3

Political Determinants of Regionalism in the

Asia-Pacific in Post Cold War Era

The old assumptions that shaped the political-security relations among

the Asia-Pacific countries during the cold war period, have undergone sea-

change with the end of it. It has created mixed responses within the region.

The ASEAN Standing Committee in its Executive Summary stateq that

"ASEAN moved to a higher plane of political and security cooperation as it

began to be involved in the evolution of post cold war security dialogue in

the region."1 On the contrary, there exists another school of analysts who

believe, that the virtual disappearClflce of the Soviet bloc has led to the

emergence of a highly fluid and indeterminate security environment, marked

by rapid acquisition of improved military capabilities in the Asia-Pacific.

Like in Europe, in this region too, the end of cold war has weakened the

solidarity formed earlier in response to a commonly perceived threat. But,

unlike Europe, however, "perceptions of potential threat are focussed on

others within the same set of countries that are putative participants m

cooperative security arrangements. "2 This situation has produced a

seemingly odd result that the Asian-Pacific countries call for continued

I. 'Executive Summary'; Annual Report of the ASEAN Standing Committee 1992-93, ASEAN Secretariat (Jakarta, n.d.) p. 1.

2. Edward A. Olsen, "A New American Strategy in Asia?", Asian Survey, vol. XXXI, no. 12, December 1991, p. 1145.

48

American deployment in the region as an externally imposed constraint on

their own conflictual tendencies and actions. In the words of one

Singaporean diplomat, Tommy Koh, "In no small way, America's presence

in the region keeps Asians from provoking fights with ASEANs.3 Similarly,

Indonesia's Foreign Minister) Ali Alatas declared, that the new global '\

security environment which· had emerged after the cold war was less

predictable and was marked by fluidity and instability .4

However, all these togetherly indicate that multilateralism, in both the

security and economic realm, has come to dominate the agenda of the Asia-

Pacific conferences. There is also an emerging consensus that in some areas

instability characterises the present security situations.

Concept of Security in the Post Cold War Asia-Pacific Region

In the post cold war world, security has become less of a military

based attribute and more of a socially based one.5 Therefore, the Asia-

Pacific countries have made a coordinated effort to chart out regional

3. Japan Times (Tokyo), 27 May 1995.

4. ''The Emerging Security Environment in East Asia and the Pacific: An ASEAN Perspective", Address of H.E. Ali Alatas before the Nus Society, Singapore on 28 October 1992 (Pamphlet).

5. T. B. Miller, Changing Strategic Perceptions in South-east Asia (London, 1991), p. 123.

49

policies on this basis. Maintenance of a stable system of deterrence against

any nuclear threat has become the main thrust of regionalism in the Asia­

Pacific during this period. Because of several factors like, the vast size of the

region, the diversity of the interests of its states, the relatively local nature of

their security concerns and lack of cohesion across the region as a whole,

any kind of comprehensive security structure seems inappropriate. Hence,

the approach has become. sub-regional, mainly working through the

established bodies for cooperation like the ASEAN, the South Pacific Forum

(SPF) and also developing other new networks for consultation.

Lower level of security issues certainly influence the ASEAN

cooperation, but do not have the capacity to affect overall regional security.

They may stimulate suspicion between the ASEAN neighbours, making

security cooperation more difficult to achieve and preventing the

development of an ASEAN · multilateralism. Intensified susp1c10n can be

reflected in arms purchases or in defence policies directed against

neighbours which may contribute to a vicious circle. In the worst scenario,

minor issues affecting intra-ASEAN relations or ASEAN relations with

50

neighbours may escalate into conflict which may reqmre international

attention.6

The danger of a conventional military conflict has been reduced as a

consequence of the ending of cold war. The security of the region has

improved greatly, thanks to the termination of superpower confrontation and

the defusing of the Cambodian conflict. The main uncertainty facing the

region relates to the creation of a new equilibrium between the U.S., Japan,

China and the region. The new equilibrium has also to do with China's

potential growth into a great power and Japan's close relations with South

Korea.

Cooperative security has become the key word in the Asia-Pacific

strategic framework. It means the common security of states to be promoted

or obtained through their cooperative efforts. To put it in other words,

cooperation between states in various fields including more particularly in

the security field is likely to ~nhance their common security.7 Nevertheless,

6. Leszek Buszynski, "Post Cold War Security in the ASEAN Region", in Garry Klintworth, ed., Asia-Pacific Security : Less Uncertainty, New Opportunities? (New York, 1996), pp. 125-126.

7. J. Soedjati Djiwandono, "Cooperative Security in the Asia-Pacific Region : An ASEAN Perspective", The Indonesian Quarterly, vol. XXII, no. 3, Third Quarter 1994, p. 205.

51

it is not a new concept on either bilateral or multilateral basis. The Sino­

Vietnamese Treaty of Mutual Defence and Security of 1978, and bilateral

security and defence arrangements between the U.S. respectively with the

Thailand and the Philippines during the cold war, were existing earlier. The

multilateral security cooperation took the form of the SEATO (South East

Asian Treaty Organisation) and FPDA (Five Powers Defence Arrangement)

: which is an agreement to consult if the security of either Malaysia or

Singapore is threatened, is continuing till date involving Great Britain,

Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia and Singapore. However, in the post cold

war period the concept has been renovated keeping in view two basic

premises, (i) minimum interference of external great powers ; and (ii)

multilateral approach towards security cooperation.8

The Old and New Regionalism-A Comparison

The end of cold war renewed the interest in regionalism. The new

regionalism embodies the principle of inclusiveness, namely, the inclusion

of the very sources of uncertainty (or potential threats) themselves in the

arrangements concerned. It is further noted that the new regionalism was

market driven instead of politically driven and the function of new

8. ibid., pp. 206-7.

52

regionalism was to deal with uncertainty and to promote confidence. There

is also a shift from alliance formation and signing of military pacts to

formation of institutions with a loosely structured framework. 9 In a further

attempt to distinguish the new regionalism from the previous one, Norman

Palmer has argued that the new regionalism differs in scope, character and

purpose. The new regionalism, he asserts, is widespread and does not

concentrate in Europe only as was the case of old regionalism. A clear

manifestation of it is the formation of North American Free Trade

Agreement (NAFT A) and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC).

According to Palmer, the spread of regionalism to the North America and

the Asia-Pacific too reflects the globalisation of world diplomacy as

territories formerly under European colonial powers gained their

independence and assumed their place in international relations. Secondly, it

also reflects the gradual shift on the focus of the world geo-political balance

from the traditional Euro-centric view to the North America and the Asia-

Pacific. As a consequence of these developments, the Asia-Pacific has

become the new focus of international diplomacy. Moreover,

9. Hadi Soesastro, ed., ASEAN in a Changed Regional and International Political Economy (Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 1995) See Introduction .

53

these developments were fuelled by the remarkable economic performances

of the Asia-Pacific countries in the past decades. 10

After the end of cold war, the new threats of international security

derive less from great power tension and more from nationalist aspirations,

ethnic conflicts and localised animosities. While the threat of major nuclear

war has diminished, the dangers of nuclear proliferation continue to grow

and the need for effective international proliferation safeguards has become

more urgent than ever. 11

ASEAN Solidarity in Post Cold War Era

The South-east Asian power structure has undergone drastic changes

consequent upon the withdrawal of the U.S. military bases from the

Philippines and Soviet military presence from the Camh Ran Bay of

Vietnam. 12 It has contributed greatly to the promotion of stability and

regional cooperation. Now, the ASEAN is responding to the changes in

the international situation following the end of cold war.

10. Norman Palmer, The New Regionalism in Asia and Pacific (Lexington, 1991), pp. 50-54.

11. Insight, vol. 5, no. 3, 25 March 1996, p. 2.

12. Gennady Chufrin, "The USSR and Asia in 1991 : Domestic Priorities Prevail", Asian Survey, vol. XXXII, no. 1, January 1992, pp. 1264-66.

54

In January 1992, the ASEAN held its fourth Summit Meeting at

Singapore where the leaders agreed to the expansion of relations with Indo-

China and the strengthening of political and security dialogue through the

ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conferences (PMCs). It was declared that "the

ASEAN has made major strides in building cooperative ties with states of

the Pacific region and shall continue to accord them high priority". 13 In the

. economic field, they also agreed to Strengthen regional economic

cooperation through the establishment of the ASEAN Free Trade Area

(AFT A). 14 Upon invitation by the ASEAN, the foreign Ministers of China,

Russia, Vietnam and Laos took part in the 25th Foreign Ministers Meeting

(AMM) held in Manila in July 1992. 15 This marked the beginning of a new

phase of the ASEAN as almost all the cold war adversaries were

incorporated in the Association as participants of the constructive dialogue

mechanism. The ASEAN, thus has become an important stabilising factor in

the Asia-Pacific region. The Manila AMM in July 1992 was held as the first

13. n. 1, p. 5.

14. The AFTA Council was established by the Fourth Summit to supervise, coordinate and review the implementation of the Common Effective Preferential Tariff Scheme (CEPT); ibid ; p. 7.

15. ibid., p.6.

55

security dialogue between t~em and it produced among other things 'the

Declaration on the South China Sea' .16

As a further step in strengthening the PMC process, a Senior Officials

Meeting (ASEAN-SOM) for the ASEAN-PMC was held on 20-21 May

1993 in S-ingapore for the first time. Senior officials from the ASEAN,

Australia, New Zealand, the U.S., and the Republic of Korea participated in

this multilateral political and security consultations. The meeting agreed to

hold consultations at least once a year. A work program was adopted by the

senior officials t-o guide their future activities. 17

In the following year, at the Singapore AMM held in July 1993, the

formation of the ARF was agreed upon. 18 The ARF was finally launched in

Bangkok on 25 July 1994. It was a move which signified the agreement of

the ASEAN Members and all major players in the region to help maintain

stability and growth not only in the South-east Asia, but in the Asia-Pacific

16. During the 25th AMM, the ASEAN Foreign Ministers issued the ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea urging parties to the Spartly Island issue "to apply the principles contained in the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in South-east Asia as the basis for establishing a code of international conduct over the South China Sea " ~

ibid., p.6.

17. ibid.,p.5.

18. n.l (for the year 1993-94), p. 8.

56

region as a whole. In the first meeting of the ARF, it was stated that it is a

move in accordance with the Singapore Declaration of ASEAN (Fourth

Summit) whereby, the ASEAN Heads of State and Government proclaimed

their intent to intensify ASEAN's external dialogues in political and security

matters as a means of building cooperative ties with states in the Asia-

Pacific Region. 19 In the Annual Meeting of the ASEAN Foreign Ministers

held in July 1994, Vietnam's application was considered. Vietnam was

welcomed as the seventh Member of the ASEAN at the 28th ASEAN-AMM

held in Bandar Seri Begawan (Brunei) from 29 July 1995. At the admission

ceremony of Vietnam to the ASEAN, Indonesian Foreign Affairs Minister :J

Ali Alatas said :

"The declaration signed today not only formalises Vietnam's admission but also signifies Vietnam's solemn commitment to subscribe and to accede to all the declarations and treaties adopted by A SEAN, including the 196 7 Bangkok Declaration, the 1971 ZO PEAN Declaration, the 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in South-east Asia and the Declaration of ASEAN Concord, as well as the Framework Agreement on Enhancing ASEAN Economic Cooperation

19. Chairman's Statement, 1st Meeting of the ARF, Bangkok, Thailand, 25 July 1994, Twenty Seventh ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, ASEAN Regional Forum, and Post Ministerial Conferences with Dialogue Partners, Bangkok -1994, published by ASEAN Secretarial, (Jakarta, 1994), p. 61.

57

and the Agreement on the CEPT Scheme for the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFT A)."20

After remaining in isolation under military rule since its take over in

March 1962, Myanmar has· also started integrating itself politically and

economically with the rest of South-east Asia. The ASEAN has also opted

for 'constructive engagement' with Myanmar and felt that improvements

could be brought about not by isolating the regime but by engaging

politically and through economic interactions. In 1994 AMM, Vietnam and

Laos had attended in the capacity of observers, while Myamnar was given

the 'guest of the host country' status?1

On 23rd July 1997 , a d~y before the 30th Annual Meeting of the AMM

at Kuala Lumpur, Myanmar and Laos have been formally admitted as

members of the A SEAN and its total Membership increased to nine. On 1Oth

July 1997, it was announced that Cambodian Membership, which had been

approved alongside that of Myanmar and Laos at a meeting of the ASEAN

20. Speech of Ali Alatas, Twenty Eighth AMM, ARF and PMCs with Dialogue Partners, Brunei Darussalam-1995, ASEAN Secretariat (Jakarta, 1995).

21. Keynote Address by Mr. Chuan Leek Pai, Prime Minister of Thailand on 22 July 1994, Twenty Seventh AMM, ARF and PMCs with Dialogue Partners, Bangkok-1994, ASEAN secretariat release (Jakarta, 1994), p. 1.

58

Foreign Ministers in May 1997, had been delayed pending a settlement of

the internal conflict. 22 The ASEAN expressed 'regret' that Cambodia could

not be admitted and hoped that a peaceful solution of the present crisis

would be soon found out, thereby enabling the ASEAN to fulfill the vision

of an 'ASEAN-1 0' at the earliest. 23

On the occasion of joining the ASEAN, Vietnam's Deputy Foreign

Minister Le Mai said, "Hanoi joins for the first time a regional grouping of

countries which have different socio-political systems and ideologies".24

Vietnam has pursued a national policy of renovation (Doi Moi), it has re-

centred its foreign policy and systematically eliminated the sources of

22. on 5-6 July 1997 a coup had taken place in Cambodia in which second Prime Minister Hun Sen had ousted the first Prime Minister Norodom Ranaridh ; this coup was condemned by the ASEAN and it was decided, that Cambodian Membership of the Organisation, originally scheduled for 23 July 1997, was indefinitely deferred. The A SEAN continued to recognise Ranaridh as co-premier and sent a diplomatic mission to Beijing, headed by the Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas to meet with king Norodom Sihanouk and to find out a solution. Keesings Record of World Events (1997), p. 41734.

23. ibid.,p.41777.

24 Le Mai, quoted in Allan E. Goodman, "Vietnam and ASEAN : Who would have Thought it Possible", Asian Survey, Vol. XXXVI, no.6, June 1996, p. 594.

59

confrontation that complicated relations with all the ASEAN states in the

1980s.25

The enlargement of the ASEAN is not an isolated event. While the

end of cold war has not resulted in the advent of new world order, it has

focussed attention on the importance and dynamics of regional economic

and political developments. In a state system increasingly characterised by

the declining power of government to control events especially in the

econoq1ic and social areas, even the so called great powers no longer possess

the ability to project policies and values that they enjoyed during most of the

century.26 Consequently, most states are becoming part of an ever expanding

web of regional networks that enhance their bargaining power in global

parlance.27

The agenda for the ASEAN-PMC features varwus confidence

building measures to increase military transparency, i.e. notification of

military excercises, exchanges of observers of non-sensitive intelligence

25. ibid., p. 595.

26. Kenneth Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics", International Security, no. 48, Fall 1993, p. 44.

27. Kenichi Omhae, "The Rise of the Region State", Foreign Affairs, Spring 1993, p. 78.

60

and thereby, to reduce the chances of miscalculations of capabilities and

misperceptions of intent. More substantive issues such as arms proliferation

and control and various regional conflicts are only discussed. But, there is

absence of any sort of institutional mechanism to resolve these issues. 28

Afterwards, the ASEAN-PMC was supplemented by the Council for

Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP), consisting of

government officials, academics and think-tank leaders acting in a private

capacity to serve as a working level group providing research support to the

ASEAN-PMC. The CSCAP was established in June 1993.29 The CSCAP is

a 'Track Two' Forum and parallel to the ARF and provides ARF with

inputs. A link between 'Track one' and 'Track Two' activities is maintained

through the Chairman of the ASEAN Standing Committee. It is in this sense

that the ARF combines the advantages of the official or governmental and

informal or non-governmental methods of functioning. Since the advent of

28. David P. Rapkin, "Leadership and Cooperative Institutions in the Asia-Pacific", in Andrew Mack and John Ravenhill, eds., Pacific Cooperation : Building Economic and Security Regimes in the Asia­Pacific Region (Canberra, 1994), p. 117.

29. n. 1, p. 63.

61

the ARF, however, these 'Track Two' activities have enormously

. d 30 mcrease .

Within the ASEAN, the domestic insurgencies, which were once the

central focus of military concern, have mostly disappeared. Most states have

established normal diplomatic relations with China. In spite of these

improvements in the political environment, there is an apparent paradox that

as perceived threats decline, _the ASEAN defence budgets have been rising

rapidly. Source of the concern for the ASEAN defence planners lies in the

Japanese rearmament. "There is an obvious parallel here between ASEAN's

concern about Japan, and European concerns about a militarily resurgent

Germany.'.J1

In order to address the exigencies of the post-cold war era, there

emerged several proposals concerning confidence and security building

measures (CSBMS) for the region. One such was Australian Foreign

Minister, Gareth Evans' ambitious proposal for a Conference on Security

and Cooperation in Asia (CSCA) floated in July 1990 at Jakarta AMM.

30. Yen Foong Khong, "Making Bricks Without Straw m the Asia­Pacific", Pacific Review, vol. 10, no. 2, 1997, p. 292.

31 . Andrew Mack, "After the Cold war and Gulf war : Prospects for Security in the Asia-Pacific", Working Paper no. 1, 1992 (Deptt. of International Relations\ RSPAS, ANU, Canberra, 1992), p.5.

62

According to Gareth Evans, this would help building "confidence and .

patterns of cooperation not only between old friends but also between old

adversaries. ,,32 A similar suggestion for a somewhat smaller CSCA had also

been made earlier in 1986 by Mikhail Gorbachev in his Vladivostok

speech.33

Recent events suggest that the ASEAN countries are well advancing

towards creation of a region wide cooperative security system, in order to

adapt themselves to the emerging trends of new regionalism. However, such

expansion is not free from major disadvantages. The potential costs and

benefits of the ASEAN after its enlargement are given below in a tabular

form.

32. Speech of Gareth Evans, delivered at the "Conference on Security and Cooperation in 1990" held in July 1990. Proceedings of the Twenty Seventh AMM, ASEAN Secretariat (Jakarta, 1990), p. 61.

33. Speech of Mikhail Gorbachev in Vladivostok on 28 July 1986 (Pamphlet) (Moscow, 1986), p. 2.

63

TABLE -1 POTENTIAL COSTS AND BENEFITS ANALYSIS AFTER THE

ENLARGEMENT OF ASEAN

Major Potential Costs34

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------1. The danger that the inclusion of new members will erode the

traditiona-l spirit of solidarity, accommodation and consensus building.

2. The danger that a larger ASEAN may not be able to move effectively to make decisions on regional issues and areas of cooperation ;

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------3. The potential for longstanding suspicions between some members (for

example, Vietnam and Thailand) to carry over into ASEAN;

4. The danger of impending the development of the ASEAN Free Trade Area:

-----------------------------------·--------------------------------------------------------5. The danger that ASEAN may come to be divided on key issues,· for

example that a 'two tier' ASEAN may develop with the older and richer members coming into conflict with the newer and much poorer membe~;and ·

6. The danger that expansion may lead to difficulties in ASEAN's relations with major external partners such as the US and the EU over the policies of certain Members, for example, Burma.

(Table continued)

34. Carlyle A. Thayer, 'ASEAN's Expanding Membership', Submission to Foreign Affairs Sub-Committee, Report of the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Parliament of Australia, February 1997, p. 6.

64

Major Potential Benefits35

1. An expanded ASEAN will be able to increase its geo-political weight and enhance its leverage with major powers including the U.S., China, Japan and India (as well as Australia);

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------2. An expanded ASEAN with an internal market of about 500 million

people will be attractive to investors and enhance ASEAN' s overall international economic weight;

3. An expanded ASEAN will be able to reduce the danger of inter-state conflict by increasing confidence and communications ;

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------4. An expanded ASEAN will encourage the newer members to continue

and increase progress towards economic reform and towards strategies that can achieve both growth and equity ;

5. An expanded ASEAN will enhance prospects for bilateral and subregional cooperation, and contribute to stability both in South-east Asia and in East Asia overall ; and

----------------------------------------------------------·---------------------------------6. An expanded ASEAN should be able to contribute to an increased

sense of regional confidence and identity and thus bolster ASEAN's 'spirit' and positive image.

-----------------------------------~--------------------------------------------------------

35. ibid.

65

The ASEAN after enlargement has gained more weight in balancing

the influence of the East Asian major powers, particularly China. However,

enlargement seems likely to make cohesion and decision-making in the

ASEAN more difficult. Burma's inclusion is likely to have some adverse

impact on the ASEANS's international image and limited progress towards

internal reform in Burma may exacerbate this problem. The ASEAN also

faces a difficult test in relation to the situation of political confrontation in

Cambodia. However, it will be difficult to develop a consensus on social and

political issues that could attract agreement across the highly diverse

A SEAN region. The ASEAN' s cohesion could be weakened by ongoing

division between the old, richer members and the new, poorer members.

The focus that the ASEAN would be able to retain as a group, will

clearly depend on the effective processes of leadership and political change

in the individual member countries. The question of political transitioh and . .

national resilience would be critical. Considerable part of the cohesion

among the members has been contributed by the long standing efforts of

leaders such as Suharto, Lee Kuan Yew, Fidel Ramos and Mahathir

Mohamed. As Professor James Clad has observed:

"The question which hangs over the inevitable process of generational displacement is whether the incoming leadership will have the time, or the inclination, to enter into the type of sedulous cultivation of the

66

ASEAN country leaders indulged in by Singapore's Lee Kuan Yew for over three decades". 36

Debate on Constructive Engagement and Constructive Intervention

The conflict in Cambodia in early July 1997 and the ASEAN's

effort to exercise influence have added to~ debate about the potential for the

association to assume a more active role in exercising a moderating "'

influence in relation to certain countries' internal affairs. The leading

Indonesian analyst, Jusuf Wanandi (Centre for Strategic and International

Studies, Jakarta), argued :

"In the case of ASEAN relations, it is clear that in the longer team, economic integration, social interaction and political cooperation will increase the stake of each member country in the development of other member countries. Therefore, it cannot be expected that there will be a completely hands-off-policf. towards the domestic developments of other member countries". 7

In 1997, attention has· been drawn to the concept of 'constructive

intervention', which has been mooted as a possible ASEAN response to

some internal situations in South-east Asia, by Malaysia's Deputy Prime

36. James Clad, "Regionalism in South-east Asia : A Bridge Too Far?", South-east Asian Affairs (Singapore, 1997), p. 4.

37. JusufWanandi, "ASEAN's Domestic Political Developments and Their Impact on Foreign Policy', Pacific Review, vol. VIII, no. 3, 1995, p. 457.

. 67

Minister, Anwar Ibrahim. It is largely felt that the ASEAN needs to revise its

modes of operation and exercise an increased degree of political maturity,

which is precisely termed as 'constructive intervention'. It means providing

not only assistance in times of political crisis, but also the continuous

deployment of regional resources for economic and social development in

poorer parts of the region. The time has arrived to explore this avenue more

thoroughly and put in place a guideline of just what exactly constructive

intervention would entail. The ASEAN may want to review the various

forms that constructive intervention would take, such as assistance towards

legal and bureaucratic reform, measures to promote human resources

development and the general strengthening of the rule of law and of civil

. 38 soctety.

This concept, however, is likely to be difficult to develop and execute.

In the case of Cambodia, the. ASEAN countries have an internal agreement

(Paris Agreement of October 1991) which eight of the nine current ASEAN

members signed, on which to base their pressure for free and open elections.

Again on 24 July 1993, a statement was issued by the ASEAN Foreign

Ministers on Cambodia in which they reiterated their support for

38. Abdul Rahman Adnan, "ASEAN Turns to Constructive Intervention", Asian Wall Street Journal, 30 July 1997.

68

UNT AC and suggested that the International Conference on the

Reconstruction of Cambodia (ICORC) should immediately effect the

disbursement of aid and assistance already pledged at the Tokyo Conference

of june 1992 for the reconstruction of Cambodia. 39

Such a basis, however, does not exist in the case of any other regional

state. The ASEAN' s nine members comprise a number of very different

polltical systems ; it would be difficult to maintain agreement on how and

where 'constructive intervention' may be justified. It is very difficult to see

how pursuing the notion of 'constructive intervention' can easily coexist

with the maintenance of cohesion and harmony within the ASEAN.40

Post Cold War South Pacific Regional Order

The notion of a South-Pacific regional order shaping state and societal

attitudes and actions was largely a cold war construct. In the post cold war

era the central idea was that security should be the ultimate objective of

regional order, the internal stability in one state should continue to be linked

39. Statement by the ASEAN Foreign Ministers on Cambodia, Singapore, 24th July 1993, ASEAN Secretariat, ASEAN Documents Series 1992-94 (Jakarta, 1994).

40. Frank Frost, "ASEAN at 30 : Enlargement, Consolidation and the Problems of Cambodia", Current Issues Brief, no.2 (1997-98), Department of the Parliament Library, Canberra, p. 17.

69

conceptually to regional security and that economic assistance and regional

organisation should continue to be seen as important elements in its

promotion. The Australia and_ New Zealand have developed detailed policies

on regional security issues emphasising economic and environmental threats,

etc. They had begun to acknowledge the interests of the Pacific Island states

during the cold war and they had done so to obtain Island support for the

West's objectives. In the post-cold war period that agenda is being pursued

in its own right and with increased vigour. This is reflected in a series of

new initiatives taken to revitalize the regional institutions, like the South

Pacific Regional Environmental Agency, the South Pacific Forum's

Regional Security Committee, etc. The conception of regional security

promoted by Pacific Island states also includes the defence of state

sovereignty which means that internal security matters are the preserve of

the state and should not be on regional agenda. 41

In the late 1980s and particularly since the end of the cold war, South

Pacific cooperation has given new emphasis to a wide range of

environmental issues, moving beyond the single issue approach of earlier

41. Greg Fry, "The South Pacific and the Changing World Order" in Richard Leaver and James L. Richardson, eds., Charting the Post Cold War Order (Boulder, 1993), pp. 239-240.

70

years. The agenda has also broadened to include issues associated with the

development decisions of the Pacific Island states.42 Symptomatic of this

new emphasis was the establishment of a fully autonomous regional

environmental agency, the South Pacific Regional Environment Program

(SPREP) in 1991. While a small unit of the same name was already in

existence within the South Pacific Commission Secretariat, it did not have

the resources or independence to play the desirable role. The initial priority

of the new SPREP has been the pressing of a collective South Pacific

position in the meetings leading up to the United Nations Conference on the

Environment and Development in Rio in 1992, and in the negotiations on a

Framework Convention on Climate Change-an issue of particular concern to

the low lying pacific islands.43

Of late, the South Pacific Forum has become the most active on

environmental issues. The forum expressed its concern about Japanese plans

to ship plutonium from Europe through the Pacific, but fell short of making

an official protest. The forum countries felt that they had not been consulted

42. Forum Communique-=- 1989, Honiara, Solomon Islands, p.2.

43. South Pacific Regional Environment Program, Annual Report 1991, no. 2 and 1992, no. 3 ; Forum Communique, Port Vila (1990), Palikir (1991) and Honiara (1992).

71

by Japan, jtist as the US had failed to consult them prior to the shipment of

chemical weapons to Johnston Atoll. On the question of Johnston Atoll, the

forum stressed that the weapons destruction facility had to be closed down,

in line with US assurances.44

Australia has been consciously pursumg a policy for enchanced

politico-strategic cooperation· in the region. In the defence policy statement

of the Liberal and National Party Coalition (which won the Australian

Federal Election on 2 March 1996), the following defence interests interalia

have been identified. 45

The promotion of a sense of strategic community between Australia and the countries in the region ; The promotion of a favourable strategic situation for Australia within South-East Asia and South Pacific ; The maintenance and enhancement of our alliance and security relationships with the U.S., New Zealand and other States within the Asia-Pacific region.

44. Pacific Report, vol. 5, no. 14, 16 July 1992 (Canberra, 1992); Insigllt vol. 1, no. I, 24 July 1992.

45. n. 11, VDL 5, 24 April1994, p. 3.

72

Australia has felt that its security is directly related to its interaction

with the countries of the Asia-Pacific region at various levels. Further,

Australia's interest will be best promoted by developing a strong web of

bilateral defence and security ties through the region, reinforced by

interaction in multilateral fora such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).

Australia's relationship with rest of the region has evolved over the post-war ~

years from development assis.tance and strategic cooperation towards a more

equal partnership characterised by ever increasing levels of economic and

political cooperation and cultural exchange. The ASEAN Regional Forum,

APEC and the Five Powers Defence Agreements each play an important part

in furthering political security cooperation and understanding within the

. 46 regiOn.

The ANZUS treaty which was treated as cornerstone of both Australia

and New Zealand's defence· policy during cold war days faced a major

furore in 1984. However, over the decades it not only survived but also has

started gaining force. Even now, New Zealand looks forward to

46. ibid., pp. 5-6.

73

Australia on almost all regional issues. 47 One opinion poll shows that most

New Zealanders do not want to change the anti-nuclear stance of New

Zealand on regional issues.48

Political integration of the Asia-Pacific region, however, got much

strengthened after the French President, Jacques Chirac's decision in June

1995 to resume !luclear testing in French Polynesia. Australia rallied behind

other South-Pacific states and protested against this decision. While

predominantly an issue affecting Australia's relations with France, it also

held implications for Australia's relations with the Pacific islands. After

cautious response by Gareth Evans, the Australian Government moved

4 7. It is pertinent here to quote the following words of David Lange, the then New Zealand Prime Minister : "Just as Australia looks to the U.S., also New Zealand looks to Australia as the big brother on the bloc. The price of that is tied to what Australia determines it should be. As against that , we have to make our own political judgements to what is acceptable in terms of price. That is the dilemma we h~d with the ANZAC frigates . (A joint programme between the ANZAC partners, i.e., New Zealand and Australia)". Interview of New Zealand Prime Minister David Lange taken by Alister Sands, Pacific Researcll, vol. 4, no.1, February 1991, p.4.

48. Kelvin Clements, "'The Last Broken Promise : Amending New Zealand's Anti-Nuclear Act", Pacific Researcll, vol. 4, ho. 4, November 1991, p. 8. K· Clements had conducted an opinion poll the results of which shows that 52% preferred to stay outside ANZUS and leave the anti-nuclear law unchanged ; while 41% said they "'preferred new Zealand's rejoining ANZUS by changing the iaw to a-llow nuclear ships visits."

74

quickly to lead a concerted and vigorous anti-nuclear testing campaign.

Australia for its strength relied on the creation of a South Pacific collective

opinion. In contrast to the regional reform agenda previously followed, this

meant casting Australia as very much part of, rather than external to, a South

Pacific Community.49

In Australia's regional security environment now, a bilateral threat

symmetry no longer applies. It is argued that while reliance on the United

States' technology remains, it has moved away from primary dependence on

the alliance relationship with the U.S .. Australia's approach to national

. security puts greater emphasis on 'comprehensive engagement' with South

East Asia and 'constructive commitment' with the South Pacific. The

stated Australian aim now is to enmesh its security interests with those of the

region and placing less emphasis on the US alliance and specifically on

ANZUS. 50

49. Greg Fry, "Australia and the South Pacific : The Rationalist Ascendancy", in James Cotton and John Ravenhill, eds., Seeking Asian Engagement : Australia in World Affairs 1991-95 (Oxford, 1997), p. 304.

50. Stuart Harris, Australia's Regional Security Environment, Working Paper no. 3, 1994 (Deptt. of International Relations, ANU, Canberra), p.5.

75

Australia's post cold war security engagement in the region seemed to

be based on the following assumptions :-

*

*

*

*

*

51.

Closer professional contact between military personnel in the region will reduce possibilities for misperception and misunderstanding, and are thus a form of confi.dence building ;

Defence cooperation will help ensure Australian participation if a more structured regional defence community were to be created in future;

Intelligence exchange, joint exercises, ship VISits, exchanges of personnel and enhanced transparency will in themselves help create a regional security community ;

Defence cooperation is an element in a broader process of growing inter-dependence which is assumed by its very nature to be security enhancing ; and

Australian participation in the Five Power Defence Arrangements (the five powers are : Australia, the United Kingdom, New Zealand, Malaysia and Singapore), whatever its original rationale may have been, is now important because it provides a formal security linkage with at least part of the region.51

Pauline Kerr and Andrew Mack, Security Studies in Australia in the 1990s, Working Paper no. 2, 1994 (Deptt. of International Relations, AN1J, Canberra), p. 4.

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