PHILCONSA v. PEDRO M. GIMENEZ G.R. No. L-23326 December 18, 1965

Facts:

                Philippine Constitution Association, Inc (PHILCONSA) assails the validity of RA

3836 insofar as the same allows retirement gratuity and commutation of vacation and sick leave

to Senators and Representatives, and to the elective officials of both Houses (of Congress). The

provision on retirement gratuity is an attempt to circumvent the Constitutional ban on increase of

salaries of the members of Congress during their term of office, contrary to the provisions of

Article VI, Section 14 of the Constitution. The same provision constitutes “selfish class

legislation” because it allows members and officers of Congress to retire after twelve (12) years

of service and gives them a gratuity equivalent to one year salary for every four years of service,

which is not refundable in case of reinstatement or re election of the retiree, while all other

officers and employees of the government can retire only after at least twenty (20) years of

service and are given a gratuity which is only equivalent to one month salary for every year of

service, which, in any case, cannot exceed 24 months. The provision on vacation and sick leave,

commutable at the highest rate received, insofar as members of Congress are concerned, is

another attempt of the legislator to further increase their compensation in violation of the

Constitution.

The Solicitor General counter-argued alleging that the grant of retirement or pension

benefits under Republic Act No. 3836 to the officers objected to by the petitioner does not

constitute “forbidden compensation” within the meaning of Section 14 of Article VI of the

Philippine Constitution. The law in question does not constitute class legislation. The payment of

commutable vacation and sick leave benefits under the said Act is merely “in the nature of a

basis for computing the gratuity due each retiring member” and, therefore, is not an indirect

scheme to increase their salary.

Issue:

                whether Republic Act 3836 violates Section 14, Article VI, of the Constitution which

reads as follows:

The senators and the Members of the House of Representatives shall, unless otherwise provided

by law, receive an annual compensation of seven thousand two hundred pesos each, including

per diems and other emoluments or allowances, and exclusive only of travelling expenses to and

from their respective districts in the case of Members of the House of Representative and to and

from their places of residence in the case of Senators, when attending sessions of the Congress.

No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all

the Members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives approving such increase. Until

otherwise provided by law, the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of

Representatives shall each receive an annual compensation of sixteen thousand pesos.

Held:

                Yes. When the Constitutional Convention first determined the compensation for the

Members of Congress, the amount fixed by it was only P5,000.00 per annum but it embodies a

special proviso which reads as follows: “No increase in said compensation shall take effect until

after the expiration of the full term of all the members of the National Assembly elected

subsequent to approval of such increase.” In other words, under the original constitutional

provision regarding the power of the National Assembly to increase the salaries of its members,

no increase would take effect until after the expiration of the full term of the members of the

Assembly elected subsequent to the approval of such increase.

The Constitutional provision in the aforementioned Section 14, Article VI, includes in the

term compensation “other emoluments”. This is the pivotal point on this fundamental question as

to whether the retirement benefit as provided for in Republic Act 3836 fall within the purview of

the term “other emoluments.”

Emolument is defined as the profit arising from office or employment; that which is

received as compensation for services or which is annexed to the possession of an office, as

salary, fees and perquisites.

It is evident that retirement benefit is a form or another species of emolument, because it

is a part of compensation for services of one possessing any office.

Republic Act 3836 provides for an increase in the emoluments of Senators and Members

of the House of Representatives, to take effect upon the approval of said Act, which was on June

22, 1963. Retirement benefits were immediately available thereunder, without awaiting the

expiration of the full term of all the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives

approving such increase. Such provision clearly runs counter to the prohibition in Article VI,

Section 14 of the Constitution. RA 3836 is therefore unconstitutional.

Republic Act No. 6645             December 28, 1987

AN ACT PRESCRIBING THE MANNER OF FILING A VACANCY IN THE

CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress

assembled::

Section 1. In case a vacancy arises in the Senate at least eighteen (18) months or in the House of

Representatives at least (1) year before the next regular election for Members of Congress, the

Commission on Elections, upon receipt of a resolution of the Senate or the House of

Representatives, as the case may be, certifying to the existence of such vacancy and calling for a

special election, shall hold a special election to fill such vacancy.f Congress is in recess, an

official communication on the existence of the vacancy and call for a special election by the

President of the Senate or by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, as the case may be,

shall be sufficient for such purpose. The Senator or Member of the House of Representatives

thus elected shall serve only for the unexpired term.

Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall fix the date of the special election, which shall not

be earlier than forty-five (45) days not later than ninety (90) days from the date of such

resolution or communication, stating among other things the office or offices to be voted for:

provided, however, that if within the said period a general election is scheduled to be held, the

special election shall be held simultaneously with such general election.

Section 3. The Commission on Elections shall send copies of the resolution, in number sufficient

for due distribution and publication, to the Provincial of City Treasurer of each province or city

concerned, who in turn shall publish it in their respective localities by posting at least three

copies thereof in as many conspicuous places in each of their election precincts, and a copy in

each of the polling places and public markets, and in the municipal buildings.

Section 4. This Act shall take effect upon its publication in the Official Gazette or in at least two

newspapers of general circulation.

Approved: December 28, 1987.

Ligot vs Mathay (G.R. No.   L-34676)

Salaries of Representatives – Retirement

FACTS: Ligot served as a member of the House of Representatives of the Congress of the

Philippines for three consecutive four-year terms covering a twelve-year span from December

30, 1957 to December 30, 1969. During his second term in office (1961-1965), RA 4134 “fixing

the salaries of constitutional officials and certain other officials of the national government” was

enacted into law and under section 7 thereof took effect on July 1, 1964. The salaries of members

of Congress (senators and congressman) were increased under said Act from P7,200.00 to

P32,000.00 per annum, but the Act expressly provided that said increases “shall take effect in

accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.” Ligot’s term expired on December 30, 1969,

so he filed a claim for retirement under Commonwealth Act 186, section 12 (c) as amended by

RA 4968 which provided for retirement gratuity of any official or employee, appointive or

elective, with a total of at least twenty years of service, the last three years of which are

continuous on the basis therein provided “in case of employees based on the highest rate

received and in case of elected officials on the rates of pay as provided by law.” HOR granted his

petition however, Velasco, the then Congress Auditor refused to so issue certification. The

Auditor General then, Mathay, also disallowed the same. The thrust of Ligot’s appeal is that his

claim for retirement gratuity computed on the basis of the increased salary of P32,000.00 per

annum for members of Congress (which was not applied to him during his incumbency which

ended December 30, 1969, while the Court held in Philconsa vs. Mathay that such increases

would become operative only for members of Congress elected to serve therein commencing

December 30, 1969) should not have been disallowed, because at the time of his retirement, the

increased salary for members of Congress “as provided by law” (under Republic Act 4134) was

already P32,000.00 per annum.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ligot is entitled to such retirement benefit.

HELD: To allow petitioner a retirement gratuity computed on the basis of P32,000.00 per

annum would be a subtle way of increasing his compensation during his term of office and of

achieving indirectly what he could not obtain directly. Ligot’s claim cannot be sustained as far as

he and other members of Congress similarly situated whose term of office ended on December

30, 1969 are concerned for the simple reason that a retirement gratuity or benefit is a form of

compensation within the purview of the Constitutional provision limiting their compensation and

“other emoluments” to their salary as provided by law. To grant retirement gratuity to members

of Congress whose terms expired on December 30, 1969 computed on the basis of an increased

salary of P32,000.00 per annum (which they were prohibited by the Constitution from receiving

during their term of office) would be to pay them prohibited emoluments which in effect increase

the salary beyond that which they were permitted by the Constitution to receive during their

incumbency. As stressed by the Auditor-General in his decision in the similar case of petitioner’s

colleague, ex-Congressman Singson, “(S)uch a scheme would contravene the Constitution for it

would lead to the same prohibited result by enabling administrative authorities to do indirectly

what cannot be done directly.”

Manuel Martinez vs Jesus Morfe

44 SCRA 22 – Political Law – The Legislative Department – Immunity from Arrest under the

1935 Constitution

Manuel Martinez and Fernando Bautista, Sr. were delegates to the 1972 Constitutional

Convention. Both were facing criminal prosecutions. Martinez was charged for falsification of a

publicdocument before the sala of Judge Jesus Morfe. While Bautista was charged for violation

of the Revised Election Code. The two were later arrested, this is while the Constitutional

Convention was still in session. They now assail the validity of their arrest. They contend that

under the 1935 Constitution, they are immune from arrest because the charges upon which they

were arrested are within the immunity.

ISSUE: Whether or not Martinez and Bautista are immune from arrest.

HELD: No. There is, to be sure, a full recognition of the necessity to have members of

Congress, and likewise delegates to the Constitutional Convention. They are accorded the

constitutional immunity of senators and representatives from arrest during their attendance at the

sessions of Congress and in going to and returning from the same except in cases of treason,

felony and breach of the peace. In the case at bar, the crimes for which Martinez and Bautista

were arrested fall under the category 0f “breach of peace”. Breach of the peace covers any

offense whether defined by the Revised Penal Code or any special statute. Therefore, Martinez

and Bautista cannot invoke the privilege from arrest provision of the Constitution.

NOTE: Under the 1987 Constitution:

A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall, in all offenses punishable by not

more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in

session. No member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or

debate in Congress or in any committee thereof.

Sergio Osmeña, Jr. vs Salipada Pendatun

109 Phil. 863 – Political Law – The Legislative Department – Parliamentary Immunity

In June 1960, Congressman Sergio Osmeña, Jr. delivered a speech entitled “A Message to

Garcia”. In the said speech, he disparaged then President Carlos Garcia and his administration.

Subsequently, House Resolution No. 59 was passed by the lower house in order to investigate

the charges made by Osmeña during his speech and that if his allegations were found to be

baseless and malicious, he may be subjected to disciplinary actions by the lower house.

Osmeña then questioned the validity of the said resolution before the Supreme Court. Osmeña

avers that the resolution violates his parliamentary immunity for speeches delivered in

Congress. Congressman Salipada Pendatun filed an answer where he averred that the Supreme

Court has not jurisdiction over the matter and Congress has the power to discipline its members.

ISSUE: Whether or not Osmeña’s immunity has been violated?

HELD: No. Section 15, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity

upon members of the legislature which is a fundamental privilege cherished in every parliament

in a democratic world. It guarantees the legislatorcomplete freedom of expression without fear of

being made responsible in criminal or civil actions before the courts or any other forum outside

the Hall of Congress. However, it does not protect him from responsibility before the legislative

body whenever his words and conduct are considered disorderly or unbecoming of a member

therein. Therefore, Osmeña’s petition is dismissed.

Jimenez vs Cabangbang (G.R. No.   L-15905)

Freedom of Speech & Debate

Facts: Cabangbang was a member of the House of Representatives and Chairman of its

Committee on National Defense. On 14 Nov 1958, Cabangbang caused the publication of an

open letter addressed to the Philippines. Said letter alleged that there have been allegedly three

operational plans under serious study by some ambitious AFP officers, with the aid of some

civilian political strategists. That such strategists have had collusions with communists and that

the Secretary of Defense, Jesus Vargas, was planning a coup d’état to place him as the president.

The “planners” allegedly have Nicanor Jimenez, among others, under their guise and that

Jimenez et al may or may not be aware that they are being used as a tool to meet such an end.

The letter was said to have been published in newspapers of general circulation. Jimenez then

filed a case against Cabangbang to collect a sum of damages against Cabangbang alleging that

Cabangbang’s statement is libelous. Cabangbang petitioned for the case to be dismissed because

he said that as a member of the HOR he is immune from suit and that he is covered by the

privileged communication rule and that the said letter is not even libelous.

ISSUE: Whether or not the open letter is covered by privilege communication endowed to

members of Congress. Whether or not the said letter is libelous.

HELD: Article VI, Section 15 of the Constitution provides “The Senators and Members of the

House of Representatives shall in all cases except treason, felony, and breach of the peace. Be

privileged from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of the Congress, and in going to and

returning from the same; and for any speech or debate therein, they shall not be questioned in

any other place.” The publication of the said letter is not covered by said expression which refers

to utterances made by Congressmen in the performance of their official functions, such as

speeches delivered, statements made, or votes cast in the halls of Congress, while the same is in

session as well as bills introduced in Congress, whether the same is in session or not, and other

acts performed by Congressmen, either in Congress or outside the premises housing its offices,

in the official discharge of their duties as members of Congress and of Congressional

Committees duly authorized to perform its functions as such at the time of the performance of

the acts in question. Congress was not in session when the letter was published and at the same

time he, himself, caused the publication of the said letter. It is obvious that, in thus causing the

communication to be so published, he was not performing his official duty, either as a member of

Congress or as officer of any Committee thereof. Hence, contrary to the finding made by the

lower court the said communication is not absolutely privileged.

The SC is satisfied that the letter in question is not sufficient to support Jimenez’ action for

damages. Although the letter says that plaintiffs are under the control of the persons unnamed

therein alluded to as “planners”, and that, having been handpicked by Vargas, it should be noted

that defendant, likewise, added that “it is of course possible” that plaintiffs “are unwitting tools

of the plan of which they may have absolutely no knowledge”. In other words, the very

document upon which plaintiffs’ action is based explicitly indicates that they might be absolutely

unaware of the alleged operational plans, and that they may be merely unwitting tools of the

planners. The SC does not think that this statement is derogatory to Jimenez to the point of

entitling them to recover damages, considering that they are officers of our Armed Forces, that as

such they are by law, under the control of the Secretary of National Defense and the Chief of

Staff, and that the letter in question seems to suggest that the group therein described as

“planners” include these two (2) high ranking officers.Petition is dismissed.

Adaza vs Pacana (G.R. NO. L-68159)

Singularity of Office/Position

FACTS: Adaza was elected governor of the province of Misamis Oriental in the January 30,

1980 elections. He took his oath of office and started discharging his duties as provincial

governor on March 3, 1980. Pacana was elected vice-governor for same province in the same

elections. Under the law, their respective terms of office would expire on March 3, 1986. On

March 27, 1984, Pacana filed his certificate of candidacy for the May 14, 1984 BP elections;

petitioner Adaza followed suit on April 27, 1984. In the ensuing elections, petitioner won by

placing first among the candidates, while Pacana lost. Adaza took his oath of office as

Mambabatas Pambansa on July 19, 1984 and since then he has discharged the functions of said

office. On July 23, 1984, Pacana took his oath of office as governor of Misamis Oriental before

President Marcos, and started to perform the duties of governor on July 25, 1984. Claiming to be

the lawful occupant of the governor’s office, Adaza has brought this petition to exclude Pacana

therefrom. He argues that he was elected to said office for a term of six years, that he remains to

be the governor of the province until his term expires on March 3, 1986 as provided by law, and

that within the context of the parliamentary system, as in France, Great Britain and New Zealand,

a local elective official can hold the position to which he had been elected and simultaneously be

an elected member of Parliament.

ISSUE: Whether or not Adaza can serve as a member of the Batasan and as a governor of the

province simultaneously. Whether or not a vice governor who ran for Congress and lost can

assume his original position and as such can, by virtue of succession, taeke the vacated seat of

the governor.

HELD: Section 10, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution provides as follows:

“Section 10. A member of the National Assembly [now Batasan Pambansa] shall not hold any

other office or employment in the government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality

thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations, during his tenure, except that of

prime minister or member of the cabinet . . .”

The Philippine Constitution is clear and unambiguous. Hence Adaza cannot invoke common law

practices abroad. He cannot complain of any restrictions which public policy may dictate on his

holding of more than one office. Adaza further contends that when Pacana filed his candidacy for

the Batasan he became a private citizen because he vacated his office. Pacana, as a mere private

citizen, had no right to assume the governorship left vacant by petitioner’s election to the BP.

This is not tenable and it runs afoul against BP. 697, the law governing the election of members

of the BP on May 14, 1984, Section 13[2] of which specifically provides that “governors,

mayors, members of the various sangguniang or barangay officials shall, upon filing a certificate

of candidacy, be considered on forced leave of absence from office.” Indubitably, respondent

falls within the coverage of this provision, considering that at the time he filed his certificate of

candidacy for the 1984 BP election he was a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan as

provided in Sections 204 and 205 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, 5 otherwise known as the Local

Government Code.

Homobono Adaza vs Fernando Pacana, Jr.

135 SCRA 431 – Political Law – Congress – Singularity of Office/Position

Homobono Adaza was elected governor of the province of Misamis Oriental in the January 30,

1980elections. He took his oath of office and started discharging his duties as provincial

governor on March 3, 1980. Fernando Pacana, Jr. was elected vice-governor for same province

in the sameelections. Under the law, their respective terms of office would expire on March 3,

1986. On March 27, 1984, Pacana filed his certificate of candidacy for the May 14, 1984

BP elections; petitioner Adaza followed suit on April 27, 1984. In the ensuingelections,

petitioner won by placing first among the candidates, while Pacana lost. Adaza took his oath of

office as Mambabatas Pambansa on July 19, 1984 and since then he has discharged the functions

of said office. On July 23, 1984, Pacana took his oath of office as governor of Misamis Oriental

before President Marcos, and started to perform the duties of governor on July 25, 1984.

Claiming to be the lawful occupant of the governor’s office, Adaza has brought this petition to

exclude Pacana therefrom. He argues that he was elected to said office for a term of six years,

that he remains to be the governor of the province until his term expires on March 3, 1986 as

provided by law, and that within the context of the parliamentary system, as in France, Great

Britain and New Zealand, a local elective official can hold the position to which he had been

elected and simultaneously be an elected member of Parliament.

ISSUE: Whether or not Adaza can serve as a member of the Batasan and as a governor of the

province simultaneously. Whether or not a vice governor who ran for Congress and lost can

assume his original position and as such can, by virtue of succession, take the vacated seat of the

governor.

HELD: Section 10, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution provides as follows:

“Section 10.   A member of the National Assembly [now Batasan Pambansa] shall not hold any

other office or employment in the government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality

thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations, during his tenure, except that

of prime minister or member of the cabinet . . .”

The Philippine Constitution is clear and unambiguous. Hence Adaza cannot invoke common law

practices abroad. He cannot complain of any restrictions which public policy may dictate on his

holding of more than one office. Adaza further contends that when Pacana filed his candidacy for

the Batasan he became a private citizen because he vacated his office.  Pacana, as a mere private

citizen, had no right to assume the governorship left vacant by petitioner’s election to the BP.

This is not tenable and it runs afoul against BP. 697, the law governing the election of members

of the BP on May 14, 1984, Section 13[2] of which specifically provides that “governors,

mayors, members of the various sangguniang or barangay officials shall, upon filing a certificate

of candidacy, be considered on forced leave of absence from office.” Indubitably, respondent

falls within the coverage of this provision, considering that at the time he filed his certificate of

candidacy for the 1984 BP election he was a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan as

provided in Sections 204 and 205 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 337,  otherwise known as the Local

Government Code.

Cicero Punsalan vs Estelito Mendoza

140 SCRA 153 – Political Law – Congress – Singularity of Office/Position

Cicero Punsalan and Estelito Mendoza were the vice governor and the governor of Pampanga

respectively. Both belong to KBL. On 17 May 1984, Mendoza tendered his resignation as the

governor but the same should only be “effective at the President’s pleasure.” On 30 June 1984,

Mendoza was appointed as the Minister of Justice by the president. On 14 July 1984, he was

concurrently appointed as a member of the Batasan Pambansa. On 16 July 1984, he filed a

request to the Minister of Local Government (MLG) to consider him as the governor-on-leave of

Pampanga while the President was considering his resignation. The request was subsequently

approved by the MLG. Mendoza advised Punsalan to take the governorship temporarily while

his resignation is being considered.  Punsalan subsequently took his oath of office not as the

acting governor but as the governor and thereafter assumed office. About 6 months later

however, Mendoza resigned from his Batasan Membership and upon the result of the KBL’s

caucus, he returned to Pampanga to assume his governorship. Punsalan denounced Mendoza’s

return claiming that he has already vacated his office by virtue of his resignation which was

impliedly approved by the President. Punsalan also pointed out that when Mendoza was a

member of the Batasan, he was barred from holding governorship because there  is an inhibition

against Batasan Members from holding two elective positions; this is a constitutional provision

which cannot be compromised. Further, Punsalan claimed that  Mendoza had forfeited his right

and title to the office when he accepted his appointment as Minister of Justice and that of

“appointive” Batasan Member because of the incompatibility” of the positions with the

Governor’s office.

ISSUE: Whether or not Mendoza can still return to his governorship.

HELD: Section 10, Article 8 of the 1973 Constitution provides:

“A Member of the Batasang Pambansa shall not hold any other office or employment in the

Government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned

or controlled corporations, during his tenure except that of Prime Minister, Member of the

Cabinet or Deputy Minister. Neither shall he, during the term for which he was elected, be

appointed to any civil office which may have been created or emoluments thereof increased

while he was a Member of the Batasang Pambansa.”

Punsalan anchored his contention upon the above provision but he failed to ascertain that the

Constitution made a distinction. The Constitution itself divided the Batasan membership into

three categories: The elective provincial/city/district representative; the sectoral representatives

who are either “elected or selected as may be provided by law”; and those “chosen” from

Members of the Cabinet. It is the SC’s opinion that the prohibition in question does not extend to

the third group of members, those chosen from the Cabinet. The prohibitions, undoubtedly, deal

with “a Member” who enters the Batasan primarily as a legislator voted into office by the

electorate of his constituency, the “elected” provincial or city or district representative with a

“fixed term” (6 years) of office i.e an elected governor who, while in office, was elected as a

member of the Batasan cannot concurrently hold those two elective positions. Mendoza was

elected as the governor but was not elected as a member of the Batasan; he was appointed.

Punsalan’s contention that Mendoza’s resignation was impliedly approved by the president is not

tenable. The president in fact needed more time to consider the validity of the resignation and

upon the KBL’s recommendation, he instead chose to approve Mendoza’s return to his

governorship.

 

Raul Villegas vs Valentino Legaspi

113 SCRA 39 – Political Law – The Legislative Department – Appearance in Court by a

Congressman 

This case is a consolidation of two cases involving the issue of whether or not a member of

Congress may appear before the regular courts as counsel for ordinary litigants.

Case 1

In September 1979, Raul Villegas filed a civil case against spouses Vera Cruz et al before the

Court of First Instance (CFI) Cebu. The Vera Cruz spouses filed their answer to the complaint

and they were represented by Valentino Legaspi, then a member of the Batasang Pambansa.

Villegas then challenged the representation made by Legaspi as counsel for the spouses on the

ground that it is unconstitutional; as pointed out by Villegas “no member of the Batasang

Pambansa shall appear as counsel before any court without appellate jurisdiction”. The

presiding judge however overruled Villegas’ challenged and proceeded with the trial. The judge

said that CFIs have appellate jurisdiction.

Case 2

In July 1979, Edgardo Reyes filed a civil case against N. V. Verenigde Buinzenfabrieken

Excelsior-De Maas, a corporation, before CFI Rizal. Estanisalo Fernandez appeared as counsel

for the corporation. Reyes questions the appearance of Fernandez as counsel for the corporation

on the same ground invoked in Case 1 because Fernandez is also a member of the Batasang

Pambansa.

ISSUE: Whether or not the said members, Estanislao Fernandez and Valentino Legaspi, of the

Batasang Pambansa may appear as counsels before the said CFIs.

HELD: No. Members of Congress are prohibited to appear as counsel berfore CFI’s acting in

their original jurisdiction. CFI’s have dual personalities. They can be courts of general original

jurisdiction (courts of origin) or appellate courts depending on the case that they took cognizance

of. In the cases at bar, CFI Cebu and CFI Rizal acted as a courts of general original jurisdiction.

Both cases were not elevated to the said  CFIs from any lower courts. Thus, the CFIs in the case

at bar are “courts without appellate jurisdiction”.

 

NOTE: Under Section 14, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution:

No Senator or member of the House of Representatives may personally appear as counsel before

any court of justice or before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial and other administrative

bodies. Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be interested financially in any contract with, or

in any franchise or special privilege granted by the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or

instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or controlled corporation, or its

subsidiary, during his term of office. He shall not intervene in any matter before any office of the

Government for his pecuniary benefit or where he may be called upon to act on account of his

office.

Appearance of the legislator is now barred before all courts of justice, regardless of rank,

composition, or jurisdiction. The disqualification also applies to the revived Electoral Tribunal

and to all administrative bodies, like the Securities and Exchange Commission and the National

Labor Relations Commission. Courts martial and military tribunals, being administrative

agencies, are included. 

PUYAT, ET. AL. vs. DE GUZMAN JR., ET. AL. G.R. No. L-51122, 25 March 1982

The suit is for Certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction poised against the Order of

respondent Associate Commissioner of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Hon.

Sixto T. J. De Guzman, Jr., granting Assemblyman Estanislao A. Fernandez leave to intervene in

a SEC Case.

FACTS:

On 14 May 1979, an election for the eleven Directors of the International Pipe Industries (IPI), a

private corporation, was held – six of the elected directors were herein petitioners that may be

called the Puyat Group, while the other five were herein respondents, the Acero Group. Thus, the

Puyat Group would be in control of the Board and of the management of IPI.

On 25 May 1979, the Acero Group instituted at the SEC quo warranto proceedings questioning

the election.

Conferences were held on 25-31 May 1979 and the Puyat Group objected on Constitutional

grounds the appearance of Justice Estanislao Fernandez, then a member of the Interim Batasang

Pambansa, as counsel for the Acero group. Section 11, Article VIII, 1973 Constitution, then in

force, provided that no Assemblyman could "appear as counsel before xxx any administrative

body" and SEC was an administrative body. The prohibition being clear, Assemblyman

Fernandez did not continue his appearance.

When SEC Case was called on 31 May 1979, it turned out that Assemblyman Fernandez had

purchased on 15 May 1979 ten shares of IPI stock for Php200.00, but the deed of sale was

notarized only on 30 May 1979. He then filed on 31 May 1979 an Urgent Motion for

Intervention in the SEC Case as the owner of 10 IPI shares alleging legal interest in the matter in

litigation, which motion was granted by the SEC Commissioner.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Assemblyman Fernandez, in intervening in the SEC Case, is in effect appearing

as counsel, albeit indirectly, before an administrative body in contravention of the Constitutional

provision.

RULING:

The Court en banc ruled that ordinarily, by virtue of the Motion for Intervention, Assemblyman

Fernandez cannot be said to be appearing as counsel. His appearance could theoretically be for

the protection of his ownership of ten (10) IPI shares.

However, certain salient circumstances militate against the intervention of Assemblyman

Fernandez. He had acquired a mere Php200.00 worth of stock in IPI. He acquired them "after the

fact", that is, on 30 May 1979, after the contested election of Directors, after the quo warranto

suit had been filed, and one day before the scheduled hearing of the case before the SEC. And

what is more, before he moved to intervene, he had signified his intention to appear as counsel

for the Acero group, but which was objected to by petitioners Puyat group. Realizing, perhaps,

the validity of the objection, he decided, instead, to "intervene" on the ground of legal interest in

the matter under litigation.

Under those facts and circumstances, there has been an indirect appearance as counsel before an

administrative body, which is a circumvention of the Constitutional prohibition. The

"intervention" was an afterthought to enable him to appear actively in the proceedings in some

other capacity.

A ruling upholding the "intervention" would make the constitutional provision ineffective. All an

Assemblyman need do, if he wants to influence an administrative body is to acquire a minimal

participation in the "interest" of the client and then "intervene" in the proceedings. That which

the Constitution directly prohibits may not be done by indirection or by a general

legislative act which is intended to accomplish the objects specifically or impliedly

prohibited.

Thus, the intervention of Assemblyman Fernandez in the SEC Case falls within the ambit of the

prohibition contained in the 1973 Constitution. Respondent Commissioner's Order granting

Assemblyman Fernandez leave to intervene in the SEC Case was reversed and set aside.

Ceferino Paredes, Jr. vs Sandiganbayan

252 SCRA 641 – Political Law – The Legislative Department – Suspension of a Member

of Congress – RA 3019 

In January 1990, Teofilo Gelacio, the then vice mayor of San Francisco, Agusan del Sur filed a

case against Ceferino Paredes, Jr. (who was then the governor of the same province), Atty.

Generoso Sansaet (counsel of Paredes), and Mansueto Honrada (a clerk of court). The three

allegedly conspired to falsify a copy of a Notice of Arraignment and of the Transcript of

Stenographic Notes. Gelacio claimed that, in fact, no arraignment notice had ever been issued

against him in a criminal proceeding against him. Gelacio was able to produce a certification

from the judge handling the case himself that the criminal case against him never reached

thearraignment stage because the prosecution was dismissed. Atty. Sansaet on his part

maintained that there was indeed a Notice of Arraignment but he later retracted his testimonies.

Paredes claimed that Sansaet only changed his side because of political realignment.

Subsequently, the Office of the Ombudsman recommended that Paredes et al be charged with

Falsification of Public Documents. Paredes appealed but was eventually denied by the

Sandiganbayan.

ISSUE: Whether or not Paredes, now a member ofCongress, may be suspended by order of the

Sandiganbayan.

HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the order of suspension of Congressman Paredes by

the Sandiganbayan, despite his protestations on the encroachment by the court on the

prerogatives ofcongress.  The SC ruled:

“x x x.  Petitioner’s invocation of Section 16 (3), Article VI of the Constitution – which deals

with the power of each House of Congress  inter alia to ‘punish its Members for disorderly

behavior,’ and ‘suspend or expel a Member’ by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members subject to

the qualification that the penalty of suspension, when imposed, should not exceed sixty days – is

unavailing, as it appears to be quite distinct from the suspension spoken of in Section 13 of RA

3019, which is not a penalty but a preliminary, preventive measure, prescinding from the fact

that the latter is not being imposed on petitioner for misbehavior as a Member of the House of

Representatives.”

Jose Avelino vs Mariano Cuenco

83 Phil. 17 – Political Law – The Legislative Department – Election of

Members/Quorum/Adjournment/Minutes 

On February 18, 1949, Senator Lorenzo Tañada invoked his right to speak on the senate floor to

formulate charges against the then Senate President Jose Avelino. He requested to do so on the

next session (Feb. 21, 1949). On the next session day however, Avelino delayed the opening of

the session for about two hours. Upon insistent demand by Tañada, Mariano Cuenco, Prospero

Sanidad and other Senators, Avelino was forced to open session. He however, together with his

allies initiated all dilatory and delaying tactics to forestall Tañada from delivering his piece.

Motions being raised by Tañada et al were being blocked by Avelino and his allies and they even

ruled Tañada and Sanidad, among others, as being out of order.  Avelino’s camp then moved to

adjourn the session due to the disorder. Sanidad however countered and they requested the said

adjournment to be placed in voting. Avelino just banged his gavel and he hurriedly left his chair

and he was immediately followed by his followers. Senator Tomas Cabili then stood up, and

asked that it be made of record — it was so made — that the deliberate abandonment of the

Chair by the Avelino, made it incumbent upon Senate President Pro-tempore Melencio Arranz

and the remaining members of the Senate to continue the session in order not to paralyze the

functions of the Senate. Tañada was subsequently recognized to deliver his speech. Later, Arranz

yielded to Sanidad’s Resolution (No. 68) that Cuenco be elected as the Senate President. This

was unanimously approved and was even recognized by the President of the Philippines the

following day.  Cuenco took his oath of office thereafter. Avelino then filed a quo

warrantoproceeding before the SC to declare him as the rightful Senate President.

ISSUE: Whether or not the SC can take cognizance of the case.

HELD: No. By a vote of 6 to 4, the SC held that they cannot take cognizance of the case. This is

in view of the separation of powers, the political nature of the controversy and the constitutional

grant to the Senate of the power to elect its own president, which power should not be interfered

with, nor taken over, by the judiciary. The SC should abstain in this case because the selection of

the presiding officer affects only the Senators themselves who are at liberty at any time to choose

their officers, change or reinstate them. Anyway, if, as the petition must imply to be acceptable,

the majority of the Senators want petitioner to preside, his remedy lies in the Senate Session Hall

— not in the Supreme Court.

Supposed the SC can take cognizance of the case, what will be the resolution?

There is unanimity in the view that the session under Senator Arranz was a continuation of the

morning session and that a minority of ten senators (Avelino et al) may not, by leaving the

Hall, prevent the other (Cuenco et al) twelve senators from passing a resolution that met with

their unanimous endorsement. The answer might be different had the resolution been approved

only by ten or less.

**Two senators were not present that time. Sen. Soto was in a hospital while Sen. Confesor was

in the USA.

Is the rump session (presided by Cuenco) a continuation of the morning session (presided

by Avelino)? Are there two sessions in one day? Was there a quorum constituting such

session?

The second session is a continuation of the morning session as evidenced by the minutes entered

into the journal. There were 23 senators considered to be in session that time (including Soto,

excluding Confesor). Hence, twelve senators constitute a majority of the Senate of twenty three

senators. When the Constitution declares that a majority of “each House” shall constitute a

quorum, “the House” does not mean “all” the members. Even a majority of all the members

constitute “the House”. There is a difference between a majority of “all the members of the

House” and a majority of “the House”, the latter requiring less number than the first. Therefore

an absolute majority (12) of all the members of the Senate less one (23), constitutes

constitutional majority of the Senate for the purpose of a quorum. Furthermore, even if the

twelve did not constitute a quorum, they could have ordered the arrest of one, at least, of the

absent members; if one had been so arrested, there would be no doubt Quorum then, and Senator

Cuenco would have been elected just the same inasmuch as there would be eleven for Cuenco,

one against and one abstained.

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION (filed by Avelino on March 14, 1949)

Avelino and his group (11 senators in all) insist that the SC take cognizance of the case and that

they are willing to bind themselves to the decision of the SC whether it be right or wrong.

Avelino contends that there is no constitutional quorum when Cuenco was elected president.

There are 24 senators in all. Two are absentee senators; one being confined and the other abroad

but this does not change the number of senators nor does it change the majority which if

mathematically construed is ½ + 1; in this case 12 (half of 24) plus 1 or 13 NOT 12. There being

only 12 senators when Cuenco was elected unanimously there was no quorum.

The Supreme Court, by a vote of seven resolved to assume jurisdiction over the case in the light

of subsequent events which justify its intervention. The Chief Justice agrees with the result of the

majority’s pronouncement on the quorum upon the ground that, under the peculiar circumstances

of the case, the constitutional requirement in that regard has become a mere formalism, it

appearing from the evidence that any new session with a quorum would result in Cuenco’s

election as Senate President, and that the Cuenco group, taking cue from the dissenting opinions,

has been trying to satisfy such formalism by issuing compulsory processes against senators of the

Avelino group, but to no avail, because of the Avelino’s persistent efforts to block all avenues to

constitutional processes. For this reason, the SC believes that the Cuenco group has done enough

to satisfy the requirements of the Constitution and that the majority’s ruling is in conformity with

substantial justice and with therequirements of public interest. Therefore Cuenco has been

legally elected as Senate President and the petition is dismissed.

Justice Feria: (Concurring)

Art. 3 (4) Title VI of the Constitution of 1935 provided that “the majority of all the members of

the National Assembly constitute a quorum to do business” and the fact that said provision was

amended in the Constitution of 1939, so as to read “a majority of each House shall constitute a

quorum to do business,” shows the intention of the framers of the Constitution to base the

majority, not on the number fixed or provided for in the Constitution, but on actual

members or incumbents, and this must be limited to actual members who are not

incapacitated to discharge their duties by reason of death, incapacity, or absence from the

jurisdiction of the house or for other causes which make attendance of the member

concerned impossible, even through coercive process which each house is empowered to

issue to compel its members to attend the session in order to constitute a quorum. That the

amendment was intentional or made for some purpose, and not a mere oversight, or for

considering the use of the words “of all the members” as unnecessary, is evidenced by the fact

that Sec. 5 (5) Title VI of the original Constitution which required “concurrence of two-thirds of

the members of the National Assembly to expel a member” was amended by Sec. 10 (3) Article

VI of the present Constitution, so as to require “the concurrence of two-thirds of all the members

of each House”. Therefore, as Senator Confesor was in the United States and absent from the

jurisdiction of the Senate, the actual members of the Senate at its session of February 21, 1949,

were twenty-three (23) and therefore 12 constituted a majority.

United States vs Juan Pons

34 Phil. 729 – Political Law – Journal – Conclusiveness of the Journals

Juan Pons and Gabino Beliso were trading partners. On April 5, 1914, the steamer Lopez y

Lopez arrived in Manila from Spain and it contained 25 barrels of wine. The said barrels of wine

were delivered to Beliso. Beliso subsequently delivered 5 barrels to Pons’ house. On the other

hand, the customs authorities noticed that the said 25 barrels listed as wine on record were not

delivered to any listed merchant (Beliso not being one). And so the customs officers conducted

an investigation thereby discovering that the 25 barrels of wine actually contained tins of opium.

Since the act of trading and dealing opium is against Act No. 2381, Pons and Beliso were

charged for illegally and fraudulently importing and introducing such contraband material to the

Philippines. Pons appealed the sentence arguing that Act 2381 was approved while the Philippine

Commission (Congress) was not in session. He said that his witnesses claim that the said law

was passed/approved on 01 March 1914 while the special session of the Commission was

adjourned at 12MN on February 28, 1914. Since this is the case, Act 2381 should be null and

void.

ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must go beyond the recitals of the Journals to determine if Act

2381 was indeed made a law on February 28, 1914.

HELD: The SC looked into the Journals to ascertain the date of adjournment but the SC refused

to go beyond the recitals in the legislative Journals. The said Journals are conclusive on the

Court  and to inquire into the veracity of the journals of the Philippine Legislature, when they

are, as the SC have said, clear and explicit, would be to violate both the letter and the spirit of the

organic laws by which the Philippine Government was brought into existence, to invade a

coordinate and independent department of the Government, and to interfere with the legitimate

powers and functions of the Legislature. Pons’ witnesses cannot be given due weight against the

conclusiveness of the Journals which is an act of the legislature. The journals say that the

Legislature adjourned at 12 midnight on February 28, 1914. This settles the question, and the

court did not err in declining to go beyond these journals. The SC passed upon the

conclusiveness of the enrolled bill in this particular case.

Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. vs Pedro Gimenez

7 SCRA 347 – Political Law – Journal – Conclusiveness of the Enrolled Bill                

Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. (Casco) was engaged in the production of synthetic resin

glues used primarily in the production of plywood. The main components of the said glue

are urea and formaldehyde which are both being imported abroad. Pursuant to a Central Bank

circular, Casco paid the required margin fee for its imported urea and formaldehyde. Casco

however paid in protest as it maintained that urea and formaldehyde are tax exempt transactions.

The Central Bank agreed and it issued vouchers for refund. The said vouchers were submitted to

Pedro Gimenez, the then Auditor General, who denied the tax refund. Gimenez maintained that

urea and formaldehyde, as two separate and distinct components are not tax exempt; that what is

tax exempt is urea formaldehyde (the synthetic resin formed by combining urea and

formaldehyde). Gimenez cited the provision of Sec. 2, par 18 of Republic Act No. 2609 which

provides:

The margin established by the Monetary Board pursuant to the provision of section one

hereofshall not be imposed upon  the sale of foreign exchange for the importation of the

following:

xxx                                      xxx                                      xxx

“XVIII. Urea formaldehyde  for the manufacture of plywood and hardboard when imported by

and for the exclusive use of end-users.

Casco however averred that the term “urea formaldehyde” appearing in this provision should be

construed as “urea and formaldehyde”. It further contends that  the bill approved in Congress

contained the copulative conjunction “and” between the terms “urea” and, “formaldehyde”, and

that the members of Congress intended to exempt “urea” and “formaldehyde” separately as

essential elements in the manufacture of the synthetic resin glue called “urea formaldehyde”, not

the latter a finished product, citing in support of this view the statements made on the floor of the

Senate, during the consideration of the bill before said House, by members thereof.

The enrolled bill however used the term “urea formaldehyde”

ISSUE: Whether or not the term “urea formaldehyde” should be construed as “urea and

formaldehyde”.

HELD: No. Urea formaldehyde is not a chemical solution. It is the synthetic resin formed as a

condensation product from definite proportions of urea and formaldehyde under certain

conditions relating to temperature, acidity, and time of reaction. “Urea formaldehyde” is

clearly a finished product, which is patently distinct and different from “urea” and

“formaldehyde”, as separate articles used in the manufacture of the synthetic resin known as

“urea formaldehyde”.

The opinions or statements of any member of Congress during the deliberation of the said

law/bill do not represent the entirety of the Congress itself. What is printed in the enrolled bill

would be conclusive upon the courts. The enrolled bill — which uses the term “urea

formaldehyde” instead of “urea and formaldehyde” — is conclusive upon the courts as regards

the tenor of the measure passed by Congress and approved by the President. If there has been any

mistake in the printing of the bill before it was certified by the officers of Congress and approved

by the Executive — on which the SC cannot speculate, without jeopardizing the principle of

separation of powers and undermining one of the cornerstones of our democratic system — the

remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree.

 

Herminio Astorga vs Antonio Villegas

56 SCRA 714 – Political Law – The Legislative Department – Journal;When to be Consulted 

In 1964, Antonio Villegas (then Mayor of Manila) issued circulars to the department heads and

chiefs of offices of the city government as well as to the owners, operators and/or managers of

business establishments in Manila to disregard the provisions of Republic Act No. 4065. He

likewise issued an order to the Chief of Police to recall five members of the city police force who

had been assigned to then Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga (assigned under authority of RA 4065).

Astorga reacted against the steps carried out by Villegas. He then filed a petition for

“Mandamus, Injunction and/or Prohibition with Preliminary Mandatory and Prohibitory

Injunction” to compel Villegas et al and the members of the municipal board to comply with the

provisions of RA 4065 (filed with the SC). In his defense, Villegas denied recognition of RA

4065 (An Act Defining the Powers, Rights and Duties of the Vice-Mayor of the City of Manila)

because the said law was considered to have never been enacted. When the this said “law”passed

the 3rd reading in the lower house as House Bill No. 9266, it was sent to the Senate which

referred it to the Committee on Provinces and Municipal Governments and Cities headed by then

Senator Roxas. Some minor amendments were made before the bill was referred back to the

Senate floor for deliberations. During such deliberations, Sen. Tolentino made significant

amendments which were subsequently approved by the Senate. The bill was then sent back to the

lower house and was thereafter approved by the latter. The bill was sent to the President for

approval and it became RA 4065. It was later found out however that the copy signed by the

Senate President, sent to the lower house for approval and sent to the President for signing was

the wrong version. It was in fact the version that had no amendments thereto. It was not the

version as amended by Tolentino and as validly approved by the Senate. Due to this fact, the

Senate president and the President of the Philippines withdrew and invalidated their signatures

that they affixed on the said law.

Astorga maintains that the RA is still valid and binding and that the withdrawal of the concerned

signatures does not invalidate the statute. Astorga further maintains that the attestation of the

presiding officers of Congress is conclusive proof of a bill’s due enactment.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 4065 was validly enacted.

HELD: No. The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is no ordinary record.

The Constitution requires it. While it is true that the journal is not authenticated and is subject to

the risks of misprinting and other errors, the journal can be looked upon in this case. The SC is

merely asked to inquire whether the text of House Bill No. 9266 signed by the President was the

same text passed by both Houses of Congress. Under the specific facts and circumstances of this

case, the SC can do this and resort to the Senate journal for the purpose. The journal discloses

that substantial and lengthy amendments were introduced on the floor and approved by the

Senate but were not incorporated in the printed text sent to the President and signed by him. Note

however that the SC is not asked to incorporate such amendments into the alleged law but only

to declare that the bill was not duly enacted and therefore did not become law. As done by both

the President of the Senate and the Chief Executive, when they withdrew their signatures therein,

the SC also declares that the bill intended to be as it is supposed to be was never made into law.

To perpetuate that error by disregarding such rectification and holding that the erroneous bill has

become law would be to sacrifice truth to fiction and bring about mischievous consequences not

intended by the law-making body.

Morales v. Subido (1968)

Enrique Morales (pet.) v. Abelardo Subido, Comm. of Civil Service.(resp.)

G.R. No. L-29658, November 29, 1968

26 SCRA 150 (1968)

Facts:

The petitioner Enrique V. Morales is the chief of the detective bureau of the Manila Police

Department and holds the rank of lieutenant colonel. He rose to the rank in the said police force

despite his having no college degree. He was provisionally appointed as chief of police of Manila

which became vacant upon the resignation of the former chief of police, Brig. Gen. Ricardo G.

Papa on March 14, 1968.

The resp. Comm. of the Civil Service, Abelardo Subido, approved his designation but rejected

his appointment for failure to meet the minimum educational and civil service eligibility

requirements for the said position. The pertinent rule cited is that of sec. 10 of the Police Act of

1966 (RA 4864). The resp. instead certified other persons as qualified for the post and called the

attention of the Mayor of Manila to fill the vacancy within 30 days as required by sec. 4 of the

Decentralization Act.

The pet. requested for a mandamus from the Court to compel the resp. Commissioner to include

him in the list of eligible persons to the post of Chief of Police of Manila for the consideration of

the City Mayor. He contended that he is qualified despite lacking a college degree under the

statement of the aforementioned rule:

"has served in the police department of any city with the rank of captain or its equivalent therein

for at least three years"

Issue:

Whether the petition for mandamus be granted due to a different interpretation of the respondent

and the petitioner of Sec 10 of the Police Act of 1966.

Decision

No. The petition for mandamus to compel the respondent Commissioner of Civil Service to

include the name of the petitioner will not be granted since taking the present state of the law, he

is neither qualified nor eligible. Even if ,as noted by the Court, there may be a possibility of

ommision of a phrase, when the bill was passed by the Congress to the Senate, that may permit

the interpretation that he is qualified, the enrolled bill in possession of the legislative secretary of

the President, is signed by the Presidents of both the Lower and Upper Houses together with

their respective secretaries and the President and therefore must be deemed valid and binding to

the Court. No inclusion of other enlargements, no matter how sound they are, should be used in

the interpretation of an already enrolled bill.

Version 2 Enrique Morales vs Abelardo Subido

26 SCRA 150 – Political Law –  The Legislative Department – Journals vs Enrolled Bill 

Enrique Morales has served as captain in the police department of a city for at least three years

but does not possess a bachelor’s degree. Morales was the chief of detective bureau of the

Manila Police Department and holds the rank of lieutenant colonel. He began his career in 1934

as patrolman and gradually rose to his present position. Upon the resignation of the former Chief,

Morales  was designated acting chief of police of Manila and, at the same time, given a

provisional appointment to the same position by the mayor of Manila. Abelardo Subido,

Commissioner of Civil Service, approved the designation of Morales as acting chief but rejected

his appointment for “failure to meet the minimum educational and civil service eligibility

requirements for the said position.” Instead, Subido certified other persons as qualified for the

post. Subido invoked Section 10 of the Police Act of 1966, which Section reads:

Minimum qualification for appointment as Chief of Police Agency. – No person may be

appointed chief of a city police agency unless he holds a bachelor’s degree from a recognized

institution of learning and has served either in the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the

National Bureau of Investigation, or has served as chief of police with exemplary record, or has

served in the police department of any city with rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at

least three years; or any high school graduate who has served as officer in the Armed Forces

for at least eight years with the rank of captain and/or higher.

Nowhere in the above provision is it provided that a person “who has served the police

department of a city …” can be qualified for said office. Morales however argued that when the

said act was being deliberated upon, the approved version was actually the following:

No person may be appointed chief of a city police agency unless he holds a bachelor’s degree

and has served either in the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the National Bureau of

Investigation or police department of any city and has held the rank of captain or its equivalent

therein for at least three years or any high school graduate who has served the police

department of a city or who has served as officer of the Armed Forces for at least 8 years with

the rank of captain and/or higher.

Morales argued that the above version was the one which was actually approved by Congress but

when the bill emerged from the conference committee the only change made in the provision

was the insertion of the phrase “or has served as chief of police with exemplary

record.” Morales went on to support his case by producing copies of certified photostatic copy

of a memorandum which according to him was signed by an employee in the Senate bill

division, and can be found attached to the page proofs of the then bill being deliberated upon.

ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must look upon the history of the bill, thereby inquiring upon the

journals, to look searchingly into the matter.

HELD:  No. The enrolled Act in the office of the legislative secretary of the President of the

Philippines shows that Section 10 is exactly as it is in the statute as officially published in slip

form by the Bureau of Printing. The SC cannot go behind the enrolled Act to discover what

really happened. The respect due to the other branches of the Government demands that the SC

act upon the faith and credit of what the officers of the said branches attest to as the official acts

of their respective departments. Otherwise the SC would be cast in the unenviable and unwanted

role of a sleuth trying to determine what actually did happen in the labyrinth of lawmaking, with

consequent impairment of the integrity of the legislative process.

The SC is not of course to be understood as holding that in all cases the journals must yield to the

enrolled bill. To be sure there are certain matters which the Constitution expressly requires must

be entered on the journal of each house. To what extent the validity of a legislative act may be

affected by a failure to have such matters entered on the journal, is a question which the SC can

decide upon but is not currently being confronted in the case at bar hence the SC does not now

decide.  All the SC holds is that with respect to matters not expressly required to be entered on

the journal, the enrolled bill prevails in the event of any discrepancy.