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P O L I C Y A N A L Y S I S E X E R C I S E

Revitalizing NATOA Role for the U.S. Congress

Usha Sahay

Belfer Center for Science and International A!airs Harvard Kennedy School 79 JFK Street Cambridge, MA 02138

www.belfercenter.org

This paper was completed as a Harvard Kennedy School Policy Analysis Exercise, a yearlong

project for second-year Master in Public Policy candidates to work with real-world clients in

crafting and presenting timely policy recommendations.

Statements and views expressed in this report are solely those of the authors and do not imply

endorsement by Harvard University, Harvard Kennedy School, or the Belfer Center for Science

and International A!airs.

Cover photo: Flags on stage at NATO headquarters in Brussels for a meeting between U.S.

Secretary of State Antony Blinken and NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, Tuesday, March

23, 2021. (Yves Herman, Pool via AP)

Copyright 2021, President and Fellows of Harvard College

About the Author

Usha Sahay is a senior editor at Politico Magazine, where she focuses on foreign policy and global a!airs. She is a 2021 graduate of the Harvard Kennedy School, where she received a Master in Public Policy. While at the Kennedy School, Usha was a Belfer Center student fellow, working as a research assistant to Prof. Fredrik Logevall and the Belfer Center Cyber Project. Her paper “Revitalizing NATO: A Role for the U.S. Congress” was the co-winner of the Robert Belfer Award for Best Policy Analysis Exercise in International and Global A!airs.

Usha is the creator and host of the War on the Rocks podcast series “A Most Terrible Weapon.” Prior to graduate school, Usha was managing editor of War on the Rocks, and has also been an editor at the Wall Street Journal and Hu!Post. She started her career as a Herbert Scoville, Jr. Peace Fellow at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation. Usha graduated magna cum laude from Columbia University, where she majored in political science and history.

Belfer Center for Science and International A!airs | Harvard Kennedy School

Revitalizing NATO: A Role for the U.S. Congress

Usha Sahay Policy Analysis Exercise April 6, 2021 Harvard Kennedy School Faculty Adviser: Professor Stephen Walt Seminar Leader: Professor Dara Kay Cohen Client: House Committee on Foreign Affairs

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Table of Contents

Tables

Acknowledgements----------------------------------------------------------- 2

Executive Summary----------------------------------------------------------- 3

Introduction--------------------------------------------------------------------- 4

Motivations for This Study--------------------------------------------------- 6

Methodology-------------------------------------------------------------------- 8

NATO’s Challenges------------------------------------------------------------ 11

Rethinking Congress’ Role in Foreign Policy---------------------------- 16

Recommendations------------------------------------------------------------ 24

Cautions, Caveats, and Challenges---------------------------------------- 36

Conclusion---------------------------------------------------------------------- 38

Bibliography-------------------------------------------------------------------- 40

Appendix 1: Interviews and Interview Questions---------------------- 49

Appendix 2: Ethics and Transparency Statement---------------------- 51

About the Author-------------------------------------------------------------- 53

Table 1: NATO’s Top Challenges----------------------------------------- 15

Table 2: Congress’ Avenues of Influence in Foreign Policy-------- 23

Table 3: Summary of Recommendations------------------------------- 35

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Acknowledgements My heartfelt thanks go to Professor Dara Kay Cohen, whose dedication to every single one of her students and their research projects has been gratifying and inspiring. Professor Cohen’s incisive edits and creative suggestions have enriched this PAE, while her mentorship and good spirits have enriched the writing process. Professor Stephen Walt generously agreed to advise me while on sabbatical, going above and beyond with ideas for new angles and people to talk to. Working with him has been a privilege.

Jacqueline Ramos made this PAE possible, first by posing the question that inspired the project and then by agreeing to sponsor it as a client. Her willingness to share her insights, time, and professional connections is all the more remarkable given that she has never met me (a fact that I hope will change soon). I am grateful to Melissa Hanlon for introducing us, as well as for the mentorship I received from her and her colleagues during my summer working on Europe and NATO at the U.S. Department of Defense.

Twenty-three busy professionals agreed to share their expertise – and to add one more Zoom meeting or phone call to their day – to help out a graduate student. I am tremendously grateful to each of my interviewees for making this project what it is. I am indebted to Richard Fontaine, Loren DeJonge Schulman, and Christopher Skaluba, whose work has heavily influenced my thinking about NATO, Congress, and foreign policy.

My roommate and close friend Megan Linquiti has been a patient, helpful sounding board on topics ranging from PAE edits to what to eat for dinner. Finally, Josh Altman has been by my side not just for every step of the PAE process, but also for every day of the pandemic that has served as the unfortunate backdrop for that process. With his support and his example, I have become a better writer, thinker, and person.

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Executive Summary This Policy Analysis Exercise examines the role Congress can play in reforming U.S. policy toward the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The project is intended to serve as a guide to members of Congress and congressional staff who want to influence the alliance’s priorities, capabilities, and missions. More generally, the project seeks to understand what the legislative branch can do to advance policy reform at a time when Congress’ ability to govern is hampered by high polarization and low institutional capacity. Drawing primarily on interviews with 23 NATO experts, current and former congressional staffers, and other former government officials, the paper outlines NATO’s main challenges and explore how Congress can help tackle them. I find that even though Congress has struggled to exercise its formal foreign policy powers in recent years, it retains significant power to shape foreign policy through informal avenues of influence. These avenues are:

Ø Calling out wrongdoing Ø Influencing the executive agenda and changing the narrative Ø Informal authority, institutional memory, and longevity Ø Relationships with foreign governments.

Lawmakers can use these avenues of influence in a number of ways to help address NATO’s challenges and contribute to revitalizing the alliance. This report’s recommendations for Congress include, but are not limited to:

Ø Request a briefing on the Biden administration’s priorities for NATO Ø Participate in ongoing efforts to redefine NATO’s mission Ø Use carefully framed NDAA language to focus attention on burden-sharing Ø Encourage allies to meet their commitments, but be constructive Ø Convene a hearing on metrics for measuring allied commitment Ø Publicly highlight NATO’s under-appreciated strengths, including on China Ø Help shift NATO’s narrative to highlight the alliance’s democratic values.

Although this report is about NATO, its findings suggest a general set of principles for how Congress can shape foreign policy at a time when budgets, bandwidth, and bipartisanship are all in short supply. Capitol Hill does not need to wait for major structural change before it can contribute substantively to foreign policy and national security. It is my hope that this report will equip members of Congress and congressional staff with useful tools to improve NATO and U.S.-Europe relations, while also contributing to a clearer understanding of where Congress’ true power lies.

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Introduction In 1948, the U.S. Senate passed the Vandenberg Resolution, ensuring that Congress would play a strong role in shaping the postwar relationship between the United States and Europe. The measure, sponsored by Senate Foreign Relations Committee chairman Arthur Vandenberg, effectively gave congressional approval to what would eventually become the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Notably, the Vandenberg Resolution made clear that U.S. participation in international defense agreements would respect American constitutional procedures, a nod to the Senate’s power to ratify treaties and, more generally, to the role of Congress and the American public in influencing U.S. alliance policy. During hearings on the North Atlantic Treaty the following year, Vandenberg again highlighted the power of an individual lawmaker to shape the foreign policy debate, intentionally asking the witnesses softball questions meant to reassure his wary colleagues that the new alliance was viable.1 On July 21, 1949, the Senate ratified the treaty, and soon after, the United States joined NATO.2 From the beginning, Congress has had a critical role in shaping U.S. involvement in the transatlantic alliance.3 As NATO expert Stanley Sloan puts it, “Throughout the nearly seven decades since NATO’s founding, US participation in the alliance reflected the fact that the Congress…considered itself a joint manager with the executive branch of the ‘transatlantic bargain.’”4 From pressuring allies to spend more on defense in the 1970s to approving NATO’s expansion after the Cold War to checking President Donald Trump’s efforts to undermine the alliance, Congress has worked both alongside and against American presidents to influence NATO’s structure, resources, priorities, and mission. Today, it’s unclear whether Congress can play the robust role in U.S. foreign policy that it did during Vandenberg’s days. Experts and even some members of Congress believe lawmakers have “abdicated” their responsibility on foreign policy, pointing to the legislature’s inability to authorize ongoing U.S. counter-terrorism operations and the general erosion of congressional oversight powers.5 The executive branch’s foreign policy powers have expanded, while Congress struggles in general to pass laws given high political polarization and low legislative capacity.6

1 Haas, Harry and Arthur, 235-237, 268-272. 2 “North Atlantic Treaty.” 3 I am grateful to Robert Bell for sharing the Vandenberg anecdote as an example of Congress’ formative role in NATO. Interview with Robert Bell. 4 Sloan, “Donald Trump and NATO,” 222-223. 5 Fowler, Watchdogs on the Hill; Malinowski, “Congress Has Willfully Abdicated Its Responsibility;” Webb, “Congressional Abdication;” Gude and Martin, “Preventing Endless War.” 6 McKeon and Tess, “How Congress Can Take Back Foreign Policy;” LaPira et. al., Congress Overwhelmed; Goldgeier and Saunders, “The Unconstrained Presidency;” Binder, Goldgeier, and Saunders, “The Imperial Presidency;” Hedtler-Gaudette, “Congress Must Reclaim Its Role;” Reynolds, “Improving Congressional Capacity.”

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Yet despite these obstacles, individual lawmakers and congressional staff members still have foreign policy and national security issues in their portfolios, and want to contribute to constructive reform on these issues. But it’s not always clear how to do so. On an issue like NATO, which rarely presents obvious opportunities for congressional involvement, it can be especially difficult to discern what part the legislative branch can and should play. This Policy Analysis Exercise offers a guide to congressional practitioners who want to influence U.S. policy toward the NATO alliance. Drawing primarily on interviews with NATO experts, current and former congressional staffers, and former government officials, I will outline NATO’s main challenges and explore how Congress can help address them. While this report is specifically about NATO and transatlantic relations, its findings apply to other foreign policy issues where lawmakers and staff hope to exert influence. I find that Congress retains significant power to shape foreign policy even though its best-known and most formal powers in this area – authorizing military intervention, passing budgets, and exercising oversight – have been hampered in recent years by high political polarization and low institutional capacity. Congress can still wield outsize influence on foreign policy through more informal channels such as calling attention to problems, setting the agenda for the executive branch and U.S. allies, shaping the narrative about particular issues, and communicating U.S. priorities to allies. These findings have intriguing implications for NATO. Congress can exert influence in this area in a number of ways. Among other proposals, this report recommends that Congress seek information from the executive branch on its transatlantic agenda; participate in efforts to clarify NATO’s mission; encourage better burden-sharing through the NDAA and direct interactions with allies; spur a debate about new ways to measure contributions to the alliance; and help shift NATO’s narrative by publicly highlighting its role in countering China and its democratic values. More generally, lawmakers can bolster the alliance by interacting more frequently with NATO counterparts and fostering good working ties with relevant members of the administration. This report proceeds as follows: First, I outline the motivations behind my research and my methodology. I then outline the main challenges NATO faces today. Next, I turn to Congress, outlining its unique avenues of influence in foreign policy and proposing recommendations that draw on those avenues to address NATO’s challenges. Finally, I consider potential obstacles and caveats, and conclude by considering the implications of my findings for the legislative branch’s future involvement in U.S. foreign policy.

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Motivations for This Study This Policy Analysis Exercise has three objectives. The first is to identify the role Congress can play in reforming U.S. policy toward NATO, in order to assist members of Congress and congressional staff working on the issue. An extensive policy literature has emerged about revitalizing the transatlantic relationship7, but these analyses tend to discuss America’s role in general terms rather than distinguishing between the executive branch, Congress, and other parts of the American foreign policy apparatus.8 This report will develop recommendations tailored to the legislative branch by putting the insights of NATO experts in conversation with the perspectives of those who have worked in or with Congress. Second, this report seeks to make a contribution to the academic and policy literature about Congress’ role in foreign policy. This literature, too, is robust, but generally analyzes Congress’ role as an adversary to or check on the executive branch, rather than a partner to the executive or a foreign policy actor in its own right. 9 Such a focus is sensible, given the constitutional system of checks and balances and the executive branch’s general dominance of foreign policy. From a constitutional perspective, Congress’ most important foreign policy roles are to appropriate funds for national defense, declare war or otherwise authorize the use of military force, and approve treaties with foreign countries. But some scholars have noted that outside of highly visible moments like the lead-up to war or the defense budgeting process, lawmakers also play a quieter role influencing U.S. foreign policy on a day-to-day basis.10 This report focuses on how Congress helps to shape and manage U.S. alliances, an area of foreign policy where the legislative role is not immediately apparent. Congress’ relationship with American alliances received some attention during the Trump administration, whose hostility toward allies galvanized lawmakers to engage on the issue.11 Indeed, the Trump era revealed that Congress can and does play a role in managing alliances when it perceives them to be under threat.12 My research will probe whether that finding will hold in the post-Trump years, examining what role Congress should play under more conventional U.S. administrations.

7 See, for instance, Atlantic Council, “NATO 20/2020;” Barnes-Dacey et. al., “A New Transatlantic Bargain;” Brattberg and Baer, “Reimagining Transatlantic Relations;” Burns et al. “Stronger Together;” Coffey and Kochis, “NATO in the 21st Century;” German Marshall Fund, “Together or Alone?” 8 An important exception is the numerous analyses of Congress’ role in NATO that followed Trump’s attacks on the alliance. See, for instance, Rizzo and Cordero, “Bolstering Congressional Support for NATO.” 9 See, for instance, Tama and Thurber, Rivals for Power: Presidential-Congressional Relations; Fowler, Watchdogs on the Hill; Scott and Carter, “The Not-So-Silent Partner.” 10 Lindsay, “Congress and Foreign Policy;” Carter and Scott, “Taking the Lead.” 11 Rapp-Hooper and Waxman, “Presidential Alliance Powers;” Boller and Herr, “From Washington Without Love;” McKeon and Tess, “How Congress Can Take Back Foreign Policy.” 12 Interviews with Kathleen McInnis and Christopher Skaluba.

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Third, this report will investigate what the legislative branch can do to advance policy reform at a time when Congress’ governing capacity is significantly hampered and many are questioning its ability to act as a co-equal branch of government. Congressional dysfunction has become an accepted fact of life in American politics in light of persistent partisan gridlock, high polarization, and incentives to grandstand.13 Other problems include reduced legislative capacity, loss of expertise, leadership-imposed constraints on members, a “broken” budgeting process, inability to conduct oversight, and an apparent lack of interest in the substance policy. 14 On foreign policy in particular, experts agree that Congress has ceded much of its authority to the executive branch.15 Against this dismal backdrop, what – if anything – can entrepreneurial members of Congress and their staff do to make even incremental progress on their issues of interest?16 This is the broader question my Policy Analysis Exercise seeks to answer. My specific project is to translate the robust debate about reforming NATO and the transatlantic alliance into realistic recommendations for Congress that take advantage of the institution’s strengths while acknowledging its limitations. More generally, though, I hope the analysis will inform legislative engagement on other issues where practitioners are similarly interested in contributing to reform but unsure how or whether they can do so given the constraints facing today’s Congress.

13 Kane, “Congress Deeply Unpopular;” Enten, “Congress’ Approval Rating.” 14 Curry, Legislating in the Dark; Kane and Willis, “Laws and Disorder;” Goldgeier and Saunders, “The Unconstrained Presidency;” Fowler, Watchdogs on the Hill; Mills and Selin, ‘Don’t Sweat the Details;” LaPira et. al., Congress Overwhelmed; Reynolds, “Improving Congressional Capacity;” Lee and Curry, The Limits of Party, 189-192; Vallone, “How Congress Is Hamstringing the Defense Industrial Sector.” 15 Fontaine, Schulman, and Tankel, “War Powers;” R Street Institute, “Congress and Foreign Policy;” interview with Robert Bell. 16 I am indebted to Richard Fontaine and Loren DeJonge Schulman, whose work at the Center for a New American Security has greatly influenced my understanding of Congress’ influence outside of legislative channels. Fontaine and Schulman, “Congress’s Hidden Strengths.” See also McCormick and Mitchell, “Commitments, Transnational Interests, and Congress;” Lindsay, “Congress and Foreign Policy.”

What – if anything – can entrepreneurial members of Congress and their staff do to make even incremental progress on their issues of interest?

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Methodology To answer my research question – what role should Congress play in reforming NATO? – I split it into two parts. First, what are NATO’s challenges, and second, what can Congress do about them? In this section, I outline my methodology for each question, explain the criteria I used to formulate my recommendations, and discuss limitations and biases. What are NATO’s challenges? My main research method for both questions was 23 interviews with experts on NATO and on Congress. My interviewees were a mix of former executive-branch officials, current and former congressional staffers, scholars, and analysts at think tanks. (For more details and a list of interviewees, see Appendix I17). In addition, to answer the first question I also conducted a review of what I refer to as the “policy literature” on NATO and transatlantic ties. Policy literature is distinct from academic literature and refers to analysis explicitly intended to influence policymakers, including think tank reports and op-eds. My aim with the first question was not to provide an original analysis of NATO’s challenges, but rather to offer an overview of expert commentary and highlight areas of agreement. I sought to provide a general sense of the state of transatlantic affairs that could serve as a starting point for congressional action. What can Congress do? To answer the second research question, as with the first, I relied primarily on interviews. For this question, I also reviewed academic and policy literature on Congress in order to understand the institution’s strengths and weaknesses in foreign policy. The literature I reviewed fell into two general categories. The first is literature that specifically examines Congress and foreign policy. This includes studies of oversight, war powers, sanctions, and, to a lesser degree, alliances and diplomacy. As mentioned earlier, this literature tends, with some exceptions, to focus on Congress as a potential or actual adversary to the executive branch. The second category of literature is about Congress in general. Many recent books and articles have examined how Congress operates in today’s polarized era, probing how polarization and partisanship have prompted changes in congressional procedure and shifted the relative power of actors like committees, lobbying groups, congressional leaders, and individual members. This literature rarely examined foreign policy specifically, but it was useful for grasping how the modern Congress operates and what it can and cannot accomplish under the present conditions of high polarization and low capacity.

17 Footnotes refer to interview date only when necessary to distinguish between anonymous interviewees.

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Combining findings from this literature with the insights of interviewees, I developed a list of Congress’ avenues of influence in foreign policy and developed recommendations for how those avenues could be used to address the NATO challenges identified in the first part of the research. Criteria for developing recommendations In developing these recommendations, I employed the following criteria: Feasibility: I sought above all to make recommendations that would be within reach for Congress in the near future. None of my proposals involve significant expenditures of federal funds, political capital, or staff time, or represent a significant departure from the views of the Democratic or Republican parties. Moreover, all of the recommendations are intended to be things an individual member of Congress or a small group of members could pursue on their own.

Convergence of interests: I also tried to develop recommendations that would be in the shared interests of the various constituencies involved, rather than benefiting Congress at the expense of the executive branch or NATO allies (or vice versa). Bearing in mind the unique pressures on lawmakers – pursuing re-election, balancing demands of constituents and party leadership, working on a broad issue portfolio – I looked for areas in which Congress’ incentives would line up with those of the executive branch and of allies.

Limitations and biases Finally, several limitations constrained my research and may have shaped my findings. Feasibility constraint: The biggest limitation of my research is that I focused narrowly on recommendations that are politically, financially, and operationally feasible. I have chosen this constraint because this report is primarily intended to serve as a blueprint for action for members of Congress and their staff. However, this focus has required discounting a number of congressional powers – such as the power of the purse and the power to pass legislation – that I conclude are not likely to be applied to NATO in the near future. At the end of the “Recommendations” section, I offer four longer-term, more aspirational recommendations that are unrealistic or undesirable at this time but would be worth considering if conditions change in the future. U.S. perspectives: This research draws heavily from American points of view, likely under-representing European and other non-American perspectives. While the report is meant to be a resource for American policymakers, its findings would be more robust had I had more opportunity to speak with practitioners and scholars from other countries. General status quo bias: Finally, this report assumes that the basic architecture of the transatlantic relationship should remain in place. It does not consider a fundamental

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overhaul of U.S. commitment to NATO. I made this choice partially because of the feasibility constraint discussed above – for instance, I encountered proposals to withdraw or threaten to withdraw U.S. troops from Germany, but judged that this would be highly unpopular in Congress. Similarly, Congress is unlikely to favor a major increase in U.S. troop commitments to Eastern Europe. But this choice was also a substantive one, reflecting the views of the majority of experts I encountered. Most interviewees agreed that while the transatlantic relationship should be recalibrated in favor of more European responsibility, the basic arrangement – the United States and its allies commit to collectively defending each other through largely voluntary commitments of military power – should not change. Those who favor a more robust U.S. commitment or (more commonly) a reduced U.S. commitment may understandably find this limitation problematic. This bias (such as it is) is a result of my own methodological choices, selection and availability bias in terms of expertise I sought out, and the actual distribution of views in the field. This report is not intended to offer an original analysis of NATO or of U.S. strategic interests in Europe. Others have covered that ground, and practitioners who work on the issue are familiar with this literature. Rather, my aim is to help the legislative branch understand how it can move NATO’s most important priorities forward given Congress’ institutional power as it stands today. My hope is to retain the ambition and vision of the experts who have weighed in on the future of NATO and translate that into an actionable plan for Congress, thereby helping to bridge the gap between experts and practitioners.

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NATO’s Challenges Donald Trump presented something of a crisis for NATO, with the volatile U.S. president browbeating allies for not spending enough on defense, questioning the core tenets of collective defense, and even suggesting the United States might leave the alliance. Trump’s presidency spurred a flurry of analyses about what was next for the transatlantic relationship, with most experts agreeing that the alliance’s challenges predated Trump and would not disappear at the end of his presidency.18 Now, with the Trump administration out of office and its successor moving eagerly to highlight U.S. commitment to NATO, what are the top challenges on the alliance’s agenda? This section draws on my literature review and my interviews to identify NATO’s most salient challenges. While there is, of course, disagreement about what the biggest problems are and how (or whether) they can be fixed, my research has uncovered some general areas of consensus. Below, I first briefly discuss structural realities affecting NATO – deep-rooted, longstanding conditions that shape the alliance’s geopolitical environment, but are not challenges for NATO to “solve” or eliminate. Then, I outline NATO’s five most important challenges, which will serve as the basis for my recommendations.

Structural realities affecting NATO Here, I identify several factors that are sometimes described as “challenges” for NATO to address but are, in fact, underlying geopolitical realities that the alliance can’t do much about. These realities shape NATO’s environment, but are not challenges to be solved.

Absence of a Cold War adversary: First, NATO’s purpose has not been fully clear since the Soviet Union disintegrated. Even those who believe NATO still has a strong role to play in the 21st century acknowledge confusion over what exactly this role is.19 This confusion underlies many of NATO’s current challenges. Most notably, the lack of a clear adversary and mission creates internal disagreements over what the alliance’s priorities should be. America apart… A second structural reality is the unique place that the United States occupies in NATO. America’s superior military power is foundational to the alliance’s architecture, and geographically, the United States is separated by an ocean from the territorial threat NATO was created to deter. America’s exceptional role is a feature, not a bug. Yet it has always been a source of tension. American leaders from Eisenhower and

18 See, for instance, Duclos, “Trump or Biden;” Patrick, “What Are Biden’s Actual Prospects for Reviving Trans-Atlantic Relations?;” Taylor, “The Old Transatlantic Relationship Ain’t Coming Back.” 19 Goldgeier and Martin, “NATO’s Never-Ending Struggle for Relevance;” Skaluba, “In Praise of NATO’s Dysfunctional, Bureaucratic Tedium;” interviews with Rachel Rizzo and Jim Townsend.

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Kennedy to Obama and Trump have expressed frustration at Europe’s underinvestment, while Europeans have wondered from NATO’s earliest days whether America was truly committed to their defense.20 …but Europe ascendant: Even as America has shifted attention away from Europe, Europe has gained more power to advocate for its own interests, creating friction within the alliance. While the military balance of power between Europe and the United States has not fundamentally changed, European nations increasingly have leverage in economic, diplomatic, and regulatory debates, a major departure from the Cold War and the years immediately following it.21 Shifting nature of challenges: The world faces different types of problems today than it did during the Cold War, and even a decade ago. The 21st century presents a number of challenges that are outside NATO’s core competencies, including China, cyber warfare and disinformation, climate change, and pandemics.22 Global rise of authoritarianism and democratic backsliding: Finally, faith in democracy is eroding around the world and authoritarian sympathies are on the rise. From the United States to Hungary and Poland to India, Brazil, and Turkey, countries are experiencing what Freedom House calls “democratic decline.”23 This global phenomenon affects NATO, which conceives of itself not just as a military alliance but also as a community of like-minded democracies.24

Current challenges to NATO Below, I outline the top challenges NATO faces today. Unlike the structural realities above, these are challenges that NATO can reasonably hope to eliminate or at least manage.

Disagreements and confusion over priorities. NATO allies have long disagreed about what the alliance should and shouldn’t prioritize. 25 This problem, while not new, is an important one for NATO to address in order to preserve cohesion and ensure it can carry out whatever missions it sets for itself. Clashes over priorities are especially problematic for NATO because it operates by consensus, meaning it generally cannot act unless all members agree.

20 Trachtenberg, Constructed Peace; Creswell and Victor, “A History of Vexation;” Goldgeier, Not Whether But When,1-3; interview with Jeremy Shapiro. 21 Erlanger, “Europe Wonders if It Can Rely on U.S.;” Duclos, “Trump or Biden;” McTague, “Joe Biden Has a Europe Problem;” interviews with Emma Ashford and Ted Galen Carpenter. 22 Duclos, “Trump or Biden;” NATO, “NATO 2030;” Gottemoeller, “NATO Is Not Brain Dead.” 23 Repucci, “A Leaderless Struggle;” Mounk, “The Week Democracy Died;” Mason, “Democracy Is Dying.” 24 Baer, “America Is Back.” 25 NATO, “NATO 2030;” Ulgen, “Don’t Blame Turkey;” Wallander, “NATO’s Enemies Within.”

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Today, China is a prominent area of transatlantic disagreement. While countering China has become America’s top foreign policy priority, European nations have been more hesitant to challenge the Asian giant, though they have shifted in recent months toward a more confrontational stance. There are similarly disparate views about the threat posed by Putin’s Russia, with Eastern European countries viewing the priority as more urgent than France and Germany do (this is also an area of disagreement between the United States and Germany26). Finally, Turkey has become a particularly difficult source of disagreement, frequently espousing geopolitical priorities that are at odds with the rest of the alliance. Transatlantic tensions over burden-sharing. In addition to disagreeing about priorities, NATO countries also clash over burden-sharing, or how much nations should contribute to the alliance’s collective capabilities. In particular, the United States has long expressed frustration with European allies not paying their fair share. 27 These tensions are, to some extent, a natural product of America’s exceptional status in the alliance; indeed, burden-sharing has caused friction since NATO’s earliest days. However, these disagreements became particularly bitter under Trump and are likely to remain a major challenge. My research found near-universal agreement that NATO needs to address the burden-sharing issue. There was strong consensus that European nations will have to contribute more to collective defense, but also that they will struggle to do so in the coming years given the economic climate and Europe’s general history of military dependency on the United States.28 The challenge for U.S. policymakers is to encourage allies to contribute more meaningfully without alienating them from important areas of transatlantic cooperation – something that came close to happening under Trump. A need for new metrics. Another area of clear consensus is that the main metric for determining whether allies are paying their fair share to NATO is highly flawed. Currently, allies are considered to be contributing adequately if they spend two percent of their gross domestic product on defense, and 20 percent of that defense spending on new equipment. Among the common critiques of this metric: The two percent figure was chosen essentially arbitrarily; it doesn’t make enough distinction between useful and less useful types of military spending; and measuring a percentage of GDP artificially inflates contribution when the economy is contracting.29 Perhaps most importantly, the metric conflates military spending with security at a time when the definition of security is broadening to include nonmilitary problems such as economic statecraft, new technologies, cyber warfare and disinformation, pandemics, and climate change.30

26 Benjamin, “How One European Pipeline Is Derailing Biden’s ‘America Is Back’ Promise.” 27 Deni, “There’s a Better Way;” Alexander and Brunnstrom, “Gates Parting Shot;” Creswell and Victor, “A History of Vexation.” 28 Deni, “Security Threats,” 46-47; interviews with Ted Galen Carpenter and Christopher Skaluba. 29 Martin and Martonffy, “Abandon the 2 Percent Obsession;” Deni, “There’s A Better Way;” Hicks et. al, “Counting Dollars or Measuring Value;” interviews with Jim Goldgeier, Kathleen McInnis, and Olivier-Remy Bel. 30 Interviews with Kathleen McInnis and Stanley Sloan.

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At the same time, critics of two percent acknowledge that it is useful. The metric is easy to understand, serves as a proxy for something that’s hard to quantify, and provides a concrete talking point to bring up with allies.31 A former Senate staffer recalled how easy it was for members of Congress to grasp whether or not allies had met their two percent commitment, but also lamented the metric’s lack of nuance, warning that overemphasizing that single figure could lead to serious backlash.32 The NATO literature contains a plethora of proposals for rethinking contribution metrics.33 The challenge will be to measure commitment in a way that’s usable and easy to understand, but also accurately captures what allies are contributing to NATO’s capabilities and mission.

Sense of poor adaptation to modern threats: NATO constantly faces questions about whether it is suited to counter modern threats, which is closely related to the confusion over the alliance’s mission. While NATO has shown its ability to respond to some post-Cold War challenges, such as conflict in the former Yugoslavia and the war in Afghanistan, other emerging threats have proven more difficult. Most prominently, there’s a lively debate about whether NATO can (or should try to) tackle the challenge of China.34 There are similar questions about NATO’s ability to adapt to disruptive technologies, cyber and information warfare, climate change, and pandemics.35

On certain challenges, NATO is actually adapting better than its public image suggests. While popular perceptions of the alliance are largely about defending Europe, one expert argued that NATO’s greatest strength is its interoperability and ability to mass military power on short notice.36 This makes it well-suited for coalition operations, as in Afghanistan, as well as for logistics and crisis management challenges such as distributing medical aid during the COVID-19 pandemic.37 Another under-discussed strength is that NATO is “the key transatlantic forum” for coordinating policy across countries, because it meets often and has reliable, longstanding

31 Martin and Martonffy, “Abandon the 2 Percent Obsession;” interview with Jeremy Shapiro. 32 Interview with former Senate committee staffer, January 2021. 33 Martin and Martonffy, “Abandon the 2 Percent Obsession;” Hicks et. al, “Counting Dollars or Measuring Value;” Chollet, Keil, and Skaluba, “Rethink and Replace Two Percent.” 34 Deni and Schatzer, “China’s Economic Statecraft;” Goldgeier and Martin, “NATO’s Never-Ending Struggle for Relevance;” Hildebrand et. al., “Build an Atlantic-Pacific Partnership;” Smith et. al., “Charting a Transatlantic Course to Address China.” 35 NATO, “NATO 2030;” Gottemoeller, “NATO Is Not Brain Dead;” interview with Rachel Rizzo. 36 Interview with Jeremy Shapiro. 37 De Maio, “NATO’s Response to COVID-19.”

The challenge for U.S. policymakers is to encourage allies to contribute more meaningfully without alienating them from important areas of transatlantic cooperation.

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policymaking procedures embedded in its routines.38 In particular, many experts emphasized the value of this consultative function for developing a transatlantic approach to countering China.39 Finally, another strength of NATO is its values. The alliance is a large community of democracies that can, at least in theory, speak collectively in favor of human rights, democracy, and the rule of law. At the same time, it’s important to acknowledge the limits of NATO’s capabilities against 21st century security challenges and to consider whether some problems might be more effectively addressed by other entities. Internal challenges by Turkey and other “backsliders.” Democratic decline around the world has manifested itself clearly within NATO. Most troublingly, Turkey’s shift toward authoritarian governance challenges the alliance’s values as well as its strategic goals and daily operations.40 Turkey has purchased Russian air defenses that are incompatible with NATO systems, scuffled with Greece in the Eastern Mediterranean, edged toward military clash with France, and held up Eastern European defense plans.41 Because the consensus decision-making model allows a single member to hold up initiatives, Turkey’s divergence from NATO’s generally agreed core functions has significantly hampered its effectiveness. To a lesser extent, anti-democratic shifts in Hungary and Poland also undermine the alliance’s commitment to democracy and its ability to speak as a cohesive whole.

Table 1.

NATO’s Top Challenges

Ø Disagreements and confusion over priorities

Ø Transatlantic tensions over burden-sharing

Ø A need for new metrics

Ø Sense of poor adaptation to modern threats

Ø Internal challenges by Turkey and other “backsliders”

38 Deni and Schatzer, “China’s Economic Statecraft;” interviews with Jeremy Shapiro and Jim Goldgeier. 39 Goldgeier and Martin, “NATO’s Never-Ending Struggle for Relevance;” Ringsmose and Rynning, “China Brought NATO Closer Together.” 40 Wallander, “NATO’s Enemies Within;” Katz and Taussig, “An Inconvenient Truth;” interviews with Jeremy Shapiro and Olivier-Remy Bel. 41 Reuters, “Turkey Cannot Go Back.”

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Rethinking Congress’ Role in Foreign Policy Having established NATO’s challenges, I turn next to examining Congress’ ability to address those challenges. This section seeks to develop an understanding of how Congress can shape foreign policy at a time of high polarization and low institutional capacity. A quick scan of recent headlines would suggest bleak prospects for congressional influence in foreign policy: a hamstrung and polarized legislature lacking adequate expertise and resources, unable to pass legislation or conduct oversight.42 Indeed, Congress has struggled to fully exercise its most important foreign policy powers – the power of the purse, the power to authorize or prohibit U.S. military action, and the power to hold the executive branch accountable. However, my research uncovered a number of less formal ways in which Congress can shape foreign policy despite the institutional obstacles. I refer to these tactics as “Avenues of Influence” to distinguish them from more formal congressional powers such as budgeting, legislating, and oversight. This section draws heavily on my interviews, as well as on academic and policy literature. In particular, my thinking has been influenced by the Center for a New American Security’s “Congress’s Hidden Strengths: Wielding Informal Tools of National Security Oversight.”43 In that report, Richard Fontaine and Loren DeJonge Schulman note that while Congress has failed to pass legislation authorizing the use of U.S. military force, lawmakers have other, less formal tools at their disposal to influence debates about U.S. military involvement abroad. I am grateful to the authors for their insights, which I hope to refine and extend to other foreign policy issues such as alliance management. Calling out wrongdoing. First, Congress is especially well-suited to vocally and forcefully critiquing bad behavior by other actors at home or abroad. As the branch of government that represents the American public, Congress has long embraced a duty to investigate wrongdoing within the broader constitutional system of checks and balances.44 More generally, it derives unique legitimacy from its role as the voice of the people and the body that ultimately determines whether a policy can be backed by funds.45 As Richard Fontaine, a former foreign policy advisor to Sen. John McCain, put it, “They have institutional authority and power that doesn’t exist anywhere else in government, from the power of the purse to the confirmation process to other forms of power and leverage.”46

42 Goldgeier and Saunders, “The Unconstrained Presidency;” Vallone, “How Congress Is Hamstringing the Defense Industrial Sector;” Reynolds, “This Is Why the Congressional Budget Process is Broken; Fowler, Watchdogs on the Hill. 43 Fontaine and Schulman, “Congress’s Hidden Strengths.” 44 Office of the Historian, “Investigations & Oversight.” 45 Interview with Senate staffer, February 2021; interview with House committee staffer. 46 Interview with Richard Fontaine.

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Lawmakers have added incentives to engage in “callouts” because fighting unethical or unlawful behavior plays well with constituents and in the media. In addition, the sheer size of Congress creates a messiness that lends itself to the calling-out function: It is much easier to get a group of lawmakers with different interests to agree on criticizing something than on, say, proposing a new initiative. Checking the executive. Congress’ callouts frequently take the form of holding the executive branch accountable, a power with a well-established constitutional and historical basis. Congress exercises oversight of the executive through hearings, reporting requirements, and investigations.47 This is one of the traditional areas of congressional involvement in foreign policy that has eroded in recent years.48 Still, Congress does retain some ability to exercise oversight through traditional mechanisms as well as through more indirect channels, such as shaping the public and media narrative and making its priorities known to the executive branch.49 Congress’ defense of NATO against the Trump administration’s efforts to undermine the alliance illustrates the direct and indirect ways in which lawmakers can push back against the executive-branch. Congress inserted language in the National Defense Authorization Act to block withdrawal of U.S. troops from Germany, while the House passed a resolution prohibiting the use of U.S. funds to withdraw from NATO. In a highly symbolic move, Congress invited NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg to address the legislature.50 In addition, Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi led a delegation to the Munich Security Conference, a prominent transatlantic policy conference, where members emphasized Congress’ involvement in foreign policy to counteract allies’ fears about Trump’s behavior.51 Congress’ active efforts during this period affirm the broader proposition of this report – that Congress does play a role in foreign policy issues like alliance management.52 The question is whether lawmakers will be willing to play that role in future administrations when alliances are no longer seen as being under threat. “Bad cop” for allies. The function of critiquing undesirable actions extends to foreign nations. Congress frequently serves as a useful source of pressure on other countries, drawing attention to problematic behavior and opening the door for the executive branch to follow up with negotiations or other measures.

47 Fontaine and Schulman, “Congress’s Hidden Strengths;” Kliman, “China’s Power Play;” Ratner, “Blunting China’s Illiberal Order.” 48 Fowler, Watchdogs on the Hill; Guenov and Ross, “At a Crossroads;” interview with Senate committee staffer, December 2020. 49 Fontaine and Schulman, “Congress’s Hidden Strengths.” 50 Gordon and Wise, “Congress Moves to Block Trump’s Troop Cuts;” Gould, “U.S. House Votes Overwhelmingly to Bar US Exit From NATO;” Cooper and Barnes, “In Rare Speech to Congress, NATO Leader Says Allies Must Deter Moscow.” 51 Gould, “Congress’ Foreign Policy Flex in Europe.” 52 Interview with Nicholas Burns.

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When it comes to NATO, Congress has played the “bad cop” most frequently in the area of burden-sharing. Members routinely put pressure on allies to increase their contributions to the alliance, which gives executive-branch negotiators political cover to make the same demand because they can claim Congress is tying their hands. NATO expert Stanley Sloan is worth quoting at length on the history of congressional involvement in burden-sharing:

From the very beginning, the congressional partner regularly raised questions about the persistent burden-sharing issue. This questioning began with the initial debate in the Senate on whether it should give its advice and consent to the Treaty. The administration of President Harry Truman reassured senators that the European allies would contribute to their own defense and that the United States would not end up carrying a disproportionate share of the burden. As the European states recovered from the devastation of World War II, some senators argued that the Europeans had become capable of defending themselves. Montana’s Senator Mike Mansfield (D) famously promoted resolutions from the mid-1960s into the early 1970s that sought to force administrations to begin withdrawing US forces from Europe. While US administrations—Democratic and Republican—sought to contain the financial burdens and to get the Europeans to compensate the United States for some of NATO’s costs, the established pattern persisted into the post–Cold War years. Over all these years, Congress did most of the complaining while successive presidents of both parties urged allies to do more but largely defended the alliance and its costs as necessary for US national interests [emphasis added]. 53

Interviewees with experience in the executive branch repeatedly told me that congressional “complaining” or “needling,” sometimes seen as unproductive grandstanding, is actually a useful way to pressure allies and get issues on the agenda.54 To be sure, congressional critiques can also cause headaches for the executive branch if they create diplomatic friction. Interviewees emphasized the need for useful congressional pressure that is coordinated with the executive and stops short of disrupting fragile bilateral relationships. Spotlighting rights abuses abroad. Congress is similarly well-suited to draw attention to violations of human rights and other illiberal behavior in foreign countries. In addition to the reasons above, Congress has an advantage in this area because it interacts directly with issue-based advocacy groups, which frequently lobby members to take action on issues like arms sales and human rights.55 Members can target other countries’ bad behavior in a variety of ways. They may bring resolutions, circulate “Dear Colleague” letters, or condemn the behavior in floor

53 Sloan, “Donald Trump and NATO,” 223. For a more recent example of more muscular congressional involvement, see Gould, “Bill Would Make Pentagon Track Allied Defense Spending.” 54 Interviews with Jim Townsend and Robert Bell; interview with DoD official. 55 Interview with House committee staffer.

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statements or in the media. One of the most common tactics is also the most controversial: sanctions. The experts I interviewed were nearly unanimous in their agreement that Congress over-relies on sanctions. As American University’s Jordan Tama told me, “It tends to be a way for Congress to be able to demonstrate that it’s doing something without an issue without being particularly costly. You don’t have to spend money to impose sanctions, so there’s no need for appropriations.”56 Indeed, sanctions may have become a go-to tool precisely because they are one of the few things that are still easy for Congress to do in today’s climate. Sanctions have proved especially frustrating in the case of Turkey, which is subject to U.S. sanctions due to its purchase of the S-400 missile system from Russia. Interviewees expressed concern that Congress would not be able to unwind the sanctions on Turkey even after it came into compliance with U.S. demands, and worried more generally that Congress had over-involved itself.57 In this way, a congressional effort to punish bad behavior by an ally may have overstepped its bounds and crossed into the territory of undermining a delicate relationship. In general, Congress’ strength lies in calling attention to bad behavior and getting it on the bilateral agenda – but then stepping aside to let diplomats negotiate with the problematic partner, a process that is often delicate. One former Senate staffer invoked the common saying that “Congress is a hammer, not a scalpel,”58 while a current staffer similarly described the role as that of a “sharpener.” “Our job,” this staffer argued, “is to take the plans and policies of the executive branch and improve them. That is where we can add the most value, especially in foreign policy.”59 Influencing the executive agenda and shaping the narrative: A third set of strengths has to do with Congress’ ability to put priorities on the executive branch’s agenda and generally shape the domestic and international narrative around particular issues.60 These strengths, which are closely related to the “calling out wrongdoing” idea, similarly stem from Congress’ status as the representative of the American people, which endows its priorities with a unique legitimacy.

56 Interview with Jordan Tama. 57 Interviews with Jim Goldgeier, Emma Ashford, and Aaron Stein. 58 Interview with former Senate committee staffer, January 2021. 59 Interviews with Senate staffer, February 2021, and Kathleen McInnis. 60 Interview with Emma Ashford.

Congress frequently serves as a useful source of pressure on other countries, drawing attention to problematic behavior and opening the door for the executive branch to follow up.

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Narrative-shaping through hearings and more: Congressional attention to a given foreign policy priority can significantly influence the debate over that issue at home and abroad. Interviewees who have worked in the executive branch and with NATO agreed that both actors pay close attention to what happens in Congress. As Fontaine and Schulman argue, “Congress can play a vital role in encouraging, convening, and organizing public and alternative sources of information.”61 For instance, they argue that congressional hearings can uncover new issues or new ways of thinking about old issues.62 Nicholas Burns, former U.S. ambassador to NATO, told me that calling a hearing “shines a bright light on a big issue...It’s a convening power to ask members of the administration to appear before Congress and to engage in conversation and debate about the administration's policies.”63 As a 2018 Foreign Affairs article noted, “Hearings and investigations draw attention to neglected issues and can force administrations to rethink decisions. They can divert the executive branch from its priorities and focus the attention of the press.”64 The same applies to other non-legislative tools such as requests for briefings, resolutions, letters to the president and Cabinet officials, floor statements, and media interviews.65 Even resolutions, far from serving a purely symbolic function, can frame the narrative and push the administration to care about something.66 Reporting requirements: Congress can also influence the executive branch’s agenda by requesting a report on a particular issue, such as the amount each NATO ally is spending on defense.67 The executive branch sometimes dismisses congressionally mandated reports as busy work and even a waste of taxpayer money68, but Hill staffers argued that reports force the administration to pay attention to an issue.69 “The point is not to get the report,” one emphasized. “The point is to make a bunch of people think about it.”70 Informal authority, institutional memory, and longevity: Current and former staffers pointed out that the executive branch relies heavily on Congress because congressional staffers’ tenures last much longer than a presidential administration. Committee staff in particular have years of expertise and many relationships, which makes them an attractive source of consultation for administration officials as well as members of foreign

61 Fontaine and Schulman, “Congress’s Hidden Strengths.” 62 Fontaine and Schulman, “Congress’s Hidden Strengths.” 63 Interview with Nicholas Burns. 64 McKeon and Tess, “Congress and Foreign Policy.” 65 Fontaine and Schulman, “Congress’s Hidden Strengths.” 66 Interviews with Emma Ashford and Stanley Sloan. 67 Interview with Stanley Sloan; Gould, “Bill Would Make Pentagon Track Allied Defense Spending.” 68 Interviews with Robert Bell and Jim Townsend. 69 Interview with former Senate committee staffer, January 2021. 70 Interview with Senate staffer, February 2021. See also Lindsay, “Congress and Foreign Policy,” 618.

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governments.71 One staffer said that administration officials have two additional incentives (beyond simply getting congressional support for a policy) to build strong consultative relationships with Hill staffers: First, these relationships can help ensure that a policy retains support after that particular administration leaves office, since congressional staffers (especially committee staffers) stay for a long time. Second, relationships on the Hill expand administration staffers’ professional networks for future job searches.72

The point about durability is particularly important for NATO, since allies are worried that America may again elect a president with Trump-like views on alliances. The executive branch will be eager to secure congressional buy-in on its transatlantic policy to make clear that the policy will not easily be reversed under future administrations.73 These findings are consistent with James Curry’s research, which finds that

committee leaders and committee staff have become more influential sources of expertise as the traditional legislative process has eroded.74 Committee staffers can use their influence and longevity as a source of influence with the executive branch. Relationships abroad: Closely related, members of Congress and congressional staff have strong relationships with representatives of foreign governments. One staffer argued that congressional relationships with foreign dignitaries are underused and that behind-the-scenes diplomacy with members of Congress can have an important impact.75 Foreign dignitaries are often eager to engage with members of Congress, which is a source of legislative strength.76 Again, however, there’s a balance to be struck, as interviewees emphasized that the executive branch should retain the lead in diplomatic negotiations. Travel: An important part of congressional relationships with foreign counterparts is travel. Many experts argued that members of Congress can have a significant impact by traveling to a NATO-related location and meeting with stakeholders.77 Lawmakers sometimes travel with congressional delegations (CODELs) to places like NATO headquarters in Brussels and

71 Interview with Senate committee staffer, December 2020; Harbridge-Yong, “Congressional Capacity and Bipartisanship,” 248. 72 Interview with Senate staffer, February 2021. 73 Interview with Jim Goldgeier; interview with former Senate staffer, January 2021. 74 Curry, “Knowledge, Expertise, and Committee Power;” Crosson, et al, “How Experienced Legislative Staff Contribute to Effective Lawmaking.” 75 Interview with Senate committee staffer, December 2020; interview with Jordan Tama. 76 Interview with Richard Fontaine; interview with Senate staffer, February 2021. 77 Interview with Senate staffer, February 2021; interviews with Nicholas Burns and Jim Townsend.

One staffer argued that congressional relationships with foreign dignitaries are underused and that behind-the-scenes diplomacy with members of Congress can have an important impact.

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the Munich Security Conference. CODELs offer a chance to communicate American priorities to foreign governments, including wielding threats of punitive action if a country is seen as not cooperating.78 To be sure, it’s difficult to get members on these trips, in part because traveling to seemingly glamorous places like Europe may come off to constituents as spending taxpayer dollars on a luxurious getaway.79 More generally, NATO is low on the list of places that are worth members’ limited time. Still, members should note that travel offers a way to have a big impact, particularly on foreign governments. Congress retains significant influence on foreign policy despite today’s constrained environment and the executive branch’s general dominance of this area. Notably, most of these avenues of influence can be pursued in a highly partisan climate. Initiatives like spotlighting rights abuses abroad, critiquing the executive branch, and interacting with allies often have bipartisan support, while tactics like private conversations with foreign counterparts and statements to the media do not require reaching across the aisle at all.80 Perhaps most importantly, many of the legislature’s most important channels of influence are informal ones, largely separate from the formal, constitutional powers that today’s Congress often struggles to exercise. Indeed, Congress wields influence even when it does not pass legislation. As James Lindsay wrote three decades ago:

…focusing on the legislative track record captures only part of the story. Congress influences policy through several indirect means: anticipated reactions, changes in the decision-making process in the executive branch, and political grandstanding. Indeed, the same factors that frustrate congressional attempts to lead on foreign affairs encourage legislators to use indirect means to influence policy.81

Today, these indirect means may be even more important. This section has found that Congress does have a role to play on day-to-day foreign policy issues like alliance management, and that the legislative branch remains relevant despite the institutional and political constraints that hamper its governing capacity.

78 Interview with former Senate committee staffer, November 2020; interview with Nicholas Burns; Kliman, “China’s Power Play.” 79 Interview with Senate staffer, February 2021. 80 Interview with Jordan Tama. 81 Lindsay, “Congress and Foreign Policy.”

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Table 2.

Congress’ Avenues of Influence in Foreign Policy

Ø Checking the executive

Ø Influencing the executive agenda and changing the narrative

Ø Informal authority, institutional memory, and longevity

Ø Relationships abroad

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Recommendations In this section, I outline recommendations for members of Congress, member staff, and committee staff that address NATO’s top challenges using Congress’ avenues of influence in foreign policy. For each NATO challenge, I present recommendations in order of priority. I also offer several cross-cutting recommendations that aren’t specific to any challenge but would help strengthen the alliance. Finally, I offer several aspirational recommendations that are not feasible or desirable now, but would be worth considering in the longer term. Disagreements over alliance priorities: This is an area where Congress’ ability to set the agenda and shape the narrative can play an important role. Congressional signals about what it believes NATO’s top priorities are could go a long way, serving as a forcing function for the administration to sharpen its own thinking about NATO priorities, which in turn would clarify the picture for allies. I recommend:

Ø Request a briefing on the Biden administration’s priorities for NATO. A former Senate committee staffer argued that Congress is unsure how it can contribute to NATO policy not because it doesn’t know how to use its own tools, but because it doesn’t know the administration’s agenda for NATO.82 Briefings are a relatively low-cost way to gather information about the administration’s priorities, from which members of Congress take their cues. In addition, the very request for a briefing helps elevate the issue on the executive branch’s agenda, and the process of preparing for it can sharpen the executive branch’s thinking about the matter. Finally, the process may also have the added benefit of helping to create a working relationship between congressional and administration staff. In this way, a briefing on priorities fits Congress’ role as an agenda-setter and priority shaper, rather than the party taking the lead on actual management of the alliance.

Ø Participate in ongoing efforts to redefine NATO’s mission. The current Congress

has a timely opportunity to engage with two internal NATO processes that will shape the alliance’s future mission and purpose. The first is the “reflection process,” a study group convened to “reinforce Alliance unity, increase political consultation and coordination between Allies, and strengthen NATO’s political role.”83 In late 2020, the group published a report that included 138 recommendations to achieve those three goals.84 A reaction from members of Congress to the report could help the alliance choose which recommendations to focus on and develop a narrower, more feasible agenda for NATO policy meetings.

82 Interview with former Senate committee staffer, January 2021. 83 NATO, “Secretary General appoints group.” 84 NATO, “NATO 2030.”

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Congressional engagement on the reflection process could take the form of a joint letter to the secretary general responding to the report, a request to the administration for further information about some of the recommendations, or simply a public statement endorsing certain recommendations while expressing the need for more study on others. One interviewee suggested that the Senate NATO observers’ group, an informal existing group of senators who are interested in NATO, could take the lead on this initiative.85 Second, Congress can influence the coming update of NATO’s Strategic Concept. The Strategic Concept is the primary official statement of alliance priorities, and is updated periodically via a process that convenes the allies and reconciles their concerns into a single guiding document.86 NATO is likely to convene another update soon (the last one was in 2010), which offers an opportunity for Congress to influence the discussions.87 To do this, members could request information from the administration about its own vision for the Strategic Concept, either via a written product or a briefing. After securing that information, members could issue a statement or letter detailing which issues they believe the Strategic Concept updating process should address.

Transatlantic tensions over burden-sharing: Burden-sharing is the area of NATO policy where Congress has traditionally been most active. Congressional pressure, calibrated effectively, can give the executive branch leverage with allies. The legislative branch, as the representative of the American taxpayer and the overseer of the U.S. defense budget, is well-equipped to play this role. However, Congress should consider several caveats. First, the issue of burden-sharing is especially sensitive after the Trump presidency. With allies wary that future U.S. administrations will treat burden-sharing the way Trump did,88 congressional pressure could easily become a source of friction. Second, while Congress may find it politically valuable to crack down on “free-riding” allies, ultimately the executive branch does the negotiating.89 A heavy-handed congressional approach that isn’t coordinated with the executive could disrupt ongoing diplomatic efforts on a variety of issues. With these obstacles in mind, members of Congress can contribute to a better burden-sharing debate by keeping in mind Stanley Sloan’s idea of “constructive pressure.”90 Members can signal their continued wish for more equitable allied contributions without weaponizing the issue (particularly in public). At the same time, they can make an

85 Interview with former Senate committee staffer, January 2021. 86 NATO, “Strategic Concepts;” interviews with Chris Skaluba, Jim Goldgeier, and Jim Townsend. 87 Interview with Jim Goldgeier. 88 Erlanger, “Europe Wonders If It Can Rely on U.S.” 89 Interview with Frances Lee. 90 Interview with Stanley Sloan.

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important concession to allied concerns by showing that they understand the problems with the two percent metric and are open to rethinking it. In this way, Congress could help tackle the burden-sharing challenge as well as the “need for new metrics” challenge.91 I recommend:

Ø Use carefully framed NDAA language to focus attention on burden-sharing. Congress should insert language about burden-sharing into the much-watched annual National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), one of the only pieces of foreign policy legislation that Congress consistently passes. The NDAA is one of Congress’ most important formal tools for influencing foreign policy, and the executive branch and foreign countries pay close attention to it.

In the spirit of “constructive pressure” and given lingering concerns about the Trump era, it’s important that any NDAA language on burden-sharing avoid a punitive or demanding tone. One approach might be to emphasize the importance of equitable burden-sharing while avoiding specific reference to the two percent metric, which carries some sensitivity because it has been wielded as a hammer in the past. This approach would also have the advantage of opening the door to new proposals for measuring contributions.

On this and other recommendations, congressional practitioners should keep in mind that their strengths are setting the agenda, shaping the narrative, and convening political support for priorities, not legislating specific alliance policies. Even fairly vague NDAA language can serve this purpose. Compared to more detailed provisions, general language is also likely to be more feasible for members to agree on and more helpful to the executive branch and to NATO.

Ø Encourage allies to meet their commitments, but be constructive. Several

interviewees suggested that members of Congress should directly communicate to foreign counterparts that burden-sharing is important to them, while avoiding being overly punitive or calling countries out publicly. 92

91 Interview with Jeremy Shapiro. 92 Interview with Jim Townsend; interview with former Senate committee staffer, January 2021.

Burden-sharing and contribution metrics present an opportunity for Congress to act as a “bad cop” while shifting the conversation to focus on acquiring the most important capabilities.

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Ø Acknowledge other forms of contribution. Individual members can use hearings, briefings, statements to the media, and Dear Colleague letters to build a two-pronged narrative: Allies need to meet their defense spending commitments, but contributions to NATO consist of more than just military spending numbers.93 Again, members should remember that as narrative-shapers and agenda-setters, they can make a meaningful contribution to the burden-sharing debate by simply engaging with it. They don’t need to have a specific solution or policy proposal in mind before they can get involved.

A need for new metrics: My recommendations on this challenge go hand in hand with the ones above. There is almost universal agreement among experts that the two percent metric is inadequate, and many go a step further to argue that the problems with the metric are overshadowing the strategic value of burden-sharing and collective defense in the first place.94 However, it’s also clear that two percent has some political and diplomatic value – including to members of Congress. Given how entrenched the two percent metric is, Congress’ most helpful contribution will be to help open a debate, rather than definitively advocating for one metric or another. There are several ways in which lawmakers can help shift the narrative toward spending better rather than spending more.95 Crucially, none of these steps preclude putting pressure on allies to contribute more. Burden-sharing and contribution metrics present an opportunity for Congress to act as a “bad cop” while shifting the conversation to focus on acquiring the most important capabilities rather than simply increasing their spending.

Ø Convene a hearing on metrics for measuring allied commitment. This hearing could be titled “Bolstering NATO’s Capabilities: Measuring Allied Contributions to Maximize Collective Security,” to convey a primary focus on making NATO stronger while also conceding that contributions are not being measured effectively. This would be a powerful, relatively low-cost way for Congress to signal to allies that the United States wants to improve the existing system. (Signaling openness to non-defense metrics might also make allies more receptive when America does push for defense spending). The hearing should convene critics and defenders of the two percent metric to debate ways of measuring allies’ contributions to NATO that better connect to the mission those contributions are meant to enable. This is the only challenge for which I have suggested a hearing, because it involves an issue where a clear, public signal from Congress would be helpful. Because two percent has been a source of toxicity in the transatlantic relationship, and because

93 Interview with former Senate committee staffer, January 2021. 94 Interview with Kathleen McInnis; Mehta, “How Kathleen Hicks will approach nukes, shipbuilding and the budget.” 95 Here, I paraphrase Sen. John McCain, qtd. in Dowdy, “More Tooth, Less Tail.”

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Congress itself is an obstacle to rethinking the metric, a public hearing on new metrics would be a very positive signal with relatively little risk of upsetting allies. The more likely downside is that Congress could appear inept if it moves to establish new metrics that don’t go anywhere.

Ø Talk to allies about how they want to redefine contribution. In parallel with convening experts to explore alternatives to two percent, members of Congress should gather information from allied counterparts as well. This recommendation would be easy to implement because anytime a member of Congress meets with a representative of a NATO country, burden-sharing is likely to come up. A slight modification of the talking points to acknowledge the member’s openness to rethinking burden-sharing metrics would have outsize effects. In the longer term, continued U.S. pressure on allies to spend more on defense combined with new contribution metrics could form the contours of a sustainable arrangement in which each side gets some of what it wants. Brookings expert and former State Department official Jeremy Shapiro suggested this compromise, noting that it would also have the advantage of bringing together Democrats who want to see the definition of security broadened beyond the military realm and Republicans who want to see allies spend more on defense.96

Sense of poor adaptation to modern threats: While NATO’s effort to adapt to new challenges is a debate that will play out largely in Brussels, Congress can help to clarify NATO’s changing role in the 21st century international security environment.

Ø Publicly highlight NATO’s under-appreciated strengths, including on China. The discussion of NATO’s challenges noted three strengths that are not generally part of the alliance’s narrative: its interoperability and military capacity; its role as a forum for transatlantic policymaking on issues like China; and its role as a community of likeminded democracies. Congress can use its narrative-shaping strength to emphasize these functions, which will clarify what NATO actually does and help counter the perception that NATO is a Cold War relic. For advocates of NATO, highlighting the alliance as a highly effective military force capable of fighting 21st-century wars, developing policies to counter China, and managing complex logistics problems would be a more effective way to make the case for allocating resources to the alliance. And even for NATO skeptics, clarifying what the alliance actually does would open the door to a better debate about whether it still matters. If more people saw NATO as the military force fighting in Afghanistan or the venue where countries air their perspectives on China, skeptics

96 Interview with Jeremy Shapiro.

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would have a useful starting point for debating whether these functions are worth the cost to taxpayers. While shifting NATO’s narrative will be a gradual, long-term process, members of Congress can make a significant contribution by changing the way they discuss NATO in public statements and at hearings, as well as through the types of information they request. For instance, lawmakers could schedule a hearing on NATO’s role in countering China, request a report on prospects for continued NATO involvement in Afghanistan, or publicly praise the alliance’s role in responding to the COVID-19 pandemic. Acknowledgment of these less visible functions can help gradually shift Americans’ perception of the alliance while also clarifying to NATO itself what its main strengths are.

Ø Deepen engagement with the European Union and other multinational bodies. Members of Congress should also keep in mind that effective transatlantic policy requires relationships with other multinational bodies, most importantly, the European Union. The European Union, not NATO, dominates Europe’s economic approach to China.97 More generally, the European Union has significant economic, political, and regulatory power and is a dominant voice on issues like regulating large tech platforms, trade, climate, Middle East diplomacy, and more.98 Lawmakers should ensure they understand the EU’s role and have relationships with EU policymakers.99 The bipartisan European Union Caucus in Congress, as well as the Transatlantic Legislator’s Dialogue, are two existing fora that could facilitate more congressional coordination with EU counterparts.100

Internal challenges by Turkey and other “backsliders.” Congress is well-suited to call out the erosion of democratic norms in NATO allies Turkey, Hungary, and Poland.101 Lawmakers have leaned on these strengths to take punitive actions toward Turkey in recent years, imposing secondary sanctions as well as freezing arms sales.102 However, my research has also shown that congressional involvement in the U.S.-Turkey relationship and other bilateral negotiations carries risks. In particular, I found almost

97 Deni and Schatzer, “China’s Economic Statecraft.” 98 Interview with Emma Ashford. 99 Interview with Olivier-Remy Bel. 100 European Parliament, “EU-US Relations.” 101 Interview with Stanley Sloan. 102 Insinna, Gould, and Mehta, “Congress Has Secretly Blocked US Arms Sales.”

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universal skepticism about the efficacy of sanctions.103 A former Senate staffer cautioned that congressional overinvolvement could put too much pressure on the fragile relationship, pushing Turkey further into the orbit of Russia.104 Turkey expert Aaron Stein, asked how Congress could contribute on the issue going forward, answered bluntly: “The congressional role here now is basically to stop.”105 As such, I steered away from recommendations that might create friction with allies or upstage existing negotiations, as well as from vocal public criticisms.

Instead, my recommendations emphasize Congress’ “declaratory” role106: narrative-shaping and keeping the issue on the agenda, as well as taking steps to ensure sanctions on Turkey can be unwound.

Ø Help shift NATO’s narrative to highlight democratic values. NATO’s primary function as a military alliance is far better understood (and more widely agreed on) than its more nebulous secondary role as a community of democracies with shared values.107 Just as Congress can shift the narrative by emphasizing NATO’s military and consultative strengths, it can highlight NATO’s role as an alliance of values. Such signals would indicate that Congress is paying attention to the behavior of Turkey, Hungary, and Poland while avoiding an overly public callout that could create diplomatic friction or undermine other areas of cooperation. Members can use questions at hearings and briefings, media statements, and private conversations with allied counterparts to emphasize that they understand that NATO is a community of democracies in addition to a military alliance. In this way, it will lend urgency to the backsliding issue and elevate it on NATO’s agenda.108

Ø Quietly discuss backsliding with allies and the executive branch. Given the risks of congressional over-involvement in bilateral relationships, Congress can use some of the more private tools at its disposal – such as informal discussions with foreign counterparts and closed-door briefings – to elevate Turkey, Hungary, and Poland on the agenda without risking a public spat.

103 Interview with Jeremy Shapiro. 104 Interview with former Senate committee staffer, January 2021. 105 Interview with Aaron Stein. 106 Interview with Stanley Sloan. 107 Interviews with Olivier-Remy Bel, Emma Ashford, and Kathleen McInnis; interview with former Senate committee staffer, November 2020. 108 Interview with Olivier-Remy Bel.

Congressional practitioners should keep in mind that their strengths are setting the agenda, shaping the narrative, and convening political support for priorities.

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Ø Avoid additional sanctions on Turkey. Congress has already taken legislative action against Turkey in the form of secondary sanctions for Turkey’s purchase of a Russian missile system. While interviewees were split on the wisdom of imposing these sanctions in the first place, they generally agreed that the sanctions will be difficult to unwind, which could make it hard to convince Turkey to reverse its behavior. Instead of focusing on further penalties, members of Congress should consider creative ideas for undoing the sanctions if Turkey comes into compliance.109

Cross-cutting recommendations: Below, I outline recommendations that don’t correspond to any particular challenge, but emerged from the research as generally helpful ways for Congress to engage with NATO.

Ø Increase travel to Europe (and engage with allies virtually). One of the strongest points of agreement across my interviews was the impact members of Congress can have by traveling to places like Brussels or the Munich Security Conference. Experts repeatedly stressed that lawmakers make a big difference by just showing up.110 CODELs have an important narrative-shaping function, as shown when lawmakers traveled to Munich during the height of Trump’s tensions with NATO. In addition, traveling helps members and staff learn about NATO and build relationships their counterparts in allied countries. It’s true that members will not be willing to prioritize travel to Europe, both because such trips may appear like gratuitous luxuries and because being active on NATO doesn’t offer political dividends. Even so, my research showed that there are many reasons beyond narrow electoral interest that members choose to get involved in certain issues.111 They may become interested in NATO because of personal connections to the issue, constituencies with European heritage, relevant committee assignments, previous interactions with the subject matter, or a mere desire to have an impact.112 As such, members and staff with NATO in their portfolios should seek out opportunities to bring diverse groups of lawmakers onto CODELs. Moreover, arranging member interactions with foreign dignitaries is much easier when those dignitaries visit Washington or when meetings or conferences are virtual.113

109 Interview with Emma Ashford. 110 Interviews with Jim Townsend, and Nicholas Burns; interviews with Senate staffer, February 2021, and former Senate committee staffer, November 2020. 111 Fenno, Home Style; McCormick and Mitchell, “Commitments, Transnational Interests, and Congress.” 112 Interview with Richard Fontaine. 113 Interview with former Senate committee staffer, January 2021.

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Ø Deepen legislative-executive ties for a better working relationship. Interviewees with backgrounds in both the legislative and executive branches repeatedly emphasized the value of open, friendly, and collaborative ties between the administration and Congress.114 One congressional staffer acknowledged that people on Capitol Hill don’t spend enough time with people implementing the laws they pass. The staffer argued that when the two branches don’t collaborate, the result can be an “abusive relationship” in which the legislative branch foists requirements on the executive without understanding why the measures will be difficult to implement.115

114 Interviews with Senate committee staffer, December 2020, and Senate staffer, February 2021. 115 Interview with Senate committee staffer, December 2020. See also interviews with Emma Ashford and Jim Townsend.

The Role of the Executive Branch: View from the Hill

While this report is about Congress, interviews with current and former congressional staffers yielded useful insights about how the executive branch could improve the way it interacts with Capitol Hill. The main takeaways were that while the executive branch clearly leads on most foreign policy initiatives, it can get positive reinforcement from members of Congress by equipping them with information about its priorities. Transparency is key: Staffers emphasized that they consistently have far less information than members of the executive branch do, and that the lack of information-sharing is a frequent source of tension. One suggested that whenever possible, the administration should share information about its initiatives early on, rather than waiting until they become public. Help with CODELs: Another suggestion from a former staffer was that the administration make more effort to provide members of Congress with briefs and talking points prior to trips abroad. This would ensure better legislative-executive coordination because lawmakers would have a sense of the White House’s agenda when speaking with allies. A congressional education campaign: One ex-staffer went even further, advocating for a concerted effort by the administration to educate members on its view of the NATO challenge. The staffer argued that a robust outreach effort, including engagement with the relevant committees and members, would help assuage European fears about a future Trump-like administration because Congress would become more invested in the alliance. Pursue informal collaboration: Finally, staffers noted the value of collaborating with the executive outside of formal settings. Nearly every staffer I spoke with mentioned the value of informal phone calls or meetings over drinks to build better working relationships with their executive-branch counterparts.

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Establishing these ties is a two-way effort, and there is a general expectation that the executive branch takes the lead on proposing foreign policy initiatives and reaching out to Congress about them (see “The Role of the Executive Branch,” pg. 32). For their part, however, congressional staff can contribute to better ties by reaching out to new members of the administration to build relationships as well as to gauge possible concerns about upcoming congressional initiatives that might clash with executive priorities.

Ø Interact with other parliamentary bodies: Congress can play to its diplomatic strengths by taking advantage of the numerous venues for U.S. lawmakers to engage with parliamentarians abroad. For instance, the NATO Parliamentary Assembly offers a way for members to build relationships with, and communicate priorities to, lawmakers in allied nations. Several interviewees said these channels would be especially useful in focusing the alliance’s attention on China.116

Aspirational recommendations: Below, I offer four recommendations that are not feasible or desirable now, but would be worth considering under the right circumstances in the longer term.

Ø Use NDAA language to attach funding to specific priorities. The recommendations outlined thus far are meant to push the U.S. government to figure out its vision for NATO during a time of flux. Once those priorities become clear, Congress can use its formal powers to direct funds toward the relevant initiatives. Most importantly, it can use the NDAA to attach conditions to the funds authorized for NATO-related purposes. However, in the short term, the focus should be on determining what the alliance’s priorities are and building domestic consensus around those priorities.

Ø Bring back allied contribution reports, but with better metrics. Over the years, Congress has frequently required the executive branch to submit reports detailing the level of contribution each country is making to NATO.117 Today, members routinely introduce bills of this nature as a way of putting pressure on allies.118 In the future, such reports could be a useful way to clarify the state of burden-sharing in NATO, put the issue on the executive’s agenda, and get underpaying allies to pay attention. However, as long as the 2 percent metric remains the main way to quantify allied commitment, mandating such a report would be counterproductive because it would essentially double down on 2 percent rather than fostering a debate about better metrics. Moreover, publicly cataloguing who is meeting their 2 percent commitments would be especially sensitive given the damage done by

116 Interviews with Richard Fontaine, Stanley Sloan, and Nicholas Burns. See also NATO, “Our Mission;” Smith et. al., “Charting a Transatlantic Course,” and Ratner, “Blunting China’s Illiberal Order.” 117 Interview with Stanley Sloan. 118 Gould, “Bill Would Make Pentagon Track Allied Defense Spending.”

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Trump. As such, Congress should hold off on this until the diplomatic climate is more favorable and there is more consensus on how to measure allied contribution.

Ø Pass a resolution declaring that NATO is an alliance of values. This recommendation is a more concrete version of the proposal to “Publicly highlight the alliance’s democratic values.” One interviewee argued that democratic backsliding was the alliance’s biggest challenge and said a clear statement from the United States affirming NATO’s democratic values would have a major impact on the alliance’s efforts to deal with Turkey, Hungary, and Poland. A resolution from Congress would be an ideal way to communicate this. In the short term, this is unlikely to happen given that members of Congress who do pay attention to NATO are largely focused on its military relevance. However, if the narrative shifts in the future to emphasize NATO’s “softer” strengths, a resolution affirming NATO’s values would be a useful way to combat backsliding.

Ø Commission a blue-ribbon panel to study NATO’s relevance to U.S. security. In the longer term, the United States should address the more fundamental question about whether the transatlantic relationship is still relevant. While most experts generally favor a recalibrated status quo, others have argued that the United States should gradually scale back troop commitments in Europe, eliminate the nuclear “umbrella” over allied countries, and generally prepare to make the case for a reduced American commitment to alliances.119 To determine the long-term future of U.S. commitment, Congress should task an independent panel with assessing NATO’s continued value to U.S. national security. However, I have classified this as a future recommendation because in the short term, commissioning such a panel would almost certainly create friction with allies given the questions raised during the Trump era about U.S. commitment to NATO. A more serious version of this recommendation that I considered but ultimately discarded would be to codify the U.S. commitment to the transatlantic alliance through legislation. While I began this project assuming that some sort of legislative solution would be central to my recommendations, I concluded that legislation on NATO would overstep the appropriate legislative-executive boundaries in foreign policy. Interviewees made clear that while Congress has not been doing its job on foreign policy, that job is to refine, sharpen, and critique the executive branch’s policy rather than crafting policy itself. For this reason, it is not desirable for Congress to legally mandate a certain level or type of U.S. commitment to Europe. Rather, it should use its avenues of influence to push the executive branch to put forth a strategy, and then question and improve that strategy.

119 Wertheim, “Americans, Go Home?”; Walt, “It’s Time to Fold America’s Nuclear Umbrella;” Shifrinson, “Time to Consolidate NATO?”

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Table 3: Summary of Recommendations.

NATO Challenge

Recommendations

Disagreements over priorities

Ø Request a briefing on the Biden administration’s priorities for NATO. Ø Participate in ongoing efforts to redefine NATO’s mission.

Tensions over burden-sharing

Ø Use careful NDAA language to focus attention on burden-sharing. Ø Encourage allies to meet their commitments, but be constructive. Ø Acknowledge other forms of contribution.

Need for new metrics

Ø Convene a hearing on metrics for measuring allied commitment. Ø Talk to allies about how they want to redefine contribution.

Sense of poor adaptation to modern threats

Ø Publicly highlight NATO’s under-appreciated strengths, i.e. on China. Ø Deepen engagement with the EU and other multinational bodies.

Democratic backsliding

Ø Help shift NATO’s narrative to highlight democratic values. Ø Quietly discuss backsliding with allies and the executive branch. Ø Avoid additional sanctions on Turkey.

Cross-cutting

Ø Increase travel to Europe (and engage with allies virtually). Ø Deepen legislative-executive ties for a better working relationship. Ø Interact with other parliamentary bodies.

Aspirational/ Longer-term

Ø Use NDAA language to attach funding to specific priorities. Ø Bring back allied contribution reports, but with better metrics. Ø Pass a resolution declaring that NATO is an alliance of values. Ø Commission a blue-ribbon panel to study NATO’s relevance

to U.S. security.

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Cautions, Caveats, and Challenges Here, I consider potential obstacles to the successful adoption of my recommendations and other limitations of this report. U.S. policy toward NATO may need a more serious overhaul. This paper has not argued that the U.S-Europe relationship needs to be fundamentally rethought at this time, either by making the U.S. commitment to Europe more robust or by jettisoning U.S. support. There are two reasons for this. First, a highly divided Congress is unlikely to be able to pass any measures that would majorly overhaul U.S. transatlantic policy, particularly in the aftermath of the Trump presidency. Second, with some exceptions, the experts I encountered during the research process favored a modified version of the status quo: In general, they argued that Europe needed to be less passive in providing for its own defense, but that the basic precepts of the transatlantic relationship should not change. However, I acknowledge that my recommendations may not go far enough to challenge the status quo, particularly for those who believe the U.S. should scale back its commitments sooner rather than later. It is possible that more drastic action is needed to force Europeans to pay their fair share and allow the United States to focus on other strategic priorities. I have suggested examples of what those more drastic actions might be in the “Aspirational recommendations” section, while explaining why the current political and diplomatic climate is more conducive to incremental change. As the debate over U.S. commitment to Europe moves forward and future administrations clarify whether they intend to depart from the transatlantic status quo, it would be fruitful for further research to continue probing how Congress can contribute. Congress may find it difficult to prioritize NATO. A potential obstacle to implementing these recommendations is that members of Congress may not care enough about NATO, either because other foreign policy issues take priority or because NATO isn’t politically useful for them. Indeed, while members of Congress generally support Europe, most are unwilling to spend much time, money, or political capital on it. NATO’s lower place on the foreign policy agenda is undeniable. Its importance may drop even further in the coming months and years, with Trump’s attacks on NATO out of the picture, Washington “focused like a laser beam on China,”120 and defense dollars getting scarcer.121 This paper has taken that limitation as a starting premise. But it is precisely because Congress is unlikely to have much time for NATO that I have emphasized low-cost recommendations that are easy to take on and will have outsize effects in the executive branch and allied capitals. The findings in this report should be useful to staffers who have

120 Interview with Richard Fontaine. 121 Interviews with Chris Skaluba, Kathleen McInnis, and Stanley Sloan.

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NATO and Europe in their portfolios and seek to contribute on these issues while reserving time and energy for other priorities. Moreover, it is undoubtedly true that working on transatlantic policy does not pay direct political dividends with constituents. However, political scientists have shown that members get involved in issues for a variety of reasons beyond narrow electoral considerations, including seeking institutional power within Congress and a desire to do “good public policy.”122 Indeed, as a 2007 study noted, a narrow electoral view of member motivation does not explain why legislators regularly spend time on things like human rights. The study went on to argue that internationally focused NGOs play a role in motivating members of Congress to get involved on issues such as human rights.123 Interviewees confirmed that lawmakers routinely choose to work in issues that have no direct electoral relevance.124 It is reasonable to expect that some members will retain strong interest in transatlantic issues, while others will exhibit “softer” commitments that will vary according to what is in the news and on the congressional agenda. Congress may be too hamstrung to enact meaningful change. Finally, in a divided Congress hampered by polarization and capacity problems, even relatively “low-lift” recommendations may be out of reach. This limitation is unavoidable. Even so, one of the main conclusions of this paper is that seemingly symbolic or incremental steps by Congress have a disproportionate impact on the administration and on allies abroad. Moreover, most of the actions I propose can be undertaken by a single member or small group of members and do not require bipartisan support or significant expenditure of resources. Finally, it’s worth noting that scholars have found that bipartisan action on some foreign policy issues remains feasible, notwithstanding a highly polarized climate.125 Even if they cannot be implemented, my recommendations should at least spur new thinking about how Congress can regain its voice on foreign policy amid political and institutional obstacles that are not going away anytime soon.

122 Fenno, Home Style; Lovett, “Individual Members of Congress and Policy Change,” 11. 123 McCormick and Mitchell, “Commitments, Transnational Interests, and Congress.” 124 Interviews with Richard Fontaine and Nicholas Burns. 125 Interview with Jordan Tama; Böller and Herr, “From Washington Without Love;” Harbridge-Yong, “Congressional Capacity and Bipartisanship,” 252.

It is precisely because Congress is unlikely to have much time for NATO that I have emphasized low-cost recommendations that are easy to take on and will have outsize effects in the executive branch and allied capitals.

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Conclusion

This report has provided a blueprint for members of Congress, member staff, and committee staff who seek a larger role for the legislative branch in shaping U.S. policy toward NATO and Europe. I have supplemented prior research on Congress’ indirect avenues of influence with the testimony of congressional staffers and other government officials, and extended their insights about congressional influence to apply specifically to the issue of NATO. However, this research has also yielded a general set of principles for how Congress can shape foreign policy at a while when budgets, bandwidth, and bipartisanship are all diminishing. A few of the most important insights are: Congressional buy-in confers legitimacy. While Congress’ partisan tendencies and seeming inability to get things done sometimes induce frustration and disdain in the foreign policy community, legislative buy-in bestows a unique legitimacy on policy. This legitimacy, one staffer argued, is a direct product of how difficult it is to get an initiative through Congress – the institutional and procedural obstacles to any congressional action are precisely what give those actions weight.126 Congress’ power to appropriate or deny funding and its role as the representative of the people legitimize its actions even further. When Congress acts, Washington and the world pay attention. Because Congress confers legitimacy and because its members are (on balance) less active on foreign policy, the legislative branch has a disproportionate impact when it does act. The executive branch and foreign governments pay close attention to what Congress does, which gives members a unique tool for shaping these stakeholders’ agendas.127 Notably, interviewees generally agreed that Congress can have this sort of impact on the executive branch and allies even through low-cost actions like informal conversations with foreign diplomats or statements to the press. Congress’ ability to directly influence foreign governments, in particular, is an interesting finding of this project and an important exception to the overall reality that the legislative branch is less influential than the executive on foreign policy. The executive branch leads, but Congress refines and sharpens. Finally, when calibrated correctly, the executive-legislative relationship on foreign policy works quite well, with clear, complementary roles for each branch. Interviewees generally agreed on the basic contours of this relationship: The executive branch largely has the initiative, but Congress’ role is to critique, refine, sharpen, and underscore.128 Neither branch can formulate good foreign policy without the other. To be sure, this balance may often get thrown off in practice, and it’s easy to find examples of Congress and the executive branch clashing. However, this

126 Interview with Senate staffer, February 2021. 127 Interview with Jordan Tama. 128 Interviews with Kathleen McInnis and Stanley Sloan; interview with Senate staffer, February 2021.

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research suggests such clashes may be unavoidable – and perhaps even desirable – when two very different institutions bring their respective incentives and capabilities to bear on crafting foreign policy. Seventy-three years after Arthur Vandenberg helped ensure that Congress would have an active role in shaping the nascent Atlantic Alliance, various political, institutional, geopolitical, and other structural factors have shifted the balance of power in U.S. foreign policy toward the executive branch and away from Congress. Meanwhile, outside of foreign policy, Congress has acquired a reputation for being unwilling or unable to perform basic legislative functions. The institutional obstacles to a more robust role for the legislative branch are numerous and challenging. However, this report has shown that Capitol Hill does not need to wait for high-level structural change before it can contribute substantively to foreign and national security policy. In fact, alliance management may be an especially fruitful place to start this process, since it is an area where low-cost efforts from Congress can have outsize effects on the constituencies that matter (allies and the executive branch). It is my hope that this report has equipped members of Congress and congressional staff with useful tools to improve NATO and U.S.-Europe relations, while also contributing to a more granular and accurate understanding of where Congress’ power lies.

“Our job is to take the plans and policies of the executive branch and improve them.” -Senate staffer

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Appendix 1: Interviews

Interviewees: Name Affiliation/Expertise Interview Date

Anonymous Professional staff member on a House committee November 2020 Anonymous Former professional staff member on a Senate committee November 2020 Robert Bell CEO of National Security Counsel; professor at Georgia

Tech; former Senior Civilian Representative of the Secretary of Defense in Europe and Defense Advisor to the U.S. Ambassador to NATO

December 2020

Anonymous Defense Department official based in Europe; former NATO advisor

December 2020

Jeremy Shapiro Brookings Institution; former State Department official December 2020 Anonymous Professional staff member on a Senate committee December 2020 Jordan Tama American University; political scientist focused on

congressional-executive relations in foreign policy December 2020

Rachel Rizzo Truman Project; researcher focusing on transatlantic issues December 2020 Nicholas Burns Harvard Kennedy School; former U.S. ambassador to NATO December 2020 Jim Townsend Center for a New American Security; former Deputy

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Europe and NATO January 2021

Emma Ashford Atlantic Council; researcher focused on grand strategy and U.S. foreign policy

January 2021

Stan Sloan Middlebury College; formerly at Congressional Research Service; scholar focused on NATO and transatlantic issues

January 2021

Olivier-Remy Bel Atlantic Council; formerly at French Ministry of Defense January 2021 Anonymous Former professional staff member on a Senate committee January 2021 Aaron Stein Foreign Policy Research Institute; researcher focusing on

Turkey and Middle East February 2021

Jim Goldgeier Brookings Institution; American University; political scientist who has written extensively about NATO

February 2021

Anonymous Senate staffer focused on national security issues February 2021 Ted Galen Carpenter

CATO Institute; author of several books on NATO and alliances

February 2021

Christopher Skaluba

Atlantic Council; former Principal Director for Europe and NATO at U.S. Department of Defense

February 2021

Kathleen McInnis Congressional Research Service February 2021 Constanze Stelzenmüller

Brookings Institution; expert on German foreign policy and transatlantic issues; German foreign policy expert

March 2021

Frances Lee Princeton University; political scientist focused on Congress March 2021 Richard Fontaine Center for a New American Security; former foreign policy

advisor to Sen. John McCain March 2021

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Interviews were conducted via Zoom video call or via phone. For the most part, they lasted between 30 and 45 minutes. Interview Questions: NATO:

Ø What priorities are highest on NATO’s agenda in the post-Trump era? Ø How should the United States change the way it approaches the alliance? Ø What kinds of interactions did you, as a NATO or executive branch

practitioner, have with Congress? Congress:

Ø What tools does Congress have on foreign policy that you think are underused?

Ø What pushes a member of Congress to become interested in a given issue? Ø When does the legislative-executive relationship work best? When does it

break down? Ø What do you hope the Biden administration will do when it comes to

working with Congress on foreign policy? NATO & Congress:

Ø How can Congress contribute to reshaping the U.S. approach to NATO? Ø How can Congress contribute to the debate over NATO burden-sharing? Ø How should Congress respond to democratic backsliding in Turkey,

Hungary, and Poland? Ø Does member travel have a meaningful impact on the alliance?

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Appendix 2: Ethics and Transparency Statement To maintain ethical standards in conducting interviews, I provided interviewees with the option to be anonymous, and only recorded interviews with permission. None of the interviewees were deemed to be members of vulnerable communities.

Every interviewee received a document outlining the project’s intentions and the research ethics procedures it was adhering to. The document is reproduced here.

Interviewee Information and Consent Form: Usha Sahay

Background • This interview is being conducted by myself, Usha Sahay, a graduate student at the

Harvard Kennedy School, to inform my Policy Analysis Exercise (PAE), tentatively titled, “A Congressional Role for Revitalizing NATO in the Post-Trump Era.”

• I am completing the PAE as part of the graduation requirements for the degree of Master in Public Policy, as well as on behalf of my PAE client, Jacqueline Ramos of the House Foreign Affairs Committee.

• I am providing this document to each interviewee in order to comply with university rules surrounding ethical research and informed consent.

The Interview • You will be participating voluntarily in the interview, which will run for 30-45

minutes and be conducted over Zoom. • You can stop the interview at any time and/or refuse to answer any questions. • There are no material risks or benefits to your participation, other than possible

reputational impacts if you are quoted by name. • The interview will be recorded, and the recording will not be provided to anyone

without your express consent. If you have any concerns about the recording, please let me know.

• Before commencing the interview, I’ll ask you to provide your verbal consent to all of the information contained in this form.

Confidentiality and Public Availability • You can opt to be quoted/paraphrased either explicitly or anonymously.

Explicit citation: Power, Samantha, author interview, January 20, 2020, Cambridge, MA. Anonymous citation: Former UN official, author interview, January 20, 2020, Cambridge, MA.

• Upon completion, the PAE will be provided to Ms. Ramos, to other members of the committee that she chooses to share it with, and to my faculty advisors at HKS. It will also be available to Harvard affiliates as a hard copy in the library.

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• If at any point after the PAE is submitted I decide to turn it or parts of it into a public product, I will request your express consent before doing so.

Resources • If you have any questions, concerns, or complaints about the research or the

interview, you may contact me (ushasahay@hks.harvard.edu), my faculty advisor Stephen Walt (Stephen_Walt@hks.harvard.edu) or my seminar leader Dara Kay Cohen (dara_cohen@hks.harvard.edu).

• You may also email paeresearch@hks.harvard.edu,which is monitored by a faculty committee knowledgeable about research ethics.

Belfer Center for Science and International A!airs Harvard Kennedy School 79 JFK Street Cambridge, MA 02138

www.belfercenter.org

Copyright 2021, President and Fellows of Harvard College