Prof. Ian Giddy New York University Review of Corporate Financial Restructuring.

Prof. Ian GiddyNew York University

Review ofCorporate Financial

Restructuring

Copyright ©2002 Ian H. Giddy Corporate Financial Restructuring 2

Corporate Financial Restructuring

Why Restructure?

Proactive

Example:

Sealed Air

Distress

Example:

Loewen 1999

Defensive

Example:

Loewen 1996

Management acts to preserve or enhance shareholder value

Management acts to protect company, stakeholders and management from change in control

Lenders and shareholders lose, but try to work out best way to minimize loss



Corporate restructuring – business and financial

Structured financing techniques Proactive restructuring Distress-induced restructuring Mergers, divestitures and LBOs


A Simple Framework

A company is a “nexus of contracts” with shareholders, creditors, managers, employees, suppliers, etc

Restructuring is the process by which these contracts are changed – to increase the value of all claims.

Applications: restructuring creditor claims (Conseco);restructuring shareholder claims (AT&T);restructuring employee claims (UAL)


“Nexus of Contracts”

Shareholders

Senior lenders

Subordinated lenders

Franchisors

Salespeople

Management


Examples

SAP – upgrading shareholder control rights

Sealed Air – exploiting free cash flow Marvel – post-bankruptcy negotiations Westpac – structured finance Novartis – merged and divested Alphatec – rescuing residual value


Novartis: Financial Restructuring

Fixed

Assets

Debt

Equity

Assets LiabilitiesFixed the cash

and working capital

Fixed the capital

structureCash

Divested

Non-core

business


Restructuring Checklist

Figure out what the business is worth now

Use valuation model – present value of free cash flows

Fix the business mix – divestitures Value assets to be sold

Fix the business – strategic partner or merger

Value the merged firm with synergies

Fix the financing – improve D/E structure

Revalue firm under different leverage assumptions – lowest WACC

Fix the kind of equity What can be done to make the equity more valuable to investors?

Fix the kind of debt or hybrid financing

What mix of debt is best suited to this business?

Fix management or control Value the changes new control would produce


Valuation is a Key to Unlock Value

Value with and without restructuring Consider means and obstacles Who gets what? Minimum is liquidation value

Valuation

Going Concern LiquidationAfter Restructuring


Getting the Financing RightStep 1: The Proportion of Equity & Debt

Debt

Equity

Achieve lowest weighted average cost of capital

May also affect the business side


Getting the Financing RightStep 2: The Kind of Equity & Debt

Debt

Equity

Short term? Long term? Baht? Dollar? Yen?

Short term? Long term? Baht? Dollar? Yen?

Bonds? Asset-backed? Convertibles? Hybrids?

Bonds? Asset-backed? Convertibles? Hybrids?

Debt/Equity Swaps? Private? Public? Strategic partner? Domestic? ADRs?

Debt/Equity Swaps? Private? Public? Strategic partner? Domestic? ADRs?

Ownership & control? Ownership & control?


Capital Structure: Optimal Range?

VALUE OFTHE

FIRM

DEBT

RATIO

Optimal debt ratio?

Nestle Loewen


Cost of Capital and Leverage: Method

Estimated Beta

With current leverage

From regression

Unlevered Beta

With no leverage

Bu=Bl/(1+D/E(1-T))

Levered Beta

With different leverage

Bl=Bu(1+D/E(1-T))

Cost of equity


E(R)=Rf+Bl(Rm-Rf)

Equity

Leverage, EBITDA

And interest cost

Interest Coverage

EBITDA/Interest

Rating

(other factors too!)

Cost of debt


Rate=Rf+Spread+?

Debt


Ratings and Spreads

Corporate bond spreads: basis points over Treasury curveRating 1 year 2 year 5 year 10 year 30 year Typical Int Coverage RatiosAaa/AAA 40 45 60 85 96 >8.50Aa1/AA+ 45 55 70 95 106 6.50-8.50Aa2/AA 55 60 75 105 116 6.50-8.50Aa3/AA- 60 65 85 117 136 6.50-8.50A1/A+ 70 80 105 142 159 5.50-6.50A2/A 80 90 120 157 179 4.25-5.50A3/A- 90 100 130 176 196 3.00-4.25Baa1/BBB+ 105 115 145 186 208 2.50-3.00Baa2/BBB 120 130 160 201 221 2.50-3.00Baa3/BBB- 140 145 172 210 232 2.50-3.00Ba1/BB+ 225 250 300 350 440 2.00-2.50Ba2/BB 250 275 325 385 540 2.00-2.50Ba3/BB- 300 350 425 460 665 2.00-2.50B1/B+ 375 400 500 610 765 1.75-2.00B2/B 450 500 625 710 890 1.50-1.75B3/B- 500 550 750 975 1075 1.25-1.50Caa/CCC 600 650 900 1150 1300 0.80-1.25

Corporate bond spreads: basis points over Treasury curveRating 1 year 2 year 5 year 10 year 30 year Typical Int Coverage RatiosAaa/AAA 40 45 60 85 96 >8.50Aa1/AA+ 45 55 70 95 106 6.50-8.50Aa2/AA 55 60 75 105 116 6.50-8.50Aa3/AA- 60 65 85 117 136 6.50-8.50A1/A+ 70 80 105 142 159 5.50-6.50A2/A 80 90 120 157 179 4.25-5.50A3/A- 90 100 130 176 196 3.00-4.25Baa1/BBB+ 105 115 145 186 208 2.50-3.00Baa2/BBB 120 130 160 201 221 2.50-3.00Baa3/BBB- 140 145 172 210 232 2.50-3.00Ba1/BB+ 225 250 300 350 440 2.00-2.50Ba2/BB 250 275 325 385 540 2.00-2.50Ba3/BB- 300 350 425 460 665 2.00-2.50B1/B+ 375 400 500 610 765 1.75-2.00B2/B 450 500 625 710 890 1.50-1.75B3/B- 500 550 750 975 1075 1.25-1.50Caa/CCC 600 650 900 1150 1300 0.80-1.25


Interest Coverage Ratios, Spreads and Ratings: Small Firms

If interest coverage ratio isgreater than ≤ to Rating is Spread is

-100000 0.499999 D 14.00%0.5 0.799999 C 12.70%0.8 1.249999 CC 11.50%1.25 1.499999 CCC 10.00%1.5 1.999999 B- 8.00%2 2.499999 B 6.50%

2.5 2.999999 B+ 4.75%3 3.499999 BB 3.50%

3.5 4.499999 BBB 2.25%4.5 5.999999 A- 2.00%6 7.499999 A 1.80%

7.5 9.499999 A+ 1.50%9.5 12.499999 AA 1.00%12.5 100000 AAA 0.75%

Example:EBIT 10000Interest expense 2500LT Govt bond rate 6.00%

Interest coverage ratio = 4Estimated Bond Rating = BBBEstimated Default Spread = 2.25%Estimated Cost of Debt = 8.25%

Example:EBIT 10000Interest expense 2500LT Govt bond rate 6.00%

Interest coverage ratio = 4Estimated Bond Rating = BBBEstimated Default Spread = 2.25%Estimated Cost of Debt = 8.25%


Optimal Debt Ratio for a Private Company: Example

Debt RatioBetaCost of EquityBond RatingInterest RateAT Cost of DebtCost of CapitalFirm Value0% 1.03 12.65% AA 7.50% 4.35% 12.65% $26,78110% 1.09 13.01% AA 7.50% 4.35% 12.15% $29,11220% 1.18 13.47% BBB 8.50% 4.93% 11.76% $31,18230% 1.28 14.05% B+ 9.50% 5.51% 11.49% $32,80340% 1.42 14.83% B- 11.25% 6.53% 11.51% $32,67950% 1.62 15.93% CC 13.00% 7.54% 11.73% $31,34160% 1.97 17.84% CC 13.00% 7.96% 11.91% $30,33370% 2.71 21.91% C 14.50% 10.18% 13.70% $22,89180% 4.07 29.36% C 14.50% 10.72% 14.45% $20,70390% 8.13 51.72% C 14.50% 11.14% 15.20% $18,872

Debt RatioBetaCost of EquityBond RatingInterest RateAT Cost of DebtCost of CapitalFirm Value0% 1.03 12.65% AA 7.50% 4.35% 12.65% $26,78110% 1.09 13.01% AA 7.50% 4.35% 12.15% $29,11220% 1.18 13.47% BBB 8.50% 4.93% 11.76% $31,18230% 1.28 14.05% B+ 9.50% 5.51% 11.49% $32,80340% 1.42 14.83% B- 11.25% 6.53% 11.51% $32,67950% 1.62 15.93% CC 13.00% 7.54% 11.73% $31,34160% 1.97 17.84% CC 13.00% 7.96% 11.91% $30,33370% 2.71 21.91% C 14.50% 10.18% 13.70% $22,89180% 4.07 29.36% C 14.50% 10.72% 14.45% $20,70390% 8.13 51.72% C 14.50% 11.14% 15.20% $18,872

Damodaran’s spreadsheets:

http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/New_Home_Page/spreadsh.htm


TDI Financial History

TDI

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995

$ m

illi

on

s

Debt

EBITDA


Restructuring Debt and Equity at TDI (A & B)

Evaluate the financial restructuring taking place at TDI:

Effect of the LBO on capital structure? How did LBO lenders protect their interests? Alternative restructuring plans? Post Dec 89 operational, portfolio and

financial restructuring proposals? 1992-93 restructuring, before-and-after

comparison


Restructuring Debt and Equity at TDI (C)

Consider the choices facing TDI in 1994: Evaluate the alternatives available to take

best advantage of TDI’s free cash flow:Leveraged buyoutLeveraged ESOPLeveraged recapitalization

Or: Invest cash or debt in growth opportunities

Or: Do nothing to retain flexibility


Restructuring Debt and Equity at TDI (D)

Evaluate the possible means for cashing out shareholder value in a private company such as TDI in 1996:Leveraged recapIPOSale to financial buyerSale to strategic buyer

Which when?


Leveraged Recapitalization

Strategy where a company takes on significant additional debt with the purpose of paying a large dividend (or repurchasing shares)

Result is a far more leveraged company -- usually in excess of the "optimal" debt capacity

After the large dividend has been paid, the market value of the shares will drop.


Leveraged Recapitalizations

Motivations:DefensiveProactiveOwnership transition/liquidity

Which produces what value?


Exchange Offers

Give one or more classes of claimholders the option to trade their holdings for a different class of securities of the firm.

Typical examples are allowing common shareholders to exchange their shares for bonds or preferred stock,

Or vice-versa Motivations?


Exchange Offers-- Effect Depends On:

Leverage increasing or decreasing Implied increases or decreases in future

operating cash flows Implied undervaluation or overvaluation of

common stock Increase or decrease in management share

ownership Increase or decrease in management control

over cash usage Positive or negative signalling effects.


Asset-Backed Securities:Ford Credit Owner Trust 1999-A


Finance Co. Ltd(Seller)

FCL 1997-A(Special Purpose Co.)

Investors

Financial GuaranteeProvider

(if required)

Servicing Agreement

Proceeds

Sale of Assets

Proceeds

Asset-BackedSecurities

GuaranteeAgreement

Rating Agency

Top Rating

TrusteeTrust

Agreement

Finance Co.’sCustomers

Hire-PurchaseAgreement

Credit Enhancement: Guarantee Method


Finance Co. Ltd(Seller)

FCL 1997-A(Special Purpose Co.)

Senior

Proceeds

Sale of Assets

Rating Agency

Top Rating

Credit Enhancement:An Alternative Approach

Subordinated

More Subordinated

Lower Rating

No Rating

Financial GuaranteeProvider

(if required)GuaranteeAgreement


The Alternative: Synthetic ABS

DB (Originator)

SPECIALPURPOSEVEHICLE

REFERENCE

POOL OF LOANS

(Stay on

balance sheet)

ISSUESASSET-BACKEDCERTIFICATES

CREDIT SWAPAGREEMENT

TOP QUALITYINVESTMENTS



Why Restructure?

Proactive

Example:

Sealed Air

Distress

Example:

Loewen 1999

Defensive

Example:

Loewen 1996

Management acts to preserve or enhance shareholder value

Management acts to protect company, stakeholders and management from change in control

Lenders and shareholders lose, but try to work out best way to minimize loss


Match the Solution to the Problem

Trouble!

The financing

is bad

The company

is bad

Business

mix is bad

Raise equity, or

Do debt/equity swap

Or change debt mix

Change control

or management

through M&A

Sell some businesses

or assets

to pay down debt

Reason

Remedy


Reorganization Processes Out-of-court negotiated settlement

Firm continues Exchange: equity for debt Extension: pay later Composition: creditors agree to take less

Firm ceases to exist: assignee liquidates assets and distibutes proceeds on a pro-rate basis

Merger into another firm (which assumes or pays off debt) Continues as subsidiary Absorbed into other operations

Formal legal proceedings Firm continues: Ch 11, court supervises composition or modification of

claims Firm ceases to exist

Statutory assignment: assignee liquidates assets under formal legal procedures Ch 7 liquidation: bankruptcy court supervises liquidation


When Default Threatens, Value the Company

S a le to S tra te g ic B u yer A u c tion

M e rg ed V a lue

E x is tin g M an a g em e nt N e w M a n a ge m e nt

V o lu n ta ry R eo rg a n iza tion C h 1 1 R e org a n iz a tion

G o in g C o nce rn V a lue

V o lu n ta ry L iq u id a tion C h 7

L iq u id a tio n V a lue

H ig h e s t V a lu a tion o f C om p a n y?


Zombie Inc Valuation

Share ValuationBefore After

Shares 400,000 850,000Book Value 10.00$ 10.00$ Acquisition Value 8.00$ Management Est. 20.00$ 9.41$ NPV, based on

EBITDA 1,000,000 1,000,000WACC 17.43% 10.68%Growth 2% 2%

Debt 10,100,000 5,600,000 (8.72)$ 7.23$

Debt at 65% 0.11$ Option value?

Bank lenders Before AfterDebt (at market) 5,850,000 3,600,000 Equity (NPV value) 0 3,254,631Total 5,850,000 6,854,631


Valuation in Distress Restructuring

Liquidation value Acquisition price Enterprise value


Enterprise Valuation in Distress Restructuring

Multiples FCFF discounted at WACC APV Capital Cash Flows Option Value


Marvel

Icahn et al.

Perelman

Banks

Choices:Accept Perelman’s planSell the debt at $.14-$.17Reject plan and propose own

Controls Marvel equity NPV is negative Option value may be positive

Secured and senior Get fully repaid under plan


Marvel’s Option Value, Nov. 96

$9.18

Option Value

Marvel Ent. Price$4.63

Breakeven stock price

=Debt value/No. of collateral shares Debt value=Mkt price*face value (Ex 6) Collateral shares=77.3m

=$709.5/77.3

=$9.18


=Debt value/No. of collateral shares Debt value=Mkt price*face value (Ex 6) Collateral shares=77.3m

=$709.5/77.3

=$9.18

Nov 96 stock price


When Marvel’s stock price is below $9.18, Perelman’s investment in the Holding Companies is worthless on a liquidation basis, but still has option value.

When Marvel’s stock price is below $9.18, Perelman’s investment in the Holding Companies is worthless on a liquidation basis, but still has option value.


Mergers and Acquisitions

Gains from merger

Synergies Control

Top line Financial

restructuring

Business

Restructuring

(M&A)

Bottom line


AOL-Time Warner

Possible motivations Economies of scale and scope Diversification Access to new technology Regulatory arbitrage Hubris

Possible problems Overestimating synergy Slow pace of integration Poor strategy Payment in stock Overpaying Poor postmerger

communication Conflicting corporate cultures Weak core business Large size of target company Inadequate due diligence Poor assessment of technology


AMP/AlliedSignal/Tyco

What defenses did AMP employ?

Who won? Who lost?


Comparables

Value Indicator Earnings Cash Flow Revenues Book

Value Indicator Earnings Cash Flow Revenues Book

Average

Comparable Industry Firms Deals

Average

Comparable Industry Firms Deals

Target

Company

Numbers or

Projections

Target

Company

Numbers or

Projections

Estimated

Value of

Target

Estimated

Value of

Target


What’s It Worth?

D isso lve B re a k -up

L iq u id a tion

C o m p a ra b les P V C a sh F lo w s

G o in g co n ce rn

T o p lin e B o ttom line

S yn e rg ies

B u s in e ss m ix F in a n c ia l

C o n tro l R iva l A dva n ta ge

A cq u is it ion

V a lu a tion


Optika-Schirnding with SynergySchirnding-Optika

Optika Schirnding Combined SynergyGrowth 5% 5% 5% 5%Tax rate 35% 35% 35% 35%Initial Revenues 3125 4400 7525 7525COGS 89% 87.50% 86.00%WC 10% 10% 10% 10%Equity Market Value 1300 2000 3300 3300Debt Market Value 250 160 410 410Beta 1 1 1 1Treasury bond rate 7% 7% 7% 7%Debt spread 1.5% 1.5% 1.5% 1.5%Market risk premium 5.50% 5.50% 5.50% 5.50%

T+1 T+1 T+1Revenues 3281 4620 7901 7901-COGS 2920 4043 6963 6795-Depreciation 74 200 274 274=EBIT 287 378 664 832EBIT(1-Tax) 187 245 432 541-Change in WC 16 22 38 38=Free Cash Flow to Firm 171 223 394 503Cost of Equity (from CAPM) 12.50% 12.50% 12.50% 12.50%Cost of Debt (after tax) 5.53% 5.53% 5.53% 5.53%WACC 11.38% 11.98% 11.73% 11.73%

Firm Value 2278 3199 5859 7479Increase 1620


Conrail:Obstacles to an Unfriendly Takeover

Pennsylvania “Fair Value” statute: bids >20% all get same priceBidder’s voting rights maxed at 20% unless

management approves “Constituency” statute: protect unions

ConrailBreak-up fee to CSXCSX has “lock up” option to buy 16m new sharesPoison pill (suspended for CSX): shareholders get

new shares at half price if outsider buys 10%6-month “no talk” clause


Takeover Defenses

Poison Pills Preferred flip-over stock Flip-over rights Flip-in rights Poison put bonds

Shark Repellants Limitations on board changes Limitations on shareholder actions Supermajority rules Anti-greenmail limits on share repurchases Fair-price provisions Supervoting stock exchange offers Reincorporation

Golden parachutes


Post-Takeover Bid Responses

“Just Say No” Litigation White Knight Greenmail ESOP Pac-Man Restructuring, including

Leveraged Recapitalization Share Buybacks Using cash for acquisitions Divestitures Going private Liquidation


Breaking Up

Why—The business may be worth more outside the company than within

How—Sell to another company, or to the public, or give it to existing shareholders

Tax Aspects—As a rule if you get paid in cash you realize a taxable gain; not otherwise

Effect on Shareholders—The bigger the part sold off, the greater the percentage gain


Tax-Free Breakups

Spin-offs—pro-rata distribution by a company of all its shares in a subsidiary to all its own shareholders

Split-offs—some parent-company shareholders receive the subsidiary's shares in return for their shares in the parent

Split-ups—all of the parent company's subsidiaries are spun off and the parent company ceases to exist

Tracking Stock—special stock issued as dividend: pays a dividend based on the performance of a wholly-owned division

S p in -O ff S p lit-U p T ra ck in g S to ck

T a x -F re e


Taxable Breakups

Divestitures—the sale of a division of the company to a third party

Equity carve-outs—some of a subsidiary‘s shares are offered for sale to the general publicSplit-off IPOs—a private company offers a part

of the company to the public Bust-ups—voluntary liquidation of all of the

company’s business

D ive s titu re E q u ity C a rve -O utS p lit-O ff IP O

B u s t-U p

T a xa b le


Break-up Computation

PPR with Finaref PPR without Finaref Finaref Standalone Finaref with CAEBITDA € 800 € 500 € 300 € 330Tax rate 40% 40% 40% 40%Beta 1.4 1 1.6 1.6Growth rate 3.50% 2.50% 4% 4.50%Equity € 8,000 € 6,000 € 3,000 € 3,500Debt € 7,000 € 5,000 € 0 € 0Risk Free 3% 3% 3% 3%Mkt Risk Premium 7% 7% 7% 7%Debt spread 3% 2% 4% 2%Re 12.80% 10.00% 14.20% 14.20%Rd 6.00% 5.00% 7.00% 5.00%WACC 8.51% 6.82% 14.20% 14.20%Enterprise PV € 16,538 € 11,868 € 3,059 € 3,555Equity PV € 9,538 € 6,868 € 3,059 € 3,555Additional Gains/losses € 1,187 € 0 -€ 1,400

Choice € 9,538 € 11,114 € 10,155

Source: breakup.xls


LBO: A Temporary Capital Structure

COST

OF

CAPITAL

DEBT

RATIO

Stage 1: Pre-LBO

Stage 4: Debt paydown

Stage 2: LBO financing

Stage 3: LBO refinancing


Cost of the Deal

Estimating cost of deal

Shares 10Price 45$ Premium 15%Equity cost 518$ Debt cost 55$ Fees 5% 29$ Capex & restructuring 10% 57$ Total cost of deal 658$

lbocapacity.xls


Borrowing Capacity

Estimating borrowing capacity

Given:EBIT 95$ Min EBIT int coverage ratio 1.3Interest capacity 73$ Interest rate 16.00%Debt capacity 457$

From table

lbocapacity.xls


Cost of Debt

Estimating the cost of debtEnter the type of firm = 2 (1 if large manufacturing firm, 2 if smaller or riskier firm)EBIT 95$ Current interest expenses = 73$ Current long term government bond rate = 0.06OutputInterest coverage ratio = 1.3Estimated Bond Rating = CCCEstimated Default Spread = 10%Estimated Cost of Debt = 16%

For large manufacturing firms For smaller and risk ier firmsIf interest coverage ratio is If interest coverage ratio is> ≤ Rating is Spread is > ≤ Rating is Spread is

-100000 0.199999 D 0.14 -100000 0.499999 D 0.140.2 0.649999 C 0.127 0.5 0.799999 C 0.127

0.65 0.799999 CC 0.115 0.8 1.249999 CC 0.1150.8 1.249999 CCC 0.1 1.25 1.499999 CCC 0.1

1.25 1.499999 B- 0.08 1.5 1.999999 B- 0.081.5 1.749999 B 0.065 2 2.499999 B 0.065

1.75 1.999999 B+ 0.0475 2.5 2.999999 B+ 0.04752 2.499999 BB 0.035 3 3.499999 BB 0.035

2.5 2.999999 BBB 0.0225 3.5 4.499999 BBB 0.02253 4.249999 A- 0.02 4.5 5.999999 A- 0.02

4.25 5.499999 A 0.018 6 7.499999 A 0.0185.5 6.499999 A+ 0.015 7.5 9.499999 A+ 0.0156.5 8.499999 AA 0.01 9.5 12.5 AA 0.018.5 100000 AAA 0.0075 12.5 100000 AAA 0.0075lbocapacity.xls


Capital Structure

Preliminary capital structure

Debt 457$ Missing 177$ Mgt equity 25$ Total financing 658$

lbocapacity.xls


LBO Financing

NEWCO

Cost of

purchasing

the

business Equity $25

Senior

debt $457 What securities?

What returns?

What investors?Mezzanine


Case Case

Does it work? How much equity for management?

How much for the VCs?

Bankers

Management

VC Investors


How the Asian Bet Was Lost

Vulnerable economies, newly liberalized, succumbed to currency crises

Vulnerable corporate financial structures Companies were unable to service even

domestic debt, never mind foreign currency debt

Many Asian companies resisted reform even after the crisis, and remain misfinanced

The three excesses Too much debt Too much labor Too much capacity

The three excesses Too much debt Too much labor Too much capacity


What’s Needed?

Corporations must implement the key principles of corporate finance – estimate realistic cost of capital and discard investments below the WACC

Shareholders must exercise ownership rights Banks must break the link between loan

origination and collection Governments have to leave insolvent

borrowers to their fate Regulators should get tough on loan

classification standards.


What Do Debt-Equity Swaps Do?

Overleverage creates financial distressOverleverage creates financial distress

Actual or potential defaultActual or potential default

Lenders take equity in lieu of repaymentLenders take equity in lieu of repayment

Lenders hold equity passivelyLenders hold equity passively Lenders replace managementLenders replace management Lenders sell equityLenders sell equity

Existing management buys timeExisting management buys time Change of control

means restructuring

Change of control

means restructuring

Financial engineering Bottom line “rationalization” Divestitures & outsourcing

Financial engineering Bottom line “rationalization” Divestitures & outsourcing


New Equity for Astra

What investors?Portfolio investorsFinancial investorsCorporate investors

What returns should they expect?= Risk-free rate+ Corporate risk+ Financial risk (leverage/debt mismatch)+ “Agency cost” premium+ Country risk

What restructuring?


Contact Info

Ian H. Giddy

NYU Stern School of Business

Tel 212-998-0426; Fax 212-995-4233

[email protected]

http://giddy.org

Prof. Ian Giddy New York University Review of Corporate Financial Restructuring.

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Transcript of Prof. Ian Giddy New York University Review of Corporate Financial Restructuring.