by the Japan Social Development Fund which was approved in March 2004. NEEP-I’s successful implementation enabled it to raise additional donor support from the ARTF that took its funding from $25.42 million to a total of $52.82 million and its life to 6 years, running in parallel with the other two projects. In January 2008 the Bank’s Board approved the National Emergency Rural Access Project (NERAP) and in March 2009 the Management Committee of the ARTF approved a new phase of co-funding.

12

3. Assessment of Outcomes

3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation At the design stage, NEEP-I was aligned with the Interim Afghan Government’s framework and one of the Bank’s higher-level objectives for a post-conflict situation: restoration of livelihoods and social protection. In the course of implementation, following the government-led NEEP review, the objectives were shifted to focus more on rural access, while continuing to address social protection. These objectives remained the Afghan Government’s top priority through to completion. The Afghan National Development Strategy4, in its section on the transport sector, stated that “the Government continued to give high priority to improving 5,334 km of secondary roads (national, urban and provincial) and to improving and building 6,290 km of rural access roads, as a key to raising rural livelihoods and reducing poverty and vulnerability in rural areas”.

The NEEP/NRAP program objectives and strategy have also remained relevant to all Bank assistance strategies developed since the Bank’s re-engagement in Afghanistan in 2002. These include the 2003 Transitional Support Strategy and the Interim Strategy Note of 2006. All have retained the promotion of the growth of the rural economy and improvement of rural livelihoods as an important and central strategic pillar.

3.2 Achievement of Project Development Objectives

Objective: The nation-wide quality rehabilitation, reconstruction and maintenance of essential rural access infrastructure using appropriate labor-based approaches, thereby creating short-term opportunities for the rural poor. Most activities planned at appraisal and the additional activities agreed upon when more funding became available, were duly delivered, despite the prevailing challenging security circumstances and the difficult reconstruction context. The results achieved by project closure even surpassed the revised targets. As such the achievement of the Project Development Objectives is rated as Satisfactory.

In a country that throughout history has suffered from strife among its several ethnic communities and from a weak national government, the NEEP/NRAP program has contributed to a stronger sense among rural communities of belonging to an integrated nation. Improved rural access has worked in both directions. National line ministries have been seen to deliver public services in remote areas: schools, health care centers and administrative offices have been upgraded. Farmers have been able to market their produce further afield, at higher prices than before. In the process, a local contracting industry has emerged and is providing job opportunities in remote areas. In short, remote

4Afghanistan National Development Strategy 1387-1391 Solar Year (2008-2013).

13

communities have, perhaps for the first time, a sense of connection to the outside world. This achievement is still far from complete and remains fragile, but it is real. For both the public works and the irrigation component, the targets were met as summarized in Table 3. At the time of project closing, 3,173 km of rural access roads and 19,090 meters of cross drainage structures had been completed. In addition 98 natural resource management sub-projects, 23 small irrigation subprojects and four large irrigation subprojects (delivering water to 15,000 hectares in the Shamalan area) had been completed. Of the 538 contracts awarded, 504 contracts had been completed, and 34 contracts had been terminated or canceled for various reasons. Subprojects under NEEP-I (and with further continuous financing under the follow-on National Rural Access Projects) have now reached 358 districts in all of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces. Table 3: Achievement of Key Performance Indicators

Performance Indicators Initial Targets

Revised Targets

Achieved at Closure

Percentage Achieved

Roads (km) 5,000 3,100 3,173 102% Irrigated areas benefitting from repairs to, and desilting of, canals (ha)

24,000 15,000 15,000 100%

Length of structures (linear m) Not planned

9,700 19,090 197%

Unskilled labor (person-days) 4,780,000 5,200,000 5,256,874 101%

These outputs all contributed to the overarching objectives of creating jobs by generating 5.26 million work-days for the needy, while the improved roads provide opportunities for integrating the rural economy to the market. The delivery mechanism was quick enough that in less than two months, it was possible to mobilize communities to start work on the community contracted road and irrigation works, and begin earning the needed income. The minimum wage sub-objective was also successfully achieved, in that the mid-term review found that the cost of delivery to government was about $4-5 per day of employment, comparing favorably with similar programs in other post-conflict countries, and lower than estimates made at the outset.

3.3 Efficiency Due to the general paucity of socio-economic data when the project was prepared, no sound economic analysis was done to justify the investment. However, following the Bonn agreement in 2001, donors agreed to the Interim Government’s priority to “revitalize economic activity-including restoring essential infrastructure, stimulating job creation, and providing an enabling environment for the private sector”. To confirm the economic soundness of the investment in rural access infrastructure, an ex-post evaluation has been made on a sample of road subprojects financed under the three parallel sources of funding (ARTF, IDA and JSDF). The criteria for selecting subprojects were more or less similar under each project. The objective of social

14

protection cut across the three projects, and the design, implementation arrangements and delivery mechanism were the same. Their implementation periods also overlapped substantially, and they had similar social impacts. Conclusions drawn from analysis of NEEPRA and NEEPRAL subprojects therefore apply also to NEEP-I with reasonable confidence. This was confirmed by the result of the analysis carried out on one NEEP-I subproject included in the sample. The following summarizes the results of this analysis5.Economic rate of return: The estimated ERRs based on savings in vehicle operating costs and travel time ranged from 5% to 46%. Out of 14 sample road investments, three yielded ERRs ranging from 5 to 8%. Another five yielded ERRs ranging from 12 to 19%, and the rest yielded returns over 22% (see Annex 3). When pooled together, the sample projects generated an ERR of 22%. The rate of return would have been higher if a monetary value could have been put on non-quantified social and environmental benefits attributable to the improved roads. (Such benefits were not subject to any systematic monitoring and impact evaluation.) Convergence of complementary development projects in the NEEPRA project areas will further help in exploiting the potential second-round employment and other benefits, but much depends on the sustainability of the rural access infrastructure already rehabilitated. The following table shows the results for the single representative NEEP-I road located in Samangan Province in the North Region. Table 4: Partial Results of Economic Analysis of NEEP-I Representative Road

Economic Analysis Road ID

Costs ($) Benefits ($) Net PV ($) ERRRRD/WB/NEEP1/NTH/SMN/002 374,125 475,084 100,959 19% Grand Total of 14 Sample Roads 4,616,123 6,643,054 2,026,931 22%

3.4 Justification of Overall Outcome Rating Rating: Satisfactory The major intended outcomes, that is: (i) protection of social livelihoods, by creating employment opportunities, and (ii) improvement of rural access, have been realized and the physical and spending targets have even been surpassed. The project started life as support to post-conflict reconstruction. From the outset the Bank and the donors to the ARTF recognized the very limited institutional capacity of the Borrower to implement such a program. The implementation mechanisms put in place were judged, in the light of prior international experience as the best compromise between ownership by the Borrower and technical and financial competence. During implementation the capacity of the line ministries remained very weak, and UNOPS as implementing partner also suffered shortcomings of administrative competence and continuity. But the project nonetheless produced important outputs consistent with its development objective. It was also able to leverage support from other donors, fostering an enabling environment for further investment under the NRAP

5 ICR for NEEPRA, June 20, 2008

15

umbrella. Regrettably, the weakness of project monitoring and evaluation systems does not allow a full appreciation of the gains made. By the time the project was completed six years after approval, the political situation was somewhat more settled, but it remained very fragile and the administrative environment remained weak. In this light, the overall outcome can be rated satisfactory.

3.5 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts (if any, where not previously covered or to amplify discussion above) (a) Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development Efforts were made to make the project responsive to issues of gender, ethnicity, local poverty conditions, community dynamics and the institutional context. Efforts were also made to identify the most vulnerable groups. Local partners with good reputation and contacts ensured a fairly inclusive consultative process, that took place and helped prevent political interference and elite capture. Options for women to participate in the work-force were explored, using innovative solutions such as the production of building materials in the home (see photo) or other socially acceptable locations. The involvement of communities in implementing subprojects was positive. The approach adopted worked well to ensure that a pro-poor labor selection process was maintained for the community-based contracts and that community participation remained transparent, generating ownership of the subprojects. Stakeholders’ consultation was carried out for all subprojects, including secondary access roads with the involvement of social inclusion specialists. (b) Institutional Change/Strengthening Capacity in Afghanistan remains weak. The mid-term review confirmed the weaknesses and low capacity in both the public and private sectors to manage infrastructure, and acknowledged that reliance on international technical assistance was absolutely necessary. During project implementation, some capacity building activities were undertaken, including extensive on-the-job training, but it remains to be seen how this limited training impacted on the overall institutional strength. The project established the following:

• Program Implementation Units (PIUs) functioning in MPW and MRRD, managing the programs of the ministries, undertaking planning, design, implementation reporting and M&E functions.

16

• An MIS/GIS system in both line ministries and the Program Development and Coordination Unit, formerly known as the Joint Program Management Unit6.

• Standardized technical specifications for both ministries. • Innovative construction techniques adopted, including pre-stressed technology,

double surface treatment of roads, and research and trial of cement/lime stabilized road bases.

NEEP-I was implemented by MRRD and MPW using the services of UNOPS as IP. There was a perception that the delivery cost of the project was on the high side but comparable to that of other donor agencies. Nevertheless, given the low capacity of the government, the project could not have been implemented without UNOPS. The two implementing ministries differed somewhat in their project implementation approach, in that MRRD went through a reform process where most staff resigned their civil service position and became consultants. MPW did not. In MPW apart from UNOPS international staff in Kabul and the regions, there were approximately 100 national staff on IP contract, and about 150 civil servants working on the program. The civil servants were paid monthly project allowances, as the government salaries were still very low. The MPW civil servants, particularly technical staff, had been involved hands-on in subproject design and supervision and hence had gained considerable training, e.g. surveying, laboratory testing, Autocad and road design. MRRD on the other hand mostly relied on national consultants on the IP contract to carry out the project. In addition to the IP’s international staff based in the center and the regional capitals, the ministry had about 200 national staff on the IP payroll based in the center and the regions. In additional about 120 civil servants received operational/project-related allowances, but contributed only marginally to the NEEP/NRAP program. Following the mid-term review, the World Bank prepared a short discussion paper in 2005 titled “From Implementing Partners to Implementing Agencies” with an aim to inform the two ministries of the issues relating to the implementing arrangements. Thereafter, both line ministries put additional effort into identifying and retaining skilled staff and position them strategically for project implementation. The Priority Reform and Restructuring (PRR) program supported this process. Furthermore, the task team also carried out an institutional review of UNOPS. It found that certain areas like administrative procedures, and systems such as performance evaluation, information collection and documentation needed improvement. The team followed up on these findings during subsequent missions and registered progress in some areas, while others were still lagging behind, largely due to the high staff turnover.

6 Although the transition from JPMU to PDCU aimed at shifting the focus of the unit from operational to strategic policy making and program coordination, the PDCU very much remained the implementation coordination body until the end of the project. This is due to the lack of sufficient capacity in the ministries.

17

At the peak implementation period, about 700 staff were on the payroll of the NEEP cluster, i.e. NEEPRA, NEEP-I and NEEP DDR/RLS. Over time, several layers of management were created, for example, MPW and MRRD program coordinators, chief and deputy chief coordinators of the PDCU, director and deputy directors of the project implementation units of MRRD and MPW. The national consultants in the central and regional PIUs had national counterparts who were there for capacity building purposes. The number of national staff providing services went up due to increased focus on capacity building, further dispersed geographic location of works, and increased scope of services to be provided (support for programs rather than single projects). National consultants included those individuals who had opted for the Government’s Priority Reform and Restructuring process, and were hired on a consultancy basis through a competitive process (undertaken by UNOPS). The salary scales of national staff were based loosely on PRR pay scales (less than market rates) in order to ensure that national staff could be absorbed by the ministries at a later stage. The PRR enabled the staff of core civil service departments, ministries and agencies and self-financed public sector organizations, undertaking key functions, to be placed on an interim additional allowance for a fixed term in return for undertaking a reform and restructuring process. The initial objective of the PRR was to restore administrative capacity by stimulating incremental reform of priority functions through a combination of: (i) careful restructuring of such units through revised vision, goals, organizational structure and job descriptions based on job output; (ii) appointment of key staff to new positions through a merit-based open and competitive process; (iii) pay increases through an interim allowance system to attract qualified Afghans into government and (iv) administrative efficiency improvements. In June 2007, the task team recommended more rationalized staffing to avoid duplication and under-utilization of personnel. (c) Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts (positive or negative)

The World Bank played a pivotal role in donor coordination and mobilization of additional financing for Afghanistan’s rural access agenda. The Bank’s leadership fostered better donor coordination, which helped avoid duplication of efforts. The NEEP as a program and NEEP-I as a project proved to be a good delivery instrument for the priority social protection goals. NEEP-I secured from donors additional financing ($34 million) more than the original grant amount, without the need to prepare a new project. This not only ensured the continuity of the program, but also allowed its expansion into NEEPRA and NEEPRAL.

3.6 Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and/or Stakeholder Workshops No beneficiary survey has been carried out for the NEEP-I project.

18

4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome Rating: Significant

Since the project was designed for rapid delivery in the start-up phase of post-conflict reconstruction, it was appraised quickly, in the expectation that it was preparing the ground for a larger IDA-funded operation to be launched a few months later. At the time there was no requirement for a systematic risk identification and risk management plan, but the task team was well aware of the underlying risks and mainstreamed the mitigation measures in the project design. In hindsight the project was a high risk/high reward operation, and the lesson learned provided a good foundation in designing a recent project such as NERAP (approved in 2008). Sustainability: The main risks to the development outcome pertain to the sustainability of the investments and the capacity of the line ministries to identify and implement suitable mechanisms to provide and manage the maintenance of the assets. The Government lacks an overall rural infrastructure strategy and related to this, planning for maintenance of infrastructure is inadequate. There is also no sustainable flow of maintenance funding that will assure optimum asset management. It is hoped that the Rural Access Strategy to be developed under NERAP will address this issue. Targeted Beneficiaries: On the social protection side, the project succeeded in generating 5.2 million days of labor. It made attempts to include women in road construction to the extent possible. Women’s ability to take part in NEEP subprojects was very limited because of cultural norms and traditions that prevent women from working in public in many provinces. Special efforts were made to reserve employment space for women and the disabled, but this practice was the exception rather than the norm. Security: The escalation of the insurgency is one of the major risks to the assets and their maintenance, and to the effective capacity of the ministries to provide services. Security is deteriorating across the country, and particularly in the southern and eastern regions, where project and contractor staff have become casualties or received threats and warnings. Criminal activities against staff, contractors, and offices have also increased. Weak Capacity of Institutions: Scarce availability of qualified engineers, fiduciary specialists, and technical staff in the public sector is exacerbated by a crowding out effect from the emerging private sector. More generously funded donor projects may further weaken the capacity of the ministries to manage programs. There is a substantial risk that qualified national staff will leave their jobs in the ministries, due to the low civil service salaries or poor management environment. Afghanistan still has a very limited skills base due to the prolonged conflict and the slow return of qualified people. Weak Construction Industry: There is a risk that experienced contractors may not be available for further work, including routine and exceptional maintenance if needed.

19

5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance

5.1 Bank Performance (a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry

Rating: Satisfactory The Bank’s performance in ensuring quality at entry is rated as satisfactory, based on a cumulative analysis, as listed in Table 5. Table 5: Evaluation of Bank’s Quality at Entry Criterion Rating Justification Strategic relevance and approach

Satisfactory Project objectives were closely aligned with the Government’s priorities and the Bank’s country assistance strategy. Follow-on projects have built on and expanded the objectives into a bigger Rural Access Program. The intention to target the poorest was not completely realistic because the disabled and women could not benefit from jobs on construction sites. The objective to rebuild the rural road systems was highly relevant to the country requirements.

Technical and financial aspects

Moderately satisfactory

The overarching goal was a rapid transfer of cash through employment creation and no economic analysis was carried out at entry. Ex-post evaluation of the NEEP program, including one subproject funded by NEEP-I, showed ERs of about 20 percent.

Fiduciary aspects

Satisfactory Cognizant of the weak capacities of the implementing ministries, the Bank fully entrusted procurement and financial management functions to the IP. It designed procurement systems to be as simple as possible for quick delivery and easier contract management.

Poverty, gender and social development

Satisfactory Identification of the most vulnerable groups was handled adequately. Local partners with good reputation and contacts ensured the consultative processes that took place and helped prevent political interference and elite capture. Options for women to participate in the work-force were explored, using innovative solutions such as the production of building materials in the home or other socially acceptable locations.

Policy and institutional aspects


At entry the emergency nature of the project did not lend itself to a strong focus on policy. Rural road rehabilitation was viewed as a means for quick cash transfer without a strong policy direction. Quick implementation was given priority over institution-building.

Stakeholder consultations

Satisfactory The Government carried out a series of consultations among stakeholders that ensured better ownership during implementation.

Implementation arrangements

Satisfactory Given the weak capacity of the line ministries, the reliance on the IP (drawing on prior experience) was the right choice. The same IP was involved for all NEEP projects to ensure continuity and to tap from the project knowledge accumulated over the years.

Monitoring and evaluation Arrangements

Satisfactory The monitorable indicators were relevant and strongly linked to the PDO. They were designed to be simple, considering the limited institutional capacity to monitor them.

Risk assessment

Satisfactory At the time there was no requirement for a systematic risk identification and risk management plan. However, the task team was well aware of the underlying risks and mainstreamed the mitigation measures in the project

20

design. In hindsight its was a high risk/high reward operation and the lessons learned provided a good foundation in designing a recent project, such as NERAP.

(b) Quality of Supervision

Rating: Satisfactory

The Bank’s supervision performance is rated as satisfactory, based on a cumulative analysis of the Bank’s performance against key criteria relevant to the developmental and country context, as listed in Table 6. Table 6: Evaluation of Quality of Bank Supervision Criterion Rating Justification Focus on development Impact

Highly satisfactory

The supervision team always kept an eye on the achievement of the objectives, by quickly clearing procurement documents and working closely with donors to assure the timely availability of financing, not to interrupt the labor-intensive projects.

Supervision of fiduciary aspects

Satisfactory The team maintained close interaction with the ministries and IP on procurement aspects and periodically suggested improvements to the procurement procedures in use by the IP to ensure greater harmonization with Bank standards.

Candor and quality of performance reporting

Satisfactory Internal project reporting was candid in pointing out deficiencies and shortcomings in the implementation processes such as procurement, cost-monitoring and financial management; and reporting on performance indicators, particularly the outcomes.

Role in ensuring adequate transition arrangements

Satisfactory Learning from this project, the Bank team, in preparing the follow-on project, designed transition arrangements such that the implementing ministries would take over some responsibilities and their performance was assessed during the mid-term review with a view to their assuming more responsibilities.

(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Bank Performance

Rating: Satisfactory

The Bank’s overall performance is rated as satisfactory, based on a combined reading of the ratings received in respect of quality at entry and supervision. 5.2 Borrower Performance (a) Government Performance Rating: Moderately Satisfactory

The Government’s performance is rated as moderately satisfactory, based on a cumulative analysis, as listed in Table 7.

21

Table 7: Evaluation of Government Performance Criterion Rating Justification Government ownership and commitment to achieving development objectives

Highly satisfactory

From the outset the government was clear on the country’s priorities and formulated 12 development programs, six of them priorities. The Livelihood and Social Protection program is one of the six. The Government has always been in the driver seat to mobilize resources from donors, which has been seen as highly successful. The NEEP/NRAP program was overseen by high-level government officials chairing its steering committee.

Provision of enabling policy environment


As an emergency social protection operation, the project cut across sectors and was not aligned to a specific sector or theme. For this reason there was no clear sector policy. But, the Govt in its transitional strategy gave it the highest priority and housed it under its most dynamic ministries, MPW, MIWRE and MRRD.

Adequacy of stakeholder consultations

Satisfactory The Government ensured the inclusion and active participation of international financing partners and public stakeholders at the provincial and district levels, in the process of policy development and subsequent project implementation. Community councils were responsible for selecting the laborers.

Role in ensuring synergies between programs/projects


Co-ordination within and across ministries and agencies has been, and continues to be, weak. There is still no well-defined and shared strategy for capacity building. Investment programs are not sufficiently coordinated to achieve maximum synergies

Implementation readiness


The Government was flexible enough to set up arrangements for carrying out the project smoothly. From the start it acknowledged the line ministries’ weak capacities and sought the intensive support of UNOPS and consultants.

(b) Implementing Agencies’ Performance Rating: Moderately satisfactory

The work and inputs to the project of implementing agencies MPW, MRRD, MIWRE and the Implementing Partner (UNOPS) are hardly distinguishable, since in the project’s early years the ministries relied heavily on UNOPS. The combined performance of the line ministries and UNOPS is rated as moderately satisfactory, based on a cumulative analysis, as listed in Table 8. Table 8: Evaluation of Implementing Agency/Partner’s Performance Criterion Rating Justification Ownership and commitment to achieving development objectives

Satisfactory UNOPS remained firmly committed to achievement of the targeted project outcomes, such as simultaneous analytical work towards rural access policy development that recommended: (a) rationalization of the growing use of equipment-based methods in rural access rehabilitation, and; (b) use of innovative construction techniques based on local resources that could generate more employment opportunities.

Adequacy of stakeholder


The line ministries did their best to reach out and consult with beneficiaries in the identification of projects, and targeted

22

Criterion Rating Justification consultations beneficiaries in the cash-for-work program. A Social Inclusion

Unit was established and assigned officers in the regions to facilitate consultation. Donor coordination by the line ministries was limited but was mitigated by an active Bank engagement with the donors and the ministries.

Implementation readiness

Satisfactory Unlike the common defensive attitude of most public entities called on to outsource their core function, the ministries were candid enough to acknowledge their weak capacities and sought the intensive support of implementation partners and consultants. The arrangement worked satisfactorily with marked improvement and increasing involvement of the ministries, for a later take-over.

Timely resolution of implementation issues


Because of the weakness of institutional capacity and relevant strategies, the ministries and UNOPS were often been slow in resolving implementation issues, with consequent delays.

Fiduciary management and control

Moderately Satisfactory

Financial management was satisfactory despite initial problems with timely reporting. Similarly procurement management was not fully effective until a decision was made for all procurement activities to be carried out in accordance with the Bank’s bidding documents (replacing UNOPS’ standard documents). Shortage of qualified staff in procurement had been a challenge to UNOPS. The effort made to address social issues was commendable. Environmental issues were not given the same attention, but the project had negligible environmental impacts.

Adequacy of monitoring and evaluation arrangements


The indicators designed to monitor outcomes were simple and measurable. UNOPS adequately updated the progress of the outcomes, with a reliable data collection arrangement.

Adequacy of transition arrangements


The broader government focus now seems to be shifting toward more equipment-based construction methods, to the inadvertent exclusion of the future scope of public works-based social protection interventions. In these circumstances the implementing agencies launched commendable analytical and capacity building work (especially over the closing period) toward the potential mainstreaming of key thematic priorities in future rural access and social protection policy and strategy formulation.

(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Borrower Performance

Rating: Moderately satisfactory

The Borrower’s overall performance is rated as moderately satisfactory, based on a combined reading of the ratings received in respect of quality at entry and supervision.

6. Lessons Learned (both project-specific and of wide general application) Several key lessons have emerged from this operation, which are relevant for other fragile states and post-conflict reconstruction cases.

23

First, post-conflict projects require good understanding of local social structures and an ability to work with local leaders. Project implementation in a conflict-affected environment requires flexibility in deploying and redeploying staff; good understanding of local social structures; an ability to work with community leaders to ensure access to project sites and security; good capacity to manage and supervise community-based contracting, which, in volatile areas, may be the most appropriate solution; and the provision of visible benefits to the population through short lead times, employment creation, and quality infrastructure. Second, we have to expect rapid rotation of staff on the client side, which presents a big challenge for continuity. Rapid rotation of staff on both the client and the Bank sides increases the need for robust fiduciary systems. And yet it is difficult to attract to the country quality staff that can develop and update such systems. Third, capacity building efforts should be targeted at those directly involved in project implementation, not at a general pool. When the capacity of client staff is weak, capacity building efforts need be targeted to those staff involved in project implementation rather than to general capacity building for the ministries. Experience in Afghanistan on capacity building through provision of generalized technical assistance has had limited success because it was neither targeted nor linked to measurable performance improvements. Fourth, keep projects simple. Projects need to be focus on one or two key objectives and minimize institutional demands on incipient public sector administrations. This is especially valid during the initial post-conflict reconstruction period. This was also one of the recommendations of the Bank’s FY07 Quality of Supervision Assessment of NEEPRA: Countries emerging from conflict generally face considerable damage to institutional capacity, social capital and relations, economic conditions and infrastructure, coupled with large numbers of donors and NGOs seeking government attention. Fifth, Bank management needs to be flexible and hold modest expectations. Risk is inherently higher in these contexts, and expectations need to be adjusted in line with what can be reasonably achieved during the initial reconstruction phase. Although the Bank provides for a fast-track procedure for project preparation in conflict-affected countries, implementation procedures remain as for standard Bank operations, and this may affect project delivery, timeliness and effectiveness. Revision of Bank policies for implementation might be necessary to reap the full benefits of accelerated project preparation. Post-conflict conditions need to be taken into account and procedures should be flexible enough to accommodate specific implementation needs.

24

7. Comments on Issues Raised by Grantee/Implementing Agencies/Donors (a) Grantee/Implementing agencies The implementing agencies commented on December 14, 2009 that the draft Implementation Completion Report of NEEP-I was formulated very well and reflected the overall achievements and impacts of the project. (b) Cofinanciers/Donors Not Applicable.

25

Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing

(a) Project Cost by Component (in $ million equivalent) Components Appraisal

Estimate ($ million)

Actual ($ million)

Percentage of Appraisal

Rehabilitation of Secondary Roads 21.95 35.41 161% Rehabilitation of Tertiary Roads 0.00 13.93 No allocation

at appraisal Repairs and Desilting of Irrigation Canals 3.47 3.47 100% Total Baseline Cost 25.42 52.81 208% Physical Contingencies 0.00 0.00 0

Price Contingencies 0.00 0.00 0

Total Project Costs 25.42 52.81 208%

(b) Financing Source of Funds Appraisal

Estimate ($ million)

Actual ($ million)

Percentage of Appraisal

ARTF 25.42 52.81 208%

26

Annex 2. Outputs by Component

Components Output

Rehabilitation of tertiary roads (km) 2,543 Rehabilitation of secondary roads (km) 630 Irrigated area benefitting from repairs to, and desilting of, canals (ha) 15,000 Length of structures (linear m) 19,090 Unskilled labor employed (person-days) 5,256,874

The location of rehabilitated roads can be seen in the map at the end of this report. The rehabilitated irrigation areas are too dispersed to be shown in the map. A detailed list of all sub-projects is in the files.

27

Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis

To confirm the economic soundness of the Project’s investment in a series of clustered projects under the NEEP umbrella and later on under NRAP, an ex-post evaluation has been made on a sample of subprojects financed under the National Emergency Employment Program for Rural Access (NEEPRA, IDA), the National Emergency Employment Program for Reintegration and Alternative Livelihood (NEEPRAL, JSDF-funded) and this project. The criteria for selecting subprojects under each project were more or less similar and expected to yield the same end result. The overarching objective of social protection cut across the three projects, and the design, implementation arrangements, and delivery mechanism were the same. Implementation periods also significantly overlapped, and they had similar social impacts. It is therefore concluded that conclusions drawn about NEEPRA and NEEPRAL subprojects apply also to NEEP-I, with a reasonable level of confidence. This was confirmed by the result of the economic analysis carried out on one NEEP-I subproject included in the sample. 1. Project Coverage: The project development objective was to assist the Recipient in providing employment in rural areas at a minimum wage, as a safety net, to as many people and in as short a time as might be feasible. NEEP-I completed 3,173 km of rural access roads and 19,090 meters of cross-drainage structures. In addition 98 natural resource management subprojects, 23 small irrigation subprojects and four large irrigation subprojects (restoring flow to 15,000 hectares in the Shamalan area) were completed. Of the 538 contracts awarded, 504 contracts were completed, and 34 contracts were terminated or canceled for various reasons. Days of labor generated under the project were 5.26 million. Subprojects under NEEP-I (and with further continuous financing under the follow-on National Rural Access Projects) have now reached 358 districts in all 34 provinces of Afghanistan. 2. Database: No monitoring and evaluation process was in place at the start of implementation but a monitoring system was set up later. No impact evaluation was carried out because of the very difficult country circumstances. The economic analysis is therefore based on data drawn from several sources. The social audit report of NRAP, covering 11 subprojects from nine districts and seven provinces, has documented the qualitative impacts of rural access infrastructure investments: increased access to motorized vehicles, public buses, health services, education facilities, employment opportunities, mechanized agriculture, distant markets and developmental projects. Based on these findings, case studies were conducted covering a sample of 14 subprojects (including one under NEEP-I) distributed among 25 districts and 10 provinces. These subprojects were equally divided between the implementing agencies (MPW and MRRD), representing diversity in the contract levels and types of rural access infrastructure investments. Secondary data were collected from project office documents and health center records, traffic surveys, community-level interactions, focus group discussions and assessment by the professional experts including the site engineers. They were used to generate the needed database for quantifying the project benefits. Sampled subprojects covered 126 km of rehabilitated rural roads and two bridges/culverts. The total investment cost was $3.6 million, benefiting 182 villages and 73,873 families with a

28

total population of 0.5 million. About half of the beneficiary families were farmers’ families directly cultivating agriculture lands. 3. Project Benefits: Improved roads have generated multiple benefits providing better access to basic services and facilities like education and health, economic opportunities such as access to markets, employment and agriculture mechanization and development projects, for example access to primary and secondary roads, power, drinking water supply, housing and drainage improvements. 4. Basic Services and Facilities: Rehabilitated sample rural roads provided better connectivity to 23 hospitals and all villages located within a maximum distance of 7.5 km from these hospitals took advantage of the improved access to health services. Outpatients using the hospital facilities increased by 30%, women seeking pre-natal care went up by 90%, and women seeking delivery care and services doubled during the post-project period. The ratio of women availing themselves of prenatal services from these hospitals went up from 41% to 51% in the benefited villages. As a result of improved roads connectivity, 111 villages located along the sample roads got better access to schools located nearby, as well as in the district centers. Enrolled students in 17 primary schools, 22 secondary schools and 5 high schools connected by the sample roads increased by 36% during the post-project period. The proportion of girls taking advantage of education facilities increased from 29 to 36%. 5. Economic Opportunities: Without the project, 151 villages experienced disruption in road connectivity for 2.7 months in a year. With rehabilitated and improved roads under the project, the disruption came down to 0.4 month in a year. The sample subprojects collectively generated employment of 205,116 days worked during the project implementation period, providing a wage rate of $3.30 per day. Disbursed wages accounted for 19% of the actual infrastructure investments. In addition to this direct employment, 157,342 days worked have also been generated annually due to expanded agriculture and non-agriculture activities. The nominal wage rate went up by 24% and the real wage rate increased by 9%, indicating improved labor productivity associated with improved rural access infrastructure.

6. Agriculture Impacts: Better road connectivity has triggered mechanized cultivation of wheat and reduced the unit cost of wheat production in project benefited villages. The cropped area went up by 19% and transportation cost for an average distance of 15 km was halved. Improved roads facilitated higher profit margins for the wheat-producing farmers, mainly driven by improved efficiency in agriculture; 90% contributed by reduced unit costs of production and 10% by increased unit price due to reduced transportation cost to the market. The number of pairs of oxen came down by 65%. The number of tractors used by the farmers in the benefited villages more than doubled and the number of threshers used for wheat threshing more than tripled during the post-project period. The area ploughed with tractors and wheat area covered by threshers increased by about 150% during the post-project period.

29

7. More Development Projects: Better road connectivity facilitated more flow of funds for other development projects in the villages connected by the improved road network. Specifically, in the villages benefiting from improved road access, investment projects covering infrastructure development (roads, power, housing and drainage), economic development (livestock improvement, income-generating activities) and social development (drinking water supply) have either been completed or are in an advanced stage of completion. These completed and on-going projects, during the last three years, in the NEEPRA beneficiary villages account for $2.7 million funded from various national and international agencies, amounting to 75% of the NEEPRA-led infrastructure investments in the sample roads.

8. Economic Analysis: The sample roads covered 126 km of rehabilitated rural access infrastructure. Incremental benefits due to improved rural roads come from savings in vehicle operating costs (VOC) and savings in time taken for travel, which are valued using the concept of consumer surplus. Underlying assumptions for the economic analysis are: project life of 10 years; potential vehicle operating cost and time benefits due to roads to be realized in four years in equal increments; average annual routine maintenance cost for improved roads at 5% of the investment; average periodic maintenance cost for improved roads at 8% of the investment; frequency of periodic maintenance being twice during the project life; average annual growth in the motorized traffic at 4.5% ‘with the project’ and 1% ‘without the project’; and opportunity cost of capital at 12%. The financial prices of non-traded goods and services have been adjusted to economic prices using a factor of 0.8. 9. VOC and time savings have been estimated for 13 types of vehicles using data on traffic volume and travel time data available for the ‘before’ and ‘after’ project situations. The needed database was drawn from available national data, a sample NEEP-I/NEEPRA roads survey and professional experts/site engineers’ judgment, supplemented with similar rural road rehabilitation investments and experiences in South Asia, including Pakistan and India. Average annual economic benefits from VOC savings are estimated at $6,112 per km and average annual economic benefits from time savings are assessed at $2,452 per km for the improved roads at 2007 prices. About 71% of the benefits result from VOC savings and the other 29% comes from time savings. 10. Economic Rate of Return: The estimated ERRs based on VOC and time savings ranged from 5% to 46%. Out of 14 sample road investments, three subprojects yielded the lowest ERRs ranging from 5 to 8%. Another five projects yielded 12 to 19%, while the rest yielded a rate of return over 22%. The variation in return is probably due to differences in the complexity (and hence cost) of the works and the volume of traffic. When all the 14 sample projects are pooled together, the rural access infrastructure investments generated a net present value of $2 million over 10-year project cycle with an ERR of 22%. The actual rate of return to the NEEP-I/NEEPRA road investments will be higher if some of the social benefits directly attributable to the improved roads can be segregated and measured. These benefits are excluded in the rate of return analysis since no systematic M&E and impact assessment was done. Convergence of complementary development projects in the NEEPRA project areas will further help in exploiting the

30

potential second-round employment and other benefits, but much depends on the sustainability of the rural access infrastructure already rehabilitated under NEEPRA.

Table 9: Economic Returns of Selected Roads under NEEP

Present Value ($000) Road ID

Costs Benefits Net ERR

Ministry of Public Works NEEPRA-PW/023/NRHE/BKN/BR-042 $147 $105 ($42) 5% NEEPRA-PW/051/KUN/BGH-09 $330 $947 $617 46% NEEPRA-PW-C2/KBE/KBL-010 $317 $322 $5 12% NEEPRA-PW-C2/KBE/KBL-010 $1,026 $1,121 $95 15% NEEPRA/PW/058/JAL/NAG/009 $500 $789 $289 25% MPW/WB/NRAP/KBL/PRN/002/C2/001 $249 $593 $353 40% NEEPRA-PW/046/NORTH/SAM/003 $47 $116 $69 38%

Ministry of Rural Reconstruction & Development

RRD/WB/NEEPRA/KBL/KBL/003 $208 $485 $277 38% RRD/WB/NEEPRA/KBL/PRN/001 $72 $81 $9 15% RRD/JF/RAL/KBL/KBL/001 $369 $410 $401 14% RRD/PS/NRAP/MTC/EAST/LMN/003 $234 $178 ($56 6% AFG/03/R8/East/NGR/001/C2/001 @ $82 $65 ($17 8% RRD/JF/RAL/NTH/BLH/002 $670 $956 $286 22% RRD/WB/NEEP1/NTH/SMN/002* $374 $475 $101 19%

Grand Total $4,616 $6,643 $2,027 22% * funded from NEEP-I grant

31

Annex 4. Grant Preparation and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes

(a) Task Team Members Names Title Unit Responsibility/

Specialty Lending/Grant Preparation

Amer Durani Sr. Transport Specialist SASDT Teak Team Leader Hasan Azfal Zaidi Transport Specialist SASDT Transport Specialist

Supervision/ICR Abdul Hameed Khalili Operations Analyst SASDT Operations Mgmt. Amer Zafar Durrani Sr. Transport Specialist SASDT Former TTL Anna Cestari Young Professional YPP Engineer Asha Narayan Financial Analyst SARFM Financial Managemt Christine Helen Allison Lead Human Developmt Spec. SASHD Social Protection Deepal Fernando Sr. Procurement Specialist SARPS Procurement Dhirendra Kumar Consultant SARPS Procurement Hasan Afzal Zaidi Transport Specialist SASDT Transport Specialist Kenneth O. Okpara Sr. Financial Management Spec. SARFM Financial Managemt Maha Ahmed Consultant SASDA Gender Mesfin Jijo Sr Transport Specialist SASDN ICR TTL Mohammad Arif Rasuli Environmental Spec. SASDI Environment Mohammad Q. Haidari Sr. Operations Officer SASDT Operations Mgmt. Nagaraju Duthaluri E T Consultant SARPS Procurement Naila Ahmed E T Consultant SASDA Social Inclusion Nobuo Yoshida Economist SASPR Economist Palwasha Lena Kakar Consultant SASDN Social Safeguards Rahimullah Wardak Procurement Analyst SARPS Procurement Rajesh Dongol ACS SASDT Team Assistant Susanne Holste Sr. Transport Specialist SASDT Former TTL Vardah Khalil Malik Assoc. Investment Off. CGMP8 Finance Zabi Ahrary ACS SACAF Team Assistant Zafar Iqbal Raja Sr. Highway Engineer SASDT Engineering

(b) Staff Time and Cost

Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only) Stage of Project Cycle No. of staff weeks $ 000 (including travel and consultant costs)

Lending FY05 10.05 41.78 FY06 11.18 27.56 FY07 24.26 64.82

Supervision/ICR FY08 1.3 1.88 FY09 12.4 22.12 FY10 2.8 2.39

Total: 61.99 160.55 Note: This project was supervised jointly with the two parallel projects being carried out under the common NRAP umbrella. Hence staff inputs to each project were not recorded separately.

32

Annex 5. Summary of Grantee’s ICR

I. Executive Summary Introduction In 1381, Afghanistan had entered a new era of peace after quarter century of conflict and the new Transitional Islamic Government of Afghanistan was grappling with multitude of problems. One of the primary areas of concern was poor infrastructure like roads, bridges, irrigation system in rural areas. It is under this context, National Emergency Employment Program (NEEP), later renamed National Rural Access Program (NRAP), came into existence, to improve road/irrigation infrastructure and provide the much needed income transfer to rural poor through short term employment. National Rural Access Program is a National Priority Program, which finds strategic relevance under the National Development Framework, Interim Afghanistan National Development Strategy (I-ANDS) Afghanistan Compact 2006 and Comprehensive Agriculture and Rural Development (CARD) strategy. The Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) is the donor for this project, with contributions from agencies like DFID, USAID, AusAID and CIDA. The trust fund is administered by World Bank. NEEP 1 has been effective from 1381 (14th March 2003) to 1388 (31st March 2009). The total value of the grant is USD 52.82 million. NRAP strategy is “Nation-wide quality rehabilitation, reconstruction and maintenance of essential rural access infrastructure using appropriate labor based approaches thereby creating short term employment opportunities for the rural poor”. The program consisted of three main components dealing with Secondary Roads Implemented by MPW, Tertiary roads implemented by MRRD and Irrigation component implemented by MIRWE, now called Ministry of Energy and Water. UNOPS was the implementation partner for NEEP and executed crucial tasks related to Logistics, Survey and Design, Contracts management, Human Resources, Financial management, Procurement and Facilities management. UNOPS played a significant role in enhancing capacity of National Consultants, Ministry staff and contractors through numerous training and capacity building initiatives. Project Performance NEEP focused on Labor Intensive Public Works for short term employment until NEEP review in late 1383 which changed the program course. Program was renamed as NRAP at this juncture and primary focus shifted to nature of infrastructure instead of emergency relief. The program exceeded the intended outputs by a large margin and details are given in Table 1.1. The program has received consistent satisfactory rating from ARTF from 1384 to 1387 for achieving the grant objectives and implementation.

33

The main beneficiaries of this program were rural poor of Afghanistan who benefited from improved roads and employment opportunities, program implementing ministries like MPW, MRRD and MIRWE which gained from capacity building efforts and program execution experience, local private contractors in terms of capacity building and local shura/CDCs through community contract implementation experience.

As evident from Table 1, the program has surpassed expectations in terms of irrigation, total length of structures including bridges, cross drainage and protection structures and employment generated. The program has substantially achieved 98% of the roads target. Table 1: Progress against targets specified in ARTF Amendment 3 Performance Indicators Baseline Revised

targets Achieved to

date Progress

Roads (km) 5,000 3,100 3,173 102% Irrigation areas rehabilitated (hectares)

24,000 15,000 15,000 100%

Length of structures (m) n.a 9,700 19,090 211% Un-skilled labor days 4,780,000 5,200,000 5,256,874 101%

Factors affecting implementation The main factors which affected Project implementation were Insecurity, Weak contracting capacity, Project finance issues, NEEP Review and National ownership. While the initial three factors affected implementation adversely, last two affected the project positively. (a) Insecurity- Due to the evolving and unpredictability of the security situation in certain

parts of the country, the NRAP team found it very challenging to accurately forecast work plan, estimate construction costs, finish the project without delays and had limited international and national supervision in insecure areas due to UN MOSS movement requirements.

(b) Weak contracting capacity -Weak contracting capacity due to the post conflict nature of

the country also created implementation issues with respect to quality, cost and timely completion. Contractors generally had limited financial and staff capacity and UNOPS has conducted several capacity building activities to improve their capacity.

(c) Project Finance issues- Funding delay of 12 months between ARTF Project approval and

first tranche disbursement, exchange rate loss due to delayed grant amount disbursal, and absence of a multi year donor funding also affected project implementation negatively.

(d) NEEP Review conducted in early part of 2005 brought a strategic shift to the program

and focus changed from being a short term emergency program to long term sustainable program under National Rural Access Program. This review also suggested an improved management structure and the safety net objective were removed.

(e) National ownership is another significant factor which has affected the program

positively. Ministerial ownership at Planning and implementation has resulted in significant increase in capacity building.

34

Lessons Learned Some of the main lessons learned are as follows (a) Programmatic approach in financial management allowed project to function without break, during project finance delays (b) Clients were proactive and took timely course corrections at strategic level whenever needed (c) Strong emphasis was placed on capacity building efforts for Ministry counterparts, National Consultants and Local contractors (d) Ambitious Implementation period and weak risk forecasting resulted in delay of target delivery (e) Lack of fixed procurement plans resulted in frequent changes in plan and delayed works implementation and (f) Level 1 community contracts are a good confidence building tool for the involved communities and facilitated easier access to project sites and local patronage (g) Capacity building efforts need to be targeted and performance oriented instead of general targeting (h) Lack of baseline information and unreliable country profile data negatively affected the quality of planning, target setting and evaluation of impact Recommendations Under project design, for future projects, it is recommended to develop a program wide investment planning and establish baseline data at the program outset. For future projects, more systematic capacity building plans should be implemented throughout the project cycle and more importance needs to be given in improving local contractor’s capacity. Considering delays in project implementation due to UN MOSS movement requirements, it is recommended to bring some possible changes and flexibilities in contracting modalities of project staff in order to assure on time and proper supervision of sub-project sites. Conclusion Despite various external constraints, the Government has been able to successfully complete the program, exceed output expectation and secure further funding for next phase of NRAP, i.e. NERAP. Capacity has been built among ministry staff, national consultants and local contractors, although more targeted approach needs to be adopted for future programs. The intended beneficiaries have benefited directly or indirectly through NRAP and this has been a program where it was nationally planned and locally executed with optimum usage of local people and resources.

35

Annex 6. List of Supporting Documents

1. ARTF Application for NEEP-I. 2. ARTF Application for Additional Financing of NEEP-I. 3. ARTF Grant Agreement – March 14, 2003. 4. Afghanistan Transitional Support Strategy, March 12, 2002. 5. Afghanistan Transitional Support Strategy, February 14, 2003. 6. Technical Annex for Emergency community Empowerment and Public Works

Project, May 13, 2002. 7. Grant Reporting and Monitoring Reports (GRM), 2004, 2005, 2006. 8. ARTF Grant Agreement Amendments-No.1, No.2 and No.3. 9. Aide Memoirs for NEEP/NERAP Cluster Projects. 10. Implementation Status and Results Report (ISR), February 2009. 11. “The Road from Emergency Employment towards Integrated Rural Access-Re-

orientation of the Afghanistan national emergency Employment program to the Rural Access Program”, Report No. 19, South Asia Human development Sector, Sustainable Development Sector, November 2006.

12. National Emergency Employment Program Phase-1, Final Completion Report, UNOPS, June 25, 2009.

13. National Emergency Employment Program, Final Review Report. 14. Implementation Completion and Results Report, NEEPRAL, WB, Report No.

48602, May 29, 2009. 15. Implementation Completion and Results Report, NEEPRA, WB, Report No.

ICR0000625, June 20, 2008. 16. Implementation Completion and Results Report, ECEPWP, WB, Report No.

33120-AF.

Meydan Shahr¯

Bamyan¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯Charıkar

Gardız̄Ghaznı̄

¯ ¯Taloqan¯Kunduz

¯Baghlan¯Samangan

Mazar-eSharıf

¯¯

¯Sheberghan

¯Chaghcharan

Khadir

¯Herat

¯Farah

Zaranj

¯Lashkar Gah¯Kandahar

¯Qalat

¯Tarın Kowt

Pol-e ‘Alam

¯ ¯ ¯Jalalabad

¯Mehtarlam

¯ ¯Nuristan

Bazarak

¯ ¯Asadabad

Sharan

Kowst

Meymaneh

Saripul

¯ ¯¯Mahmud-e Raqı¸

Faisabad

KABUL¯

B A D G H I S

H E R A TG H O R

F A R A H

N I M R O Z

K A N D A H A R

U R U Z G A N

D A Y K U N D I

P A K T I K A

PAKTYA

G H A Z N I

NANGARHAR

KABULLAGHMAN

B A G H L A N

KAPISAPARWAN

SAMANGAN

TAKHAR

BADAKHSHAN

KUNDUZJAWZJAN

F A R Y A B

H I L M A N D

KHOST

Z A B U L

LOGARWARDAK

KUNAR

PANJSHER

B A L K H

SAR I PUL

B A M Y A N

NURISTAN

T U R K M E N I S T A N

U Z B E K I S T A NT A J I K I S T A N T A J I K I S T A N

P A K I S T A N

P A K I S T A N

ISLAMICREPUBL ICOF IRAN

Qal‘eh-yeNow

Meydan Shahr¯

Bamyan¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯Charıkar

Gardız̄Ghaznı̄

Taloqan¯ ¯¯Kunduz

¯Baghlan¯Samangan

Mazar-eSharıf¯

¯¯Sheberghan

¯Chaghcharan

Khadir

¯Herat

¯Farah

Zaranj

¯Lashkar Gah¯Kandahar

¯Qalat

¯Tarın Kowt

Pol-e ‘Alam

¯ ¯ ¯Jalalabad

¯Mehtarlam

¯ ¯Nuristan

Bazarak

¯ ¯Asadabad

Sharan

Kowst

Meymaneh

Saripul

Qal‘eh-yeNow

¯ ¯¯Mahmud-e Raqı¸

Faisabad

KABUL¯

B A D G H I S

H E R A TG H O R

F A R A H

N I M R O Z

K A N D A H A R

U R U Z G A N

D A Y K U N D I

P A K T I K A

PAKTYA

G H A Z N I

NANGARHAR

KABULLAGHMAN

B A G H L A N

KAPISAPARWAN

SAMANGAN

TAKHAR

BADAKHSHAN

KUNDUZJAWZJAN

F A R Y A B

H I L M A N D

KHOST

Z A B U L

LOGARWARDAK

KUNAR

PANJSHER

B A L K H

SAR I PUL

B A M Y A N

NURISTAN

T U R K M E N I S T A N

U Z B E K I S T A NT A J I K I S T A N T A J I K I S T A N

P A K I S T A N

P A K I S T A N

ISLAMICREPUBL ICOF IRAN

30° N

30° N

35° N

60° E

35° N

75° E

60° E

65° E 70° E

65° E

70° E

AFGHANISTAN

0 50 100

0 50 100 Miles

150 Kilometers

IBRD 37438

DECEMBER 2009

AFGHANISTAN

NATIONAL EMERGENCY EMPLOYMENT PROGRAMPHASE 1 PROJECT (NEEP 1)

NATIONAL HIGHWAYS

PROVINCE CAPITALS

NATIONAL CAPITAL

DISTRICT BOUNDARIES

PROVINCE BOUNDARIES

INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES

PROJECT ROADS

PROJECT BRIDGESThis map was produced by the Map Design Unit of The World Bank. The boundaries, colors, denominations and any other informationshown on this map do not imply, on the part of The World BankGroup, any judgment on the legal status of any territory, or anyendorsement or acceptance of such boundaries.

Public Disclosure Authorized · 2016-07-08 · CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS (As of November 30, 2009)...

Documents

Transcript of Public Disclosure Authorized · 2016-07-08 · CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS (As of November 30, 2009)...