PreviouslybyA.S.DulatandAdityaSinha

Kashmir:TheVajpayeeYears(2015)

PreviouslybyAdityaSinha

TheCEOWhoLostHisHead(2017)DeathofDreams:ATerrorist’sTale(2000)

FarooqAbdullah:Kashmir’sProdigalSon(1996)

ForthcomingfromAsadDurrani

PakistanAdrift:NavigatingTroubledWaters(2018)

THESPYCHRONICLES

RAW,ISIandtheIllusionofPeace

A.S.Dulat,AsadDurraniandAdityaSinha

Tomylateparents,ShamsherandRaj,whospentmanyjoyoushoursplayingbridgewithtwosuccessiveHighCommissionersofPakistaninIndia:SyedFida

Hussain,myfather’sformerICScolleague,andAbdulSattar.

—A.S.Dulat

Toallthefacelessagentswhotakegreatrisksintheserviceoftheircountry.

—AsadDurrani

Tomyparents,NeelamandChandreshwarNarainSinha,who,inEnglandduring1965-71,werebestfriendswithGulshanandNazirHussain,immigrantsfrom

Lahore.

—AdityaSinha

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

16.

17.

18.

19.

20.

ContentsPreface

Introduction

I:SETTINGTHESTAGE

‘Evenifweweretowritefiction,noonewouldbelieveus’

TheAccidentalSpymaster

BrotherhoodtotheRescue

II:THESECONDOLDESTPROFESSION

Pakistan’sDeepState

ISIVsRAW

TheCIAandOtherAgencies

TheIntelligenceDialogues

III:KASHMIR

StatusQuo

TheCoreK-word

AmanullahGilgiti’sDreamsofIndependence

Kashmir:TheModiYears

TheUnlovedDrFarooqAbdullah

TakeWhatYouCanGet

IV:KABUKI

IndiaandPakistan:‘Almost’Friends

LonelyPervezMusharraf

Modi’sSurpriseMoves

TheDovalDoctrine

TheHardliners

BB,MianSahebandAbbasi

GoodVibrations,India-Pakistan

V:THEFLASHPOINTS

21.

22.

23.

24.

25.

26.

27.

28.

29.

30.

31.

32.

33.

HafizSaeedand26/11

KulbhushanJadhav

TalksandTerror

SurgicalStrike

ThePoliticsofWar

VI:NEWGREATGAME

TheDealforOsamabinLaden

SelfishSelf-interestsinAfghanistan

DonaldTrump,Nudger-in-chief

Pakistan’sPal,Putin

VII:LOOKINGAHEAD

ForgeStructureorBreakIce?

CouncilofSpies

AkhandBharatConfederationDoctrine

DeewangiKhatam

Notes

Index

AbouttheBook

AbouttheAuthors

Copyright

Ifonlysomehowyoucouldhavebeenmine,whatwouldnothavebeenpossibleintheworld?

—AghaShahidAli,‘TheCountrywithoutaPostOffice’

Preface

Inthededication,A.S.DulatandIhaveeachmentionedIndia-Pakistanfriendshipsthatweredeepand,sillyasitmaysound,beautiful.Itisagrowingfearthatintheage of shouting heads on TV and hyper-nationalistic NRIs, we are reminiscingaboutabygoneera.Allhopeisnotlost—myelderdaughterwasbestfriendswithaKarachi-iteduringherundergraduateyearsatNewYorkUniversity.Onthewhole,however,sheseemspartofashrinkingminority,andawindowofopportunityforgoodwillbetweenthepeopleofthetwonationsmaybeclosing.Itistokeepthatwindowopen,andshowthatthroughthewindowonemayseeendlesspossibilities,thatthisbookwaswritten.

The hostilities that are ceasefire violations across the Line of Control eruptoccasionally, but the norm is of long periods of peace. Similarly, armed conflictbetweenIndiaandPakistanhasbrokenouton fouroccasions in their71yearsofindependence.Eventheproxywarofterrorismischaracterisedbyintenseburstsofviolencethatoccasionallypunctureeverydaypeace.

Thecoldwarbetweennations,conductedbytheirspyagencies, iscontinuous,however.Thereisnolet-up.Therearenouniforms,orcounter-measuresthatforceterroriststooptforsofttargets.Spiesandtheirnetworkslive24x7liesatgreatriskto themselves. They are a last line of defence. If a Kargil happens, then it isultimatelyattributedtointelligencefailure.Terrorismisseenasaslippagethroughaninvisiblenetputupbytheagencies.Wariseitherpursuedoravertedmainlyduetointelligenceefforts.

Thearmy’sInter-ServicesIntelligence(ISI)directoratehasbeenPakistan’smainintelligenceagencysinceimmediatelyafterindependence.Thecabinetsecretariat’sResearchandAnalysisWing(RAW),founded50yearsagoasofSeptember2018,wascreatedoutofIndia’sIntelligenceBureau(IB)duetoperceivedfailuresofthe1962 and 1965 wars with China and Pakistan, respectively. Due to Pakistan’sunique history, the ISI has gained a larger-than-life aura, often seen in India asPakistan’sDeep State. TheRAWhas a similarly sinister image, if not among itsowncitizensthenatleastamongthoseacrossthewesternborder.

This book brings together two men who each had a stint at heading theirrespectiveagencies.Assuch,theyhavebeenprivytotheirnation’sgreatestsecrets—whethertheyrelatetosecretagentsplacedinsensitiveforeignlocations,nuclearweaponry, strategic intelligence, or secret liaison with foreign agencies andgovernments.Theyarethekeepersoftheirnation’sdarkmatter.

Indians and Pakistanis keep trying to talk to one another. Politicians and

diplomatsspeaktotheircounterparts;peaceniksexchangenotes; sportsmensharelocker-roomchat;andbusinessmendroolovereachother’smarkets.This isopen.Spychiefs rarely talk toeachother—youcanbecertain that the spiesneverdo—thoughtherehavebeenoccasionswhentheirgovernmentshavedirectedthemtodo so. In the last two decades, some former spychiefs have come together toexchangeviewsinTrack-IIdialogues.Buttheyhaveneverspokenopenly.

Asthetwospymasterssay,theyareawareofthestakes.Whattheysaytoeachother,aroundatable,theirguardsdown,countsforsomething.Theirconversationgoes to the heart of the India-Pakistan relationship; a deep dive into the DeepState,ifyouwill.

ThisbookwasDulat’ssuggestionaftertheencouragingsuccessofthe2015bookweco-wrote,Kashmir:TheVajpayeeYears. Sincehe andDurrani had earlier co-authoredtwopapers,hisideawastofollowthatformat.ChikiSarkar,thepublisheratJuggernautBooks,suggestedtomethattoreachawideraudienceaswellastomake it an interesting read, it ought to be in a dialogue format. She pulledHitchcock/Truffautoutofherlivingroomlibraryasanexample.Itwasawinningsuggestion,inmyopinion.

AfterDulatgotDurranionboard,theyenlistedthehelpofPeterJones,oftheUniversityofOttawa’sCentreforInternationalPolicyStudies.HehelmstheTrack-II‘IntelDialogue’betweenIndiaandPakistan,andhegraciouslyagreedtohostmeat themeetings in Istanbul (May24-26,2016)andBangkok(February1-3,2017and October 28-30, 2017), so that we could spend a couple of days after theofficialengagementtoproducematerialforthisbook.Therewasameetingthatwedidonourown inKathmandu,Nepal (March25-29,2017), thoughSudheendraKulkarnioftheObserverResearchFoundation,anardentsupporteroftheprojectthroughout,offeredtofacilitate.

These meetings produced a total of over 1.7 lakh words. The manuscriptpreparedforpublicationwashalfthatsize.Thetranscriptshadalotofspontaneityand the two former chiefs got into the spirit of each discussion; I have tried toretainthattoneinthemanuscript,despitethesecondthoughtsofeachparticipantatdifferentpoints.IhavealsoattemptedtoprovidetheflowingliterarystylethatDrFarooqAbdullahtoldmeheadmiredmostaboutKashmir:TheVajpayeeYears.

UnlikeKashmir:TheVajpayeeYears,whichwasessentiallyDulat’snarrativeandthus demanded to be read chronologically, this conversation between Dulat,Durraniandmyselfcanalsobereaddifferently:thatis,onemayreadchaptersorsectionsoutoforderorinisolation,anddriftbackandforththroughthebookasonefancies.Thechoiceisthereader’s.

In acknowledgement, mention must go to Krishan Chopra, who seized the

projectwithbothhandsanddidnot letgo;Siddhesh Inamdar,whoput inmuchefforttoproducethisbook;myfriendsMayankTewari,whoatdifficultmomentsreminded me that Philip Roth would have treated this project as ‘material’, V.Sudarshan,whoremindedmethatthisprojectwasanenviablejournalisticexercise,andP.Krishnakumar,whogavemeagigatMid-Daywhichwasinvaluableinmoreways than one; and of course my spouse, Bonita Baruah, whom I regard as mybetter51percent.

AdityaSinha

NewDelhi,India

March2018

Introduction

Pointingtothehorizonwheretheseaandskyarejoined,hesays,‘Itisonlyanillusionbecausetheycan’treallymeet,butisn’titbeautiful,thisunionwhichisn’treallythere.’

—SaadatHasanManto

Kaashkehumdosthote.

GeneralAsadDurraniandIhavegelledeversincewemetataTrack-IIdialoguenamedafterThailand’sChaoPhrayaRiver.Itwasheldintheaftermathof26/11,inthewakeofWesternapprehensionofwhatmaycometopass.Whoknows,ifamadmanwasincontrolwecouldallstillbeblowntokingdomcome,inrevengefor1971oreven1947.

GeneralSahebhasbeenafriend.Hisstraightforwardnessisstriking.Thereisnobullshit;forhimaspadeisalwaysaspade,whichisattimesdisappointingforme.Hehasneverhesitatedtospeakuporrenderhelp.

WhenPrimeMinisterNarendraModiwaspreparingtotaketheoathofofficein2014, two notables from Srinagar called and suggested that Pakistan’s primeminister,MianNawazSharif,beinvited.Theysaidhewaskeentocome.Sinceitwas early days, people in high places were prepared to listen, so I passed themessage along.Therewas excitement in government, but the bigwigswanted anassurancethatMianSahebwouldcomeifinvited.

Toconfirm,IfirstcalledaseniordiplomatinPakistan.Hisadvicewastonotriskit, because Nawaz Sharif might not be allowed to come to India. Somewhatdisappointed I called the General. His response was unequivocal; there was noreasonforNawazSharifnottocome.GeneralsinPakistanaregenerallyright,andmoresoAsadDurrani.

OurwivesmetatoneoftheTrack-IImeetingsonKashmir,heldinDecember2015ataDeadSearesortinJordan.MywifeParanandtheBegumarepolesapart.ParanenjoysanoccasionalsmokewiththeGeneralwhereastheBegumapprovesofneithersmokingnordrinking.Yettheygotalonglikeahouseonfire.Incidentally,at the same meeting, the Pakistanis enquired whether there was any hope offorward movement between India and Pakistan. I stuck my neck out and saidsomething should happen soon. Lo and behold, we were in Abu Dhabi onChristmasDayonourwayhomewhenwe learnt thatModiji haddropped in atLahore.Sincethen,however,theprocesshasgonenowhere.

If it’sanyconsolation,Pakistanis inabiggermessthanweare.ThemanIndiaput its faith in,Nawaz Sharif, is likely to be kept out of power (alongwith hisfamily)bythemilitarywhenthenextelectionsareheld,likelyinAugust2018;the

military’spreferredchoiceisthecurrentPM,ShahidKhaqanAbbasi,whomMianSahebhadhandpickedtoreplacehim.

InanyIndia-Pakistanconversation,Kashmirwillinevitablycomeup.InJanuary2018,duringmyannualpilgrimagetoGoa,ImetaKashmiriinatailoringshop.HetoldmethatKashmirwantedindependence.

‘Whateverfor?’Ienquired.

‘Howwouldyouexpectme to react if youwalked intomy shop and slappedme?’hesaid.

That’s what the security forces do in Kashmir. Anyone can be stopped andbeaten,heclaimed.Theslightestprotestorstone-peltingleadstoteargasandpelletguns.Kashmirremainsontheboil:theLineofControl(LoC)andborderaremorevolatilethanusualandquestionsarebeingraisedaboutthegovernment’smuscularpolicy.

AreformedmilitantwhohadflirtedwiththeLashkar-e-ToibavisitedmemorerecentlyandspokeofthethreatofincreasingradicalismintheValley.HesaidtheyouthinSouthKashmirpreparedformartyrdomandhadnoconcernforPakistanastheybelievedtheywerefightingforAllah.AsformerPakistanForeignSecretaryRiaz Mohammad Khan acknowledged, the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attack didirreparabledamagetotheKashmiricauseandtarnishedIslamabad’simageaswell.Pakistanhadbeenoutofitsincethen,untilwebroughtthembackintothepicturein2016.

Themilitant,whonowresemblesaprofessormorethanaterrorist,warnedthatthe Jamaat-e-Islami, once with pockets only in Sopore, Shopian, Kulgam andPulwama,wasnowomnipresent in radicalising theyouth. Ithadmade inroads inthe state government and infiltrated the J&K Police as well. The central jail inSrinagarwas thehubof radical indoctrination,he said frompersonal experience.Militancy was a thriving industry, where everyone was someone with a vestedinterestinthestatusquo—exceptthatthestatusquoisneverstatic.TheKashmiriswhocravepeaceliveinfearofthenextexplosion,notknowingwhereorwhenitwillhappen.WhatachangethisisfromthetimewhenSrinagarwasacityofgreatstyle,fromthe1960stotheearly’80s.

ThesituationinKashmir,likeourrelationshipwithPakistan,isgoingnowhere.It waits for another Vajpayee. Could General Pervez Musharraf and Dr FarooqAbdullah,sharingmanysimilarities,givenanopportunity,havefoundasolutionontheLoC?KashmiriscravepeacebuttherecanbenopeaceorforwardmovementinKashmirsolongaswekeeprelatingittoelectionselsewhereinthecountry,justaswedoinourrelationshipwithPakistan.WeneedtotalktoPakistanasmuchasweneedtoengagewithKashmir.AsChiefMinisterMehboobaMuftisaidinthestate

assemblyinFebruary2018,withtheriskofbeingcalledanti-national,thereisnoalternative to engagement with Pakistan. Or, as the old Kashmiri communistMohammedYousufTarigamisaid,seekinga‘securitysolution’toafundamentallypoliticalproblemwillnotsucceed.

Findingawayoutofanymessrequiresawillingnesstolisten.ItconnectsustoKashmirandtoourselvesaswell.Butwearesocaughtupinthenoisearoundusthat very fewhave the time to listen. Sentiments at times aremore illuminatingthanfacts.EmpathyisthekeytounderstandingKashmir.

I have learntmuch fromTrack-II, including the similarities betweenKashmir,AfghanistanandBalochistan.NotedPakistaniauthorAhmedRashidoncesaidthatif Kashmir were resolved, Afghanistan would be a cakewalk. At one of ourmeetings,RustomShahMohmand,aPakistanibureaucrat,diplomat,andagemofa humanbeing, remarked that Pakistan needed to put its ownhouse in order inBalochistanbeforefindingfaultwithIndiainKashmir.

Surprisingasitmaysound,IwasashappyleavingthePrimeMinister’sOfficein2004as Iwas joining it in2001,eventhoughthesewereby farmybestyears ingovernment.Yes,therewasatingeofsadnessatleavingtheRAWjustwhenIwasbeginningtoenjoyit;17monthsisnotenoughforachief.Buttherearesomanyworlds,somuchtodo.Retirementisthebeginningnottheendoflife.Whocouldhave imagined I could even become an author in the bargain?As someone said,there is no pleasure in having nothing to do; the fun is in having lots to do anddoingnothing.

Having lived more than my life of secrecy, spookiness still clings to me. AKashmirifriend,notknowingwehadshiftedresidencetoDefenceColonyinDelhi,dropped in and enquired if this was my ‘new safe house’. Pakistani friends stilldon’tbelievethatmyonlye-mailIDismywife’s.Andmywifetellsallherfriendsthat you can never get thewhole truth out of this spook.A ‘cover story’ is stillusefulattimes.

WhentheideaofajointprojectwasfirstmootedbyPeterJonesatoneofourTrack-IImeetingsinIstanbul,theGenerallaughedandsaidnobodywouldbelieveusevenifwewrotefiction.Wehavetriedtostayasclosetothetruthaswebelieveit to be even if some of it is regarded as fiction. The reality is that there arenormallymorethantwosidestomoststories.Truthisakaleidoscope.

Iknowtherewillbepeopleinthefraternitywhowillsayhowdidtheseswinesgetsochummy:whowasworkingforwhom?Afterallwehaveeachbeenapartoflicensedskulduggeryoneitherside.

Noteveryonewillagreewithwhatwehavesaid,possiblynobody.Buttheeffortherehasbeen tomake some senseof the India-Pakistan conundrum in thehope

thatsanitywillsomedayprevail.

Ihaveoftenbeenlabelledanoptimist.Ifso,it’sonlyawayoflifeandIhavenoregrets,orasGeneralSahebsays,hedoesn’tgiveadamn.AllIcansayit’sbeenagreatlife.AsMarkTwainputsit,goodfriends,goodbooksandasleepyconscience:thisistheideallife.Andthis,Ibelieve,ishowtheGeneralandIhavegoneaboutit,eventhoughheismuchmoreofarealist.

Finally,thisprojectcouldneverhavetakenoffwithoutourfriend,philosopherandguide,AdityaSinha.

A.S.Dulat

NewDelhi,India

March2018

IwasbornanIndian—therewasnoPakistanthen.Rawalpindi,mybirthplaceandnow the headquarters of the Pakistan Army in which I served for over threedecades, iswhere I liveafter retirement.WhenBritish Indiawasdivided, IwasaschoolgoingkidinSheikhupura,acitythatfellonthePakistaniside.Iwassparedthe horrors of theGreatDivide, except for a brief glimpsewhenwe visited ourrelatives inDelhiduring summervacation in1947.The riots forcedus to returnpost-haste, but strangely I have nomemories of the journey backhome. Itmusthavebeenoneoftheluckytrainsthatgotaway.

OnechangeIrecallfromsoonafterPartitionwastheabsenceofamatka.Theshop halfway to schoolwherewe often stopped to sipwater had a new owner.Unlike hisHindu predecessor, he had no use for the pitcher that contained theelixiroflife.Thenextepisodetoremindmethattheworstwasnotyetoverwaswhen we moved fromMatka to Mucca. I can’t remember what caused tensionbetweentherecentlydissectedtwinssometimein1950,butIdorememberthatourprimeministerrespondedbyraisinga fist—whichbecameknownas ‘Liaqat’sMucca’. Throughout those years, though the Kashmir issue was simmeringsomewhereinthebackground,thestudyofhistoryinourschoolswasmostlyaboutthegloryoftheMuslimruleinIndia.Littlesurprisethatitledtosomefascinationwiththeseatofpower,bothpoliticalandspiritual:broadlytheregionboundedbyDelhi,AgraandAjmer.Anylinkwithoureasternneighbourthuscontinuedtobefollowedwithgreatinterest.

I grewupwatching Indianmovies; even knew all the great names from showbusinessbased in ‘Bombay’,anamethatstill soundsmorefamiliar thanMumbai.Indeed,ittooksometimebeforesomeoneexplainedtomewhyMuslimactorslikeDilip Kumar andMeena Kumari had to take non-Muslim names. Episodes thatdealt with the Mughal period were generally watched with nostalgia. But my

memories of those earlier years were more influenced by the sporting scene.Cricket duelswere keenly listened to, as radio commentarywas the onlyway tofollowthem.Butunlikepresenttimes,thesewerenotamatteroflifeanddeath.

In a test match in Montgomery—now Sahiwal—where we had a world-classstadium, an Indianbatsman, SanjayManjrekar,was the crowd’s favourite. In thesame city, when it hosted the National Games, the Indian Punjab was alsorepresented.AftertheeventsomeSikhsdroppedintoseemyfather,whoatthattimewasinchargeofCentralJail.Theycametogetafewdurrees(cottonwovencarpets)—the place was famous for this product—and pleaded for immediatedelivery so that these could be taken as personal baggage—let’s say ‘duty free’.Overtimethelegaciesofthepasthadtobeshedbecausetherealpolitikoverrode.

Imayhave joined thearmy in1959becauseAyubKhanhadputschedonlyayear earlier, or because the girls in Government College Lahore, where I wasstudying,clearlyfanciedthosewhoshowedoffinuniform.ButafterIdid,itturnedoutthatIhadtoappearmoreoftenincombatthaninmyformeralmamater.

Whiletrainingforwar,weweretaughtthatthoughwehadtofightbetterthanourlargeradversary,butmustalsokeepinmindthatourenemytoowasdoinghisdutyforhiscountry.Andwhenwesawthatbothinthe1965and1971wars,theIndian and the Pakistani armies deliberately spared non-combatants—fightinggentlemanlywars,inotherwords—mutualrespectamongstthetwomilitarieswasreinforced—but so did the belief that our countries were not likely to becomefriends anytime soon. Post-’71, even within the uniformed clans—despiteprofessionalcorrectness—theassessmentoftheantagonistbecamehard-nosed,andtheattitudeharder.

In due course, I went for training and visits abroad, and met our easternneighboursonneutralground.Thathelpedmemakethebestofabadrelationship.OnceonacourseinthenorthGermantownofHamburg,IbumpedintoasouthIndianprofessor.Thenextdayhewalkedintoourapartmentwithhiswifetoinviteus to his home.When returning the courtesy, I asked him if he had any dietaryrestrictions. He said that as a Brahmin he was forbidden to eat even eggs. HisGermanspouse,however,assuredusthatshecouldmakehimdevourwhateverweserved.

When I returned to Germany as an attaché a few years later, my Indiancounterparts walked up to me at the first opportunity to introduce themselves.Thoughirritatedbyourhost’sspecialfavourssincePakistanwasthefrontlineallyin Afghanistan, they did not let our domestic battles affect our personalrelationship.ItwasduringthatperiodthatthefirstIndianofficerwastocomefortheGermanGeneral StaffCourse, and from amongst the alumni Iwas the firstpersontobecontactedforadvice.OperationBlueStartookplacesoonafterIleft.

OtherwiseIwouldhavetickledoneofthemthatthedaysofoneSinghortheotherrepresentingtheIndianArmyinGermanywereover,andIamsurehewouldhavetakenitsportingly.

Ever since, therehasneverbeen ‘anyquietonoureastern front’.TheSiachenviolation; Indira Gandhi’s assassination; Brasstacks—if it was an exercise or anoperationdependeduponitsdesign;theSikhinsurgencyandtheKashmiruprising;thenuclear tests; theKargil ingress;and indeedall thepost-9/11turmoilensuredthat our relationship was alive and (literally) kicking. Indeed, the period wasdotted,evenifsparsely,bypeaceeffortsliketheCompositeDialogue,Vajpayee’sbus yatra, ‘they met at Agra’, and the Kashmir bus service. The toxic, or theintoxicating,mixhelpedpeoplelikeme,whohadbeeninandoutofhotseats,joinpost-retirementtheever-expandingclubfatuouslycalled‘thestrategiccommunity’.

Nosurprise,therefore,thatsomeofusareburstingwithwisdomthatcanhardlywait to be shared.One of themore usefulmeans to do sowould indeed be anexchangeamongstkeyplayersontheoppositesides—providedofcoursewewereprepared to concedeour faults andprovide adifferentnarrative, evenalternativefacts.Howfarmy‘comradeinarms’—ashedescribesourequation—AmarjitSinghDulat,andIhavesucceededinthismissionisobviouslyforthereadertojudge.

AsadDurrani

Rawalpindi,Pakistan

March2018

I

SETTINGTHESTAGEIntheopeningchapters,DulatandDurraniexplainhowthisbookcameaboutandwhytheythought it relevant.Theyspeakabouttheirbackgroundsasprofessionalintelligenceofficers,andnarrateanepisodethatnotonlysolidifiedtheirfriendshipbut also firmedup their belief that a healthy India andPakistan relationshiphasmorebenefitsthandownsides.

Settingthescene

May25,2016:Our first setofmeetingswas in Istanbul,atanupmarkethotel inthe historicOld Town. The first time the three of usmetwas for lunch at therooftop restaurant, the mild sun pleasantly shining through the windows, thewaterfrontvisibleinthedistance.GeneralDurranilookedatmeintensely,asiftosizemeup.PeterJoneswasevenmorewary,perhapstheeffectofafullplateofTurkishkebab.

1

‘Evenifweweretowritefiction,noonewouldbelieveus’

Aditya Sinha: The trust between you and Mr Dulat would seem unusual to alayperson.Howdiditcomeabout?

AsadDurrani:Inmyexperience,oncepeoplebelievetheyaregoingtogettogetherand exchange their views as professionals, more often than not they have noproblem. Also, when we speak and one says—this is how we read a particularsituationat the time;and then theother says—well,wewere reading it like this.Thisisofgreatmutualbenefit.

Forexample,whenIreadDulat’sbook,1Ifoundsomanythingsbeneficial,butalsoclarified.Forinstance,howtheothersidereactedtoaparticulardevelopment.

Sinha:Anexampleofaneye-opener?

Durrani: The Kashmir uprising. I was involved in aspects for a couple of years.Whenithappened,IwasheadingMilitaryIntelligence.Wewerelookingformoreinformation. It was not my subject, more for the foreign office or the ISIdirectorate.And it happened during Benazir Bhutto’s first government, probablyearly1990;sheaskedallthreefortheirassessments.

Someweresaying,it’shappenedbefore,it’sanothertypeofdevelopmenttakingplace,moreyouth,andnotlikelytolast.SuchpeoplehadknownaboutcommotioninKashmir.

It,ofcourse,wentonlongerthanexpected.Thedeficiencyonoursidewasthatthosewhogotinvolvedweresurprised;theyweren’texperts,maybeignorant,andtheirassessmentwasnotuptothemark.

Dulat’s book showed that on the other side they had a man dealing withKashmir for a long time, ten years, I think, before he became RAW chief, indifferentcapacities.Hewasasked todo somethingabout it,manage it aswell aspossible,andthat focuscontinued.Thatcontinuityofpersonalities,ofknowledgeandexperience,andprobablyalsoofpolicy.

Onourside,thePakistaniside,mostofthetimewedealtwiththedevelopmentfrom event to event, as a person saw it fit, not clear till late what actuallyhappened,howfaritwouldgo.Andevenifonefiguredoutthebestwayforward,the government changed, the personalities changed, and even the policy, so

continuitydoesnothappen. Just readingDulat’sbookhighlighted this forme. Itwas not a complete surprise, one knew about him and the tenures on the otherside.

I remember in MI someone told me that on the Jammu side there was alieutenant colonel posted there for 15-16 years, I forget his assignment. I wastemptedtorecruithim.Heprobablyknewmoreaboutusthanourownpeopledidbecausetheychangedsooften.Thatmaybepeculiartothesystem.

Sinha:Whatdoyouhopeforfromthisbook?

Durrani:Frankly,theideawasAmarjit’s.Hesaid,let’sdoabook.We’vedonejointprojects, the first on intelligence cooperation, after the Pugwash Conference2 inBerlinin2011,andthatwasagoodexperience.ThesecondwasapaperpublishedbytheUniversityofOttawaonKashmirin2013,anditwasencouraging.

Dulat’sbookwasalso interesting for itsLondon launch. IndiansandPakistaniswerethere,includingsomePakistaniacademicsandotherswithwhomIoncespentan evening. One of them messaged me: ‘We were at the book launch and therelaxed way in which the former RAW chief spoke, with a bit of humour,reminded us of ourmeetingwith you. Andwe thought someonewith a similarbackgroundmightdoasimilarproject.’

Ifourbeingtogethergetstractionandcreatesinterest,onecangiveperspectiveonsomematters.Ifonewouldsayone’spieceasfranklyandhonestlyaspossible,withoutbeingdefensiveoroffensive,thenthiswasaprojectworthpursuing.

Amarjit Singh Dulat: We had done two papers. Some people provoked andproddedus:‘Youguysseemtobecomfortablewitheachother,whydon’tyoudosome writing?’ Let’s attempt something a little more serious, and we wrote onintelligence cooperation. As General Saheb says, when professionals meet theyexchangeviews.Iagree,therehastobeacomfortlevel.

Wehavedifferent types of personalities.Ourbackgrounds are different, apartfrombeingfromthe(intelligence)agencies.Buttherearecommonalitiesalso.Hedoesn’t bother to watch television, nor do I. I realised he can be laid-back. IthoughtIwastheonlyonewhowaslaid-back.Itgivesyoucomfort.

Theinterestingthingwashe’smysenior.WhenwemetIwasactuallylookinginthisTrack-IIbusinesstomeetsomeonefromtheISI.ItwasahugeopportunityandIdidn’twanttojustspendmytimewithdiplomats,drinkingwhiskey.Iwantedtotalkourkindofbusiness.

IfirstwenttoPakistanfortheBalusaGroup3meetinginJanuary2010,thankstoSalmanHaidar.4WhenIgottoLahorethefirstthingIaskedthegeneralstherewas—isn’tthereanyonefromISIwholivesinLahore.Iactuallysaidthis.

‘No,you’llhavetogoto“Pindi”,’cametheresponse,‘oratleasttoIslamabad.Ifyouhadtoldus,wemighthavearrangedit.’

AndthenIcameacrossGeneralSaheb.

Durrani:ItwasinaChaoPhrayaDialogue5inBangkok.Weco-chairedasessiononterrorism.

Dulat:Iwantedtosaythingsbutitwasmyfirsttime.Iwantedtobemoretruthfulthanwenormallyare,butfoundmyselfwaffling.Andwhenhespoke,hespokesodirectly,aboutproxies,andhowtheywerelegitimateforeveryintelligenceagency.

During the coffee break, I said: ‘General Saheb, what are you saying aboutproxies?’

‘Why?’hesaid.‘Don’tyouuseproxies?WhatdidyoudoinBangladesh?WhatwastheMuktiVahini?’6

Themanwasdirect.‘No,Sir,Iunderstand,’Isaid.‘I’vefigureditout.’

Therewerethreeofusatthefirstfewmeetings,includingVickySood,7andwewerelaughingabout‘happyhours’.GeneralSahebsaidthesesessionswouldgoon,but that the three of us should talk separately. The three of us sat down withglassesofwhiskeyandstartedtalking.Moreopenlyandhonestly.

Iwas surprised by the things he said.He said amazing thingswhich I franklycouldn’tthinkof,becausespooksdon’ttalkeasily.AndforaformerISIchieftobetalkingcandidly.EvenVickywaspleasantlysurprised.

After the secondmeeting Vicky went off to greener pastures in Europe.Wewereleftbyourselves,acertainrelationshipbuilt.

In Islamabad in 2011, when we got a bottle of Black Label (whiskey) fromGeneral Saheb’s car and had a drink inmy room, he spoke tome about how itwouldbe ifwehad anunderstanding. For instance, ifMumbai8 happened again,therewouldbeanunderstandingthatIndiahadtoretaliate.Andthat itcouldbemanaged.ThatIndiacoulddowhat(PrimeMinisterNarendra)Modidid,asurgicalstrike.

Itwas interesting.Herewasa former ISIchiefwithaconsiderable reputation,suggestinghowtochoreographsurgicalstrikes.Howcanapersongetmorecandid?

The ISI is supposed to have themost difficult rogues. I have gotten to knowGeneralSaheboveraperiodoftimeandhehassurprisedmemoreandmore.

Thesesessionswenton.Oneinterestingmorningthetwoofussattogether,ataconference in Istanbul,andMaliniParthasarathyof theHinduwas soexcitedshetook out her phone and took a photograph, saying, ‘I’ve got the two spookstogether.’Itsoundedsofunny.

It was in that session that Peter Jones9 made a suggestion that we writesomething.

Durrani:Ajointpaper.

Dulat:Wewroteajointpaperonintelligencecooperation.GeneralSahebinitiallyremarked that even ifwewrote fiction nobodywould believe it, but okay,we’llgiveitatry.ItwaspublishedsimultaneouslyintheHinduandinDawn.

ThenPetersuggestedwedoaKashmirpaper.ThatisnowontheUniversityofOttawawebsite.

Sinha:Whatwasthereactiontoyourjointpaper?

Durrani:(Americanacademic)StephenP.Cohensentamessagethathewasveryimpressedbyourpaperon intelligencecooperation.He’saspecialistonIndo-Pakaffairs.Igotemailsfromelsewhere.

Sinha:Whatdothegovernmentssayaboutsuchmeetingsorpapers?

Durrani:Notaword.

Dulat:Sameonourside.AndbecauseGeneralSahebisinternationallyrenowned,StephenCohenmayhavecalledhim,butnobodycalledme!

Durrani: I’m sure there are people on your side, like a couple on ours who areupset and say: ‘These chaps?What do they know?Havingmessed up royally intheir own time, they want to have a joint anti-terror mechanism and a jointintelligence?Theywantanotherparadigm?’Theythinkwearelookingnotonlyforrecognitionbutfurtheremployment.

Even in the US think-tanks like Brookings Institute, which are ‘Inside theBeltway’,theykeepchurningoutpapers,earmarkingthemtoSenatecommittees.Unlesswhat they say supports existing government policy, theywill not get dueattention.Theymakerecommendationsbutthegovernmentisfollowingapolicyinthebeliefthatit’sdoingtherightthing.Rarelyisareportseenandisthebasisforhelp.

Dulat:Absolutelyright,Sir.That’swhatgivestheIDSAornowtheVivekanandaFoundation importance, because they toe a certain line. These are almostgovernmentthink-tanks.

Sinha:Theyupholdthestatusquo.

GeneralSaheb,after interactingwitha fewchiefs fromtheotherside,doyouseeMrDulatasrepresentativeofIndianspooksorisheamaverick?

Durrani:Ofcoursehe’sdifferent.Wearealldifferentinourownways,butheisdifferentinanumberofways.

Firstofall,hishands-onexperience.MorethantenyearslookingatKashmir,attheIB,thenastheRAWchief,thenatthePMO(PrimeMinister’sOffice).Thathewas a former IBmancoming toheadRAWand thathewas acceptedmeanshisapproach was different. I know institutions resist outsiders gatecrashing theirdomain. They would like to show that this intruder fails. Otherwise, inductingoutsiders might become the norm. I know from personal experience, and alsowithinthemilitary.

Certainly his book also shows that he’s not stuck on a particular idea. HeunderstandstheKashmirissue’sgenesis,notthinkingofwhattodonow,aresponsehere,atit-for-tatthere,butseeingthebiggerpicture,thepeoplethere.

YoumaymanageKashmirormuddlethroughitbutfinallyonewillhavetofinda lasting solution.This iswhenhe sayswe’llhave todo somethingdifferent.Myassessment,though,isthatwearenotlikelytodoanythingthatmuchdifferent,notbecausewearestuckinagroovebutbecausewehavesettledconclusionsasStatepolicythatwetryandmakelastaslongaspossible.

Myownexperienceinintelligencewaslimited,justthreeandahalfyears,sohemay have more narrative to add, I have less. But we have come to certainconclusionsthatmaslayehhaiandperhapsthatcanhelpshiftthefocusfromtheusualrutandprovideawayforward.Somemaybescepticalaboutthethingswecomeupwith,butevenifafewthoughtsstartmakingsensetothem,thenitcouldpercolatetodecision-makers.

Dulat:Yes,I’velearntanamazingamountthroughKashmirinthelast30years.TounderstandKashmiryouhavetoempathisewithKashmir,youhavetohaveaheartto try and seewhat is happening.And if you start understandingKashmir you’llfindthatyouunderstandalotmorehappeningintheworld.

KashmirtookmetoPakistan.AndintryingtofigureoutPakistan,thattookmeto Afghanistan. And looking at Afghanistan, I find so many similarities withKashmir.

(Pakistani writer) Ahmed Rashid once said that if we can sort out Kashmir,Afghanistanwouldbeacakewalk.KashmirleadsyoutoCentralAsiaaswell.WhenIlookattheworldIfindthereisalottolearnfromwhatishappeninginKashmir.

GeneralSaheboncementionedthePalestinianproblem.Inmanywaysit’sstuckinthesamewayasweareinKashmir.

TheinterestingthingisthatnewsaboutourassociationhastravelledinKashmir.AfewKashmirissaytomethatonewayoutofthiswholethingistogetacoupleofIndianswhounderstandKashmirtogetherwithafewformerISIchiefs,andthefirstnamealwaysmentionedisGeneralSaheb.Theysayifyougiveusachancetositwithyouguys,wecanfindawayout.

It’s interestingthattheseparatistKashmiri looksat it likethat.HeknowsthatthiscannothappenwithoutPakistan.Noweventhemainstreamiscomingtothesameconclusion.MuftiSaheb10usedtosaythis.Mehbooba11doesn’tsayanything,rarelydoesshementionPakistan.Strangely,DrFarooq12hasbeenrepeatedlysayingthatunlessIndiaandPakistansitdown,we’llnothaveasolutioninKashmir.

Sinha:SinceGeneralSahebmentionedthebook,youreceivedcriticismforitandforsayingthatmoneyplayedapartinKashmir,thoughthatmaynotbeasecrettoaprofessional.

Dulat:YouweredeterminedtosendmetoTihar(jail)!Whenitcameout,liketheGeneralsaid,nobodysaidawordtome.Officially,directly.ButIcouldsensethattheestablishmentwasnothappy.And therewerepeoplewhowere critical.Notdirectly.Likeyouheard. I’mnot surprised,others also toldme thatpeoplewerenothappy.Isaidyeah,sobeit,I’vewrittenabookandthat’sit.

What is the big deal about money? This became a big thing for everyone.(Seniorjournalist)HarinderBawejatookmetolunchjusttogetmetotalkaboutmoney.Moneyisagivenallovertheworld.

Durrani:(Chuckles.)

Dulat: I said it inacertaincontext, thatafter I leftgovernmentandthePMOin2004,someblamedmeforeverythingthatwentwronginKashmir.It’sthisguy’sfault,hebribedKashmiris.A senior, seniorofficer said Ibribedmyway throughKashmir.

My reaction was:Why don’t you try dealing with Kashmir? Or tell me of abetterwayofdoingit?

2

TheAccidentalSpymaster

Aditya Sinha: General Saheb, how did you reach the ISI? Before you met MrDulat, had either of you met counterparts from the opposite agency? Did youpicturethemtohavehornsandtails,forexample?

AsadDurrani:Myentry to intelligencewas accidental. Iwasnot trained for thiswork.Iwasanormallineofficerwithareasonablygoodcareer.

The first time Iwas nominally administered by an organisation called ISIwaswhenIwasafullcolonelandwaspostedasdefenceattachéatourembassyinWestGermany,1980-84.Otherwise,thepostisanopenone.

Do you know who cleared me for the posting ultimately? I was a seniorinstructorat theCommandandStaffCollege, forusaprizedposition.WhenmynamecameupfortheGermanyposting, ithadtobeclearedbyvariousagencies.Oneofthemwenttomyin-laws’houseinModelTown,Lahore,toaskaboutme.Noonewasathome,sotheywentandaskedtheneighbours’chowkidar,‘Yehkaiseloghain?’Thatchapsaid,‘Yehacchheloghain.’IgotthegreensignalandIalwayssay that my neighbours’ chowkidar provided the certificate that the intelligenceagencysought.

Sinha: So had your in-laws been home, you might not have become defenceattaché?

Durrani:Quitepossible.Youneverknowwiththesein-laws!

AsdefenceattachétheISIwasadministratively lookingafterme,butIhadnocovertmissionsassignedtome.IwasnotspyinginGermany.Thehostsknewme,Iwould go and get information from them. Iwas lucky to go there, just after theSovietinvasion1ofAfghanistan;becauseofPakistan’sstancewehadextraordinarilygoodrelationswith theWest.Getting information fromtheGermanswasnobigdeal,andaftertheNATOattachés,Iobtainedthemaximum.Attimes,Ievengotexclusivebriefings.

IreturnedtoPakistanandresumedmycareerasalineofficer.Zia’s2planefellfromtheskies,andthenewarmychief,GeneralMirzaAslamBeg,withwhomIhadserved,putmeinchargeofMilitaryIntelligence(MI).Thatwasaboltfromtheblue.

ThemovetoISIwasalsoaccidental.AfterBenazirBhutto’s3dismissalinAugust

1990theywerelookingforapersontokeeptheseatwarmtilltheyfoundsomeoneelse.JustbecauseIwasinMIfortwoyears,asamanagerofthatbranchandfromthemilitary,doingmilitaryassessmentsonthemilitaryfront,theygrabbedholdofme. Since I was current on Afghanistan, current on Kashmir, current on theimpendingIraq/Kuwaitcrisis,Igotthejob.

Ispentnearly18monthsattheISI.Surprisingly,whenIlandedinMIIsawanIndianconfidentialreportdescribingmeasahawk.NoonefromtheothersidehadevertalkedtomeexceptforyourattachésinGermany.Abroadyouaren’thawkishor dovish, you are colleagues working in a third country, sometimes exchangingviewsandtalkingon‘soft’matters.

Sinha:WhatwasyourimageofintelligenceworkbeforeyouwenttoGermany?

Durrani:Anynormalperson,inPakistanorinIndiaorelsewhere,iswaryofanyoneinthespookbusiness.Thatchapprobablyhastheboss’sears.Godknowswhatelsetheseintelligencechapsareupto,theymovecovertly,quietlyandsurreptitiously.Sobecareful.

WhenIwasinthebusinessIsaidgoodheavens.Wewereassessingthreatstothecountry, external and external-sponsored threats, trying to warn the relevantquartersthatthesethreatsaredeveloping,thesearethedangerousones.Itwasn’twhatIusedtothink,cloak-and-daggerwork,butitwasanhonourablejob.

That’swhy Ihad theCorpsof Intelligencecreated in thePakistanArmy.Theidea had been floating for some time but I said let’s go ahead with it. Certainaspects of intelligence should be handled by specialists. Previously there werereservations, and this apprehension was not misplaced, that professionals in thisbusiness would acquire the form or character of a mafia, and become abrotherhood.Andthen,leaveasidethecountry,everyoneelseintheenvironmentisthreatened.ButIwentaheadwithit.

Onethingthathappensiscollateraldamage.I’mlookingforthepeopleonthepayrollofanenemycountry,whomaybeonthepayrollofpeoplewhoseinterestsarenotthesameasmine,andintheprocessstumbleonactivitythathasnothingtodowiththeinterestsofthecountry.Imightthinkit’sagoodideatosorthimout.Some would even blackmail: look I caught you with a girl, nothing to do withnational security, but since one has come to know about this extra-maritalrelationshiponecannailthatchap.

These thingshappen.This isnotourmain taskand if ithappens, ithas toberesolved.Butitmakespeopleseeintelligenceassomethingtobeshunned.Acovertoperator can know things we don’t want him to know, and he may be at aparticularlevelbutcangotohighlevelsbecauseofthenatureofthejob.Ifpeoplethinktheywillgetexploitedandmisused,theygetscared.

Sinha:YoualsoservedunderNawazSharif?

Durrani: ItneverworkedoutwithMianSahebwhenhefirstheadedgovernmentandIwasDGISI.Peoplecantalkaboutchemistryorabouthiswayoflookingatthings.Itjustdidnotworkout.

Sinha:Youdidn’tthinkhighlyofhisintellectualcapability.

Durrani:That’s one. I also thought hewas paranoid about certain things.Aboutwhat themilitarymightdo,what the ISIwoulddo, shouldhenothavehisownpersontoheadISI?

WhenmybossAslamBegleft,andsincetheDGISIservesatthepleasureoftheprimeminister regardlessof thearmy—thearmynever says, ‘issiko lagao’—Igotready togo.Since I servedas a two-stargeneral itwas supposed tobea stopgaparrangement.

UltimatelyIbecamethree-star,continuingbecauseMianSahebsaidthatAslamBeghasgoneandAsifNawaz(Janjua)hascomeinhisplaceasarmychief.Thisisparanoia:thinkingthatifAsifNawazgetshisownDGISIthenthere’llbeanarmy-ISI nexus that he’d be facedwith. Sharif had had his doubts aboutme, but hisexpectationssuddenlychangedandhenowthoughthehadhisman.

Itwasanexampleoftheflawedperceptionthatcivilianpoliticianshadofhowaffiliationsandloyaltiesintheserviceswork.Wearenotanyone’sman.Youcanbefondofsomeonebutwhenitcomestoworkyouareloyaltotheinstitution.Thatstillremainsapluspointforus,andonmanydifferentlevels.

For instance,withAslamBeg I did not agree on the firstGulfWar, in 1991.With Nawaz Sharif I did not agree on Afghanistan; he believed that we wereworking for not only a broader consensus but we were also asking the UnitedNations—Benon Savan used to be special emissary (formally, the Secretary-General’sPersonalRepresentative)—towork for theLoya Jirga, becausePakistanindividually or Pakistan-Iran or Saudi Arabia may not be able to. We weren’tmakingheadway onAfghanistan, so the reconciliation should be led by theUN,supported by the OIC (Organisation of Islamic Cooperation). We had workedhard.Theforeignofficemayhaveledthatparticularstrategyandwesupportedit.

It’swell knownhowAslamBeg saw the firstGulf crisis. JehangirKaramat asDGMilitaryOperations (DGMO) did not agreewith him. I asDG ISI did notagreewithhim.Buthedidnotholditagainstus.Infact,oncehisownassessmentwent wrong, he actually almost publicly admitted he was wrong. That’s thegreatnessoftheman.

InSharif’sparticularcase,hehadthefearthatthischapcan’tbetrusted.Sosixmonthslater,hefoundanopportunityandappointedhisman.Ileft.

Itwasgoodforme,Iwentbacktothemainstream.Iheadedsomethingthatnoonewithmybackgroundhadeverbeeninchargeof,themilitary’straining.It’samostly infantry army and I was an artillery man, a gunner. I had served in aninfantryformationbutthat’sanotherstory.Iwasthefirstnon-infantryofficerwhoheaded the army’s training branch, which also holds inspections. I was happyduringthatperiod,andthenwentontoNationalDefenceCollege.Ifanyofusgetsanall-armsappointment,itwasafeatherinthecap.

Sinha:Thisisn’tthefirsttimeyou’vetalkedaboutyourISIdays,isit?

Durrani:There isonethingthatIndiansshare,whethertheyarefriendlytowardsPakistanorhostile: nothing gives themgreaterpleasure than if a former ISImancanbeputonthemat.

Twicethiswasthecase:in2004atthePugwashConferenceinDelhi,andattheTehelkameeting in London. I found them a good bunch, Tarun Tejpal and hissister,theirfatherbeingaformerfauji.Butonstage,onbothoccasions,whentheyaskedmetosaysomething,itwasusuallythatImusthavebeensendinginfiltratorsintoIndia.

Howdoyouavoidthatembarrassment,orhowdoyoudefendit?Imadelightofit saying, you peoplemisunderstood.Wewere not sending infiltrators, we weresending people because your visa regime is so rigid, we were sending them forpeople-to-peoplecontacts.Goandmeetthem!Goandtalktothem!

Dulat: The General said something very apt that while in service nobody isanybody’sman.IhaveoftenbeenreferredtoasDrFarooqAbdullah’sman,whichincidentallyIregardasacompliment,butin2002whentheNClosttheAssemblyelections I was made out to be the main villain. I was then Brajesh Mishra’s‘henchman’andoftenonthewrongsideofNorthBlock.

3

BrotherhoodtotheRescue

AsadDurrani:WhenyoumentionedalackofhostilitytowardsPakistanIthoughtof an episode that should findplace in this book.ThatwaswhenMrDulat andsomecolleaguesrescuedmysonOsmanwhowasstrandedinIndia,inMay2015.

AmarjitSinghDulat:IgotacallfromGeneralSahebwhileoutfordinner,around11p.m.Hesoundedabitdesperate.

Durrani: Osman was in Kochi, on behalf of the company he works for. It’s acompany that he had a hand in co-founding, in Germany, and had recentlyestablished an Indian office.As head of one of the company’s software divisionsOsmanwent there for aweek for fresh recruitment and to develop an esprit decorpsinthenewteam.That’saculturetherethatdoesnotexistinmanyplaces;it’swhy a company is successful not just for the product but also for its collegialatmosphere.ThewaythattheJapanesedoit.

Thecruxis:mysonwashereonaPakistanipassport.Thoughhe’sbeenlivinginGermany for 20 years or so, and in this company for 15 years, he had kept hisPakistaninationality.He’dsay,I’mapatrioticPakistani.

AndpeopleinKochiwerefascinatedbyhim.‘YouarefromPakistan,howniceto seeyou,’ theywould say.Theywereveryglad to seeaPakistanibecause theyhad never seen one before. And these were not Urdu speakers; there he spokeEnglish.Someonetoldhim,nexttimebringyourwifeandfamily.We’dliketoseeaPakistaniwoman.

Onthisvisithefinisheduphiswork infour-fivedays.Hethoughtoftakingaflight fromMumbai.Theofficepeople inKochi senthimtoMumbainotdue tobloody-mindednessbutoutofignorance.TheydidnotknowthatifapersoncamewithaPakistanipassporthehadtofollowacertainprocedure:hehadtoleaveviathe city his visa allowed. They were only used to handling German passportholders,dotheirregistrationandflyaway.Theydidn’tknowaPakistanipassportholder had to go to the police station, he had to go to Foreigners RegionalRegistrationOffice,andthatonthewayoutofthecountryhewouldagainhavetogotobothofficesforclearance.

AttheMumbaiairport,however,theimmigrationofficialssaidyourvisaisonlyforKochi,whatareyoudoinginMumbai?Andhewassentawayfromtheairport.

He then rang me up for help and advice, and besides talking to our high

commissionerinDelhi,AbdulBasit,IcalledupASD.

Dulat:PossiblybecauseithappenedinMumbaiitwaseasierforustohelpoutthanit would have been in Delhi. General Saheb was unusually worried and keptinquiringwhetheritwassafeforOsmantostayinMumbaiorwhetherheshouldreturntoKochi.Isaidthatmeansacceptingthatwecan’tdoanythingbutwewilldosomething,it’ssuchaminorthing.Let’ssleepoverit,thoughIdon’tthinktheGeneralwouldhavesleptpeacefully.

IalsospoketoaformercolleagueinRAW,whoI’msurehelpedwithouttakinganycreditforit.Moresubstantively,in2003atip-offfromtheRAWtotheISIhadsavedGeneralMusharraf’slife.

Durrani:Osmanwas stuck in some office for three to four hourswhere no onewantedtodealwithhim.Itwasanormalsubcontinentalbureaucraticoffice,wherewheneverhesaidIhavebeenreferredtothisgentlemantheywouldsay,sahebtohseatparnahinhain.Twicethishappenedthatanamewasgiventohimandtheysaidtheofficerisnotinhisseat.IwasonthephonewithOsmanandIsaid,theyobviouslydon’twanttodoanything.

Wewereinapanicbecausewedidnotknowwhatwouldhappen.

But even thosepeopledidnot say tohim,youdon’thave a visa forBombay,whatareyoudoing,pakdo,andarkaro.Thatcouldhavehappened,butitdidn’t.

All thiswhilemywife and Ihad another concern—what if someone reportedthatOsman, the son of a former ISI chief,was roaming aroundMumbai,whichhadn’tforgotten26/11,withoutavisaforthatcity?

Even his taxi driver had a good idea what was happening because he stayedoutsideforfourhourswithhisluggageinthecab.AporteradvisedhimtogobacktoKochi,weknowaboutthisthingaboutleavingthewayyoucame.

Dulat: TheGeneral calledme six to seven times the next day, often asking thesamething:shouldIsendhimbacktoKochi?Itoldhim:‘Ourboysareonthejoband,Inshallah,hewillflyoutofMumbaiintheevening.YoubelieveinAllahandIhavefullfaithinWaheguru,allwillbewell.’

Asthedaypassed,thethingwasstuckinthepolice’sSpecialBranchinMumbai,anditwasaSaturdaysothingswereclosed.IgotaholdofJeevanVirkar,anoldfriendfromthe IB. IknewtheMumbaipolicecommissionerbut thatwasanoldlinkandIhadn’tbeenintouchwithhim,whereasJeevanandIhadkeptmeeting.Wewere inthesamesocialcircle, sohewasa friendthroughout. IcalledJeevanandsaid,bhaiyehkarnahai.

Incidentally,JeevanhadmetGeneralSahebbecausehehadattendedacoupleoftheseTrack-IImeetings.Hepromisedtosortitout.

Durrani:A fewthingshappenedduring this toand fro thatcouldonlybe sortedoutbythiscyber-savvygeneration.Forexample,whenOsmanhadearliertriedtoboardtheflightandwasoffloaded,thechapattheimmigrationofficeaskedhim:‘HowdoweknowthatyouwereeverinKochi?Youmayneverhavegonethere!’

Osman quickly went on the internet on his cell phone and downloaded thedocument of theKochi police registration. Later,with Jeevan’s intervention, thelady in charge of the office arrived to finally force the reluctant staff to provideOsmanwiththenecessarypapers.

ThemanatthedeskaskedOsmanwhatflighttoMunichhewouldbetaking.Hehadn’t booked a flight yet, so he quicklywent to theLufthansawebsite andreservedaseatonlineforthenextflight.Thenheshowedthemthereservationandtheyweresatisfied.

Itwasacombinationofhiscyberexpertise,goodluckandhelpfromDulatandCo.thatgothimoffthehook.

For 24 hours he had been on the phone, and a thing that was declaredimpossiblewaspulledoffforhim.

Sinha:AformerRAWchief’sIBbackgroundhelpedaformerISIchief.

Durrani:AfterthisepisodehiscompanyinsistedhetakeaGermanpassport.Theysay,we’ve been asking you to change your nationality, then all these restrictionsthat are imposed onPakistanis in India, youwon’t have to dealwith them.Youweresavedbytheskinofyourteethbyyourfather’sfriend,otherwiseyouwouldhavebeenintrouble.Imagine,beinginMumbai,after2008,beingaPakistaniandwithafatherwhowastheISIchief.Theymighthavesaid,whatacatchwe’vegot!

Now,withhiswifeandtwodaughtersOsmanhashelpedretardthedeclineintheGermanpopulation.

Dulat:WhenOsmanfinallyleftMumbai,theGeneralcalledandsaid:‘YourfaithinWaheguruhelpedOsman.’

‘OurGuruNanak said therewas noHindu, noMussalman,’ I told him. ‘Wewereatbestbornintoafaith.TheSupremeBeinghadrescuedOsman.’

IrangupJeevanandthankedhimprofusely.ThenIrealisedI’dbetterthankmyex-colleague fromRAW,so I ranghimup. ‘Notatall,Sir,’he said.But thebestpartofhisresponse,whichmademeextremelyhappy,washisreferencetoGeneralSaheb.

‘It’sourduty,’hesaid,‘afterall,he’sacolleague.’

Durrani:Iimmenselyvaluethatremark,andhopetogettheopportunitytothankthegentlemanpersonally.

II

THESECONDOLDESTPROFESSIONInthesefourchapters,DulatandDurranidiscussthebusinessofspying.Wetackle,head-on, theperceptionsof the ISIandcompare it to theRAW.Theyassess theactivitiesofotherintelligenceagencies,particularlyoftheUS,England,RussiaandGermany.Theythenspeakabouttheadvantagesofadialogueofspychiefs,andtheneed to formalise a spy-spy communication channel between India andPakistan,withtheiruniquecallforan‘openpost’ineachother’snationalcapitals.

Settingthescene

Istanbul,May25,2016:Wecongregate inDulat’s roomfor ‘happyhours’ in theevening,adayofgoodworkbehindus.Sincethetaperecorderisoff,afewotherretiredspychiefslandintheroom,their(lubricated)tonguesloosenandthejokesbegintofly.Itmaynowberevealedthatspiesallowthemselvesacertaindegreeofbawdinessinafraternalatmosphere.

4

Pakistan’sDeepState

AdityaSinha:PeoplesaytheISIisPakistan’s‘DeepState’.

AsadDurrani:Many intelligenceagencieshavebeencalled theDeepState.CIA,KGB.It’satermdenotinganestablishmentwhichrunstheaffairsofstatebehindthescenes.Theverynomenclatureindicatesthatitisinvisibleyetinfluential.Inmyvocabulary,it’sapsy-warterm.It’salsohypocrisy.TheUnitedStateshasa‘DeepState’anditcomprisesbigmoney,themilitary-industrialcomplex,andtheJewishlobby.

The ‘Deep State’ inAmerica can even scuttle presidential policy, as it did toPresidentBarackObama’s efforts toend thewars inAfghanistanand theMiddleEast.TheCIA, StateDepartment, Pentagon, and themilitary-industrial complexmakethepoliticalleadershiphelpless.ThisisnotsomethingPakistansays,variousAmericans including some former CIA heads say yes, there’s no coordinationbetweenvariousorganisations,sowedowhateverwedeemfit.

Deep State, incidentally, is also making life miserable for President DonaldTrump, preventing him from improving relations with Russia or fulfilling hiselectionpromisestodisengagefromforeignmilitaryventures.

Sinha:Didn’tPakistan’sDeepStatekeepOsamabinLadenhidden?

Durrani:I’vebeenonTVwithmyownassessment,whetherunkochhupakerakhahuahain, orwhether at some stagewe knew,wehad the upper hand.At somestagetheISIprobablylearntaboutitandhewashandedovertotheUSaccordingtoamutuallyagreedprocess.PerhapswearetheoneswhotoldtheAmericansiskolejao,wearegoingtofeignignorance.1Ifwedeniedanyrole,itmayhavebeentoavoidpoliticalfallout.CooperatingwiththeUStoeliminateapersonregardedbymanyinPakistanasa‘hero’couldhaveembarrassedthegovernment.

A.S.Dulat:Ourassessmentisthesame.ThathewashandedoverbyPakistan.

Durrani:Itwasprettyuncomfortableforus.

Dulat:InIndiawehadneverheardtheterm‘military-industrialcomplex’tillafewyearsago,thatitwasbecomingpowerful.

As for the ISI, it’sagreatorganisation,otherwise itwouldn’tgetnamedeveryday in India. Whatever goes wrong in India is attributed to the ISI. It’s veryeffective,whetheryoucallittheDeepStateortheStatewithintheState.Itisby

farthemostexcitingoftheintelligenceagencies.

Sinha: But ISI publicity has come down after Narendra Modi became primeminister.Noweverythingisblamedonliberalsandintellectuals,notonISI.

Dulat: IwasonceaskedbyaTVchannel inKarachiwhat I thoughtof the ISI. Isaid,ISI’sgreat,IwouldhavelovedtohavebeentheDGISI!

Sinha:Haveprimeministers inPakistanbeenfearful,ambivalentor fascinatedbytheISI?

Durrani:Quitedistrustful.Idon’tthinkanyonewantstotasktheISIwithagoodrun-downonanysubject,thoughit’stheirright.

On critical matters the ISI will often impose itself simply because it needs adecision.Weneededtotakeacertainstep,butwedon’twanttowarnthemilitary,thecivilianleadership,thebureaucracy.

SomethinktheISIispowerfulenoughtoordereveryonetofallinline.Evenifthatweretrue,theISIwouldnotgetciviliancooperationunlesstheywerewilling.

Dulat:You’reright,butthepointisit’sasmallstate,it’sadictatorship.WhentheISIfocusesononething,theyhavethemanpowerandcapabilitytodoitinmanykindsofways.They’llgetitonewayoranother.

Durrani:TheISI’scloutgrewprobablybecauseofthe(1980s)Afghanjehad.Theorganisationwasdeveloped,andgivenplentyofresourcesandsupportbecausetheSoviets had invaded Afghanistan. Otherwise it would never have had thewherewithal that a country facing somany threats, external and internal, wouldget. It still remained short andhad to focusonquality. It couldnotaffordmuchmanpowerandhadtomakedowithless.

Itdevelopedareputationforefficiency.ItalsodevelopedareputationbecausemanypeopledidnotlikewhattheISIdid,duetoclashinginterests.Oneexamplewas after the Soviets left, theUnited States becameuneasy: now that the job isdone,howdowecuttheISIdowntosizebeforeitbecomestoobigforitsboots.

Therewasaparticularreason,concededbyGeneralBrentScowcroft,whowasUSPresidentGeorgeH.W.Bush’sNSA(nationalsecurityadviser).Twoyearsafterthe1991GulfWarhesaid inLondonthat the ISIassessmentof the Iraqi forces’potentialwhenitoccupiedKuwaitwasbetterthantheCIA’s.ItwasmyassessmentthattheCIAhighlyexaggeratedthethreat.Wehardlyhadanyassetsonthegroundandrequiredahard-nosed,cold-blooded,methodicalassessment.

TheCIAdeliberately overblew the threat either to oblige its politicalmasterswhowereraringforwar,ortoplaysafewithdubioussatelliteimages.Idon’tknowwherethesatelliteswerelookingwhenIndiawaspreparingforitsnucleartestsin

Pokhranin1998.

Dulat:GeneralSahebdismissedelectronicsurveillanceandIagree,Idon’tbelieveanythingelectronicunlessit’sendorsedbyhumanintelligence.

Durrani: If I was in the CIA’s position I would also worry about the type ofassessmenttheISIwascapableofmaking.Ihavesaidthis inapiecepublishedintheAtlanticafewyearsago:thenexttimeyouwanttosexuptheWMDthreatinIraq,ashappenedin2003,andiftheISIsays,nonsense,youshouldbeworried.

These things created the ISI profile. Larger than life? Probably a littleexaggerated. But it had to be efficient given Pakistan’s environment: India is bigenough, Afghanistan is hot enough, Iran is experienced enough and sometimesindependentenough,andtheUSalsostillmeddles intheregion’saffairs.TheISIhadtojugglemanyballs.

Youpeopleprobablydid thingsmorediscreetly.Youcouldafford to:youhadtime,weattimeswereinahurry.Wefeltthreatenedtotheextentthatweoptedfor immediate results. One can lose the basic principle of doing things coolly,deliberately,forthelonghaul.

Dulat:TheISIchiefwasthelastword,hecouldsayanythingandgetawaywithit.Right or wrong. He had to be right if he was saying so. Our guys were morecircumspectinanassessment,whichwassupposedtobemoreserious.

Durrani: ISI’s ability tomake political assessment has been quite limited. YahyaKhan2wentaheadandheldthe1970electionbecausetheintelligenceagenciestoldhim itwouldbeahungoutcomeandhis regimewould thuscontinue.However,Mujibur Rahman3 swept in East Pakistan, Bhutto4 swept in West Pakistan, andYahyaKhanlandednowhere.

WhenIheadedISI,peoplereportedassessmentsandlikelyturnoutforthe1990election. I said the People’s Partywould suffer, but onlymarginally. The resultsshowedthePPPwasdecimated.Somuchforthatassessment.

Whenitcomestograssrootsintelligence,however,thepolicearemoreeffective.Nooneisbetterthanthepolice’sSpecialBranch.

Forexample,theLalMasjid5episodeinwhichmanychildrenandwomenwerevictims of a massacre. I believe it was a disaster. It was badly handled by theauthorities:wrongforceused,wrongmeans.Onoccasionslikethatwhenyouhavehundredsofchildrenandwomenwithpossiblytensofmilitants inaplacethat isopentomovementandenoughinformationavailable,andifyouhavetotakethemilitantsout,it’sbesttousetheSpecialForces.Theyoperatestealthily,andwouldhave nabbed themilitants while saving the innocent. But they sent the Rangersinstead,whoburntdowntheplace.

Thatincidentgaverisetosuicidebombers.

A couple of weeks later I was in Rawalpindi. These garrison towns havephotography studios and tailor shops where military people go, have a uniformtailoredandgetaphotographtaken.Iwenttothewell-knownBhattistudios,asonmanyoccasions,andanSHOwalksin.Herecognisedmeandsaid:‘GeneralSaheb,ekSHOdakaamsi,tussisaarifauj lekaruthhepahunchgaye?’(ItwasanSHO’sjob,whydidyoutaketheentirearmythere?)

A single SHO could have gone in, seen howmanymilitants were there, andthenprobablybribedafeworprobablygotaholdofthefamilymembersofafewof them and used them to release hostages. And before we know it, the 10-12militants would have been taken care of. But the government did not trust theeffectivenessofthepolice.

Then the Peshawar school incident,6 whichwas a nasty one. The intelligenceagencies had been warned that a big place would be hit, but which one of thehundreds? The Special Branch would have noticed unusual activity at the APS(Army Public School), whichwas on thewatchlist, and increased security. Thattypeofnear-timeinformationismoreuseful.AndthenwouldcometheISIs,theRAWsandtheIBstobuildthebigpictureofterroristattacks.

Themighty ISI will say, whowill implement it?Who’s better known to thelocalswithwhomweultimatelydeal?That’swhatthelocalpolicearefor.Allwecandoisensurethepoliceremaineffective.

Dulat: I’m happy thiswhole argument is coming from theGeneral and notme.BecauseI’manoldIBguy,buthe’saGeneral.AndchiefoftheISI.

Sinha:ThemostinfamousISIchiefinIndianeyeshasbeenthelateGeneralHamidGul.7HewastoIndiawhatAjitDovalistoPakistan.

Durrani:HamidGulwasmypredecessor, thoughnotmy immediateone. IhaveknownHamideversincewewerebothlieutenantcolonels.Hewasaprofessionalintelligenceman.Verybrainy.Readalot.Andhisfortewasthathewouldtryandhypothesisethings,puttheminaparticularcontext.Idon’tknowwhathehimselffabricated,buthehadaparticularpurpose.Hispresentationwasalwaysimpressive.Knowledgeofhistory,etc.Ifhebecamefamouslateritisbecausehetalkedaboutthesetheoriesorhypotheses.

Hamidlikedtosexthingsupforthenecessaryimpact.Weweredifferenttypesof people but remained friends till he died. We agreed on certain things anddisagreed on others but were friends. I admired him, and his knowledge,commitmentanddedication.

Dulat:Yes.Weusedtosayhewasthevillain,thegodfather,theultimate.Andyet

afterhepassedaway,quiteafewtributeswerepaid,somenotverynice.

Themost interesting thingwas thatA.K.Verma8wrote a piece in theHindusaying therewas a timewhenHamidGul offered peace to us. Itwas a positivetribute. Reality and perception don’t always match. And on our side, if you’relookingforhawks,A.K.Vermaisahawk.Yethe’swillingtocreditHamidGul.

Durrani:WhenHamidwasDGISIhewasmonitoringthe1988election.IwasatMI.HesaidthePeople’sPartywouldwinandcameclosetotheactualnumberofseats. But hewentwrong in Punjab and Sindh; the resultswere the opposite ofwhathepredicted, by the samemargin. In Sindh, hepredicted less for thePPP,theyswept.InPunjab,hepredictedmoreseats,theygotthatmanyless.

Sinha:Aroundthattime,theBibleforreporterslikemewasTheBearTrap.9

Durrani:TherearemanybookslikeTheBearTrapthatareinaparticularmould,with an agenda. That’s all that I want to say. It wants to highlight a particularpersonality or period or contribution. That becomes the problem.When it waspublished,Ithinkduringmyperiod,someonecameandsaidlookatwhat’swritten.Whatshouldwedo?Shouldwegetaholdoftheman,courtmartialhim,issuearebuttal? I said, there must be 20 people who have read it but once we dosomething,200peoplewillreadit.

I’mnothappywiththingsthatareprojectedoutofcontextorsendamessagethatmightnotbehelpfuleithertothecountryortotheorganisation.

Idon’trecallaccuratelyastowhatwefoundatthattimethatshouldbevettedorscrutinised.Butonesaid,letitbe.Whateveryousayaboutthebookwillneverbe as effective as the book itself. Also, it was well-written, a foreign chap wasinvolved. One had heard good things about the author Mohammad Yousaf’scontributions. He headed the ISI’s Afghan cell under General Akhtar AbdurRahman,10atacrucialstageoftheAfghanjihad.

Sinha:SincetheISIispartofthemilitary,canpeopleenterathigherlevelswithoutamilitarybackground?

Dulat:Letmetakethelibertytosaythatwemaybealittlemore‘onthejob’.

Durrani:Wehadahandicapinthisregard.There isexperienceandcontinuity intheIB,SpecialBranches,police.

ISImadeitsnamefordifferentreasons—Afghanistan,militaryrule—butithasacertainpersonnelproblem.MIcametomewhenIwasamainstreamofficer,andIwasmovedtoISIbecauseIwascurrentonbothofourfronts.

This was not unusual. Many heads of ISI and MI came with no intelligenceexperienceforavarietyoffactors.Bythetimeyoustartunderstandinghowyou’re

supposedtodofieldjobsorspecialisedjobs,yougetpromoted.Itisagap,thoughthemilitaryseesitasmovementwithintheforce.

TherewasanairforceofficerwholeftISIandwenttotheIB.FewdothatsincetheIBismostlypoliceorciviliansfromthegovernmentcadre;someretiredmilitaryofficershaveheadedtheIBbutthat’sanexception.Wedidn’tmissthechap,buthedidareasonablejobinIB.Theinterestingparthappenedwhenhefellafoulofthepoliticalleadership.Theymadehimstayathome,butgavehimhispay,andhekept silent, pursuing leisure like reading, writing, etc. This would not havehappenedinthemilitary.

Onemorething.Back in2010,AmanullahGilgiti11was leadinghispeople fortheOctober2712marchfromMuzaffarabadtoChakothiontheLineofControl.Iwentalong.There’san importantbarrierwithabattaliontopreventpeoplefromgoingtooclosetotheLoC,andIthoughtIwouldtellthemwhoIwas,onceuponatime.Therewasa juniorcommissionedofficerwhostoppedmeandsaid: ‘Saheb,aapkabhithhetohthhe,abhitohnahinhainna.’

Dulat:Thathappens all the time.Theymaynotopenly say it,butnobody takesnoticeofyouonceyou’reoutofthesystem.

Durrani:ThefirstthingIwasinvolvedinwhenIenteredtheintelligencebusinesswastheMaldivesinvasion.13Alsoatthattime,NepalwasactivebecauseitboughtsixMPA(MasterPieceArms)gunsfromChina.ThereafterRajivGandhi14enforcedaweaponsembargo.15Isaid,ifthisisthesituationbetweenNepalandIndia,wheredowe fit in?Wemay have hadwishes for a long time, but thiswaswhen onestartedlookingatit.Howdowemakeuseofthis?

Benazir’sgovernmentwasneither interestednorknewwhat todo.Withsomecolleagues I said,whatwouldGeneralZiahavedone?Weagreed thatZiawouldhavebeenproactive.Peoplewouldhavebeenseendoingsomething—statements,visiting,callingtheambassador,theworks.

SoIwentandlookeduptheNepaleseambassador.Kathmanduusuallypostedretiredmilitarychiefsasambassadors.Inthosedaysacoupleofmilitarymenhadfollowedoneanother.TheSriLankansalsodid that. Iwentandaskedhim,howcouldwehelp?

Sinha:TheyhadamilitarymanbecauseofZia?

Durrani:Probably.Forme,itwasadevelopmentinIndianbackwaters,howcanwemakeuseofit?

Dulat:Howcanweexploitit?

Durrani: The Kathmandu dinner we three had, I asked our host despite yourpresence, whether India makes the Nepalese unhappy. He said, yes, of course.

Because here is a big country, India, with hegemonic ambitions. They likeprevailingonus,tellinguswhattypeofsystemweshouldhave,whetherornotitisgoodforus.ThatwecouldbeapartofIndia,abigprovince,benignly,positively.That’sonewayofannexation.WhatisittheydidtoSikkim?

Butwhyonly talk ofNepal and India?Afghanistan andPakistan:we’remuchsmaller than India, and Afghanistan much bigger, more potent and moreproblematicthanNepal.YetAfghangeneralscomeandsay,youthinkweareyourfifthorsixthprovince,kyabaatkarraheho?Someofourpeoplesay,youareouryoungerbrother.Theyimmediatelyrespond:‘Youngerbrother?Wewerethere200yearsbeforeyoucamealong.WehadneverevenheardofyouinAfghanistan.’

Thisequationofanoverbearingcountryanditsneighbourexistsonoursidetoo.

Dulat: The Nepalese were always willing to concede that they are the youngerbrothers.

Sinha:WhathappenedwiththatNepaleseambassadorwhowasamilitaryman?

Durrani:Hesaid, ‘We’reonlytryingtogetclosertoChina,thatwasthehelpwegotfromthem.Indiaisnottheonlyone.’Neverputyoureggsinonebasket.

Butnothinghappened.PakistanwasnotinapositiontohavedonemucheitherinMaldivesorinNepal.

Sinha:Thatambassadorbecameyourfriend.

Durrani:Iwentandmethimonceortwice.WhenIwasthehead,theISIheaddidnotattendreceptions,foreignNationalDays,nothing.IonlyattendedtwoNationalDay functions. One was whenMani Dixit16 invited me when Foreign SecretaryMuchkundDubeywasvisitingIslamabad.

Igot toknowManiwell. Imethimwhile IwasatMIandsitting inthearmychief’sroom.ManihadtakenoverasIndianhighcommissionerandwasmakinghisfirst call on Aslam Beg, who handled things well though he sometimes got badpress.AfterhalfhourorsoAslamBegsayswe’regoingtoholdabigexercise(Zarb-e-Momin).AfterOperationBrasstackswedidnotwanttosendthewrongsignalorcreatepanic.Hesaid:‘We’regoingtoholditwellawayfromtheborder.’

Mani Dixit, the trained, blue-blooded diplomat that he was, merely said:‘General,Iwillconveyyourmessagetopeoplebackhome.’

AfterImovedtoISI,DubeywasvisitingandIwasinvitedtoareception.TheDG ISI is unlikely to go to an Indian reception even under the best ofcircumstances,but Iwent andManiDixitwas appreciative.WechattedwithhisdaughterAbha,whowasresearchingonSindh,andthenIhadafewminutesone-on-onewithDubey.

TheotherfunctionwaswhenNepalsentaninvitationforitsNationalDay.Theambassador, that General, was a clever man. There was no one else at thereception,Iwastheonlyonethere.JusttheambassadorofNepalandtheISIhead.The man was so clever that when he found out I was coming, he probablydisinvited everyone or postponed it. He just wanted a one-on-one with me.Otherwisenoreceptions.

Dulat:IservedinNepalthree-and-a-halfyears,underthreeambassadors,myonlyexperience in diplomatic service. I made a lot of friends and the key to thosefriendshipswascricket,becauseIplayedalot.

Itstartedmodestly.Nepalnowhasanationalcricketteamwhichin2017visitedBangladesh.Inthosedaystherewerefive-sixcricketclubs.TheIndianembassywasone.Theyhadtwotournamentshere.Onewasaleague,andonewasaknockout.Irepresented the Indian embassy and came into contactwith a lot ofNepalese. Imademanyfriends.

In those three-and-a-half years the Indian embassy became a serious cricketteam. At the end of it we won the league, we won the knockout, and in ourarrogancewetookonacombinedNepalteamandbeatthemaswell.

Sinha:That’swhytheycalledyouBigBrother.

Durrani:Beatingthemwasnotagoodidea.WeusedtohaveapolotournamentinBruneiandtheAmericanteamthatcameadvisedusnottobeattheSultan’steam.Thatwastheprescriptiontogetinvitedagainandagain.

Dulat:Maybeitwasnotagoodideabeatingthem.Asaresult,aNepalesecricketteamevolved.BeforeIleftKathmanduIwasinvitedtoplayforNepal;theyweregoingtoBangkoktoplayinThailand,theremustbesomeclubthere.IsaidIwouldlovetocome,butI’mnotNepalese.I’llhavetostayoutofthis.

Onebecamewellknownherebecauseofcricket.There’sabigparadegroundknown as Tundikhel, where the parades are held, andwhere cricket used to beplayedinthosedays.

There was a game going on, we were playing one of the major clubs inKathmandu, theGentlemen’s Cricket Club. I was watching from the boundary.Thebatterhadgottenout,andayoungsterwalkeduptomeandasked(inNepali),who’splaying. IsaidIndianEmbassyvsGCC.Hedidn’trecognisemeandasked,Daulatkikatiho,meaning,howmuchdidDaulatscore.Iwastickled.

ButthenetresultwasmyfinalambassadorwroteareportonmetoDelhisayingIdidnothingbutplaycricket.

Durrani: I got a similar compliment from a famous corps commander. He wasaskedifIcouldbetakenfromthecorpsforappointmentelsewhere.Hesaid,yes,as

long as he’s available to join the corps team in the coming golf tournament. Forhim,hisbrigadecommanderwasofnouse.

Sinha:AnyanecdotefromyourMIdays?

Durrani:There’s one aboutA.Q.Khan.17 TheDGMI attends certain receptionsand Ioncewent toaparticularNationalDay reception.Manycarscome,peopleget out, they go in.Once they come out, theman at the gate announces them.GeneralDurraniSahebkigadileaaye.

Onthatoccasionthevaletsaid,GeneralSahebaapektarafkhadehojaye,Ihavetotalktoyou.Isaidkyahua.Hesays,whatbusinessdoesA.Q.Khanhavetocometo all these receptions? Meaning this man should preferably be away from thelimelight.Hesays,SahebIdomyduty,IhaveneversaidA.Q.KhanSahebkigadileaaye. Ialwayssay,driverFazaluKhan,gadi leaaye, sothatnooneknowsthatA.Q.Khanwashere. I’mtryingtokeepthismanasanonymousaspossible.Thischapcomesandtakespartineverything.

Iappreciatedthisgesture,butA.Q.Khanlovedtobeseenandrecognised.Hemayhavebeenapplaudedatacoupleofplaces,buttherewereenoughpeoplewhodid not appreciate it. Self-projection was one of his weaknesses, but hiscontributiontoournuclearprogrammewassubstantialifnotdecisive.

I went to the President Ghulam Ishaq Khan, who was the custodian of ournuclearprogramme.Hegot that role fromZia-ulHaq.Z.A.Bhuttoas theprimeministerwas the fatherof theprogramme,Zia tookchargeof it and fromhim itpassedtoGhulamIshaqKhan.Hewasthebestmantoensurethatourprogrammeremainedoncourse,becauseheknewhow todealwith things. If theAmericanscame,hewouldnottalktothem.Ifsomeoneelseasked,hewouldexplainourneedforit.

Isaid,Sir,A.Q.Khan’sappearanceonfrequentoccasions,hispublicstatements,theyarenotright.Thewiseoldmanthathewas,hesaid,yes,Iknow.Everymanhastobeacceptedasapackage.He’suseful,he’sindispensablefortheprogramme,andthisissomethingwehavetolivewith.

Had I gone anywhere else they would have said, please go and talk to thepresident.Somewouldsay,layoff.Toothers,hewouldsaynoneoftheirbusiness.Hewouldmakesurenoonetouchestheprogramme,noonefiddleswithit,nooneeventriestoderailit.

Sinha:Soyourfriendsweren’tscaredoftheDeepState?

Durrani:Onthelighterside:astheheadoftheISI,anoldfriendinvitedmeforasmalldinner.Drinkswereserved.Someguestsgotscaredandsaid,GoodLord,wecamehereforaniceeveningandthechiefspymasterissittinghere.He’sgoingto

tellpeopleweweredrinking.Andsomeofthemwereuniformedofficers.

Myfriendassuredthem,Iknowthisfellow,andhehascertainconstraintsrightnow,buthe’snotlikelytogoaroundandsaythatso-and-sodrinks.Theyprobablythenfeltconfidentthatokay,wecangetawaywithit.

People may be scared that those caught drinking are dealt with severely.Regardless of all the prohibition from law, from religion, I do not remember ifpeoplewhowerefondofthetipplewereeverharmed.GeneralZiawassurroundedby peoplewhowere fond of drinking. It’s unbelievable. And these peoplewerescaredbecauseIwasthere.

5

ISIVsRAW

AdityaSinha:Whichisbetter,ISIorRAW?

A.S.Dulat:TomakeacomparisonwiththeRAWmaynotbefairbecausetheISIismuch older,whereas theRAW is nearly 50 years old, bifurcated from the IB inSeptember1968. Its creationwas a falloutpossibly of the ’62 and ’65wars, andMrs Gandhi1 felt the intelligence from abroad at her level was not receivingsufficientattention.

AsadDurrani:OnceanAmericanjournalistwithpoorposturecameuptomeataconference,casuallyposingaquestion:‘HowdoyourateRAW?’

Itwasobviouslynot socasual aquestion, andwasprobably intended tocatchmeoff-guardandprovokemeintoanalysisorsaynothing.Hewas likelytogototheRAWchiefandsay,look,thisiswhattheotherfellowsaid,andgetaresponsefromhim.

Instead,almostreflexivelyIsaid:‘Atleastasgoodasweare.’

The ISI’s Afghanistan involvement happened before I took over, but I foundabsolutelyeveryoneapplaudingit:friends,oldfriends,newfriends,pseudo-friends.ManycameandsangpraisesthatISIhasbecomecapable,itcontrolseverybody,ithasaname.

When I had that one-on-one with a member of (Foreign Secretary) Dubey’sdelegation,heasked: ‘What is the ISI’smain focus?’Atthat timeourmain focuswasofcourseAfghanistan,but I thought I shouldputSouthBlocktowork.So Isaid:‘India,ofcourse.’

Dulat:IwouldagreewithGeneralSahebthatifyoutookRAWandIBagainsttheISIoragainstPakistan’sagencies,theyareasgoodprofessionally.There’salotdonebyour agencies thatpeopledon’t get toknowabout, or shouldnot get toknowabout. In the intelligenceworld India produced big names like B.N.Mullik2 andR.N.Kao3andM.K.Narayanan4andnowAjitDoval.5

Durrani: About ten years ago a ratings website called Smashing Lists came outwith,amongotherlists,theworld’stenbestspyagencies.Outoftheblue.ISIwasnumberone,followedbyMossad,CIA,andalltheothers.

Ofcourse,athomepeople felthappyabout it. Iwasaskedand I said, Idon’tknowbutthecriteriaforthisratingseemedprettygood.Onewasthenumberof

threatsPakistanfaced,bothinsideandoutside,anotherwastheresourcesavailabletoit.UnlikethedayswhenwegotmoneyfromSaudiArabiaandAmerica,there’sashoestringbudgetandsoatightcontrolofmoney.

Thepoint isnotwho’sone,two,threeorfour.Youdoa jobwell,keepa lowprofile, no one takes credit, no one blamed, no claims. Like you guys did yourMuktiVahiniquietly.

For me, the best way to judge ISI was that during the Soviet occupation ofAfghanistan, it got all the help from most of the big players in the West butallowednointerferenceinitsrole,organisingtheresistance.ButthentheColdWarwasoverandwehadtochangeourobjectivesintheregion,andtheISIwaskeytothat.

Another accomplishment is that none of our operators ever defected or was‘caughtoncamera’.

Sinha:WhathasbeenthegreatestISIfailureagainstIndia?Iwillaskhim(Dulat)asimilarquestion.

Durrani:Ithinkmycolleagueshouldstart.

Dulat: Our biggest failure against Pakistan is that we’ve not been able to turnaroundanISIofficerorhaveanISIofficerworkingforus.Ornottomyknowledge,atalevelwhereitcounts.

IfyougobacktotheColdWar,whatwasthemaintaskofaCIAofficer?Itwastosomehowfindadefector.IfaCIAguyfoundadefectorthenfortherestofhiscareer he didn’t need to do anything, because he had donewhatwas supremelyrequired.

On our side I don’t thinkwe’ve even imagined it properly and I don’t thinkwe’vesucceeded.

Sinha:EvenifwehadamoleinsideISI,nobodywouldknow.

Dulat:Molesareeasiertohavethandefectors.

GeneralSahebwastalkingaboutdoubleagents.Doubleagentsarethenextbestthingtodefectors.IfaguyisworkingforPakistanandIgetholdofhim,thenIhaveachanceofgettingtowhereI’msupposedtobe.So,notbeingabletofindanISIdefectorisourbiggestfailure.

Durrani: At the operational level, the 1965 war, we could claim we got goodinformationabouttheotherside,howtheyareassembledforwar.Butitwasalosteffort.

Inthe1971wartheISIwasunabletoanticipatetheattackinEastPakistan.

In my time we predicted that India’s military build-up, after the Kashmiruprising,wasnotintendedforwar.Icanpatmyownbackforthat.

But the biggest failure was when the Kashmir uprising happenedwe did notknowhowfaritwouldgo.Thesethingsusuallyruntheircourseinsixmonthsorayear.Whenitbecamelasting,wewonderedhowtokeepahandleonit.Wedidn’twantittogooutofcontrol,whichwouldleadtoawarthatneithersidewanted.Couldwemicro-manageit?Thatwasourchallenge.ISI’sleverageontheKashmirinsurgencyturnedoutlessthansuccessful.

Inparticular,IregretittilltodaywhywedidnottakeAmanullahGilgitimoreseriously.Hisgroupledtheuprising.Hestartedit,initiatedit,spokeaboutit.ImethimwhenIwasattheISI.Hedidnotseemimportantatthattime.Inanycase,histhirdoptionofindependencewasunnecessarilymuddyingthewater.Andwhatdidindependencemeananyway?

Gilgiti,though,wasprobablythemostseriousone,focusedandconnected.Likethe rallies atChakoti.Everyyear, onour side,October27 is celebrated asBlackDay. Gilgiti was the only person who brought his crowd in, disciplined, sober,serene,conductingtheproceedingsandthemarchwithoutcommotion.Theotherswerenon-serious,theycamefromhereandthere,madetheirspeechesandleft.

ButgoingbacktotheevolutionoftheKashmiruprisingofthe1990s,Ithinktheformationof theHurriyat6 toprovideapoliticaldirection to the resistancewasagoodidea.Givinguphandleonthemovement—lettingthefactionsdowhattheybloodywellwantedto—wasnot.

Dulat:Letmemakeclearonething.InpublicperceptionnotgettingDawood7orHafizSaeed8orMasoodAzhar9areglaringfailures.ButifinsteadofputtingoutasupariforDawood,you‘turned’theISIstationchiefinDelhi,thatinintelwouldbeamuchbiggerthing.

About the Pakistani angle in Kashmir, they often crow about putting outsomebodyhere, or bumping off somebody there, or forcing someone to form anorganisation,orsendingoutdiktats.It’sokay,workstoanextent.

Kashmir is very painstaking and requires patience.That iswhere Pakistan haslostout.

Becauseafterawhilethefeelingwas,asGeneralSahebsaid,jaanedo,letthemgo.ThisisonthebasisofconversationswithPakistanisoverthelasttenyears,sincetheMumbai attack. The general responsewas that they can talk about Kashmirlater,fornowtheycanputitonthebackburner.

But it’snow ‘gameon’again in the last threeyearsbecauseof theuncertaintywe’vecreated.ThestatusquomesswecreategetsPakistaninterestedagain.

IusedtotellPakistanifriendsinTrack-II,let’sdiscussyourcoreissue,Kashmir.EvenGeneralSahebwouldsay,thereisn’tsufficientinterestinKashmir.Forgetitforthetimebeing.

It’s been like that. It’s a typical military reaction, a typical military way ofdealingwithaproblem.Thatpossibly,Sir,isoneoftheshortcomingsintheISI.

Durrani:That’sinoursystem.

Dulat:Youbulldozeyourway.TheKashmiriknowshowtoplaydifferentsides.

Sinha:SotheintelligencegameiswonbytheKashmirieventhoughheissuffering.

Dulat:AfellowI’veknownforyearswilltellmeonethingandsixmonthslaterwilltellmesomethingelse;hisperception,hisstory,everythingwillchange.

Inbetween,he’llbowlGeneralSahebagoogly.

ButKashmirrequirestime.Ifyouwanttounderstanditorgetyourselfinvolvedthenitrequirestime,patience,empathy.

Durrani: I agree. I also agree with the point that under the circumstances,KashmirisorAfghanslearntolivewithit,whichmeansyouhavetokeeptwoorthreedifferentsidesingoodhumour.Andstillsurvive,fightingtheIndianarmyortheUSarmy.

Dulat:AboutAfghanistan,wealwaysknewitwasgoingtohaverepercussionsforus. If theCIA let loose the ISI inAfghanistan, thenyou let loose theHizb,10 theLashkarandtheJaishinKashmir.Youmaysayitisdirectlylinked,butthere’saninevitabilityaboutit.IftheAmericansfelttheISIwasgettingoutofcontrol,andtheyfeltitasearlyasthen,thenourapprehensionswerejustified,thatthisisgoingtohavebig-timeimplicationsinKashmir.

Durrani:It’seasytotalkaboutpossibilitiesandscenarios;ifyoudothat,thentheywill do this. The capability, performance possibilities, conducive situation:manyfactorscomeintothepicture.Itdoesn’thappenthatyourpeopleareinAfghanistanandourpeoplewillgotoKashmir.It’snotacyber-gameinwhichyoucantargetJaish-e-MohammedthissideandaRAW-backedgrouponthatside.Doesithaveingress?Wouldlocalscooperatewiththem?

Atthesametime,ifweintenddeployingagroupIdon’tthinkoneiswaitingforthe Indians orAmericans to take a step and then, as quid pro quo, do it.We’dprobablybedoingitalready.Ifnotblatantly,atleastinsomeformorother.It’snotnecessarilytit-for-tat.

Dulat:Itwasnottit-for-tat,Sir.Wealreadyhadthetit!Nowweweregettingthetat.

Durrani:Sometimesyoumightbelieveitisso.Sometimesyoumightdoitbecause

ifyou’renotgoingtodoitinKashmiryou’regoingtosomewhereelse.

Dulat:SoweagreethatiswhentheISIgotalarger-than-lifeimageandthatwasitsheyday?

Durrani:TheKashmirthing?

Dulat:TheAfghanthingandthenKashmir.

Durrani:TheAfghanthing.Kashmir?

Dulat:KashmirfollowedtheAfghanthing.

Durrani:Whenonewas lookingatKashmir, it ispossible thatonewasunable toget thewholepicture right.But initially, if thepotential is suspect,wewait andwatch.

Dulat:That’sright,that’sright.

Durrani:Thenwesaythatbecauseoftheproblemsthatyouhaveelsewhere,thisisnot right time forus to startplaying theSikhcard, theKashmir card, theULFAcard.

Eventually,theideawasthatifthisisanuprising,itshouldnotleadtoaconflictthatneithersidewants.Itcanblowup,involvebothcountriesinawarthatneithersideisbargainingfor.

Theideawastokeepitonaleash.Whetherwecouldcontrolthesethingsisadifferentmatter altogether.Onehad a good idea about our limited capability tohandlesomanybigthings,andpunchingaboveone’sweightisnotagoodidea.

But if the dynamics of that thing was beyond us, that’s anothermatter. TheintentionoftheStatewas,however,nottocontinueonthistrack,andultimatelyflyagreenflagonLalQila(RedFort).

Indeed,somemighthavesaidthat—nowthattheSovietUnionwasnomore—ZiaorHamidGulhadambitionsbeyondAfghanistan!Butessentiallywewereonlythinkingabouttradeandcultural links.Atthattimeevenprojects like‘electricityfrom Central Asia’ looked like a bit over the top. Now with CASSA 100 andCPEC,itseemsthatsomefuturisticthinkingwasalwaysinorder.

ItsoundedfantasticatthetimebuttheonlysubstantialthingIheardwas,let’sgetelectricityfromCentralAsia.Isaid,whatnonsenseareyoutalking,howwillwegetthelinesovertheWakhancorridor?Butnow,25yearslater,theChina-PakistanEconomicCorridor(CPEC)isaboutthat.

Dulat:Returning to thequestionofprofessionalism, I had asked thoseKashmiriswho had seen us andwho had been to the other side, which agency has betterpeople or is more professional? The general response was that our guys are

generally better. Pakistan has some fine officers but they may not have an AjitDoval.

Durrani:ThankGod.

Dulat: I would say the RAW or the IB could certainly dowith aGeneral AsadDurrani.

Sinha:TheRAWhashaditsshareofpoorleaders.

Dulat: Iwouldalwayscontest that since itwouldbe trueof agenciesworldwide.Therewouldbeoutstandingchiefsandsomequiteordinary.GeneralSahebhassaidhis opinion of the CIA was that it is a great organisation but it is a third-rateintelligence agency.11 If the CIA is third-rate then its chiefs must have beenordinary.

Sopedestrianchiefsareeverywhere,intheIB,intheISI.

Sinha:HastheISIconsistentlyseenstrongleadership?

Durrani:GenerallyweregardtheIndiansystemasmoreeffective.It’sinstitutional.It’s not at anyone’swhims, likewhenTariqAzizwas pulled out of the revenueserviceandmadeourNationalSecurityAdvisor.OrtheloyalistwhowasasecurityofficerbutmadetheIBchief.

The DG ISI may be recommended by the army chief but the appointingauthoritywastheprimeminister.Notnecessarilybecausehe’ssomebody’sfriend.He’llhave ideas, flair,knowabitof internationalrelations,management,andtheright temperament. Take his timewith things. Somewhowere brusque tried toturntheorganisationonitshead,butmercifullytheorganisationisresilientandcanwithstandtemporaryshocks.

Dulat:Oneproblemisthatunlikesomeotheragencies,weareburdenedwithnotjustintelligencecollection,butintelligenceanalysis.IthinktheISIislikeusinthisregard.Inbothagenciesthereistoomuchemphasisonanalysisandnotenoughoncollection.Ouragenciesneedtobemorehands-on.

Otherwise they are burdenedwith toomuch.What is an agency supposed toproduce? Ifyouwant it toknoweverything thathappens, thenyoumissout theessentials.What isour focus?Arewe lookingatPakistan?Afghanistan?Kashmir,Tamil Nadu, Punjab? Internal security, external security? Counter-intelligence?Counter-terrorism?It’sendless.

Anotherhandicapwehaveisourtenure.

Durrani:Mossadchiefhassixyears.

Dulat:TheMI6chiefcouldservelonger,andafterithegetsknighted.Iwaschiefforonly17-18months,likeGeneralSaheb.Justasyou’resettlinginandbeginning

to understand thewhole thing and enjoy it, your time’s up. In India now chiefshavetwoyears,buteventhatisnotenough.Itshouldbethreeyears,exceptthatthe longer the term, themore peoplewillmiss out on being chief.Youhave toweighthis.

GeneralSahebsaidtheISIworkedonashoestringbudget.InthatcasewehadnobudgetatallbecausewewereneverfundedbytheCIA!

There’s also the question of keeping a lowprofile. Therewas a time in IndiawhenyouneversawaphotographofanIBchief.MrKaowasneverphotographed.Now chiefs becoming public and being in the open is a recent phenomenon. Isupposeit’sthesamearoundtheworld.

Sinha:Isittougherforspychiefswithastrongprimeminister?

Dulat:Itistougher,butit’salsobetter.Thetaskingwouldbemuchtougher.Theagenciesliketocreatetheirowntasking.Wefeelweknowitbetterthananybodyelse.Whenthetaskingstartscomingfromthetop,howithastohappenandwhichwayweareheading,thenitbecomesthatmuchmoredifficult.

It’sdifficultifyouarecatering,asGeneralSahebhinted,toacertainregime,oracertainset-up.WithaprimeministeraspowerfulandstrongasModi,thejobofthe intelligence agenciesmustbe thatmuch tougher. Itmightbegetting simplerbutitwouldnotbeeasy.

Therehavebeen, incidentally,primeministers in Indiawhohadno interest inintelligence.Idon’tthinkMorarjiDesai(1977-79)consideredintelligenceanasset.P.V.NarasimhaRao (1991-96)was too intelligent and thought itwas fraud andchuglibaazi. Even I.K. Gujral (1997-98) was sceptical about intelligence. PrimeministerslikeRajivGandhi(1984-89)founditfascinating,maybebecausehewasyoung.Hewasabsolutelyfascinated,andreliedsomuchontheagencies.ThestoryisthattheDIBwouldhavecoffeeandchocolatewithhimat10:30everynight.

TheprimeministerthatIservedwith,A.B.Vajpayee(1998-2004),helikedtolisten,helikedtobebriefed.Hedidn’treact,buthemadeyoufeelimportantandthatwhatyou’retellinghimhewantstoknow.Hedidn’trubbishit.Forapersonwhospokelittleandwassoreallyhimself,hegaveyouapatienthearing.

Sinha:DotheIBandtheRAWworktogetherwell?

Dulat: I’m not saying that we don’t work together, we do. The nature ofintelligencework is such that inevitably there is a certain degree of jealousy andone-upmanship.Buthowfardoyoutakethat?InAmerica,therehavealwaysbeenproblemsbetweentheCIAandFBI.Nottosaythatitdoesn’thappenelsewhere.It’sattributedtohowbigtheCIAbecame.Onthegroundthat’sresentedbytheotherpeoplewho’redoingthesamekindofthing.

Durrani: If in India you areworking together, youareone step aheadofus.Wehardlyseeanycooperationbetweenouragencies.

Dulat:Pakistanisonestepbehindus?I’mglad,thereshouldbesomethinginwhichtheyarebehind.

Durrani:InPakistan,cooperationbetweengovernmentdepartments,civil-military,andgenerallyisfarfromdesirable.Itmaybebecauseofourhistory.

Dulat:IgrewupintheIB,spent30yearsthereand,strangely,hadn’tthefoggiestideawhathappensintheRAW.IntheIBwehadcontemptfortheRAW.Whenasked if I would like to head that organisation, I jumped at it. I was otherwiseretiringasnumbertwointheIB;earlierthehomesecretaryofferedmeoneofthepara-militaryforcestoheadandIsaidno,Ispentmywholelifeinintelligence,whywouldIwanttomoveout.

When Iwent to theRAW theydidn’t like it.Understandably, they thought Iwasanoutsider.IttookawhiletosettledownandforthemtoacceptthatIknewthe business. Interestingly, everybody worried that there would be a hugeinfiltrationoftheRAWbyIBguys.MyoldfriendsthoughtIwasstillanIBguyintheRAW.Sowhenevertherewasalittleargumentordiscussionbetweenthetwoorganisations,IBchiefswouldsay,arreyaaryou’reoneofus.I’dsay,ofcourse,butnowI’mheadingtheRAWanditsinterestswouldbeuppermostinmymind.

CabinetSecretaryPrabhatKumaronedayasked,Dulat,maindekhtahoonidharudharIBwaleko,RAWwalekobhidekhtahoon,tumnetodonodekhehai,tumbataowhichisbetter.Isaid,botharebetter.Isaid,theIB’smoresolid,itcomprisesbasicallypolicemen.Hereyouhaveamixofvariouskinds,sosometimesthere’snogellingtogether.

Sinha:EspritdeCorps?

Dulat:Yeah,sometimes.Butmantoman,therearegoodpeopleintheRAW,soweshouldnotrunitdown.WorkingtogetherwassomucheasierinmytimeintheRAWbecauseIwouldcallShyamal12upandsay,let’ssitdownandsortitout.

Unfortunately it didn’t last long. After us, it was b