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No 1(X)/2014ISSN: 2083-7372quarterlyJanuary-March

1 (X

) / 14

Victoria NarizhnaIgor Lyubashenko

Mykola RiabchukTaras Voznyak

RUSSIA A Dress Rehearsal for Democracy? Ayder Muzhdabayev

On learned helplessness Alexander Snegirev

B O O K S & R E V I E W S : A N D R Z E J W A J D A , L Y U D M I L A U L I T S K A Y A , R O M A N S Z P O R L U K , S L A V O J Ž I Ž E K & S R E Ć K O H O R V A T

ISSN 2083-7372

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Dear Reader,The beginning of every year, unavoidably, brings refl ection over what has

happened in the year before and what consequences it could have on the year to come. However, while we all tend to agree that history matters, we also know how impossible it is to foresee the course of the future based on the past. And indeed, we fi nished 2013 with an incomplete chapter in Ukraine along with some disappointment with the European Union’s limited success in integration with the East.

Recent events show that when it comes to this region nothing can be taken for granted, including Russia and its geopolitical aspirations. As two Lithuanian analysts, Laurynas Kasčiūnas and Vytautas Keršanskas, write in a summary of the 2013 Eastern Partnership Summit: “decision makers in the EU should take into account that the Russia-led Eurasian Customs Union is qualitatively different from all previous integration initiatives in the post-Soviet space”. A painful truth, but also one that the EU should not disregard, especially in light of the arguments made by Dominik P. Jankowski and Paweł Świeżak, Polish security experts, who state that: “Eastern Europe has become an ‘unwanted child’ for some western countries, one they would prefer to forget about.”

Considering the limited attention span on this issue, we want to present you with analyses of one of the countries which probably represents the biggest victim of western misconceptions. Belarus is often easily assigned the label of “Europe’s last dictatorship”, yet seen by many others as located in the heart of Europe. While explaining the complexities of its current situation, the authors of this issue, who don’t question Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s authoritarian rule, point to the EU policies that poorly address the Belarusian people who, as an intellectual and oppositionist Alyaksandr Milinkevich writes, are not only entrepreneurial but also pro-European. The articles aim to present Belarus from various viewpoints and allow us to ask a question why we overlook this key nation too often.

This issue also includes an essay by Alexander Snegirev, a Russian writer, who tackles the problem of learned hopelessness in post-Soviet societies as well as and an insightful interview with Ayder Muzhdabayev, the deputy editor-in-chief of Moskovsky Komsomolets. Lastly, in the review section, we point to the newest fi lm directed by Andrzej Wajda presenting the story of the Polish communist fi ghter – Lech Wałęsa.

As always, we encourage you to join us online and via our social networks (Twitter and Facebook).

The Editors

4

ContentsOpinion and Analysis

8 Lessons from Vilnius Laurynas Kasčiūnas and Vytautas Keršanskas The Eastern Partnership Summit in

Vilnius must be seen as an opportunity to review the goals of Europe’s policy in the region. Thus far, the policy has been understood as the spread of European values and norms in the neighbourhood. But, the cases of Ukraine and Armenia show that competing integration projects could reduce the EU’s abilities to tie the neighbouring states to Europe.

14 A New Kind of Revolution Victoria Narizhna

23 Euromaidan. Chronicles of networked revolt

Igor Lyubashenko The period between November 21st and

December 1st 2013 marks the beginning of a new era in Ukrainian politics. It is now possible to say with confi dence that one of the main things that took place is the political initiation of the new generation.

28 Europe with a View to the Future Adam Reichardt

33 The Eastern European Winter Dominik P. Jankowski and Paweł Świeżak

41 The Emergence of a New (Old) Eurasia

Adam Balcer

Despite Russia’s goal to create a Eurasian Union to reintegrate the countries of the former Soviet Union, this vision will most likely remain on paper. The rise of China’s role in the region clearly demonstrates that the Eurasian Union does not constitute a serious obstacle to economic and political cooperation between countries in the post-Soviet space and other regional powers.

48 The Russian Orphanage Model Alexander Snegirev

52 After the Crash Mykola Riabchuk

58 Georgia’s Choice Nika Sikharulidze

65 What Gives Us Strength? Alyaksandr Milinkevich The current times cannot be called

favourable for Belarus, but it is on this anvil that the Belarusian identity is being tempered. The Belarusians are a people with a European past and capable of preserving their identity.

76 The Anatomy of Belarusian Numbness Dzmitry Hurnevich

84 Redefi ning Identity Jędrzej Czerep

91 Between Collaboration and Confl ict Andrzej Poczobut In Belarus, there is an economic crisis;

there is social discontent; there are trade unions, but there are no worker protests. Why haven’t the trade unions become the main agent of the change and social resistance in Belarus?

99 In Search of One Voice Alena Zuikova

109 Challenging Cooperation on the Local Level

Miroslav Kobasa

112 The Pitfalls of Eurasian Integration Anna Maria Dyner

5

131 Dress Rehearsal Democracy? A conversation with Ayder Muzhdabayev “I do not believe that Navalny is a hope

of Russian democracy and a European type politician on the whole. And this may also be in Putin’s interests, as he may demonstrate to the West: look here, in case of democratisation, I could be replaced by people who encourage Muscovites to join Nazi processions.”

137 The Ukrainian Window to Europe An interview with Taras Voznyak

142 Human Traffi cking in Romania Misha Hofl and

148 Eastern Galicia Revisited Tadeusz Iwański

156 Surviving Totalitarian Regimes An oral history interview

with Mimi Jiránkova and Nataša Lišková

Books and Reviews

Reports

Interviews

History

People, Ideas, Inspiration

118 Rethinking EU Policy towards Belarus Andrei Liakhovich Relations with Belarus are not a high

priority for the European Union. The majority of its policy is based on containing Russia’s infl uence. The EU could have a greater impact on Belarus relations, but only if it wants to. For now, it seems to be perfectly satisfi ed with the status quo.

125 So close, yet so far away Evgeny Treshchenkov

161 Happiness Is Near? Aleksandra Eriksson The Russian city of Perm recently

underwent a revolutionary change from a rusting industrial city to a cultural hot spot.

169 The Evolution of the Central European City A Conversation with Jan Sucháček

175 Ryszard Jabłoński – A Different Wajda? Wałęsa. Człowiek z nadziei (Wałęsa. Man

of Hope). A fi lm directed by Andrzej Wajda 177 Filip Mazurczak – Beyond the Cold Warrior On Zbig: The Strategy and Statecraft

of Zbigniew Brzezinski. Edited by Charles Gati180 Ida Orzechowska – Europe

in the Time of Cholera On Slavoj Žižek and Srećko Horvat’s What

Does Europe Want? The Union and its Discontents

183 Andrey Miroshkin – Letters on a Post-War Country

On Lyudmila Ulitskaya’s Детство 45–53: а завтра будет счастье (Childhood 45-53: And Tomorrow There Will Be Happiness)

186 Anna Kotaleichuk – Reading Szporluk on Maidan

On Roman Szporluk’s Формування модерних націй:Україна – Росія – Польща (The Formation of Modern Nations: Ukraine – Russia – Poland)

189 Zośka Papużanka – Unravelling the Past On Wiesław Myśliwski’s Ostatnie rozdanie

(The Last Deal)192 Dorota Sieroń-Galusek

– The Ethos of Bridge Builders On a Handbook of Dialogue. Trust and Identity.194 Philip Palmer – Reframing the Debate On Magdalena Waligórska’s Klezmer’s

Afterlife: An Ethnography of the Jewish Music Revival in Poland and Germany

198 Grzegorz Nurek – Around Polish Cinema On a series dedicated to Polish fi lm directors

published Krytyka Polityczna

EDITOR AND PUBLISHERThe Jan Nowak-Jeziorański College

of Eastern Europe in Wrocław offi ce@kew.org.pl

www.kew.org.pl

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EDITORIAL BOARDLeonidas Donskis, Yaroslav Hrytsak, Paweł Kowal,

Ivan Krastev, Georges Mink, Zdzisław Najder, Cornelius Ochmann, Eugeniusz Smolar,

Lilia Shevtsova, Roman Szporluk, Jan Zielonka

EDITORIAL TEAMAdam Reichardt, Editor-in-Chief

Iwona Reichardt, Deputy Editor, Lead Translator Giacomo Manca, Contributing Editor

EDITORIAL INTERNMartina Cebecauerova

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Lessons from Vilnius L A U R Y N A S K A SČ IŪN A S A N D V Y TA U TA S K E R Š A N S K A S

Th e Eastern Partnership Summit in Vilnius must be seen as an opportunity to review the goals of Europe’s policy in the region. Th us far, the policy has been understood as the spread

of European values and norms in the neighbourhood. But, the cases of Ukraine and Armenia show that competing integration projects could further reduce the EU’s abilities

to tie the neighbouring states to Europe.

Th e Vilnius Summit was neither a victory nor a failure for the European Union’s

Eastern Partnership policy. It is an important milestone because the original

mission to give a European perspective to the region has been accomplished. On

the other hand, however, no agreement with Ukraine that we could call the “point

of no return” was reached during the summit. Th e biggest achievement of the

summit is not very inspiring – the initialling of the Association Agreements with

Moldova and Georgia, and, to some extent, a “green light” for the visa-free regime

with Moldova.

Of course the big disappointment of Ukraine’s slap in the face to EU made these

achievements look even better. Ukraine’s signing of the Association Agreement

with EU would have meant that the Ukrainian multi-dimensional foreign policy

would be practically over, ending the country’s possibility to enter into the Customs

Union. However, this round was lost and the competition between the integration

spaces continues.

Winners and losers

Decision makers in the EU should take into account that the Russia-led Eurasian

Customs Union is qualitatively diff erent from all previous integration initiatives

in the post-Soviet space. Th e Eurasian Customs Union means deeper integration,

9

because, apart from a free trade area, it also includes a single imports taxation

system, a uniform external customs tariff and other harmonised standards. Once

a country joins the Eurasian Union, it loses its independence in the area of external

trade policy. Members of the Eurasian Customs Union have to both agree on the

common customs tariff and jointly develop a common trade regime with third

countries.

Should EU partner countries join the Eurasian

Union, this would mean that Russia would gain

leverage in the external trade policy of the other

countries in the Eurasian Union and will be able to

aff ect their relations with the EU. For instance, it

could foreclose their negotiations with the EU on

enhanced free trade agreements. Th us, the current situation in Ukraine becomes a

zero-sum game: for Russia it is a win or lose question in the context of the possibility

to dominate in the biggest and economically strongest post-Soviet state. At the

same time, the EU may win or lose momentum, after which the political and civil

will to integrate may decrease dramatically (the lessons of the NATO Bucharest

Summit in 2008 must be considered).

So, why didn’t the EU and Ukraine sign the Association Agreement? Who are the

winners and losers of this political challenge? Th e dominant interpretation states

that the EU has lost this round, not only diplomatically but also geopolitically, while

it is the third victory in a row for Russia if we consider Syria and Edward Snowden

to be the fi rst two. It is quite obvious that the EU was trapped by its normative

policy – playing the Tymoshenko card and not recognising early enough that the

EU is not the only player in town.

Th e overly high requirements in the fi elds of selective justice and democratic

reforms for Ukraine were not fl exible enough to react to the changing situation.

Th us, this normativity only pushed Ukraine into Russia’s fi eld of interest and,

automatically, created a greater dependence on anti-democratic internal and

external political powers. Viktor Yanukovych’s decision was also determined by

the enormous economic and political pressure from Russia, which the EU did not

manage to react to.

However, there is an alternative view that states that Yanukovych, not Russia,

is the winner of this geopolitical game. Given that Yanukovych did not even plan

to sign the Association Agreement, his bargaining to the EU was only intended to

“raise his price” and use the perspective of the Association Agreement as leverage

in the relations with Russia, especially in the fi elds of gas prices and credit rates.

So, it was not the traditional question of Ukraine’s participation in the Russia-

led Customs Union, but the question of (not) signing the Association Agreement

An alternative view states that Yanukovych, not Russia, is the winner of this geopolitical game.

Laurynas Kasčiūnas and Vytautas Keršanskas, Lessons from Vilnius Opinion and Analysis

10

that was on the table during the negotiations with Russia. According to this view,

Yanukovych is the absolute winner of this game exactly because of this achievement.

Th is situation is a perfect example of Kyiv’s well-known West-or-East balancing,

supplemented with the Ukrainian belief that it is possible to fool both sides.

However, this time it looks that Yanukovych came to a deadlock when hundreds

of thousands protesters came to the streets.

Th ere were some presumptions which stated that Ukraine is inevitably dependant

on Russia. According to this position, the oligarchic economic model that is anchored

in Ukraine along with the adhesion of business and politics and the domination

of informal rules in respect to the principle of supremacy of law are the invisible

leashes that tie these two countries together. Trying to escape this situation has

been programmed for failure since the beginning, and the unsuccessful agreement

with the EU only proves this once again.

Different views

Regardless of one’s point of view, the Eastern Partnership Summit in Vilnius must

be seen as an opportunity to review the goals and implementation of this policy

and shape its future. What lessons should be learnt? So far, the EaP policy has been

understood as the spread of European values and norms in the neighbourhood. But

the cases of Ukraine and Armenia show that the alternative integration projects

competing with the EU do not rely on the principle of formal conditionality, off ering

a stimulus package which could further reduce the EU’s abilities to “tie” neighbouring

states to European rules. Th is means that the strategic planning for the Eastern

Partnership policy should more deeply assume the geopolitical situation. Th is is

necessary, as the EU Eastern Partnership policy is not the only player in town.

In Vilnius, it became clear that the six partner

countries had diff erent views and capacities for

adopting the European rules of the game and

choosing the EU as their main geopolitical direction.

It is therefore possible to distinguish two blocks of

EaP countries in regards to their diff erent progress

in implementing the programme’s provisions. Th e “advanced” or simply potential

associated partners are Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia. Meanwhile Azerbaijan

“does not want”, Armenia “cannot”, and Belarus “does not want and cannot” choose

rapprochement with the EU as off ered by the Eastern Partnership programme.

It has become clear that the common Eastern Partnership model does not satisfy

the interests of all six countries and, although the de facto implementation of the

Th e common Eastern Partnership model does

not satisfy the interests of all six countries.

Opinion and Analysis Laurynas Kasčiūnas and Vytautas Keršanskas, Lessons from Vilnius

11

programme continued at a diff erent pace, the adaptation of the programme of multi-

speed integration into the EU is a reality. It is important to provide conditions for

the three guiding principles – individual progress, catching up and diff erentiation –

to further serve as driving motives behind the Eastern Partnership. In this case, the

dilemma is what the EU can off er to the “advanced” partnership countries so that

they will continue to seek adoption of European rules and move closer to the EU.

Another important question is the type of relationship model that the EU should

apply to the rest of the EaP countries, for those who cannot (Belarus) or those who

do not (Azerbaijan and Armenia) seek to sign an Association Agreement with

the EU. Obviously, diff erentiation trends in modelling the future of the Eastern

Partnership makes us think of applying more fl exible, thus, dissimilar instruments

to the countries that have made progress. Th e current EaP content consists of two

main pillars: 1) the Association Agreement and integration into the EU domestic

market through an enhanced free trade agreement and 2) a gradual movement

towards a visa-free regime as well as various facilities.

Visa liberalisation is considered the most urgent issue for ordinary citizens. In

order to retain less advanced countries in the fi eld of EU interests, the prospect

of visa-free travel should not be denied despite the reluctance of these countries

to sign the Association Agreement. Although visa liberalisation is still a future

issue, its advocates believe that visa-free travel would create opportunities for

Ukrainian president, Viktor Yanukovych, was greeted at the Vilnius Summit by Lithuanian

President Dalia Grybauskaitė, European Council President Herman Van Rompuy and President

of the European Commission José Manuel Barroso. Ukraine’s decision not to sign the

Association Agreement has led to much speculation as to what is next in this geopolitical game.

Photo: Giacomo Manca

Laurynas Kasčiūnas and Vytautas Keršanskas, Lessons from Vilnius Opinion and Analysis