Passmore-Treatment of Animals (JHI 36.2 [1975])

8/10/2019 Passmore-Treatment of Animals (JHI 36.2 [1975])

1/24

THE TREATMENT

OF ANIMALS1

BY JOHNPASSMORE

One restrictionon the absolutism

of

man's rule over Nature

is now

generally

accepted:

moral

philosophers

nd

public

opinion

agree

that

it

is

morally mpermissible

o be cruel

to

animals.

And

by

this

they

mean

not

only

that

it is

wrong

to

enjoy torturing

animals-which

few

moralists

would

ever have

wished

explicitly

o

deny,

however ittle

em-

phasis they

might

have

placed

on

cruelty

to animals

in

their

moral

teaching-but that it

is

wrongto cause them to sufferunnecessarily.

"The

Puritan,"

Macaulay

once

wrote

with

condemnatory

intent,

"hated

bear-baiting,

ot because

t

gave

pain

to

the

bear,

but because

t

gave

pleasure

to the

spectators."2

n other

words,

what

they

hated-

and

by

no means

perversely-was

the

enjoyment

of animal

suffering;

o

the

mere fact that the bears

sufferedas

a

consequence

f humanaction

they

were

ndifferent.

That,

on the

whole,

s

the

Christian radition.

But

now the situation has

changed;

not

only cruelty-the

enjoyment

of

animalsuffering-but callousness, ndifferenceo animalsuffering,not

taking

it

into account

in

deciding

how

one

ought

to

act,

is

morally

condemned.3

Controversies

no

doubt

remain.

But

they

now

turn around he

ques-

tion what

is

to

count

as

"making

animals

suffer

unnecessarily,"

whether,

for

example,

vivisection

or

fox-hunting

are,

in these

terms,

morally

ustifiable.By looking

in

some

detail at

the

way

in

which the

general

moral

principle

hat

it is

wrong

to

act

callously

has

gradually

won acceptance,we can hope to see revealed,first, how reluctantly

Western

man has

acceptedany

restrictionwhatsoever

on

his

supposed

right

to deal as

he

pleases

with

Nature

and,

secondly,

how

changes

n

his

moral

outlook

have

nevertheless ome

about.

The Old

Testament did

not

leave

men

totally

without

guidance

n

their treatment

of animals.

The Hebrews

were

told,

for

example,

not to

"seethe

a kid

in his

mother's

milk"

and

not

to "muzzle

he ox when

he

treadeth out

the corn."4

But

these

somewhat outre

prohibitions,

as

lAn occasional sentence in this paper also appears in my Man's Responsibility for

Nature

(London,

1974).

2Thomas

Macaulay,

History of

England

(London,

1850),

I,

ch.

2,

161.

3The distinction

between

cruelty

and

callousness,

here

suggested,

does not conform

to

ordinary

usage

which includes

under the head

of

"cruelty"

both indifference

to and

enjoyment

of

suffering.

In the

argument

that

follows,

this

usage

will

sometimes be

adopted.

But

at

other

points

it

leads

to

the

confusion

of

issues,

and I shall have to

dis-

tinguish,

as

I

have

just

done,

between

enjoyment

(cruelty)

and

indifference

(callous-

ness).

4Exodus

23:19;Deuteronomy

25:4.

195


2/24

196

JOHN

PASSMORE

Maimonides and

Aquinas

suspected

and modern

scholarship

has

confirmed,

weredirected

against

heathen

magical

practices

rather

han

againstcrueltyor callousnessas such.5As for the other familiarOld

Testament

prohibitions,

hey

sometimes

rest

on the fact

that

asses and

oxen

were a valuable

orm

of

property, ust

as

when

Luke

reports

Jesus

as

asking

he Jews "Which

of

you

shall

have an assor an

ox fallen

nto a

pit,

and

will not

straightway

ull

him out on the Sabbath

day?"

he

is

not

suggesting

hat

they

will

break

the Sabbath

o relieveanimal

suffering,

but that

they

willdo

so to retrieve heir

property.6

n other cases

they

reflect

a

superstitious

ear

of

shedding

blood. So one

must not

exag-

gerate, as some interpretershave been temptedto do, the degreeto

which

the Old

Testament condemns

callousness.

Its

total

effect,

however,

is

certainly

not one of

complete

indifference

to

animal

suffering.

Paul, however,

refuses

o

interpret iterallyany

Biblical

precepts

re-

lating

to the

treatment

of

animals.

"Doth

God,"

he

rhetorically

asked,

"take care

of oxen?"When

men are

told not to muzzle

he mouthof the

ox, this,

Paul

is

confident,

s

meant

metaphorically,

s a

way

of

telling

men that "he thatplowethshouldplowin hope."7Nor does Paul stand

alone.

In

his

commentary

on Psalm

104,

Augustine

after

quoting

with

approval

Paul's

"Doth

God

take care

of

oxen?"carries

his

habit

of alle-

gorical

interpretation

o

far as

completely

to.disguise

he

character

of

that

psalm

as a

hymn

to God's

providentialgovernment

of

Nature.

("The

earth,"

for

example,

becomes

n

Augustine's

nterpretation,

the

Church.")8

The

precept

not to seethe

a kid in

its

mother's

milk

Augus-

tine understands

as a

prefiguring

f

Christ.9

In

short,

God,

as

under-

stood by Augustine,is quite unconcernedabout man's treatment of

Nature;

all God cares

about

s man's

relation

o

God

and

his

Church.

Augustine

was

particularly

concerned lest Christians

should be

tempted

by

the Manichaean

doctrine hat

it is

wrong

to

kill

and

eat ani-

mals.

He

had

been a Manichaean

himself

and knew

ts

attractions.

As

is so

often

true of

vegetarianism,

Manichaean

egetarianism

estedon a

complex

religioussystem.

The

divine

part

of

the

world,

so

the Man-

"Moses

Maimonides,

Guide

of

the

Perplexed

(Part

III,

ch.

48)

and the

commentary

by

David Bourke

and

Arthur

Littledale

to their

translation of

Aquinas,

Summa Theolo-

giae,

vol.

29,

The

Old

Law

(la

2ae,

98-105),

question

102,

article

6,

p.

225.

6Luke

14:5.

7I

Corinthians 9:10-11.

8Expositions

on the

Book

of

Psalms,

trans.

by

members

of the

English

Church

(Ox-

ford,

1853),

V,

85.

9Aurelii

Augustini

Opera,

Pars V:

Quaestiones

in

Heptateuchum,

Liber

Secundus,

Quaest.

Exodi, XC,

23,

19

in

Corpus

Christianorum,

XXXIII,

114-15

(Turnhout,

1958).

On the

whole theme of Christian

attitudes to

animals: Edward

Westermarck,

Christianity and Morals ch. XIX, and C. W. Hume, The Status of Animals in the

Christian

Religion (London,

1956).


3/24

THE TREATMENT

OF

ANIMALS

197

ichaeans

taught,

was

constantlybeing

released

from the soil.

It

enters

thence

into

plants

in

virtue of the fact that

they

have

their roots in the

soil.10Animals eat the plants,butin the processdefilethe divine ngre-

dients

the

plants

contain-inevitably

so,

on Manichaean

principles,

since animalsare

born

as a result

of the

supremelydefiling

act

of

sexual

intercourse.

Holy

men,

spiritualizedby

prayer,

celibacy,

and

fasting,

can

extract

divinity

n its

pure

form from

plants

whereas even their

holiness

couldnot

abate

the

corruption

nherent

n animalbodies."

In

the course

of

attacking

the Manichaeans

Augustine

was led

to

make a

quite general

point

about

man's treatment

of animals.

"Christ

Himself,"he writes,"showsthat to refrain romthe killingof animals

and the

destroying

of

plants

is

the

height

of

superstition

or,

judging

that there

are

no

common

rights

between

us

and

the

beasts and

trees,

he

sent the devils

nto a

herd

of swineand

with

a cursewithered he tree

on whichhe foundno fruit."

"Surely,"

Augustine

continues,

"the swine

had

not

sinned,

nor had the tree."

Animals,

that

is,

have

no

rights.

Christ,

who

might

simply

have

destroyed

the

possessing

devils,

chose

rather to

transfer them

to swine

in

order

to make

that fact

perfectly

clearto men.At anotherpoint Augustine ells us that animalsuffering

means little

or

nothing

to human

beings.

"We can

perceive by

their

cries,"

he

writes,

"that animalsdie

in

pain, although

we

make little

of

this

since the

beast,

lacking

a rational

soul,

is not related

to us

by

a

common

nature."12 ince beasts

lack

reason,

that

is,

we

need

not con-

cern ourselves

with

their

sufferings.

And

this, too,

is

why

they

have no

rights.

The source of these

Augustinian

eachings

s

certainly

not

the Old

Testament,according o whichanimalsandmensharea commonprin-

ciple

of

life

(nebesh).

For the

author of

Ecclesiastes,

indeed,

"that

which befalleth the sons of men befalleth

beasts;

even

one

thing

be-

falleth

them;

as

the one

dieth,

so dieth the

other;

yea,

they

have

all

one

breadth;

so that a man hath no

preeminence

above a beast."13And

if

Ecclesiastes

s a hard nut for

orthodoxy

o

crack-it

is

nowhere

quoted

in

the

New

Testament-there

is

nothing

novel,

from

an Old

Testament

point

of

view,

in its

suggestion

hat man and beast

share "one

breath,"

?1This iew-that the soil

is

the

source of all

goodness-persists

in

European

and

American

thinking.

Jefferson

Notes

on the State

of

Virginia,

Query XIX)

was con-

vinced hat "thosewho labour

n

the earth

are the chosen

people

of God."Or

compare

P. W.

Foxburgh's

The Natural

Thing

New

York,

1953):

"The land

is

good,

in

fact

good

beyondquestion

and

t

is

good

to live on the

land

andwork

t"

(24).

The

goodness

of

virgin

oil is often

taken

for

granted,

with

disastrous

agricultural

onsequences.

"Augustine,

The

Catholicand

Manichaean

Waysof Life,

trans.

D. A.

Gallagher

and

I.

J.

Gallagher

Washington,

966),

ch.

XV,

91.

21Ibid.,

h.

XVII,

102and 105.

3Ecclesiastes

:19.


4/24

198

JOHN

PASSMORE

one

soul,

one

principle

of

life.

In the

New

Testament,

too,

all

living

things

are

represented

s

possessing

a

psyche.14

We do

not

have

to

look

far

into Greek

philosophy,

however,

o

find

the

source

of

Augustine's

eachings.

TheStoics

thought

t obvious

hat

animals

were

devoid

of

reason.

They

were

as

confident

as

Paul

that

Providence

cared

nothing

for

animals,

except

as an indirect

way

of

caring

for

men.

And

like

Augustine,

they

were

ready

to

conclude

that

animals,

as

lacking

reason,

must

also lack

rights.15

From

the

society

of

rational

beings,"

so Pohlenz

sums

up

the

Stoic

position,

"animals

are

naturally

excluded."

"Against

the

Pythagoreans,"

he

goes

on

to

pointout, "theStoicsvigorouslydefended heviewthatthere

s no

legal

or moral

tie of

any

kind

between

man

and animal."16

Even

the

most

unorthodox

of

Stoics

stood

firm on

this

point,

during

the

long

five-

hundred

ear

history

of

the Stoic

school.

Not all Christians

were

convinced,

however,

by

the

Stoic

argument

that

since

the

beasts are

irrational,

men

may

treat

them

as

they

please.

"Even to

the

unreasoning

creatures,"

wrote

John

Chrysostom

n the

fourth

century,

"[the

saints]

extend

their

gentleness."17

lso

a

Greek-

the Italian Fathers absorbedsomething of the inhumanitycharac-

teristic of

Rome-Basil

the

Great

composed

a

prayer

for

animals:

"And for

these

also,

O

Lord,

the

humble

beasts,

who

bear

with

us

the

heat and

burdenof

the

day,

we

beg

thee to extend

thy

great

kindness

of

heart,

for thou

hast

promised

o save

both

man

and

beast,

and

great

is

thy loving-kindness,

O

Master."18

Note

that Basil

thinks of

God

as

having"promised

o

save both

man

and beast."

He

relies,

no

doubt,

on

Paul's

Epistle

to

the

Romans,

where

Paul tells

us

that "the

earnest

ex-

pectationof the creaturewaitethfor the manifestationof the sons of

God."

Paul's

phrase

"of

the

creature,"

particularly

when

t

is followed

by

the observation

hat

"the whole creation

groaneth

and

travaileth

n

pain

together

until

now,"

does

not

suggest

that

it is

only

human

beings

who are

waiting

on God.19

But,

although

Basil

is

by

no

means

the sole

exception,

his

passage

has

not

normally

been taken to

imply

that beast

as well as man

will be

saved,

as

distinct from

being

"transfigured."

That beasts are

incapable

of

immortality,

indeed,

is

often

taken to

follow fromtheverynatureof theirsouls.20

4W. E.

Lynch,

"Soul,"

in New Catholic

Encyclopedia

(New

York,

1967),

XIII,

449-50,

sums

up

the Biblical

situation.

15Cf.

E. V.

Arnold,

Roman

Stoicism

(London,

1911),

187,

205,

274.

16Max

Pohlenz,

Die

Stoa

(G6ttingen,

1948),

137.

17Homilies

of

St. John

Chrysostom

on

the

Epistle

of

St.

Paul

to

the

Romans,

trans.

by

members

of

the

English

Church

(Oxford,

1861),

Homily

XXIX,

471.

"8Quoted

A. W.

Moss,

Valiant

Crusade

(London,

1961),

5.

"9Romans,

8:19,

22.

Compare

Karl

Barth,

Church

Dogmatics,

III,

pt.

IV,

trans.

G. W. Bromiley andT. F. Torrance (Edinburgh, 1961).

20E.g.,

Charles

Journet,

The

Meaning of

Evil,

trans.

M.

Barry

(London,

1963),

142,

which

lays

it down

that

not even

God

can

bring

an

animal

back

to life.


5/24

THE

TREATMENT OF

ANIMALS

199

In

the

popular

mediaeval

tradition,

as contrasted

with

official

theology,

there are

many legends

which

associate

saintliness and

martyrdom

with kindness o

animals:even

Jerome

has

his

lion,

to

say

nothing

of Androcles.

Vicious animals

in

that tradition

were

like

the

Gadarene

wine,

inhabited

by

demons.

They

might

be

brought

o trial

for their

misdeedsand

punished

by

the

extremest

of

penalties-a

form

of

distinction

which,

no

doubt,

they

would

willingly

have

foregone.

Domesticated

animals,

n

contrast,

were the

dwelling

places

of

angels.

The

merely

wild,

but not

the

vicious,

were

spiritually

uninhabited.

Saintliness

was

demonstrated

by

a

capacity

to drivethe demons out of

the

vicious-as

some

of the

biographers

of

Francis

of Assissi

report

that

he

tamed the

wolf

of Gobbio-and

ordinary

human

virtue

in

domesticating

wild

animals,

hus

making

of

them a

fit

residence or an-

gels.

Saint Francis

s,

of

course,

the

most

famous

example

of a Christian

Nature-lover,

alling

upon

birds

as his sisters in an Umbria still

not en-

tirely

Christianized ut of

Nature-worship.21

ut his

case

is

anything

but a clear one.

Biographies y English

animal-lovers,

ften Protestant,

naturallystress his fellowshipwith Nature; Roman Catholicbiogra-

phers,

n

contrast,

are intent

on

establishing

his

orthodoxy.22

hey

write

with

scorn of those

who

see

in

Francisa sentimental

nature-lover,

nly

by

an

accident

of

time

ineligible

or the

Presidency

f

the

Royal

Society

for

the Prevention

of

Cruelty

to Animals.

Nor

is

there

any

hope

of set-

tling

such

controversies

by

returning

o

primary

sources;

hose

sources

are

for

the

most

part

deliberately

designed

o

create

a

particular

mage

of Saint

Francis,

he

image varying

rom

chronicler

o

chronicler.

A fewfacts, however,seemto be relativelyuncontroversial.His at-

titude

to

Nature-as

given

expression,

or

example,

in his

Canticle

to

the

Sun-is

very

like

that

of the

psalmist.

When

he

"preaches

o

the

birds"

it

is to

exhort

them

to

glorify

God in

the same

spirit

as

the

psalmist

calls

upon

not

only

all

living things

but even "fire

and

hail;

snow

and

vapors;

stormy

wind

ulfilling

his word" o

praise

he

Lord,

or

as an

old

Englishhymn

informs

us,

in a somewhatunfortunate

meta-

phor,

that "even

the

worm

bends

his

knee

to God."

"My

sister

birds,"

Francis s saidto havepreached,"youowe much to God andyou must

always

and

in

everyplace give

praise

to

him."23

And

his chronicler

oes

on to draw a

moral

n which he birds

are

compared

o the friars

"who,

like the

birds,

owned

nothing

of their

own

in

the world

and

entrusted

21E.

M.

Almedigen,

Francis

of

Assisi

(London,

1967),

23.

22Esp.

Michael

de

la

Bedoyere,

Francis

(London, 1962).

23The Little

Flowers

of

St.

Francis,

and

other Franciscan

Writings,

trans.

S.

Hughes

(New

York,

1964),

78.

The

introduction

should

be read as

illustrating

how

difficult it is to decide what Saint Francis did and taught; also J. R. H. Moorman, The

Sources

for

the

Life

of

St.

Francis

of

Assisi

(Manchester, 1940),

in the 1966

reprint

with

a new

preface

by

Bishop

Moorman.


6/24

200

JOHN

PASSMORE

their lives

only

to the

providence

f

God."

It

was, indeed,

o the

friars,

not

to

the

birds,

that Francis

was

preaching.

Anthony

of

Padua,

in a

similarspirit,was to "preach

o

fish" as a means

of

rebuking

eretics.

Only

once does the

question

of

callousness

arise

in the

biographies

of Saint Francis

written

by

his friendsor

near-contemporaries

ndthen

it does so rather

disconcertingly.

One

of

the

brethren,

aken

ill,

told

Saint Francis'

disciple,

Jonathan,

he

had a

longing

for

pig's

trotters.

"In

great

fervor

of

spirit,"

Jonathan

cut

a trotter

off

a

living

pig.

Saint

Francis rebuked

him,

but with

no

referencewhatsoever

o his

callous-

ness. He

urged

him,

only,

to

apologize

o

the owner

of

the

pig

for

having

damagedhisproperty.24

The

vogue

of

Saint Francis

is

a

modern

one;

he

was in no

sense

a

well-known aint

until

after

the

appearance

of Paul

Sabatier's

Life

in

1893.

For Sabatierhe was that

favorite

nineteenth-century

igure:

an

in-

dividual

n

revolt

against

an institution.

Subsequentapologists

have

found

him useful as a

living

demonstration

hat

Christianity

does not

necessarily

think of Nature

as

something

to be dominated.

But Saint

Francis

had,

in this

particularrespect,

no immediate nfluence.

And

as

thatstaunchhumanitarian, rancesCobbe,putsit:

It

is a

very

small

matter that a

Saint,

six hundred

years ago, sang

with

nightingales

and fed

wolves,

if the monks of

his own Orderand the

priests

of

the

Church

whichhas canonised

him,

never

warn

their

flocks that

to torment

God's

creatures is

even a venial

sin,

and

when

forced

to notice barbarous

cruelties

o

a

brute,

nvariably

eply

"Non

e

Cristiano,"

s if all claims

to

com-

passion

were

dismissed

by

that

consideration.25

In general terms, certainly, Christianity, ike Stoicism, has not

thought

of

man as

being

bound

by

moral considerations

n

his

dealings

with

animals.

When

n

1772

James

Grangerpreached

against

cruelty

o

animals

his

sermon,

he

tells

us,

"gave

almost universal

disgust

to

two

considerable

congregations."

"The

mention

of

horses

and

dogs,"

he

continues,

"was censured

as

a

prostitution

of the

dignity

of

the

pulpit."26

The characteristicRoman Catholic

teaching

on

man's treatment

of

animals derivesfrom Aquinas. Aquinasdraws a distinctionbetween

affections

of reason

and

affections

of

sentiment.

At

the level

of

reason,

he

says,

it is

a matter

of

indifference

ow

men

behave

owardsanimals.

For God has

given

men

complete

dominionover them.

In

the

words of

the

psalmist, praising

God:

"Thou

madest

him

to

have dominionover

24Lifeof

Brother

Jonathan,

Ch.

I,

in

The Little

Flowers,

186-87.

25Lifeof

Frances

Power

Cobbe,

by

Herself

(London,

1894),

II,

ch.

XVIII,

174-75.

2E.

S. Turner,All Heaven in a Rage (London, 1964), 72-73.


7/24

THE TREATMENT

OF ANIMALS 201

the works

of

thy

hands;

hou hast

put

all

things

under

his

feet."27

This,

according

o

Aquinas,

s the

sense

in

which"St.

Paul

says

that God

has

no carefor oxen, since he does not judge a man on how he has acted

with

regard

o

oxen or

other animals."28

The

situation

at the level of the emotions

is rather different.

Ani-

mals can

feel

pain;

men can feel

pity

for their

pain.

And

the

man

who

often

feels

pity

for

suffering

animals

s

more

likely,

so

Aquinas

ells

us,

to

have

compassion

on

his

fellowman.

It

is in

the

light

of

this

fact,

he

argues,

that we

ought

to

interpret

what

is

often taken

to

be

the

most

unambiguous

Old

Testament moral exhortation

o

man

to care for

his

beasts: "a righteousmanregardeth he life of his beast: butthe tender

mercies of the wicked are cruel."2

Men,

on

Aquinas's

view,

are "of a

piece"; they

are

compassionate

both to

men

and to animals.

So

righteous

men

will in

fact treat

their

beasts

well. But

only

their com-

passion

or their

cruelty

to men

is

of

any

moral

consequence; hey

are

not

righteous

because

they

treat their beasts well. The

Jews,

Aquinas

goes

on

patronizingly

o

remark,

were

particularlygiven

to

cruelty.

God, therefore,

"exhorted

hem

in

pity

even to

animals,

by

forbidding

certainpracticessavoringof crueltyto them." The fact remainsthat

there is

nothing morally

objectionable

n

cruelty

to

animals,

as

such,

considered

n

isolation from

the

cruelty

to men

with which

it

is

em-

pirically

associated. And

"cruelty"

includes both

enjoyment

of

and

indifference o their

sufferings.

He sums

up

his

position

thus:

"If

any

passages

of

Holy Scripture

seem

to forbid

us to

be

cruel

to

brute

ani-

mals,

for

instance

to kill a bird

with its

young,

that

is

either

to remove

men's

thoughts

from

being

cruel

to

other

men,

or lest

throughbeing

cruelto animalsone becomes cruelto other humanbeings,or because

injury

of an animal eads to

the

temporal

hurt of

man,

eitherof

the doer

of

the

deed,

or of

another;

or because of some

signification...

."30

These conclusions are

supposed

to

follow from

the

fact

that rational

creatureshavethe

right

to

govern

rrationalnature.

This

interpretation

f the

moral

situationwas to have

a

long

life.

In

the

eighteenth

century

Hogarth's engravings

The

Stages of

Cruelty

produced

a considerable

ffect;

they

purported

o

show,

somewhat

n

the mannerof his now better-knownRake's Progress,how crueltyto

animals

develops

into

cruelty

to man.

In

his lectures

on

ethics,

Kant

used these

engravings

as

a text on

which o

hang

his

Aquinas-like

iews

about man's treatment

of Nature.

The Leibnizian

Baumgarten,

so

Kant tells

us,

had

maintained hat

we have dutiesboth

towardsanimals

27Psalms

8:6.

28Summa

Theologiae,

Vol.

29,

la

2ae

102, 6,

p.

225.

9Proverbs

12:10.

30Summa

contra gentiles, Bk. III, ch. CXIII.


8/24

202

JOHN

PASSMORE

and towardsbeautiful

andscapes.31

his

Kantdenies.

Animals,

he

says,

"are

not

self-consciousand

are there

merely

as

a

meansto an

end,"

the

end

being

man. What

Baumgarten

hinks of as duties

to animalsare in

fact

"indirect

duties

towards

humanity."

n

so far as

the actionsof ani-

mals

are

analogous

o

human

actions,

e.g.,

in so far as

we

can

think of

an

animal,

ike a

servant,

as

doing

service o

us,

we

have

duties

relating

to

them.

But

this

is

only

because

"thus we cultivate he

corresponding

duties towards human

beings."

If,

for

example,

a man shoots a

dog,

although

t

has served

him

well,

because t

is

getting

old,

"he does not

fail in

his

duty

to the

dog,

for

the

dog

cannot

udge."

Nevertheless,

"his

act is inhumanand damagesin himself that humanitywhichit is his

duty

to show towards mankind."

Anyone

who

is cruel or callous

in

regard

to animal

suffering,

so Kant

suggests,

will

become

cruel

or

callous

n

his

dealings

with

mankind;

nversely,

"tender

eelings

owards

dumbanimals

develop

humane

eelings

owards

mankind."

In

his

last

published

work,

his

Metaphysics

of

Morals,

Kant in-

cludes

compassion

to

animals

among

a man's

duties to

himself

rather

than his

duties

to

others.

But even

if

Kant's modification

f his

original

viewmay bear witnessto a degreeof uneasiness, hegeneral ine of his

argument

is

unaffected.

"Intimately

opposed

to

man's

duty

to

himself,"

Kant

writes,

"is a

savage

and at

the same

time

cruel

treatmentof

that

part

of creationwhich

s

living,

hough

acking

reason

[animals]."

"For

thus,"

he

goes

on,

"is

compassion

for

their

suffering

dulled

n

man,

and

thereby

a natural

predisposition

ery

serviceable

o

morality

in

one's

relations

with

other

men

is weakenedand

gradually

obliterated."

Kant was

anything

but a

callous man:

he is

ready

o main-

tain that "physicalexperiments nvolving xcruciatingpainfor animals

and conducted

merely

for the sake

of

speculative

nquiry

when

the end

might

also be

achieved

without

such

experiments)

are

to

be ab-

horred."32

ut he

cannot see how

men

can be said

to

have a

duty

to

ani-

mals as

distinct from a

duty

relating

to or

concerning

animals;

he has

somehow

to

convert

it

either

into a

duty

to

other

men

or

a

duty

to

ourselves.

For

a rational

ethics,

as

distinct

from

religion,

here can

be,

on Kant's

view,

no such

thing

as a

duty

to

God-the

only

other

hypothesishe mighthaveentertained.)

The

generalizations

n which Kant's

argumentdepends

are more

8"Kant,

Lectures

on

Ethics,

trans.

L.

Infield

(London,

1930),

239-40.

I

have

not

been able to trace the

reference

in

Baumgarten.

In

his

lectures,

Kant

is

commenting,

for the most

part,

on

Baumgarten's

Ethica

Philosophica.

In

?398

of

that

work

Baumgarten lays

it

down that brutal men should be avoided.

But Kant's

reference

is

to

a much more

developed

view.

"Metaphysics of

Morals,

Pt.

II;

The

Metaphysical

Principles

of

Virtue

(1797),

Ele-

ments of

Ethics,

Pt.

I, ?17,

trans. J.

Ellington

and W. Wick

(Indianapolis,

1964),

106.


9/24

THE TREATMENT

OF ANIMALS 203

than

dubious-tyrants

from Nero to

Himmler

have

been

notoriously

devotedto animals.

It is

a matter

of common

observation,

ndeed,

hat

kindness o animals s often substituted or kindness o humanbeings.

Whether

he inverse

also

holds,

whether hose who are

cruel to

animals

are also cruel

to human

beings

t is more

difficult

o

say.

There

s

cer-

tainly

no

difficulty,

at

least,

in

conceiving

a

situation

n

which

cruelty

to

man and

cruelty

to

animals are

completely

dissociated:Kant

would

have

us believe hat underthese circumstances

here would be

nothing

wrong

n

cruelty

o

animals.

Newman's

conclusionson

cruelty

to

animals-sufficiently

authori-

tative in the Roman Catholic Churchto be quoted at length in the

Catholic

Encyclopedia-belong

to

this

same Stoic tradition:

We

have

no duties owards

hebrute

reation;

here s

no

relation f

justice

between

hemandus. Of course

we

are

bound ot to

treat hem

ll,

for

cruelty

is

an

offence

gainst

hat

holy

Law

which

urMaker

aswritten n our

hearts,

and s

displeasing

o Him.

But

they

can claim

nothing

t our

hands;

ntoour

hands

they

are

absolutely

delivered.

We

may

use

them,

we

may destroy

them

at

our

pleasure,

not our

wanton

pleasure,

but still for our own

ends,

for our

own benefitor satisfaction,providedwe cangivea rationalaccountof whatwe

do.33

Men,

in

other

words,

can deal

with animalsas

they

like,

providedonly

that

they

have

a

good

reason

for

doing

so: the

suffering

f

animals

does

not count as a

countervailing

eason.

They

ought

not to

enjoy

mal-

treating

hem,

but indifference

o their

suffering-callousness-is

not

a

sin.

Although

t

wouldbe

wrong,

or

example,

o make

of

cruelty

to ani-

mals a

sport,

it is

morally

unimportant

f animals

suffer

ncidentally

o

our

sport. Bullfighting,

n this

view,

is therefore

permissible

and so is

coursing.

If

what Newmancalled

"wanton"

pleasure

n the

sufferings

f

animals

is

forbidden,

his is

only

as a

consequence

of the fact that

all

wanton

pleasures

are

morally mpermissible.

Behind his attitude

to animals ies a

theology,

a

theology bitterly

opposed

to

any

form of

naturalism,

determined

o insist that between

man and beast there

lies an absolute barrier.

(Consider

he

everyday

use

of

the words

"brutes,""beasts,"

and even

"animal.")

So,

asked

to

permit

the

setting

up

of a

Society

for the Prevention

f

Cruelty

o Ani-

mals,

Pope

Pius

IX

replied

hat "a

society

for such

a

purpose

could

not

be sanctioned

n

Rome."

The

principle

o which

his

reply appealed

was

the familiar

Stoic

one that "man owed

duties to

his

fellow

men;

but he

owed

no

duties

to the lower animals."34

33J.H.

Newman,

Sermons Preached

on Various

Occasions,

2nd

ed.

(London, 1858),

Sermon

VI,

106-07.

3"Lifeof Frances Power Cobbe, by

Herself

(London, 1894), II,

ch.

XVIII,

171-72.

Cardinal

Manning

was more

sympathetic:

man,

he

thought,

had

a

duty

to God

to be


10/24

204

JOHN

PASSMORE

Neither

Aquinas

nor

Kant

nor

Newman

denied,however,

hat ani-

mals could suffer:Descartes

and Malebranche

houghtdifferently.

t

is

impossible, hey argued, o be cruel to animals,sinceanimalsareinca-

pable

of

feeling.They

lack

not

only-as

Aquinas

had

followedAristotle

in

arguing-a

rationalsoul but even that sensitive oul

whichboth Aris-

totle and

Aquinas

had allowed

them. To

suppose

that animals could

feel would

be to

suggest

that there could

be

pain

and

suffering

where

there has

been

no

sin.

For

animalsdid not eat

of the

ForbiddenTree.

"Being

nnocent,"

Malebranche

writes,

"if

they

were

capable

of

feeling,

the

effect would be that

under

the

government

of an

infinitely ust

and

all-powerfulGod an innocent creature would sufferpain, which is a

penalty,

and

the

punishment

of some

sin."3

The

only

possible

con-

clusion,

appearances

o the

contrary

notwithstanding,

s that animals

cannot

feel.

"They

eat without

pleasure,"

Malebranche herefore ells

us,

"they cry

without

sorrow...,

they

desire

nothing,

they

fear

nothing,

they

know

nothing."36

The

Stoic

Chrysippus,

t is

worth

noting,

had also

suggested

hat animalsdo not feel

but

only

"as

it

were"

feel.)37

What

we hear

as

a

cry

of

pain

s

of

no more

significance

han the

creaking of a machine. An organ, the CartesianRouhault argues,

makes more noise

when

I

play

it than

an animal

when

t cries

out,

yet

we

do not

ascribe

eelings

o the

organ.38

These

teachings,

it

should

be

observed,

were more

than

metaphysical

speculations.

They

had a direct effect

on seventeenth-

century

behavioras

manifested,

or

example,

n the

popularity

f

public

vivisections,

not

as

an

aid

to scientific

discovery

but

simply

as

a tech-

nical

display. "They

administered

beatings

to

dogs

with

perfect

indifference,"o La Fontaine,a contemporaryobserver, ells us, "and

made

fun of

those who

pitied

the creaturesas

if

they

had felt

pain....

They

nailed

poor

animals

up

on boards

by

their four

paws

to

vivisect

them and see the

circulationof

the

blood whichwas a

great

subject

of

conversation."39

kind to

the

animals

God had

created.

Nowadays,

indeed,

there is in

Great Britain

a

Catholic

Study

Circle for Animal

Welfare-with its

own

journal,

The

Ark,

founded

in

1932.

(Within

the

Anglo-American

Roman Catholic

Church, too,

there are Animal

Blessing Services.) Even more strikingly in the United States, what was once The Na-

tional Catholic

Society for

Animal

Welfare

has

significantly

renamed itself

Society

for

Animal

Rights,

although

this still

does not

go quite

as far as the

name of

the

parallel

In-

dian

Society,

Animal Citizens.

3Recherche

de

la

Verite,

IV,

XI, ?11,

in

Oeuvres

Completes,

ed. G.

Rodin-Lewis,

II,

104.

36Ibid., VI, II, VII,

394;

also

C.

A.

Sainte-Beuve,

Le Port

Royal,

3rd. ed.

(Paris,

1867),

Bk.

2,

ch.

16,

316-17.

37Pohlenz,

Die

Stoa,

147.

38Entretiens

ur

laphilosophie,

II,

157.

39Quoted(no source given) in Loren Eiseley, The Firmament of Time (New York,

1962).

28-29.


11/24

THE TREATMENT OF

ANIMALS

205

The

theological

problem

Descartes and

Malebranche

professed

to

have solvedwas

quite

a

seriousone: to account

for

the

sufferings

f ani-

mals

on

the

supposition

hat the world s

governedby

a benevolentand

omnipotent

God.

Augustine

had

sought

to solve

it

by arguing

hat there

was a lesson for

men

n

animal

suffering.

He

condemned

hose

"carping

critics" who

"try

to

shake

the

faith

of those less

instructed

on

the

problem

of

pain

and

hardships

also

suffered

by

animals"-animals

which

had

not been

implicated

n

Adam's

fall. The

solution,

according

to

Augustine,

s

that

only through

heirobservation

f

animal

suffering,

suffering

which is

"a

conscious

struggle

against

disintegration

and

dissolution,"

an men be made

sufficiently

ware

hat animals

possess

a

longing

for

unity,

a

longing

he

tells

us,

whichcould

only

have been

im-

planted

n

them

by

"the

supreme,

sublime,

and

unspeakable

unity

of

their

Creator."40

Animal

suffering,

n

other

words,

is a

chapter

n the

book

of

nature.

Less

sophisticated

heologians

were more

ready

to

adopt

the

al-

ternative view

that animal

suffering

was after

all a

consequence

of

Adam's

sin;

that sin threw he entireuniverse

nto confusion-as

indeed

Paulseems to suggestwhenhewritesthat "thewholecreationgroaneth

and travaileth

n

pain

together

until now."41

But there

s

something

in-

gularly

repellent

n

the idea

of a God

who wouldcause

animals o suffer

either so that

theologians

could

supply

another

reason

for

believing

hat

animalsare his creationor because

Adam had

disobeyed

him. It was

in

many ways

a

theologically

easier

solution

to

suppose,

however

im-

plausibly,

hat animalsdo not

in fact suffer

at all.

Indeed,

a

contempo-

rary

Roman Catholic moral

philosopher,

Dom

Trethowan,

is

still

readyto suggestthat the apparent ufferingof, for example,cats can

only

be

explained

on the

supposition

hat "a cat

is so

arranged

hat

if

you

pull

ts

tail,

a

noise comes

from

the other end."42

One of his

co-religionists,Jacques

Maritain,

adopts,

however,

a

very

differentattitude.

He

specifically

rejects

the

Aquinas-Kant

view

that men

ought

not to be cruel

to

animals

only

because

"cruelty

towards animals

developsfeelings

and

habits of

insensitivity

r sadism

which vitiate one's

personality

and menace

others." This

is

in

spite

of

his agreeingwith Kant andtheStoics that animalsarenot moralagents

and

have,

in

consequence,

neither

duties

nor

rights.

Nonetheless,

he

says,

we have duties

toward

them;

for all

that,

they

have

no duties

toward

us. Animals are

"foreshadowings

f human

persons";

n virtue

of that

fact,

they

have a

foreshadowing,

lthoughonly

a

foreshadowing,

4?Augustine,

The Free

Choice

of

the Will

(Washington,

1968),

trans.

F. P. Russell in

The Fathers

of

the

Church,

LIX,

227.

4Romans

8:22.

42Trethowan,

An

Essay

in Christian

Philosophy,

41;

also 92.


12/24

206

JOHN PASSMORE

of

rights.

Our

duties towards

them,

however,

are real.43Thisview has

behind

t, too,

a

long

if

very

broken

tradition.

The Romans carried

cruelty to animalsto new depthsof barbarity.Only very gradually,

indeed,

did

they

impose

limitationson

a

man's

treatmentof his children

or

a

citizen's

of

foreigners.

As

for

slaves,

the Christian

Emperor

Justin-

ian's

codification

of Roman Law

lays

it down that "slaves cannot

be

outraged

themselves"

although

a master can

be

outraged

through

his

slave.

Not

surprisingly

t takes a

very

similarview

aboutoxen.44

The

Greeks, however,

had

generally

opposed

cruelty

to

animals:

"do

not

be cruel

to animals" s said to

have been one of

three moral

preceptsof Eleusis,45 ndPlutarchwas no exception.Especially n his

early

writings,

he

attacks

that

sharp

contrastbetween

man and animals

which had been

typical

of the Stoics.

He sets out to

show,

relying

for

this

purpose

on a

long

series

of

popular

fables,

that animals

are

quite

capable

of

reasoning.46

f

considerably

more interest

s

his

attempt

to

cope

with a

somewhat

special,

and

very

relevant,

argument

which de-

rives,

he tells

us,

from Stoic sources. There

could be no such

thing

as

justice,

this

argument

runs,

if beasts

partake

of reason.

For

men are

then"necessarilyunjust f theydo not sparethem";yet if theydo, "life

becomes

impracticable

and

impossible."

In

short,

"we shall be

living

the

life of

beasts

once we

give up

the

use of beasts"-no civilized

pur-

suit,

no

"refinementof

living"

could survive.47

Civilized

man,

so the

Stoic

argument

concludes,

simply

cannot

afford

to

allow that animals

are

rational.

Plutarch

suggests

a

reply

to this line

of

argument,

a

reply

which

dates

back,

so he

tells

us,

to

Pythagoras.

There s no

injustice,

he

says,

in punishingand slayingsuch animals as are vicious,"anti-socialand

merely injurious."

Nor

is

there

any injustice

n

taming

those

animals

which end

themselvesto

domestication,

"making

hem our

helpers

n

the tasks for

which

they

are fitted

by

nature,"

trainingdogs

as sen-

tinels,

or

keeping

herds of

goats

and

sheep

to be milkedand shorn.

For

men, too,

are

punished

or

put

to death

if

they

are

viciousand

men, too,

are trained

for

particular

asks,

for which

they

are

by

nature suited.

Only

in two

respects

do men need

to

alter

their conduct

f

they

are

to

43Maritain,

Neuf

lecons sur les notions

premieres

de

la

philosophie

morale

(Paris,

1951),

as

trans.

in

Charles

Journet,

The

Meaning of

Evil,

trans. Michael

Barry

(London,

1963),

138-39. Journet

follows Maritain on this

point.

"Institutes

ofJustinian,

trans. J.

B.

Moyle,

5th ed.

(London,

1913),

169-70.

45So

Porphyry says, quoting

from

Mermippus,

citing

Xenocrates.

The

precepts

can

be traced

back,

he also

alleges,

to

Triptolemus

(On

Abstinence

IV,

22).

46Plutarch,

The

Cleverness

of

Animals

in

Moralia,

?961,

trans.

W.

Helmbold,

Loeb

Classical

Library,

335.

On Plutarch and other classical writers:

George

Boas,

"Theriophily,"Dictionary of the History of Ideas (1973), IV, 384-88.

47Ibid.,

?6,963-64,

p.

347.


13/24

THE TREATMENT OF

ANIMALS

207

deal

justly

with animals:

hey

should

give up slaughtering

hem for the

table

and

they

should

give

up

those varieties

of

sport

which

involve

crueltyto, or the deathof, animals."ForI thinksportshouldbejoyful

and between

playmates

who are

merry

on both sides."48Thus

it is

possible

to

reconcile

being

just

to animals and

sustaining

civilization.

For

civilizationdoes

not

depend,

Plutarch s

confident,

either on the

eating

of

meat or

on

blood

sports.

(Later

n

life,

Plutarch

was

to

excuse

meat-eating

on the

ground

that it "has become

a sort of unnatural

second

nature," i.e.,

a fixed

custom

which it would

be

impossible

to

overthrow,

although

he still

thought

t

best to

do without

t.)49

Plutarch's arguments were taken over by the neo-Platonist

Porphyry.

Animals,

he

agrees

with

Plutarch,

"are

not

entirely

alienated

from our nature."

They participate

n

reason,

even

if to an inferior

degree.

It

is therefore

quite

wrong

to hunt or

to

eat

them,

or

at

least

it

is

wrong

for

such

men as

aspire

o

perfection

o do

so,

the

only

class of

man

in

whom

Porphyry

was interested.

But

Porphyry

went

even further

than Plutarch. "He who

does not confine harmless conduct

to men

alone,"

he

writes,

"but extends

it

to other

animals,

most

closely ap-

proachesto divinityand if it werepossible to extend it to plants, he

would

preserve

this

image

in

a

still

greaterdegree."50

A

typical

ascetic,

he was

quite

unimpressed y

the Stoic

argument

hat the refinements

f

civilization

depend

on our

dealing

autocratically

with

animals

and

plants.

So much

the

worse

for refinements

Like

Genesis,

Porphyry

tells us

that men

in their

perfected

state

would eat

nothing

but

the

fruits which

plants

bear

in

numbers

beyond

theirneed to

reproduce.

This

s

at

least

a

gastronomic

mprovement

n

the bill of farepermittedby theprophetsof SamuelButler'sErewhon.

They

restrictthe

diet

of the

righteous

o

rotting

fruit and

decaying

cab-

bage-leaves.)51

e

adopts

a rather different

approach

o the Stoic

ar-

gument

that

any

attempt

on

man's

part

to be

just

to

the

beasts would

reduce

him to their

evel.

Justice,

he

says,

is

"nothing

more

than

a

phi-

lanthropy";

t

consists

in

"abstaining

rom

injury

to

anything

which

is not

noxious":

that is

why

men

can

properly

eat

superfluous

ruit,

shear

sheep,

and take theirmilk.52

It is illuminatingo observe heusewhichhas beenmade n modern

times

of

Porphyrean

eaching.

In 1792

the

Platonist

Thomas

Taylor

published

a work

entitled

A

Vindication

f

the

Rights of

Brutes

which

48Ibid.,

?7,964-65,

pp.

353-55.

49De Tuenda

Sanitate

Praecepta,

XVIII,

in

Plutarch's

Moralia,

trans.

F. C.

Bab-

bitt, II,

265.

500n

Abstinence,

VI,

27.

I have followed

the translation

in

Westermarck.

"5Erewhon,ch. XXVII.

"5De

Abstinentia,

3, 26,

trans.

Thomas

Taylor

(1823),

127.


14/24


15/24

THE

TREATMENT

OF ANIMALS

209

restrained

by

what

he

significantly

alls "the

cautious,

ealous

virtueof

justice."

The

same is

true,

he

argues,

of

their

dealings

with

uncivilized

peoplesandwithwomen;women andthebarbarians,ikeanimals, ack

sufficient

power

to

compel

men to

compromise

with

them.

The fact

remains that

"we should be bound

by

the laws of

humanity

to

give

gentle

usage

to these

creatures."55

But

it

was not

only

the

skeptics

who were

beginning

to think

differently

about man's

relationships

o the

animals.

Rather

surpris-

ingly,

Hume's teacher Hutcheson had been

prepared

o

suppose

that

animalswere

capable

of

virtue,

f

only

virtue

of

a

primitive

kind,

of

the

sort children analsopossess.56Othermoralphilosophers id notgo so

far

as

this in

their

criticism

of

the

Stoics,

but

even

such

Stoic-influenced

moralistsas

WilliamWollastonwere

prepared

o

grant

that men

ought

to take

the

happiness

of

animals nto account

when

hey

act

"in

propor-

tion to their

several

degrees

of

apprehension."57

nd

Wollaston's

fellow-rationalist,

ohn

Balguy,

while

rejecting

Hutcheson's

view

that

animals

are themselves

capable

of

virtue,

nonetheless

s

confident hat

"brutes,

as

they

are

capable

of

being

treated

by

us either

mercifully

or

cruelly,maybe theobjectseitherof virtueorvice."58

Poets and

novelists,

as well as

moral

philosophers,

id

something

o

prepare

he

way

for

a

new attitude o

animals,

as indeed o Nature as a

whole.

In

As

You

Like

It

not

only

"the

melancholy

acques"

but,

much

more

significantly

even

the

aristocratic exiles

display

an

unexpected

degree

of

sensibility

to

the

sufferings

of

a

woundeddeer.59Sterne's

somewhat mawkish

apostrophe

o

a

donkey

and

Cowper's

poem,

The

Task,

are well known

eighteenth-centuryxamples

of the

new

tendency.

The "sentimentalist"movement as a whole, like Romanticism ater,

encouraged

men to

reflect on

their

relations

to

animals

as well

as

to

their

fellowman.

ndeed,

t

sometimes

emphasized

he formerat the

ex-

pense

of the latter.

But these were

observations

in

passing,

straws

in the

wind,

or

perhaps

not even so

much,

the

personal

reactions

of

men

of

unusual

sensibility.

The

fact

remains,

as

we

have

already

een,

that the

preacher

John

Granger

aroused

hostility

and

ridiculewhenhe

preached

n

1772

againstcruelty

to animals.And as late as

1798,

Thomas

Young began

his

Essay

on

Humanity

to Animals

by

expressing

he fear that he had

exposed

himself

to

ridicule

by

writing

a book on such a

topic.

Yet

55Enquiryconcerning

the

Principles of

Morals,

Sect.

III,

Pt.

I;

ed.

Selby-Bigge,

?145,

152.

"5Francis

Hutcheson,

An

Inquiry

into

the

Original of

our Ideas

of Beauty

and

Virtue,

Treatise

11,

4th

edition

London,

1738),

Section

7,

?3.

57Wollaston,

he

Religionof

NatureDelineated

London,

1724),

Section

2,

?10.

58Balguy,The Foundation of Moral Goodness (London, 1728), Pt. I, ?3.

5eAs

You Like

It,

Act

II,

Sc.

I.


16/24

210

JOHNPASSMORE

Henry

Primatt

had

already,

n

1776,

published

his

Dissertation

on the

Duty

of

Mercy

and Sin

of Cruelty

to

Animals

and

the

century

that

followed was to witnessa long series of books on man's treatmentof

the animals.

Both Primatt

and

Young,

it will be

observed,

plead

for

"humanity"

o

animals;

Primattdescribes

mercy

as a

duty

and

cruelty

as a sin.

The belief

still

widely

prevailed,

t must

be

remembered,

hat

large

segments

of

mankind

were,

as Aristotle had

maintained,

born to be

slaves.60"From

the

hour

of

their

birth,

some

are

markedout

for

sub-

jection,

others for

rule....

Some men are

by

nature

free,

and others

slaves, and ... for these latter slavery is both expedient and right."

From our

present point

of

view,

significantly,

Aristotle

compared

he

natural

slave to tame animals

which,

he was

convinced

"have

a

better

nature

than

wild."

Not

until

1792did

Wilberforce

persuade

he British

House of Commonsto

agree

to the

gradual

abolition

of the slave

trade;

not until

1811 was

slave-trading

a

felony.

In

America

Delaware

abolished

slavery

as

early

as

1776,

but

it was

not

abolished in the

United States

as

a whole until 1865.

And

in

the widerworld

t

lingered

on, perhapsstill lingerson, well into the twentiethcentury.Not only

slaves

but

primitivepeoples,

too,

were

commonly thought

of as

lying

beyond

the bounds

of

morality,

as

Calibans.

As

late

as

the

mid-nine-

teenth

century,

the

aboriginal

inhabitants of Tasmania were de-

liberately

wiped

out.

So

long

as callousness towards

the

sufferings

of slaves

and abo-

rigines

was

not

morally

condemned,

t was

unlikely

that

callousness

towards

animalswouldbe

seriouslyregarded.

ndeed

o

insist

on

men's

moral responsibilityowardsslaves and barbarianst was sometimes

thoughtnecessary,

as it was

by

Herder,

to draw

a

sharp

distinctionbe-

tween the treatment

proper

to

man and

the

treatment

even

of

such

higher

animals

as

apes.

"O

man,

honor

thyself,"

Herder

writes,

"neither he

pongo

nor

the

gibbon

s

thy

brother;

he American

and the

Negro

are;

these

therefore hou

shouldnot

oppress,

or

murder,

or

steal

from;

for

they

are men like

thee;

with

the

ape

thou

canst

not enter

into

fraternity."61

lsewhere,

however,

Herderdraws attention

o the close

relationshipbetween men and, at least, domesticatedbeasts. "It is

generally

known,"

he

writes,

"that all animals

subservient

o the

pur-

poses

of

man

are more

useful,

in

proportion

o the

humanity

of

the

treatment

they

receive."62

Note

that

it

is

the

usefulness of kindness

6?Politics

1.5,

1254a-1255a,

rans.

B. Jowett

in

The

Works

of

Aristotle,

ed. W. D.

Ross,

Vol.

X

(Oxford,

1921).

"'Herder,

Reflections

Ideen),

Pt.

I,

Bk.

7,

ch.

1,

trans. T.

O.

Churchill

London,

1800).Bya "pongo" he translatorprobably,f wrongly,meantanorangutan.

62lbid.,

Bk.

8,

ch. 3.


17/24

THE

TREATMENT

OF ANIMALS

211

which

is

here

emphasized:

here is

no

suggestion

that

animals have

rights. Nineteenth-century

writers,

in

contrast,

tended to

emphasize

not so

much

the

inhumanity

f

slavery

or

cruelty

as

the

violence

t

does

to

rights-the

typical

reactions

of a

politically-conscious

ge.

As

so

often,

the Benthamites ould

oin

handswith

the

evangelicals.

"The French have

already

discovered,"

Bentham

wrote,

"that

the

blackness

of the skin is no

reason

why

a

human

being

should be

abandoned

withoutredressto

the

caprice

of a

tormentor.

It

may

come

one

day

to be

recognised

hat

the

numberof

legs

... or the termination

of

the

os

sacrum

are

reasons

equally

insufficient

or

abandoning

a

sensitivebeingto the sameplight."63Observe he transition romslave

to animal. Bentham'sUtilitarianism ooks not to the

rationality

of the

agent

or

the

patient,

n

the

Stoic

manner,

but to

the

effect

of

the

agent's

actions on

all sentient

beings,

who are from this

point

of

view

to

be ac-

counted

equal.

If

all

pain

is

evil,

as

Bentham

hought,

then the

pain

of

animals-assuming

only

that

they

can feel

pain-ought

not

to

be

ignored

n man's moral

decisions.

The

pains

of animals

might

be

less,

as

not

including

he

pains

of

anticipation,

han

the

pains

felt

by

man,

but

that is no reason for not takingthem into account."Thequestion s

not,"

so

Bentham

argues,

"Can

they

reason?"

nor

"Can

they

talk?"

but "Can

they

suffer?"

So

whereasPlutarch and

Porphyry hought

t

necessary

to

begin

their case

against treating

animals

merely

as chat-

tels

by

arguing

hat

animalshave a share

n

reason,

for

Bentham

t

is

ir-

relevant

whether or not

they

are

rational and to what

degree.

It is

enough

hat

they

are

capable

of

suffering.

In

his

later

writings,

however,

Benthamreverted

o

something

more

like the Aquinas-Kantposition. The Traites edited by Dumont

condemn

cruelty

to animals

only-if

Dumont

can

be trusted-on

the

ground

that

it can

give

rise

to

indifference

o

human

suffering.

n his

Constitutional

Code,

Bentham's

mphasis

s

not on

suffering

but

on

the

alleged

act,

made

secondary

n

the

Principles,

hat mature

quadrupeds

are more moral

and more

intelligent

han

young

bipeds.

I

do not know

why

Bentham

changed

his

mind.

But

perhaps

he

boggled,

and

not

un-

naturally,

at the conclusion

hat to determinewhether

an

act

is

right

we

ought to take into consideration ts consequencesfor every sentient

being.64

The

evangelical-Benthamite

rusadehas

been

largely

successful.

In

Great Britain

he

law has

extended ts

protection

irst

(1822)

to horses

63lntroduction

to

the

Principles of

Morals

and

Legislation,

written

1780,

published

1789,

ed.

J.

H.

Burns and

H. L.

A. Hart

(London,

1970),

ch.

XVII,

?IV,

note b.

In

some

other editions the

chapter

number is XIX.

64For

details

of the

change:

David

Baumgardt,

Bentham and

the Ethics

of

Today

(Princeton,

1952),

338,

362.


18/24

212 JOHN PASSMORE

and

cattle,

excepting

only

bulls,

and

eventually,

although slowly,

to

other animals.65

t is

sometimes

argued-as by

H.

S. Salt

in

his

Animal'sRights(1892)-that this is all thatis needed o show that ani-

mals have

rights:

o

say

that

they

have

rights

s

just

to

say

that

they

are

protected by

law.

Yet trees

may

also be

protected

by

law,

as

in

Na-

tional

Parks;

t

would be

very

odd to conclude hat

they

have

rights.

If

we think

of

a

"right"

as

a

demand

which,

f

it

is

made,

s

backed

by

law

or common

practice,

then animals

have no

rights;

hey

make no claims.

Nor

(in

this

respect

they

are

unlike

nfants)

can someoneelse

demand,

let

us

say,

free

pasturage

for

the rest of its life as

compensation

or

damagesincurred n an accident. Its owner,no doubt, can claim for

damages

in

such a

case,

but he does

not

hold the

damages

n

trust

for

the

horse;

he

is, indeed,

at

perfect

iberty

o shoot

it.

What has

happened

over the

last

century

and a half in the West is

not that

animals have been

given

more

power,

more

freedom,

or

anything

else which

might

be accountedas

a

right.

Rather,

men have

lost

rights:

hey

no

longer

have the same

power

over

animals,

they

can

no

longer

treat them as

they

choose.

This is characteristicof a

moral

change; t followsfrom the fact that, in Hart'swords,"moralrules m-

pose

obligations

and withdrawcertain

areas of conduct from

the

free

option

of

the

individual o do

as he likes."66

But

that men have lost

rights

over them

does

nothing

o convertanimals nto bearersof

rights,

any

more than we

give

rights

to

a river

by

withdrawing

omebody's

right

o

pollute

t.

Disputing

Salt's

conclusions,

D. G. Ritchie has

argued,

n

my

view

correctly,

that animals

cannot have

rights,

"not

being

members of

human society."67We sometimes now meet with the suggestion,

however,

that animals

do

in

fact

form,

with

men,

a

single

community.

Indeed,

the American

ecologist,

Aldo

Leopold,

has

gone

furtherthan

this:

"When

we see land as a

community

o

which

we

belong,

we

may

begin

to

use

it with love and

respect."68

As

a final

absurdity,

t is

worth

noting,

Thomas

Taylor's

Vindication

of

the

Rights of

Beasts

had

looked forwardto

a time when "even the

most

contemptible

clod

of

earth"

would

be

thought

of

as

having

rights.

He was better

as

a

prophet

than as anironist.)

Ecologically,

no

doubt,

men form a

community

with

plants,

ani-

mals, soil,

in the sense that a

particular ife-cycle

may

involve

two,

three,

or even

all four of them.

From the

point

of view of a

virus-if I

may

be

permitted

his

way

of

talking-men

are

hosts

in

which

hey

can

65Fordetails of

this crusade:

E.

S.

Turner,

Heaven

in

a

Rage

(London,

1964).

66H.

L.

A.

Hart,

The

Concept of

Law

(Oxford,

1961),

7.

67D.

G.

Ritchie,

Natural

Rights (London, 1894),

107.

68Leopold,

A

Sand

County

Almanac

(New

York,

1970),

Foreword,

xviii.


19/24

THE

TREATMENT

OF

ANIMALS

213

develop,

hosts

which,

regrettably,

ometimesdie before

the virus

has a

chance to

pass

on to other hosts. But if it is

essential to a

community

that the membersof it have common interestsand recognizemutual

obligations

then

men,

plants,

animals,

and

soil

do not form a com-

munity.

Viruses and men do

not

recognize

mutual

obligations,

nor

do

they

have common interests.

In

the

only

sense

in

which

belonging

o

a

community

generates

ethical

obligation, hey

do not

belong

o

the same

community.

And it

can

only

create confusion o

suppose

that

they

do,

or

ought

to.

Spinoza

was

right

n

saying

that

"excepting

man

we

do

not

know

of

anything n nature in whose mind we can take pleasure,or anything

with whichwe can unite

ourselves

by way

of

friendship."

A

dog

cannot

be "a

man's best friend"

unless this is

just

a

way

of

saying

hat the man

has no friends.At

best,

to

adopt

Maritain's

phrase,

his relation

with

the

dog

is

a

"fore-shadowing"

f

friendship.

A

man

can,

of

course,

take

pleasure

n

a

dog's feelings,

he can be

pleased

hat his

dog

is

happy,

and

he

can take

pleasure,

oo,

in his

dog's

intelligence.

But

he cannot "share

his mind"

with

the

dog,

if

only

because

he

dog,

unlike

man,

has

no

con-

cern for thefuture.It doesnot follow,as Spinozaalso thought,that we

are

free to

destroy

everything

xcept

human

beings

"or

to

adapt

it to

our

service

n

any way

whatever,"

hat to have

scruples

on this

point

is

a

sign

of

"empty superstition

and womanish tenderness."69

here

is

nothing

"womanish"

or

"superstitious"

about

condemning ruelty

to

animals,

even if it

is

not difficult o

think of attitudes o animals

which

are both

"womanish" n their

coddling

and

"superstitious"

n

that

they

try

to

treat a

dog

as

if,

let

us

say,

it

were

a

person

n a

poodle's

skin.

At the same time, the reference o dogs remindsus that domesti-

cated animals

may

in a sense form

part

of a

community

as

wild

animals

do not. Or at least this is true

of

societies

in which a domesticated

animal

belongs

to

a

particular family,

which tends to treat

it

as

a

"honorary

human

being,"referring

o

it,

as one

sign

of

this

attitude,

as

"he" or

"she,"

not

as

"it." Its wants are

respected,

and its ownersfeel

some sense

of

obligation

o

it,

perhaps

o the

degree

that

they

will

not

migrate

to another

country,

or take

a

long

holiday,

if this

means

deserting t. Such a feelingof obligation,however, s onlyjustifiableon

the

assumption

hat to desert one's

pets

is

a

form

of

cruelty

and that

cruelty

is

morally wrong.

Otherwise t can

properly

be

condemned,

n

Spinoza's

manner,

as

superstitious.

It is

sometimes

supposed

hat

compassion

o animals

s a

duty;

as

we have

already

seen,

Kant

gets

into some

difficulty

n

trying

to deter-

mine to whom it is our

duty.

But,

as

Hart has

pointed

out,

there is

somethingvery

odd

in

describing ompassion

as a

duty,

as if a manwho

69Ethics,

Pt.

IV,

Prop.

37,

Note

1.


20/24

214

JOHN

PASSMORE

is cruelto animals s

guilty only

of a

dereliction

of

duty.70

t

is far more

natural

to

describe

compassion

as

good

and

cruelty

to animals as

morally wrong. It can still be granted, o

Passmore-Treatment of Animals (JHI 36.2 [1975])

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