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Issue 38 • January 2017
in this issue
Peter R. Mansoor • Angelo M. Codevilla • Bing West
Revitalizing America’s Security
Editorial BoardVictor Davis Hanson, Chair
Bruce ThorntonDavid Berkey
Contributing MembersPeter Berkowitz
Max BootJosiah Bunting III
Angelo M. CodevillaThomas Donnelly
Admiral James O. Ellis Jr.Colonel Joseph Felter
Josef JoffeEdward N. Luttwak
Peter R. MansoorGeneral James Mattis
Walter Russell MeadMark Moyar
Williamson MurrayRalph Peters
Andrew RobertsAdmiral Gary Roughead
Kori SchakeKiron K. Skinner
Barry StraussBing West
Miles Maochun Yu
ContentsJanuary 2017 · Issue 38
Background EssayBlast from the Past: The Strategic Realignment of the United States in the Trump Administration by Peter R. Mansoor
Featured CommentaryAmerica Respected vs. Global Security by Angelo M. Codevilla
Trump’s Strategic Realignments by Bing West
Educational MaterialsDiscussion Questions
Suggestions for Further Reading
About the Posters in this issue
Documenting the wartime viewpoints and diverse political sentiments of the twentieth century, the Hoover Institution Library & Archives Poster Collection has more than one hundred thousand posters from around the world and continues to grow. Thirty-three thousand are available online. Posters from the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, Russia/Soviet Union, and France predominate, though posters from more than eighty countries are included.
Blast from the Past: The Strategic Realignment of the United States
in the Trump AdministrationPeter R. Mansoor
As Donald Trump assumes office as the nation’s 45th president, questions swirl regard-
ing the strategic trajectory and alignment of the United States during his administration.
Mr. Trump campaigned on a platform of putting “America First,” but the policy details
of what exactly this means were, to put it mildly, lacking. Candidate Trump castigated
America’s NATO allies for failing to live up to alliance commitments to spend at least
2 percent of their GDP on defense, hinted that Japan and South Korea would be better off
with their own nuclear umbrellas, and, while vowing that his administration would crush
ISIS quickly, stated that other problems in the Middle East, such as the Syrian Civil War,
should be left to local actors to resolve or outsourced to Russia. He would bolster US mil-
itary power, but use it more sparingly. Whether this means the Trump administration will
follow neo-isolationist, offshore balancing, conservative internationalist, or some other
form of grand strategy remains to be seen. Given the uncertainty of what lies ahead in the
next four or eight years, a review of the grand strategic alignment of the United States in
the last two centuries is in order for clues as to what might lie ahead.
The first US presidents avoided “entangling alliances,” as Thomas Jefferson put it,
focusing instead on the security of the homeland and protection of American commerce
overseas. In his farewell address to the American people, President George Washington
stated America’s preferences clearly: “It is our true policy to steer clear of permanent alli-
ances with any portion of the foreign world.” When President Thomas Jefferson deployed
naval squadrons and Marines against Barbary pirates in the Mediterranean, he did so
without the help of nearby European states. The nation’s small army was employed
guarding ports and safeguarding westward expansion. The War of 1812, the “second war
for American independence” in the eyes of many contemporary American observers, con-
firmed US sovereignty in the homeland, but did not fundamentally change the nation’s
grand strategic outlook.
The trajectory of US grand strategy changed dramatically in 1823, when President
James Monroe announced that the United States would not tolerate the expansion of
1Background Essay Issue 38 | January 2017
colonial empires in the Western Hemisphere. The Monroe Doctrine greatly expanded
the concept of US national security. The defense of the United States would not begin
at the nation’s borders, but would rather encompass North, South, and Central America
as well as the oceanic approaches to the Western Hemisphere. As presidential doctrines
go, the Monroe Doctrine had a long run, governing US foreign policy for more than a
hundred years. But we should not give too much credit to US pronouncements and power
for keeping colonial powers at bay; Great Britain, France, the Netherlands, Spain, and
Portugal were all too willing to cede the balance of power in the Western Hemisphere to
the United States, a nation that seemed more focused on westward expansion than in
impinging on European colonial possessions outside North America, most of which had
gained their independence by 1823 in any case.
At the end of the 19th century the United States veered suddenly and unexpectedly
onto the strategic path to overseas expansion. American public opinion, whipped to a
fever pitch by yellow journalism (which has come back into vogue), demanded war in
support of Cuban revolutionaries after the USS Maine blew up in Havana harbor, a trag-
edy blamed by many Americans on Spain but which was more likely due to an internal
explosion. Overcoming mobilization and deployment challenges, the US armed forces
seized Cuba, Puerto Rico, and Guam, while the US Navy Asiatic squadron under Commo-
dore George Dewey destroyed the Spanish Pacific Fleet in the decidedly lopsided battle
of Manila Bay. An army expeditionary force defeated the Spanish army in the Philippines
and then spent a number of years battling Filipino and Moro guerrillas.
With no malice aforethought, the United States now found itself in possession of
Caribbean and Pacific colonies (including the new territory of Hawaii, annexed in 1898),
the defense of which would begin far from the Western Hemisphere. Doing so would
require the acquisition of a powerful oceangoing navy, the first manifestation of which
was the cruise of the “Great White Fleet” around the world from 1907 to 1909. The United
States had emerged from its isolationist shell.
The great conflagration that erupted in Europe in 1914 eventually engulfed the
United States, a rising industrial state with vast reserves of untapped military power. The
initial concern of the Wilson administration was a familiar one to Americans—freedom of
the seas. The sinking of the RMS Lusitania in May 1915 brought an ultimatum from Wilson
to Imperial Germany to honor the rules of cruiser warfare or face American entry into the
war. The Germans wisely backed off, only to resume unrestricted submarine warfare in
1917, gambling for victory before the presence of American troops on the Western Front
could be felt. For the first time in its history, the United States was involved in a great
power conflict outside the Western Hemisphere, albeit as an “associated” power rather
than as an ally to Great Britain and France.
2 Issue 38 | January 2017 Strategika
Wilsonian grand strategy came to be associated with liberal internationalism—an
effort by the world’s leading powers to prevent major power conflict, police international
affairs, and advance humanitarianism through collective action. The Treaty of Versailles
hardly accorded to Wilson’s “Fourteen Points,” which promised national self-determination,
freedom of the seas, and open diplomacy, among other things. But the treaty did create
a League of Nations, the foundational structure of collective security to ensure the Great
War would be the last such conflict. The US Congress, however, would have none of it.
By a vote of 49 to 35 the Senate rejected the treaty and with it American participation
in the League of Nations. The United States would return to its traditional isolationist
stance. Given that US troops were deployed in China and the Philippines, the term was
not exactly accurate, but it did encapsulate the mind-set of the American people, who
believed they gained little from the Great War and wanted to put “American first.”
The retrenchment of American power in the interwar era was deep and significant.
Although the nation maintained a strong navy that in 1938 included fifteen battleships
and five aircraft carriers, the US Army shrank to just 174,000 troops (ranking it 17th in
the world in terms of troop strength, just behind the army of Portugal), and the Army Air
Corps in that year had few modern combat aircraft (the B-17 bomber and P-40 fighter
were in the final stages of testing). As critically, Congress tied the president’s hands with
legislation intended to keep the United States out of future great power conflicts. The
Neutrality Acts prohibited the export of weapons and ammunition to nations at war, pro-
hibited Americans from extending loans to belligerent nations, forbade US citizens from
traveling on belligerent ships, and prohibited American merchant ships from transporting
arms to belligerents. The American people showed their support for isolationism through
the creation of the America First Committee, dedicated to keeping the United States out
of foreign wars. A major political force in the late 1930s, the America First Committee
boasted 800,000 members in 450 chapters.
“America first,” at least as embodied in the grand strategy of the interwar era,
worked only as long as there remained a balance of great powers overseas. Isolationism
as a grand strategic framework became much less tenable after the fall of France in June
1940. Great Britain also appeared to be on the ropes, which raised the possibility of Ger-
man domination of the European continent. Given the expansionist philosophy of the
Nazi regime, that prospect posed an existential threat to the United States. President
Franklin D. Roosevelt and Congress responded by passing the Two Ocean Navy Act, mobi-
lizing the National Guard, and—a first in American history—enacting a peacetime draft.
Roosevelt sent arms to Great Britain, traded destroyers for bases, and put the US Navy
on a collision course with the Kriegsmarine in the Atlantic. Admiral Harold Stark’s Plan
Dog and subsequent American-British-Canadian staff discussions paved the way for the
4 Issue 38 | January 2017 Strategika
adoption of Rainbow 5, a war plan that envisioned the United States fighting as an ally of
Great Britain (and later the Soviet Union) in both Europe and Asia. The Japanese attack
on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, was only the final dagger in the heart of a grand
strategy that no longer accorded with America’s national security interests. Once again—
and this time seemingly for good—the defense of the United States would begin with the
defense of America’s overseas allies.
The destruction of the Axis powers laid the foundation for a more stable postwar
order, this time with the United States willing and able to participate in its creation and
maintenance. Having engaged in two great world wars in just a quarter century, US polit-
ical and military leaders embraced collective security and the defense of allies made
possible by the visible commitment of forward deployed troops in Europe and Asia. This
liberal international order, along with its policies and institutions such as the Marshall
Plan, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the North Atlantic Treaty Organi-
zation, and defense treaties with Japan and South Korea, has lasted for more than seventy
years. Republican and Democratic administrations over that period would argue about
specifics of policies underlying liberal internationalism—containment, engagement,
NATO enlargement, and so forth—but
there was no disagreement over the ends
of policy. The United States would but-
tress the international order from which
it profited greatly with its vast reserves
of diplomatic, informational, economic,
financial, and military power.
For ten years after the collapse of the
Soviet Union in 1991, it seemed that the
United States would exert its authority
through an international system in which
it held the preponderance of power. The
unipolar moment was fleeting. The terror
attacks on the US homeland on Septem-
ber 11, 2001, began the process by which
America’s domination ended. The admin-
istration of George W. Bush committed
the nation to an expansive war on ter-
ror, including campaigns in Afghanistan
and Iraq in which it collapsed the Taliban
and Ba’athist regimes and enmeshed US
PoLL: What should be
President Trump’s policy
regarding Russia?
Get along better with our EU and NATO partners, and curtail Russian aggression with stronger sanctions.
Continue the reset policies and jawboning of the Obama administration.
Adopt a policy of benign neglect to allow Putin a greater sphere of interest along his border.
Seek active detente with Putin to concentrate on common enemies like radical Islamists.
Enlist Putin as an ally, in hopes of flipping Russia away from Syria and Iran to rejoin the Western order.
5Background Essay Issue 38 | January 2017
armed forces in long-term military operations to stabilize their successors. Neither war
ended quickly or successfully, and their multitrillion-dollar price tags, along with the
deaths and wounding of thousands of service members, soured the American people on
continued service as the guarantor of the international system.
The rise of China, a revanchist Russia, allies that have failed to live up to treaty obli-
gations in terms of defense spending, and the lingering effects of a crippling recession
have all contributed to a malaise that has affected the American psyche. The Obama
administration has exacerbated these factors by its use and misuse of American power: a
premature withdrawal of US forces from Iraq, eliminating the leverage they provided over
the conduct of the Iraqi government and thereby enabling the rise of ISIS; using force
against the regime of strongman Muammar Qaddafi to cause its collapse (and his mur-
der) without thought as to how to stabilize Libya in the aftermath of conflict; announcing
an ill-conceived “red line” over the use of chemical munitions in Syria and then failing to
enforce it; failing to support the Syrian rebellion in its early stages when the creation of
a moderate, secular front against Bashar al-Assad was still possible; and banking on sta-
bilizing the Middle East by negotiating a nuclear accord with the ayatollahs in Tehran, an
agreement whose benefits have reenergized the Iranian economy without moderating
Iranian conduct. Little wonder why the American people were ready to vote for change
when the presidential election rolled around in 2016.
What type of grand strategy the Trump administration will adopt going forward
is anyone’s guess, but it will not be more of the same. Mr. Trump has promised to put
“America first,” which means jettisoning supposed deadbeat allies who freeload off of
American power, picking America’s fights more judiciously, and employing overwhelming
force when sending American troops into battle. Given the president’s fascination with
Russian President Vladimir Putin, it seems quite likely that the US-Russian relationship
will be recast, with Putin benefiting from the lifting of sanctions (and thereby acknowl-
edging the seizure of Crimea as a fait accompli) and a free hand in Syria (which will bolster
Russian power but not end the civil war there). What the United States would get out of
this policy is an open question; perhaps nothing more than Putin’s goodwill—thin gruel
when it comes to issues that matter. On the other hand, if such a policy does not impel
NATO allies to raise their levels of defense spending through fear of the Russian bear,
then perhaps nothing will. The president has already shown his willingness to challenge
China on issues of long-standing import, such as the “one China” policy vis-à-vis Taiwan.
He has promised to renegotiate America’s trade relationships to bring jobs back home, to
substantially limit Muslim immigration into the United States, and to build a wall along
the US southern border with Mexico.
6 Issue 38 | January 2017 Strategika
Taken together, these policies spell the end of the liberal international order as we
have known it since the end of World War II. The United States is returning its grand stra-
tegic posture to an earlier time, when America eschewed allies and presidents talked
softly and carried big sticks. Those policies, one might note, ended with the United States
embroiled in two world wars. It remains to be seen whether they will be more successful
this time around.
Peter R. Mansoor, colonel, US Army (retired), is the General Raymond E. Mason, Jr. Chair of Military History at Ohio State University. A distinguished graduate of West Point, he earned his doctorate from Ohio State University. He assumed his current position after a twenty-six-year career in the US Army that included
two combat tours, culminating in his service as executive officer to General David Petraeus in Iraq. He is the author, his latest book, Surge: My Journey with General David Petraeus and the Remaking of the Iraq War, a history of the surge in Iraq in 2007– 8, was published by Yale University Press in 2013.
7Background Essay Issue 38 | January 2017
America Respected vs. Global SecurityAngelo M. Codevilla
George Kennan wrote that Americans in 1905 had not
imagined threats from abroad, but that by 1950 they
could hardly think of anything else. In the interven-
ing half century, US foreign policy had adopted the
maxim that America’s security is inseparable from the
rest of the world’s peace and progress. Accordingly,
Woodrow Wilson’s Great War, his settlement thereof,
and subsequent American-led treaties for global peace
and arms control sought to “make the world safe for
democracy.” Franklin Roosevelt had made war to rid
the world of “ancient evils, ancient ills” and invented
the United Nations Organization to police the result.
Three generations later, after more treaties, trillions
of dollars, and wars in pursuit of world order and
global security, we are less secure than ever—massive
increases in all manner of power notwithstanding.
Now, as Russia and China expand, as the rest of the
world integrates nuclear weapons into ordinary mil-
itary operations even as the US government tries to
disinvent them, the Muslim world’s warriors kill Amer-
icans while inspiring others among us to murder their
neighbors.
In short, a century’s trials have shown the
consequences of departing from the classic states-
manship of presidents from Washington to Theodore
Roosevelt—minding America’s business and main-
taining a surplus of power over commitments. They
illustrate the need for decisiveness in minding Amer-
ica’s own business, and for refraining from interfering
in others’ affairs while brooking no interference in
ours. Then, America’s guiding strategic principle was:
“what is nearest is dearest.” Jealous balancing of ends
and means was its practical guide. Returning to this,
the opposite of retrenchment, would mean channel-
ing Ronald Reagan, the only president since TR who
approached confrontations in terms of “we win, they
lose.”
Distinguishing among what is America’s vital
business—to be minded with all our might—what
is peripheral, and what is others’ business, has ever
been statesmanship’s primordial responsibility. Such
distinctions are not arbitrary. Nor are they to be made
by executive orders, agreements, telephone calls, or
“understandings.” As matters of life and death, they
are the American people’s business, to be debated and
voted.
To regain respect for its words, the US government
must prepare to do something that it has not done
since 1945—namely, win a war. Peacefully to delimit
spheres of influence vis-à-vis any power requires the
capacity to win wars. This means guarding American
lives by prioritizing firepower and defending Ameri-
ca’s satellite network. To be taken seriously by nuclear
powers, which have plans for using nuclear weapons
in military operations, it means, above all, protect-
ing Americans against ballistic missiles—renouncing
the half-century-old bipartisan consensus that peace
requires keeping Americans vulnerable.
We can be grateful that today’s geopolitical chal-
lenges do not amount to the threat which the Soviet
Union had posed. Russia’s and China’s imperialisms
are of the traditional kind, expanding to the limits of
8 Issue 38 | January 2017 Strategika
resistance. Defining spheres of influence with such
empires by deciding the extent of our own interests
vis-à-vis theirs is the stuff of traditional statecraft.
To exercise it, the US government must define what
America’s traditional objective of preventing a single
power from dominating all of Europe, and another
from dominating East Asia, means in today’s circum-
stances. That is very much our business. Then, it must
communicate that understanding to Russia, China,
and their neighbors—with deeds more than with
words.
American declarations and “trip wire” troops
cannot stop Russia’s military incursions into areas
with substantial Russian populations, and hence
from overawing ever more of its “near abroad.” Nor
does anyone imagine the United States, or even the
Eastern European governments involved, making war
on Russia to stop it. By the same token, Russia is not
going to bog itself down militarily trying to conquer
and hold western Ukraine or the Baltic states, never
mind Poland. The US government could define Amer-
ica’s and Russia’s respective spheres of influence by
arming these countries substantially, dispensing with
inflammatory words and the unserious economic
sanctions currently on Russia, but obviously preparing
the devastating kind should she bid for an hegemony
that threatens America.
China’s appropriation of the South China Sea,
accomplished by its masterly construction of mili-
tary outposts on built-up reefs, cannot be reversed
by “freedom of navigation patrols.” These are the sad
equivalents of “trip wire” troops. Breaking China’s
shore-based control of the Western Pacific is beyond
America’s current military and political capacity,
especially given Chinese missiles’ free ride to local
and US targets. Mitigating this threat would have to
begin with making our Pacific bases—and America
itself—invulnerable to Chinese missiles. Achieving a
new, favorable balance of military power in the region
might require fortifying Taiwan. But nothing short of
that would make it possible to establish a peaceful,
long-term delimitation of China’s influence.
Islamism’s threat stems from the Muslim worls’s
civilizational collapse and internecine warfare, as well
as from our foreign policy establishment’s attempts
to alleviate its effects and steer its course. Having
learned that this is counterproductive, America’s stra-
tegic choice should be to leave that world’s concerns
to its denizens, minimizing contact with them. Sadly,
some potentates and even entire communities incite
and celebrate killing Americans. Our business, our
safety, lies in killing as many people as are associated
in any way with killing Americans, repaying incitement
with death, devastation, and economic privation, so
that terrorism will become an occasion for communal
bewailing rather than celebration.
Angelo M. Codevilla, is a professor emeritus of international relations at Boston University. He was a US naval officer and Foreign Service officer
and served on the Senate Intelligence Committee as well as on presidential transition teams. For a decade he was a senior research fellow at the Hoover Institution. He is the author of thirteen books, including War Ends and Means, The Character of Nations, and Advice to War Presidents. He is a student of the classics as well as of European literature; he is also a commercial grape grower.
10 Issue 38 | January 2017 Strategika
Trump’s Strategic RealignmentsBing West
“Likely,” when considering what strategic realign-
ments the Trump administration will embrace to
restore American deterrence and enhance global
security, is the least likely adverb to apply to predic-
tions. A Wall Street Journal review of 6,500 market
predictions by economic experts found that most
were wrong. I don’t know what the Trump administra-
tion will do, or how that will affect global security. So
here are my seven guesses—acknowledging most are
likely to be incorrect:
1. Overt Bargaining. President Trump appears to
view geopolitics as business deals, with the actors on
opposing sides having legitimate interests that can
be accommodated by compromise. Thus he employs
bluster and hyperbole to provide leverage for reason-
able settlements between masters of the universe.
President George W. Bush displayed a similar belief
that kings decide the course of their nations. He
thought he could steer Vladimir Putin, Nouri al-Maliki,
and Hamid Karzai onto righteous paths, while the cit-
izens of their countries placidly followed. Trump has
similar confidence in his own magisterial magnetism.
However, a Trump administration devoid of evangel-
ical vision will not overreach, as did Bush. And while
President Obama’s global retreat will cease, a mer-
chant creed of quid pro quo deals cannot be America’s
lodestone. Some doctrine has to emerge as guidance.
2. Return of Balance of Power. With the economy
as his top priority, Trump will leave the fundamental
management of foreign policy to his Cabinet. The
Secretaries of State, Treasury, and Defense, as well
as the Director of the CIA and Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs, are centrist pragmatists. Under their tutorship,
the Trump administration will seek some variation of
the balance of power that began with the Peace of
Westphalia (1648) and reached its apex following
the Congress of Vienna (1814—15). That balance was
shattered by the two world wars of the 20th century.
America’s reign as the world’s sole superpower was
transitory, lasting for only a decade after the Soviet
Union disintegrated in 1991. What followed was
overreach by George W. Bush and retreat by Barack
Obama. Now the Trump administration is certain to
resume a restrained competition against our adver-
saries. Given Trump’s choices to lead his Cabinet, over
the next two years some variation of the traditional
balance of power will evolve into written doctrine.
3. Checking Russia. Putin has annexed portions of
Eastern Ukraine, intimidated Europe, and employed
indiscriminate bombing to keep Assad in power. These
gains can be contained, but not rolled back. Putin
wants to consolidate his global status, not challenge
Trump as he did Obama. Trump will reinitiate the gov-
ernment contacts severed by Obama and, as in the
Reagan years, engage with Russia within sensible lim-
its. “No nation,” George Washington wrote in 1778, “is
to be trusted farther than it is bound by its interests.”
We can rely upon Trump’s Cabinet to adhere to that
dictum. Russia will remain America’s adversary both in
terms of geopolitics and values.
Obama never regained credibility after not enforc-
ing his “red line.” Trump’s “red line” will be a test in
11Featured Commentary Issue 38 | January 2017
the cyber world, probably involving Russia. Defense
alone is insufficient. Attacks will not cease until there
is firm, punitive retaliation. At the same time, Rus-
sia (and China) must be convinced that America will
prevail in any tit-for-tat escalation duel. Our private
sector is both our weakness and strength. Corporate
CEOs must be included in war-gaming all options.
They know how to employ cyber strikes to affect
economies. But our society must be willing to accept
disruptions in response. To succeed, Trump must use
the bully pulpit to convince the public to stand firm,
while accepting that the ideology of the mainstream
press insures negative coverage of whatever action he
takes.
4. Stasis in Europe. Like his predecessors in the
Oval Office, Trump has good reason to be skepti-
cal about the heft and commitment of Europe. His
demand that European nations contribute more to
the common defense echoes that of prior administra-
tions. It will be met with overt agreements and covert
accounting legerdemain. The European democracies
are our exasperating and dearest friends. They should
be more assertive of the values they preach. But while
State and Defense will insure close personal relation-
ships, the leftist tilt of most European states assures
their constant skepticism of Trump, who will respond
in like measure. On balance, NATO, our most critical
alliance, will remain more iconic than substantive.
5. An Ever-turbulent Middle East. In the Middle
East, due to America’s copious energy supplies, oil
has ceased to be the driving exigent for our military
involvement. (In fact, energy commodity exports are
an unrecognized lever in tilting the global balance of
power in our favor.) President Obama fractured our
friendships with Sunni nations in order to align with
an Iran that remains hostile and radical. Frequent vis-
its by senior American officials may partially reassure
Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and the Gulf states, but rebuild-
ing trust will take years. If the Boeing $17 billion deal
with Iran proceeds, then Iran will gain access to the US
and global banking system, greatly reducing the cred-
ibility of imposing future sanctions. How the Boeing
deal plays out will signal Trump’s resolve or acquies-
cence toward Iran.
Iranian and Russian military involvement has
enabled Assad’s Alawite regime to control western
Syria. There is no indication that the administration
will apply hard leverage to break the alliance between
Russia and Iran. Trump, however, will authorize more
bombing against an ISIS that will wither as a func-
tioning state among the poor Sunnis confined to
central Syria. The Kurds will consolidate a de facto
state in northern Iraq and eastern Syria, guaranteeing
Hoover Institution Archives Poster Collection, US 5905
12 Issue 38 | January 2017 Strategika
escalating clashes with a dictatorial Turkey. Iraq under
a corrupt, Shiite-controlled Parliament will remain a
satrap of Iran. Without intervening in large numbers,
America will provide the intelligence, bombing, advis-
ers, and commando raids to restrict and gradually
destroy the terrorist bases across the Levant and in
Afghanistan, while accepting that occasional terrorist
attacks in Europe and America will recur.
6. A Trade Deal with China. In Asia, the island
forts will remain fixtures in the South China Sea. But
China is certain to face US naval exercises designed to
insure freedom of the seas and solidarity with Asian
states discomfited by China’s aggressiveness. Trump is
incensed by China’s mercantilism, cyber hacking, and
theft of intellectual property. China will deflect retal-
iation by adjusting the balance of trade. Given the
strength of the dollar, Chinese concessions may not be
that significant. But the adjustment will be trumpeted
as a major foreign policy victory.
7. Conclusion: Multipolar Competition Resumes.
Obama sought to divest America of global leader-
ship. He believed the arc of history, independent of
the acts of man, bent inexorably toward democracy
and tranquility. In the real world, maintaining a bal-
ance of power among Russia, China, and America
demands American resolve. Under the Trump admin-
istration, America will resume competing, as it has
since 1945. After eight years of passivity and retrench-
ment, this reversion to the mean in American foreign
policy—modest as it will be—qualifies as a strategic
realignment.
So far, Trump’s competitive instincts have focused
upon short-term transactions, while America’s global
leadership is based upon lasting principles. Conjoining
the evanescent with the enduring will require growth
while serving in the Oval Office. Whether and how that
growth occurs is unpredictable.
Bing West is an author and former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs during the Reagan administration. He is a graduate
of Georgetown and Princeton Universities where he was a Woodrow Wilson Fellow, and served in the marine infantry in Vietnam. He is the best-selling author of nine books on military history, he travels frequently to war zones. His latest book is entitled One Million Steps: A Marine Platoon at War (2014).
13Featured Commentary Issue 38 | January 2017
Discussion Questions
1. Is Donald Trump an isolationist, a realist, or a Jacksonian—or none of these?
2. Do our Asian partners feel more or less comfortable with the idea of a Trump presidency?
3. How might the new Trump administration cope with the Iran Nuclear Deal?
4. Is the bipartisan American postwar policy of active engagement abroad over?
14 Issue 38 | January 2017 Strategika
in the next issue new Military technologies
Suggestions for Further Reading
• Hal Brands, What Good Is Grand Strategy? Power and Purpose in American Statecraft from Harry
S. Truman to George W. Bush (Cornell University Press, 2015). http://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/book
/?GCOI=80140100829820
• Council on Foreign Relations, “The Next Commander in Chief,” (2017). http://www.cfr.org/campaign2016/
• Jeffrey Goldberg, “The Obama Doctrine,” The Atlantic (April 2016).
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/04/the-obama-doctrine/471525/
• George F. Kennan, American Diplomacy (University of Chicago Press, 2012).
http://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/A/bo12352365.html
• Jay Sexton, The Monroe Doctrine: Empire and Nation in Nineteenth-Century America (Hill and Wang, 2012).
http://us.macmillan.com/books/9780809069996
15Educational Materials Issue 38 | January 2017
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Military History in Contemporary ConflictAs the very name of Hoover Institution attests, military history lies at the very core of our dedication to the study of “War, Revolution, and Peace.” Indeed, the precise mission statement of the Hoover Institution includes the following promise: “The overall mission of this Institution is, from its records, to recall the voice of experience against the making of war, and by the study of these records and their publication, to recall man’s endeavors to make and preserve peace, and to sustain for America the safeguards of the American way of life.” From its origins as a library and archive, the Hoover Institution has evolved into one of the foremost research centers in the world for policy formation and pragmatic analysis. It is with this tradition in mind, that the “Working Group on the Role of Military History in Contemporary Conflict” has set its agenda—reaffirming the Hoover Institution’s dedication to historical research in light of contemporary challenges, and in particular, reinvigorating the national study of military history as an asset to foster and enhance our national security. By bringing together a diverse group of distinguished military historians, security analysts, and military veterans and practitioners, the working group seeks to examine the conflicts of the past as critical lessons for the present.
Working Group on the Role of Military History in Contemporary ConflictThe Working Group on the Role of Military History in Contemporary Conflict examines how knowledge of past military operations can influence contemporary public policy decisions concerning current conflicts. The careful study of military history offers a way of analyzing modern war and peace that is often underappreciated in this age of technological determinism. Yet the result leads to a more in-depth and dispassionate understanding of contemporary wars, one that explains how particular military successes and failures of the past can be often germane, sometimes misunderstood, or occasionally irrelevant in the context of the present.
StrategikaStrategika is a journal that analyzes ongoing issues of national security in light of conflicts of the past—the efforts of the Military History Working Group of historians, analysts, and military personnel focusing on military history and contemporary conflict. Our board of scholars shares no ideological consensus other than a general acknowledgment that human nature is largely unchanging. Consequently, the study of past wars can offer us tragic guidance about present conflicts—a preferable approach to the more popular therapeutic assumption that contemporary efforts to ensure the perfectibility of mankind eventually will lead to eternal peace. New technologies, methodologies, and protocols come and go; the larger tactical and strategic assumptions that guide them remain mostly the same—a fact discernable only through the study of history.
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