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From the assignment given I have chosen to elucidate upon the relationship

between a prediction and an explanation in regard to the assigned reading by Carol

Cleland. In the following pages I will attempt to explain her view on the methods used to

construct predictions or explanations in either historical or classical science. I will also

expound upon her view of how explanations and predictions are not the same, but may

use similar methods. Finally, I will conclude with a comparison of explanations and

predictions in light of her contention that effects are under-determined by

their (putative) causes, and causes are over-determined by their effects.

Cleland explains classical science as a force for predicting phenomenon out of a

multiplicity of lab uality experiments. !he also discusses how proper experimenters

should rely on the "opperianfocus of falsifying the hypothesis in uestion, and protectingit from ad hoc explanations. !he goes on to describe the current situation as,

engaging in systematic, extended

experimentation that sometimes resembles an

attempt to falsify a hypothesis and sometimes

resembles an attempt to protect a hypothesis

from falsification, but is really aimed at

something quite different, namely, minimizing

the very real possibility of misleading

confirmations and disconfirmations in concrete

laboratory settings (478)

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In regards to historical science, she describes it as setting out to explain a

phenomenon based upon its effects. #er view of historical science focuses on what is

referred to as the smo$ing gun. !he explains the smo$ing gun as,

%a trace(s) that unambiguously discriminates one

hypothesis from among a set of currently available

hypotheses as providing &the best explanation' of the traces

thus far observed (*).

In essence the smo$ing gun properly explains the past phenomenon being uestioned by

the posed hypothesis.

Cleland argues that both explanations and descriptions use similar methods when

confronted with difficult situations. !he explains how sometimes a historical hypothesis

will reuire the use of comparable examples to past phenomena, e.g. the test for

primordial soup. +ith that in mind, she is able to disprove #enry ees opinion that

historical science, or explanations, cant be tested in a lab by showing how certain

situations can call for an experimental test of historical hypotheses. !he also explains

how classical hypotheses will often reuire the generation of a new auxiliary assumption

in light of a failed experimental test, almost li$e loo$ing for a smo$ing gun. !he believes

though, that after either of these situations play out the experimenter will return to their

original methods for obtaining the explanation or prediction that arises from it. !he goes

on to explain how historical science never sets out to disprove the hypothesis but support

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it with more traces. his is obviously not the same as classical science in that is doesnt

attempt to falsify but prove the hypothesis. /n the other hand, classical science never

entertains new hypotheses but only attempts to control for other factors in the experiment

that might mislead the true prediction.

+ith all of this said, it is a simple tas$ to decipher what Cleland would believe is

the relationship between prediction and explanation. If effects are underdetermined by

their causes, than even though classical science wor$s to control for a variety of causes,

the process is still uite difficult to prove a correct hypothesis and much easier to

disprove it. If causes are over determined by their effects, than historical science has a

mush easier time proving their hypotheses right than classical experimental science. In

light of this it is easy to come to the conclusion that Cleland would say that predictions

e.g. classical science, are much more li$ely to be proven false than explanations e.g.

historical science. +hat can be gleaned from this is that explanations are not the same as

predictions, and not only use different methods but are after different goals when testing

the hypothesis.