INFORMATIONAL MODELS OF CONSCIOUSNESS AND SYSTEMATIC DESCRIPTIONS OF LINGUISTIC PROCESSES

Pavel N. Baryshnikov Pyatigorsk State Linguistic University9 Kalinin Avenue, Pyatigorsk, 357500, Stavropol Region, Russiapnbaryshnikov@pglu.ru

Brief survey of key items

• “Intellect” and non-formalizable human concepts;

• Mathematics and brain activity;• Computability of Self-entity;• Problem of metalinguistic

description;• “Too human” cognition in

environment complexity (summary)

“Intellect” and non-formalizable human concepts

The theory of AI provokes some particular anthropological models of cognitive processes;

The process of defining becomes quite problematic, as the word "intellect" has an anthropological "conceptual trail " in everyday language. According to this definition, only a human being may possess an "intellect" along with all the variety of non-formalized axiological and ethical contents.

The idea of AI, which is capable of reproducing of the main functions of human consciousness on the basis of information processes. And we interpret the human cognition as informational procedure.

“Intellect” and non-formalizable human concepts

The conclusion seems to be quite a paradox: our consciousness is able to take a metaposition towards its processes of logical, linguistic and behavioral acting, the artificial intellectual systems, in return, do not need it.

Why?Because the machines don’t know

about its own existence.

Mathematics and brain activity

Mathematics and brain activity

Human brain is not only a calculating processor working with the evolution programs, but also an open developing system connected to the source of these programs themselves.

Mathematics and brain activity

Brain is a material carrier of countable physical processes and it is possible to study it through down to the limits of “fissility” of substance.

At the same time, the result of consciousness activity is utterly unstable and is quite difficult to work with using formal analytical methods.

Mathematics and brain activity

In other words, within informational models of consciousness it is easier to study the influence of a wave of a certain length upon the photo-receptors with the further information transfer to the visual zone of a cerebral cortex than to take out of consciousness a subjective mental image or a “branching” linguistic concepts using complex metaphors.

Mathematics and brain activity

From the point of view of logical and mathematical methods there is a problem of non-recursiveness of the natural semantics, except the restrictions tied up to computability of the mental processes.

Mathematics and brain activityComputable structures were described and formalized long ago, but the laws which generate the given structures (according to the mentioned theorem of Gödel) are out of the limits of structures.

Mathematics and brain activity There are some synthetic approaches

(V. Nalimov) which propose to enter spontaneous filter (p(y/μ) in the Bayes' rule:

p(μ/y)= kp(μ) p(y/μ)

It contradicts the information nature itself because information transmits the strong ordered meaning.

Computability of Self-entity

Computability of Self-entity

The human capacity to self-consciousness isn’t model-based as the process of natural language because the semantic base of natural language is the unique system of token computation which mounts the Gödel’s ontological proof.

Computability of Self-entity

What does “self-entity” mean? “To experience the absolute is to experience the absence of self, person, entity, soul, essence, substance, presence. We realize very distinctly that the sense of the entity of the self is actually a result of holding different things together with some sort of glue. The glue is the concept of entity, giving the illusion of entityhood”

The most striking property of natural language is the creating of infinite senses with limited syntax code plus possibility of description of proper referential procedures.

What is this glue?

Computability of Self-entity If there is a level of behavioral or

communicative intention in the proposition system (saying the preposition meaning “x” I keep in mind “y”) it means that there is a metasubject of proposition. In the natural language the recipient interprets as a rule “senses” the true speaker’s intention with nonverbal code, cultural presupposition and enigmatic inference rules (semantic deduction).

Computability of Self-entity

Here we have a paradox: the referent of pronoun “I” has nothing in common with the person pronouncing it. Because saying “I” we intend something quite different than what we perceive as our “self”. But it is something that we feel our “self”, “encodes” the linguistic embodiment of pronominal referent.

And here the mathematical identity law is broken!

Problem of metalinguistic description

There are technological possibilities of modeling of a natural signal and of its limited scope of meanings as well.

Problem of metalinguistic description

Bee-robot Linguistic behavior

Basis of a decoded bee dance, with

signal formal models.

Polysemantics, interpretative communicative basis, opportunity of metadescription.

Problem of metalinguistic description

Theoretical and informational approach may decode the quantitative component of the signal system or levels of complexity of the system, but not the sense-creating procedures of consciousness capable of generating endless number of senses using a limited number of signs.

Problem of metalinguistic description

Semantic Web 2.0 Linguistic consciousness

The server uses context metadata RDF (Resource Description Framework); sourcing the meaning out of net object of information exchange (based on logical conclusion). We can talk here about prototype of machine understanding and self-learning.

Linguistic procedures of consciousness (it is impossible to calculate this semantics) can easily solve the problem of conceptualization of the experience of perception and communication.

Summary and conclusions

Complex non-formalizable functions of consciousness were reflected within linguistic sign and symbolical systems:

Introspection and self-entity;Free sense-creating;“Flinkering” senses and

“branched” concepts;Forms of metadescription;

Summary and conclusions

Whether it is worth trying to reproduce these “too human” forms of cognition within artificial models?

Summary and conclusions

Thank you for your attention!