Political Islam in Yemen: Whither the Islah Party?

8/9/2019 Political Islam in Yemen: Whither the Islah Party?

1/96

BOSTON UNIVERSITY

GRADUATE SCHOOL OF ARTS AND SCIENCES

DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

PoliticalIslaminYemen:WhithertheIslahParty?

DANIEL T. MAHONEY III

MastersResearchPaperAdvised by Professor Charles F. Dunbar

Submitted April 13, 2009


2/96

2009

DanielT.MahoneyIII

ALLRIGHTSRESERVED


3/96

iii

Iowemanythanksandaninexpressibledebtofgratitudetomyadvisor,

ProfessorCharlesF.Dunbar,whointroducedmetoYemeninthespringof2008.

IwouldalsoliketothankmyfamilyRosemary,Daniel,James,ChristineandKarenforall

theirloveandunderstandingthroughoutthisprocess.

AndthankyoutoaformerB.U.gradstudent,RepresentativeHarriettL.Stanley,whohasbeen

anexceptionallysupportivebosstheselasttwoyears.


4/96

iv

ABSTRACT:

Previoustounificationin1990,politicalpartieswereoutlawedinbothNorthandSouthYemen.

In

the

North,

the

General

Popular

Congress

(GPC)

was

the

political

organization

of

the

regime,

which ostensibly represented the interests of all Yemenis. In the South, itwas the Yemeni

SocialistParty(YSP)thatruled. Uponunification,politicalpartiesweremadelegalandamulti

partysystemwas inaugurated. The IslahPartywas formed shortlyafter theunification,and

wasagroupingof themoreconservativemembersofnorthernYemeni regime. Madeupof

tribal, religious and business interests, Islahwas instrumental in helping the President Salih

regimeassertdominanceovertheentirecountryby1994. Sincethen,however,thepartyhas

beenincreasinglymarginalizedbytheregimeleadingtoacompletebreakbetweenthetwoby

2005. By2008 Islah,asthe leaderofanoppositioncoalitioncalledthe JointMeetingParties

(JMP),wasabletotakeadvantageofaconfluenceofeconomic,ecologicalandsecuritycrises

affecting the regime to aid in their success to have elections scheduled for April 2009

postponedfortwoyears. WhilethisvictoryisthefirstofitstypeinYemen,andshowsthatthe

regime is inaweakened state, thedesignsof Islaharenotnecessarily theoverthrowof the

regime,butanequalplaceatthetablefacilitatedbyamoretransparentelectoralprocess. As

eventsarequitefluidinthecountryatthetimeofwriting,onecanbeonlycautiouslyoptimistic

thatthesegoalsoftheoppositionwillbegrantedinthetimeallotted. Thealternativemaybe

thatYemen

becomes

afailed

state.


5/96

v

TABLEOFCONTENTS

Page

Abstract. iv

Introduction vi

ChapterOne 1

ChapterTwo.. 24

ChapterThree.. 40

ChapterFour

..

52

Annex....... 62

Footnotes...... 65

Bibliography 76

PaperProposal.. 83


6/96

vi


7/96

vii

INTRODUCTION

AliAbdullahSalihfacesthegreatestchallengetohisruleinhismorethanthreedecadesas

Yemensauthoritarianpresident. Acountryheavilydependentonoilrevenue,Yemenhasseen

therecent

price

per

barrel

plummet

with

aconcomitant

slashing

of

its

annual

budget.

1

Corruptionisrampant. Inthenorththerearesignsthatthefifthwarinthecountrysnorthern

provinceofSaada,unilaterallyendedbytheregimelastsummer,isabouttobreakoutintoa

sixth.2 Inthesouththereisagrowingdissatisfactionwithperceivedeconomicmarginalization

thathasledtoarmedclashes,bombings,anddeathsatthehandsofsecurityforces. Tofurther

exacerbate the situation, therehavebeenan unprecedentednumberof terroristattacks in

the country during 2008, culminating in the January 2009 announcement that Yemeni and

SaudialQaedagroupshadunifiedandwouldoperateoutofYemen.3

In the past, Salih has had success in overcoming awide variety of foes and daunting

politicalandeconomicchallengesathomeandabroadandhasbeenverysuccessfulinmaking

himself

by

far

the

most

consequential

leader

the

country

has

known

since

the

1962

revolution

thatoverthrewtheImamate.Ontheheelsofinfrastructuraldevelopment,hisregimewasable

toextenditsreachintopreviouslyautonomousregionsduringthe1980s.4 In1979Hecreated

theGeneralPopularCongress(GPC)apoliticalorganization5thatbroughtalltheinfluential


8/96

viii

inYemento thepoliticaltable: modernists,technocratsand influentialtribalists;evenexiled

formerpresidentsAbdullahalSallalandAbdulRahmanYahyaalIryani. Adecade laterSalih

wouldplaya largepart increatingamultipartypoliticalsystemuponunificationof the two

YemensthatwouldultimatelyextendhisreachacrossthewholeofunifiedYemen.

Atthesametime,Salihhasalsoenjoyedsuccess inhisnearandmoredistantabroads.

Thoughhewasmetwithearly resistancebySaudiArabiaatundefinednorthernandeastern

borders,SalihwasstillabletoabletobuildagoodrelationshipwiththeUSasaresultofhis

partnershipwithRayHuntandtheYemenHuntOilCompany. Mr.Huntscompanydiscovered

oil inYemen in1984. In1989,thePresidentseizedontheopportunitycreatedbytheendof

the ColdWar to engineer the unification of north and south Yemen andwas successful in

maintainingthatunityinthefaceofa1994SaudiArabiansponsoredsecessionbyformerSouth

Yemenileaders.6 In1990,YemenandSaudiArabiafinallyreconciledtheirdifferenceoverthe

borderbetween thetwocountries.7 Salihmadegreatstrides in repairingagreatlydamaged

relationshipbetweenYemenandtheU.S.thatresulted fromYemenstacitsupportof Iraq in

199091. SoonafterSeptember11,2001,heandhis formerprimeministerengaged intheir

own shuttle diplomacywithWashingtonD.C.,declaring their support for theU.S. Waron

Terror.8

The Yemeni Grouping for Reform, hereafter referred to as Islah, emerged as a part of

Salih'sgrandpoliticaldesignuponunificationofthetwoYemensin1990.9Withthelegalization

andproliferationofpoliticalpartiesatunification,Islahscreationwasessentiallyjustapeeling

offofthemostconservativeGPCmembersbywhichSalihandhisregimehopedtocounteract


9/96

ix

whatever influencetheYemeniSocialistParty(YSP)theformerrulingregime intheSouth

had at unification. As an Islamist political party, though dominated by conservative tribal

memberspersonifiedbyIslahsleaderSheikhAbdullahbinHusseinalAhmar,therewasadeep

seated animosity towards the godlessmembers of the YSP. This ultimately gave political

coveragetotheSalihregimeasitdeclawedthatparty. Afterthecivilwarof1994,theremay

havebeenanexpectationthatIslahwouldbecomethepermanentloyalopposition.

In 2005, Islah decided it was no longer prepared to play the role of a permanent

opposition.Today,IslahisenteringitsfourthyearofunitedoppositiontotheSalihregimeasde

factoheadoftheJointMeetingParties(JMP). Atthiscrucialcrossroads,itfacesthechoiceof

either remaining with the old Salihdominated system or further entrenching itself in

opposition. In late February, Salihs GPC and the Islahled JMP agreed to postpone

parliamentaryelections(scheduledforlateApril2009)foranothertwoyears.10

Broughtabout

byinternationalpressureandtheunitedoppositionoftheJMP,11

thetwoyearhiatusincreases

thelikelihoodofaresolutionofelectoraldisagreementsinfavoroftheopposition. Itwillalso

allowmoretimeforIslahtocapitalizeonthecontinuing ineffectivenessandcorruptionofthe

Yemeni regime.12

As the Yemeni ship of state lists, Islah now has ample time to consider

whethertoabandonship.

As mentioned previously, many scholars and observers believe Yemen may be fast

approachingfailedstatestatusalongthelinesofSomalia.13

Canitbeavoided? Itiswithinthis

contextthattheroleofIslahwillbeconsideredinthisstudy. Tothatend,theaimofthispaper

willbetoaddressthreeinterconnectedquestionsregardingIslah: (1)Willthepartybeableto


10/96

x

maintain its splitwith the Salih regime andhisGPC? (2)Will thisbreak have the effect of

breakingtheauthoritarianruleofSalihsregime?and(3)Willtheoutcomebethedawnofreal

politicalpluralisminYemen?

Thepaperconsistsoffourchapters. ThefirstchapterwilldealwiththehistoryofIslahup

totheparliamentaryelectionsof2003,coveringawidehistoricalperiodfromIslahsoriginsto

its first true, though tentative, splitwith the regime. The chapterwill describehow Islahs

growingexposuretootherpoliticaltendencies,coupledwiththeregimeseffortstomarginalize

itasapoliticalparty,inevitablypusheditintotheoppositionalcamp.

ChapterTwowill speak to thecurrent stateof theparty,paying specialattention to the

periodafterthesummerof2005whenIslahmadethefatefuldecisiontodecisivelyallywiththe

JMP. MuchofthischaptersfocuswillbeontheJMP,asIslahsabilitytomaintainitssplitwith

theregimeisdirectlyrelatedtothepreservationofthisalliance. Anotherreasonforaddressing

thealliance

as

awhole

is

because

the

constituent

members,

for

the

most

part,

have

been

quite

adeptatcontainingpartydifferenceswhenconsideringthebroader issuesatstake inYemen.

Wewill conclude this chapter by looking at the currentpolitical crisis surrounding the now

postponedparliamentaryelections,scheduled forApril27,2009beforebeingpostponedthis

past February, making clear the dangers to both regime and opposition in what Gregory

Johnsentermsanelectoralgameofchicken.14

ChapterThreewill lookattheperennialchaosthat isYemen. Thechapterwillcontaina

survey of the current crises contributing to the instability of the Salih Regime: political

stalemate,war,secessionism, Islamicradicalism,economicandecologicaldisaster.And itwill


11/96

xi

seektoexplaintherolethatthe IslahledJMPplays inmitigating,orstoking,theseproblems.

Wewill also showhow Islahs relationshipwith theopposition especially in regard to the

instabilityintheSouthhasbenefitedthemthroughexposuretopoliticalproblemstheymay

nothaveconsideredotherwise. Apositiveeffectofthispoliticallearningmaybeanexpanded

politicalsupportbase.

ChapterFourwillcontaintheconclusion. Itwilldemonstratethat,whiletheJMPcoalition

isextremely fractured,15

lessening theirchancesofbreaking theauthoritarian ruleofSalihs

regime; in fact, Islahoffers thebesthope for effecting significantpolitical change in Yemen

today. Asrecenteventsshow,suchasthepostponementofparliamentaryelectionsasaresult

ofunifiedoppositiontotheregimesbusinessasusualapproach,adifferent futuremaybe in

storeforArabiaFelix,onethatmostscholarsareskepticalof;namely,thedawnofrealpolitical

pluralisminYemenwithIslahatthehelm.


12/96

1

CHAPTERONETHEEARLYYEARS

PRELUDETOTHEUNITARYSTATE:

Throughout the 1970s, therewere both ongoing discussions about unifying North and

SouthYemen,aswellaspartisansofeitherregimeseekingtotoppletheother. In1979,soon

after the ascension to the presidency of Ali Abdullah Salih, the southern based National

DemocraticFront (NDF),essentiallyapartofthePDRYsrulingpartysapparatus,16

launched

border skirmishes with the northern regime, in part with widespread if secret support of

northerners inaneffortto forciblyunify thetwocountriesunderthePDRY flag.17

TheNDF

wasultimatelydefeatedasaresultofsupportforSalihbyan informalgroupofconservatives

andIslamistsknownastheIslamicFront.

TheIslamicFrontwasmadeuplargelyofMuslimBrotherhoodmembersandconservative

triballeaders. ItwassupportedbySheikhAbdullahbinHusseinalAhmar,andwassuppliedby

theUnitedStatesviaRiyadhatatimewhentheUnitedStateswaseagertostrengthenrelations

with Saudi Arabia.18

As Schwedler notes in Islam, Democracy, and the Yemeni State, the

willingnessof IslamicFrontmembers to fight for the regimestemmed fromtheirestablished


13/96

2

tiesand their viewof the Souths socialists asa commonenemy. Thearmed struggles also

cemented the Islamic Fronts relationshipwith the Norths President Salih,who had taken

power in 1978.When Salih launched theGPC in 1982, Islamic Frontmembers,whowould

foundIslaheightyearslater,playedimportantroles.19

InTheHighWaterMarkofIslamistPolitics?TheCaseofYemen,AprilLongleysupportsthe

view20thattheGPCwascreated inthe1980sasacatchall,corporatistpartyofthepolitical

centerwiththeabilitytostiflecompetitionbyabsorbingcompetitors.21

Andregardlessof

itscurrent iterationasapoliticalparty, it still remainsan umbrella foravarietyofpolitical

philosophies, andhas traditionallybeen able toeludeopposition partlybecause it canbuy

supportersandpartlybecauseSalih isanexpertatcooptionand inclusion.22

In fact,Salih is

suchasuccessfulauthoritarianruler,thatSheilaCarapicocouldwritethatthetop leadership

inSanaain1995wasvirtuallyidenticaltowhatithadbeenin1985,withtheadditionofonlya

fewselfdeclaredIslamistsandacoupleoftokenproSanaasocialists.23

Around the same time that Salihs regime crystallized, Yemenwas also fastbecoming a

recipient of oil revenues, workers remittances and increased economic aid from abroad.

Looking back, William Burrowes would echo the sentiments of Eva Bellin, who said

governmentswith access to rentsusuallypaid themselves first,24

commenting in theMiddle

EastJournalthatthestatequickly,andforthefirsttime,becameaprincipalsourceofwealth

andprivategain for thewellplacedand fortunate few. Asa result, the systemhasevolved

largely intoa specialvariantofoligarchy,akleptocracy i.e.governmentof,by,and for the

thieves.25


14/96

3

Manyrecipientsofthis largesse,fromconservativetribal leadersto Islamists,wouldsoon

formthepoliticalpartycentraltoourstudy: Islah. AsSarahPhillipsreports,Zaydirepublicans

likeSalihandAhmar[SheikhAbdullah]reliedonSunniMuslims,particularlytheBrotherhood,

tocounterthreatsfromtheformerlyMarxistsouth. Yemenipoliticsarenotreligioussectarian

divisions per se, but are based on a complexweb of tribal, social, religious and politically

expedientalliances.26

President Salih ranNorth Yemen in adecentralizedwaywith the supportof the tribes,

Islamistsand themilitary.27

Asmentioned,SalihsGPCwasmoreofanumbrella forvarious

politicaltrendswithintheYARthanapoliticalpartywithasetideology. ThoughtheGPCwould

begintodevelopalongpartylinesafterunification,thegovernmentoftheNorthwasbasically

anautocraticregimejoiningwithanother,theSouthsYSP, ledbyPresidentAliSalimalBidh,

undertheconditionofatransitiontodemocracy.28

PROMINENTISLAHIS:SheikhAbdullahbinHusseinalAhmarandthealAhmarfamilyhaveplayedaprominent

role in theHistory of Yemen. His fatherHussein BinNasser AlAhmarwas the paramount

sheikhoftheHashid,thestrongestYemenitribalconfederationand,untilthe1950s,alliesof

theImamate. In1959,SheikhHusseinandhissonHamidwereexecutedbyImamAhmedafter

Husseinspearheaded

atribal

alliance

that

failed

to

topple

the

Imam.29

As

Burrowes

relates,

they were executed despite the traditional rules of hospitality and safeconduct for

negotiationsmakingtheHashidleadersand,inparticular,ShaykhAbdullahbitterenemiesof

the Imamate.30

Bythe1960s,SheikhAbdullahnowparamountSheikhoftheHashidhad


15/96

4

risentoprominenceforhisroleintherevolution. In1969hewaselectedtochairtheNational

Council for Yemen Arab Republic; which went on to write the North Yemens permanent

constitution.

WhileSheikhAbdullah lostsomeofhis influence intheearly1970s,heregainedmuchof

hisprominencewhenPresidentSalih came topower in1978. He servedon thePresidents

ConsultativeCouncilfromitsfoundationin1979,andin1982,becameamemberoftheGPCs

PermanentCommitteeuntilYemeniunificationin1990. UponunificationofthetwoYemens,

SheikhAbdullahformedthe Islahparty,and in1993waselectedtoparliamentwherehewas

electedSpeakerinthefirstelectionsofunifiedYemen.HewouldleadbothIslahandparliament

untilhisdeathinDecember2007.

SheikhAbdalMajidalZindani is amajor advocateof radical Islam inYemen. InCairo

duringthe late1950shewasexposedtotheMuslimBrotherhoodandbecame interested in

therelationship

between

science

and

the

Quran,

which

is

often

termed

al

i'jaz

al

'almi,

or

the

scientificwondersoftheQuran.31

Duringthe1970sherosetoprominenceastheheadofthe

state agency responsible for moral guidance and as a founder of the Yemeni Muslim

Brotherhood in North Yemen. He and fellowMuslim brothers were also seized on as a

counterweighttotheNDFaboutthistimebythenpresidentIbrahimMohamedalHamdi,who

appointedalZindaniasGuide.

In1983,ZindaniwasmadetheMinisterofEducation,apositionhedidnotholdlongashe

upsetmanypeople. Itwasunderhistenureandwithhissupport,alongwithSalihandSheikh

Abdullah, that scientific institutes, backed by Saudi funding, opened and began spreading


16/96

5

Sunnismacrossthecountryasacounterweighttothesocialists.32 Marginalizedpoliticallyand

inexilethroughoutthe1980s,hispolitical fortunesrevivedagain inthe1990s whenhewas

persuadedbySalihtoreturnfromSaudiArabia,wherehehadbeenforthegreaterpartof1979

through1993,with thepromiseofa seaton thepowerful fivepersonPresidentialCouncil.33

Uponhisreturn,healsobecametheheadoftheIslamicistwingofIslah.34

AsGregoryJohnsenwrites,Inthepoliticalarena[Zindani] isafrighteningman,whohas

advocatedviolenceanddestructionforthosewhodisagreewithhim.35

Hewasamentorto

OsamabinLaden,whomhemetwhenateacherattheInstitutefortheScientificInimitabilityof

theQuranandSunnah. The institutewasbasedatKingAbdalAzizUniversity inJeddah,and

was thesite fromwhichZindani recruitedSaudisandYemenisto fight inAfghanistanagainst

the Soviets. In 1994, it was his contacts with former AfghanArabs that aided Salih in

defeatingthesouthsattemptsatsecession.

MuhammadQahtan,

Muhammad

al

Yadumi

and

Abdul

Wahab

al

Anisi

represent

the

moderateMuslimBrotherhoodwingwithin Islah. Allthreearepartyintellectualswhooccupy

administrativepositionswithinIslah,andweremostcommonlycitedfortheirpragmatismby

both IslahandnonIslahmembersof the JMP.36

Qahtan isa foundingmemberof Islahand

currentlyleadsitspoliticalofficewhileservingonitsShuraCouncil. MorethanalYadumioral

Anisi,heisnotoriousforhissharpcritiqueofboththeGPCandSalih.

AlYadumi isa formermemberofSalihssecurityapparatuswhowentontobecomethe

firsteditorofalSahwaanewspaperfundedbytheMuslimBrotherhoodatitsfoundationin

1985andcurrentlyIslahspartypaper. HeisalongtimememberofIslahspoliticalbureauwho


17/96

6

wentontoserveasthepartyssecretarygeneraluntilFebruary2007,whenalAnisi,thepartys

firstsecretarygeneral,reassumedtherole.

AlAnisi

was

considered

the

third

of

Islahs

formal

leaders,

after

Sheikhs

Abdullah

and

Zindani. In1995DreschandHaykelwouldwritethathewasregardedatallpointsasenjoying

excellentrelationswiththepresident'sassociates.37

Thisisexemplifiedbythefactthat,when

badly defeated in 1993 parliamentary elections, Salih gave him a seat on the Council of

Ministers. Afterthecivilwarof1994SalihwouldelevatehimtothepostofFirstDeputyPrime

MinisterthehighestposteverheldbyanIslahi.38

Currently,hisclosenesstotheregimeisin

question. InstrumentalintyingIslahtotheJMPalliance,herecentlyfinishedaoneyearterm

asheadoftheJMP.

ISLAHANDTHEREPUBLICOFYEMEN,THEFIRSTFOURYEARS:

SoonaftertheunificationofYemen,therewasaproliferationofnewpoliticalparties: the

unification agreement of the new Republic of Yemen (ROY) lifted the official legal ban on

oppositionparties. Followingthisaction,severalgroupssplitfromtheGPCandformedtheir

own parties.39

Chief among these was Islah. Depending on the source, the party was

comprisedof:1. Intellectualreformist Islamists (or the Yemeni Muslim Brotherhood, personified by

moderates such asAbdulWahab alAnisi), a conservative tribal group (ledby Sheikh

Abdullah), and a conservativeradical salafi group (best personified by the infamous

SheikhAbdalMajidalZindani).40


18/96

7

2. Or an alliance of leading tribalpersonalities, Islamists, and

businessmen.41

Islahwas formedlargelyfrommembersofthe

GPCinanefforttomarginalizetheYSPandgive

a distinct political voice to the GPCs more

religiously inclinedmembers.42

Theywere like

theGPCinsofarastheirpoliticswereastyleof

patronageand

connections

rather

than

of

ideology or of activists as vanguard of the

masses(seesidebar).43

Islah was not and is not the only Islamist

group to form in Yemen upon unification,

thoughtheyarethe largest. Therealsoexisted

radical groups who reject Islahs political

participation, and are best described as

salafiyyin (returning directly to evidence of

scripture): precisely the sort of people others

[incorrectly]tag

as

quintessentially

Islah.44

In

reality,Islahseesitselfastherepresentativeofthemoderatepartofthereligiouscivilsociety

rather than an Islamic movement that aims at implementing its conservative theological

doctrine.45Salafisare,byandlarge,outside Islah. Most Islamistswithinthe Islahpartyare

PATRONAGESalihsregimehastraditionallybeenheldtogetherby

patronage garnered by oil rents. Early on, Salih

recruited traditional tribal leaders and powerful

localinterests

into

asystem

that

[gave]

them

astake

in thestatusquo. Oneofthose tribal leaderswas

SheikhAbdullah,whowas a major stakeholder in

thepatronagenetwork. WiththepurchaseofSheikh

Abdullahssupport,theeffectsofextremistpolitical

Islam were dampened by subsuming it within the

frameworkofthelargerandmoremoderateYemeni

MuslimBrotherhoodfactionwithinIslah.1

This system of patronage, which is pervasive,

includes the selective distribution of benefits and

applicationof

punishments,

granting

a

huge

amount ofpower to the regimewhich extends to

theawardingofallgovernmentjobs. Itisclaimedto

be the biggest obstacle to reform that Yemen

faces.2 Withtheconclusionofthecivilwarin1994,

the regime dismantled court systems in the south

and encouraged the tribalization of problem

resolution there. Thispenetrationconsolidated the

regimes patronagesupported dominance

throughout Yemen. Oil receipts that have funded

thisnetworkuntilnow,however,aredwindling. To

maintaincontrol,

the

regime

will

have

to

find

alternatewaystomaintainitspreeminence.3

1YEMEN:Stateisdeterioratingandcouldfail,OxfordAnalytica

(http://www.oxan.com/display.aspx?ItemID=DB142377;accessed

March31,2009),May1,2008.2SarahPhillips,EvaluatingPoliticalReforminYemen,pg.13.3Janglingnerves,TheEconomist,

(http://www.economist.com/world/mideast

africa/displaystory.cfm?story_id=12342204;accessedMarch31,

2009),October2,2008.


19/96


20/96

9

build, and historically benefited from, political and economic patronage

extending from the regime. In addition,many Islahi tribesmenhave entered

businessthroughgovernmenttiesandmustmaintainallegiancetotheregime

inordertoprotecttheircompanies.Giventheseconnections,manyshaykhsin

Islahsee

their

financial

and

political

fortunes

tied

to

the

regime

as

much

or

morethantoIslah.52

Islahspoliticalprogramwouldcomeintoviewintheleaduptoparliamentaryelectionsin

1993. PredictableMuslimBrotherhoodsloganssuchasIslamistheSolution,andTheQuran

and the Sunna supersede the constitution and the law were a staple, as were slogans

promising the implementation of sharia and the rejection of secularism. Their political

manifestodeclaredsupportforthepeacefultransferofpowerthroughelectionsandfocused

on the centrality of the Islamic concept of Shura.53

In effect, it presented itself as the

conservativepartyoftraditionalvaluesand,whilebasicallyanIslamistpoliticalparty,glossed

over the realdifferenceswithinandbeyond thepartyamongWahhabis,Salafis, theMuslim

Brotherhoodandothertendencies.54

PresidentSalihandhisGPCsupportedthefoundationof Islahasacounterbalancetothe

YSP,whowereseenasthemainthreattotheGPCin1990. Theywerealsoacounterbalanceto

YemensZaydiforcesastheyespousedclassicallySunniideas.55

AsEricWatkinsreports,Islahi

leaderswerediscreetpartnersinSalihsplantodismantletheYSP evenasSalihagreedtothe

mergerofthetwoYemensbasedonsharedpowerbetweentheGPCandYSPandathreeyear

transitionalperiod

leading

to

elections.

Salih

undertook

aseparate

and

secret

relationship

with the fundamentalistalIslahParty,aimedat securing thedemiseofhispoliticalpartners

fromtheSouthandgivinghimfullcontrolofthenewlyfoundedstate.56


21/96

10

Islahwas coled by SheikhAbdullah and Sheikh Zindani. The glue that kept these two

together (Sheikh Abdullah being classified as a cowboy conservative by Sheila Carapico,

Zindani as a doctrinal puritan) was their shared common antipathy to certain traditions

associatedwith the imamate. AlongwithSalih, theywereidentifiedasSaudiclientswho

bothprosperedundertheSalihadministrationanddespisedcommunistsandWesterners.57

Sheikh Abdullahwas seen early on not as an opponent of the president but as someone

sufficiently connectedwith the president to intervene with him,58

while ZindanisMuslim

BrotherhoodhadbeenasactiveasAbdullahsHashidTribalConfederationintheIslamicFront.

ISLAHSEARLYCLASHESWITHTHEYSP:

Withunification Islahpursued anythingbut inclusivity.As Jillian Schwedler relates, Islah

broughttogetherarangeofpoliticalactorsunderthebannerofan Islamistpoliticalparty in

large part to aid the leaders of the former North in defeating the Souths YSP in national

electionsand

thus

diminishing

southern

power

in

postuinification

Yemen.

59

At

their

foundation they were not concerned with democracy at all but with antisecularism and

Islamistrhetoric.60

IslahsattemptstosubverttheYSPpoliticallybeganin1991. Therewasareferendumon

theconstitutionaskingwhethertheshariashouldbethesoleorprincipalsourceoflaw. Islah

hadfavored

the

former

formulation

and,

sensing

defeat,

had

ultimately

called

for

aboycott

of

thereferendum. Inthisparticularinstance,theYSPandimportantelementsoftheGPCclosed

ranksagainst Islah'sclaimsand the languageadoptedwasprincipal.61

What is interesting,

however, is that Islahs argument that the referendumwas undemocratic as therewas no


22/96

11

discussionon itsubstancebutwasmerelya yesor nopropositionwas itsfirstserious

engagementofademocracynarrative,andtheonlyoneforseveralyears.62

Thenext

scuffle

took

place

in

1992

over

Zindanis

scientific

institutes.

As

mentioned

earlier,ZindaniwasinstrumentalinfoundingtheseQuranicschoolsinNorthYemenaboutthe

same timeheorganized theYemeniMuslimBrotherhood.The instituteswereclaimed tobe

frontsofIslamistmilitancybytheYSP. Ascallsforjihadversusthegodlesscommunistsofthe

YSP grew louder from 1990 onwards, the confrontation was finally taken public during

parliamentarydebatein1992.63

The instituteshave theirorigins in the IslamicFront,andwere founded soonafter their

defeat of the NDF in the early 1980s. Many key commanders of the Islamic Front were

subsequentlyrecruited intotheAfghanjihadand,upontheirreturntoYemen,setupschools

similar to those founded in Afghanistan to indoctrinate youth against the Soviets.64

The

proliferationof

these

institutes,

by1987,thereweremorethan1,100 institutes throughout

the country claiming as many as 118,000 students,65

was owed to the fact that Zaydi

republicanslikePresidentSalihand SheikhAbdullahhadreliedonSunniMuslims,particularly

theBrotherhood,tocounterthreatsfromtheformerlyMarxistsouth.66

Inaveryrealsense,

theseSaudifinancedandWahhabicenteredschoolswereturningoutaYemeniTaliban.

Theseinstitutes

also

spread

into

parts

of

the

YAR,

such

as

the

Saada

region,

that

had

only

recentlybeenpenetratedby the republican regime. Saadawaspartof thenorthern Zaydi

tribalareaconsideredthe heartlandoftheoldZaydiregime,andhadremained loyalto the

imamateuntilthebitterend(1970). SalihusedtheseWahhabiinstitutesthereinthe1980s


23/96

12

againstthe[Zaydi]sayyids,someofwhomretainedproimamatesympathiesandtocounter

Zaydiparochialschooling.67

Theseinstitutes

were

suspected

to

be

an

important

contributor

to

the

assassination

campaignagainsttheYSP (acampaignthattargetedmorethan100oftheir leadersbetween

1990and199468). Tomakemattersworse,theROYwasfundingtheseinstitutes. Inessence,

the YSP was a coalition partner in a government that was carrying out an assassination

campaignagainstthem. ItwasonlynaturalthattheYSPwouldpursuegovernmentdefunding

of these institutes, and incredible that the leadersof Islahwouldbecomeenragedover the

possibility and stepup attackson YSPparliamentarians. SheikhAbdullahhimself raised the

specter ofjihad and,when the legislation to defund the institutes passed, the Speaker of

Parliament, who was a member of the YSP, had his home attacked with rocketpropelled

grenades.69

Theinstituteslostgovernmentfundingbutremainedopen.70

Amidstthese

disagreements,

the

first

ever

multi

party

parliamentary

contest

approached.

Sinceunification,theunifiedROYparliamenthadsimplybeentheamalgamationofformerYAR

andPDRYparliaments. April27,199371

andtheprecedingfreeandopendebateonissuesand

ideology,however,wouldmarkthebirthoforganizedmasspoliticsinaregionwherepolitical

powerhas long remained a closelyheld family affair.72

Itwould alsomark the endof the

unificationprocessinYemen.

ItwasinthisspiritintherunuptoelectionsthatIslahheldtheirUnityandPeaceparty

conference, adopting the slogan theQuran and the Sunna supersede the constitution and

[secular]law.73

Theironyofaconferenceonunityandpeaceadoptingsuchasloganwasnot


24/96

13

loston theYSP,whomusthave feltquite skepticalof its intentions amidstan assassination

campaignthatwaskillingmanyprominentYSPmembers.

THE1993PARLIAMENTARYELECTIONS:TheYemenisfacedagargantuantaskinconstructinganelectoralsystemfromscratchin

ordertoholdelections. TheprocesswascarriedoutbyanewlycreatedSupremeElections

Committee(SEC),whichdrewup301equallypopulatedvotingdistrictsandestablishedallthe

proceduresassociatedwiththeelectoralprocess,suchasvoterandcandidateregistration,

campaigning,voting,observationandcounting. SheilaCarapiconotesthatinternational

electionmonitors,journalists,andobserverswereuniformlyimpressed,whilenotingthe

processwasnotwithoutincident. Choosingtoremainoptimistic,shedeemedincidentssuch

asballotstuffing,briberyandgunfireresultingindeathastestimonytoacompetitiveand

pluralistenvironment.74

The positive impact of the 1993 parliamentary elections cannot be overstated; and the

hopefulness of Carapicos article analyzing the event soon thereafter should not be

diminished.75

However,with thebenefitofhindsightandwith somehumorPaulDresch

unveiledthetruenatureofthe1993electoralprocess:

There were certainly irregularities (famously Hamid alAhmar in Hajjah

removedtheballotboxesatgunpoint;theYSPofficetherewasdestroyedby

bazooka fire) but generally the pollingwas conducted fairly. The subtleties

precedingthepollwerecomplex. InseveralplacesGPCandIslahcededplace

one to the other, and vast numbers of independent candidates coalesced,

realignedandsuddenlywithdrew inpatternsspecifictoeachconstituencybut

producinga result inwhichGPCmanagershadconfidencebefore theprocess


25/96

14

started[emphasisadded].76

TheGPCandIslahwereincahoots,andtheirtargetwastheYSP. Notonlydoestheabove

quoteencapsulatethepracticeofcoordination,apracticewherebypoliticalpartiesmake

decisionsonelectedseatsaheadofanelection,butitevidencesthecorruptionofthebody

chargedtooverseetheelectionstheSEC.

AftertheAprilelectionswereoverandthedusthadsettled, itturnedoutthatwhilethe

GPChadgained themostseats farandaway, Islah77

hadnudged theYSP forsecondplace.78

Therehad

also

been

GPC/Islah

coordination

on

more

than

one

third

of

the

301

parliamentary

seats. AsDreschandHaykelwouldwrite,duringthe1993elections,itwassaid,nolessthan

seventyIslahcandidateswithdrewinfavorofGPCcandidates,whilethirtypeopleelectedinthe

name of the GPC were in fact Islah supporters.79

There there occurred a scuffle over

appointments to the 5man presidential council and the apportionment of secretariats of

whichIslahtooksomeincludingtheSecretariatofAwqaf(endowments).

Thebiggestpointofcontention,however,wasoverthemakeupofthepresidentialcouncil

where thepresidentandvicepresidentwerechosenandexecutivepowerwielded. Because

Islah had outpolled the YSP, they demanded a seat on the fiveman council. Prior to the

election, itwascomposedof twoYSPmembersandthreeGPCmembers. Interestingly, Islah

wasgranted

aseat

at

the

expense

of

the

GPC,

and

not

the

YSP,

reconfiguring

the

makeup

to

be

221. InOctober1993SheikhAbdullah,whohadbeenelectedSpeakerofParliament,put

forwardaslateforthepresidentialcouncilwithZindaniastheIslahcandidate. Inparliamentary

voting,ZindaniplacedthirdaftertheGPCcandidatesbutinfrontofbothYSPcandidates,one


26/96

15

ofwhomdidnotreceivesufficientvotes. Obviously,thisdidnotsitwellwiththealBidhand

theYSPasZindaniwasthemostnotoriousradicalwithin Islahandhisnominationcouldhave

easilybeenperceivedasaslapinthefacetotheformerrulersoftheSouth.

Throughoutlate1993andintoearly1994,manyconferenceswereorganizedinaneffortto

resolvetheimpasseoverpowersharing. EffortsbyneutralgroupssuchastheYemeniNational

Dialogue of Political Forces aswell as other conciliatory groups, however,were ultimately

thwartedwiththeassassinationofalBidhssonswhenacompromiseseemedintheoffing. In

early 1994, alBidh took himself toAden andmade the fateful decision to reconstitute the

formerPDRY.80

THE1994CIVILWAR:

Ithasbeensaidthatthecivilwarcanbeexplainedasarejectionofpluralismanddialogue

bybothmilitary leadershipswhoultimatelywanted tomaximize theirdomain,whichmeant

eitherhalfthepowerinunifiedYemenorasecededautonomoussouthernstatetoalBidh,and

totalcontrolofaunifiedYementoSalih.81

Islahwas firmlyfavoredthe totalcontroloption

and,asinthedaysofoldwhentheIslamicFronthadaidedSalihagainsttheNDFintheinfancy

ofhisYARregime,soIslahaidedSalihintheinfancyofhisnewestregime.

Intermittent skirmishing had been occurring since early 1994, but the true war got

underwayonApril27,1994inthecityofAmran. Inacalltoarms,severalIslamistsclaimedthat

tofighttheYSPwasjihad. AbdalWahhabalDaylami,amemberofIslahsoontobecomethe

ROYsMinisterofJustice,issuedafatwadeclaringsocialistskafirandtheirkillingsanctioned.82


27/96

16

BothSheikhAbdullahandZindaniwerescathing intheirdenunciationoftheYSP,andZindani

wassuccessfulinrecruitingmanyAfghanveteransintothefight.83

Themajority

of

Islahi

Islamist

support,

however,

was

moral.

Though

Islamist

auxiliaries

mayhaveprovidedcriticalsupportinsomeinstances,andbeenstoriedtohaveadvancedlike

antsasifblindinthefaceofheavyfire,thetruthisthattheirtotalforcenevernumberedmore

than5,000.84

Thebulkofthefighting,andcasualties,werebornbynortherndraftees.

Withinthreemonths,theYemeniArmyhadtakenAdenandthewarforsecessionwaslost.

AsSanaa

radio

ever

colorful

would

proclaim

on

V

Day,

[Bidh]

and

his

deviant

gang

had

wageredontheirmilitarymachine. Theyhavefoundthemselvesascumdrowninginthemud

oftreasonatwhichallYemenisspit.85

ItwasthusthatIslahhadactedasaproxyofSalihsin

thedestructionoftheYSPasapoliticalopponent. WithalBidhs failure,heandmanyother

topleadersofthepartysoughtasylumoutsideYemenwhileinsidemanytopleadershadbeen

assassinatedover

the

previous

three

years.

As

aresult,

Islah

moved

in

to

take

many

of

the

vacatedYSPSecretariatsandtheYSPasanoppositionpartywouldbeadministeredablow

fromwhichitisonlybeginningtorecover.

The Civil War of 1994 may be seen as a pretext for quickly adopted constitutional

amendments that rescinded many of the progressive reforms allowed since the 1990

unification.86Sarah

Phillips

explains

the

sweeping

nature

of

these

changes:

InSeptember1994,barelytwomonthsafterthefightingceased,constitutional

amendments were passed by a special committee, without a popular

referendum.TheYSPsdefeat in thewarcosttheparty itsparliamentaryveto,

allowingamendmentstobedrawnupbytherulingGPCIslahcoalition.Closeto


28/96

17

half of the original articles in the constitution were amended, and 29 new

articleswere added. The amendments abolished the Presidential Council and

broadened thepowersof thepresident.ThePresidentialCouncil,which in the

1991 constitution was a fivemember body elected by the parliament, was

replacedby

the

Consultative

Council

(Majlis

al

Shura),

whose

59

(now

111)

membersareappointedbythepresident.UnlikethePresidentialCouncilbefore

it,theMajlisalShurawasinitiallyanadvisorybodythatcouldnotissuebinding

resolutions,althoughithassincebeengrantedsomeminorlegislativefunctions.

The legal code of the former South, much of which was quite progressive,

particularlyregardingwomen,wasalsoformallynullified.Furtherconsolidating

power in the executive, the amended constitution allowed the president to

appoint theprimeminister,head theSupreme JudicialCounciloverriding the

constitutionalseparationofpowersanddecreelawswhenparliamentwasnot

in

session.

87

AsSchwedlernoted,therewasasubstantialcoolingdownofthe politicalopening.88

Atthe

same time, there were also postwar midlevel defections from Islah to the GPC,89

quite

possiblywiththeassumptionthatthedaysofpartypoliticswasover.

TheWar also allowed for a reconstituted Political SecurityOrganization that resumed

extrajudicial

detentions

during

the

state

of

emergency

and

which

continued

to

assert

itself

well

afterSalihandtheGPChadconsolidatedruleengagingintheusualArabroundupofregime

criticsduringthe1997elections.90

Responsibilityofthepress,notfreedom,becamethenew

byword,allowingSalihsconsolidatedregimetoforestalltherestorationoftheprivilegesand

toleranceestablishedduringthefouryearliberalinterlude. CivilSocietynowrepresenteda

fragile

but

still

meaningful

defense

against

extra

legal

harassment

by

security

personnel

and

publicprosecutors.91


29/96

18

ISLAHENTERSTHEWILDERNESS:

Salih awardedmany political offices formerly held by the YSP to Islah after thewar as

booty.92

For

their

part,

Islah

used

moderates

to

fill

ministerial

posts

ameaningful

decision

as

itsuggestedtheIslahleadershipsrealizationthattomaximizethepartysinfluence,itneeded

to presentministers thatwould receive bothwide government support aswell as popular

acceptance.93 Thetruthofthematter,however,wasthatfollowingtheYSPsdefeat,theSalih

regimenolongerhadanyneedforIslah.

Illustrativeof

Islahs

marginalization

following

the

civil

war

was

the

award

to

the

party

of

onlyprimarilyserviceministriesas rewardforsupportofaunifiedYemen. Thiswasjustthetype of political opening that represented a closing of political space as the Salih regime

channeled Islahs political participation in fields, serviceministries,whose reformwould be

painfulanddifficult,andthusunpopularwiththecitizenry.94

Theleveloffrustrationoverthe

inabilityto

accomplish

anything

led

to

an

exodus

from

government

of

Islah

ministers

who

felt

theirattemptsatreformhadbeenidentifiedasIslamistbytheGPCinordertobuildresistance

totheirefforts.95

Theflightwascompletebytheendof1996.

Withthe1997parliamentaryelectionsonlyayearout,theGPCannounceditsintentionto

attain themajorityof seats in Parliament.96

This angered Islah greatly,whose rankandfile

memberswere

feeling

increasingly

marginalized.

The

party

responded

by

entering

into

discussionswithYemens firstpoliticalopposition coalition,ofwhich theYSPwas the senior

party, theSupremeCoordinationCouncil forOpposition (SCCO).97

TheMuslimBrotherhood,

whichwasthemoderateIslamistvoicewithinthepartyandranitsinformationarm,eventoyed


30/96

19

with the ideaofboycottingelections. While thepoliticalpowerof important figureswithin

Islahmayhavebeenon the increase, suchasSheikhAbdullah, their risewasowingmore to

theirpersonalclosenesswithSalihandhisregimethanpartyaffiliation.98

While nothing ultimately came of the Islah/SCCO talks themselves, Islah had set a

precedentbypubliclybreaking stepwith theGPC for the first time. Their approach to the

oppositionalsocausedSalihsregimetoallegedlycometoacoordinationdealwithIslahby

whicheachpartywouldagreenottoruncandidatesagainsteachotherincertaindistricts.99

If

thisagreementwaseveranythingmorethanaruse,itwasapretextfortheYSPtoboycott.100

1997wasaconfusingmomentforIslah. Notonlyhadthepartystruggledwiththeideaof

boycotting theelection,butwhen coordinationwith theGPC failed, theyhad signed ajoint

statementof cooperationwith theSCCO. Whilejoining the SCCO,however, Islah stillmade

effortstoretainclosetiestotheGPCinordernottobethrownintothepoliticalwilderness.101

Muchof

this

confusion

was

aresult

of

growing

factionalism

within

the

party

exemplified

by

the

MuslimBrotherhoodledpolicybranchofthepartyengagingwiththeoppositionfromthemid

1990s onward. Simultaneously Islahs leading personalities retained their close relationship

withSalih. Thegrowingincoherencyofthepartywasevidenttoall.102

Asmentionedearlier, Islahwasformed in1990asacombinationoftribesmen, Islamists,

includingSalafis

and

Muslim

Brothers,

and

businessmen.

While

the

core

of

its

ideology

was

drawn up by theMuslim Brotherhood, andwas thereforemoderate, the tribal component,

personifiedbySheikhAbdullah,lentitpoliticalcoverageinthebeginningasaresultofitstiesto

theSalihregime. ThisinnerdiversitywasnotaproblemintheearlydaysofIslah/GPCalliance


31/96

20

againsttheYSP.103

However,theallianceofconservatismthatbroughttriballeaderstogether

withIslamistsunderthetentoftheIslahpartywasstartingtocomeapart.

AsJohnsen

warned

in

The

Election

Yemen

Was

Supposed

to

Have,

as

always

in

Yemen,

it

is

important to remember that,while political parties are not purely ornamental, behindthe

scenesalliancesoftribeandkinshipmeanmuchmorethanparty loyalty.104

Itappearsas if

SheikhAbdullahandthetribalIslahis,whohadbuilt,andbenefitedfrom,awebofpoliticaland

economicpatronageextendingfromtheSalihregime,werecontentwiththestatusquo.105

TheMuslim

Brotherhood

Islahis,

however,

were

not

happy

with

the

status

quo.

While

the

tribal faction within Islah were busy tying themselves as closely as possible to Salih, the

Brotherhoodwas engagedwith formulating party policy. As Schwedler submits in Yemens

AbortedOpening,the Islamists in Islahdidhaveanagenda,albeitdemocraticreformthrough

literacy inserviceofuniversal Islamiceducation.106

Butmoreoften thannot, Islahscentral

bureaucracy[would

announce]

formal

policies

and

positions

that

[were]

directly

contradicted

by the statements of prominent leaders in the party.107

Writing shortly after Yemens

unification in 1990, Former US Ambassador to Yemen Charles Dunbarwrote: the strong

positionSalihhasbuiltforhimselfvisvisthetribes,theinabilityofthesouthernleaderstoact

independently,andthecontradictionsthatbesettheconservativeopposition[emphasisadded]

areundoubtedassetsforthe[Salih]leadership.108

Thisassertionwouldringtrueuntilthemid

2000s.

Islahspoliticalmarginalizationand,ultimately,shifttowardamoreoppositionalrolewith

regardtotheGPCcanthusbedirectlytiedtotheGPCsuccesswithsubstantialIslahaidinits


32/96

21

struggle for domination over the YSP.109

With Islahs progressivemarginalization over the

courseofthe late1990sintotheearly2000s,thefracturednatureofthepartywaslaidbare:

With party leaders contradicting official positions and Muslim Brotherhood members

dominatingpartybureausbutnotpositionsthattied IslahtotheSalih/GPCregime,therewas

bound tobe interparty fordiscord.110

Ultimately, thisdiscordwouldplague Islah tovarying

degreesandinonefashionoranotherfrom1997untilabout2005.

THE1997ELECTIONS:ISLAHCHANGESCOURSE

Withthe

YSP

boycotting,

aright

wing

coalition

went

into

the

1997

elections

virtually

unopposed. However,thoughtheGPCdidntrunGPCcandidates incertaindistricts,theydid

runcandidatesonlyas independentsand Islahwastrounced.111

Theonlycitywhere Islah

mighthavewonamajority,Ta'izz,was likely averted through thisprocessby theGPC. The

upshotwas that the GPC candidateswon 63% of the parliamentary seats, and unofficially

controlledabout

75%.

With

hindsight,

Sheila

Carapico

would

comment

in

2003

that

it

was

theseelectionsthatfirmlymovedIslahintoopposition: TheGPCnoweasilyrubberstamped

anygovernmentproposalincludinganextensionofitsownparliamentarytermofoffice.112

WiththeGPCsdramaticvictoryin1997,therewasnoneedfortheGPCtoformacoalition

government. They offered Islah no cabinet portfolios. And even though Abdullah was

reelectedto

his

speakership

of

the

lower

house,

this

had

more

to

do

with

his

tribal

and

presidentialconnectionsthanhisleadershipofIslah. Besides,AbdullahandZindani,asleaders

of Islah,notoriouslyalignedwiththepartyand itsplatformwhen itsuitedthemwhiletaking

contradictorypartypositionsalmostcasually.113


33/96

22

With Islahs electoral defeat, they became openly critical of the GPC, causing their

businessmenconstituencytomeltawaywiththeirsupport. AsAprilLongleynotes,Islahslowly

lost powerfulmerchant support to the GPC as they, and the tribal tendency in Islah,were

loathe tomove squarely into the oppositional camp. Longley claims the reason behind

businessmenabandoningthepartywasfinanciallymotivatedandthat,regardlessofsimilarities

inideologybetweenthemandtheMuslimBrotherhood,theyjoinedtheGPCtoprotecttheir

investments. Theywentontomakeanassertionthathasbecomequiteprevalent inYemen

today: Chambers of Commerce and prominent businessmen were firmly in Salihs corner

becausetheybelievedaYemenwithoutSalihwouldleadtoviolence,instability,andthelossof

investments.114

Islahincreasinglybegantomoderateitspoliticalagenda. AsLongleyfurtherrelates,Islah

was originally founded as a religiousparty. The party fought the socialists and struggled to

make Sharia the basis of law. Now party leaders speak on issues foreign to their original

charter, suchasdemocracy,human rights,andwomens rights.115

Butmore than that, the

IslamistswereworkingwithformerideologicalenemiessuchasleftistswhichSchwedlertook

tobemorethanjustastrategicaccommodation.116

Thenarrowingofpoliticalopportunity for themajorityof Islahiswascausingawidening

engagementwiththeopposition,confirmingthenotionthatinstitutionalconstraintsstructure

behavior[as]oneofthekeypropositionsof[apoliticalsciencetheoryknownas]theinclusion

moderation hypothesis. According to this logic, groups will begin to cooperatewith even

former enemies when the incentives are strong enough.117

At the same time, Islah was


34/96

23

proving a related theory that beliefs and agendas can evolve over time as political actors

engageinformsofpluralistparticipation.118

Thisideological

moderation,

admittedly

not

uniform

throughout

Islah,

gained

momentum

during the late 1990s with meetings between Islah and YSP leaders at NationalIslamic

ConferencesaswellasworkshopsandjointconsultationsorganizedbytheNationalDemocratic

Institute(NDI)topromotedemocraticvaluesandinstitutions. IthasbeenclaimedthattheNDI

coordinatedthedirecttalksbetween IslahandtheYSPthat ledtotheiralliance.119

Thepoint

howeverisnothowtheywerebroughttogether,butthattheywerebroughttogether. Itisalso

interestingthatIslahsmoderationwastakingplaceoutsidethepowerstructure,leadingJillian

SchwedlertoadjusttheinclusionmoderationdefinitiontoassertthatIdeologicalchangemay

resultnotfromparticipation,inpluralistprocessesperse,butfromengagementwithmultiple

narratives:120

As the 1999 presidential elections approached, the relationship between the

Islahparty

and

the

GPC

had

severely

deteriorated.

Contacts

between

certain

Islah leaderssuchasMuhammadQahtan,theheadofthepoliticalsection,and

secretarygeneralMuhammadYadumiandYSPleaders,notablyJarallahUmar,

thepartysdeputysecretarygeneral,werestillsporadicbutmorefrequent.121

Islah leaderssupportedthepresident in1999,butby2001were inseriousdialoguewith

theYSP. In July2001,SheikhAbdullah signaled that the tribalmembersof thepartywere

unhappyaswell,sayingIslahwasspeakingwiththeoppositioninordertopushthegovernment

backtowardsthedemocraticpath. Byearly2003,Islahhad,togreatextent,movedintothe

oppositioncampandparticipated in the foundingof the JMPwhoselifeand timesare the

subjectofthenextchapter.


35/96

24

CHAPTERTWOTHEMARCHTOWARDSOPPOSITION

THEJMPISBORN:

MuchlikeIslahwasformedbackin1990tocounter,andultimatelyneuter,YSPdominance

intheformerPDRY,sowastheJMPformedtounderminethedominanceoftheGPC. Thechild

ofJarallahOmaroftheYSP,122

asouthernerwho ledthecommandoforcesoftheNDF inthe

north during the late 1970s, Islah was brought into the JMP fold by prominent Muslim

Brotherhood Islahis123

MuhammadalYadumi,AbdulWahabalAnisiandMuhammadQahtan.

Thethird force in forming the JMP isapoliticalscienceteacherandmemberoftheZaydial

Haqq party, Muhammad Abd alMalik alMutawakkil. One of the JMP political platform

ideologues, alMutawakkil characterizes the political problems in Yemen as not a struggle

betweenMarxismandcapitalism,orbetweenPanArabnationalismandstatenationalism,or

between Islamandunbelief,norevenastrugglebetweennorthandsouthorbetweenShafii

andZaydi,

but

between

two

sets

of

values:

values

of

democracy

and

values

of

domination.124

TheYemenioriginsoftheJMPrestwiththeaforementionedpeople,buttheywerefirstput

togetherbyoutsideforces. AsMichaelleBrowersexplains,MutawakkilandJarallahmetatthe


36/96

25

1994NationalIslamic Conference in Beirut, a conference that continues to be held and of

whichMutawakkilhasbeenanorganizer. ItisattheseconferencesthatJarallahalsocameinto

contactwithbothalAnisiandQahtan. Inaddition,theNationalDemocraticInstitute(NDI)has

worked with both Islah and the YSP to promote democratic values and institutions while

holdingworkshopsandjointconsultations. IthasbeenclaimedthattheNDIcoordinatedthe

directtalksbetweenIslahandtheYSPthatledtotheiralliance.125

But itwasntjust themoderate Islahiswhowereseriouslyengaged in reassessing Islahs

relationshipwith the Salih regime. In a BBC interview in July 2001,Abdullah portrayed his

partys relationship with YSP as one of coordination to push the regime back in the

democraticdirection,claiming,forthesakeofdemocracy,weshouldgiveourhelptoallthe

forces that are loyal to democracy.126

ThatAbdullah used the loaded term coordination,

shouldnotbeoverlookednorshouldthefactthatAbdullahhadsaidthat Islahhadmore in

commonwith theGPC than theoppositionjust three yearsearlier. Jillian Schwedlerwould

echoAbdullahsentimentabout thesame time,commentingthatthe firstyearsafterYemeni

unificationhadlookedpromising,butthatthegovernmentcurrentlyresembledtheautocratic

preunificationNorth.127

As 2002 progressed and the parliamentary elections of April 2003 drew nearer, the

coalitionworkedontheirpoliticalvisionforYemen:

The opposition hoped to win seats in the 301member parliament with a

platformcallingforfair,free,ruleboundcontestedelections;policiestoalleviate

Yemen's acute problems with public security, increasing poverty, dire water

shortages and inadequate services; and a rule of law plank calling for the


37/96

26

eradication of corruption, the protection of human rights and rights of free

expression.128

On December 28, 2002, after addressing an audience of several thousand at a closed

conventionat

the

Islah

party

headquarters

in

Sanaa,

Jarallah

was

gunned

down

at

close

range.129

The father of the JMP, at the pinnacle of accomplishment, died en route to the

hospital. ThoughthemotivesandaffiliationsattributedtoJarallahsassassinareunclear,Sheila

Carapicoandothershave commented that fewArab leaderswould toleratea former rebel

commanderspearheadingelectoralopposition.130

TheJMPcoalitionwasformedshortlyafter

Jarallahsassassination,

and

Islah

was

immediately

the

dominant

force.

The

YSP,

the

Populist

NasiristUnityOrganization,theUnionofPopularForcesandAlHaqq,theTruthparty,rounded

outthecoalition.131

Muchliketheparliamentaryelectionsof1993and1997,Islahwentontogainabout20%

ofthepublicvotein2003. WiththedeathoftheJMPfounderjustfourmonthsearlierandin

themiddle

of

an

Islah

convention

it

was

surprising

that

the

coalition

didnt

fracture.

Interestingly, for the first time in parliamentary elections therewas no coordination; the

traditional15%ofthevotethatusuallywenttoindependentswerenowfirmlywiththeGPC.

ISLAHCHOOSESOPPOSITION:

IftheParliamentaryelectionsof2003occurredtoosoonaftertheformationoftheJMPfor

the coalition to properly engage the public,132

the presidential election of 2006, running

concurrentlywithlocalelections,wouldbetheirfirsttest.


38/96

27

Throughout2004andmostof2005,Islahremainedambivalentwithitsloyaltiesregarding

theopposition,ofwhichitwasapart,andtheregime. AsPhillipswrites,manyIslahmembers

stilldidntwanttobeunambiguouslypartoftheopposition,133

and Islah leaderswereclear

that they didnt have capacity to form an alternate government, being reluctant to oppose

Salihsgovernmentinsuchawaythatmighttoppleit.134

Thisstanceledmanytodistrustthem.

THEBEGINNINGOFTHEENDOFTHESALIH/ABDULLAHRELATIONSHIP:

For themost part, this ambivalence came to a head because of a sharp difference of

opinionbetween

Sheikh

Abdullah

and

President

Salih

stemming

from

aproposed

substantial

reductionofthenationalfuelsubsidyinJuly2005. Thesubsidyreductionledtoriotsinallthe

majorcities. Forwhatmayhavebeenthefirsttime,therewasmassiveopencriticismofSalih

inthestreetswithcriesoflaaSanhanbadalyawm,135

togetherwithchargesthatSalihwas

anenemyofGod. MohammedalYadumi, theSecretaryGeneralof the Islahpartyanda

MuslimBrotherhood

member,

saw

his

opening.

As

Phillips

reveals,

Yadumi

told

the

president

thatthepossibilityofanotheralliancebetweenthetwopartieswasnowover. Hereportedly

warnedPresidentSalihthatwhilehemightbeabletoremovesomeofIslahsleaders,theparty

wouldendure.136

The 2005 disintegration of the relationship between Sheikh Abdullah and Salih was a

watershedfor

Islah,

binding

them

closer

to

their

former

ideological

rivals.

Less

than

four

months later, inNovember 2005, The JMP released its platform forpolitical, economic and

social reform. Claiming there are nomore fantasies in theminds of Yemenis about the

catastrophethatiswaitingforthem,theJMPproclaimedtheonlyoptionwastotalreform.137


39/96

28

Thedocumentcalled forreformoftheconstitution,parliament,andjudiciary,aswellasfor

the peaceful rotation ofpower, respect for the law and the constitution, theprevention of

corruption,greater limitationsonthe roleofthemilitaryandsecurityapparatus,civilservice

reforms[and]greaterpopularempowerment.138

Andwhilethedocumentwasanimpressive

account ofwhat needed to be done to right the ship of state, Sarah Phillips identifies the

explicitsplitIslahwasmakingwiththeGPCintheopeningpagesasthetrueslapinthefaceto

Salih:

Leaving aside the question ofwhether the JMP knows how to achieve these

reforms,the

documents

power,

and

probably

the

reason

behind

the

regimes

accusationsoftreasonandconspiracy, lies in itsarticulationofasplitbetween

theopposition,particularly Islah,andtherulingparty.This isasignificantstep,

considering Islahshistoricalplacewithin the regimespatronagenetwork,and

onethatcouldmarkthewillingnessofthepopularIslamistpartytoopposethe

governmentmorecoherently.139

ByDecemberof2005,paradigmaticchangeswereoccurringinIslah. SheikhAbdullahsent

astrongmessagetoSalihthroughhissonHusseinwhowasaGPCMPwarningthePresident

thathewouldconsiderbreakingwiththeGPCtoformanewpartyiftheregimedidnotalterits

policies. Also,theMuslimBrotherhoodmovedtodistancethemselvesfromthe[Islahi]Salafis

byannouncingwomenwouldbetrainedascandidatesforthe2006localelections.140

Inaclear

decisionthatsignaledtherenewedcommitmentof Islahtoopposetheregime,bytheendof

themonthaJMPexecutivecommitteehadbeenformedwithMuhammadQahtanofIslahasits

spokesperson.141By early 2006, Islahs Muslim Brothers had gained ascendance in deciding the partys

political direction. With the exodus of conservative businessmen a decade earlier and the


40/96

29

recentsuccess inmarginalizingtheSalafis,personifiedbyZindani,142

thereremainedonlytwo

majorcontendinggroupswithintheparty:thetribalistsandtheMuslimBrothers. Atthesame

timethetribalgroup,which,accordingtoPhillips,hadenjoyeddisproportionatepowerduring

the 1990s resulting from its relationship with the regime and president, saw their power

diminishing in relation to theMuslim Brotherhood Islahis as a result of the Salih/Abdullah

split.143

With the increasingexclusionof SheikhAbdullah from the informal (patronage) system,

Phillips

believes

Islah

had

to

reach

out

to

the

other

opposition

parties

for

protection.

As

a

result of years of dialoguewith the opposition, this yielded an advantage to themoderate

MuslimBrotherswhilefurthereroding Islahsexclusionarypoliticalideology.144

Asmentioned

previously, therehadbeen a substantial rollback inprogressivepolitical reforms adopted at

unification following the 1994 civilwar. Islahs open rapprochementwith the YSP sent an

importantmessagetosupportersandwouldbesupportersoftheirparty: thenowdominant

tendencywithinthepartywasno longersatisfiedwiththeYemenspoliticalstatusquo.Their

membershipwiththeJMPmeanttheydesiredtopreserveandexpandwhatfewdemocratic

openingsremain.145

THE2006ELECTIONS:

TheGPChadreactedseverelytotheJMPplatform,claimingittobeboilerplatethatmerely

sought todivideYemenis in the leadup toelections. In fact, it seems theSalih regimewas

actuallyworriedthattheJMPmightbesuccessful. GPCofficialsmetindividuallywithleadersof

the opposition parties, and effortsweremade to drive awedge between the coalition by


41/96

30

makingpromisestobothIslahandtheYSP.146

IslahwasofferedcabinetpositionswhiletheYSP

was offered a return of property and offices confiscated after the civil war if they would

abandonthe JMPandcome intoalignmentwiththeGPC. Phillipsassertsthat Islahwrestled

withtheirchoiceuntilonlyfivemonthsbeforeelections,butthenthrewitselfinverypublicly

withtheopposition.147

Theregimeseffortshadfailed.

ButSalihultimatelyhadnoreasontoworry. ApparentlyaidedbysubstantialfraudtheGPC

achieved a resounding victory in local elections.148

In presidential balloting, Salih was

overwhelminglyreturnedtoofficewithmorethan77percentofthevote. Therealsoexisted

factionalism in the JMP thatworked against them,which led the JMP to putmost of their

energies into thepresidentialelection insteadof focusingon the localelections,where they

may have made inroads. To make matters worse, two weeks before the election Sheikh

AbdullahssonHamidberatedSalihinaspeechduringaJMPrallyattendedby300,000forthe

JMPspresidentialcandidate,FaisalOthmanBinShamlan. Itwassoprovocativearallythatthe

specterofviolenceintheeventofaShamlanvictorywasraisedandSheikhAbdullah,whowas

almostcertainlyinvolvedinthisturningupoftheheatontheregime,hadtodiffusethecrisis

byendorsingSalih.149

The JMP losswas staggering. Where they had poured themajority of their resources,

Shamlanhadcomeawaywithonly23percentof thevote. In the localelections they fared

evenworse. ManyYemenischolarssaw littlepositive inthe2006electionsoutcome for the

JMP. Longley claimed it confirmed the oppositions internal weakness and political

immaturity,150

whileBurrowesbelievedtheJMPhadbecomedistractedfromlocalelectionsby


42/96


43/96

32

betweentheJMPandGPChadcollapsedandtheJMPinstitutedaboycottonassociationwith

theSCER.

Inorder

to

restart

the

registration

process

and

hold

elections

on

time,

the

NDI

brokered

the June 18th

Agreementbetween theGPC and JMP (see annex). Amongother things, the

accordaddedtwoJMPmemberstotheSCERbringingthetotalfromseventoninemembers;

apportioned the supervision of election commissions along a 54/46 percent GPC/JMP split;

guaranteedtheneutralityofthestatemedia,militaryandsecurityforces;prohibitedtheuseof

state

facilities

and

mosques

for

the

purpose

of

campaigning;

and

promised

a

thorough

examinationofthevoterlistbybothGPCandJMPlegalteams.157

InhindsightitisclearthattheregimeviewedtheJune18th

Agreementasapretexttodraw

theoppositionback into theprocess. Both theNDIs Reporton the2006 Presidential and

LocalElectionsintheRepublicofYemenandtheEUEOMsYemen2006:FinalReportmake

itplain

that

the

regime

subverted

the

Agreement.

There

was

serious

abuse

and

misuse

of

publicresources,158

securityforce intimidationofoppositionrallies,andpaymentofbonuses

to governmentemployeesjustdaysbefore theelection. In addition,promisesmade to the

opposition intheAgreementthatbothsideswouldworktogethertoaddressseriousflaws in

thevoter listwere ignored. This listwasacknowledgedbytheSCERtohaveat least150,000

duplicationsand

names

of

ineligible

and

underage

voters,

but

was

arbitrarily

amended

withoutinputbytheJMPandinanontransparentmanner. Thepromiseofanelectroniccopy

ofthevoterdatabasebeingmadeavailabletotheJMPwasalsoignored.


44/96

33

Thoughtheelectionmayhavebeengenerallycharacterizedas openandgenuine,there

was a lot ofwork yet to do tomake theprocessmore trustworthy and transparent to the

oppositionandcitizenryatlarge. Asaresult,theEUEOMmade35recommendationsfollowing

the elections to improve the process.159

Both the JMP and GPC agreed to take up these

electoralreformsinadvanceofParliamentaryelectionsscheduledforApril2009.

FOOLMETWICE:

Throughout2007and into2008, theGPCand JMPwere inparliamentarydiscussions to

cometoanunderstandingthatwouldamendtheelectionlawsaswellaschangehowtheSCER

wasconstitutedandbetterdefineitsresponsibilities. Majorproposedchangestotheelection

lawsincludedthestipulationsthatnoindividualshouldbeforcedtocasthisvoteforacertain

nominee, [and that] any civilormilitaryofficialwho is found tousehisauthority to forcea

voterorhisemployeestoworkinfavororagainstanypoliticalnominee,partyororganization,

willbe

tried

according

to

the

stated

punishments

as

well

as

dismissal

from

their

post

position.160 Other principal amendments pursued by the JMP sought to confine the

registrationofvoters to theirplaceofbirthor residenceandguarantee. the impartialityof

publicfinancingandstaterunmediaduringelectioncampaigns.161

Whileelectoralreformdiscussionswereunderway,theterm forthethenSCERmembers

expired. ThoughEUEOMrecommendationscalledfortheappointmentofjudgesasopposed

topresidentialselectiontothecommission,theJMPhadcounterproposeditsformationfrom

parties represented in parliament. This was not an idle proposal, as judgeships were

presidentialappointments.162


45/96

34

ByJuneof2008,theGPCandJMPhadstillfoundnoagreementonhowtoaddressthese

issues. Asaresult,theGPCsoughttobringtheamendmentstothefloorofparliament,where

theprocesswouldhavebeencompromisedbythesheernumberofGPCparliamentarians. In

response, the YSP led a JMP boycott of parliament on June sixth. They did not return to

parliamentuntilamonthlaterandonlyaftertheGPCagreedtosuspendparliamentarydebate

ontheamendmentsuntilagreedtobyallparties.163

ByAugust,andwithelectionsonlyeightmonthsaway, thestrugglebetween the regime

and

the

JMP

reached

a

fever

pitch.

Amidst

GPC

claims

that

they

had

an

agreement

with

the

JMPonelection lawamendmentsand JMPcounterclaims that theyhadnot,164

TheYSP first

staged a parliamentary sitin before again leading the way in another JMP parliamentary

boycottonAugust sixth. This time theboycottwasnotonlyover the stalledparliamentary

process,butincludedJMPcallsforthereleaseofpoliticalprisonersandaresolutiontothecrisis

in theSouth.165

The followingweek,oneof theGPCs most loyalparties, theArabBaath

SocialistParty,defectedfromtheGPCtotheJMP.166

OnAugust18,2008,Parliament finally took thematter toavote. JMPparliamentarians

were present as President Salih had promised the release of political prisoners two days

earlier.167 Using the excuse that the JMP failed toput forth their SCERnominees thatday,

somethingthe

JMP

refused

to

do

as

they

had

consistently

called

for

the

election

laws

to

be

amendedfirst,GPCparliamentarianstooktheopportunitytodefeatallamendments.168 They

then proceeded to confirm the old SCER commissioners in their positions, allowing for the


46/96

35

addition of three JMPmembers as a sop. The JMPwas unified in its condemnation, and

steppeduptheircriticalattacksontheregime.

Assummer

turned

to

fall,

Salih

and

his

regime

were

fruitless

in

their

efforts

to

drive

a

wedgebetweentheJMPmemberpartiesandfindacceptanceinsomecorneroftheopposition

for theiractionsofAugust18th. Inwhatwas seen as aneffortby the regime to split Islah,

ZindanireenteredthespotlightastheheadofanewandhighlycontroversialCommittee

forProtectingVirtueandFightingVice.169

AndPresidentSalih,usingterminologyreminiscent

of

the

1994

civil

war,

excoriated

the

JMP

as

traitors

who

were

involved

in

inciting

a

crisis,

organizingdemonstrationsandsitins,andcallingforsecession [emphasisadded].170

At the

endof September the JMPmadehistory in refusing apresidentialdecree thedecreehad

reappointedformerJMPcommissionerstothenewlyformedSCER,andtheJMPsrefusalwas

thefirsttimethishadeveroccurredinYemen.

ByOctober,

the

JMP

had

decided

to

boycott

the

SCER

voter

registration

process,

set

to

begin the following month, and was considering how they would view the parliamentary

elections. InaYemenPost interviewwithIslahsGeneralSecretaryAbdulWahabalAnesi,al

AnesiwasquotedassayingtheJMPwouldnotboycottelections,butwouldalsonotparticipate

according to criteriadesiredby rulingGPC.171

Withinaweekafter the interview,alAnesi

citing

the

importance

of

elections

in

bringing

political

reform

said

JMP

would

try

to

hold

independentelections,leadingSalehtoappointformerForeignandPrimeMinisterDr.Abdul

KarimalEryaniastheregimesnegotiatorwiththeJMP.172


47/96

36

When the SCERadministered voter registration process began inNovember, therewas

resistance to theprocessacross the country,andnotonlyby the JMP. Asa result, security

forcesarrested JMPsupporters forpeacefulprotestand thehandingoutof literature. Some

voterregistrationcentersclosedduetoalackofturnoutwhileotherswereattacked,onewith

grenades.173

Intribaldistricts,electioncommitteeswere forcedoutnotbecauseofthe JMP,

butbecauseofgovernmentfailureregardingdevelopment.

Butthesituation[was]worseningandconfrontationsbetweenthegovernments

forcesanddemonstrators,believedtobepushedbyJMP,claimedlivesinsome

provinces,inadditiontosomanyinjuries. SheikhHamidalAhmar[whosefather

SheikhAbdullah

had

died

in

late

December

2007]

addressed

tens

of

thousands

of

peoplesayingthattheJMPandYemenipeople[were]strugglingforchange.He

accusedtheregimeofrevoltingagainstdemocracy[by]usingitsmajorityinthe

Parliament lastAugust,when itrefusedsomeamendmentstotheelection law

andformedthe[SCER]withouttheapprovalofJMPsblocsintheParliament.174

HamidalAhmarwentontosaythattheprotestsagainsttheSCERcommitteeswerejustthe

beginning,andthattheJMPwoulduseallpossiblemeanstostoptheillegalelections.175

As the protests increased, Parliament extended local council terms, cancelling local

elections thathadbeen scheduled for samedayasparliamentaryelections.176

If the regime

thoughttheirdecisionwoulddampendemonstrations,theyweremistaken.

OnNovember 27th

what isnow characterizedby theopposition as bloodyThursday,

awakeningThursday,orthe November Intifada,177

governmentsecurityforcesandpolice in

SanaaopenedfireonthousandsofprotesterscallingforaboycottoftheApril2009elections.

Reporters on the scenewere beaten by troops using batons andweapon butts.178

One

witness claimed that government troops opened fire and threw bricks and tear gas at the


48/96

37

protest[ors],prompting a stampede,which caused someof theinjuries.179

When itwasall

over,dozenswerehurt,atleastthreecritically.

Inmid

January,

aEuropean

delegation

arrived

in

Yemen

to

mediate

between

GPC

and

JMP.

Their chief goal was ostensibly to reconstruct the SCER and engage the opposition in its

operation,and theywouldseektodelay theelections forsomemonths inorder todoso.180

ButtheJMPhadalreadybeenfooledbyjustsuchatacticbackinJune2006,andtheywerent

abouttoletithappenagain. Bytheendofthemonth,sourcesleakedtotheYemenPostin

anarticleprovocativelyentitledEUMission:WewillnotObserveElections ifOppositionnot

Involvedthat themissionwasworkingtowardsdelayingtheelectionsforoneyearsothat

thedemandsofoppositionpartiescouldbemetduringthisperiod. Themissionwasalsoclear

withtheregimethattheywouldnotsendobserversforonesidedelections.181

ByearlyFebruary,theregimelauncheditselfonalastditchoffensivetoforceitswillupon

theopposition

and

hold

elections

on

time

and

according

to

their

political

scheme.

In

one

interview,theHeadofthePoliticalOfficeatGPC,AbdullahAhmedGhanim,accused Islahand

theYSPofembracingterroristgroupstopromotetheirextremistideas.182

Oneofthesegroups,

whichwe shall address inChapterThree,were theHouthis in Saadaprovince,whosemost

recent rebellion against the government dated back to the summer of 2004. Days later,

Ghanimwonderedaloud inanother interview,Whydothosepartieshighlight [the]nameof

AlQaeda inYemenand theirunitywithotherAlQaedacomrades inSaudiArabia? Healso

contendedthattheJMPsoughttocreateanewalliancethatmightinvolveinadditiontoJMP

member parties, Houthi rebels in Sanaa, those who instigate secession in southern


49/96

38

governorates,and representativesofextremistand terroristcurrents thathave tieswith the

IslahParty.183

Asweeping,ifnotanincrediblyfarreaching,condemnationoftheJMP.

Intandem

with

their

slur

campaign,

the

regime

gave

ground.

Claiming

that

everything

is

allright[andthat]thecrisis[was]onlyintheeyeofthebeholder,184

theGPCaffirmedthatthe

elections would still go off in April, and that the parliament was readying to revote the

amendmentsdefeatedbackinAugust:185

anaffirmationtheJMPignoredaspoliticalposturing.

TheJMPsmelledblood. Theirunityincrisis(datingbacktothepreviousJune)together

withthe

threat

of

aunified

opposition

boycott

erased

more

than

adecade

of

defeat

and

exploitationat thehandsofthe regime. Withthe implicitsupportof internationalobservers

whorefusedtomonitoronesidedelections,theydidnthavelongtowait.OnFebruary24th,a

deal brokered by the EU delegation, along with members from the NDI, postponed the

electionsfortwoyears. SoonafterParliamentvoted intheaffirmativetoallowthetwoyear

postponement,Anisi

announced

his

support

for

elections

but

said

it

had

been

impossible

to

holdthemwhilethecrisesinbothnorthandsouthYemenpersisted,implicitlylayingthedelay

attheGPCsdoorstep.186

SheikhHamidAlAhmar,aleadingmemberofIslahPartyandakey

supporterofJMP,wasmoreequivocal. Sayingthepostponementwasapositivesteptowards

improving national dialogue on important political issues, he called on all Yemenis to get

involved in solving their political problems, admitting that the JMP call for dialogue is a

confessionofthefactthat[the]oppositionpartiesaloneareincapable[ofhandling]thecurrent

crisis.187 Salihhadfinallyblinkedfirst. Itwasthedawnforanewtypeofoppositionpoliticsin

Yemen.188.


50/96

39

ThesuccessoftheJMPdidnotoccurdivorcedofothercalamitiesthateithererodedthe

regimesabilitytosuccessfullyadministerthestate,ormadeevidenttheir inability,or lackof

desire, tosuccessfully resolvepoliticalconflict. Inmanycases, JMPgoalsand these troubles

weremutually reinforcing. Beforewemove on to our conclusion, then, it is important to

addressthemanyproblemsapartfromtheJMPthattheSalihregimefaces,understandingthat

the regimehas effectively received a twoyear reprieve as a resultof thepostponement of

parliamentaryelections. Untilnow,Salihhasalwaysbeenveryeffectiveat findingaway to

balancefactionsagainsteachotherinordertoprolonghisrule. Thequestionnowis: Doestwo

yearsgivehimenoughtimetofindhiswaybacktothetop?


51/96

40

CHAPTERTHREEYEMENSPERENNIALCHAOS

Mostnationalnewspapers,whenreflectingonthepastyearofeventsintheircountryand

constructingatop

10,

usually

are

not

as

grim

as

the

Yemen

Post

was

on

December

29,

2008.

Theriseinterroristattacks,warinSaada,naturaldisastersinHadramaut,protestinthesouth,

and stalled negotiations between the GPC and JMP made the top 5; while the rise in

kidnapping, the drop in oil prices and threats to the diminishing Yemeni Jewish community

rounded out a somber picture.189

Bitterly, the paperwould reiteratewhat has become a

mantraof

the

regime:

however,

GPC

leaderships

stress

that

the

crisis

is

only

in

the

mind

of

thosewhospeakabout itsexistence.190

WiththeYemenTimesalsoreportingtheregimeas

sayingeverything isallright [and that] thecrisis isonly in theeyeof thebeholder,191

they

identifiedwar inthenorthandtroubles inthesouthasroundingoutatriumvirateofpolitical

obstacles,alongwiththeJMP,thatwilldominatethecountryspoliticalspherein2009.192

ECOLOGICALDISASTERANDTHESCARCITYOFNATURALRESOURCES:OnOctober24,2008,catastrophicflashfloodswereunleashedthroughouttheHadramaut

following three days of heavy rains. More than 180 people were killed and 20,000 left


52/96

41

homeless after mud houses were washed away by 30 hours of heavy rain.193

In the

Hadramaut Valley, close to 100,000 acres of farmlandwas swept away. According to the

YemeniAgriculturalMinistry,thedestructionincluded570,857palmtrees,5,239lemontrees,

35,819otherfruittrees,and66,680beehives.194

Thetopsoilwasalsowashedaway, leading

agricultural officials to predict things would take between five and eight years to rectify

themselves.

Thisdisaster isrepresentativeofaloomingprobleminacountrywhere40percentofthe

populace isalreadyundernourishedandwhichcurrently importsabout80percentof itsfood

needs.195

Whileinternationalagencieshavesteppedintofillthefoodgapforthetimebeing,

foodsecurityhasyettobeaddressed inearnestby theregime,whichrelieson itsdwindling

income fromoil to import thebulkof the countrys food. Asnational income fromoil and

agriculturecontinuetoplummet,andseveredroughtreducesarablelandtoonlythreepercent

ofthecountry,Yemensstagnanteconomy[truly]offersatroublingprospect.

Totop itoff,Yemenfaceswidespreadwaterscarcityandsoildepletionduetoextensive

cultivationofthenarcoticqat.196

TheWorldBanksmostrecentMENADevelopmentReport

observesthat:

Yemenisoneofthemostwaterscarcecountriesintheworld;percapita,ithas

nomore than2percentof theworldsaverage.Agricultureemploys3million

peopleout

of

aworkforce

of

5.8

million,

and

uses

[95.3]

percent

of

water

supplies. Overabstraction of groundwater encouraged by fuel subsidies and

demand for themildlynarcoticcropqathadcreatedanacute firstlevelwater

availabilitycrisis.Whileestimatesvary,itisbelievedthatinmanyofthehighland

basins,where a significant share of the population is concentrated, stocks of

waterareatcrisislevels,andsomevillagesarealreadybeingabandoned.197


53/96

42

Plainly stated, food and water security represent a huge problem for Yemen. In the

summerof2008itwasnotedthatagricultureaccountedfortheincomeofnearly75percentof

thepopulationbetween2000and2005comprising21percentofGDPandcloseto60percent

ofYemensnonoilexports. Agriculture,however,islosingground. Muchofthisretreatisthe

result ofwater scarcity, the insufficient public investment in the sector, and the growing

cultivationofwater intensive crops suchasqat198

anevergreen shrubwithnonutritional

benefitwhoseleavesaresaidtoreduceappetite,sharpenthesensesandalleviatefatiguewhen

chewed.

Theclarioncalltoreassesswatersustainabilityseemstobefallingondeafears,however.

TheWorldBankhasbeenreportingforyearsthatwatersustainabilitystartedtoworseninthe

1970swiththediggingofdeeptubewellsforbothdrinkingandagriculturalusewhichledtoa

substantialdepletionofgroundwater.199

Thegroupalsoreportedmorethantwodecadesago

that8090percentofallnewwellsbeingboredintheHighlandswereusedfortheproduction

of qat.200

If some of the more liberal estimates are true, then almost 90 percent of all

groundwaterandat least36percentof totalwater resources inYemenarebeingexpended

annuallyonqatcrops.201

Withagricultureaccounting for the incomeofnearly75percentof

thepopulation,itisintheqatmarketthatthemajorityofYemeniworkersmaketheirliving.

Another natural resource at risk, and one tied into southern grievances, is oil. Since

unification,oilhasgreasedthewheelsoftheregimespatronagearrangement. Ithasbound

thetribes,oppositionpoliticians,businessmenandreligiousextremistsintoawebofpersonal

loyalty,202

whileprolongingSalihsreignthroughthewarpingofpartypolitics. Inrecentyears


54/96

43

therehasbeenasubstantialdeclineinYemenioilproductionfromahighofalmost450,000

barrels per day (bpd) in 2002, to an estimated average of about 320,000 in 2008. This

Political Islam in Yemen: Whither the Islah Party?

Documents

Transcript of Political Islam in Yemen: Whither the Islah Party?