Political Law Review Doctrines Arts2!6!1217

8/20/2019 Political Law Review Doctrines Arts2!6!1217

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P a g e | 1ARTICLE II

• DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES & STATEPOLICIES •

SEC. 1ACCFA V. CONFEDERATION – Functions such asthose relating to the maintenance of peace

and the prevention of crime, those regulatingproperty and property rights, those relating tothe administration of justice and thedetermination of political duties of citizens,and those relating to national defense andforeign relations are traditionally calledconstituent functions. These are exercised bythe State as attributes of sovereignty, and notmerely to promote the welfare, progress andprosperity of the people which are ministrantfunctions.

owever, the growing complexities of modernsociety have rendered this traditionalclassi!cation of the functions of government"uite unrealistic, not to say obsolete. Theareas which used to be left to privateenterprise continue to lose their well#de!nedboundaries and to be absorbed withinactivities that the government must underta$ein its sovereign capacity if wants to meet theincreasing social challenges of the times.

REPUBLIC V. CFI OF RIZAL – %overnmental

agencies are exempt from paying legal feesand posting an appeal bond. The mercantileactivity of a government agency &i.e. buyingand selling of palay, rice, and corn' is onlyincident to its primary governmental functionwhich is to carry out some government policyto serve the well being of the people &i.e.policy of subsidizing and stabilizing the priceof palay, rice and corn in order to ma$e it wellwithin the reach of average consumers'.

MAQUERA V. BORRA – (mposing property

"uali!cations in order that a person could runfor a public o)ce is inconsistent with the

nature and essence of the *epublican systemordained in the +onstitution and the principleof social justice underlying the same.

*epublicanism is premised upon the tenet thatsovereignty resides in the people and allgovernment authority emanates from them,and this, in turn implies necessarily that the

right to vote and to be voted for shall not bedependent upon the wealth of the individualconcerned, whereas social justice presupposese"ual opportunity for all, rich and poor ali$e,and that accordingly, no person shall, byreason of poverty, be denied the chance to beelected to public o)ce.

SEC. 12PIERCE V. SOCIETY OF SISTERS – Thefundamental theory of liberty upon which allgovernments in this nion repose excludes

any general power of the State to standardizeits children by forcing them to acceptinstruction from public teachers only. The childis not the mere creature of the State. Thosewho nurture him and direct his destiny havethe right, coupled with the high duty, torecognize and prepare him for additionalobligations.

SEC. 16OPOSA V. FACTORAN – -inors can, forthemselves, for others of their generation and

for other succeeding generations, !le a classsuit. Their personality to sue in behalf of thesucceeding generations can only be based onthe concept of intergenerational responsibilityinsofar as the right to a balanced andhealthful ecology is concerned.

The right to a balanced and healthful ecologyconsiders the rhythm and harmony of nature/which includes the judicious disposition,utilization, management, renewal andconservation of the country0s naturalresources to the end that their exploration,

development and utilization be e"uitablyaccessible to the present as well as futuregenerations. 1very generation has aresponsibility to the next to preserve thatrhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology.

2hile the right to a balanced and healthful

ecology is to be found under the 3eclarationof 4rinciples and State 4olicies and not underthe 5ill of *ights, it does not follow that it isless important than any of the civil andpolitical rights enumerated in the 5ill of *ights. This right carries with it the correlativeduty to refrain from impairing theenvironment.

Timber licenses may be revo$ed or rescindedby executive action. (t is not a contract,property or a property right protected by the

due process clause. (t is merely a permit or aprivilege.

ARTICLE VI• LEGISLATIVE •

SEC. 1ABAKADA V. PURISIMA – Two tests determinethe validity of delegation of legislative power6&7' the completeness test and &8' thesu)cient standard test. 9 law is completewhen it sets forth therein the policy to beexecuted, carried out or implemented by thedelegate. (t lays down a su)cient standardwhen it provides ade"uate guidelines orlimitations in the law to map out theboundaries of the delegate0s authority andprevent the delegation from running riot.

The Supreme +ourt has recognized thefollowing as su)cient standards6 publicinterest: justice and e"uity: publicconvenience and welfare: simplicity: economy

and welfare. The optimization of the revenue#

POLITICAL LA REVIE DOCTRINES | ATTY . !ACK !IMENEZ | MARK !OREL O. CALIDA


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P a g e | "generation capability and collection of the 5(*and 5;+ is infused with public interest.

PEOPLE V. ROSENT#AL – 4ublic interest is asu)cient standard. The criterion may befound in the purpose of the act, there"uirements imposed and the context of theprovisions itself. The protection of the public

against speculative schemes is a su)cientstandard.

AGUSTIN V. EDU – (n order to avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a standardset by the legislature itself which determinesmatters of principle and lays downfundamental policy. The standard may beexpressed or implied and does not have to bespelled out speci!cally. (t could be impliedfrom the policy and purpose of the actconsidered as a whole.

9 standard6 &7' de!nes legislative policy: &8'mar$s its limits and maps out its boundaries:&ected: &?' isthe criterion by which legislative purpose maybe carried out.

C#IONGBIAN V. ORBOS – 9 legislative standardneed not be expressed, it may be implied. (tneed not be found in the law challenged

because it may be embodied in other statuteson the same subject matter as that of thechallenged legislation.

2hile the power to merge regions is notexpressly provided for in the +onstitution, it isa power traditionally lodged with the4resident, in view of the power of generalsupervision over local governments. There isno abdication by +ongress of its legislativepowers in conferring on the 4resident thepower to merge administrative regions. To

promote simplicity, economy and e)ciency inthe government, to enable it to pursue

programs consistent with national goals foracceleration socio#economic development andto improve the service in the transaction of public business/ is a su)cient standard.

RUBI V. PROVINCIAL BOARD – The legislaturemay delegate legislative powers to @%s. 2hoelse but these o)cers, as the o)cial

representatives of the province are better"uali!ed to judge when such a course isdeemed necessary in the interest of law andorder.

PEOPLE V. VERA – 9 law which grants boardsroving commission which enables them toexercise arbitrary discretion is invalid.+ongress may not leave the entire matter toboards to determine.

Y NOT V. IAC – There is invalid delegation of

legislative powers when there is unlimiteddiscretion in the distribution of the propertiesarbitrarily ta$en. 9 law may not grant a rovingcommission or a wide sweeping authority, asu)cient standard must be provided.

U.S. V. PANLILIO – There can be no delegationof power to criminalize when the law itself does not de!ne a crime nor provided apenalty.

SEC. 5

ANG BAGONG BAYANI V. COMELEC – 4oliticalparties, even the major ones, may participatein the party#list elections. They cannot bedis"uali!ed from the party#list election merelyon the ground that they are political parties. The +onstitution provides that the members of the ouse may be elected through a party listsystem of registered national, regional andsectoral parties or organization.

*9AB=7 or the 4arty @ist @aw enumeratesthose sectors which are marginalized and

underrepresented &CODE$ WHY FIVE POPUL'6

omen, #andicapped, Y outh, Fisherfol$,Indigenous, Veterans, Elderly, Peasants,OF2s, Profesionals, Urban poor, Laborers.Cevertheless, this enumeration is notexclusive.

(t is not enough for a candidate to claimrepresentation among those enumerated

groups because it is easy to claim and feign.4arty list groups must factually and trulyrepresent the marginalized andunderrepresented.

%uidelines to determine "uali!cations of political parties to join party#list elections&CODE$ DIRRT Nom Nom Nom'&7' -ust not be Dis"uali!ed under *9AB=7&%NOTE'&8' -ust be Independent from the government&not adjunct, funded or assisted'

&


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P a g e | )&D' 3eclares Untruthful statements in itspetition&A' Fails to Participate in the last 8 precedingelections or fails to obtain at least 8G of thevotes cast in the 8 preceding elections&E' *eligious Sect or association organized forreligious purposes

%% NOTE$ Huali!cations of party#list nomineesunder B of the 4arty @ist @aw6&7' Catural#born citizen&8' 9ble to read and write&


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P a g e | *intervening/ in the proceedings ma$es theconstitutional prohibition ine>ective.

SEC. 16 (1)AVELINO V. CUENCO – 9 minority of 7J senatorsmay not, by leaving the session hall, preventthe majority of 78 other senators from passinga resolution with their unanimous consent.

There is a di>erence between a majority of ALL THE MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE, and amajority of THE HOUSE. The house/ does notmean all the members: a majority of themembers constitute the house./ Forexample, there are 8< senators present and 7absent for a surgery in the .S., an absolutemajority of all the members of the Senate is78. (f there are 78 senators there is "uorum todo business.

SANTIAGO V. GUINGONA – -ajority is de!ned as

the number greater than half or more thanhalf of any total. The +onstitution does notdelineate who shall comprise the majority,much less the minority. 2hile the +onstitutionprovides the manner of electing the Senate4resident, it does not however provide thatthe members who will not vote for him shallipso faco constitute the minority. Co law orregulation states that the losing candidateshall be the minority leader.

istory indicates that majority/ refers to the

political party to which the most number of lawma$ers belonged, while minority/ refersto a party with a lesser number of members. There could also be several minority parties,one of which has to be identi!ed as thedominant minority./

The rules of Senate do not provide for thepositions of majorityPminority leaders. (n theabsence of any speci!c rule, the +ourt has nobasis upon which to determine the legality of the acts of the Senate.

SEC. 16 (2)PEOPLE V. !ALOS!OS – The privilege to be freefrom arrest applies only if the o>ense ispunishable by less than D years of imprisonment. -embers of +ongress cannotcompel absent members to attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The performance of legitimate and even

essential duties of a public o)cer has neverbeen an excuse to free a person validly inprison.1lection does not free the accused from thecommon restraints of general law. The voterswere fully aware of the limitations of hisfreedom of action. They voted him with the$nowledge that he could discharge hislegislative functions within the con!nes of prison only.

SEC. 16 (3)

ARROYO V. DE VENECIA – The +onstitutionempowers each house to determine its rulesof proceedings. (t is a continuous powerbeyond the challenge of any other body. Thefailure to regard the rule is not a subjectmatter of judicial in"uiry.

The rules adopted by deliberative bodies aresubject to revocation, modi!cation, or waiverby the body adopting them. 4arliamentaryrules are merely procedural, and with theirobservance, the court has no concern. -ere

failure to conform to parliamentary usage willnot invalidate the action, when the re"uisitenumber of members has agreed to aparticular measure.

OSMENA V. PENDATUN – 4arliamentaryimmunity guarantees the legislator completefreedom of expression before the courts orany other forum. 5ut this is only outside thecongressional halls. (t does not protect himfrom responsibility before the legislative bodyitself whenever his words and conduct areconsidered disorderly or unbecoming a

member thereof. The ouse is the sole judgeof what constitutes disorderly behaviour.

SANTIAGO V. SANDIGANBAYAN – Suspensionunder 9rt. Q( 7D&


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P a g e | +which re"uires the judicial department toaccept as having passed by +ongress, all billsauthenticated in the manner stated. (f theattestation is absent and the same is notre"uired for the validity of the statute, thecourts may resort to the journals and otherrecords of the +ongress for proof of its dueenactment.

The law ma$ing process ends when the bill isapproved by both ouses, and thecerti!cation does not add to the validity of thebill or cure any defect already present upon itspassage. The approval by congress, and notthe signatures of the presiding o)cers, isessential.

2hen the Senate 4resident declares hissignature on the bill to be invalid, and issued asubse"uent certi!cation that the invalidation

of his signature meant that the bill he hadearlier signed had never been approved bythe Senate. This declaration has more weightthan the attestation which it invalidated.9bsent such attestation and there being noenrolled bill, the +ourts may examine the journal to determine whether or not the bill isduly enacted.

P#ILIPPINE !UDGES V. PRADO – The +ourt maynot in"uire beyond the certi!cation of theapproved bill from the presiding o)cers of

+ongress.

ABAKADA V. ERMITA – (f a change is desiredin the practice of the 5icameral +onference+ommittee, it must be sought in +ongresssince it refers to an internal rule of +ongress.

(t is incorrect to conclude that there is nodi>erence in the bills of each house merelybecause such provision exists in the ouseversion while it is absent in the Senateversion. (t is precisely the absence of such

provision in the Senate bill and the presencethereof in the ouse bill that causes the

conRict. The absence of the provision showsthe disagreement in the intention.

SEC. 17VERA V. AVELINO – 9n election contest relatesonly to statutory contests in which thecontestant see$s not only to out the intruder,but also to have himself inducted into the

o)ce. The power to defer oath ta$ing belongsto +ongress, and not the electoral tribunal. (tis an inherent power of +ongress as ameasure of self#preservation. +ongress alsohas the power to in"uire into the credentialsof any of its members.

ABBAS V. SET – (n providing for the S1T to besta>ed by both S+ ustices and Senators, the+onstitution intended that both those judicialand legislative components commonly sharethe duty and authority of deciding all electoral

contests. The legislative component cannot betotally excluded from participation.Cevertheless, a senator#member may inhibitor dis"ualify himself from sitting in the S1Twhen he sincerely feels that his personalinterests or biases would stand in the way of objective and impartial judgment.

BONDOC V. PINEDA – 1lectoral tribunals arebodies separate and independent of thelegislature. They were created to function asnonpartisan even if 8P< of its members are

politicians. 4olitical parties cannot use theelectoral tribunal as a tool for theaggrandizement of the party in power.3isloyalty to the party is not a valid ground forthe expulsion of a member of the electoraltribunal. -embers enjoy security of tenure:membership may not be terminated exceptfor just cause.

SEC. 18DAZA V. SINGZON – The manner of !lling upthe +ommission on 9ppointments as

prescribed in the +onstitution is not a political

"uestion. The ouse has the authority tochange its representation to reRect at anytime, the changes that may transpire in thepolitical alignments of its membership. Suchchanges must be permanent and do notinclude the temporary alliances or factionaldivisions not involving severance of politicalloyalties or formal disa)liation.

COSETENG V. MITRA – 9 lone member of aparty is not entitled to one of the twelve seatsin the +ommission on 9ppointments. Theendorsement of other congressmen isinconse"uential if they do not belong to theendorsee0s political party.

GUNGONA V. GONZALES – 5y adding togethertwo halves to ma$e a whole is a breach of therule on proportional representation. The+onstitution does not contemplate that the

+ommission on 9ppointments must alwaysinclude twelve senators and twelvecongressmen. 2hat the +onstitution re"uiresis that there be at least a majority of theentire membership.

SEC. 21ARNAULT V. NAZARENO – The power of in"uiryis essential and auxiliary to the legislativefunction. @egislature cannot legislate wiselyand e>ectively in the absence of informationabout the conditions which the legislation is

intended to a>ect or change. 2hen thelegislative body does not itself possess there"uisite information, recourse must be had toothers who do possess it.;nce in"uiry is established to be within the jurisdiction of a legislative body, theinvestigating committee has the power tore"uire a witness to answer a "uestionpertinent to that in"uiry, subject to theconstitutional right against self#incrimination. The "uestion must be material to the subjectof the in"uiry or investigation. The test of

materiality is the direct relation to the subject



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P a g e | ,matter of in"uiry and not by indirect relationto any proposed or possible legislation.

The fact that the +onstitution expressly gives+ongress the power to punish members doesnot imply exclusion of the power to punishnon#members for contempt. Cevertheless, noperson can be punished unless the testimony

is re"uired in a matter over which +ongresshad jurisdiction to in"uire.

SABIO V. GORDON – The +onstitution explicitlyrecognizes the power of investigation not justof +ongress but also of any of itscommittees./ +ongress0 power of in"uiry,being broad, encompasses everything thatconcerns the administration of existing lawsas well as proposed or possibly neededstatutes. (t even extends to governmentagencies created by +ongress and o)cers

whose positions are within the power of +ongress to regulate or even abolish. 9nexecutive order exempting members and sta> of an agency from the +ongress0 power of in"uiry cannot be countenanced.

SENATE V. ERMITA – 9n exemption to thepower of in"uiry of +ongress is executiveprivilege. (t is recognized only in relation tocertain types of information of a sensitivecharacter. The validity of a claim thereof depends on the ground invo$ed and the

context in which it is made. 1xecutive o)cialsare not exempt from the duty to discloseinformation by the mere fact of beingexecutive o)cials.

The re"uirement to secure presidentialconsent is valid with respect to appearancesin the "uestion hour, the appearance of thedepartment heads in the "uestion hour isdiscretionary on their part. owever, it isinvalid to appearances of department heads inin"uiries in aid of legislation unless a valid

claim of privilege is subse"uently made, eitherby the 4resident or by the 1xecutive Secretary.

+ongress has the right to $now why theexecutive considers the re"uested informationprivileged. (f the executive branch withholdssuch information on the ground that it isprivileged, it must so assert it and state thereason therefor and why it must be respected.

NERI V. SENATE – 1lements of presidentialcommunications privilege6 &7' thecommunication protected must relate to a"uintessential and non#delegable presidentialpower: &8' operational proximity, thecommunication must be authored or receivedby a close adviser of the 4resident or the4resident himself: &


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P a g e | Senate can practically rewrite a bill re"uired tocome from the ouse and leave only a traceof the original bill.

9 committee to which a bill is referred may doany of the following6 &7' endorse the billwithout changes: &8' to ma$e changes in thebill omitting or adding sections or altering its

language: &ectivepostal service system.

SEC. 26 (2)TOLENTINO V. SOF – The presidentialcerti!cation dispenses with the re"uirement

not only of printing but also that of thereading of the bill on separate days.

The purpose for which three readings onseparate days is re"uired is two#fold6 &7' toinform the members of +ongress of what theymust vote on: and &8' to give them notice thata measure is progressing through the enactingprocess thus enabling them and othersinterested in the measure to prepare theirpositions.

SEC. 27 (2)GONZALES V. MACARAIG – The power given tothe president to disapprove any item in anappropriations bill does not grant theauthority to veto a part of an item and toapprove the remaining portion of the sameitem.

9n item refers to the particulars, details, thedistinct and severable parts of the bill. (t is theindivisible sum of money dedicated to a statedpurpose. (t in itself is a speci!c appropriationof money, not some general provision of law.

9 distinct and severable part of a bill may besubject of a separate veto. 9ny provision inthe general in the general appropriations billshall relate speci!cally to some particularprovision therein, and that any such provisionshall be limited in its operation to theappropriation to which it relates. 1venassuming that provisions are beyond vetopowers, a provision may still be vetoed



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P a g e | /following the doctrine of inappropriateprovisions

BENGZON V. DRILON – The general rule is thatthe president must veto the bill in its entirety.(tem vetoes are allowed to avoid riders beingattached to appropriation measures but only aparticular item &meaning the particulars,

details, the distinct and severable parts' maybe vetoed.

P#ILCONSA V. ENRIQUEZ – The repeal of a lawshould be done in a separate law, not in theappropriations law. The scope of item vetoshould be any provision which6 &7' does notrelate to any particular item: &8' extends theoperation beyond the item of appropriation:&ected. (ncidental bene!t or advantage tothe public does not justify the use of publicmoney. The test of constitutionality is whetherthe statute is designed to promote publicinterests, as opposed to the furtherance of theadvantage of individuals, even if each

advantage to individuals incidentally servesthe public.

PLANTERS V. FERTIP#IL – 9n inherent limitationon the power of taxation is public purpose. They cannot be used for purely privatepurposes or for the exclusive bene!t of privatepersons.

GUINGONA V. CARAGUE – The amounts inautomatic appropriation for debt servicing aremade certain by legislative parameters. There

is no unlimited discretion as to the amounts tobe disbursed for debt servicing. The mandateis to pay only the principal, interest, taxes andother normal ban$ing charges, and as whenthey shall become due.9utomatic appropriation provides theRexibility for the e>ective execution of debtmanagement policies. 9lso, the amountneeded to cover the payment of principal,interests and taxes should be made availableas they fall due, without necessity of periodicenactments of separate laws, since both the

period and necessities are incapable of determination in advance.

ARTICLE VII• E0ECUTIVE •

SEC. 1P#ILCONSA V. ENRIQUEZ – The +ountrywide3evelopment Fund is explicit that it shall beused for infrastructure, purchase of ambulances and computers and other priorityprojects and activities and credit facilities to"uali!ed bene!ciaries./ (t was +ongress itself that determined the purposes for theappropriation. 1xecutive function under thesaid fund involves implementation of thepriority projects speci!ed in the law.

EBB V. DE LEON – The prosecution of crimespertains to the executive department, whoseprincipal power and responsibility is to see toit that our laws are faithfully executed. 9necessary component of this power to executeour laws is the right to prosecute theirviolators.

SEC. 8ESTRADA V. DESIERTO – For there to beresignation, there must be intent to resign andthe intent must be coupled by acts of relin"uishment. 9 proposal for a snap election

where the president would not be a candidateis indicia of intent to resign.

SEC. 13CIVIL LIBERTIES V. E0ECUTIVE SECRETARY – There is a sweeping, all#embracing prohibitionimposed on the 4resident, members of +abinet, which prohibitions are not similarlyimposed on other public o)cials. Theprohibition against holding dual or multipleo)ces must not be construed as applying toposts occupied by executive o)cials6 &7'

without additional compensation: &8' in an ex#o)cio capacity: &


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P a g e | &='as re"uired by the primary functions of saido)cial0s o)ce.

9dditional duties must not only be closelyrelated to, but must be re"uired by theo)cial0s primary functions. (f the functionsre"uired to be performed are merelyincidental, remotely related, inconsistent

incompatible, or alien to the primary function,then it would prohibited.

SEC. 15IN RE$ APPOINTMENT OF VALENZUELA – 9rt. E,=&7' provides that the vacancy shall be !lledwithin BJ days contrasts with the prohibitionunder 9rt. A, 7? is couched in strongernegative language that the president shall notma$e appointments.

7? is directed against appointments for

buying votes &within 8 months prior toelection' and those made for partisanconsiderations &midnight appointments'. Thenarrow exception to this rule is temporaryappointments to executive positions whencontinued vacancies would prejudice publicservice or endanger public safety.

The !lling of vacancies in the judiciary isundoubtedly in the public interest, there is noshowing of any compelling reason to justifythe ma$ing of the appointment during the

period of the ban. (n fact, there is a strongpublic policy against appointments madewithin the ban period.

DE CASTRO V. !BC – The prohibition under 7?does not apply to appointments to !ll avacancy in the Supreme +ourt or to otherappointments in the judiciary. The records of the deliberations of the framers reveal thatthe arrangement of the allocation of powersamong the three departments is a truerecognition of the principle of separation of

powers.

The Qalenzuela ruling did not !rmly rest onthe deliberations of the +onstitutional+ommission. 9lso, the use of the word shall/imposes a duty which should not bedisregarded. Thereby, =&7' imposes on the4resident the imperative duty to ma$e anappointment of a -ember of the Supreme

+ourt within BJ days from the occurrence of the vacancy.

7? doesn0t apply as well to all otherappointments in the udiciary. Theestablishment of the udicial and 5ar +ounciland their subjecting the nomination andscreening of candidates for judicial positionsto the unhurried and deliberate prior processensures that there would no longer bemidnight appointments to the udiciary. Thecreation of the 5+ was to depoliticize the

udiciary by doing away with the interventionof the +ommission on 9ppointments.

SEC. 16RAFAEL V. EMBROIDERY BOARD – For thechairman and board members to "ualify, theyneed only be designate by their respectivedepartment heads. They all sit ex#o)cio, inorder to be designation they must already beholding positions in the o)ce mentioned inthe law. Co new appointments are necessaryand there is no attempt to deprive the

4resident of his power to ma$e appointments.

BERMUDEZ V. TORRES – 9ppointmentnecessarily calls for an exercise of discretionon the part of the appointing power. (t is theprerogative of the appointing power: the rightof choice is the heart of the power to appoint.

The recommendation of the S; for theappointment of prosecutors should beinterpreted as essentially persuasive incharacter, not binding, nor obligatory, upon

the 4resident.

SARMIENTO V. MISON – The +onstitutionprovides for four groups whom the presidentshall appoint6&7' ead of executive departments,ambassadors, consuls, o)cers of the 9F4 withran$ of colonel or naval captain and above,other o)cers whose appointment are vested

in him in this +onstitution &members of the 5+, chairman and commissioners or +S+,+;-1@1+, +;9 and members of regularconsultative commissions' – *e"uires consentof the +ommission on 9ppointment&8' 9ll other o)cers of %overnment whoseappointments are not otherwise provided bylaw – Co con!rmation&


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P a g e | 12 The grant of power to appoint to the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, orboards is a matter of legislative grace.+ongress has the discretion to grant to, orwithhold from, the heads the power to appointlower#ran$ed o)cers. (f it so grants, +ongressmay impose certain conditions for the exerciseof such legislative delegation. This is in

contrast to the 4resident0s power to appointwhich is a self#executing power and thus notsubject to legislative limitations or conditions.

The o)cers whom the heads of departments,agencies, commissions, or boards mayappoint must be of lower ran$ than thosevested by law with the power to appoint. 9lso,the power to appoint can only be vested in theheads or chairpersons of the commissions orboards and not to their members.

SEC. 17

ANG-ANGCO V. CASTILLO – The 4resident doesnot have blan$et authority to remove anyo)cer or employee of the government, butthat power must still be subject to the law thatmay be passed such as the +ivil Service 9ct. The power of control is de!ned as the powerof an o)cer to alter or modify or nullify or setaside what a subordinate o)cer had done inthe performance of his duties and tosubstitute the judgement of the o)cer for thatof the subordinate. The 4resident0s control

over the executive department refers only tomatters of general policy or any de!nitecourse or method adopted and followed by agovernment or body. The removal of an o)cercannot be said to come within the meaning of control over a speci!c policy of government.

The power of control of the 4resident mayextend to the power to investigate, suspendor remove o)cers who belong to theexecutive, under the principle that the powerto remove is inherent in the power to appoint.

owever, this applies only if they are

presidential appointees. 9s to those o)cerswho belong to the classi!ed service thatpower cannot be exercised.

NAMARCO V. ARCA – 9 %;++ parta$es thenature of government bureau which isadministratively supervised by the9dministrator of the ;)ce of 1conomic

+oordination, whose ran$ is e"uivalent to ahead of an 1xecutive 3epartment, and isresponsible to the 4resident under whosecontrol his functions shall be exercised. Theright to appeal to the 4resident reposes uponthe 4resident the power of control overexecutive departments.

9ll executive and administrative organizationsare adjuncts of the 1xecutive 3epartment,whereby the heads are agents of the +hief 1xecutive.

ANGELES V. GAITE – The declaration of martiallaw, the suspension of the writ of %a&"ascorp$s, the exercise of pardoning powerdemands the exclusive exercise by the4resident of the constitutionally vested power. The list is not exclusive, but there must be ashowing that the executive power in "uestionis of similar 'ra(ias and exceptional import.

The power of the 4resident to review thedecision of the S; dealing with the

preliminary investigation of cases cannot beconsidered as falling within the sameexceptional class which cannot be delegated.

SEC. 18LANSANG V. GARCIA – Two conditions mustoccur for the valid exercise of authority tosuspend the privilege of writ of %a&"ascorp$s6 &7' the existence of invasion,insurrection, and rebellion: &8' public safetyre"uires such suspension. Cevertheless, the+ourt has the authority to in"uire into the

existence of the factual bases in order todetermine the constitutionality thereof.

nder the +onstitution the 4resident also hasthree options6 &7' to call out the 9rmed Forces:&8' to suspend the privilege of the writ of %a&"as corp$s and &


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P a g e | 11%enerally, +ongress is the repository of emergency powers. The framers of the+onstitution deemed it wise to allow +ongressto grant emergency powers to the 4resident,subject to certain conditions6 &7' there is a waror emergency: &8' the delegation is for alimited period only: &ected with public interestwithout authority from +ongress. The4resident also has no power to point out thetypes of businesses a>ected with publicinterest that should be ta$en over.

SEC. 19DRILON V. CA – 9 person0s sentence which hasalready been commuted can no longer bereinvestigated. The commutation of sentenceneed not be in a speci!c form. (t is su)cientwhen a person is voluntarily released with noterms or conditions, except that he shouldremain in house arrest. ouse arrest cannotbe considered as a continuation of hissentence, because in no way is arrest apenalty, but rather a mere means of ta$ing a

person into custody.

CRISTOBAL V. LABRADOR – There are threelimitations on the exercise of pardoningpower6 &7' power must be exercised afterconviction: &8' cannot be extended toimpeachment cases: &enses. 9lso by virtue

of the power of supervision and control, the4resident may reverse or modify a rulingissued by subordinate against an erring publico)cial.

SEC. 21GONZALES V. #EC#ANOVA – 9lthough the4resident may enter into executive

agreements without previous legislativeauthority, he may not, by executiveagreement, enter into a transaction which isprohibited by statues enacted prior thereto.e many not defeat legislative enactments byindirectly repealing the same through anexecutive agreement providing for theperformance of the very act prohibited by thesaid laws. The +onstitution authorizes thenulli!cation of an executive agreement, notonly when it conRicts with the fundamentallaw, but also when it runs counter to the act of

+ongress.

USAFFE V. TREASURER – 1xecutiveagreements are of two classes6 &7' agreementmade purely as executive acts a>ectingexternal relations and independent of orneeds no legislative authorization&presidential agreements' and &8' agreemententered into in pursuance of acts of congress&congressional#executive agreements'.

ARTICLE VIII

• !UDICIARY •

SEC. 1SANTIAGO V. BAUTISTA – (t is necessary thatthere be a law that gives rise to some speci!crights of persons or property under whichadverse claims to such rights are made. The judiciary will not interfere in literary contests,beauty contests, and similar competitions.

9 judicial function is an act performed by

virtue of judicial powers. The test to determinewhether a tribunal or board exercises judicial



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P a g e | 1"functions6 &7' there must be speci!ccontroversy involving rights of personsbrought before a tribunal for hearing anddetermination: &8' that the tribunal must havethe power and authority to pronounce judgment and render a decision: &ered or threatened injury as a result of theallegedly illegal conduct of government: &8'that the injury is fairly traceable to thechallenged action: &


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P a g e | 1)FRANCISCO V. #R – udicial power is not only apower: it is also a duty which cannot beabdicated by the mere spectre of the political"uestion doctrine. There are two species of political "uestions6 &7' truly political"uestions/ and &8' those which are not trulypolitical "uestions./ The determination of atruly political "uestion from a non#justiciable

political "uestion lies in the answer to the"uestion of whether there are constitutionallyimposed limits on power or function conferredupon political bodies. (f there are, the courtsare duty#bound to examine whether thegovernment properly acted within such limits.

The possibility of the occurrence of aconstitutional crisis, embarrassing conRictsbetween the congress and the judiciary andpolitical stability are not reasons for theSupreme +ourt to refrain from upholding the

+onstitution in all impeachment cases. ustices cannot abandon their constitutionalduties just because their action may start, if not precipitate, a crisis.

PACU V. SECRETARY OF EDUCATION – -ereapprehension that the Secretary might underthe law withdraw the permit of the petitionersdoes not constitute justiciable controversy. 9naction must be brought for a positive purpose,to obtain actual and positive relief. +ourts donot sit to adjudicate mere academic "uestions

to satisfy scholarly interest, no matter howintellectually solid the problem may be.

DAVID V. ARROYO – The moot and academic/principle is not a magical formula that canautomatically dissuade the courts in resolvinga case. +ourts will decided cases, otherwisemoot and academic, if6 &7' there is a graveviolation of the +onstitution: &8' paramountpublic interest is involved: &ers fromin!rmity cannot be a source of legal rights orduties. owever, prior the declaration of nullity, it must have been in force and had to

be complied with. The existence of a statuteprior to its being adjudged void is an operativefact to which legal conse"uences areattached.

PEOPLE V. MATEO – The +onstitution is notpreclusive in character and does notnecessarily prevent the Supreme +ourt, in theexercise of its rule#ma$ing power, from addingan intermediate appeal or review in favor of the accused, a procedural matter. (f only toensure utmost circumspection before the

penalty of death, reclusion perpetua or lifeimprisonment is imposed, the +ourt nowdeems it wise and compelling to provide inthese cases a review by the +ourt of 9ppealsbefore the case is elevated to the Supreme+ourt. 9 prior determination by the +ourt of 9ppeals on, particularly, the factual issues,would minimize the possibility of an error of judgment.

SEC. 5 (4)PEOPLE V. GUTIERREZ – The Secretary of

ustice has no power to assign cases to beheard, it violates the separation of the1xecutive and udiciary. ;ne of the incidentaland inherent powers of the courts is that of transferring the trial of cases from one courtto another of e"ual ran$, whenever theimperative of securing a fair and impartialtrial, or of preventing a miscarriage of justiceso demands.

SEC. 5 (5)PNB V. ASUNCION – nder the +ivil +ode, thecreditor has the right to proceed against

anyone of the solidary debtors or some or allof them simultaneously. The choice is left tothe creditor. To re"uire the creditor to proceedagainst the estate would deprive him of thesesubstantive rights under the +ivil +ode.Substantive law cannot be amended byprocedural law.

SANTERO V. CFI – Since the provision of the+ivil +ode, a substantive law, gives thesurviving spouse and the children the right toreceive support during the li"uidation of theestate of the deceased, such right cannot beimpaired by the *ules of +ourt which is aprocedural rule.

DAMASCO V. LAGUI – 4rescription of a crime isthe loss or waiver by the State of its right toprosecute an act prohibited by law. 2hile it isa rule that an accused who fails to move to

"uash the information before pleading isdeemed to waive all objections, it does notapply to the defense of prescription, asubstantive right under the *4+ whichextinguishes criminal liability.

PEOPLE V. LACSON – *e"uirements to theapplication of the time#bar of *ule 7A6 &7' theprosecution with the express conformity of theaccused, or the accused, or both moves for aprovisional dismissal of the case: &8' o>endedparty is noti!ed of the motion: &


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P a g e | 1*against the accused after the information hadbeen !led but subse"uently provisionallydismissed.

9 procedural law may not be appliedretroactively if to do so would wor$ injustice orwould involve intricate problems of dueprocess or impart the independence of the

+ourt.

ST. MARTIN FUNERAL V. NLRC – 1ver sinceappeals from the C@*+ to the Supreme +ourtwere eliminated, the legislative intendmentwas that the special civil action of certiorariwas and still is the proper vehicle for judicialreview of decisions of the C@*+. There is anunderlying power of the courts to scrutinizethe acts of such agencies on "uestions of lawand jurisdiction even though no right of reviewis given by statute. The purpose of judicial

review is to $eep the administrative agencywithin its jurisdiction and protect thesubstantial rights of the parties.

SEC. 6MACEDA V. VASQUEZ – (n the absence of anyadministrative action ta$en against a judge orcourt employee, the investigation beingconducted by the ;mbudsman encroachesinto the +ourt0s power of administrativesupervision over all courts and its personnel,in violation of the doctrine of separation of

powers. 2here a criminal complaint arisesfrom their administrative duties, the;mbudsman must defer action on saidcomplaint and refer the same to the Supreme+ourt for determination whether the said judge or court employee has acted within thescope of their administrative duties.

SEC. 10NITAFAN V. CIR – The clear intent of theconstitutional commissioners is to delete anexpress grant of exemption from payment of

income tax to members of judiciary. Salaries

of justices and judges are properly subject tothe general income tax law.

SEC. 11VARGAS V. RILLORAZA – +ongress may notpass a law adding dis"uali!cations to thoseadopted in the +onstitution. The phrase

unless otherwise provided by law/ does notauthorize any legislation that would alter thecomposition of the Supreme +ourt, no matterhow brief a time it may be imagined. 9temporary member/ is a misnomer notcontemplated by the +onstitution. (t is clearthat the chief justice and the justices have tobe appointed by the president and con!rmedby the +ommission on 9ppointments. -eredesignation does not satisfy this re"uirement.

ARTICLE I0-A

• COMMON PROVISIONS •

SEC. 5CSC V. DBM – The no report, no release/policy may not be validly enforced againsto)ces vested with !scal autonomy. Theirapproved appropriations shall beautomatically and regularly released. 5yparity of construction, automatic release/ of approved annual appropriations to the +S+,should be construed to mean that nocondition to fund releases to it may beimposed. Shortfall of revenues does not justifynon#compliance with the mandate.

9gencies which the +onstitution has vestedwith !scal autonomy should thus be givenpriority in the release of their approvedappropriations over all other agencies notsimilarly vested when there is a revenueshortfall. 1ven assuming that there was arevenue shortfall, it could not withhold fullrelease of the +S+0s funds without violating

the +onstitution.

+ongress is not prohibited from reducing theappropriations of the +S+, +;9 and +;-1@1+below the amount appropriated for them forthe previous year.

SEC. 7FILIPINAS ENGINEERING V. FERRER – +;-1@1+0spowers may be classi!ed as administrative in

character and pertaining to adjudicatory or"uasi#judicial functions. 9warding a contractdoes not come within the purview of !nalorder which is exclusively and directlyappealable to the Supreme +ourt. 5eing non# judicial in character, no direct and exclusiveappeal to the Supreme +ourt may lie. 9ny"uestion arising from said order may well beta$en in an ordinary civil action before trialcourts.

SALIGUMBA V. CA – The power of the Supreme

+ourt to review +;9 decisions refers to moneymatters and not to administrative casesinvolving the discipline of its personnel. 1venassuming that the Supreme +ourt had jurisdiction to review the administrativematter, the Supreme +ourt cannot do so onfactual issues because the Supreme +ourt0spower is limited to legal issues only.

ARTICLE I0-B• CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION •

SEC. 2 (1)NASECO V. NLRC – %;++s which areorganized as subsidiaries under the %eneral+orporation @aw will not be covered by the+ivil Service @aw.

MSS V. #ERNANDEZ – 5oth regular andcontractual employees are covered by the+ivil Service @aw. The C@*+ has no jurisdictionover money claims of contractual employeesof the government. They are still governed by

the +ivil Service @aw and not the @abor +ode.



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P a g e | 1+CSC V. SO!OR – 9 university president with a!xed term of o)ce appointed by thegoverning board of trustees of the universityis a non#career civil service o)cer who isunder the jurisdiction of the +S+.

SEC. 2 (2)DE LOS SANTOS V. MALLARE – The phrase for

cause/ means for reasons which the law andsound public policy recognized as su)cientwarrant for removal. Cot merely causes whichthe appoint power in the exercise of discretionmay deem su)cient. The cause must relate toand a>ect the administration of the o)ce, andmust be restricted to something or asubstantial nature directly a>ecting the rightsand interests of the public.

4ositions which are policy#determining,primarily con!dential and highly technical are

excluded from the merit system and dismissalat pleasure of o)cers and employeesappointed therein is allowed by the+onstitution.

1very appointment implies con!dence, butmuch more than ordinary con!dence isreposed in the occupant of a position that isprimarily con!dential. (t denotes not onlycon!dence in the aptitude of the appointee forthe duties of the o)ce but primarily closeintimacy which insures freedom of intercourse

without embarrassment or freedom frommisgivings of betrayals of personal trust orcon!dential matters of state.

9 position is policy#determining if heformulates a method of action for thegovernment or any of its subdivisions.

9 position is highly technical if the appointeeis re"uired to possess technical s$ill ortraining in the supreme or superior degree.

CSC V. SALAS – There are two instances whena position may be considered primarilycon!dential6 &7' when the 4resident, declaresa position to be such &upon +S+recommendation': &8' when by the nature of the functions of o)ce, there exists a closeintimacy between the appointee and theappointing power, which insures freedom of

intercourse without embarrassment orfreedom from misgivings of betrayals of personal trust, or con!dential matters of thestate.

9 law specifying the nature of the position ismerely an initial determination that is notconclusive in case of conRict. (t is the natureof the position which !nally determineswhether a position is primarily con!dential,policy determining or highly technical. TheSupreme +ourt has the !nal say.

9ccording to the 4roximity *ule, a position isdeemed not con!dential where the position of the appointee is remote from that of theappointing authority since the element of trustbetween them is no longer predominant.

CSC V. !AVIER – +areer positions arecharacterized by6 &7' entrance based on meritand !tness to be determined as far aspracticable by competitive examinations orbased on highly technical "uali!cations: &8'

opportunity for advancement to higher careerpositions: &ordpublic employees security of tenure.

ABAKADA V. PURISIMA – The guarantee of

security of tenure only means that an



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P a g e | 1,employee cannot be dismissed from theservice for cause other than those provided bylaw and only after due process is accorded theemployee. 9 law that lays down a reasonableyardstic$ for removal &i.e. when the revenuecollection falls short of the target by at leastA.?G' with due consideration of all relevantfactors a>ecting the level of collection is a

standard analogous to ine)ciency andincompetence of o)cial duties, a ground fordisciplinary action under civil service laws.

CSC V. SO!OR – 2hile the 5oard of *egentshas the sole power of administration over theuniversity, this power is not exclusive in thematter of disciplining and removing itsemployees and o)cials. The +S+ hasconcurrent jurisdiction over a president of astate university. 2hile the law bestows upon agovernment body the jurisdiction to hear and

decide cases involving speci!c matters, it is tobe presumed that such jurisdiction is exclusiveunless it be proved that another body isli$ewise vested with the same jurisdiction, inwhich case, both bodies have concurrent jurisdiction over the matter.

9ll members of the civil service are under the jurisdiction of the +S+, unless otherwiseprovided by law. 5eing a non#career civilservant does not remove him from the ambitof the +S+.

SEC. 2 (4)SANTOS V. Y ATCO – The position of Secretaryof Cational 3efense and other heads of executive departments is not embraced andincluded within the terms o)cers andemployees in the civil service./ The "uestionof the impropriety as distinct from illegality of such campaign is not justiciable.

SEC. 2 (5)DELA CRUZ V. CA – 4ublic school teachersmust exercise their constitutional right to

assembly within reasonable limits. They maynot commit acts prejudicial to the bestinterests of their service by staging massprotests on regular school days, abandoningtheir classes and refusing to go bac$ to wor$even after they have been order to do so. These produce adverse e>ects upon thestudents for whose education they were

responsible.

SEC. 7FLORES V. DRILON – A expresses the policyagainst the concentration of several publicpositions in one person, so that a public o)ceror employee may serve full time withdedication and thus be e)cient in the deliveryof public services.

2hile 8 authorizes the multiple o)ces by anappointive o)cial, when allowed by law or by

the primary functions of his position, 7appears to be more stringent by not providingany exception to the rule against theappointment of an elective o)cial to othergovernment posts.

The only exceptions recognized by the+onstitution for elective o)cials are6 &7'4resident – head of the economic andplanning agency: &8' Qice#4resident – memberof cabinet: &ortsparta$e the nature of additionalcompensation.

%NOTE6 9dditional compensation – 2hen forone and the same o)ce for whichcompensation has been !xed there is addedto such !xed compensation an extra reward inthe form, for instance, of a bonus. This is not

allowed in the absence of a law speci!callyauthorizing such extra reward.

%%NOTE$ 3ouble compensation – This moreproperly refers to two sets of compensationfor two di>erent o)ces held concurrently byone o)cer. (n the instances when holding asecond o)ce is allowed when an o)ceraccepts a second o)ce, he can draw thesalary attached to such second o)ce onlywhen he is speci!cally authorized by law toreceive double compensation.

ARTICLE I0-C• COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS •

SEC. 1 (1)CAYETANO V. MONSOD – The practice of law isnot limited to the conduct of cases in court.4ractice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which re"uires the application of law,legal procedure, $nowledge, training andexperience. To engage in the practice of law is

to give notice or render any $ind of servicewhich re"uires the use in any degree of legal



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P a g e | 1$nowledge or s$ill. 9s long as the wor$ doneinvolves the determination by the trainedlegal mind of the legal e>ect of facts andconditions, then it is a practice of law.1xperience as a lawyer#economist, lawyer#manager, etc. more than satisfy theconstitutional re"uirement.

SEC. 1 (2)MATIBAG V. BENIPAYO – 9n a* i!"rimappointment is a permanent appointmentbecause it ta$es e>ect immediately and canno longer be withdrawn by the 4resident oncethe appointee has "uali!ed into o)ce. Thefact that it is subject to con!rmation by the+ommission on 9ppointments does not alterits permanent character. The +onstitutionitself ma$es an a* i!"rim appointmentpermanent in character by ma$ing it e>ectiveuntil disapproved by the +ommission on

9ppointments or until the next adjournment of +ongress.

9 by#passed appointment is one that has notbeen !nally acted upon on the merits by the+ommission on 9ppointments at the close of the session of congress. 9bsent such decision,the 4resident is free to renew the a* i!"rimappointment by a by#passed appointee. ecan be considered again if the 4residentrenews the appointment.

The prohibition on reappointment does notapply to disapproved nor by#passed a* i!"rimappointments. 9 disapproved a* i!"rimappointment cannot be revived by another a*i!"rim appointment because the disapprovalis !nal. owever, a by#passed a*+i!"rimappointment can be revived by a new a*+i!"rim appointment because there is no !naldisapproval.

9n a* i!"rim appointment that has lapsed byinaction of the +ommission on 9ppointments

does not constitute a term of o)ce. The

period is neither a !xed term nor an unexpiredterm. The phrase without reappointment/applies only to one who has been appointedby the 4resident and con!rmed by the+ommission on 9ppointments, whether or notsuch person completes his term of o)ce.

The prohibition on reappointment, common to

the three constitutional commissions, wasintended by the framers to6 &7' prevent asecond appointment for those who have beenpreviously appointed and con!rmed, even if they served for less than seven years: &8'insure that the members of the threeconstitutional commissions do not servebeyond the !xed term of seven years.

SEC. 2PANGILINAN V. COMELEC – The +;-1@1+ hasexclusive original jurisdiction over all contests

relating to the election, returns, and"uali!cations of all elective regional,provincial, and city o)cials. (t has no jurisdiction over contests relating to theelection, returns and "uali!cations of -embers of the ouse, it is the *1T who isthe sole judge of all such contests. 4re#proclamation controversies should beconstrued as referring only to those fallingwithin the exclusive and original jurisdiction of +;-1@1+.

SEC. 3SARMIENTO V. COMELEC – 1lection casesincluded pre#proclamation controversies, andall such cases must !rst be heard and decidedby a 3ivision of the +;-1@1+. The +;-1@1+"! &a!c does not have authority to hear anddecide the same at the !rst instance.

ARTICLE I0-D• COMMISSION ON AUDIT •

SEC. 1 (1)

MISON V. COA – 9 -anager of the TechnicalServices of the +;9 does not have the powerto render or promulgate a decision for the+;9. ence, such decision is void a& i!iio. That power is lodged in the +;9 as a collegialbody composed of a +hairman and twocommissioners. *ati!cation cannot validate anact void a& i!iio because it was done

absolutely without authority.

SEC. 2 (1)P#ILIPPINE OPERATIONS V. AUDITOR – The9uditor %eneral has no jurisdiction forunli"uidated claims. 9n account is somethingwhich may be adjusted or li"uidated byarithmetic process. Treasury o)cials cannotpass upon accounts where the amount is notthe result of a numerical computation.

+laims for unli"uidated damages re"uire fortheir settlement the application of judgementand discretion sustained by extraneous proof.(n such cases, it is not merely an accountwhich is determined by arithmetic process.2hen the liability or non#liability of thegovernment is put in issue, the "uestioninvolves judicial determination. The 9uditor%eneral, an executive o)cer, cannot assumethis jurisdiction.

EURO-MED V. BATANGAS – The scope of the+;90s authority to ta$e cognizance of claimsrefers only to li"uidated claims, or thosedetermined or readily determinable fromvouchers, invoices, and such other paperswithin reach of accounting o)cers. 2henparties agree that the transactions aregoverned by implementing rules andregulations promulgated by the +;9, suchmatters are not within the usual area of expertise of most judges but are within thespecial competence of +;9.



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P a g e | 1/RAMOS V. AQUINO – +ongress itself is not in aposition to oversee and supervise the actualrelease of each and every appropriation madeby law. (t is the responsibility of the 9uditor%eneral to exact obedience to any law thatallows the expenditure of public funds. eserves as the necessary chec$ to ma$e certainthat no department of the governmentexceeds the statutory limits of theappropriation. That is the purpose for thecreation of such o)ce, certainly not theenforcement of criminal statutes.

Cowhere in the law does it appear that such astatutory grant of authority of the 9uditor%eneral to open revised accounts &in case of fraud, collusion, error of calculation, new andmaterial evidence' carries with it the power todetermine who may be constituted in theevent that in the preparation thereof a crime

has been committed.

BLUE BAR V. TANTUICO – The +onstitutionprovides that the +;9 shall have the power onpost#audit basis over non#governmentalentities receiving subsidy or e"uity, directly orindirectly, from the government or thegranting institution to submit to such audit asa condition of subsidy or e"uity. 4rivateentities who handle government funds orsubsidies in trust may be examined or auditedin their handling of said funds by government

auditors.

N#A V. COA – The +;9 has the power topromulgate rules and regulations for theprevention and disallowance of irregular,unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, orunconscionable expenditures, or uses of government funds and properties. Since the+;9 is responsible for the enforcement of therules and regulations, failure to comply withthem is a ground for disapproving thepayment of the proposed expenditure.

9ccording to a +;9 +ircular, unnecessaryexpenditures are those6 &7' which could notpass the test of prudence or the diligence of agood father of a family: &8' not supportive of the implementation of the objectives andmission of the agency: &airs. The 4residentexercises general supervision over them, butonly to ensure that local a>airs are

administered according to law. The 4resident

has no power of control and cannot substitutehis own judgment.

3ecentralization of power – 9bdication orhanding over of political power in favor of @%s declared to be autonomous. Theautonomous government is free to chart itsown destiny and shape its future withminimum intervention from centralauthorities.

SEC. 8BOR!A V. COMELEC – The purpose of thisprovision is to prevent a circumvention of thelimitation on the number of terms an electivelocal o)cial may serve. (f he is not serving aterm for which he was elected &i.e. continuesthe service of the o)cial by succession', sucho)cial cannot be considered to have fullyserved the term.

Cevertheless, there is a di>erence betweenthe case of a vice mayor and a member of thehouse. The vice mayor succeeds by operationof law. (t is not enough that an individual hasserved three consecutive terms: he must alsohave been elected to the same position forthe same number of times before thedis"uali!cation can set it. ;n the other hand,a representative is elected to !ll the vacancyand in a real sense serves a term for which hewas elected. That is why his service of an

unexpired term is correctly counted as his !rstterm.

SOCRATES V. COMELEC – The prohibitedelection refers only to the next regularelection for the same o)ce. 9 recall election&even if subse"uent to the third term', is notcovered by the prohibition. The prohibitedelection refers only to an immediate re#election, not to a subse"uent one.

9 recall election is an interruption in the

continuity of service, not because of voluntary



19/23

P a g e | 1renunciation, but because of legal prohibition. The term is not a seamless continuation of thethree previous terms. 9n involuntaryinterruption occurred which bro$e thecontinuity of service. The +onstitution doesnot re"uire that the interruption should be afull term of three years. The clear intent isthat any interruption for any length of time, aslong as the cause is involuntary, is su)cientto brea$ the continuity of service.

MONTEBON V. COMELEC – Succession in localgovernment o)ces is by operation of law. The@ocal %overnment +ode provides that if apermanent vacancy occurs in the o)ce of thevice mayor, the high ran$ing Sanggunianmember shall become vice mayor. Theassumption of a councilor as vice mayor canin no way be considered a voluntaryrenunciation of o)ce because it was by

operation of law.

ALDOVINO V. COMELEC – 4reventivesuspension involves protection of the serviceand of the people being served, and preventsthe o)ce holder from temporarily exercisingthe power of his o)ce. (t is a temporaryincapacity to render service during anunbro$en term. Term limitation is triggeredafter an elective o)cial has served his threeterms in o)ce without any brea$. (nterruptionof service occurs after there has been a brea$

in the term.

9 preventive suspension is not a terminterruption since the suspended o)cialcontinues to stay in o)ce although barredfrom exercising the functions of the o)cewithin the period. The best indicator of thesuspended o)cial0s continuity in o)ce is theabsence of a permanent replacement and thelac$ of the authority to appoint one since novacancy exists.

4reventive suspension, because it is imposedby operation of law, does not involve a

voluntary act on the part of the suspendedo)cial, except in the indirect sense that hemay have voluntarily committed the act thatbecame the basis of the charge against him.From this perspective, preventive suspensiondoes not have the element of voluntarinessthat voluntary renunciation embodies.4reventive suspension, by its very nature isthe exact opposite of voluntary renunciation:it is involuntary and temporary, and involvesonly the actual delivery of service, not the titleto the o)ce.

SEC. 10TAN V. COMELEC – The remaining portion of the parent province is as much an areaa>ected. The substantial alteration on theboundaries of the parent province and theadverse economic e>ects it might su>er justify the participation of the inhabitants of

the parent province in the plebiscite. (t isinaccurate to state that where an existingpolitical unit is divided or its boundarysubstantially altered, only some and not allthe voters in the whole unit su>ersdismemberment or substantial alteration of itsboundary a>ected.

(n the absence of factual and legal basis forthe creation of such new province, there is no justi!cation for holding another plebiscite.

LEAGUE OF CITIES V. COMELEC – The+onstitution re"uires +ongress to stipulate inthe @ocal %overnment +ode all the criterianecessary for the creation of a city. +ongresscannot write such criteria in any other law. The intention of the +onstitution is to insurethat the creation of political subdivisionsfollow the same uniform, non#discriminatorycriteria found solely in the @ocal %overnment+ode which does not contain any exemptionfrom the income re"uirement. To be valid,such exemption must be written in the @ocal

%overnment +ode and not in any other law.

The criteria &land area, population andincome' must be strictly followed becausesuch criteria are material in determining thejust share/ of @%s in national taxes. Thecriteria in creating @%s must be uniform andnon#discriminatory: otherwise, there can be nofair and just distribution of the national taxes.

SEMA V. COMELEC – The creation of any of the four @%s &province, city, municipality,barangay' must comply with the followingconditions6 &7' the creation must follow thecriteria !xed under the @ocal %overnment+ode: &8' such creation must not conRict withthe +onstitution: &


20/23

P a g e | "2municipality, not even the 9*--, isrecognized under our laws as having anassociative/ relationship with the nationalgovernment. The concept implies powers thatgo beyond anything ever granted by the+onstitution to any local or regionalgovernment.

(t also implies the recognition of the5angsamoro uridical entity as a state. Theentity is a state in all but name as it meets thecriteria of a state laid down in the -ontevideo+onvention &government, capacity to enterinto relations with other states, de!nedterritory and permanent population'. The+onstitution does not contemplate any statein this jurisdiction other than the 4hilippinestate, much less does it provide for atransitory status that aims to prepare any partof the 4hilippine territory for independence.

9ssuming ar'$"!*o that the 5angsamoro uridical 1ntity may be regarded as anautonomous region, the -;9#93 wouldre"uire an amendment that would expand 9rt.M, 8J. The mere passage of a new lawpursuant to 8J B would not su)ce, sinceany new law that might vest in the said entitythe powers found in the -;9#93 must complywith the other provisions of the +onstitution&i.e. a law may not be passed granting theentity treaty#ma$ing powers since only the

4resident has that power'.

ARTICLE 0I• ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS

•

SEC. 3ROMULO V. Y NIGUEZ – The dismissal by the5atasan of the impeachment complaint is anexercise of legislative powers. Ceither can theSupreme +ourt cannot compel the 5atasan toconduct impeachment proceedings.

The provision in the +onstitution re"uiring theconcurrence of at least 8P< votes of allmembers for conviction is not violated by theprovision in the *ules of 4rocedure authorizingthe dismissal of the petition by a majority voteof the 5atasan since with such number of votes, it is obvious that the 8P< vote necessaryfor conviction can no longer be obtained.

9lso, the provision in the +onstitutionproviding that an impeachment complaintmay be initiated by a vote of 7P? of themembers is not violated by the provision inthe *ules of 4rocedure authorizing thedismissal of

IN RE$ GONZALES – 9 public o)cer who underthe +onstitution is re"uired to be a member of the 4hilippine 5ar as a "uali!cation for theo)ce held by him cannot be charged with

disbarment during his incumbency. e cannotbe changed criminally before theSandiganbayan, or are other court, with anyo>ense which carries with it the penalty of removal from o)ce. -embers of the Supreme+ourt are removed only by impeachment. They are not entitled to immunity fromliability. They must !rst be removed, via theconstitutional route of impeachment, and thenonly may he be held liable either criminally oradministratively &including disbarment', forany wrong.

FRANCISCO V. #R – The ouse has exclusivepower to initiate all cases of impeachment, noother body can do it. owever, before adecision is made to initiate a case in theSenate, a proceeding must be followed toarrive at a conclusion.

The impeachment proceeding ta$es place notin the Senate but in the ouse, and consists of several steps6&7' Filing of a veri!ed complaint by either

-ember of the ouse, or by a private citizen&endorsed by any -ember of the ouse'

&8' 4rocessing of the complaint by the propercommittee of ustice &may reject or uphold thecomplaint'&


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SEC. 7ZALDIVAR V. SANDIGANBAYAN – (t is the;mbudsman that has the duty to investigateon its own or on complaint by any person, anyact or omission of a public o)cial when suchappears to be illegal, unjust, improper orine)cient. The Special 4rosecutor &formerly

Tanodbayan' is without authority to conductpreliminary investigations and to direct the!ling of the criminal cases before theSandiganbayan. The Special 4rosecutor ismerely a subordinate of the ;mbudsman, andcan investigate and prosecute cases onlyupon the ;mbudsman0s authority andinstruction.

MACALINO V. SANDIGANBAYAN – The onlyinstance when the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a private individual is when

the complaint charges him either as co#principal, accomplice, or accessory of a publico)cer who has been charged with a crimethat is within the jurisdiction of theSandiganbayan.

ARTICLE 0II• NATIONAL ECONOMY & PATRIMONY •

SEC. 2LA BUGAL V. RAMOS – 9greements involvingeither technical or !nancial assistance/ doesnot indicate the intent to exclude other modesof assistance. There is no hint of desire in the+onstitution to prohibit foreign involvement inthe management or operation of miningactivities, or to eradicate service contracts. 5yspecifying such agreements involvingassistance, the framers necessarily gaveimplied assent to everything that theseagreements entailed or that could reasonably

be deemed necessary to ma$e them tenableand e>ective.

The framers discussed agreements involvingtechnical or !nancial assistance in the samesense as service contracts and used the termsinterchangeably. They were going to permitservice contracts with foreign corporations ascontractors, but with safety measures toprevent abuses, as an exception to thegeneral norm established which reserves orlimits to Filipino citizens and corporations atleast DJG owned by such citizens theexploration, development and the utilizationof mineral or petroleum resources &9rt. M(( 87'.

Such new service contracts are betweenforeign corporations acting as contractors&providing capital, technology and technical$now#how and managerial expertise in thecreation and operation of the large#scaleminingPextractive enterprise' and the

government as principal or owner &activelyexercising full control and supervision'.

Full control and supervision/ does not meanthat the State controls and superviseseverything down to the smallest details andma$es all re"uired actions, since this wouldrender impossible the legitimate exercise of the contractor of a reasonable degree of management prerogative in authority. +ontrolmust be ta$en to mean a degree of controlsu)cient to enable the State to regulate the

conduct of a>airs and restrain activitiesdeemed not desirable or bene!cial.

The +onstitution did not intend to !x an iron#clad rule of DJG share, applicable to allsituations, regardless of circumstances. Toavoid compromising the State0s full controland supervision over the exploitation of mineral resources, there must be no attemptto impose a minimum DJG/ rule. (t issu)cient that the State has the power andmeans, should it so decide, to get a DJG

share &or greater' and it is not necessary thatthe State does so in every case.

SEC. 5CRUZ V. SENR – 9ncestral lands and ancestraldomains are considered as private land, andnever to have been part of the public domain. The *egalian Theory does not negate nativetitle to lands held in private ownership sincetime immemorial, it will be presumed to have

been held in the same way from before theSpanish con"uest, and never to have beenpublic land.

9 distinction must be made betweenownership of land under native title andownership of land by ac"uisitive prescriptionagainst the State. ;wnership by virtue of native title presupposes that the land hasbeen held by its possessor and hispredecessors#in#interest in the concept of owner since time immemorial. (t is not

ac"uired from the State, there has been notransfer of title from the State as the land hasbeen regarded as private in character as farbac$ as memory goes. ;wnership byac"uisitive prescription involves a conversionof the character of the property from alienablepublic land to private land, which presupposesa transfer of title from State to a privateperson.

4rivate but community property/ is merelydescriptive of the indigenous people0s concept

of ownership. (t does not ipso faco convertthe character of such natural resources asprivate property of the indigenous.

(n addition to the means of exploration,development and utilization of the country0snatural resources in 9rt. M(( 8 7, the+onstitution itself states in < that +ongressmay, by law, allow small#scale utilization of natural resources by its citizens. Through theimposition of certain re"uirement andconditions for the exploration, development

and utilization of the natural resources under



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P a g e | ""existing laws, the State retains full controlover such activities, whether done on small#scale basis or otherwise.

SEC. 10MANILA PRINCE #OTEL V. GSIS – 7J is self executing, it is a mandatory, positivecommand which is complete in itself and

which needs no further guidelines orimplementing laws for its enforcement. 2henthe +onstitution mandates that the grant of rights, privileges and concessions coveringnational economy and patrimony, the Sateshall give preference to Filipinos, it just simplymeans that "uali!ed Filipinos shall bepreferred.

The patrimony of the nation that should beconserved and developed refers not only tonatural resources but also the cultural

heritage of our race.

7J embodies the so#called Filipino First 4olicy. That means that Filipinos should be givenpreference in the grant of concessions,privileges, and rights covering nationalpatrimony.

SEC. 11TELEBAP V. COMELEC – 9ll broadcastingwhether by radio or by television stations islicensed by the government. 9 franchise or

any right granted shall be subject toamendment, alteration, repeal by +ongresswhen the common good so re"uires. Theamendment of a franchise is not a ta$ing of property without just compensation.5roadcasting companies do not own theairwaves and fre"uencies: they are merelygiven the temporary privilege of using them.9s a privilege, it may be reasonably burdenedwith the performance by the grantee of somepublic service.

SEC. 12

TA3ADA 4. A5ga(a – 2hile the +onstitutionindeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipinogoods, services, labor and enterprises, at thesame time, it recognizes the need for businessexchange with the rest of the world on thebases of e"uality and reciprocity and limitsprotection of Filipino enterprises only againstforeign competition and trade practices thatare unfair. (n other words, the +onstitution didnot intend to pursue an isolationist policy.2hile the +onstitution does not encourage theunlimited entry of foreign goods, services andinvestments into the country, it does notprohibit them either. (n fact, it allows anexchange on the basis of e"uality andreciprocity.

The %9TT itself has provided build#inprotection from unfair foreign competition andtrade practices including anti#dumpingmeasures, countervailing measures andsafeguards against import surges. 2here localbusinesses are jeopardized by unfair foreigncompetition, the 4hilippines can avail of thesemeasures.

SEC. 16LIBAN V. GORDON – The essential elements of a %;++ are ownership and control by thegovernment. 9 law creating a privatecorporation with a special charter isunconstitutional. 4rivate corporations may

exist only under a general law.

9 %;++ must be owned by the government,and in the case of a stoc$ corporation, at leasta majority of its capital stoc$ must be ownedby the government. (n the case of a non#stoc$corporation, by analogy at least a majority of the members must be government o)cialsholding such membership by appointment ordesignation by the government. (t will notsu)ce that the %;++ was created by aspecial law.

SEC. 19TATAD V. SOE – The desirability of competitionis the reason for the prohibition againstrestraint of trade and unfair competition, aswell as the regulation of unmitigatedmonopolies. (n a competitive economy, themar$et system relies on the consumer todecide what and how much shall be produced,

and on competition, among procedures todetermine who will manufacture it. (t re"uiresthe presence of not one, not just a few, butseveral players.

ARTICLE 0VII• AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS •

SEC. 1LAMBINO V. COMELEC – The two essentialelements of an initiative are6 &7' the peoplemust sign the entire proposal and &8' theproposal must be embodied in a petition. These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed amendments is!rst shown to the people who express theirassent by signing such proposal in a petition.

9n initiative to change the +onstitutionapplies only to an amendment and not torevision. *evision broadly implies a changethat alters a basic principle in the+onstitution, li$e altering the principle of separation of powers or the system of chec$sand balance.

SEC. 4GONZALES V. COMELEC – The power toamend the +onstitution or to proposeamendments thereto is not included in thegeneral grant of legislative powers to+ongress. 2hen exercising the same,Senators and *epresentatives act, not asmembers of +ongress, but as componentelements of a constituent assembly. 2henacting as such, the members of +ongress

derive their authority from the +onstitution. The power to amend the +onstitution or to



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P a g e | ")propose amendments thereto is part of theinherent powers of the people as therepository of sovereignty in a republican state. They are the very source of all powers of government, including the +onstitution itself.

There is nothing in the +onstitution indicatingthat amendments thereto must be rati!ed in aspecial election. The circumstance that threeprevious amendments to the +onstitution hadbeen submitted to the people for rati!cationin special elections merely shows that+ongress deemed it best to do so under thecircumstances then obtaining. (t does notnegate its authority to submit proposedamendments for rati!cation in generalelections.

TOLENTINO V. COMELEC – The +ourts mayreview the validity of an act of the+onstitutional +onvention, proposing aparticular amendment to the +onstitution.;nce convened, the +onstitutional +onventionbecame endowed with extraordinary powersgenerally beyond the control of anydepartment of the existing government.Cevertheless, such powers are coextensiveonly with the purpose for which theconvention was called for and that theamendments it may propose cannot have anye>ect as part of the +onstitution until thesame are duly rati!ed by the people. (t

necessarily follows that the acts of theconvention, its o)cers and members are notimmune from attac$ on constitutionalgrounds.

The +onstitution states such amendmentsshall be valid as part of this +onstitution whenapproved by a majority of the votes cast at anelection at which the amendments aresubmitted to the people for their rati!cation./1ither +ongress sitting as a constituentassembly or a convention called for the

purposes may propose amendments to the+onstitution, thus there is no limit as to the

number of amendments that +ongress or the+onvention may propose. owever, there canbe no multiple or piecemeal plebiscites, butonly an election./


Political Law Review Doctrines Arts2!6!1217

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