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BACKGROUND PAPERBACKGROUND PAPER

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:A Comparative Study of Pakistan

and Other Selected Countries


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PILDAT is an independent, non-par tisan and not-for-profit indigenous research and training institution with the mission tostrengthen democracy and democratic institutions in Pakistan. PILDAT has been actively engaged with building the capabilities of

elected Legislators towards a better discharge of their functions of Legislation, Representation and Oversight. PILDAT regularlyconducts training/briefing workshops and sessions for Legislators belonging to the National and Provincial Assemblies as well asthe Senate. As a non-par tisan political research institution, PILDAT regularly prepares well-researched briefing/background papers

and Case Studies for Pakistani Parliamentarians, Parliamentary Staff and politicians on a wide range of issues. PILDAT is aregistered non-profit entity under the Societies Registration Act XXI of 1860, Pakistan.

Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development And Transparency - PILDAT

All rights reserved. Any par t of this publication may be reproduced or translated by duly acknowledging the source. This book isprovided gratis or sold, subject to the condition that it shall not, by way of trade or otherwise, be lent, re-sold, hired out or

otherwise circulated without the publisher's prior consent in any form of binding or cover.

First Published: August 2005ISBN: 969-558-015-7

Typeset in SwissPrinted by: Son Printers, Lahore

With Support from

Published by

Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development And TransparencyHouse No. 7, 9th Avenue, F-8/1, Islamabad, Pakistan

Tel: (+92-51) 111-123-345; Fax: (+92-51) 226-3078E-mail: [email protected]; URL: www.pildat.org

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CONTENTSCONTENTSAbbreviations & Acronyms

Preface

Introduction

National Security Council in Other Countries

Evolution of the Concept of National Security Council in Pakistan

National Security Council in Pakistan

Review and Concluding Observations

Select Bibliography

Appendix A: Text of The National Security Council Act 2004

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:

A Comparative Study of Pakistan

& Other Selected Countries

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Background Paper National Security Council: A Comparative Studyof Pakistan & Other Selected Countries

ARD Alliance for Restoration of DemocracyCDNS Council for Defence and National SecurityCIA Central Intelligence Agency

C-in-C Commander-in-ChiefDCC Defence Committee of the CabinetJCSC Joint Chiefs of Staff CommitteeJIC Joint Intelligence CommitteeLFO Legal Framework OrderMGK MLL GVENLK KURULU (Turkish National

Security Council)MMA Muttahidda Majlis-e-AmalNSAB National Security Advisory BoardNSC National Security CouncilNSCS National Security Council SecretariatPML-N Pakistan Muslim League-NawazPML-QA Pakistan Muslim League-Quaid-i-Azam

PPPP Pakistan Peoples Party ParliamentarianRCO Revival of the Constitution OrderSCNS Supreme Council for National SecuritySPG Strategic Planning Group

ABBREVIATIONS & ACRONYMS




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National Security Council - A Comparative Study of Pakistan and other Selected Countries attempts to provide backgroundinformation on the evolution, scope, nature and role of National Security Council in various countries of the world and itscomparison with the National Security Council in Pakistan.

Authored by Dr. Hasan-Askari Rizvi, renowned Defence and Political Analyst, the paper looks at various models of the NSC in

various countries while reviewing in comparison whether the NSC in Pakistan would prevent future military interventions in thecountry.

The views expressed in this paper belong to the author and are not necessarily shared by PILDAT and its supporters. The authorand PILDAT have made every effor t to ensure the accuracy of the contents of this paper and do not accept responsibility for anyomission and error, as it is not deliberate.

IslamabadAugust 2005

PREFACEPREFACEPREFACE




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IntroductionThe establishment of the National Security Council (NSC)in Pakistan in April 2004 under an act of the Parliamentmaterialises the efforts of the top brass of the military tocreate a legal framework for a permanent role in policymaking at the highest level. It also provides them with aformal basis to make inputs to foreign and security policiesand internal affairs as well as monitor the performance ofthe state institutions and processes. The military enjoysthe support of a section of the civilian political leaders(Pakistan Muslim League and its allies) who joinedPresident-Army Chief General Pervez Musharraf in 2002 in

his bid to civilianize his military rule. These civilian alliessupported the NSC bill in the two houses, describing it as aguarantee of political stability and continuity,

President General Pervez Musharraf maintains that, as aconsultative body, the NSC is not superior to the Parliamentand that it serves as a check on the office of thePresident; he cannot exercise his powers in disregard tothe views of the NSC. He argues that the NSC averts thepossibility of imposition of martial law because the ArmyChief can use this forum to voice his opinion on thepolicies, governance and political management. If the NSCrejects the views of the Army Chief he will not be able to

impose martial law.

The pro-military political circles argue that the NSCpromotes better consultation and coordination betweenthe military and the civilian authorities, thereby ensuringpolitical stability and continuity of policies. They also arguethat the NSC does not give any new powers to the topcommanders. Rather, it places their already-expanded rolewithin a legal and constitutional framework. The NSCmakes nonbinding recommendations to the government.

The opposition political parties take a strong exception tothe establishment of the NSC because, in their opinion, itnegates the principle of supremacy of the electedParliament. The NSC creates a legal justification for theexpanded role of the top military commanders whoseinterference will increase in governmental and politicalaffairs. They further argue that such a military dominatedpolitical environment is not conducive to development ofautonomous civilian institutions and processes.

The paper argues that the overall power architecture of a

political system is reflected in its institutions andprocesses. The NSC or a similar institution can be studiedin the historical and political context of the state in question.In established democracies, the NSC-like body has alimited and advisory role; the top brass of the military play amarginal role. However, in the political systems with a longtradition of the expanded role of the military, the NSCprovides the military top brass with a constitutional andlegal umbrella to stay engaged in policy making andmonitoring of the civilian or semi-civilian government in adiscreet manner. This gives them an additional leverageand the NSC tends to become policy setting andsupervisory body.

The paper shows that the democratic parameters of thepolitical system in the United States and India determinethe role of the NSC and the inputs from the military. TheNSC plays a limited advisory role and fully reflects theprimacy of the civil in both countries. In the case of Iran, themilitary plays a role subsidiary to the Supreme Leader, thePresident and other constitutional bodies that have a strongrepresentation of the clergy. Turkey offers a good exampleof a political system with a long tradition of the military'srole in governance and political management. The TurkishNSC enables the top brass of the military to exerciseinfluence on policy making and execution, and supervise

the performance of the government. Turkey's experiencesuggests that the establishment of the NSC does not ruleout the military's use of other means of influencinggovernance and politics, including the direct assumption ofpower.

The NSC in Pakistan situates the military's expanded role inthe non-professional domains within a legal framework. Itthus creates a legal basis for the military to make inputs topolicy making at the highest level and monitor the issues ofgovernance and political management. The militaryperforms such a role against the backdrop of the history ofmilitary's ascendancy to power, its professional and

corporate interests and the top commanders' perception oftheir critical role for ensuring external and internal security,political stability and economic development.

All states have some institutional and proceduralmechanisms for consultation, coordination and policy-formulation on internal and external security affairs. These

National Security Council in other Countries




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can range from a highly personalised arrangement createdby a ruler to an elaborate formal structure comprisingcommittees, sub-committees and key officials. Theircomposition and role depend to a great extent on the natureof the political system and the disposition of the dominantelite.

Even if the names and nomenclatures of the institutionsdealing with the high level security affairs are similar, theirposition and role vary from country to country, dependingprimarily on the overall disposition of the political system.In an established democracy, the NSC or a similarinstitution, like any other institution of the state, functions

within the parameters of civilian primacy and thesuperiority of the political over the military. In the countriesdominated by military, clan or tribal formation or a religioushierarchy, the power architecture reflects in the institutionalarrangements. It is not surprising that the political systemexperiencing military rule finds it difficult to restrain the topbrass to their professional domain. The institutions likeNSC or some special arrangements are often created toaccommodate them in policy making and management.

The following examples of the NSC show that theseinstitutions reflect the over all disposition of each politicalsystem Therefore, the dynamics of the NSC can be

appreciated only if it is located in the over all politicalcontext of the state in question.

The United States of America

The NSC was first created under an act of the Congress inJuly 1947. It had 7 members: the President, Secretaries ofState, Defence, Army, Navy and Air Force, and Chairman,National Security Resource Board. In 1949, the NSC wasreorganised. Vice President was added and three servicesecretaries (Army, Navy and Air Force) were dropped. InMarch 1953, the post of Assistant to the President forNational Security Affairs (National Security Adviser) wasestablished. The well-know National Security Advisersinclude Dr. Henry A Kissinger (December 1968-November1975, served concurrently as Secretary of State fromSeptember 1973), Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski (January 1977-January 1981), General Colin L. Powell (November 1987-January 1989, later served as the Secretary of State), Dr.Condoleeza Rice (January 2001-January 2005, laterserved as the Secretary of State.).

The NSC advises the President on planning, coordination

and evaluation of military and security policies as well asthe direction of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Itsactual role varies, depending on how much the Presidentrelies on it. Its composition also varies over time. In 2004-5, the NSC's formal members are the President, VicePresident, the Secretary of State and the Secretary ofDefence. Others who attend the meetings on a regularbasis are Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of theCIA and the President's National Security Adviser. Otherslike the Deputy Adviser and any cabinet members or seniorofficials, civil and military, may be invited to attend themeeting. The President's National Security Adviser acts asthe Director of the NSC who interacts with the President on

a regular basis. Expert civilian staff assist the NationalSecurity Adviser and the NSC in performance of theirtasks.

India

India established the NSC in November 1998 as a three tierstructure. At the apex is a six member body, oftendescribed as the NSC. It is chaired by the Prime Ministerand includes the Union Ministers of Home, Defence,External Affairs, Finance, and the Deputy Chairman of thePlanning Commission. The Prime Minister's PrincipalSecretary functions as the National Security Adviser andparticipates in the NSC in that capacity. Other cabinet

members and senior officials can attend the meeting ifinvited. It is noteworthy that the military has norepresentation at this level. The NSC deals with a widerange of issues with external and internal security, militaryaffairs, conventional and non-conventional defence, spaceand high technology, counter-insurgency, counter-terrorism, economy and environment.

The second tier is labelled as the Strategic Planning Group(SPG). It is headed by the Cabinet Secretary and includesthe chiefs of the Army, Navy and the Air Force, the Governorof Reserve Bank of India, Secretaries of the ministries ofHome, Defence, External Affairs, Finance, SecretaryDepartment of Defence Production and Supplies, ScientificAdviser to the Defence Minister, and several othersecretaries of union ministries and Director IntelligenceBureau. It could be described as the expanded version ofthe Union Secretaries Committee to which three servicechiefs and some others have been added. The SPG is toundertake the long-term review of defence matters andstrategic issues for the consideration of the apex body.




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The third level is the National Security Advisory Board(NSAB) which comprises the persons of eminence fromoutside the government with expertise in external andinternal security, foreign affairs, defence and militaryaffairs, science and technology and economics. It acts as athink tank for the policy makers and recommends policyoptions on the issues under its purview. It is supposed tomeet at least once a month. The NSC can ask them to studyparticular issues.

The existing Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) has beenre-structured and designated as the NSC Secretariat(NSCS).

Iran

Article 176 of the amended 1979 Constitution establishesa 14 member Supreme Council for National Security(SCNS). It includes the President of the Republic(Chairman); heads of three branches of the government;the Chief of the Supreme Command Council of the ArmedForces; the officer in-charge of the planning and budgetaffairs; two representatives nominated by the SupremeLeader; ministers of Foreign Affairs, Interior andInformation; a minister related with the subject, and thehighest ranking officer from the Armed Forces; and theCommander of Islamic Revolutionary Guards. The

composition of the SCNS shows that it has only threeuniformed persons as its members: two represent themilitary and one represents the Islamic RevolutionaryGuards.

The SCNS performs three major functions: formulation ofdefence and national security policies under the guidelinesdetermined by the Supreme Leader; coordination betweenthe security policies and the country's politics, social,cultural and economic fields and intelligence; andmobilisation of material and intellectual resources fordealing with internal and external threats. The decision ofthe SCNS is effective after it is confirmed by the SupremeLeader.

Turkey

The NSC (MLL GVENLK KURULU - MGK) wasoriginally established in Turkey in 1961 when the militaryrule led by General Cemal Gursel was civilianised with theintroduction of a new constitution prepared under theguidance of the military regime. Article 111 of the 1961

Constitution established the NSC to recommend to theCouncil of Ministers the necessary basic guidelinesregarding the coordination and the taking of decisionsrelated to national security. It was obligatory for thecabinet to consult the NSC before declaring a state ofemergency.

The NSC under the 1961 Constitution consisted of 10members. These were: the President (Chairman), PrimeMinister, Chief of the General Staff, Ministers of Defence,Internal Affairs and Foreign Affairs; Commanders of theArmy, Navy and the Air Force; and Commander of theGendarmerie. As all the Presidents during 1961-1980 had

military background, the people with military backgroundconstituted a majority in the NSC.

In September 1980, General Kenan Evren assumed powerand ruled the country under mar tial law for two years. Themilitary regime appointed a consultative assembly thatprepared a new constitution, which was put to referendumin November 1982. It obtained 91 per cent votes in itsfavour. Included in this referendum was the election ofGeneral Kenan Evren as the President under the 1982Constitution. He assumed elected Presidency onNovember 9, 1982 for a 7-year term.

Article 118 of the 1982 Constitution established a NSCwhose composition was similar to that of the 1961Constitution. The functions of the NSC remain the same.However, Ar ticle 118 makes it obligatory for the cabinet togive priority consideration to the recommendations ofthe NSC. This article further states that the NSC shallcommunicate its views to the council of ministers on thegovernment decisions and it will also advise them oncoordination with regard to the formulation, establishmentand implementation of the national security policy of thestate.

The term national security has been defined in such broadterms in the National Security Council Law, 1983, that itcould be interpreted to include any aspect of the statepolicy. It states that National security means the defenceand protection of the state against every kind of externaland internal threat to the constitutional order, nationalexistence, unity, and to all its interests and contractualrights in the international arena, including in the political,social, cultural and economic spheres.




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The NSC secretariat is headed by a general secretary whois always a serving four-star general or admiral. It isresponsible for keeping the records, collection ofinformation and preparation of briefing papers for the NSCmeetings.

The Turkish military is assigned special responsibilities bythe Turkish Armed Forces Internal Service Law of January1961. The armed forces are duty bound not only to defendthe territorial integrity and independence against externaland internal threats but they are also obliged to protect thenature of the Turkish Republic as defined in theconstitution, i.e. republicanism and secularism. The most

recent changes in composition and scope of MGK arefurther discussed in the section of Review and ConcludingObservations.

Israel

The NSC, established by the cabinet in March 1999, is alow key organisation that works as a part of the PrimeMinister's secretariat and derives its authority from thePrime Minister. It functions in accordance with hisinstructions. Its primary function is to serve as acentralised body for, and providing information to, thePrime Minister and the government regarding issues ofnational security.

The NSC is a small entity in the Prime Minister's secretariatfor providing necessary information and consultation tothe Prime Minister and the Cabinet, and briefings to theKnesset committees on security issues in accordance withPrime Minister's directives. It may also makerecommendation on national security policy to the cabinetand engage in the long range planning of national securitywith the help of the existing planning bodies in thegovernment department dealing with national security. Itsduties also include follow-up and update of nationalsecurity activities and to look after the implementation ofnational security decision as well as coordination andcooperation contacts with parallel national securityauthorities in selected countries in coordination with theMinistry of Foreign Affairs.

The NSC is headed by the National Security Adviser to thePrime Minister who is appointed by and answerable to thePrime Minister. It has five divisions (Security Policy,Foreign Policy, Company and Infrastructure, Terror

Combat, Organisation and Operation), each headed by asenior official. It also includes an economic adviser and alegal adviser. Normally the NSC has some officials on thesenior positions with military background (retired orreservist) but there is no active duty top-level militaryofficer on its staff. However, the Prime Minister has thepower to make such appointments. It may also bementioned that the cabinet has also got a MinisterialCommittee on National Security.

General Zia-ul-Haq was Pakistan's first military ruler whoproposed the setting up of the NSC to create constitutionalarrangements for the top brass to share policy making withthe civilian political leaders. This was an impor tant stage inthe military's rise to power which began in the early 1950s.

The Pakistan military inherited the British tradition ofcivilian primacy over the military and its aloofness fromactive politics. It maintained a professional and disciplinedprofile in the course of the political struggle for theestablishment of Pakistan, although at the personal levelthe Muslim officers were generally sympathetic towards

the Pakistan demand.Pakistan began its independent existence under extremelydifficult conditions. It faced serious domestic problemsand external security pressures due to multifacetedproblems with India in the early years of independence. Asthe state survival emerged as the highest concern of thepolicy makers, they viewed a powerful military as integralto the survival strategy. This helped the top brass of themilitary to gradually assume a direct role in policy makingon security issues.

The Army chief joined hands with the President to dislodge

the weak political leaders and assume power in October1958. This was a turning point in the military's dispositiontowards active politics. The senior commanders attemptedto tailor politics to their political preference derived fromtheir military background and experience. Field MarshalAyub Khan firmly situated the military in the politicaldomain. His successor, General Yahya Khan, continuedwith the Ayub legacy of asserting the centrality of themilitary in governance and political management.

Evolution of the Concept of National SecurityCouncil in Pakistan




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Bhutto's Civilian Rule and the Changes in the Military'sCommand Structure

However, Pakistan's military debacle in December 1971 inthe war with India and the break-up of Pakistan temporarilystalled the military's ascendancy. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, acivilian leader with popular base in the post-1971 Pakistan,assumed power on December 20, 1971 after GeneralYahya's military regime broke down in the wake of themilitary debacle. Bhutto asserted civilian primacy byintroducing several changes in the military's commandstructure and policy making on security issues. The majorchanges included:

1. The designation of the three services chiefs waschanged from the Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C)of each service to the Chief of Staff. They wereput under the command of the Joint Chiefs ofStaff Committee with the President as theCommander-in-Chief.

2. The tenure of the Chiefs of Staff was initially fixedat four years. In 1975, it was reduced to threeyears. The government also decided not to giveextension to the services chiefs.

3. The post of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Committee (JCSC) was created on a permanentbasis. General Muhammad Shariff wasappointed first Chairman on March 1, 1976.

4. The government of Pakistan issued a white paperon Higher Defence Organisation in May 1976,outlining the institutional arrangements fordealing with defence and security affairs. Theultimate responsibility of national defence restedwith the Prime Minister who was assisted by theDefence Committee of the Cabinet (DCC). Otherimportant organisations involved in the decision-making on security affairs included the DefenceCouncil, the Ministry of Defence, Joint Chiefs ofStaff Committee and its Chairman, the Chief ofStaff and the Services Headquarters.

Martial Law of 1977 and First Formal Attempt to FormNSC

Some of these changes lost relevance after the Chief ofArmy Staff, General Zia-ul-Haq, overthrew the Bhutto

government on July 5, 1977 for the reasons beyond thescope of this paper. He suspended the 1973 Constitutionand imposed martial law in the country. Under him,Pakistan experienced the longest spell of military rule (July1977-December 1985).

General Zia-ul-Haq invoked Islam to expand the role of thetop brass of the military in governance and politicalmanagement. He maintained that the armed forces wereresponsible not only for safeguarding the country'sterritorial integrity but also its ideological frontiers. He wasconvinced that the imperatives of preservation ofPakistan's ideology and its Islamic character demanded

constitutional guarantees for enabling the military to sharedecision making with the political elite at the national level.He also talked of a constitutional provision allowing themilitary commanders to take over the reins of thegovernment at the time of national emergency.

Some senior generals associated with the military regimeendorsed General Zia's political views. The pro militaryregime political circles and the press supported thesesuggestions. However, the major political parties andindependent political circles opposed the suggestions forconstitutional cover to the expanded role of the military.

General Zia-ul-Haq was not deterred by the opposition tohis political views. He added Article 152-A to the 1973Constitution through the Revival of the Constitution Order(RCO), March 1985, to establish a National SecurityCouncil for accommodating the top brass of the military inpolicy making. The NSC was empowered to makerecommendations relating to the issue of a Proclamation ofEmergency under Article 232, security of Pakistan and anyother matter of national importance that may be referred toit by the President in consultation with the Prime Minister.The NSC consisted of 11 members who were: thePresident, the Prime Minister, Chairman of the Senate,Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, the Chiefs ofStaff of the Army, the Navy and the Air Force, and theprovincial Chief Ministers (four in number).

The NSC was opposed by most political circles and it hadto be dropped as a par t of the deal with the Parliament to getthe parliamentary approval for the revised version of theRCO as 8th Constitutional Amendment in October 1985.




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Council for Defence and National Security (CDNS) -1997

In the first week of January 1997, the interim governmentof President Farooq Leghari and Prime Minister MerajKhalid established a 10 member Council for Defence andNational Security (CDNS) that comprised the President,Prime Minister, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee,three Services Chiefs of the Army, the Navy and the AirForce, federal minister for Foreign Affairs, Defence, Interiorand Finance. Its responsibilities included advice to thefederal cabinet on formulation of defence policy, itscoordination with external and domestic policies and othermatters with implications for security and stability. Its first

meeting held on January 8, 1997, discussed, among otherthings, accountability of the politicians and bureaucratsinvolved in corruption and endorsement of the decision tohold the national elections on February 3.

It seemed rather unusual that the interim governmentwould set up such a council five to six weeks before the endof its assignment. Many critics argued that PresidentFarooq Leghari established this to demonstrate themilitary's support to his political management during theinterim period.

When Nawaz Sharif's second government was installed

after the February general elections, he abolished theCDNS.

Chief of Army Staff Proposes NSC - 1998

The issue of establishment of the NSC cropped up again inthe first week of October 1998. The Chief of Army Staff,General Jehangir Karamat, addressed the Navy WarCollege, Lahore, on October 5. While responding to aquestion he underlined the need of creating an institutionalarrangement at the highest level for devising effectivepolicies for coping with the ongoing economic drift andpolitical-management problems. He maintained that aNational Security Council or Committee at the apex wouldinstitutionalise decision making if it was backed by a teamof credible advisors and a think tank of experts. Later heelaborated his comments, saying that the DefenceCommittee of the Cabinet could be enlarged to serve thispurpose. He emphasised that Pakistan needed neutral,competent and secure bureaucracy and administration atthe federal and provincial levels. He warned that Pakistancould not afford the destabilising effect of polarisation,vendettas and insecurity driven expedient policies.

This was a strong indictment of the civilian government ledby Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. But Jehangir Karamat wasoutlining the shared concern of the top brass of the Armyabout the deterioration of economic situation after thenuclear explosions, political confrontation between thegovernment and opposition, growing civic violenceincluding sectarian killings and complaints of corruptionand mismanagement against the government. The seniorcommanders felt that these developments had negativeimplications for the military.

This was not Karamat's first public comments on theperformance of the civilian government. On May 4, 1998

he said that Pakistan was threatened more by economicinstability than defence oriented dangers. He added thatPakistan currently faces a threat from within and not fromoutside. He repeated the same warning later on. Hiscomments caused speculations about the possibleimposition of martial law by the military. He denied thisreport on September 28.

It was against this backdrop that Karamat made hiscomments at the Navy War College which perturbedNawaz Sharif who had been employing the parliamentarymajority to concentrate all powers in his hands since heassumed power in February 1997. When Nawaz Sharif

expressed his displeasure on the statement, JehangirKaramat offered to resign after having failed to convincehim of the rationale of his statement. Nawaz Sharifaccepted his offer. Jehangir Karamat submitted hisresignation without discussing the matter with othergenerals.

General Pervez Musharraf who assumed power onOctober 12, 1999 after dislodging the Nawaz Sharifgovernment toyed with the idea of creating someinstitutional arrangements for securing the expanded roleof the military in policy making and governance.

General Pervez Musharraf Establishes the NSCThe Chief of the Army Staff, General Pervez Musharraf,assumed power on October 12, 1999. Five days later, in hisaddress to the nation, he announced that a NationalSecurity Council headed by the Chief Executive would beset up. A think tank of experts would be formed as anadjunct to the NSC for providing institutionalised adviceand input.




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The NSC was formally established on October 30 under anorder of the Chief Executive. It comprised the ChiefExecutive (Chairman), Chief of Naval Staff, Chief of AirStaff and other members appointed by the Chief Executive.The members were to hold office during the pleasure of theChief Executive. In August 2000, the Chief Executivereshuffled the NSC which had six members in addition tothe Chief Executive-Army Chief. They were the Chiefs ofthe Naval and Air Staff, Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Interior,Finance and Commerce. The NSC could deliberate andtender nonbinding advice to the Chief Executive on nationalsecurity, foreign affairs, law and order, corruption,accountability, recovery of bank loans and public debts

from defaulters, finance, economic and social welfare,health, education, Islamic ideology, human rights,protection of minorities and women development. TheNational Reconstruction Bureau was established as a thinktank. A couple of advisory committees were attached withsome ministries like Foreign Affairs but these did not reallytake off.

Since this was the period of direct military rule, the NSCwas overshadowed by the Chief Executive, the CorpsCommanders' meeting and the Cabinet, and it could notshape up as an important institution for deliberation onnational issues. A new expanded NSC was established in

July 2001 under the Chief Executive's Order No. 5 whichcomprised the President (Chairman), the Chief Executive,Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, the ServiceChiefs of the Army, the Navy and the Air Force, ProvincialGovernors, and such other members as may beappointed by the President in his discretion. The membersheld their office during the pleasure of the President. Thefunctions of the NSC remained unchanged. Thereconstituted NSC continued to remain on the sidelinesand the powers were exercised by General PervezMusharraf who combined four offices, i.e., Army Chief,President, Chief Executive, and Chairman, Joint Chiefs ofStaff Committee (until October 7, 2001). He leaned on theCorps Commanders, the Principal Staff Officers and theCabinet for advice.

On August 21, 2002, President General Pervez Musharrafpromulgated the Legal Framework Order (LFO) whichintroduced far reaching changes in the 1973 Constitution.One of the changes was the insertion of Article 152-Awhich established a NSC as a consultative forum thatprovided a constitutional cover to the role of the top

commanders of the armed forces in policy making at thehighest level.

With the exception of the pro-military Pakistan MuslimLeague-Quaid-i-Azam (PML-QA) and its allies, the politicalparties like the PPPP, PML-N, MMA and several smallerpolitical parties took a strong exception to the President'sdecision to unilaterally amend the constitution through theintroduction of the LFO. They were especially critical of thesetting up of the NSC which they maintained provided thesenior commanders with a constitutional basis forcontinuation of their expanded role in the political domain.

In December 2003, the MMA and the government signedan agreement for resolving the differences on the LFO. Oneof the provisions of the agreement provided that the NSCwould not be a part of the constitution but it would be set upthrough legislation by the Parliament. The major ARDparties, the PPPP and the PML-N and smaller parties in theopposition, stayed away from the MMA-governmentagreement and the passing of the 17th constitutionalamendment.

The National Security Council Bill - 2004

The government moved a bill in the National Assembly onApril 2, 2004 for setting up the NSC. The bill was debated

on April 2, 5, 6, and 7, amidst strong opposition protestsand walkouts. Though the MMA had signed the agreementwith the government on setting up the NSC throughordinary legislation, it changed its position and opposedthe NSC bill. When the bill was referred to the NationalAssembly's standing committee on law and parliamentaryaffairs, it unanimously approved the bill in 35 minutes;there was hardly any discussion on the bill. The ruling partyavailed of the opposition's absence from the house due to awalk out to pass the bill.

The Senate took up the NSC bill on April 9 and discussed iton April 12, 13 and 14. The debate was vir tually one sidedbecause the opposition opposed the bill and stagedwalkouts. The President signed the bill on April 19, whichestablished the NSC for the first time through an act of theParliament. Prime Minister Mir Zafarullah Khan Jamalideclared that the NSC would be a check on the presidentialpowers to dissolve the National Assembly and thus itwould serve as a safety valve to save the democraticsystem in the country. This perspective was rejected bythe opposition parties inside and outside the Parliament.




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National Security Council in Pakistan

The NSC, as established by the Act of the Parliament,comprises 13 members:

i. The President (Chairman)ii. The Prime Ministeriii. Chairman of the Senateiv. Speaker of the National Assemblyv. Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Committeevi. Services Chiefs of the Army, the Navy and the Air

Forcevii. Leader of the opposition in the National

Assemblyviii. Four Provincial Chief Ministers

The NSC secretariat, headed by a Secretary to beappointed by the President, is under the control of thePresident. The federal cabinet members, senior officialsand others can attend the meeting by invitation.

The functions of the NSC are:

a) The Council shall serve as a forum forconsultation to the President and the governmenton matters of national security, including thesovereignty, integrity, defence, security of thestate and crisis management.

b) The Council shall formulate and makerecommendation to the President and thegovernment in accordance wi th theconsultations on (a)

Originally the NSC bill proposed that the NSC would alsodeal with the matters relating to democracy, governance,and inter-provincial harmony. This sentence was laterreplaced with crisis management without explaining its

operational implications.The first meeting of the NSC was held on June 24, 2004. Itwas boycotted by Maulana Fazlur Rahman (Leader ofOpposition in the National Assembly) and MuhammadAkram Khan Durani (Chief Minister of NWFP). Bothbelonged to the MMA. President General Pervez Musharrafpublicly expressed his displeasure on their decision to stayaway from the NSC meeting. The Chairman Senate was

also absent because he was on an official visit abroad.Federal ministers for Foreign Affairs, Interior, GovernorNWFP and Vice Chief of Army Staff attended the meetingon special invitation.

The NSC discussed internal security affairs and expresseda strong determination to root out terrorism, extremismand sectarianism. It underlined the need of greatercoordination among various federal and provincialauthorities for dealing with the problems of internalsecurity.

Prime Minister Zaffarullah Khan Jamali attended the first

meeting of the NSC but the President did not give any hintthat Jamali 's replacement was on the cards. Two days later,Jamali resigned after meeting with the President. Thisincident appears to contradict the President's assertionthat the NSC was a check on the powers of the President.

By the end of July 2005, the NSC held four meetings whichwere boycotted by the leader of the opposition in theNational Assembly and the Chief Minister, NWFP. The NSCmeetings were held on June 24, 2004, November 25,2004, February 28, 2005 and June 8, 2005. The review ofthe deliberations of these meetings shows that the NSCdeals with wide ranging subjects covering foreign policy,

external and internal security, internal political andeconomic issues and terrorism.

The role of the NSC or a similar apex bodies can bereviewed in the context of the political system. Even if theirrole is consultative and advisory, their actual contributiondepends on the political heritage and the nature anddynamics of the political system. In establisheddemocracies, the NSC-like body plays a limited andadvisory role; the top brass of the military play a secondary

role. In the political system with a long tradition of themilitary's direct and indirect involvement in governanceand political management, the NSC-like body provides themilitary top brass with a constitutional or legal umbrella tostay engaged in policy making and monitoring of thecivilian or semi-civilian government in a discreet manner.This is an additional leverage to them and the NSC tends tobecome a policy setting and supervisory body.

Review and Concluding Observations




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In the United States, the NSC advises the President whoactually runs the government under the Presidentialsystem as set out in the Constitution and Law. TheChairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff is the only uniformed officerwho participates in the proceedings of the NSC as anadvisor on military affairs. This body limits the role andinput of the military top brass and asserts the primacy ofthe civil. Over the years, the President's National SecurityAdviser, who is a civilian, has acquired much salience.Occasionally, retired senior military officers have alsoserved on this position.

In the case of India, the military has no direct

representation in the apex body of the NSC whichcomprises the senior most members of the governmentunder the chairmanship of the Prime Minister. The ServicesChiefs sit in the second tier committee (Strategic PlanningGroup) whose most members are the secretaries of theunion (federal) ministries. This committee is chaired by theCabinet Secretary. These arrangements show the pr imacyof the civil and political institutions and leaders over themilitary. It is inconceivable in a military dominated politicalsystem that the Services Chiefs would be relegated to ajunior committee and placed at par with senior civilservants.

The Supreme Council for National Security in Iranmanifests the over all features of the political systemdominated by the clergy led by the Supreme Leader. Out of14 members of the SCNS, two belong to the regularmilitary and one is from the Islamic Revolutionary Guards.Its decisions cannot be implemented without theconfirmation of the Supreme Leader, who along with thePresident (a civilian, clergy as well as non-clergy) plays acommanding role. The back up is provided by theParliament. There is no evidence available to suggest thatthe senior commanders of the military and the IslamicRevolutionary Guards have nibbled the power and role ofthe Supreme Leader, the President, the Parliament andother constitutional institutions. This also applies to theperiod of Iran's war with Iraq (1980-88).

In the case of the state of Israel, security issues havetraditionally been assigned the highest priority and manyretired generals entered politics and held key politicalpositions. Their political ascendancy was through theconstitutional and electoral processes. The NSC, a civilianinstitution, is the creation of the government and functions

as a unit in the Prime Minister's Secretariat within the limitsdetermined by the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister alsoconsults the cabinet, the cabinet committee on nationalsecurity and, of course, the military top brass. However,the Prime Minister commands the political system.

Turkey is good illustration of a political system with a longtradition of military's role in governance and politicalmanagement. It is therefore not surprising that the NSC hastraditionally served as an important forum for the top brassof the military to mediate its influence in policy making andexecution. The military top brass have traditionally used theNSC and informal methods to influence governance and

politics. The role of the NSC and the armed forces is alsostrengthened by the National Security Law, 1983, and theTurkish Armed Forces Internal Service Law, 1961.

The tradition of the Turkish military's political role could betraced back to the Young Turks (1908), and the military'ssignificant contribution to the establishment of modernTurkish State under the leadership of Mustafa KamalAtaturk (April 1920). The military remained on the sidelinesuntil May 1960 when it assumed power under GeneralCemal Gursel. In July 1961 the country was returned tocivilian rule under a new constitution. The military stagedanother coup in September 1980 under General Kenan

Evren who introduced a new constitution in November1982 and returned to civilian and constitutional rule.

Since 1960, the military has played an active role in thepolitical domain, at time dominating decision making andcausing political changes. It established the NSC in 1961which was carried over to the 1982 Constitution. It offers aconstitutional framework to the senior commanders toinfluence policy making and execution as well as monitorthe performance of the government.

All Turkish President during 1960-1989 had militarybackground (Cemal Gursel: 1960-1966, Cevdet Sunay:1966-1973, Fahri Koruturk: 1973-1980, Kenan Evren:1980-1989). In November 1989, Turgut Ozal, a civilianpolitical leader, assumed the Presidency but he enjoyed theblessings of the military; he was close to the militaryregime of Kenan Evren and served as Prime Minister in thefirst civilian government after the end of military rule in1983. Ozal's successors (Suleyman Demirel: 1993-2000and Ahmet Necdet Sezer: 2000 to the present) were alsocivilians who were acceptable to the military. The top




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commanders communicated their preferences to thepolitical leaders, especially the Prime Minister, on theselection of the President in 1993 and 2000.

The Turkish experience suggests that the establishment ofthe NSC does not exclude the chances of the military'sdirect assumption of power. The top brass of the militaryare contented with their role through the NSC as long asthey get the things done their way. In case they come to theconclusion that the NSC does not serve their agenda orthey are no longer in a position to effect changes in thepolitical process, they can pursue other options toinfluence governance and political management. These

options include direct pressure on the government bydistancing themselves from the government policies,making their views on political developments known to thegovernment through formal communication or thoughinformal channels, public statements and comments onpolitical and economic affairs, partial or complete changeof the government, and direct assumption of power.

The NSC has been functioning in one way or another inTurkey since 1961. However, the Turkish Military has usedother means to influence the political domain from time totime.

1971: The military top brass applied pressure on thegovernment to control the right- and lef t wing violenceand political assassination in par ts of Turkey. Later thePrime Minister was forced out of office and a newPrime Minister acceptable to the military wasappointed. Martial law was declared in the troubledregions.

1979: In view of the political and economic crisis, themilitary commanders asked the political governmentthrough the President in September to control thesituation. In January 1980, the letter of the Army Chiefwas handed over to the Prime Minister on the troubledinternal situation. There was a stalemate like situationon the selection of President Koruturk's successor in1980.

1980: General Kenan Evren assumed power inSeptember by displacing the civilian government andthe 1961 Constitution.

1997: In February, the top commanders asked the

Rafeh Party's Islamist Prime Minister NecmettinErbaken through the NSC to restrain his governmentfrom encouraging religious tendencies and advisedhim to protect the secular nature of the state. Thiscaused a stand off between the military and Erbaken,who resigned in June.

Though the Turkish military views itself as the guardian ofthe republican and secular nature of the Turkish State, itsrole beyond the NSC appears to be on the decline by theend of the 1990s. The top commanders are now backing-off slowly in view of their shared effort with the civilianleaders to join the European Union (EU). Two of the major

conditions for Turkey's admission to the EU emphasise theimprovement of human rights situation and enhancementof the quality of democracy.

In an effor t to improve Turkey's democratic credentials, thegovernment decided in August 2003 to introduce somechanges in the organisation and role of the NSC. Thesechanges include: (1) The President would appointSecretary General of the NSC who could be a civilian. In thepast, only a four star general could hold this position. (ii)The NSC would meet once every two months rather thanonce a month. (iii) Its recommendations will be consideredby the cabinet in routine rather than on a priority basis, as

was the case in the past. One year later, in August 2004, adiplomat was appointed the first civilian Secretary Generalof the NSC. There are suggestions in the political circles toreduce the military's representation on the NSC andincrease the parliamentary supervision of defenceexpenditure.

In an effort to reduce the role of the NSC, Prime MinisterRecep Tayip Erdogan suggested in January 2005 that theNSC should revise the National Security Policy Documentin a manner that it was short and to the point. Hemaintained that it should offer general strategic analysisrather than the plan of action because the formulation of thedetailed security policy and the plan of action are theresponsibilities of the cabinet.

The generals appear to have accepted, albeit reluctantly, agradual erosion of their role. However, they could re-asserttheir primacy if Turkey's admission to the EU was delayedfor an indefinite period or they came to the conclusion thatthe EU was creating unjustified barriers for Turkey. Norwould they accept their total exclusion from policy making




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and governance.

Pakistan's NSC has some resemblance with the TurkishNSC but the former has to be viewed in the context ofPakistan's legacy of the military's expanded role in the non-professional fields. From the days of General Zia-ul-Haq'smilitary rule, the top commanders have sought someconstitutional and legal framework for legitimising theirrole in governance and political management. GeneralPervez Musharraf succeeded in April 2004 to turn the NSCconcept into a reality.

The NSC is part of the military commanders' efforts to

legitimise their role not only in Pakistan's security anddefence affairs but also in the major sectors of governance,the economy and the society. Zia-ul-Haq invoked the notionof the defence of ideological frontiers in order to rationalisethe expanded role of the military in the domestic context.Pervez Musharraf does not talk of the ideological frontiersof Pakistan but he projects the military as the guardian ofexternal security and internal stability, economicdevelopment and political continuity.

The military cannot effectively perform the guardianshiprole without a legal and constitutional basis. The NSCserves that purpose. Given the NSC objectives outlined in

the law and the deliberations of the first four meetings, theNSC's operational scope appears to be all-encompassing.As the President is concurrently holding the office of theChief of Army Staff, the NSC is a policy setting institutionrather than making policy recommendation to the federalcabinet.

The setting up of the NSC is in consonance with themilitary's expanded role in different sectors of the state, theeconomy and the civil society in the form of business,commercial, and industrial activities undertaken by themilitary's charitable trusts, some special organisations ordirectly by the military. This is coupled with the induction ofretired and serving military personnel to civilian jobs in thegovernment, semi-government and the private sectors.

The establishment of the NSC in Pakistan isunderstandable against the backdrop of the gradualexpansion of the role of the military in the non-professionalfields, its expanding professional and corporate interestsand the top commanders' perception of their critical role topolitical stability, economic development and external and

internal stability. However, this does not necessarily meanthat the military will limit itself to the NSC to pursue itsguardian role and expanded interests.




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SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHYSELECT BIBLIOGRAPHYSELECT BIBLIOGRAPHYAhmad, Ishtiaq, Turkish Model in Pakistani Politics, Nation (Lahore), November 7, 14, and 21, 1999.

Chubin, Shahram, Wither Iran? Reform, Domestic Politics and National Security, Adelphi Paper 342 (London: InternationalInstitute for Strategic Studies, 2002).

Constitution of the Republic of Turkey http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/english/constitution.htm\

Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran http://www.iranonline.com/iran-info/Government/constitution-13.html

Hale, William, Turkish Politics and the Military (London: Routledge, 1994).

Idris, Kunwar, Rubber-Stamping the NSC, Dawn (Karachi), April 11, 2004.

India News Online: National Security Council Set Up http://www.indiagov.org/inews/December98/9.htm

Iqbal, Nadeem, Power Play,Newsline (Karachi), August 2001, p.38.

Jenkins, Gareth, Context and Circumstance: The Turkish Military, Adelphi Paper 337 (London: International Institute forStrategic Studies, 2001).

National Security Council History, USA http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/history.html

National Security Council: Prime Minister's Office (Israel)http://www.pmo.gov.il/pmoeng/pm+office/divisions/securitycouncil.htm

Perlmutter, Amos, The Military and Politics in Modern Times, Chapter 9 on Israel (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977).

Rehman, I.A., NSC Offers No Cure, News (Lahore), March 4, 2001

Rizvi, Hasan Askari, Military, State and Society in Pakistan (New York: St. Mar tin's Press, 2000).

Rizvi, Hasan Askari, Will NSC End Military Intervention? Dawn, April 8, 2004 http://www.dawn.com/2004/04/08/fea.htm

Salt, Jeremy, Turkey's Military Democracy, Current History (Vol.98, No. 625, February 1999), pp. 72-78.

State of Democracy Repor t, April 1, 2004-June 30, 2004 (Lahore: PILDAT, November 2004)

Vas, E.A. (Lt-General, retd.), National Security Council: Role and Function. (India) http://www.inpad.org/res1.html




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APPENDIXAPPENDIXAPPENDIX




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(3) Any proposal on an issue deemed to be of national importance which requires implementation, shall be referred by theCouncil to the National Assembly or the Senate for appropriate action.

6. Meetings.-(1) The meetings of the Council may be convened by the President either in his discretion or on the advice of thePrime Minister.

(2) A meeting of the Council may be called notwithstanding a vacancy in the office of one or more members of the Council.

(3) A meeting of the Council, once called, may not be postponed due to the absence of any one or more of its members.

(4) The Council may invite any person to attend any of its meetings, by special invitation.

7. National Security Council Secretariat.-(1) There shall be a Secretary of the Council who shall be appointed by the

Chairman on such terms and conditions as may be determined by the Chairman.

(2) The Secretary shall be the head of the Secretariat and shall have such other powers and functions as may be conferred onhim by the Rules :

Provided that till such time that the rules are made the Secretary may, with the approval of the Chairman,-

(a) exercise such powers and perform such functions as may be necessary for carrying out the purposes of this Act and thefunctioning of the Council; and

(b) appoint officers and staff to be employed in connection with the functions of the Council and determine their terms andconditions of employment.

8. Power to make rules.-The Council may, by notification in the official Gazette, make rules for carrying out the purposes of thisAct :

Provided that till such time that the rules are made the Council may, with the approval of the Chairman, follow such procedureas it may deem fit.

9. Repeal.-The National Security Council Order, 2001 (Chief Executive's Order No. 5 of 2001) is hereby repealed.




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House No. 7, 9th Avenue, F-8/1, Islamabad, Pakistan

Tel: (+92-51) 111-123-345; Fax: (+92-51) 226-3078

E-mail: [email protected] URL: www.pildat.org

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