Population change in Europe: turning challenges into opportunities - Royal Netherlands … · *...

NICO VAN NIMWEGEN*

Population change in Europe:turning challenges into opportunities

1. INTRODUCTION: POPULATION CHANGE AS POLICY CHALLENGE

Population change is a major driver of social change. Trends in fertility,mortality and migration are rapidly changing the size, composition and distri-bution of Europe’s population. Due to increasing longevity and sustained lowfertility, Europe’s population is aging rapidly. This challenges the sustainabil-ity of public finances, pension systems and health care provision. Livinglonger, healthier and with smaller families also brings opportunities to par-ents, children, the relations between generations and society at large. Europe’spopulation is also becoming more diverse due to the mobility of Europeans aswell as the inflow of migrants from outside Europe. Increasing diversity mayhelp to spur economic growth but can also put a strain on social cohesion inthe migration receiving countries while depleting the human resources ofmigration sending countries. Population growth is slowing down acrossEurope and population decline is becoming a reality in an increasing numberof countries, particularly at the regional level. The mobility of Europeansacross the continent brings prosperity and contributes to economic growth insome regions, but may challenge this in others. Also the shrinking of thepotential workforce will bring new challenges to labour markets and sustain-able economic growth. This paper describes the emerging new demographicrealities which are confronting Europe. It illustrates that demographic trendsdo not play out the same way for every country or region and it highlights thevery rich variation of the demographic landscape1. This diversity also reflectsthe different social, economic and cultural settings and past experiences ofcountries and regions, which need to be taken into account when addressingthe challenges and opportunities of population change. What are the bestways to tap the rich human resources of an aging and more diverse popula-tion? And how will we deal with this in the context of the slowing down ofpopulation growth? Can Europe break new ground in promoting a society forall generations and genders?

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GENUS, LXIX (No. 1), 1-23

* NIDI - Netherlands Interdisciplinary Demographic Institute. E-mail: [email protected] Data mostly refer to member states of the Council of Europe, including for instance countrieslike Turkey and Russia.

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2. DRIVERS OF POPULATION CHANGE: FEWER CHILDREN, LONGERLIVES AND VOLATILE MIGRATION FLOWS

2.1 Fertility

Most Europeans have a preference for small families (Testa, 2007; Lutz,Skirbekk and Testa, 2006; Goldstein, Lutz and Testa, 2003). Since the lastdecades of the 20th century Europe has witnessed strong declines in fertilitylevels which were both caused by changes in the number of children that wereborn to parents, as well as changes in the timing of childbirth (eg. Balbo, Bil-lari and Mills, 2012). Due to a host of interlocking social and economicchanges, such as increasing labour force participation of women and risinglevels of education, “late and low fertility” went hand in hand and becamecharacteristic for a growing number of countries, although the pattern was farfrom universal. For Central and Eastern European countries also the socio-political changes and the accompanying economic hardship and insecurity ofthe late 1990s played a role, as well as, according to some authors, the demiseof pro-natalist family policies (Van Nimwegen and Van der Erf, 2010). In thelate 1990s almost half of European countries experienced very low fertility(an average number of children per woman - the Total Fertility Rate or TFR- of 1.3 or lower). From the beginning of the 21st century a gradual recoveryof the sometimes very low fertility levels started in many countries, whichwas at least partly attributed to economic recovery in several countries, butalso to the fact that parents did not postpone childbirth to even higher ages(eg. Sobotka, 2012).

Today European women on average have 1.5 children. This fertility levelis well below the so-called “replacement level” of 2.1 children and since thishas been the case since several decades; this means that in the long run thegenerations of parents will not be completely replaced by as large ones. Sus-tained below replacement fertility, as is characteristic for most parts of currentday Europe, is a clear indicator of imminent population decline.

Figure 1 shows the large differences in European fertility as measured bythe TFR. The highest fertility levels are recorded for Ireland, Turkey, Icelandand France where women (on average) have about 2 children. The lowest fer-tility levels are found in the Eastern part of Europe where countries like Hun-gary and Romania have a fertility level of about 1.4 children per woman.Higher fertility levels are currently more common in Northern and WesternEurope, while lower fertility has become the typical pattern for Southern andEastern Europe (Turkey’s TFR at 2.1 is the exception). Not shown in the fig-ure, is that in the most recent period, fertility rates have slightly increased inmost countries.

POPULATION CHANGE IN EUROPE: TURNING CHALLENGES INTO OPPORTUNITIES

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Figure 1 – Total fertility rate (TFR), Council of Europe countries, 2011

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The impact of the world economic crisis of 2008-2009 on fertility is not yetreflected in these data. Recent studies indicate that recessions often lead to post-ponement of fertility, especially of first births, which may later be recuperatedwhen economic security recovers. Fertility tends to react to the downs in theeconomy, when high unemployment and job instability are important reasons foryoung people to delay the formation of new families and for parents to postponechildbirth (Kreyenfeld et al., 2012; Neels et al., 2012). The impact of recessionson fertility also depends on social and institutional arrangements: governmentscan try to moderate the impact of the crisis for families, for instance through spe-cial employment and family policies. Evidence on the most recent recession sug-gests that it indeed had an impact on European fertility and changed the recentupturn to stagnation and decline (Bongaarts and Sobotka, 2012). If employmentand economic security would recover fertility levels may also recover. But as therecession is followed by a sustained period of massive cuts in public spending inmany countries to reduce budget deficits, this may also have a negative impacton social and family policies. This could further influence fertility decisions ofparents. In analogy to the notion of the “double dip recession”, some authors donot exclude a “double dip fertility decline” if social and family related expendi-tures are cut and monetary support to parents with children would decline(Sobotka et al., 2011). The recent swings in fertility support the notion that par-ents’decisions of having a(-nother) child are not taken in a social vacuum but aresusceptible to socio-economic and other conditions (Kaufman and Bernhard,2012; Berkman and O’Donnell, 2013; Martin-Garcia, 2013). Policies may playa part here, in particular family and broader family friendly social policies (forinstance with regard to housing, and the labour market) that affect the social sit-uation of (future) parents (cf. McDonald, 2006; Gauthier, 2007; Sweet, 2012).

2.2 Mortality

Europeans live longer than ever before and an increasing part of theselonger lives is spent in good health. The continuing rise in life expectancy isperhaps the most consistent demographic trend that has been observed, andthe upward trend continues in most countries. Increasing longevity reflectsbetter health and living conditions and is achieved by major medical advancesand investments in the health system. Increasing longevity is also a majordriver of population aging.

Today, a European woman may expect to live 79.4 years, while a Europeanman has an average life expectancy at birth of 72.1 years. The difference in lifeexpectancy between women and men is about 7 years. This so-called gender gap inmortality is gradually closing in most countries due to the fact that men are catch-ing up with women and show a stronger increase in life expectancy. But the gap isstill very substantive in many countries (cf. Van Oyen et al., 2012). There are alsovery large differences in mortality across Europe, both for women and men.


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A girl born in Russia, for instance, may expect to live 11 years less than aFrench girl (Figure 2). This gap in life expectancy is even wider (more than 18years) for European men, where Iceland has the highest life expectancy andRussia the lowest (Figure 3).

The East-West divide in mortality levels (cf. Botev, 2012; Kupiszewskiand Kupiszewska, 2012) is very persistent, and addressing the regional differ-ences in health and mortality may well be counted amongst the highest prior-ities for regional (health) policies. Health and mortality differences are alsopersistent across socio-economic groups, including ethnic groups (cf. Kunstet al., 2004; Huisman, 2013).

Behavioural factors such as harmful life styles, smoking, unhealthy dietsand alcohol consumption play an important role in mortality differences.From a policy perspective this opens up possibilities for preventive healthinterventions.

It is most likely that life expectancy will continue to grow further,although experts have different views about the pace of growth and the limitsof life (De Beer, 2006). Optimists claim that the maximum life expectancy (asobserved for the best performing groups) has been increasing in a linear wayfor more than a century and a half at a pace of 6 hours per day (Oeppen andVaupel, 2002), while there is no evidence that this will slow down. Othersclaim that, while amazing advances have been achieved in the past, addition-al gains in life expectancy will be harder to win when causes of death aretaken into account. Earlier gains in life years, for instance, were won by con-quering infectious diseases mainly at younger ages. In the second half of the20th century the gains in life years mainly came from declining mortality fromcardiovascular diseases in later middle age. Current and future gains in lifeexpectancy should mainly come from reductions in mortality in old age. Atadvanced ages, mortality is not usually caused by a single disease but attrib-uted to several diseases (co-morbidity) and medical advances in treating oneparticular disease would lead to smaller gains in life years, as the patient maydie from another disease (De Beer, 2006).

The more pessimistic view on gains in longevity stresses the importanceof lifestyle factors where, for instance, sustained smoking and the emergingobesity pandemic, especially among the young, will slow down the increasein life expectancy. Nevertheless, a continued growth in longevity is expected(and projected) by all experts although differences in longevity will remain(Crimmins, Preston and Cohen, 2011; Luy, Di Giulio and Caselli, 2011).

Healthy life expectancy - the number of life years one may expect to livein good health - is also expected to grow further. The period of life whenfrailty and ill health become dominant is gradually pushed to older ages (Vau-pel, 2010). The combined trends of adding more, as well as more healthyyears to life benefit an increasing number of older people. It also provides awindow of opportunities for “active aging” (Olshansky, Beard and Börsch-Supan, 2012; Pestieau and Ponthiere, 2012).

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Figure 2 – Life expectancy at birth (è0) for women, Council of Europe countries, 2011


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2.3 Migration and diversity

International migration has become one of the most dominant forces ofpopulation change in Europe. International migration is most likely to furtherincrease in scale and complexity over the next decades (e.g. Castles and Vezzoli,2009; Solimano, 2010; Tilly, 2011; Zlotnik, 2012). Over the past decade the esti-mated number of migrants worldwide has increased from 150 million around theyear 2000 to 214 million in 2010, while it is expected to further grow to an esti-mated 405 million by the middle of this century (Koser and Laczko, 2010).Demographic disparities such as high population pressure in migration sendingcountries, population aging and a declining workforce in migration receivingcountries, the impact of environmental change, political and economicdynamics, technological changes and social networks are the main causes forthe growth of international migration (Golini, 2008). International migrationinvolves an ever wider diversity of ethnic and cultural groups. More women aremigrating on their own or as heads of households, the number of people who areliving or working abroad with an irregular status continues to increase and thereis more temporary migration and circulation as well (Koser and Laczko, 2010).

The world economic crisis and the subsequent Euro crisis have temporari-ly slowed down international migration but appear not to have stimulated mas-sive return migration. In the economic downturn, permanent labour migrationdecreased by 7% in OECD countries in 2009, following a decline of 5% in 2008.As was the case in 2008, free circulatory migration accounted for a large part ofthis decline and decreased by 36%, as did temporary labour migration whichdecreased by 17% (OECD, 2011). But as countries struggle to recover from thecrisis, it becomes clear that international migration is at a turning point and, e.g.,migration for employment reasons may pick up again. However, also in thisregard the wide regional variation in demographic trends should be taken intoaccount. While some countries or regions in Europe are confronted with low orzero growth of their working age population, or even a declining working agepopulation, neighbouring regions or countries are (still) witnessing continuedgrowth of the working age population. Hence, it is to be expected that, due toregional disparities, labour migration (both from within and from outsideEurope) will play out differently for countries and regions in Europe and lead todifferent challenges (Gesano, Heins and Naldini, 2009).

The number of asylum seekers remained relatively stable during the crisis,while the number of international students continued to increase (OECD, 2011).It should be noted, however, that the “Arab Spring” will undoubtedly have animpact on international migration patterns in the Mediterranean region. Thelong term trends in international migration in OECD countries indicate theimportance of international migration in a globalising world; here, it is worth-while mentioning that, according to estimates, one in three internationalmigrants in the world live in Europe (Koser and Laczko, 2010).

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Figure 3 – Life expectancy at birth (è0) for men, Council of Europecountries, 2011


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Immigration varies strongly by country. In OECD countries, Japan has,for instance, a very low inflow of migrants, while Switzerland is at the otherextreme of the spectrum with a high inflow. The group of low immigrationcountries with inflows below the OECD average includes countries like Ger-many, France, Finland, Belgium, Austria, the Netherlands and Portugal. The(above average) high immigration countries include Italy, the United King-dom, Denmark and Spain (OECD, 2011).

The impact of international migration can also be illustrated for othercountries, which again show that net migration rates (the balance of immigra-tion and emigration) greatly vary across Europe. As compared to the previousdecade, net migration has increased in the most recent period, mostly inCyprus, Luxembourg, Spain, Ireland and Iceland. Central and Eastern Euro-pean countries witnessed a reduction of emigration in recent years, but coun-tries like Georgia, Moldova and Albania largely remain migration sendingcountries.

The population of migrant origin in the host country is statisticallyreferred to as the stock of migrants. This stock represents the accumulatedhuman capital that migration flows have brought to a country. Again, there arelarge differences across Europe, where the migrant population accounts for athird of the total population in a country like Luxembourg and a quarter of thepopulation in Switzerland. In Western Europe, relatively large migrant popu-lations (between 15 and 20% of the total population) are also residing in coun-tries like Ireland, Austria, Spain and Sweden. In Eastern and Central Europe,Kazakhstan has a large migrant population of about 20%, while countries likeUkraine, Moldova, Belarus and Armenia have migrant populations around10%. Eastern European countries like Bulgaria, Romania, Poland and Hun-gary have relatively low proportions of foreign born inhabitants (non-nation-als) in their population.

All data illustrate that the impact of international migration touchesevery country, albeit in different degrees. International migration triggersgrowing population diversity in European countries also because the compo-sition of migration movements becomes ever more diverse (Raymer andWillekens, 2008). The growing numbers and diversity of migrant populationsare a challenge for policymakers. Policies that enhance the integration ofmigrants and their children in the host society are key to social cohesion andthe better utilization of the human capital of migrants; in those policies gen-der issues play an important role (eg. Tastsoglu and Preston, 2012). Asmigrant remittances have become a major economic source (Singer, 2012;Batnitzki McDowell and Dyer, 2012) migration sending countries will alsocontinue to benefit. It is to be expected that, after the crisis, economic recov-ery will further stimulate international migration (eg. Galgozci, Leschke andWatt, 2011). Labour needs due to population aging and a declining work force

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will also become stronger pull factors of international migration. Jointly witheffective integration policies, the proper management of international migra-tion flows may enhance the benefits of international migration for bothmigrant and receiving communities.

3. POPULATION GROWTH IN EUROPE IS SLOWING DOWN. POPULATIONDECLINE BECOMES A REALITY

Of all major world regions, population growth in Europe is the lowestand contrary to world population, the population of Europe is set to decline,albeit at a very gradual pace. Although the pace of world population growthis gradually slowing down, it most certainly will continue to grow further. Thelatest population forecasts by the United Nations (2010) indicate that aroundthe year 2023 we may reach 8 billion inhabitants while, under averageassumptions, 9 billion inhabitants would be reached by the year 2041 and thepopulation would still keep growing further. The current population of theCouncil of Europe2 is 816 million, representing about 11% of the world pop-ulation. As compared to the current global population growth rate of 1.1%,Europe’s population is growing at a much slower pace of 0.2%. Europe is thefirst region in the world where population growth has come to a full stop.

Overall positive population growth rates are currently still characteristicfor the Western and especially Northern parts of Europe, while negativegrowth rates prevail in the Southern and especially the Eastern parts. But inthe longer run, as of the year 2020, the overall population growth rate forEurope will become negative. By the year 2050 the population of Europe isexpected to reach 811 million, but this minor decline over current levels main-ly comes about although the strong population growth expected in Turkey.

Looking at the components of population growth we can see, for Europeas a whole, that natural increase (the balance of births and deaths) is becom-ing less important, while net migration (the balance of immigration and emi-gration) has become the main engine of European population growth. But, asis the case with other demographic trends, population growth patterns differwidely across Europe (Figure 4).

As we noted above, the highest levels of population growth are recorded inthe Northern and Western parts of Europe. Apart from city states such as Andor-ra, the fastest growth is observed in Cyprus, Luxembourg, Azerbaijan andTurkey. Among the fast growing countries, Turkey and Azerbaijan have the high-est levels of natural population growth. The strongest population decline isrecorded in the Baltic states Latvia and Lithuania, and in Bulgaria: here negativenatural increase caused by low birth rates (typical for an increasing number ofcountries) is not compensated by a positive migration balance as is observed in

2 Note that in UN data used throughout the paper, Turkey is not included in the Europe region.


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Figure 4 – Components of annual population growth, Council of Europe countries, 2011 (%)

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many other countries, but exacerbated by out-migration. The overall trend at thenational level shows a pattern of modest and halting population growth, mainlydriven by migration, and gradually turning into negative growth. In principle,this pattern allows policymakers to timely prepare for and cope with these trends.

It should be noted, however, that at the regional level within countries thetrends are less smooth than at the national level, where regional differences andterritorial diversity can even out. It goes without saying that regional imbal-ances are not only caused by demographic factors, but also reflect, for instance,differences in economic opportunities, urbanization and transportation. Never-theless, the urgency to introduce policies which deal with population decline inthe context of regional imbalances is perhaps higher at the regional level thanat the national level. Currently, in over a quarter of European regions popula-tion decline has become a reality3. While population aging and populationdiversity will indeed have an impact on all European countries and regions, dif-ferent countries and different regions may not be affected in the same way (cf.Rees et al., 2012; McCann, 2012; Galjaard, Van Wissen and Van Dam, 2012).Some regions will have a younger population and may see the impact of popu-lation aging (for instance on the size of the working age population) be mitigat-ed by the inflow of migrants. In other regions, however, the outflow of (young)migrants may exacerbate the impacts of population aging. It follows, forinstance, that while mobility between regions (and countries for that matter)may help to solve shortages and surpluses on the labour markets in someregions, they may not be beneficial to all regions. Policies to stimulate mobili-ty may even help increase regional disparities (De Beer et al., 2010).

4. POPULATION AGING. ALSO THE EUROPEAN WORK FORCE IS AGING

Population aging is driven by declining fertility and increasing longevity.It implies changes in the age structure of the population where older age-groupstake prominence over younger age-groups and the average age of the popula-tion rises. Of all world regions, population aging is most advanced in Europe.The average (median) age of the world population is 29.2 years: Africa is theyoungest continent with a median age of 19.7 years, in North America this ageis 37.2 years and in Europe 40.1 years. There are large differences acrossEurope in the timing and pace of population aging which have major policyimplications (cf. Bloom et al., 2012; Tyers and Shi, 2012). Two dimensions ofpopulation aging need to be considered.

On the one hand, there is the share of the younger population whichdeclines in the first phase of the aging process as a direct result of low fertilityrates. This “dejuvenation” phase, where the population pyramid becomes nar-

3 This refers to regions in the so-called ESPON area, which includes all EU member States, Ice-land, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland.


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rower at its base, has largely been completed in most, but not all Europeancountries. The share of the youngest population (0-14 years of age) is lowest inGermany with 13.5% in 2010, while it is almost double in Turkey at 26%. Asregards the social impacts of population aging, a declining younger populationhas an immediate effect on, for instance, the educational system when smallercohorts of pupils enter the schools. It should be noted, however, that higher edu-cational participation rates may offset the gradual shrinking of the school agepopulation, which is especially the case at ages beyond the compulsory schoolage. This means, for instance, that the size of the younger population is not lin-early related to the magnitude of educational expenses.

On the other hand, there are also large differences in Europe at the top endof the population pyramid. Here an increasing share of the older population isusually related to, for instance, rising health care and social security costs. Itshould however be noted that older persons do not only receive care, but are alsoproviding care and support to younger generations. Not surprisingly, the differ-ences in the older age population (defined as 65 years of age or older) are tosome extent the mirror image of the pattern in the younger population: Germanyhas the highest share of 65-plus population (20%), while Turkey has the lowest(about 7%). It is worthwhile to note that, looking at these two dimensions of pop-ulation aging, the usual East-West gradient is not dominant and younger andolder populations can be observed across the continent. This implies that changesin the age structure affect the whole of Europe, albeit with different intensities.

As more Europeans are surviving to older ages, the number of oldest-oldin the population (75 years or over) is increasing as well. This so-called “dou-ble aging” signals rising health care needs as frailty tends to set in around thisage (Bonneux et al., 2012). In countries like France, Spain, Belgium and Italyabout half of the older (65+) population belongs to the oldest-old.

To capture the social impact of population aging, the younger and olderpopulation can be related to the population of working age (here defined as thepopulation of 15-65 years of age4), which supplies the majority of the workforcethat is needed to sustain people wellbeing.

The demographic dependency ratio combines the so-called “green” pres-sure of the younger population with the so-called “grey” pressure of the olderpopulation, and is an indicator for the overall demographic pressure.

As is shown in Figure 5, this demographic pressure is lowest in countrieslike Moldova, Russia and Azerbaijan (less than 40 “non-active younger andolder persons” per 100 potentially active persons). The demographic pressure isthe highest (with values of 50 or over) in France, the Scandinavian countries,Italy and the United Kingdom.

4 It should be noted that these age limits are used for illustration only and should be treated withcare. Some younger persons, for instance, are economically active and others who are countedin the potential workforce may be in school; older persons before the age of 65 may be retired,while others may be active on the labour market at higher ages.

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Figure 5 – Components of annual population growth, Council of Europe countries, 2011 (%)


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An important consequence of population aging is the aging of the Euro-pean work force (Skirbekk, Loichinger and Barakat, 2012). The inflow ofyounger workers becomes smaller due to the smaller cohorts entering workingage, but also since young Europeans stay longer in school and thus enter thelabour market at older ages. The share of older workers in the work forcebecomes larger not only as a result of demographic changes resulting from thepassing of larger cohorts through the older working ages, but also since thedeclining trend in the labour force participation of the elderly has reversed. Inthe context of pension reforms, early retirement schemes were abandoned orreduced and policies to activate older workers were introduced and the labourforce participation of older workers increased (Börsch-Supan, 2012; Casey,2012). Investments in training and education in a lifelong learning perspective,also of older workers, will improve the human capital of workers and make thework force more flexible and competitive (Henkens and Schippers, 2012;Conen, Henkens and Schippers, 2012). In view of the imminent shrinking of thelabour supply in most European countries it may also pay off to invest in a bet-ter-educated work force.

Labour migration may help to counteract local or regional labour shortagestoo (Bijak et al., 2007). Policies to enhance active aging can help to furthermobilize the rich human resources of an aging population, including theresources for intergenerational support and civic activities such as volunteeringand other forms of social participation (cf. Walker and Maltby, 2012).

5. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION

5.1 Investing in people to address population challenges

Not unlike climate change, population change has many challenges.Europe’s emerging demographic landscape and prospects will have a lastingimpact on European society. But population change also brings opportunities.Addressing the population challenges and making the most of the opportunitiesthat population change brings will include finding the best ways to tap the richhuman resources and indeed unleash the full potential of an aging and morediverse population and promote a society for all generations and both genders.Investing in people, such as in health and education, as well as promotinghealthy and active aging and intergenerational solidarity, as well as making thebest use of population diversity and migration will help to address the chal-lenges that confront Europe. These investments in the quality of life of Europe’scitizens would also offset any concerns which might be caused by the decliningrelative share of Europe’s population in a global perspective.

The rich variation in demographic trends and patterns in Europe is an assetfor policymakers who can benefit from diverse experiences and for instance

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exchange best practices. In that sense Europe can be viewed as a laboratorywhere a wide range of demographic trends and policy responses can be observedand studied. The variety of the European demographic landscape is also a chal-lenge as it implies that different sets of policy responses in different contexts arecalled for, understanding that “one size fits all” policies do not exist.

Populations change because people change. Demographic trends are thecombined result of the behaviour of people. But demographic trends are also per-sistent: population aging and population diversity are “here to stay”. Policies thataim to change demographic trends will have a direct impact on the lives of peo-ple. Policies that aim to cope with and accommodate demographic trends willalso have an impact on people. The main policy challenge of population changeseems to optimize human wellbeing. Investments which boost the human capi-tal of Europe’s population will also enable Europe to maintain and even strength-en its role as a key global player (eg. European Commission, 2010).

5.2 Policy options to cope with demographic challenges

Various options are open to policy actors who address the demographicchallenges that European countries are facing. Five broad areas of policy inter-vention are distinguished. These areas are closely linked and crosscutting issueslike gender are a dominant factor in all areas.

1. A society for all generations. The changes in the age structure of the pop-ulation are the outcome of long-term demographic trends. Populationaging is a reality that is confronting all European countries, although thetiming and pace of population aging will vary. Population aging bringsmajor challenges such as for the social security system and the provisionof pensions, the provision of health care and social services. As the num-ber of senior citizens increases through population aging, the need for ade-quate services will also increase. Senior citizens however, like other citi-zens, are also making important contributions to society and have done soduring their entire life. Governments and stakeholders will benefit if theirpolicies would recognize this contribution of senior citizens and need toexplore the ways in which the rich human resources of an aging popula-tion can be used for the benefit of all generations (eg. European Commis-sion, 2012). The promotion of “active aging” is a way to make use of thefull potential of older persons and includes, but is not restricted to the pro-longation of working life and increased labour force participation. Thecontributions of senior citizens to society at large through political andsocial participation, including volunteering and unpaid work, is a majorpart of active aging too, with a crucial role played by women: e.g., theimportant role that older generations, especially women, play to support


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their children and grandchildren. A declining working age population callsfor higher labour force participation rates of older workers as well as othergroups, notably women and migrants. The scarcity of labour also calls formore investments in the skills of workers in order to keep up labour pro-ductivity and to build “human capital”. The promotion of lifelong learningis one of the ways in which governments can cope with the challenges ofa declining and aging workforce. Multilateral organizations have a role toplay to support individual countries and other stakeholders to furtherdevelop active aging and to raise awareness of the need to mobilise the fullpotential of an aging population and to help combat age discrimination forboth men and women. Multilateral organizations may also help toexchange “best practices” of active aging.

2. A family friendly society. Sustained low fertility is one of the root causesof population aging and a very stable trend in European society. Over thepast decades fertility levels have declined across Europe where a pattern oflater births and fewer children per family has emerged. Fertility decisionsare not taken in a social vacuum and, as a result, fertility levels may fluc-tuate as has recently been the case due to the economic crisis. Some recov-ery of fertility is to be expected once economic conditions improve. Theright of parents to decide freely about the number and timing of their chil-dren is generally recognized and supported throughout Europe. Socio-eco-nomic and cultural conditions, including gender roles, play a role in thesefertility decisions and also government policies and other institutions mayhave an impact (Gauthier and Philipov, 2008; Thevenon and Gauthier,2011). As families are an important cornerstone of society, governmentswould be well advised to support families and promote gender equity. Poli-cies which enhance a family friendly society may include financial and fis-cal measures which help parents to raise their children, as well as policieswhich promote a better work-life balance, including adequate childcarearrangements. Also policies which stimulate economic security and reduceeconomic precariousness of young parents of both genders are vital for afamily friendly climate, as are policies which strengthen reproductiverights, promote gender equality and combat discrimination. Families arealso very important agents of intergenerational solidarity and support, bothof which are essential to create a society for all generations. In view of thelong term consequences of childbearing and the raising of a family,notably for women, sustained and stable policies providing transparencyand trust for parents are called for, especially in a time period when publicfinances are fundamentally restructured to promote economic recovery.Policies that enhance a family friendly society and reduce gender inequal-ities, once introduced, reinforced and sustained over time, may also havea positive impact on fertility levels.

3. A more diverse society. Due to international migration from outsideEurope but also as a consequence of internal mobility within Europe, thepopulation of European countries is becoming more diverse. A majorchallenge for all countries will be to make the best use of the potentialsof their increasingly diverse population. Migration provides opportuni-ties for migrants to use their skills and talents which cannot be used inthe country or region that they leave behind, to the benefit and wellbeingof the country or region to which they are attracted. Through migrantremittances also the migration sending country or region benefits frommigration. Migration can also create tensions in the receiving society, forinstance in a volatile labour market where local labour could be crowd-ed out, or when cultural differences between the migrant and the hostsociety are large. Turning migration into an asset may be facilitatedthrough better integration of migrants in the host society, also byaddressing gender inequalities. Especially in the case of permanentmigration, the educational system has an important part to play in inte-gration, including for the so-called second generation of migrants. Whilemigration cannot stop population aging, it may help to mitigate some of itseffects, for instance on the labour market. As migration has become amajor driver of population change in Europe, policies which help to makethe best use of the potentials of a more diverse population are needed, withthe understanding that higher participation of migrants in the host societywill also build social cohesion. Integration policies, including policieswhich promote the educational level of migrants and their children andgender equity, will also enhance social cohesion. Migration flows arevolatile and hard to manage and migration management systems need tobe developed in order to make the best possible use of the migration poten-tial, while safeguarding and enhancing the rights of migrants. Sincewomen form a large share of international migration flows, special atten-tion should be given to their position and rights, also in education.

4. Coping with lower population growth. While population aging is mostadvanced in Europe as compared to other worlds regions, Europe is alsobreaking new ground in how to deal with low population growth. Somecountries are already confronted with population decline at the nationallevel, while most of them are witnessing population decline at the region-al level. Migration is the dominant driver of (regional) population redistri-bution. Acknowledging that some countries and regions are more attractiveto migrants than others, policies which aim to cope with (regional) popu-lation decline are called for while also “best practices” need to be shared.Evidence based policies aimed to address population decline in the frame-work of regional development strategies and programmes need to bedeveloped.

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5. A sound and up to date knowledge base for policy. Population change is animportant driver of social change. European countries show a rich varia-tion in demographic trends and patterns which reflect their social, econom-ic and cultural diversity and history. To support informed decision makingby all stakeholders, including civic society, and to promote the develop-ment of evidence based policies a strong knowledge base on demographictrends, their determinants as well as their consequences is needed, includ-ing adequate statistical information services and targeted demographic andpopulation-related research. To study future trends, foresight studiesshould allow for the rich variation in demographic patterns and take pos-sible demographic pathways and futures into account. To improve andextend this knowledge base and keep it up to date also through compara-tive studies is a major challenge.

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