Organizational Culture

Pakistan-Afghanistan RelationsAuthor(s): Khurshid HasanSource: Asian Survey, Vol. 2, No. 7 (Sep., 1962), pp. 14-24Published by: University of California PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3023688 .

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PAKISTAN-AFGHANISTAN RELATIONS

KHURSHID HASAN

Pakistan and Afghanistan have much in common. They not only share the same frontier but they have inherited common historical, cultural and religious traditions. Yet the irony of the situation is that relations between these two countries, bound by historical and geographical links, have not been cordial but rather have been marked by pronounced hostility since 1947.

The primary cause of this hostility is the demand for Pushtoonistan, which was put forward by the Government of Afghanistan immediately after the emergence of Pakistan as an independent state in 1947. The essence of this demand is that Pathans and Pushto-speaking tribes in northwestern Pakistan should be accorded the privilege to "opt out" of Pakistan and set up an autonomous state. The area demanded, as shown on Afghan maps, includes not only the territory inhabited by the Pathans between the Indus and the Durand Line but also the whole of Baluchistan in the south and Chitral, Gilgit and Baltistan in the north. It should be pointed out here that the part of Baluchistan south of Quetta and the north- ernmost areas of Kashmir State are not inhabited by Pathans.1

Apparently the Afghan Government put forward the claim for Push- toonistan initially on the assumption that Pakistan would not long survive as an independent state. In anticipation of such an eventuality, Kabul wished to establish its claim to certain areas which were desired for a number of reasons. Having once committed itself to this position, the Afghan Government found it difficult to withdraw its claim which has now become a major feature of Afghan foreign policy.

Amon, the reasons which may have prompted the Afghan Government into hoisting the demand for Pushtoonistan may have been a desire for an outlet to the sea. A landlocked country, Afghanistan badly needs an opening to the sea which would reduce its dependence on transit routes across other countries. The inclusion of Baluchistan in the Afghan concept of Pushtoonistan supports this assumption. At the 1958 Geneva Conference for the Law of the Sea, Afghanistan and thirteen other states joined the Soviet Union in sponsoring a resolution which demanded an absolute right of transit across the other countries for coastless countries.

Some observers attribute Afghanistan's championship of Pushtoonistan to internal factors. It is pointed out that the population of Afghanistan consists of three main linguistic groups viz., Turki-, Persian- and Pushto-

' Olaf Caroe, "The Pathans at the Crossroads," Eastern. WorlTd, Vol. XV, No. 12, (December 1961) lo. 12.

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speaking people. The Pushto-speaking- group accounts for only one-third of the total population. Apprehensive that at some future date the Persian- speaking Afghans might turn to Iran, and the Turki-speaking towards their kinsmen in Central Asia, the Pathan ruling dynasty may have pressed its claim to Pushtoonistan in order to strengthen the position of the Pushto minority of Afghanistan. Looked at from this angle, Pushtoonistan be- comes the rhetoric for an issue which has much broader economic and political implications.

In sponsoring Pushtoonistan, the Afghan Governm-fent, among other things, has challenged the validity of the Durand Line on the ground that the treaty demarcating the boundary was signed under duress, that Pakistan cannot inherit a territory which was seized by the British by force and that "treaties are binding on governments and not their subjects and that Pakistan cannot inherit the rights of 'extinguished person' i.e., the British in India."72

However, such a contention is not supported by historical facts, nor is it legally tenable. The Indo-Afghan boundary was fixed in 1893 when Lord Lansdowne, the then Viceroy of India, despatched Sir Mortimer Durand to negotiate a settlement on the boundaries of northwestern India and Afghanistan. After detailed discussions, an agreement was negotiated between the two governments demnarcating the frontier in November 1893. The Durand Line was subsequently accepted and confirmed as the international frontier between the countries in the agreements of 1905, 1919, 1921 and 1930. Therefore, whatever reservations the Afghans might have cher- ished about the Durand Line, they went through all the forms of international usage and repeatedly reaffirmed it. The Line thus represents the legal border between the two countries. The partition of the sub-continent did not alter the northwestern boundaries of the new state nor did it bring about any change in the status of the tribal area. The transfer of sovereignty from Britain to Pakistan did not invalidate the international status of the line. According to the principle res transit citwn sla onere, treaties of the extinct state concerning the boundary lines remain valid, and all rights and duties arising from such treaties of the extinct state devolve on the absorbing state.3 The British Government has repeatedly affirmed this. For instance, the British Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, stated in June 1949 that, with regard to the territories on the former northwest frontier of India, Pakistan was in international law the inheritor of the rights and duties of the old Government of India and of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom in these territories and that the Durand Line was the international frontier.4

So far as the tribal areas are concerned, all arrangements between the tribes and the British Government lapsed in August 1947. Under the

2 The British Survey, London: British Society for International Understanding, October, 1960.

' Fraser-Tytler, Afghanistan, London: Oxford University Press, 1953, p. 309. ' The British Survey, op.cit., p. 17.



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Indian Independence Act, however, the Governor of the then Northwest Frontier Province, Sir George Cunningham, held jirgas or meetings in November and December 1947 at which the various tribes formally trans- ferred their allegiance to Pakistan. The tribes seem quite content with their existing status. The Governnment of Pakistan, unlike the British, has not had trouble of any sort in that region and withdrew all its forces from there. Some impartial observers are of the opinion that the frontier is perhaps more peaceful now than it has ever been before.

The Afghan demand for "Pushtoonistan" subjected relations between the two countries to serious strains from the very inception of Pakistan. Afghanistan was the only country which voted against Pakistan's admis- Sion into the United Nations on the ground that the Northwest Frontier Area should not be recognized as a part of Pakistan until Pathans of that area had been given the opportunity to opt for independence. The years 1949 and 1950 were marked by a number of border incidents. Things took a serious turn in 11955 when Pakistan decided to amalgamate the Northwest Frontier Province in the newly formed province of West Pakistan. The Afghan Government openly denounced the move. The Pakistan Embassy in Kabul was attacked and looted, and the Pakistan flag was torn down. The Pakistan Consulates at Kandhar and Jalalabad were also attacked. This incident had serious repercussions and led to a temporary suspension of relations between the twTo countries. It was only through third party mediation that normal trade and diplomatic relations were resumed.

The relations between the two countries registered some improvement in the following two years. The President of Pakistan, Iskander Mirza, visited Afghanistan in 1956 and in 1957 Prime Minister Suhrawardy paid a sim-i- lar visit. The Afghan Government reciprocated; Prince Daud, Prime Mill- ister of Afghanistan visited Pakistan in 1956, followed by a visit of the Afghan King in February 1958. In May of the same year, a transit agreement was signed between the two countries providing for improved facilities for passage of Afghan goods.

However, the slight relaxation of tension brought by the exchange of visits did not in any way affect the stand of the two countries on Push- toonistan, the basic issue in dispute. The propaganda was somewhat toned down, but it was revived in an intensified form in 1958 when a new government under President Ayub was established after the proclamation of martial law.

In 1960, fresh border clashes took place. Afghan irregulars and Army troops dressed as tribesmen were reported to have penetrated the Pakistan side of the Durand Line with the sanction of the Afghan Government. Two other raids took place in May and fall of 1961. This, in conjunction with constant harassment of Pakistani consular officials who were subjected to all sorts of hardships and discriminatory treatment, led the Government of Pakistan to close down its consulates in Afghanistan in August 1961, and to request the Afghan Government to do the same for its consulates and trade agencies in Pakistan. The Afghan Government retaliated against this move by breaking off diplomatic relations and closing the Pak-Afghan border.



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The suggestion in some quarters, that the closure of consulates by Pakistan was a calculated move on the part of the President and Foreign Minister of Pakistan to prod the Kennedy administration into forcing India to agree to a resolution of the Kashmir dispute, is farfetched and absurd. There is no correlation between the two. The Pakistan Government's action can more correctly be attributed to its desire to end the constant harassment of its nationals in Afghanistan, to stop Afghan propaganda for Push- toonistan among the tribes on the Pakistan side of the Durand Line and to contain future border raids. Similarly, the contention that Pakistan closed the consulates to put pressure on the Afghans to settle the Pushtoon question is not warranted by facts. Despite the closure of consulates, the Pakistan Government was, and is, quite prepared to honor its international obligations and keep the Afghan in-transit goods flowing. The Pak-Afghan border was closed, and the in-transit trade brought to a halt at the initiative of Afghanistan.

It is perhaps more logical to suggest that Afghanistan broke off diplomatic relations and insisted on the closure of the border to induce the American Government to exert pressure on Pakistan to force her into re- opening the consulates. The closing of the border threatens to affect ad- versely the American aid programs and increase Afghan dependence on Soviet trade channels. To forestall this eventuality, the United States will naturally try through diplomatic channels to bring about a resumption of diplomatic relations between the two countries. In October 1961, President Kennedy sent Mr. Livingstone Merchant to discuss the possibility of re- opening the border. However, the Merchant mission was unsuccessful, and it seems unlikely that the United States will make another bid in the near future to resolve the differences between the two countries.

It is alleged in many responsible quarters that Afghanistan is being en- couraged in its anti-Pakistan policy by India and the Soviet Union. With- out the aid and active support of some big powers, it is pointed out, Af- ghanistan, being a relatively small and primitive country and until re- cently, dependent on Pakistan for its trade routes, would not have been so openly and consistently antagonistic towards Pakistan.

India may be interested in sustaining the tension between the two countries for a number of reasons. In the first place, as long as Afghanistan is actively hostile towards Pakistan, the latter cannot concentrate all its re- sources and attention on the Kashmir front. From that point of view, it is a good diversionary tactic. Moreover, a standing dispute between the two countries prevents the development of any Muslim pressure from the north against India. If this is correct, it is a shortsighted policy for, ultimately, India's western defense depends on the ability of Pakistan to defend its northwestern frontier.

The Soviet Union has more vital and direct interests in a continued state of enmity between the two neighbors. Because of Pakistan's Mutual Se- curity Pact with the United States and membership in regional defense arrangements, such as SEATO and CENTO, the Soviet Union welcomes all developments which may weaken its position. Besides, it wants to get a foothold in Afghanistan to neutralize whatever military benefits America



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might derive from her bilateral agreement with Pakistan. Continued estrangement between Pakistan and Afghanistan has meant the latter's turning to the Soviet Union for aidl and friendship.

The Soviet Union has eagerly responded to these overtures, and over the years extended diplomatic support to Afghanistan in its dispute with Pakistan and also made available generous funds for various projects. For instance, in March 1960, when Mr. Khrushchev visited Kabul, he openly supported Afghanistan's stand on Pushtoonistan and suggested that the application of the principle of self-determination would be a rea- sonable way of easing tension and insuring peace in the Middle East. This statement was greatly resented by Pakistan who charged that the Soviet Union had "deemed it fit to interfere in this country's internal affairs."

The Soviet economic and military aid to Afghanistan has been steadily increasing. The first move took the shape of $3.5 million credit to finance the building of two grain elevators, a mechanized flour mill and a bread- baking plant. This was followed by other credits in 1954 for the construc- tion of a gasoline pipeline across the Oxus River the Soviet-Afghan river frontier three bulk gasoline storage tanks, for street paving and road- building equipment and the erection of a cement plant. In addition to this, extensive military aid has also been given to that country. In 1956, the Soviet Union and some of the other communist states gave nearly $25 million in credit for the purchase of military equipment. The Afghan Army has been equipped by Russia with a complete range of modern new weapons and trained to use them. In this process, it has been expanded from 50,000 to about 80,000 men. Some officers have been trained in Russia and more are going there now. The Soviet Union has also built a number of military airfields besides the international airport at Kabul.

The correlation between Pak-Afghan relations on the one hand and Sovie-Afghan on the other, can be gauged from the fact that on every occasion when serious trouble has erupted between the two former powers, the Soviet Union has always come forward with offers of increased aid and additional transit facilities. For instance, when the Afghan frontier with Pakistan was closed in March 1955, the Soviet Union offered prompt delivery of diesel, gasoline and cement to make up for the deficiency caused by the interrupted transit across Pakistan. > Similarly, the announce- ment of the bilateral military alliance between Pakistan and the United States in 1959 led to a visit to Moscow by the Afghan Foreign Minister and the extension of the standing economic co-operation agreement with the Soviets to include reconstruction and enlargement of the Kabul airport.6 The slowing down of in-transit trade through Pakistan in 1960 provided the Soviet Union with another opportunity to further its economic penetration of Afghanistan. Immediately after the closure of the border in 1961, the Soviet Union undertook a mammoth airlift of the grape crop, which is normally exported through Pakistan and might have been lost

' Peter G. Frank, Afghanistan Between East and West, Washington: National planning Association, 1960, p. 56.

' Ibid., p. 58.



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but for the timely action of the Soviet cargo planes. The Soviet Union has also offered increased in-transit facilities on routes across its territory to ports on the Oxus River.

Even otherwise, Afghanistan is heavily dependent on the Soviet Union for its trade. In 1950, the Soviet Union accounted for only ten per cent of Afghanistan foreign trade, and the share of the other communist countries was negligible. B ut at present, the communist bloc is responsible for fifty per cent of the country's foreign trade; out of this, the Soviet Union accounts for thirty-two per cent, and its share in the exports and imports of vital commodities touches an average of fifty per cent or more.7

It should, perhaps, be mentioned in this connection that there are a number of factors which favor trade with the Soviet bloc. Geographical proxim- ity is perhaps the most important one for it involves the saving of internal transportation cost to the northern border. In addition, the Soviet Union offers extremely favorable terms for the transit of Afghan products through its territory to Europe. The terms of trade proposed by the Soviet trade agencies are relatively more favorable than those obtainable elsewhere. Among other factors may be mentioned the absorptive capacity of the Soviet market for products which cannot be sold with equal facility to other countries of the West, or to India and Pakistan. But the two decisive factors which led to the increase in trade with the Soviet Union were the crisis in Afghan-Pakistan political relations and the availability of Soviet short term credits.

Insofar as discord between Pakistan and Afghanistan will force the latter's growing dependence on the Soviet Union, the Russians will do everything to perpetuate it. Historically, Russia has always been interested in bringing Afghanistan within its sphere of influence. The British presence in India acted as a deterrent to the realization of this ambition, but the departure of the British gave the Russians the opportunity to further their historic aim. Under the guise of economic penetration, they are in fact actively seeking Afghanistan's alignment with the Soviet bloc. It is for this reason that the dispute between Pakistan and Afghanistan ceases to be merely a regional affair and acquires international significance.

Prospects for the future appear somewhat bleak. As long as Afghanistan does not drop the demand for Pushtoonistan, there can be no rapproche- ment between the two countries, even though Afghanistan's in-transit trade through Pakistan may be resumed on a limited scale. Already, under an agreement signed in January 1962 between the United States and Afghani- stan, the border was re-opened for eight weeks for the clearance of Ameri- can and German aid goods which were lying in Pakistan. But an early resumption of diplomatic relations does not appear to be in sight.

' British Survey, op.cit., p. 3.

DR. KHURSHID HASAN is a member of the Department of International Relations at the University of Karachi in Pakistan.



THE CAMBODIAN ELECTIONS

MICHAEL LEIFER

Elections in Cambodia have become a formality and those which took place on June 10, 1962 were no exception. Candidates nom- inated by Sangkum Reastre Niyum (Popular Socialist Community), the mass ovement founded and led by the head of State, Prince Norodom Sihanouk, have ceased to be opposed and have always been returned in all constituencies. Since its inception in March 1955, Sangkum has won every single seat in the elections of 1955, 1958 and 1962; on these three occasions the total percentage vote received by Sangkum candidates has assumed proportions usually associated with elections in Communist states.

In the recent elections, Sangkum candidates captured all seventy-seven seats in the enlarged National Assembly with popular support in the constituencies estimated to have varied between 75 to 100 percent of those on the electoral register. Provisional figures show that in most constituencies, the Sangkum vote was well over 90 percent of those eligible to participate in the electoral process. And, it has been confidently asserted by an authoritative government weekly, commenting on these figures, that, discounting the infirm and those who were forced to be away from their constituencies on polling day for family or business reasons, the number of voluntary abstentions would not have amounted to more than 1 to 2 percent of those enrolled.' The implication was quite clear that, if all those entitled to vote had made use of that privilege, Sangkum could have expected almost complete electoral support.

In the weeks preceding the elections (it is scarcely appropriate to speak of an election campaign) the government press operated on the assumption of Sangkum success. It did not even consider the possibility that any Sangkum nominee might be defeated at the polls. It was confidently expected that Prince Sihanouk's followers would be victorious. The occasion was represented as a further opportunity for the people to demonstrate their gratitude, by plebiscite, to the charismatic figure who in his lifetime has become a legend within Cambodia. The primarily peasant Khmer (Cambodian) people look upon Sihanouk with an almost religious adora- tion. His picture is the symbol of Sangkum and his imprimatur makes repeated electoral victory assured for that body. Although Sihanouk re- linquished his crown in 1955, he is still the embodiment of monarchy in a country which has a tradition of a religious reverence towards the throne. In addition, Sangkum has been responsible for significant material progress within Cambodia and public gratitude is not absent.

1 R6alit6s Cambodgiennes, Phnom Penh, 15th June 1962.

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Within Cambodia, there is no other political group besides Sangkum with the appeal or organization to effectively solicit popular support. Prominent individuals in the provinces who might succeed electorally as independents are almost certain to be members of Sangkum. Moreover, independent candidates are not looked upon with sympathy. Prior to the recent elections, two Sangkum members, who failed to secure party pre-selection and who sought to stand as independents, were publicly denounced as "dissidents." Sangkum is not a party along Western political lines, but is a movement professing to represent all facets of Khmer opinion. Organized political opposition does exist outside Sangkum in the weak left-wing Pracheachon party. However, this party estimated that its chances of electoral success were so poor that it decided that it would be in its best interests not to contest any seats. More significantly, five months before the elections, the leader of the Pracheachon party, Non Suon (a former member of the Viet Minh) and thirteen of his associates were arrested on charges of conspiring with agents of a foreign power to overthrow the regime; less than a month before the election date, all fourteen were sentenced to death. It is difficult to imagine a clearer warning to Pracheachon not to involve itself in the elections. Interestingly enough, the very same day that Sangkum's third electoral success was announced, Prince Sihanouk, during an interview with Radio Television Francaise, stated that he did not think that those sentenced would be executed.

Sangkum, however, is by no means one big happy family. In a country where the path to preferment lies through membership in one political organization, it is only natural to expect opposition to arise within that organization. As indicated above, opposition does exist outside the ruling group. However, its limited influence is a reflection of the strong political position of Sangkum. Sihanouk, moreover, has demonstrated that he is determined to keep down opposition outside the ruling group to manage- able proportions.2 In Cambodia, it is possible to conceive of two distinct oppositions having certain similarities in their "world view."X3 What dis- tinguishes one from the other essentially is the relationship of each to the ruling group. For purposes of description, one can be pictured as an inner opposition and the other as an outer opposition. The Pracheachon party is the outer opposition. However, Prince Sihanouk has taken particular care to circumscribe its activities and to prevent it from becoming, in any real sense, a challenge to his authority. In this state of political castration, Pracheachon has served as a convenient target for popular abuse against those who, allegedly, are working to frustrate the national cause.

The presence of an inner opposition has been known since the formation of Sangkum out of the factions of pre-independence politics. However, it was only with the recent elections that its presence reappeared. This is the

2 See my article "The Cambodian Opposition," Asian Survey, April 1962. 3 See L. W. Pye "The Non-Western Political Process," Journal of Politics, August

1958, for an appreciation of this expression in its non-western political context. pp. 470-1.



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fact which gives these elections significance. Sihanouk's early years as Prime Minister were marked with frequent resignations and resumptions of office. The locus of power in non-Western politics does not necessarily change because the holders of official office change. Prince Sihanouk's first electoral success in 1955 meant the political extinction of the Democratic party which had been dominant prior to Sihanouk's personal assumption of power in 1952. This party had contained elements hostile to Sihanouk and the concept of monarchy, and favoured the exiled nationalist leader, Son Ngoc Thanh. Sangkum, true to its purpose of striving for national unity, absorbed many members of this Democratic party within itself. There are doubts, however, as to the success of assimilation.

The 1962 elections in Cambodia were significant in that their prepara- tions, in terms of ritual political cleansing, brought opposition within Sangkum to the surface. They demonstrated that the ruling group has certain difficulties in accommodating conflicting factions within its midst; more particularly that it had not yet successfully integrated the younger generation. Prior to the elections, there was much discussion in government publications of "certain young intellectuals who accused the Prince of deny- in, them access to positions of responsibility and of reserving such positions exclusively for the old and corrupt.":4

The basic function of elections in Cambodia is to demonstrate ritually a sense of national unity behind Prince Sihanouk. However, they are also a means of providing preferment for loyal supporters and for those with talent whose unrewarded presence could cause trouble. The National Assembly is thus a strange mixture of faithful followers, including some, but not all, cabinet ministers, judges and civil servants as well as provincial governors and an increasing number of very young faces. The Cambodian National Assembly has not been noteworthy as a check on the executive. Successes have been registered in defeating legislation prohibiting prosti- tution and preventing Cambodians from studying overseas. A more colourful legislative process takes place during the semi-annual public forums, held outside the Royal palace, known as National Congresses. It is here that Sangkum faithful, provincial officials, youth contingents and a crowd of privileged peasants brought in by buses especially for the occasion, register their unanimous approval of the achievements of Sangkum.

The 1962 elections may be viewed as the culmination of a government sponsored campaign for national unity. Attention was centered oin the need for reconciliation between allegedly contending factions in the community and within the ruling group, with Prince Sihanouk giving special consideration to the dangerous attitudes of young intellectuals. He sought to constrain them by introducing the ancient sanction of threatening to retire from public life and to disband Sangkum if electoral support from this element were not forthcoming. It is doubtful if this was taken seriously. Meanwhile Sihanouk was also busily engaged in touring outlying provinces

4 Cambodian Com17m7lenltary, Phnom Penh, January-February 1962. p. 10.



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and making monetary grants to township development funds from the royal purse.

As the election date drew nearer, Prince Sihanouk's public concern over national unity became more pronounced. For the first time, there was specific reference to dissension within the ranks of Sangkum itself. This stood out from the usual statements that the Pracheachon party was seek- inlg to make Cambodia a satellite of the Viet Minh. At the end of February 1962, Sihanouk called the members of the National Assembly together in the royal palace to lecture them on the dangerous "6lmentes gauchistes" dividing their ranks who, together with the Pracheachon party represented a threat to national unity. It appears that the Prince bad become seriously disturbed by the tone of certain debates within the Assembly in which the government had been accused of adopting a line that was too anti- communist. In some debates, indeed, criticisms were levelled against Sihanouk himself. On this occasion, he warned of the dangers facing the country from the divisions in "Notre classe dirigeante." Sihanouk had made public his concern three days earlier when he drew attention to the difficulties created for Sangkum by a group of young left-wing intellectuals in the National Assembly who, according to him, "had climbed the ladder of Sangkum to work for its downfall."5

The Prince appeared particularly concerned over the charge, made by a young member of the Assembly, Hou Youn, that he, Sihanouk, was seeking dictatorial powers and that with them he would deliver Cambodia into the hands of SEATO. Public criticism of Sihanouk from within his own party on a foreign policy issue is to our knowledge unprecedented. Sihanouk and the policy of non-alignment known as Neutrality are in- extricably linked and are represented in Cambodia as being equally virtu- ous. For anyone to suggest that the Prince would depart from his chosen path and associate with an organization which he has not ceased to ridicule publicly, would appear to be absurd. Nevertheless, the suggestion could not have been pleasant to Sihanouk and this probably explains his decision to lecture the National Assembly. He called on the left-win, elements in that body to cease putting themselves at the service of a foreign ideology and stop playing the game of Viet Minh imperialism.

Meanwhile the official press -was stressing the fact that Prince Sihanouk was looking beyond an assured electoral victory, of which there was not the slightest doubt, and was earnestly seeking the support of the left-wing intellectuals. It seemed evident as the election date drew nearer that the Prince was seeking to accommodate internal opposition rather than alienate it. Hou Youn, for example, received Sangkum pre-selection again, while all applicants for pre-selection6 over the age of sixty were excluded. At the same time it was made abundantly clear to those of the inner opposition that they could not expect to be elected to the National Assembly on their

5 Realites Cambodgiennes, 22nd March 1962. ' As a matter of interest, applicants for Sangkum pre-selection had to send written

requests to Prince Sihanouk together with a photograph and a curriculum vitae.



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own merits. It was pointed out quite bluntly that they (the left-wing intellectuals) had only attained their position because they had been associated with the name of Norodom Sihanouk and that "they are less the representa- tives of the people than those of the Prince .." The Left was also warned that any intention of removing Norodom Sihanouk would play into the hands of the Communists (of whom it was admitted there was a small element within Sangkum) and that any successor would come from the Right -probably a strong man from the army.8

The official election campaign period, from the middle of April onwards, passed without incident, as did the elections. Shortly afterwards, however, the World Court decided in favour of Cambodia in the Prah Vihar temple dispute with Thailand. The elections very quickly passed out of the news- papers and the public mind as deteriorating relations with Cambodia's western neighbor caine to occupy the centre of the political stage.

The elections, however, deserve attention. A number of new young faces entered the National Assembly and Prince Sihanouk probably hopes that in this fashion, he is providing a solution to the problem of recruiting new elements into political activity without dangerous consequences. A particular feature of politics in non-western countries is that "there may appear to be a stronger basic consensus than actually exists."9 Sihanouk is striving to produce a common sense of national purpose and to create a modern cohesive elite in Cambodia. This may give Cambodian society greater resilience and make it capable of sustaining the eventual removal from the political scene of the charismatic figure whose personal magnetism has been up to date the country's principal political resource. To the extent that the Prince can remove any sense of personal frustration from Cam- bodia's growing educated class, and can provide satisfactory opening for their skills and talents, his declared aim of national unity may be realized. However, if the National Assembly, for example, comes to be viewed by this class as a political wilderness then his efforts may be in vain.

All of the Princes' plans are dependent, of course, on external factors most of which are not subject to his personal influence. And it is not difficult to conceive of Cambodia's internal political problems being aggravated by trends in the international scene. For the time being, however, the Cam- bodian political process can be expected to continue in its distinctive non- western manner.

' Realites Cambodgie7ines, 6th April 1962. 8 Ibid. 23rd April 1962. 9 G. Kahin, G. J. Pauker and L. W. Pye "Comparative Politics of Non-Western

Countries," American Political Science Review, December 1955, p. 1025.

MICHAEL LEIFER is a lecturer in politics at the University of Adelaide.



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